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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
LOUISIANA
MABEL FERGUSON
VERSUS
ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT, et al.,
CIVIL No. 03-122-D-M3, CONSOLIDATED WITH CRIMINAL No.02-09-D-M3
248 F. Supp. 2d 547
February 27, 2003, Filed;
February 28, 2003, Docketed & Entered
RULING & ORDER
Pending
before the court are two consolidated actions brought by petitioner Mabel
Ferguson against the United States and various of its agents in their official
capacities (collectively referred to as the "Government"). The core
of her complaint is that the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons
("Bureau") have violated her federal constitutional and statutory
rights by changing their interpretation of the Bureau's discretion to place
certain classes of convicts directly into community confinement centers. The
Bureau has regarded itself as having that discretion for decades and, in fact,
exercised it in Ms. Ferguson's favor in August of 2002. The Department of
Justice has since reconsidered the relevant statutory language. It now thinks
the Bureau's earlier acts of discretion were "unlawful." Based on
this opinion, the Bureau has informed the federal courts that it will no longer
exercise its former discretion. More importantly, for Ms. Ferguson, the Bureau
has informed her that she will be transferred from a community confinement
center to a federal prison camp. It is this transfer that Mabel Ferguson seeks,
in one way or another, to stop.
In her first action Ms. Ferguson requests that this court issue a preliminary injunction against the Bureau, and its leadership in the persons of United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, Bureau Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, n1 the Bureau's Regional Director for the South Central Region, Ronald G. Thompson, and Tracy Ennen, who is the Community Corrections [*550] Manager for the same region of the Bureau. n2 The injunction Ms. Ferguson seeks would prevent the Bureau from transferring her from her current place of confinement to a federal prison camp in Bryan, Texas. In the alternative, Ms. Ferguson asks this court for a preliminary injunction so that she may seek at a later hearing to have the court vacate her prior sentence and sentence her to a shorter term that will allow her to remain at the community confinement center until her release.
Formally,
this matter comes to the court on the following three motions: (1) a motion for
an emergency stay which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f), n3
this court treated as two motions, one for a temporary restraining order and
another to vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; n4 (2) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the manner of her incarceration; n5 and (3) a
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.§§ 553, 702, and 706 with
jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. n6
The court
issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") on January 28, 2003. n7
By consent of the parties, the court extended the temporary restraining order
until February 21, 2003. n8 The court heard oral argument on that day. Based
upon the arguments presented in the parties' briefs and at oral argument;
the court determines that Ms. Ferguson
has met her burden under the standard for preliminary injunctions on the APA
and § 2241 claims. Additionally, by consent of the parties and representations
made to the court by counsel for the Government, any issues regarding
procedural defects or service were waived for the purposes of the preliminary
injunction hearing so that all parties can get to the next step. n9
Accordingly, the court hereby grants Ms. Ferguson's motion and enjoins the
Government from transferring her from the Ecumenical House Community
Corrections Center pending a final determination on the merits.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In late 2000, the United States Attorney's Office confronted
Mabel Ferguson [*551]with charges of misappropriation of postal funds, a
violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 1711. n10 She signed a waiver of her right to have the
charge made by indictment before a Grand Jury and the Government instead
charged her with misappropriation by information on January 8, 2001. n11 The
presentence investigation report, prepared on March 23, 2002, indicated that
Ms. Ferguson has a criminal history category of I (the lowest level) and that
her offense level was 13. This categorization placed her at the lowest level of
Zone D of the Sentencing Guidelines Sentencing Table, subject to a term of
imprisonment between twelve and eighteen months.
On March 28, 2002, Mabel Ferguson appeared before this court and
entered a plea of guilty to the misappropriation charge. n12 The court released
Ms. Ferguson on her own recognizance until the sentencing hearing. On July 11,
2002, the court imposed a sentence of twelve months and one day imprisonment,
three years of supervised release immediately following said term of
imprisonment, restitution payable immediately in a lump sum to the United
States Postal Service, n13 and a mandatory $100 assessment. n14 The court
recommended that "the defendant serve her sentence at the Ecumenical House
Community Corrections Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana" n15 and ordered that
she surrender herself "for service of sentence at the institution
designated by the Bureau of Prisons" before 2:00 p.m. on August 12, 2002.
n16
The Bureau, acting pursuant to a statutory grant of authority,
decided that it should follow this court's recommendation and ordered that Ms.
Ferguson serve her term of imprisonment at the Ecumenical House. This
designation allowed Ms. Ferguson to work as the daycare provider for her infant
grandchild during the daytime, but required that she otherwise be confined to
the community center. n17 Ms. Ferguson [*552] surrendered herself at the
appointed place and time on August 12, 2002, and began serving her sentence.
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice decided to reevaluate the
very statutory grant of authority that the Bureau exercised in assigning Ms.
Ferguson to the Ecumenical House. According to the Bureau at the time of Ms.
Ferguson's sentencing, 18 U.S.C.§ 3621(b) gave it the discretion to commit
people convicted of Zone C and D felonies directly to CCCs even though the
federal district courts do not have such discretion in imposing their
sentences. n18 The crucial passage appears in 18 U.S.C.§ 3621(b), which is
entitled Place of imprisonment." That section provides:
The Bureau of Prisons shall designate
the place of the prisoners imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available
penal or correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and
habitability established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal
Government or otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in
which the person was convicted, that
the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering--
(1) the resources of the
facility contemplated;
(2) the nature and
circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history and
characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any statement by the
court that imposed the sentence--
(A) concerning the purposes
for which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of
penal or correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any pertinent policy
statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of
title 28. n19
According to the Bureau's understanding of that section from the
time it became effective in 1987 until December of 2002, it gave the Bureau
authority to "designate an offender directly to a community based facility
to serve his or her sentence," though "ordinarily this is done only
with the concurrence of the sentencing court." n20 As these remarks make
clear, the Bureau's policy was that its discretion under this statute is
broader than the discretion of the district courts.
