2003 – 2004 Term
Cases of Interest to Law Enforcement
Beverly
A. Ginn
Legal Advisor
Tucson Police Department
270 S. Stone
520.791.4170
Beverly.Ginn@tucsonaz.gov
Officers executing a warrant to search for cocaine in
respondent Banks’ apartment knocked and announced their authority. The question is whether their 15-to-20-second
wait before a forcible entry satisfied the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. §3109. We hold that it did.
The time period an officer must wait
after knocking and announcing the service of a search warrant, but prior to forcing
entry, depends on the totality of the circumstances in the particular
case. The Supreme Court noted that the
question of whether 15-20 seconds was a sufficient time to wait was a close
call. While the Court approved this
entry, it reminded officers that the amount of time that must pass prior to
forcing entry depends on all the facts known to police, and certainly includes
consideration of why an immediate entry is necessary (the Court stated that,
for example, the wait may be longer if looking for a stolen piano than if
looking for rock cocaine, due to the ease with which the latter evidence may be
destroyed by the occupants of the home).
At
The officer then asked the driver if he had
any weapons or narcotics in the vehicle.
When the driver indicated he did not, the officer asked for and received
consent to search the vehicle. The
search yielded both cocaine and money.
The cocaine was located behind the back seat armrest, which the officer
had lowered during the search.
All three men denied ownership of the drugs
or money, and all three were arrested.
Once at the station, Pringle, the front seat passenger, admitted the
drugs and money were his. Prior to
trial, Pringle sought to suppress his confession, arguing that it was the fruit
of an arrest made without probable cause.
The
Court reviewed the probable cause standard:
On many occasions, we have
reiterated that the probable cause standard is a practical, non-technical
conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
* * *
[T]he substance of all the
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt and
that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to
be searched or seized. Id, at 124 S.Ct. 795, 800
(citations omitted).
Under
On the same day, at about the same
time, one week after a fatal hit and run, police set up a roadblock at the
intersection where the incident occurred.
Police believed that passing motorists, many of whom came from nearby
factories at the end of a shift, may have seen something. Police stopped each car for no more than
10-15 seconds, handed out a flyer asking for assistance and asked the
drivers/passengers if they had seen anything the previous week.
Driving up to the checkpoint in his minivan, Mr. Lidster swerved, nearly striking one of the officers. After an investigation, Lidster
was arrested for DUI. Upon appeal, the
Illinois Supreme Court found that the roadblock violated Lidster’s
rights under the Fourth Amendment and reversed his conviction.
Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that this roadblock was not
one established for general law enforcement purposes, to determine whether a
vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime, but to ask for help in solving a crime. The fact that this type of roadblock –
characterized by the Court as a “brief, information–seeking highway stop” –
involved a stop which lacked individualized suspicion, did not necessarily mean
that the roadblock was unconstitutional.
Noting that “the Fourth Amendment does not treat a
motorist’s car as his castle,” the Court pointed to other situations in which
it has approved roadblocks without individualized suspicion – sobriety
checkpoints and Border Patrol checkpoints.
The Court has held that such stops are less likely to provoke anxiety or
to be intrusive, are brief, and do not involve questions that are designed to
elicit self-incriminating information.
This type of stop should be compared, according to the Court, to the
voluntary contact an officer might initiate with a pedestrian, seeking
information with which to solve a crime.
Groh v. Ramirez, 540
An ATF agent
submitted an application for a search warrant that described in detail the
types of weapons the agent sought to find at a particular ranch. Accompanying the application was a detailed
affidavit that set forth the basis for believing that the weapons could be
found at the specified location. He also
presented a warrant form that he had completed.
The magistrate signed the warrant.
The search warrant
form itself failed to identify any of the contraband or evidence that the agent
sought to seize. Instead, in the blank which should have contained a list of
the property to be seized, the agent typed a description of the house that was
being searched. The warrant did not
incorporate the affidavit by reference.
The warrant was
executed; no items were found at the ranch.
A copy of the warrant, not including the affidavit (which had been
sealed), was left with the resident. At
the request of the resident’s attorney, a copy of the page of the application
that listed the items to be seized was faxed to the attorney the next day. No charges were ever filed.
The residents sued
the agent and other officers under Bivens and 42 U.S.C. §1983, asserting a variety of claims,
including a Fourth Amendment violation.
