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UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LUIS RUIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BARBARA BOUCHARD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-1962
60 Fed. Appx. 572
March 19, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
ORDER
Before: CLAY and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; COFFMAN, District
Judge. *
Luis Ruiz,
proceeding pro se, appeals a district court judgment dismissing his civil
rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.[*2] This case has been
referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth
Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is
not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking
monetary and equitable relief,
Ruiz sued the Warden (
Bouchard) of the Alger Maximum
Correctional Facility (AMCF), a Resident Unit Manager (Beaumon) at AMCF, and an
AMCF Case Manager (Gerth). Ruiz claimed that: 1) defendant Gerth denied him
access to the courts; 2) defendant Gerth confiscated grievances filed against
her; 3) defendant Gerth denied him an opportunity for a scheduled parole
interview; 4) his right to send and receive mail (both personal and legal) was
violated; 5) he was retaliated against for pursuing his rights when he was
convicted of various false misconduct tickets; 6) defendant Bouchard
refused to intervene on his behalf when
Ruiz informed her of the
misconduct of her subordinates; and 7) defendant Beaumon refused to intervene
when Gerth refused to give him paper for his legal work. Upon review, the
district court concluded that Ruiz did not a state a claim upon which relief
could be granted concerning his claims numbered 1. 5, 6, and 7 above. Hence,
[*3]it dismissed the complaint. However, the court did not specifically address
his remaining claims. Ruiz has filed a timely appeal, essentially reasserting
his claims.
Upon review, we conclude that Ruiz's claims numbered 2-4 above
were properly subject to dismissal because he did not establish that he
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to these claims. See 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998).
Before the district court adjudicates any claim set forth in the plaintiff's
complaint, the court must determine that the plaintiff has complied with this
exhaustion requirement. Id. Although
money damages may not be available through the prison grievance process, Ruiz
must still exhaust these state remedies because the prison has an
administrative system that will review his complaints. Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 740-41, 149 L. Ed. 2d 958, 121 S. Ct. 1819 (2001). Ruiz did not
attach to his § 1983 complaint any decision demonstrating the administrative
disposition of his claims or describe with specificity the administrative
proceeding and its outcome. Knuckles-El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.
2000). [*4]
We also
conclude that the district court properly dismissed Ruiz's remaining claims,
despite the lack of exhaustion, because they fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), (2); Brown, 139 F.3d
at 1104.
This court reviews de novo a district court's decision to
dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114
F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). First, Ruiz did not state a claim for denial of
access to the courts because he did not allege that the defendants' conduct
resulted in the loss of a non-frivolous legal claim challenging his conviction
or conditions of confinement, or that the defendants' conduct is currently
preventing him from presenting a non-frivolous claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 351-54, 135 L. Ed. 2d 606, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996).
Second,
Ruiz did not state a viable retaliation claim concerning his prior misconduct
convictions. Ruiz cannot use § 1983 to collaterally attack his prior misconduct
convictions because he has not established that the convictions have been
reversed or expunged. [*5] See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647-48,
137 L. Ed. 2d 906, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383,
114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994); Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 230-31 (6th Cir. 2000).
Furthermore, to the extent that Ruiz has asserted a pure retaliation
claim, Ruiz still has not stated a claim because he was convicted of the
misconduct charges. See Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994).
Finally, Ruiz
did not state a claim against defendants Bouchard and Beaumon
because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits
to impute liability onto supervisory personnel, see Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-95, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018
(1978), unless it is shown "that the supervisor encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Bellamy
v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). Ruiz did not allege that these
defendants participated in or authorized the challenged conduct.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. [*6] Rule
34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
* The
Honorable Jennifer B. Coffman, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.