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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OFLOUISIANA
DEBORAH LOU
HOWARD
VERSUS
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ASHCROFT, et al.,
248 F. Supp. 2d 518
February 24, 2003, Decided
February 27, 2003, Filed
RULING & ORDER
Pending before the court are two
actions brought by petitioner Deborah Lou Howard against the United States and
various of its agents in their official capacities (collectively referred to as
the "Government"). The core of her complaint is that the Department
of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons ("Bureau") have violated her
federal constitutional and statutory rights by changing their interpretation of
the Bureau's discretion to place certain classes of convicts directly into
community corrections centers. The Bureau has regarded itself as having that
discretion for decades and, in fact, exercised it in Ms. Howard's favor in
October of 2002. The Department of Justice has since reconsidered the Bureau's
interpretation of the relevant statutory language. It now thinks the Bureau's
earlier acts of discretion were "unlawful." Based on this opinion,
the Bureau has informed the federal courts that it will no longer exercise its
former discretion. More importantly, for Ms. Howard, the Bureau has informed
her that she will be transferred to a federal corrections facility in Marianna,
Florida. It is this transfer that Ms. Howard seeks, in one way or another, to
stop.
In her first action, Ms. Howard
requests that this court issue a preliminary injunction against the Bureau, and
its leadership in the persons of United States Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Bureau Director Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, n1 the Bureau's Regional Director for the
South East Region, Ray E. Holt, and Callie P. Farr, who is the Community
Corrections Manager for the same region of the Bureau. The injunction Ms.
Howard seeks would order that she remain at her current place of confinement
rather than be transferred to a federal corrections facility in Marianna,
Florida. In the alternative, Ms. Howard asks this court for a preliminary
injunction so [*521] that she may petition the court to hold a later hearing to
vacate her prior sentence and resentence her in a manner that allows her to remain
at the Bannum Place of Orlando Community Corrections Center ("Bannum
Place") until her release.
Formally, this matter comes to
the court on two motions. First, Ms. Howard brought a motion for an emergency
stay which, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f), n2 this Court
treated as two motions, one for a temporary restraining order and another to
vacate her sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. n3 Second, she has filed a
complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative
Procedures Act (the "APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702 , and 706 with
jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. n4
The court issued a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") on January 28, 2003. n5 By consent of the
parties, the court extended the temporary restraining order until February 21,
2003. n6 Additionally, by consent of the parties and representations made to
the court by counsel for the Government, any issues regarding procedural
defects or service were waived for the purposes of the preliminary injunction
hearing so that all parties can get to the next step. n7
The court took evidence and
heard oral argument on February 21, 2003. Having determined that Ms. Howard has
met her burden on at least one of her claims, the court granted her motion for
a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Government from transferring Ms.
Howard from Bannum Place pending a final determination on the merits.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In August
2000, the United States Attorney's Office confronted Deborah. Howard with a
charge of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1). n8 Ms. Howard
cooperated with authorities and pled guilty to the charge on November 8, 2001.
n9 Ms. Howard was a low level participant in the conspiracy. Her role was that
of a courier, or a "mule."
The original
pre-sentence investigation report, prepared on March 14, 2002, indicated that
Ms. Howard had a criminal history category of I (the lowest level) and that her
offense level was 25 because she met all of the criteria for the statutory
"safety valve" and received a two level reduction for her "first
offender" status under the Sentencing Guidelines. In between indictment
and sentencing, Ms. Howard provided invaluable assistance to the Government
with regard to information [*522] about her co-conspirators. In fact, Ms.
Howard continued to provide assistance to federal and state investigators even
though some of her co-conspirators were still at large and had significant
criminal histories for violence. So valuable was the information she gave and
so dangerous were some of the people her cooperation helped to convict, the
court and counsel even considered placing her into the witness protection
program. In the words of one of the prosecutors from the Middle District of
Florida her cooperation was "crucial to the development of the case."
Ultimately,
based on the assistance provided by Ms. Howard and her acceptance of
responsibility for her actions, the Government filed a § 5K1.1 motion
requesting this court to depart downward from the applicable offense level
found in the Sentencing Guidelines by 11 levels. This court decided to depart
an additional level, and reduced Ms. Howard's offense level to a 13. This
categorization placed her at the lowest level of Zone D of the Sentencing
Guidelines Sentencing Table, subject to a term of imprisonment between twelve
and eighteen months.
On August
16, 2002, the court imposed a sentence of twelve months imprisonment, three
years of supervised release immediately following said term of imprisonment, a
$2,000 fine payable in monthly installments, and a mandatory $100 assessment.
n10 The court recommended that "the defendant serve her sentence at Bannum
Place in Orlando, Florida n11 and ordered that she surrender herself "for
service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of
Prisons" at a time "designated by the Probation or Pre-Trial Services
Officer." n12
The Bureau, acting pursuant to a
statutory grant of authority, decided that it should follow this court's
recommendation and ordered that Ms. Howard serve her term of imprisonment at
Bannum Place, a community corrections center, beginning on October 14, 2002.
This designation allowed Ms. Howard to continue working as a paralegal and
provide financial support for her daughter and her infant grandchild during the
daytime, but requires that she otherwise be confined to that community
corrections center ("CCC"). n13 In fact, this [*523]designation was
frequently the topic of conversation between the Government, Ms. Howard's
counsel, and this court. All parties agreed that Ms. Howard deserved a lesser
punishment due to the circumstances particular to her case. Moreover, all parties
worked together to ensure that she would have the opportunity for this
designation.