Indeed, it would have to be in order to commit a defendant like
Ms. Ferguson, convicted of a Zone D felony, directly to a CCC. For the
discretion of the district courts is constrained by statute to follow the
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") promulgated by the United States
Sentencing Commission. n21 That statute provides:
The court shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4)
unless the court [*553] finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described.
Guideline § 5C1.1(f), in
turn, provides that "if the applicable guideline range is in Zone D of the
Sentencing Table, the minimum term shall be satisfied by a sentence of
imprisonment." n22
Compare the applicable
Guideline for a Zone C felony:
If the applicable guideline
range is in Zone C of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied
by--
(1) a sentence of
imprisonment; or
(2) a sentence of imprisonment
that includes a term of supervised release with a condition that substitutes
community confinement or home detention according to the schedule in subsection
(e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by
imprisonment. n23
As this language is widely
understood, the distinction it embodies between imprisonment and commitment to
a CCC requires that district courts impose a sentence of imprisonment for at
least half the minimum term of imprisonment of all Zone C felons.
Zone D felons who must be given a "sentence of
imprisonment," with no provisions whatsoever made for terms of supervised
release on condition of service in a CCC, cannot be committed directly to CCCs
by the district courts either. n24 Judges may, however, direct placement in a
CCC as a condition of supervised release after a term of imprisonment. n25 It
is only when it comes to the term of imprisonment itself that judges cannot
decide on the place it will be carried out.
But this is a general disability of the courts. The statutory
scheme grants exclusive authority to the Bureau to decide where a convict will
serve her sentence of imprisonment. The constraints on judges concern whether
they need to commit convicts to the Bureau in the first place. For all, and
only, those convicts who must serve terms of imprisonment under the Guidelines
are committed to the custody of the Bureau. n26 Once committed to the Bureau,
only the Bureau can determine the place of imprisonment. n27 The Guidelines
[*554] provisions concerning community confinement have to do with the courts'
authority to sentence convicts to terms of supervised release or probation,
which is only available to Zone A and certain B felons. Over these
sentences, the courts have authority
and can under the Guidelines, direct that these terms be served in CCCs. But,
the courts' authority is more limited where service of sentences of
imprisonment is concerned.
According
to the longstanding practice and policy established at the time of Ms. Ferguson's
sentencing, only the Bureau could deviate from these constraints upon the
judiciary . But, that practice was challenged only four months after Ms.
Ferguson began serving her time at the Ecumenical House. The Department of
Justice commissioned a memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel
("OLC") seeking an opinion whether the Bureau had all the discretion
it supposed itself to have. As the OLC read the statute and related documents,
the entire practice was "unlawful." It concluded that rather than grant
the Bureau complete discretion in assigning prisoners, 18 U.S.C.§ 3621 actually
cabined the Bureau's discretion within the same constraints that are placed on
the federal judiciary by the Sentencing Commission. According to the OLC, with
respect to sentencing discretion, the. Judiciary and the Bureau of Prisons are
bunkmates to the Sentencing Commission's camp counselor.
This change in policy took
effect rapidly and without remorse.
Principle Deputy Assistant Attorney General M. Edward Whelan III of the OLC
released a memorandum opinion entitled "Bureau of Prisons Practice of
Placing in Community Confinement Certain Offenders Who Have Received Sentences
of Imprisonment" on December 13, 2002 ("OLC Memo"). n28 The OLC
Memo concluded that the Bureau acted unlawfully in placing Zone C and Zone D
felons directly into CCCs. On December 20, 2002, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, Director
of the Bureau, sent her own memorandum to federal judges informing them of the
conclusion of the OLC memorandum and that the Bureau no longer would follow its
prior practice. n29 Under a new Bureau "policy," future Zone C and D
felons would never again be committed directly to CCCs under any circumstances
and regardless what sentencing judges recommend. Though the OLC Memo does not
discuss the matter, it also appears that the new "policy" applies
equally to Zone B felons, or any felon sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
because it is the position of the Bureau that the phrase "term of
imprisonment" as it appears in 18 U.S.C.§ 3621(b) does not include time
spent in community confinement centers. n30
[*555] Also buried at the bottom of that memorandum was the following
notice:
This procedure change will be
implemented prospectively, with the following exception. Inmates designated to CCCs
who, as of December 16, 2002, had more than 150 days remaining to serve on
their prison terms, will be re-designated by the Bureau to prison institutions.
Neither that memorandum nor any other communication offered to this
court attempts to explain the rationale for the determination that the new
"policy" should be applied in a selectively retroactive manner. n31
Nevertheless, retroactively
applied it was. In yet another memorandum, dated December 27, 2002, Ray Aguado,
Community Corrections Manager, informed Mabel Ferguson that:
You will be
re-designated by the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) to a prison or jail institution
within the next 45 days, but not sooner than 30 days from receipt of this
notice, for continued service of your prison sentence.
Your transfer results from a
Bureau procedure change, which complies with recent guidance from the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), finding that the term
"community confinement" is not synonymous with
"imprisonment." n32
This memo also informed Ms. Ferguson that the policy would be applied
retroactively--a point she no doubt picked up in reading its first sentence.
Though the letter explained the decision to change the policy on
discretion-insofar as the synonymy argument is an explanation-it did not
provide any rationale for its retroactivity. The memo concluded by informing
her that "if you are dissatisfied with this decision, you may challenge it
through the Bureau's administrative remedy program.