On appeal from a dismissal of all claims by the District Court, the
Ninth Circuit reinstated the Fourth Amendment violation. The court found that the warrant was invalid
on its face for failing to describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the items to be seized, and that the lead agent on the case, Groh, was not entitled to qualified immunity for the
failure to review the warrant prior to its execution.
The Supreme Court
agreed. The Court held that the warrant
was plainly invalid, as it failed to meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirement
that the items to be seized be “particularly describe[d].” The Court also agreed that Agent Groh was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the Court, no reasonable officer
would believe that the warrant was valid, given its
violation of the text of the Fourth Amendment, nor would a reasonable officer ever presume that a warrantless search of a home was constitutional.
The defendant attempted to cross the U.S.-Mexico border
in a Ford Taurus. A Customs agent who
inspected the vehicle noted that the gas tank sounded solid when tapped. A mechanic dismantled the tank, revealing 37
kilograms of marijuana bricks. The entire search process took about an hour. The defendant was indicted for unlawfully
importing marijuana and for possession with intent to distribute. The District Court suppressed the evidence,
holding that reasonable suspicion was required to search the gas tank. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no reasonable
suspicion is required prior to the search of a vehicle at the border. “It is axiomatic that the
An officer observed
the defendant driving a vehicle displaying license plates that were not
associated with the vehicle. Before the
officer could make a stop, the defendant pulled over, parked the vehicle and
got out. The driver, after some
conversation with the officer, and a consensual frisk, reached into his pocket
and pulled out bags of marijuana and crack cocaine. The officer then searched the defendant’s
vehicle and located a handgun under the driver’s seat.
Convicted for
possession with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, the defendant
appealed, seeking to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an illegal search. The defendant argued that a search of a
vehicle incident to arrest was permitted only when the officer first contacted
the person while he/she was in the vehicle.
The Supreme Court
disagreed. The rationale for search
incident to arrest – the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into
custody and the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial – applies
whether the person who has been arrested was first contacted while in the car
or while “outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle.” Id, at 2131.
In any event, while an arrestee’s
status as a “recent occupant” may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship
to the car at the time of the arrest and search, it certainly does not turn on
whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first
initiated contact with him.
Hiibel V. District Court, ___
An officer responded
to a report of an assault inside a truck traveling down the road. Police located the truck, which by then had pulled
off the road. A man (Larry D. Hiibel) was standing by the vehicle and a young woman was
inside. The officer approached and,
pursuant to a
The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction. The Court held
that, during the course of a Terry
stop (in other words, when the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is ongoing), an officer may request that a person provide his/her
name. If there is a state law requiring
the person to provide his/her name, and failure to do so is a crime, the person
may be arrested for failing to do so.
The opinion does not
permit stops without reasonable suspicion, does not require that a person
provide written proof of identification, and does not permit random stops for
identification. In those states where
there is no state law requiring a person to provide his/her name, this decision
does not provide a basis for making an arrest for failure or refusal to provide
such information.
Yarborough
v. Alvarado, ___
The juvenile
defendant and another person attempted to steal a truck, which led to the
murder of the truck’s owner. A month
after the shooting, Alvarado’s parents were advised that the police wished to
speak to him, and brought him to the station.
They waited in the lobby while the detective spent about two hours
interviewing him. During the interview,
which was recorded, Alvarado confessed to the crime. At no time did the detective read Alvarado
his Miranda rights. Following the interview, Alvarado was released
to his parents, who took him home.
Alvarado was later
charged with the murder and convicted.
Both at trial and on appeal, he sought to suppress his confession,
arguing that his age (he was 17 at the time of the offense and the
interrogation) and his inexperience with the criminal justice system had to be
considered when determining whether he was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered his age and
lack of experience, ruling that he was in custody and his rights should have
been given to him. Since they were not,
the court suppressed the confession.
The Supreme Court
reversed. It is clearly established that
Miranda warnings are required only
during custodial interrogation. Custody
for purposes of Miranda requires
objective consideration of all of the circumstances surrounding an
interrogation and a determination of whether, under those circumstances, a
reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation and
leave. This is an objective inquiry, not
a subjective one. It is not a question
of whether the person being interrogated, considering his age and inexperience,
thought he could leave, but rather whether a reasonable person in such
circumstances would believe he could leave.
According to the
Court, a person’s age and prior experience with the criminal justice system is
a subjective consideration. While such
information may be relevant when considering whether a subject’s confession is
voluntary (a subjective determination), it is not relevant when determining
whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda (an objective determination).