Ms. Howard
surrendered herself at the appointed place and time on October 14, 2002, and
began serving her sentence. By all accounts, Ms. Howard is a model prisoner. In
addition, her ability to work generates sufficient income to pay for the cost
of her incarceration at Bannum Place.
Meanwhile, the Department of
Justice decided to reevaluate the very statutory grant of authority that the
Bureau exercised in assigning Ms. Howard to Bannum Place. According to the
Bureau at the time of Ms. Howard's sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) gave it the
discretion to commit people convicted of Zone C and D felonies directly to CCCs
even though the federal district courts do not have such discretion in imposing
their sentences. n14 The crucial passage appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), which
is entitled "Place of imprisonment." That section provides:
The Bureau of
Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner's imprisonment. The Bureau
may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum
standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau, whether
maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise and whether within or without
the judicial district in which the person was convicted, that the Bureau
determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering--
(1) the
resources of the facility contemplated;
(2) the nature
and circumstances of the offense;
(3) the history
and characteristics of the prisoner;
(4) any
statement by the court that imposed the sentence--
(A) concerning the purposes for
which the sentence to imprisonment was determined to be warranted; or
(B) recommending a type of penal or
correctional facility as appropriate; and
(5) any
pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to
section 994(a)(2) of title 28. n15
According to the Bureau's understanding of
that section from the time it became effective in 1987 until December of 2002,
the Bureau had the authority to "designate an offender directly to a
community based facility to serve his or her sentence," though
"ordinarily this is done only with the concurrence of the sentencing
court." n16 [*524] As these remarks make perfectly clear, the Bureau's
policy was that its discretion under this statute was far more expansive than
the discretion of the district courts.
Indeed, it would have to be in
order to commit a defendant like Ms. Howard, convicted of a Zone D felony,
directly to a CCC. Conversely, the discretion of the district courts is
constrained by statute to follow the Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines") promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission"). n17 That statute provides:
The court shall
impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection
(a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described.
Guideline § 5C1.1(f), in turn, provides that "if
the applicable guideline range is in Zone D of the Sentencing Table, the
minimum term shall be satisfied by a sentence of imprisonment." n18
Compare the
applicable Guideline for a Zone C felony:
If the applicable guideline range is in Zone C of the
Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be satisfied by --
(1) a sentence of imprisonment; or
(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of
supervised release with a condition that substitutes community confinement or
home detention according to the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at
least one-half of the minimum term is satisfied by imprisonment. n19
As this language is widely understood, the distinction
it embodies between imprisonment and commitment to a CCC requires district
courts to impose imprisonment in institutions like prisons or jails, rather
than CCCs, for at least half the sentences of all Zone C felons.
Similarly, Zone D felons who must be given a
"sentence of imprisonment, " with no provisions whatsoever made for
terms served in CCCs, cannot be committed directly to CCCs by the district
courts. n20 Judges may, however, direct placement in a CCC as a condition of
supervised release after a term of imprisonment or in lieu of imprisonment as a
condition of probation for Zone A and B felons. n21 It is only when [*525] it
comes to the term of imprisonment itself that judges cannot decide on the place
it will be carried out.
But this is a general disability of the
courts. The relevant statutory scheme
grants exclusive authority to the Bureau to decide where a convict will serve
her term of imprisonment. The constraints on judges concern the threshold issue
of whether the convict is sentenced to imprisonment and committed to the Bureau
in the first place-as opposed to a sentence of probation or a fine, where no
commitment occurs. For all, and only, those convicts who are sentenced to imprisonment
are committed to the custody of the Bureau. n22 Thus, once committed, it is up
to the Bureau to decide just where the convict's sentence will be served. n23
This fact would explain why the
Commission's Guidelines even discuss the
notion of community confinement at all. The applicable Guidelines
provisions deal not with whether a court could designate any specific place of
imprisonment, because they can't, but rather with the courts' authority to
sentence convicts to terms of supervised release or probation, which only
applies to Zone A and certain Zone B felons. Over these two types of sentences,
the courts have the requisite authority under the Guidelines to direct that the
sentence be served in a CCC or by home detention. This is in stark contrast to
the inability of the judiciary to designate the place where terms of
imprisonment will be served.
According to the
well-established practice and policy in effect at the time of Ms. Howard's
sentencing, only the Bureau could deviate from these constraints upon the judiciary. But, that longstanding
practice was challenged only two months after Ms. Howard began serving her time
at Bannum Place. The Department of Justice commissioned a memorandum from the
Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") seeking an opinion whether the Bureau
had all the discretion it supposed itself to have. As the OLC read the statute
and related documents, the entire practice was "unlawful." It
concluded that rather than grant the Bureau complete discretion in assigning prisoners,
18 U.S.C. § 3621 actually cabins its discretion within the same constraints
that are placed on the federal judiciary by the Sentencing Commission. In a
sense, the OLC has, with respect to sentencing discretion, assigned the
judiciary and the Bureau as bunkmates under the guidance of the Sentencing
Commission's camp counselor.
This change in policy took
effect rapidly right around the Christmas holidays of 2002. Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General M. Edward Whelan III of the OLC released a memorandum
opinion entitled "Bureau of Prisons' Practice of Placing in Community
Confinement Certain Offenders Who Have Received Sentences of Imprisonment"
("OLC Memo"), on December 13, 2002. n24 The OLC Memo concluded that
the Bureau acted unlawfully in placing Zone C and Zone D felons directly into
CCCs.