On January 28, 2003, Mabel Ferguson filed a "Motion for
Emergency Stay" with this court seeking a TRO against the enforcement of
the new Bureau policy against her. The court held a conference with both
parties and granted the TRO on that same day. Subsequently, by consent of the
parties, the court extended the order until a hearing on the matter could be
held on February 21, 2003. Mabel
Ferguson filed motions seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and 28 U.S.C. §
2241, which both provide jurisdiction, and under 5 U.S.C. § 552, which gives
the court jurisdiction because it presents a federal question.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD
In order to prevail on her motion for preliminary injunction
under any of her causes of action, Ms. Ferguson must establish that: (1) there
is a substantial likelihood that she will prevail on the merits; (2) there is a
substantial threat that she will suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary
injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to her outweighs the threatened
[*556] injury to the Government; and, (4) granting the preliminary injunction
will not disserve the public interest. n33
Ms. Ferguson presents claims under three very different theories
of law. A winning argument under any one theory will entitle her to a preliminary
injunction. The court finds that she has presented two such theories. For the
purposes of this preliminary injunction ruling, the real battle is over the
question whether Ms. Ferguson can show that she has a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of her claims. All of the other factors, irreparable
injury, balance of harms, and public interest weigh easily in her favor.
However, for completeness, the court will begin with a brief discussion of
these factors.
There is no doubt that Ms. Ferguson would be irreparably injured
if she were transferred from Ecumenical House. She would be ripped from her
job, her family, and her community. Any dignity she had managed to recover
would be lost. She would suffer financially and would be joined in that fate by
her extended family who rely on her for affordable childcare. Were the court
later to rule in her favor, she would have no relief at all.
Meanwhile, the Government hardly can make out the claim that it
has an interest in this transfer. By allowing her to remain at Ecumenical House
until a final ruling on the 'merits, she will be able to continue paying for
the costs of her incarceration. Already she has paid $1,700. n34 Any Government
interest in transferring her is outweighed by the cost of doing so as well as
the cost of incarcerating her where she will be unable to continue paying for
her own upkeep. Moreover, because the Bureau has already designated Ecumenical
House as the location of Ms. Ferguson's imprisonment and she has already served
more than half of her sentence there, there is no potential harm to the public
interest in allowing her to remain there.
Indeed, the
only particularized Government evaluation of its own interests regarding Ms.
Ferguson's incarceration is that provided by the Bureau in assigning her to the
Ecumenical House in the first place. Ms. Ferguson has been a model prisoner,
and allowing her to remain there ensures that her ties to the community and
chances for rehabilitation are not crippled.
Surely the public has an interest in returning criminals to society as
good citizens living life on the right side of the law. And, surely that
interest outweighs the Bureau's interest in enforcing a new "policy"
retroactively by transferring Ms. Ferguson to a new location for a few months.
Additionally, any "tough on crime" message the Government wished to
send by making these redesignations has already made its dent in the national
consciousness. n35
[*557] Therefore, on the
basis of the above and the Government's failure to offer any argument in
opposition, the court concludes that Ms. Ferguson has met her burden, and a
preliminary injunction ruling in her favor is warranted on these factors. For
the reasons given below, the court determines as well that Ms. Ferguson is
substantially likely to prevail on the merits.
JURISDICTION
I. Jurisdiction Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, & 28 U.S.C. § 1331
The government asserts that this court does not have
jurisdiction to hear Ms. Ferguson's complaints about her treatment under the
new Bureau of Prisons "policy." Ms. Ferguson, meanwhile, proposes
several possible bases for the court to exercise its authority. First, she
argues that the court may exercise its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to
hear any claim attacking the validity of her sentence or conviction. Second,
she urges that the court also has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the writ
of habeas corpus, to hear claims challenging the manner in which her sentence
is being carried out. Finally, she asserts that the court has federal question
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear her claim that the
Department of Justice and the Bureau have violated the her rights under the
APA.
Before deciding which procedural mechanism allows the court to
act on Ms. Ferguson's case, the court must distinguish her claims and the
actions of which they complain. As discussed above, Ms. Ferguson's primary
complaint concerns a series of actions taken by various bureaucrats within
various branches of the Department of Justice. She objects to the imposition of
a new rule upon the procedures of the Bureau that issued from the Department of
Justice. That new rule was based wholly, as far as the court can determine, on
the OLC Memo. The OLC Memo expresses the opinion that it is
"unlawful" for the Bureau of Prisons to place convicts directly in
community correction centers rather than in penal facilities such as prisons or
jails. n36 She objects to this interpretation as well as the method of its
adoption. She also objects to the separate decision, apparently taken by
another official at the Department of Justice or the Bureau, to apply this
policy retroactively so that it affects people like herself, who was well into
her term at a CCC by the time she received notice that she would be moved into
a federal prison camp.
Her complaints, already legion, march on. She also claims that
the complained of [*558] bureaucratic declaration and the decisions that seek
to effectuate it have infected the validity of her initial sentence. They have
done so, she argues, by uprooting and throwing out the settled background
assumptions against which the court exercised its discretion at the time it
made its sentencing decision. She urges that the new "policy"
vitiates the court's intentions in imposing the sentence it did.
Ms. Ferguson, then, challenges the validity of several actions
of several individuals that will, left unchanged or unchecked and taken
together, take her out of her community and throw her into a prison, despite
initial judicial and agency determinations that to do so would not be in
anyone's best interest in this case. Some of these acts are administrative and
may be attacked directly insofar as they affect the Ms. Ferguson's interests.
The same administrative acts may be attacked insofar as they affect the manner
in which her sentence will be served. Others concern the imposition of Ms.
Ferguson's sentence itself.
