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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JAMES ADAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CELESTINE JONES et al.
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-5472
52 Fed. Appx. 744
December 11, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: [NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION.
SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE
RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF
CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO
BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
Before: NORRIS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; MCKEAGUE, District
Judge. *
James
Adams, a Tennessee prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
the district court order dismissing his civil rights action filed under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to
Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel
unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking
monetary and injunctive relief, Adams sued Food Steward Celestine Jones and
Food Service Manager Mac Sutton. Adams, an African American, worked as a food
service worker at West Tennessee State Penitentiary. He alleged that the
defendants violated his constitutional rights by filing a false disciplinary
charge against him in retaliation for his filing grievances and because of his
race. The district court screened the complaint, ordered Adams to comply with
the procedures for proceeding in forma pauperis, and later dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that Adams's time in
administrative segregation did not give rise to a liberty interest, [*745]
that Adams could not base a § 1983 claim on his disciplinary conviction
without first having that conviction set aside, and that his claims of
retaliation and discrimination were based only on conclusory allegations.
In his timely appeal,
Adams argues that: (1) an act can be retaliatory even if it would have been
proper if done for a legitimate reason; (2) prison officials cannot transfer
prisoners in retaliation for asserting protected rights; (3) he stated a claim
under § 1983; and (4) he was denied his right of access to the courts.
This court reviews de novo a district court's decision to
dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). In reviewing a dismissal
of a complaint for failure to state a claim, this court must accept all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true.
Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998).
"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d
635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
Upon
review, we affirm the district court's decision for the reasons stated by the
district court. Adams worked as a food service worker in prison. He alleged
that in September 2001, Sutton ordered him to retrieve rotten food from the
garbage to serve to the inmates. Adams filed a grievance over the incident. In
November 2001, according to Adams, the defendants falsely accused him of making
threatening statements in order to retaliate against him for filing the
grievance. Adams was convicted of a disciplinary violation and placed in
segregation for three days. He claimed he signed papers agreeing to accept a
written warning only because the segregation cell was uncomfortably cold. Adams
did not allege that the conviction cost him any "good-time" credit.
Adams's
placement in segregation does not support a constitutional claim. A prison
disciplinary proceeding does not give rise to a protected liberty interest
unless the restrictions imposed constitute "atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life," Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct.
2293 (1995), or it will inevitably affect the duration of the prisoner's
confinement. Id. at 487. Adams's three days in segregation did not amount to an
atypical and significant hardship and did not implicate a protected liberty
interest.
We also agree with the district court that, even
if Adams's disciplinary conviction affected the duration of his confinement,
Adams could not attack his conviction under § 1983. A state prisoner does not
state a cognizable claim under § 1983 if a ruling on his claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and confinement, until the
conviction has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or
has been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486-87, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994); Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d
1081, 1085-86 (6th Cir. 1995). Adams alleged that his disciplinary conviction
was invalid because it was procured through perjured testimony. Because he did
not claim that the conviction had been overturned before he filed suit, he has
no § 1983 claim.
We also
conclude that the district court properly held that Adams did not state a [*746]
retaliation claim. Adams alleged that the defendants wrote him up on a
disciplinary charge in retaliation for a grievance he filed. It is doubtful
that Adams's brief time in segregation is enough to constitute a deterrent effect, and Adams presented no proof
beyond his own allegations that the defendants wrote him up because of his
grievance. Bare allegations of malice do not suffice to establish a
constitutional claim. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588, 140 L. Ed. 2d
759, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir.
1999) (en banc).
Finally, we
agree with the district court that Adams failed to state a viable
discrimination claim. Adams alleged that the defendants targeted him because of
his race, and "allow white inmates to steal and get away with anything
anytime." "It is not enough for a complaint under § 1983 to contain
mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons acting under
color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the
pleadings." Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986).
Adams did not back up his allegations with any facts.
For
the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's order. Rule 34(j)(2)(C),
Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
* The Honorable David W. McKeague, United
States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by
designation.