On December 20, 2002, Kathleen
Hawk Sawyer, then-Director of the Bureau, sent her own memorandum to federal
judges informing them of the conclusion of the OLC Memo and that the Bureau no
longer would follow its prior practice. Under a new Bureau "policy,"
future felons sentenced [*526] to terms of imprisonment would never be
committed directly to CCCs under any circumstances and regardless of what
sentencing judges recommend. Though the OLC Memo does not discuss the matter,
it also appears that the new "policy" applies equally to Zone B felons, or any felon who is sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, because it is the Government's position that the phrase "term
of imprisonment" as it appears in 18 U.S.C. § 3621 does not include time
spent in CCCs. n25
Also buried at the bottom of
that memorandum was the following notice:
This procedure
change will be implemented prospectively, with the following exception. Inmates
designated to CCCs who, as of December 16, 2002, had more than 150 days
remaining to serve on their prison terms, will be re-designated by the Bureau
to prison institutions.
Neither the
memorandum nor any other communication provided to this court has offered to
explain the rationale for the determination that the new "policy"
should be applied in a selectively retroactive manner. n26 Nevertheless,
retroactively applied it was. In yet another memorandum, n27 dated December 30,
2002, Callie P. Farr, Community Corrections Manager, informed Ms Howard that:
You will be re-designated by the Bureau of
Prisons (Bureau) to a prison or jail institution within the next 45 days, but
not sooner than 30 days from receipt of this notice, for continued service of
your prison sentence.
Your transfer results from a
Bureau procedure change, which complies with recent guidance from the U.S.
Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), finding that the term
"community confinement" is not synonymous with
"imprisonment."
This memorandum also informed Ms. Howard
that the "policy" would be applied retroactively--a point she no
doubt picked up in reading the first sentence. Though it explained the decision
to change the discretion policy-insofar as the synonymy argument is an
explanation-it did not provide any rationale for its retroactivity. The
memorandum concluded by informing Ms. Howard that "if you are dissatisfied
with this decision, you may challenge it through the Bureau's administrative
remedy program." n28
[*527] Immediately after receiving
this memorandum, Ms. Howard challenged the "policy" through the
Bureau's administrative remedy process. The Bureau denied Ms. Howard's initial
challenge, and she subsequently appealed. Although a ruling has still not been
issued on her appeal as of the date of this Ruling, the Bureau sought to
transfer Ms. Howard from Bannum Place to the federal corrections facility on
January 30, 2003 anyway and still seeks to transfer her post haste. n29
Accordingly, on January 28, 2003, Ms. Howard filed a Motion to Vacate, Set
Aside and/or Correct her Sentence and a Motion to Stay her transfer. This court
issued an Order granting a TRO on that same day.
Since the issuance of that TRO, Ms. Howard
has filed a civil action alleging violations of several laws of the United
States, including the APA. She is seeking a preliminary and/or permanent
injunction to prevent the reassignment from taking place. In the alternative,
she asks this court to vacate her sentence and re-sentence her under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.
II. JURISDICTION
The
Government asserts that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear Ms.
Howard's complaints about
her treatment under the new Bureau "policy." Ms. Howard, meanwhile,
proposes several possible bases for the court to exercise its authority. First,
she argues, the court may take action under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) or Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 35 to modify her sentence in the light of the subsequent
administrative "clarifications" of the binding law. Second, the court
may exercise its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to hear any claim
attacking the validity of her sentence or conviction. Finally, she asserts that
the court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 to hear her claim that the Government has violated the her rights under
the APA.
Before deciding which procedural
mechanism allows the court to act on Ms. Howard's case, the court must
distinguish her claims and the actions of which they complain. n30 As discussed
above, Ms. Howard's [*528] primary complaint concerns a series of actions taken
by various bureaucrats within various branches of the Department of Justice.
She objects to the imposition of a new "policy" upon the procedures
of the Bureau that issued from the Department of Justice.
That new "policy" was
based wholly, as far as the court can determine, on the OLC Memo. The OLC Memo
expresses the opinion that it is unlawful for the Bureau to place convicts
directly in CCCs rather than in penal facilities such as prisons or jails. n31
She objects to this interpretation as well as the method of its adoption. Ms.
Howard also objects to the separate decision, apparently taken by another
official at the Department of Justice or the Bureau, to apply this
"policy" retroactively so that it affects people like herself, who
was well into her term at a CCC by the time she received notice that she would
be transferred into a federal prison.
Her complaints, already legion, march on.
She also claims that the complained of bureaucratic declaration and the
decisions that seek to effectuate it have infected the validity of her initial
sentence. They have done so, she argues, by uprooting and throwing out the
settled background assumptions against which the court exercised its discretion
at the time it made its sentencing
decision. She urges that the new "policy" vitiates the court's
intentions in imposing the sentence it did.
Then, Ms. Howard challenges the
validity of several actions of several individuals that will, left unchanged or
unchecked and taken together, take her out of her community and throw her into
a prison, despite initial judicial and agency determinations that to do so
would not be in anyone's best interest in this case. Some of these acts are
administrative and may be attacked directly insofar as they affect the Ms.
Howard's interests. The same administrative acts may be attacked insofar as
they affect the manner in which her sentence will be served. Others concern the
imposition of Ms. Howard's sentence itself.
However, only those claims that attack the
validity of Ms. Howard's sentence can be brought here under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Her complaints regarding the manner of her imprisonment must be filed via a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Middle
District of Florida, where she is serving her term. n32 The distinction between
the two habeas causes of action is clear. Both offer post-conviction relief,
but the relief available and the court that a prisoner must petition are often distinct.
A. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
A 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 petition for post-conviction relief allows an inmate to attack the
validity of a conviction or sentence collaterally and must be sought in the
sentencing court. n33 Section 2255 reads:
A prisoner
in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution [*529] or laws of the United States, or that the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence
was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to
collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set
aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for
such relief may be made at any time.
[...]
If the court
finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence
imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or
that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights
of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate
and set the judgment aside and shall discharge [or resentence the prisoner] or
grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. n34
Among Ms. Howard's assertions is the claim that the
subsequent change in the law-even assuming it was legitimate-undermined the
validity of her sentence. This court is the proper court to hear this claim because
it is the here that her sentence was imposed in the first place. Consequently,
as an initial matter, Ms. Howard has brought the right kind of claim to the
proper court.
There is,
however, one remaining potential barrier to the court's taking jurisdiction
over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That is the Government's argument that
this court does not have jurisdiction to hear a section 2255 claim because,
even if Ms. Howard has been wronged, the quantum of that wrong is insufficient
to warrant review under the federal habeas statute. A section 2255 remedy requires that the wrong be constitutional,
jurisdictional, or of fundamental unfairness. That, the Government argues, Ms.
Howard cannot do, and it refers the court to the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Addonizio. n35
Addonizio
presents facts that are somewhat similar to those in this case. In 1970, Mr.
Addonizio, once the Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, found himself up for
sentencing after being convicted of 63 counts of extortion and one count of
conspiracy to extort. The presiding judge sentenced Mr. Addonizio to a ten-year
term of imprisonment. n36 He made this sentence, he later said, under the
impression "that petitioner would be actually confined for a period of
approximately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence."
n37
The district
judge formed this expectation based on the "fact that [Mr. Addonizio] was
a first-offender and that there appeared to be little probability of
recidivism" as well as his understanding that these were the primary
factors used to determine when and whether to offer parole to a convict. n38 As
it turned out, the Parole Commission frustrated the district judge's
expectations by adopting new parole procedures. Specifically, the Parole
Commission determined that the gravity of the offense should be a significant
factor at parole hearings. The Parole Commission started using its new
guidelines on a trial basis in 1972, published them in the Federal Register and
began using them throughout the country in 1973, and later codified them at 28
CFR § 22.20 (1978). n39
[*530] Based
on the gravity of Mr. Addonizio's offenses--extreme breach of the public trust--the Parole Commission
twice rejected his applications for parole when he applied in 1975. n40 Mr.
Addonizio brought a motion under section 2255 to vacate and resentence. The
sentencing judge reduced his sentence to time served and the Second Circuit
affirmed.
The Supreme
Court, however, reversed this decision on the ground that the district court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter because "subsequent actions taken by the Parole Commission--whether
or not such actions accord with a trial judge's expectations at the time of
sentencing--do not retroactively affect the validity of the final judgment
itself." n41 The Supreme Court pointed out that "an error that may
justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral
attack on a final judgment" because the interests of finality and judicial
economy require that closed cases be reopened only for very serious reasons.
n42
According to
the Court, only three kinds of reason are sufficient: (1) claims of
constitutional error; (2) claims that the court lacked jurisdiction; and (3)
claims that the court committed an error of fact or law of a fundamental
character that "rendered the proceeding itself irregular and
invalid." n43 The Supreme Court's holding and rationale compel the same
result in this case, the Government argues, because this court's expectations
are no more entitled to be carried out than were the expectations of the
district judge in Addonizio. It argues that, as a matter of law, the later
activities of the Department of Justice and the Bureau could not have infected
the proceedings in this court so fundamentally as to give this court
jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The court
respectfully differs with the Government on this matter. There are many
distinctions between the facts of Addonizio and the facts of this case. The
district judge in Addonizio merely expected that the Parole Commission would
operate under its old rules. His reliance was in the nature of an idle
expectation based on an understanding of "how things work." Moreover,
the Parole Commission followed the requisite rulemaking procedures and
eventually promulgated rules regarding the grant of probation that frustrated
the district judge's intentions when, four or five years after the sentencing
the Parole Commission applied those rules to Mr. Addonizio.
In this
case, however, the court was not merely or idly speculating. The Bureau was on
record that it had the discretion to commit certain classes of convict to
imprisonment in CCCs. It published that view in 1998 in Policy Statement
7310.04. n44 It has also published the view as recently as 2000 in a reference
manual for the judiciary. n45 [*531] U.S. Attorneys, now compelled to spend
hours fighting to move the affected convicts, once collaborated with the
sentencing judges to ensure that these people were assigned to CCCs. In many
instances, after having accomplished the goal of achieving these assignments,
the U.S. Attorneys are now whipsawed by the new "policy" back into
court to stand before the same judges in a much more adversarial position.
Also, unlike parole hearings,
placement in a penal institution is a part of the sentencing process. In Ms.
Howard's case, that process was fully completed and she was assigned to a CCC
before the Government stepped in brandishing its new "policy."
Conversely, in Addonizio, the felon was convicted and served some four or five
years before he ever went before the Parole Commission--his process was not yet
complete.
Additionally, no one in Ms. Howard's case was working off of mere
expectancies. The Bureau, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the court, Ms. Howard,
and her attorney all knew what would happen to her. She would be taken into
custody at the Bureau, they would look at the particulars of her case, and
given the nature of the crimes and the recommendation of the court, they would
assign her to a CCC so that she could maintain her connections to her community
while at the same time giving up much of her freedom in order to pay back her
debt to that same community. And that is precisely what happened. Until, that
is, a bureaucrat in an office in Washington D.C. determined that the entire
legal world had been acting under the same shared "unlawful" fantasy
for decades and acted to bring us all back into step with his vision of the
law.