Only those claims that attack the validity of Ms. Ferguson's
sentence can be brought under 28. U.S.C. § 2255. Her complaints regarding the
manner of her imprisonment must be filed via a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The distinction between the two habeas causes of
actions is clear. Both offer post-conviction relief, but the relief available
and often the court which a prisoner must petition are distinct. A section 2255
petition for post-conviction relief allows an inmate to attack the validity of
a conviction or sentence collaterally and must be sought in the sentencing
court. n37 Section 2255 reads:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
[. . .]
If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without
jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or
otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the
judgment vulnerable to collateral
attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge
[or resentence the prisoner] or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as
may appear appropriate. n38
Among Ms. Ferguson's
assertions is the claim that the subsequent change in the law (if legitimate)
undermined the validity of her sentence. This court is the proper court to hear
this claim because it is the here that her sentence was imposed in the first
place. Consequently, as an initial matter, Ms. Ferguson has brought the right
kind of claim to the proper court.
She also has properly brought her section 2241 claim to this
court. The writ [*559] of habeas corpus
allows convicts to challenge the manner that their sentences are being carried
out. That section provides:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the [. . .]
district courts [. . .] within their [. . .] jurisdictions. [. . .]
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner
unless--
(1) [The prisoner] is in custody under or by color of the
authority of the United States [. . .] or [. . .]
3) [The prisoner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States. n39
Such petitions can be
brought only in a district court in the district where the convict is
incarcerated because the court must have power over the convict's custodian to
effect, a remedy. n40 As it happens, Ms. Ferguson was not only sentenced in
this court but remanded into custody here as well. She currently resides at the
Ecumenical House, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Because Ms. Ferguson attacks the
manner in which her sentence is being carried out and she is also incarcerated here, her petition is
proper.
There is, however, one remaining potential barrier to the
court's taking jurisdiction over this matter under either section 2255 or
section 2241. It is the Governments claim that this court does not have
jurisdiction to hear these habeas claims because, even if Ms. Ferguson has been
wronged, the quantum of that wrong is insufficient to warrant review under the
federal habeas statute or the writ of habeas corpus. Those remedies require that the wrong be constitutional,
jurisdictional, or of fundamental unfairness. That, the Government argues, Ms.
Ferguson cannot do, and it refers the court to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Addonizio. n41
Addonizo presents facts that are somewhat similar to those in
this case. In 1970, Mr. Addonizio, once the Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, found
himself up for sentencing after being convicted of 63 counts of extortion and
one count of conspiracy to extort. The presiding judge sentenced Mr. Addonizio
to a ten-year term of imprisonment. n42 He made this sentence, he later said,
under the impression "that petitioner would be actually confined for a
period of approximately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year
sentence. n43 The district judge formed this expectation based on the
"fact that [Mr. Addonizio] was a first-offender and that there appeared to
be little probability of recidivism" as well as his understanding that
these were the primary factors used to determine when and whether to offer
parole to a convict. n44 As it turned out, the Probation Commission frustrated
the district judge's expectations by
adopting new parole procedures.
Specifically, the Parole Commission determined that the gravity
of the offense should be a significant factor at parole hearings. The Parole
Commission started using its new guidelines on a trial basis in 1972, published
them in the Federal Register and began using them throughout the country in
1973, and later codified them at 28 CFR § 22.20 (1978). n45 Based on the
gravity of Mr. Addonizio's offenses-extreme breach of the public trust--the
Parole [*560]Commission twice rejected his applications for parole when he
applied in 1975. n46 Mr. Addonizio brought a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 to
vacate and resentence. The sentencing judge reduced his sentence to time served
and the Second Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision on the ground
that.the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter because
"subsequent actions taken by the Parole Commission--whether or not such
actions accord with a trial judge's expectations at the time of sentencing--do
not retroactively affect the validity
of the final judgment itself." n47 The Supreme Court pointed out that
"an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily
support a collateral attack on a final judgment" because the interests of
finality and judicial economy require that closed cases be reopened only for
very serious reasons. n48 Only three kinds of reason are sufficient: (1) claims
of constitutional error; (2) claims that the court lacked jurisdiction; and,
(3) claims that the court committed an error of fact or law of a fundamental
character that "rendered the proceeding itself irregular and
invalid." n49
The Supreme Court's holding and rationale compel the same result
in this case, the Government argues, because this court's expectations are no
more entitled to be carried out than were the expectations of the district
judge in Addonizio. They argue that, as a matter of law, the later activities
of the Department of Justice and the Bureau cannot have infected the
proceedings in this court so fundamentally as to give this court jurisdiction
to hear the claim. The Government also argues that the court should also
dismiss Ms. Ferguson's claims under section 2241 because the same standard
governs there.
The court respectfully differs with the Government on this
matter. There are many distinctions between the facts of Addonizio and the
facts of this case. The district judge in Addonizio merely expected that the
Parole Commission would operate under its old rules. His reliance was in the
nature of an idle expectation based on an understanding of "how things
work." The Parole Commission followed the requisite rulemaking procedures
and eventually promulgated rules regarding the grant of parole that frustrated
the district judge's intentions when, four or five years after the sentencing
the Parole Commission applied those rules to Mr. Addonizio.
In Ms.
Feguson's case, however, the court was not merely speculating. The Bureau was
on record that it had the discretion to commit certain classes of convicts to
imprisonment in CCCs. It published that view in 1998 in Policy Statement
7310.04. n50 It has also published the view as recently as 2000 in a reference manual for the judiciary. n51 U.S.
Attorneys, now [*561] compelled to spend hours fighting to move the affected
convicts, once collaborated with the sentencing judges to ensure that these
people were assigned to CCCs. Having, in many instances, accomplished the goal
of achieving these assignments, they are now whipsawed by the new
"policy" back into court to stand before the same judges in a much
more adversarial position.
Protecting public safety is the first priority when an inmate is
considered for participation in community programs. The following is the
profile of a typical offender designated directly to a CCC.