A woman suspected of involvement in a
fire that killed a teenage boy was arrested and taken to the station, where she
was questioned by a detective without Miranda
warnings. The detective questioned
her until she confessed her involvement in the crime. After a short break, the detective then read
her Miranda warnings and took a
second statement from her, in which she repeated her unwarned confession.
The Court found both the warned and
unwarned statements to be inadmissible. The
practice of first deliberately taking an unwarned statement in order to obtain
admissions of guilt prior to providing Miranda
warnings likewise renders the second statement inadmissible. To allow otherwise would provide an “end‑run”
around the protections of Miranda. The Court held that statements made during a
warned custodial interrogation are not admissible when that interrogation has
been immediately preceded by a custodial interrogation done deliberately
without Miranda warnings.
Arrested for violating a domestic
restraining order, the defendant interrupted the officer as he tried to read
him his Miranda rights, asserting
that he already knew his rights. The
officers asked about a firearm they believed he possessed. He was reluctant to answer (“I am not sure I
should tell you anything about the Glock because I
don’t want you to take it away from me”), but ultimately told the officers it
was in his bedroom and granted them permission to go and get it. The defendant was tried and convicted of
being a felon in possession of a firearm.
The District Court suppressed the
firearm, concluding that there was no probable cause for the arrest. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that ruling, but suppressed the firearm as the fruit of an illegal
confession, given that the defendant never received full Miranda warnings.
The Supreme Court reversed. In a 5-4 decision, with four separate
opinions announced, the Court held that the physical fruits of a voluntary, but
unwarned confession, are not subject to suppression.
The
[Self-Incrimination] Clause cannot be violated by the introduction of nontestimonial evidence obtained as a result of voluntary
statements.
Crawford v. Washington, ___
The defendant stabbed a man who
allegedly tried to rape his wife. Both
the defendant and his wife were interrogated by police. The defendant claimed self defense; his
wife’s statement did not support that claim.
Under
At trial and on appeal from his
conviction, the defendant argued that the Sixth Amendment’s right to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him had been violated by the introduction
of his wife’s statements. He argued that
the rule of evidence (an exception to the hearsay rule) permitting the
introduction of a reliable statement from an unavailable witness was itself a
violation of the Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court agreed. A testimonial statement of an absent witness
is admissible only where the witness is unavailable and where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Dispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing
with jury trial because a defendant in obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes.
The
Court did not specifically define its reference to “testimonial” evidence,
other than to say that the term applies “at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations.”
Blakely v. Washington, ___
Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping
his estranged wife. The facts he
admitted would have resulted, under
The defendant appealed this sentence
enhancement, arguing that the judge’s decision violated his Sixth Amendment
right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt the facts upon which
his sentence was based. The Supreme
Court agreed. According to the Court, a
judge may not impose a sentence greater than that permitted by the factual
findings made by the jury. To do
otherwise violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
Fellers v.
John Fellers was indicted by a grand
jury for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Officers went to his home, advised him that they
had a federal warrant for his arrest and questioned him concerning his
involvement in meth distribution. Fellers made incriminating statements to the
officers, who then transported him to jail.
There, he was advised of his rights under Miranda, reiterated the statements he had
made earlier, and made additional statements.
At trial, he moved to suppress all of the statements he had made, both
at home and at the jail.
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the
rule that persons who are under indictment, but who are not yet represented by
counsel, must be warned of their rights and agree to
waive those rights before they can be questioned. Once a person has been formally charged
(indicted or arraigned), officers are prohibited from “deliberately eliciting
incriminating information” from that person without first warning them of their
right to counsel and obtaining a waiver of the right to counsel. Failure to do so will result in the
suppression of the statements, as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to
an attorney.
The Court left open the question of
whether the subsequent statements, made at the jail, were admissible. The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals
had mistakenly analyzed that issue under the Fifth Amendment, rather than the
Sixth Amendment, so the issue was remanded to the lower court for consideration
under the Sixth Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment does not require
the court to specifically advise a defendant that by waiving counsel she may be
overlooking a viable defense, or that by waiving counsel she is losing the
chance to get an independent opinion on whether she should plead guilty. Rather, as the Supreme Court held, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not require a trial judge to advise an unrepresented defendant of anything other than:
The
nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding his
plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a
guilty plea.