Ultimately,
however, it is the judgment of this court that this phase of the analysis does
not concern jurisdiction to hear these claims. The remarks about jurisdiction
in Addonizio and propounded by the Government in this case concern the district
courts' jurisdiction to vacate sentences, not their jurisdiction to consider
whether the claimed violation is serious enough to warrant such a measure. n46
In
Addonizio, the Supreme Court wrote,
"under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to discharge or
resentence defendant if it concludes that it 'was subject to collateral
attack.'" n47 This remark does not indicate that the court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the due process claim. Instead, it indicates that, having
heard the claim and decided that the alleged injury is not of constitutional
magnitude, the court cannot reclaim jurisdiction over the sentence and alter it
anyway.
Courts that
have rejected due process claims in section 2255 cases make this point plainly
evident. n48 Moreover, the court has been referred to three recent cases that
reached and rejected the merits [*532] of the due process claims brought by
complainants under this new "policy." n49 All three refer to the
governing due process standard for fairness at sentencing hearings--that a
sentencing within Guideline limits can be altered if the judge relied on
materially false information in imposing the sentence--and all three reject the
due process argument based in part on the claim that these courts did not in
fact rely on the former Bureau practice and policy of direct CCC committments.
n50 Therefore, this court concludes that the Government's jurisdictional
arguments are more properly considered arguments on the merits and will
consider them as such.
B.
Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Ms. Howard
has stated claims under the APA as well. She argues that the new
"policy" is actually a substantive rulemaking that could not be put
in place until the Bureau undertook the notice and comment procedures required
by section 552 of the APA, even if it were an acceptable interpretation of the
statute. She also claims that the Bureau's "policy" is based on a
clearly erroneous interpretation of the Crime Control Act of 1984 and thus, it
is unenforceable against her. Because both of these claims state a cause of
action "arising under" the laws of the United States, the court has
jurisdiction to hear these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. n51
C.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In its most
recent filing with the court, the Government has asserted another jurisdictional
argument based on the "exhaustion of remedies" doctrine. n52 Unlike
subject matter jurisdiction, there is an exception to the jurisdictional
requirement that Ms. Howard exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing
suit. Moreover, the court finds that the exception, namely futility, applies
here.
The
Government claims that the court cannot review the Bureau's agency action or
Ms. Howard's sentencing because she has not exhausted her administrative
remedies. The Fifth Circuit has held that before bringing habeus claims,
"a federal prisoner seeking only injunctive relief must first exhaust the
administrative remedies provided by the Bureau of Prisons." n53 Similarly,
to challenge an agency action under the Administrative Procedures Act, that
action must be a "final agency action." n54 The Bureau has procedures
available that would allow her to appeal her re-designation. Those procedures
are provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19.
[*533] The
administrative appeals process has three steps. First, the inmate must submit a
"formal written Administrative Remedy Request, on the appropriate form
(BP-9)" with the Community Corrections Manager ("CCM") twenty
days from the act challenged. n55 The CCM has 20 days to respond to the
request. n56 The inmate then has twenty more days to appeal to the Regional
Director, n57 who has thirty days to respond. n58 If the inmate is still
dissatisfied with the result, she may appeal to the General Counsel within an
additional thirty days. n59 The General Counsel has forty days to respond. n60
Ms. Howard admits that she has begun taking these steps, but the process has
not been completed. Thus, the Government argues, she admits that she has no
case before this court.
The court,
on the other hand, finds that Ms. Howard need not continue tilting at the
administrative windmills in her particular case. While the Government is correct that the exhaustion doctrine
normally bars direct resort to the courts, that is not true where pursuing
administrative remedies would be futile, "because it is clear that the
claim will be rejected." n61 Where an agency has adopted a new rule or
policy and announced that it will follow that policy, especially where that
policy has its origin above the Bureau's General Counsel Office, it is
pointless to require a complainant to follow the administrative procedure.
This result
is dictated by the Government's unwavering position that the Bureau's old
practice was "unlawful," which means that the people who would review
Ms. Howard's claims in the Bureau have absolutely no power to alter her
designation. Moreover, the interpretation underpinning the new
"policy" was handed down from on high in the Department of Justice.
Thus, it appears clear to the court that an administrative appeal could only
work to delay this matter. n62
In fact, the
court believes that an administrative appeal would be more than futile in this
case; it would completely destroy any hope that Ms. Howard has of avoiding
redesignation and transfer to a federal prison. Even if Ms. Howard continued
her appeals in the administrative fora in no time at all, the Bureau would have
at least ninety days, all together, to respond to her requests for relief.
Additionally, even though she filed a Request for Administrative Remedy soon
after the very day she received her redesignation letter, she is still in the
middle of her first appeal and the Bureau wants to shuttle her off to prison
anyway. Thus, not only is it evident that she would not receive relief on
appeal, it is also evident that she would be sent to prison and will serve for
some months before she ever would have had an opportunity to bring her claim
before a tribunal--a federal district court--that could actually afford her
relief.
[*534] And
of course, Ms. Howard could not have exhausted her administrative remedies in
no time at all. It is entirely likely she would be released, or nearing release
before she ever got to federal court. By that time, the matter will likely
become moot. Under no conception of justice and due process is that an
acceptable result. Accordingly, the court finds that Ms. Howard need not have
exhausted the administrative appeals process and may pursue her claims in this
court.