-- Ordinarily sentenced to 6 months or less.
-- Not involved in large-scale drug or property offenses.
-- Has no detainers or pending charges.
-- Has no history of serious violent behavior or firearms offenses.
-- Has no history of sex crimes.
-- No medical or mental disorder requiring ongoing treatment.
-- Is not a deportable alien.
-- Has no history of threats against government officials.
-- Has no known memberships with disruptive groups of affiliations with
major organized criminal enterprises.
Id. at 16.
Also, unlike
parole hearings, placement in a penal institution is a part of the sentencing
process. In Ms. Ferguson's case, that process was fully completed and she was
assigned to a CCC before the Government stepped in brandishing its new
"policy." Conversely, in Addonizio, the felon was convicted and
served some four or five years before he ever went before the Parole
Commission. Moreover, no one in Ms. Ferguson's case was working off of
"mere expectancies." The Bureau, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the
court, Ms. Ferguson, and her attorney all in fact knew what would happen to
her. She would be taken into custody at the Bureau, they would look at the
particulars of her case, and given the nature of the crimes, they would assign
her to a CCC so that she could maintain her connections to her community while
at the same time giving up much of her freedom in order to pay back her debt to
that same community. And that is precisely what happened. Until, that is, some
Washington D.C. bureaucrat determined that the entire legal world had been
acting under the same shared "unlawful" fantasy for decades and acted
to bring us all back into step with his vision of the law.
Ultimately,
however, it is the judgment of this court that this phase of the analysis does
not concern jurisdiction to hear these claims. The remarks about jurisdiction
in Addonizio and propounded by the Government in this case concern the district
courts' jurisdiction to vacate sentences, not their jurisdiction to consider
whether the claimed violation is serious enough to warrant such a measure. n52
In Addonizio the Supreme Court wrote,
"under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to discharge or
resentence defendant if it concludes that it 'was subject to collateral
attack.'" n53 This remark does not indicate that the court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the due process claim. Instead it indicates that, having
heard the claim and decided that the alleged injury is not of constitutional
magnitude, the court cannot reclaim jurisdiction over the sentence and alter it
in any way.
That this is so is evident from the courts that have rejected
due process claims in similar cases. All three such cases to which the court
has been referred reach the merits of
the due process claims brought by complainants. All three refer to the
governing due process standard for fairness at sentencing hearings--that a
[*562] sentencing within Guideline limits can be altered if the judge relied on
materially false information in imposing the sentence--and all three reject the
due process argument based in part on the claim that these courts did not in
fact rely on the former Bureau practice. n54 Hence, this court concludes that
the Government's jurisdictional arguments are more properly considered
arguments on the merits and will consider them as such.
Ms.
Ferguson has stated claims under the Administrative Procedures Act
("APA") as well. She claims that the new "policy" is a
substantive rulemaking that, even if it were an acceptable interpretation of
the statute, could not be put in place until the Department undertook notice
and comment procedures required by section 552 of the APA. She also claims that
the "policy" is based on a clearly erroneous interpretation of the
Crime Control Act of 1984 and, for that reasons it is unenforceable against
her. The court has jurisdiction to hear both of these claims under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. n55
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -
II. Exhaustion
The Government also claims
that the court cannot review the agency action or Ms. Ferguson's sentencing
because she has not exhausted her administrative remedies. The Fifth Circuit has held that before
bringing a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, "a federal prisoner seeking only
injunctive relief must first exhaust the administrative remedies provided by
the Bureau." n56 Similarly, to challenge an agency action under the
Administrative Procedures Act, that action must be a "final agency
action." n57 The Bureau has procedures available that would'allow her to
appeal her redesignation. Those procedures are provided at 28 C.F.R. §§
542.10-542.19.
The administrative appeals
process has three steps. First, the inmate must submit a "formal written
Administrative Remedy Request, on the appropriate form (BP-9)" with the
Community Corrections Manager ("CCM") twenty days from the act
challenged. n58 The CCM has 20 days to respond to the request. n59 The inmate
then has twenty more days to appeal to the Regional Director, n60 who has thirty
days to respond. n61 If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the result, she
may appeal to the General Counsel within an additional thirty [*563]days. n62
The General Counsel has forty days to respond. n63 Ms. Ferguson admits that she
has not completed her pursuit of an administrative remedy. Thus, the Government
argues, she admits that she has no case before this court.
The court finds that Ms.
Ferguson need not exhaust administrative remedies that are mere
apparitions. While the Government is
correct that the exhaustion doctrine normally bars direct resort to the courts,
that is not true where pursuing administrative remedies would be futile
"because it is clear that the claim will be rejected." n64 Where an
agency has adopted a new rule or policy and announced that it will follow that
policy, especially where that policy has its origin above the Bureau's General
Counsel Office, it is pointless to require a complainant to follow the
administrative procedure. The people who would review Ms. Ferguson's claims in the
Bureau have absolutely no power to alter her designation. The new
"policy" was based on an interpretation that was handed down from on
high in the Department of Justice. Thus, an administrative appeal could only
work to delay this matter. n65
In fact, an administrative
appeal would be more than futile in this case; it would completely destroy any
hope that Ms. Ferguson has of avoiding redesignation and transfer to a federal
prison. Even if Ms. Ferguson could put together her complaint and appeals in
the proper form in no time at all, the Bureau would still have ninety days, all
together, to respond to her requests for relief. Even had she filed a Request
for Administrative Remedy on the very day she received her redesignation
letter, she would only have been in the middle of her first appeal when the
Bureau shuttled her off to prison. Because it is evident that she would not
have received relief on appeal, it is also evident that she would have been
sent to prison and served for some months before she ever would have had an
opportunity to bring her claim before a tribunal--a federal district court-that
might actually be able to afford her relief. And of course, Ms. Ferguson could
not have exhausted her administrative remedies in no time at all. The most
likely result is that she would have been released from prison before she ever
got to federal court. By that time, the matter would have become moot. Under no
conception of justice and due process is that an acceptable result.