The Supreme Court
noted that state courts are free to adopt, by statute, rule or decision, any
form of plea acceptance that they wish. This case simply
holds that the two admonitions insisted upon by the Iowa Supreme Court are not
required by the U.S. Constitution.
The trial court failed to notify the
defendant, as required by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, that he had no right to withdraw from the plea agreement
if the court did not follow the recommendations contained in the plea. The court did not follow the recommendations
and the defendant was sentenced to a much longer prison term than he, his
attorney, or the prosecutor believed likely.
The defendant sought to withdraw from the plea, based on the Rule 11
violation.
The district court refused to allow the
withdrawal; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a
guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under
Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would
not have entered the plea.” The
defendant must be able to convince the reviewing court that the “probability of
a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding.”
Sabri v.
The defendant’s
facial attack on the federal bribery statute, seeking to have it declared an
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under Article I, fails. Congress has the authority to spend for the
general welfare and to assure that the dollars spent are not “frittered away in
graft or upon projects undermined by graft.”
Nelson v. Campbell, ___
The defendant,
sentenced to die by lethal injection (having made no timely request for death
by electrocution), had previously used intravenous drugs to the extent that his
veins were unreachable by ordinary access.
In response to his inquiry concerning how the injection would be carried
out, the defendant was advised that, one hour prior to the execution, prison
staff would make a 2-inch incision in his arm or leg, that local anesthesia
would be used, and that a physician might or might not be present. The defendant immediately filed an action
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking a temporary stay of execution, and a permanent
injunction against the proposed procedure, known as a “cut-down,” and the
adoption of a protocol that comported with appropriate medical standards.
The lower courts
dismissed the complaint, ruling that the filing of the §1983 claim was in
effect the filing of a second or subsequent habeas application without the
authorization required under federal law.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a challenge to a discretionary
medical procedure unnecessary to carry out the execution (other less invasive
procedures were available), was not necessarily a complaint sounding in habeas,
as it did not address the fact of the defendant’s conviction or the duration of
his sentence. Instead, this was a
constitutional claim much more like those that challenge the conditions of the
defendant’s confinement, and, depending on the actual findings by the District
Court on remand, could potentially be brought pursuant to §1983.
Muhammad v. Close, 540
An inmate brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, seeking to recover damages from a prison guard who allegedly had
retaliated against him for filing prior lawsuits and grievances against
him. The lower courts ruled that the
inmate could not file suit under §1983, but was instead required to proceed
through a habeas petition.
The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying
the entitlement of incarcerated persons to bring suit under §1983. When a prisoner seeks to file a suit
challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his sentence, he must
first exhaust state court remedies and must then proceed under federal habeas
law. When the prisoner is seeking
redress for some other grievance, however, one which does not challenge the
fact of his conviction or the duration of his sentence, §1983 litigation is
permitted.
Jones
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., ___
The four-year statute of limitations
established by Congress for any Acts enacted after
A sexual harassment plaintiff who
resigns may claim that she was constructively discharged only if she is able to
demonstrate that the abusive working environment became so intolerable that her
resignation qualified as a fitting response.
The test is whether working conditions are such that a reasonable person
would feel compelled to resign.
Unless the employer causes the
plaintiff to quit by engaging in a significant adverse action that officially
changes the plaintiff’s situation (humiliating demotions, extreme cuts in pay,
unbearable working conditions), an employer may defend against a constructive
discharge claim by demonstrating both that it had an accessible and effective
policy and procedures for reporting and resolving such complaints, and that the
plaintiff unreasonably failed to use those procedures (the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense).
General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540
Workers aged 40-49
could not sue their employer over the employer’s decision to abolish health
benefits for them, but keep benefits for workers who were over 50. The Court determined that the
Locke
v. Davey, 540
The State of
The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down this limitation, finding it to be an
unconstitutional limitation on the Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court reversed, finding nothing
improper in the state’s constitution or in its limitation on the use of state
funds to train ministers.
Elk Grove
Unified
Dodging the
underlying issue of whether the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance
violate the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court held that the father, as the non-custodial parent, lacked
standing to bring the case on behalf of his child.
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, ___
The Supreme Court agreed with the ACLU
that enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act should be enjoined, as it
likely violates the First Amendment. The Court found it likely that the statute
will be found unconstitutional because it does not use the “least restrictive
means available” to prevent minors from accessing harmful material on the
Internet.
Rasul v. Bush, ___
Non-citizens may
petition for a writ of habeas corpus even if they are being held outside the
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, ___
A