The
Government also argues that the exhaustion requirement is stricter than normal
because the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") imposes a greater
exhaustion burden on prisoners than what is required of other citizens. That
Act states, "no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted." n63 While it is certainly true that this
provision does destroy the futility exception in some cases, it is equally
certain that it does not do so here. Much like the general futility exception
to the exhaustion of remedy requirement, where a petitioner not only is unable
to prevail by going through the proper procedures as a matter of plain agency
policy, but by doing so would be completely deprived of any hope of relief, the
exhaustion requirement under the PLRA does not bar relief in the courts. n64
The reason
for this rule is that where futility of such an extreme sort is present, the
administrative remedies either do not exist or they are de facto exhausted. The
Supreme Court recognized this result as a presupposition of the terms
"available" and "remedy" in the PLRA. n65 "Some redress for a wrong is presupposed
by the statute's requirement of an 'available' 'remedy'; neither [party] argues
that exhaustion is required where the relevant administrative procedure lacks
authority to provide any relief or to take any action whatsoever in response to
a complaint." n66
Therefore,
if the court believes the Government will stick to its oft repeated assertion
that the old Bureau practice and policy was "unlawful," then the court can safely conclude that the
administrative officials within the Bureau lack the authority to offer Ms.
Howard relief. Hence, the exhaustion requirement is therefore satisfied and Ms.
Howard may properly bring her suit in this court.
III. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD, ANALYSIS, AND
CONCLUSIONS
In order
to prevail on her motion for preliminary injunction under either of her causes
of action, Ms. Howard must establish that: (1) there is a substantial
likelihood that she will prevail on the merits; (2) there is a substantial
threat that the she will suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary
injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury to her outweighs the threatened
injury to the Government; and, (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not
disserve the public interest. n67
Ms. Howard
presents claims under two very differing theories of law, however, a winning
argument under either theory will entitle her to the issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The critical question with regard [*535] to this motion for a
preliminary injunction, is whether Ms. Howard can show that she has a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. All of the other
factors, irreparable injury, balance of harms, and public interest weigh in her
favor. For completeness, the court will briefly explore these factors first.
There is no doubt that Ms.
Howard would be irreparably injured if she were transferred from Bannum Place.
Any dignity she had managed to recover would be lost. She would suffer
financially and would be joined in that fate by her extended family who rely on
her for financial and emotional support. Were the court later to rule in her
favor, she would essentially have no relief at all.
Similarly, the balance of harms favors Ms.
Howard as well. By allowing her to remain at Bannum Place until a final ruling
on the merits, she will be able to continue paying for the costs of her
incarceration. Any governmental interest in transferring her is outweighed by
the costs of doing so, and the costs of incarcerating her at a location where
she will not be able to continue paying the associated bill. Moreover, because
the Bureau has already designated Bannum Place as the location of Ms. Howard's
imprisonment and she has already served a third of her sentence there, there is
no potential harm to the public interest in allowing her to remain there.
Indeed, the only particularized
government evaluation of its own interests
regarding Ms. Howard's incarceration is that provided by the Bureau in
assigning her to Bannum Place in the first place. She has been a model
prisoner, and allowing her to remain ensures that her ties to the community and
her continued rehabilitation are not crippled. Surely the public interest in
returning criminals to society as good citizens living life on the right side
of the law outweighs the Bureau's interest in enforcing a new rule
retroactively by transferring her to a new location for a few months.
Additionally, any "tough on crime" message the Government wishes to
send by making these redesignations has already made its dent in the national
consciousness. n68
[*536] Therefore, on the basis of the above
and the Government's failure to offer any argument in opposition, the court
concludes that Ms. Howard has met her
burden, and a preliminary injunction ruling in her favor is warranted on these
factors. The remaining factor that this court must resolve is whether Ms.
Howard has demonstrated that she is substantially likely to prevail on the
merits of her claims. Each of her claims
will be addressed in turn.
A. The APA
Claims-Rulemaking
The majority of Ms. Howard's
civil claims are encompassed by the APA. This is because the bulk of her federal
constitutional claims are more properly considered as part of her 28 U.S.C. §
2241 claim, which has been brought in the appropriate United States District
Court in the Middle District of Florida where she is incarcerated. As a general matter, the APA applies to all
federal agencies, including the Bureau. n69 There are a few limitations to the
applicability of the APA to the Bureau, however, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3625.
These limitations have no applicability in cases such as this, where the challenge
is not an adjudication of an individual case, but instead, a challenge to a
rulemaking. n70
At the outset, the court
observes that the "policy" change enacted by the Bureau by the stroke
of a bureaucratic pen in the waning days of 2002 looks a whole lot like a
"rule" for the purposes of the APA.
The APA defines the term "rule" as "an agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law ...." The Bureau's new "policy" of
prohibiting direct commitment of convicts to CCC's under any circumstances, and
the redesignation of previously committed convicts like Ms. Howard because she
had more than 150 days left to serve are most certainly "statement[s] of
general applicability" designed to carry out the law.
Under ordinary circumstances, an
agency that wishes to issue a rule must abide by the APA's notice and comment
procedures. Additionally, although agency "interpretations" are not
typically subject to notice and comment procedures, n71 when an interpretation
departs from a longstanding agency practice, it too must be promulgated under
the general APA notice and comment procedures. n72 There is no doubt that the
new Bureau "policy" is the exact opposite from its past policy and
practice with regard to direct CCC commitments. Thus, under either rulemaking
theory, it is highly probable that the
court could conclude that the Bureau has issued a "rule" that
requires notice and comment.