Accordingly, the court finds that Ms. Ferguson need not have exhausted the
administrative appeals process and may pursue her claims directly in this
court.
The Government also argues
that the exhaustion requirement is stricter than normal because the Prison
Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") imposes a greater exhaustion burden on
prisoners than what is required of other citizens. That Act states, "no action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions undersection 1983 of this title, or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are [*564]
exhausted." n66 While it is certainly true that this provision does
destroy the futility exception in some cases; it is equally certain that it
does not do so here. Where a petitioner
is not only unable to prevail by going through the proper procedures as a
matter of plain agency policy, but by doing so would be completely deprived of
any hope of relief, the exhaustion requirement under the PLRA does not bar
relief in the courts. n67
The reason for this rule is
that where futility of such an extreme sort is present, the administrative
remedies either do not exist or they are de facto exhausted. The Supreme Court
recognized this result as a presupposition of the terms "available"
and "remedy" in the PLRA. n68 "Some redress for a wrong is
presupposed by the statute's requirement of an 'available' 'remedy'; neither
[party] argues that exhaustion is required where the relevant administrative
procedure lacks authority to provide any relief or to take any action
whatsoever in response to a complaint." n69 The exhaustion requirement is
therefore satisfied.
ANALYSIS
I. The APA Claims - Rulemaking
The majority of Ms.
Ferguson's civil claims are encompassed by the provisions of the APA. This is
because the bulk of her federal constitutional claims are more properly
considered as part of her 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claim, which is analyzed separately
below. As a general matter, the APA
applies to all federal agencies, including the Bureau. n70 There area few
limitations to the applicability of the APA to the Bureau, however, contained
in 18 U.S.C. § 3625. These limitations have no applicability in cases such as
this, where the challenge is not an adjudication of an individual case, but
instead, a challenge to a rule making. n71
At the outset, the court
observes that the "policy" change enacted by the Bureau by the stroke
of a bureaucratic pen in the waning days of 2002 looks a whole lot like a
"rule" for the purposes of the APA.
The APA defines the term "rule" as "an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law. . . ." The Bureau's new "policy" of
prohibiting direct commitment of felons to CCC's under any circumstances, and
the redesignation of previously committed felons like Ms. Ferguson because she
had more than 150 days left to serve are most certainly "statement[s] of
general applicability."
Under ordinary
circumstances, an agency that wishes to issue a rule must abide by the APA's
notice and comment procedures. Additionally, although agency
"interpretations" are not typically subject to notice and comment
procedures, n72 when an interpretation departs from a longstanding agency
practice, it too must be promulgated pursuant to the general APA notice and
comment procedures. n73 There [*565] is no doubt that the new Bureau
"policy" is the exact opposite from its past policy and practice with
regard to direct CCC commitments. Thus, under either rulemaking theory, it is
highly probable that the court could conclude that the Bureau has issued a
"rule" that requires notice and comment. The Government admits that
the Bureau has not complied with the requirement for notice and comment. Thus,
Ms. Ferguson has shown a likelihood of success on the merits that the
"rule," and its subsequent application to her, are invalid, thereby
making a preliminary injunction on this issue warranted.
II. The APA Claims - Validity of the New Interpretation
Even if notice and comment
were not required, the court still must consider whether the Bureau's "interpretation" was a permissible
construction of the relevant statute. In reaching this determination, the
question the court faces is whether confinement in a community corrections
center is a form of imprisonment under the statute. If it is a form of
imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), then the Bureau has a clear grant of
statutory authority to exercise its discretion and place people convicted of
Zone C and Zone D felonies directly to CCCs, despite the fact that federal
district courts do not have that authority under the Guidelines. n74 If such
confinement, on the other hand, is not a form of imprisonment, then the scope of
the Bureau's discretion to designate places of imprisonment does not reach CCCs
and the Bureau may not assign designate places of imprisonment does not reach
CCCs and the Bureau may not assign inmates to those institutions unless it acts
under some other grant of authority. The court begins by noting that the Department appears to be the proper
agency to undertake to interpret the statutory provisions concerning the
Bureau. n75 As such, its interpretation may be due some measure of deference.
Review of an agency's
interpretation of the statute it administers is typically a two-step process.
First, the court must consider whether "Congress has directly spoken to
the issue." n76 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. " n77 If the court determines
that the statute is in this respect ambiguous, then the court must determine
the appropriate degree of deference given the nature of the agency
interpretation and evaluate the interpretation in that light. n78 Where, as
here, the "policy" in question is, even if in form only, a
"policy statement," this court owes the Department's interpretation
some, but only some, deference. n79 The court finds that Ms. Ferguson is
substantially likely to prevail on her claim that the interpretation by [*566]
the Department of Justice and the Bureau is inconsistent with the plain meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
The court looks first to the
language of the statute that purports to give the Bureau some measure of
discretion:
(a) A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall be
committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. [. . .]
(b) The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoners
imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional
facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability. n80
It could not be clearer from this language that the Congress grants the
Bureau a broad discretion to appoint the places where prisoners will serve
their terms of imprisonment.
Subsection 3621(a) directs
that people who must serve terms of imprisonment be given over to the custody
of the Bureau. The first sentence of subsection 3621(b) uses mandatory language
to create a duty in the Bureau to do something with the prisoners in their
custody, namely place them. The second sentence of this subsection uses
language of empowerment which tells the Bureau where it may place such prisoners.
According to that second sentence, the Bureau's discretion extends to "any
available penal or correctional facility." Thus, the statute commits
certain people to the custody of the Bureau, directs that the Bureau do
something to place people so committed, and grants the Bureau the authority to
choose the place of imprisonment from among, available penal or correctional
institutions.
In this language, there is no
suggestion of any limitation on the Bureau's authority except that the facility
chosen must (1) be a "penal or correctional facility"; and , (2) meet
"minimum standards of health and habitability established by the
Bureau." There is no controversy over this later limitation on the
Bureau's imprisonment power. Hence, the only apparent limitation on the Bureau
is that it choose a place that is a "penal or correctional facility."
n81
So the question the court
faces would appear to have evolved into the question whether community
confinement centers are penal or correctional institutions. If they are, the
statute plainly says that the Bureau may commit people sentenced to terms of
imprisonment to them. On the direction and assurances of higher courts than
this, the court will consider, for guidance, definitions of the terms
"penal" and "correctional" to decipher what meaning to
impute to those terms in the statute. It is becomes obvious, without going far,
that a community corrections center is
a penal or correctional institution.
According to the Oxford
English Dictionary, something is properly characterized as "penal" if
it is:
1. Of, pertaining to, or
relating to punishment. (a.) Having as its object the infliction of punishment,
punitive; prescribing or enacting the punishment to be inflicted for an offence
or transgression. . .(c..) Having the nature or character of punishment;
constituting punishment; inflicted as, or in the way of, punishment. . .(e.)
Used or appointed as a place of punishment.(f.) Involving, connected with, or characterized by, a penalty or
legal punishment. (g.) Of, pertaining to, or subject to the penal laws, penal
servitude, etc. n82
[*567] Dictionary wars being what they are in the courts today, some
would perhaps prefer the perspective of an American source. According to the
American Heritage Dictionary, 4th ed.,
"penal" means:
Of, relating to, or prescribing punishment, as for breaking the law.
Subject to punishment; legally punishable: a penal offense. Serving as or
constituting a means or place of punishment. n83
As either of these common definitions demonstrate, a penal facility is
a facility to which people are committed as a form of punishment.
Meanwhile, to be
"correctional" is defined somewhat unhelpfully by the Oxford English
Dictionary as "of or pertaining to
correction; corrective." n84 More helpfully, the American Heritage
Dictionary tells us that, in the appropriate context, "correctional"
means: "punishment intended to rehabilitate or improve." n85 Thus,
the court is again faced with a basic matter, namely whether CCCs are
facilities that serve the purpose of punishing, correcting, or rehabilitating
prisoners. If they do, then it is apparently within the Bureau's authority to
make direct commitments to them.
After reflection and review
on this matter, the court finds that CCCs are facilities for the purpose of
punishment, rehabilitation, or correction. Indeed, the court cannot imagine
what other purpose these facilities might reasonably serve. This finding is
consistent with the Bureau's own understanding of the function and purposes of
CCCs. n86
In fact, even the Sentencing Commission has expressed the view that
CCCs are punitive in a joint report issued with the Bureau:
Community correction centers (CCC) provide two program components
within their facilities: a pre-release component and a community corrections
component. [. . .] The community corrections component is designed to be
sufficiently punitive to be a legitimate sanction. n87
Moreover, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, relied upon by the Government to argue that Ms. Ferguson
cannot bring her claim because she has not exhausted her administrative
remedies, applies its exhaustion standard to "any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility." n88 And,
the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the phrase "correctional facility"
to apply to the Colorado state counterpart to CCCs and thus to require that
inmates in community correction centers exhaust their administrative remedies
before bringing suit. n89 Thus, it appears quite compelling that the Bureau has
the discretion to make direct commitments to CCCs.
Despite this apparently clear
statutory grant of authority, the Government now informs the court that the
Bureau's discretion is in fact limited. According to the Government, the Bureau
can no more commit [*568] a person in its custody to a CCC than it could commit
her to a turn on a merry-go-round. The reason, the Government opines, is that
neither of these locations is a "place of imprisonment." This
language, the Government argues, collapses the Bureau's discretionary powers
before it ever comes time to decide among penal or correctional institutions.
Therefore, under the Government's interpretation of the statutory language: (1)
the courts send the Bureau people sentenced to terms of imprisonment; n90 (2)
the Bureau must place them in places of imprisonment; n91 and, (3) the Bureau
may choose the places of imprisonment from among the set of available penal or
correctional facilities TM that qualify as places of imprisonment n92
There are several
difficulties with this argument. In the first instance, it is deeply
counterintuitive that the phrase "place of imprisonment" is meant to
be a limitation upon what everyone acknowledges to be the much broader phrase
"penal or correctional institution." And the statute does not simply
speak of "penal or correctional" facilities; it speaks of any penal
or correctional facility. Imagine a mother calling her child and saying,
"On the way home, go to the store and pick up some Coke. n93 You can pick
up any kind of soda you like." If on returning home the mother became
angry at her child for picking up Mr. Pibb TM , everyone would properly regard
the mother as irrational. If she really meant "Coca-Cola TM " by
"Coke" as opposed to something more generic or general, then she
would not have given her child the apparent discretion to choose any
"soda" she liked. The general term in the second sentence only makes
sense if the seemingly specific term in the first sentence had a broader meaning than might otherwise
be apparent. This is why the Government's interpretation through the OLC Memo
is implausible.
According to the OLO Memo,
Congress has told the Bureau: "Whenever the courts send you an inmate, put
her in a prison or jail. You are free to choose from all the prisons, jails,
and community confinement centers." The only sensible way to understand
the interplay between the phrases "place of imprisonment" and
"any penal or correctional facility" is to read the latter as giving
content to the former, just as the phrase "any soda" gives content to
the term "Coke" in the example above. Thus, what Congress has
expressed to the Bureau is the following: "You must place inmates sent to
you into some place of imprisonment. By that we mean, place them into a penal
or correctional facility; you choose which one." So long as community
confinement centers are viewed as penal or correctional facilities, they would
also be places of imprisonment under the statute.