The Department of Justice and the Bureau
admit that they have not complied with the requirement for notice and comment.
Therefore, Ms. Howard has shown a likelihood of success on the merits that the
"rule," and its application, are invalid, thereby making a
preliminary injunction on this issue warranted.
[*537] B.
APA Claims-Validity of the New Interpretation
Even if notice and comment were
not required, the court still must consider whether the Bureau's
"interpretation" leading up to its new "policy" was a
permissible construction of the relevant statute. In reaching this
determination, the question the court faces is whether confinement in a
community corrections center is a form of imprisonment under the statute. If it
is a form of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), then the Bureau would have
a clear grant of statutory authority to exercise its discretion and place
people convicted of Zone C and Zone D felonies directly to CCCs, despite the
fact that federal district courts do not have that authority under the
Guidelines. n73
On
the other hand, if such confinement is not a form of imprisonment, then the scope of the Bureau's discretion to
designate places of imprisonment does not reach CCCs and the Bureau may not
assign inmates to those institutions unless it acts under some other grant of
authority. The court begins by noting that the Department of Justice appears to
be the proper agency to undertake to interpret the statutory provisions
concerning the Bureau. n74 As such, its interpretation may be due some measure
of deference.
Review of
an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers is typically a two
step process. First, the court must consider whether "Congress has
directly spoken to the issue." n75 "If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." n76
If the court determines that the statute is ambiguous, however, then the court
must determine the appropriate degree of deference given the nature of the
agency's interpretation and evaluate the interpretation in that light. n77
Where, as here, the "policy" in question is only, in form at least, a
"policy statement," this court owes the Department of Justice's
interpretation some, but only some, deference. n78 Ultimately, however, the
court finds that Ms. Howard is substantially likely to prevail on her claim
that the interpretation by the Department of Justice that underpins the
Bureau's new "policy" is inconsistent with the plain meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 3621.
The court
looks first to the language of the statute that purports to give the Bureau
some measure of discretion:
(a) A person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment ... shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.
[...]
(b) The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of
the prisoner's imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or
correctional facility [*538] that meets minimum standards of health and
habitability. n79
It could not be clearer from this language that Congress granted the Bureau a rather broad
discretion to appoint the places where prisoners will serve their terms of
imprisonment. Subsection 3621(a) directs that people who must serve terms of
imprisonment be given over to the custody of the Bureau. The first sentence of
subsection 3621(b) uses mandatory language to create a duty in the Bureau to do
something with the prisoners in their custody, namely, to place them. The
second sentence in that subsection uses language of empowerment which tells the
Bureau where it may place such prisoners. According to that second sentence,
the Bureau's discretion extends to "any available penal or correctional facility."
Thus, the statute commits certain people to the custody of the Bureau, directs
that the Bureau do something to place people so committed, and grants the
Bureau the authority to choose the place of imprisonment from among available
penal or correctional institutions.
In this
language, there is no suggestion of any
limitation on the Bureau's authority except that the facility chosen must: (1)
be a "penal or correctional facility"; and, (2) meet "minimum
standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau." There is
no controversy over this later limitation on the Bureau's imprisonment power.
Therefore, the only apparent limitation
on the Bureau is that it choose a place that is a "penal or correctional
facility." n80
So, the
question the court faces would appear to have evolved into the question whether
community confinement centers are penal or correctional institutions. If they
are, the statute plainly says that the Bureau may commit people sentenced to
terms of imprisonment to them. On the direction and assurances of higher courts
than this, the court will consider, for guidance, definitions of the terms
"penal" and "correctional" to decipher what meaning to
impute to those term in the statute. It becomes obvious, without going far,
that a community corrections center is in fact a penal or correctional
institution.
According to
the Oxford English Dictionary, something is properly characterized as
"penal" if it is:
1. Of, pertaining to, or relating to punishment. (a.)
Having as its object the infliction of punishment, punitive; prescribing or
enacting the punishment to be inflicted for an offence or transgression ...
(c.) Having the nature or character of punishment; constituting punishment;
inflicted as, or in the way of, punishment ... (e.) Used or appointed as a
place of punishment. (f.) Involving, connected with, or characterized by, a
penalty or legal punishment. (g.) Of, pertaining to, or subject to the penal
laws, penal servitude, etc. n81
Dictionary wars being what they are in the courts
today, some would perhaps prefer the perspective of an American source.
According to the American Heritage Dictionary "penal" means:
Of, relating to, or prescribing punishment, as for
breaking the law. Subject to punishment; legally punishable: a penal offense.
Serving as or constituting a means or place of punishment. n82
[*539] As either of these common definitions
demonstrate, a penal facility is a
facility that people are committed to as a form of punishment.
Meanwhile,
to be "correctional" is defined somewhat unhelpfully by the Oxford
English Dictionary as, "of or pertaining to correction; corrective."
n83 More helpfully, the American Heritage Dictionary tells us that, in the
appropriate context, "correctional" means, "punishment intended
to rehabilitate or improve." n84 Thus, the court is again faced with a
basic matter, namely, whether CCCs are facilities that serve the purpose of
punishing, correcting, or rehabilitating prisoners. If they do, then it is
apparently within the Bureau's authority to make direct commitments to them.