Moreover, the court finds
that community confinement centers are
"places of imprisonment" as that phrase is most naturally understood.
The American Heritage Dictionary defines "imprisonment" as "to
put in or as if in prison; confine." The Oxford English Dictionary defines
"imprisonment" as "the action of imprisoning, or fact or condition
of being imprisoned; detention in a prison or place of confinement; close or
irksome confinement; forcible restraint within bounds'; incarceration."
Placement in a CCC allows an inmate to leave the center for the purpose of
employment, but otherwise requires [*569] the inmate to be in the center. As
the joint report by the Sentencing Commission and the Bureau point out,
"except for employment and other required activities, offenders in the CCC
component must remain in the facility at all times." n94
The parties to this case have stipulated that Ms. Ferguson
"travels to her job, caring for her two grandchildren from 7:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday" and receives "one three hour pass to
attend a religious service weekly," but is otherwise confined to the
Ecumenical House. n95 This qualifies as confinement. While community confinement centers no doubt are less confining
than prisons or jails, they nevertheless impose heavily on the freedom of the
inmates to come and go as they choose. The inmates do not return to their
homes. They do not set their own schedules. They are confined for all practical
purposes and under the control of the government through its agents. The degree
of confinement is not determinative of the whether these inmates are confined.
n96 Therefore, the court cannot escape the conclusions that a term served in a
CCC is a term of confinement and that a term of confinement is a term of
imprisonment, as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
Attention to the larger
statutory context confirms this view.
Section 3551 authorizes only three categories of sentence: (1) terms of
probation, (2) fines, and (3) terms of imprisonment. n97 Subsection 3551(b)
provides:
An individual found guilty of an offense shall be sentenced, in
accordance with the provisions of section 3553, to--
(1) a term of probation as authorized by subchapter B;
(2) a fine as authorized by subchapter C; or
(3) a term of imprisonment as authorized by subchapter D.
Of these three kinds of sentences, community confinement clearly falls
into the last category. Community confinement clearly is not a fine. Nor is it
a form of probation. Under a term of probation a convict is essentially free to
come and go as she chooses. Community confinement center inmates live at these facilities. They may be free to hold jobs in
the community, but they are not merely on supervised release. If community
confinement is a valid form of sentence, it is a form of imprisonment under the
statute.
It does not matter that
[*570] the federal district courts are constrained to a greater degree than the
Bureau. Though courts have an
institutional incentive to recognize the greatest scope for judicial authority,
they also have an institutional duty to allow that other institutions surpass them
when the law so requires. The court also finds that the Bureau has greater
authority to assign prisoners to CCCs than the court itself does. It is the job
of the court, under the statutory scheme, to impose sentences. It is the job of
the Bureau to decide where those sentences are to be served.
It is for this reason that
the court finds the bulk of the reasoning of the OLC Memo to be a series of non
sequiturs. For that document relies on a misconception of the authority of the
Sentencing Commission ("Commission"). The Commission clearly has the
statutory authority to limit the discretion of the federal district courts in
sentencing matters. And, the federal district courts are explicitly directed to
conform their sentences to the Sentencing Commission Guidelines. n98 But, the
Commission's authority does not touch that of the Bureau and the Bureau's
discretion is nowhere hemmed in by the Guidelines.
This is because the Commission's enabling statute gives it authority only over the sentencing of the
courts, not the decisions of the Bureau. Section 994(a) calls on the Commission
to "promulgate and distribute to all courts of the United States and to
the United States Probation System--(1) guidelines, as described in this
section, for use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be
imposed in a criminal case, including" whether to impose a sentence of
imprisonment, probation, or a fine, the appropriate quantum of such punishment,
whether to include a term of supervised release, and whether terms will run
consecutively or concurrently. n99 Nowhere does the Commission's enabling
statute even mention places of imprisonment or the statutory section that
purports to give the Bureau its authority. In fact, section 994 makes no
mention of authority over the Bureau at all. The only reference to the Bureau
in that section is as a partner. n100 Indeed, it is evident from the statute
that the Sentencing Commission has authority over sentencing while the Bureau
has authority over carrying sentences out. Hence, the court concludes that the
Commission has no authority over placement matters and that its Guidelines are
not binding on the Bureau.
Yet, the Government relies
for its interpretation of "imprisonment" in 18 U.S.C. § 3621 largely
on the way that the Commission has used the terms "imprisonment" and
"community confinement" in promulgating the Guidelines. The
Government is specifically concerned that there be some measure of consistency
between the language of Guideline § 5C1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Subsection (d)
of that Guideline provides:
If the applicable guideline
range is in Zone C of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied
by --
(1) a sentence of imprisonment; or
(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised
release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or home
detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least
one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment. n101
It is evident, the Government argues, that the Sentencing Commission
does not regard placement in a
community confinement center as "imprisonment." Otherwise, it would
not allow placement in a CCC, only then to require that at least half of each
term be satisfied by "imprisonment." If a CCC term were a term of
imprisonment, there would be no need for this caveat. Thus, the Government
concludes, service of a sentence in a CCC is not "imprisonment" under
the Guidelines.
As an initial matter, the court believes that the Government's interpretation is mistaken. The court reads the Guidelines [*571] to treat community confinement as a subclass of imprisonment. When a court under Guideline § 5C1.1(d) decides it is appropriate to split the sentence of a person convicted of a Zone C felony, that Guideline actually allows the court to substitute a lesser for greater form of confinement. The Guidelines' co