After review
and reflection on this matter, the
court finds that CCCs are facilities for the purpose of punishment,
rehabilitation, and/or correction. Indeed, the court cannot imagine what other
purpose these facilities might reasonably serve. This finding is consistent
with the Bureau's own understanding of the function and purposes of CCCs. n85
In fact, even the Sentencing Commission has expressed that view in a joint
report issued with the Bureau:
Community correction centers (CCC) provide two program
components within their facilities: a pre-release component and a community
corrections component. [...] The community corrections component is designed to
be sufficiently punitive to be a legitimate sanction. n86
Moreover, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, relied
upon by the Government to argue that Ms. Howard cannot bring her claim because
she has not exhausted her administrative remedies, applies its exhaustion
standard to "any jail, prison, or other correctional facility." n87
And, the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the phrase "correctional
facility" to apply to the Colorado state counterpart to CCCs and thus to
require that inmates in community correction centers exhaust their administrative
remedies before bringing suit. n88 Thus, it appears quite compelling that the
Bureau has the discretion to make direct commitments to CCCs.
Despite this
apparently clear statutory grant of authority, the Government now informs the
court that the Bureau's discretion is in fact limited. The Bureau can no more
commit a person in its custody to a CCC than it could commit her to a turn on a
merry-go-round. The reason, according to the Government, is that neither of
these locations is a "place of imprisonment." This language, the
Government argues, collapses the Bureau's discretionary powers before it ever
comes time to decide among penal or correctional institutions. Therefore, under
the Government's interpretation of the statutory language: (1) the courts send
the Bureau people sentenced to terms of imprisonment; n89 (2) the Bureau must
place them in places of imprisonment; n90 and, (3) the Bureau may choose the
places of imprisonment from [*540] among the set of available penal or
correctional facilities that qualify as places of imprisonment. n91
There are several difficulties
with this argument. In the first instance, it is deeply counterintuitive that
the phrase "place of imprisonment" is meant to be a limitation upon
what everyone acknowledges to be the much broader phrase "penal or
correctional institution." Additionally, the statute does not simply speak
of "penal or correctional" facilities; it speaks of any penal or
correctional facility. Imagine a mother calling her child and saying, "On
the way home, go to the store and pick up some Coke. n92 You can pick up any
kind of soda you like." If on returning home the mother became angry at
her child for picking up Mr. Pibb TM, everyone would properly regard the mother
as irrational. If she really meant "Coca-ColaTM" by "Coke"
as opposed to something more generic or general, then she would not have given
her child the apparent discretion to choose any "soda" she liked. The
general term in the second sentence only makes sense if the seemingly specific
term in the first sentence had a broader meaning than might otherwise be
apparent.
This is why the Government's
interpretation based on the OLC Memo is implausible. According to the OLC Memo,
Congress has told the Bureau: "Whenever the courts send you an inmate, put
her in a prison or jail. You are free to choose from all the prisons, jails,
and community confinement centers." The only sensible way to understand
the interplay between the phrases "place of imprisonment" and "any penal or correctional
facility" is to read the latter as giving content to the former, just as
the phrase "any soda" gives content to the term "Coke" in
the example above. Thus, what Congress has actually expressed to the Bureau is
the following: "You must place inmates sent to you into some place of
imprisonment. By that we mean, place them into a penal or correctional
facility; you choose which one." So long as community confinement centers
are viewed as penal or correctional facilities, they would also be "place
of imprisonment" under the statute.
Moreover, the court finds that
community confinement centers are "places of imprisonment" as that
phrase is most naturally understood. The American Heritage Dictionary defines
"imprisonment" as "to put in or as if in prison; confine."
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "imprisonment" as "the
action of imprisoning, or fact or condition of being imprisoned; detention in a
prison or place of confinement; close or irksome confinement; 'forcible
restraint within bounds'; incarceration." Placement in a CCC allows an
inmate to leave the CCC for the purpose of employment, but otherwise requires
the inmate to be in the CCC. As the joint report by the Sentencing Commission
and the Bureau point out, "except for employment and other required
activities, offenders in the CCC component must remain in the facility at all
times." n93
The parties to this case agree that Ms.
Howard travels to her job, Monday through Friday, receives limited one to
three-hour passes to visit her family, attend counseling, or religious services
on a weekly basis, but is otherwise confined to the Bannum Place. This most
certainly qualifies as confinement as most people would understand it.
[*541] While
community confinement centers no doubt are less confining than prisons or
jails, they nevertheless impose heavily on the freedom of inmates to come and
go as they choose. The inmates do not return to their homes. They do not set
their own schedules. They are confined for all practical purposes and under the
control of the Government through its agents. The degree of confinement is not
determinative of whether these inmates are confined. n94 Therefore, the court
cannot escape the conclusions that a
term served in a CCC is a term of confinement and that a term of confinement is
a term of imprisonment, as used in 18 U.S.C. § 3621.
Attention to
the larger statutory context confirms this view. Section 3551 authorizes only three categories of sentence: (1) terms
of probation, (2) fines, and (3) terms of imprisonment. n95 Subsection 3551(b)
provides:
An individual found guilty of an offense shall be
sentenced, in accordance with the provisions of section 3553, to--
(1) a term of probation as authorized by subchapter B;
(2) a fine as authorized by subchapter C; or
(3) a term of imprisonment as authorized by subchapter
D.
Of these three kinds of sentences, community
confinement clearly falls into the last category. Community confinement is
neither a fine nor a form of probation. Under a term of probation, a convict is
essentially free to come and go as she chooses. Community confinement center
inmates live at these facilities. They may be free to hold jobs in the
community, but they are not merely on supervised release. If community
confinement is a valid form of sentence, then it is a form of imprisonment
under the statute.
It does not matter that the
federal district courts are constrained to a greater degree than the Bureau.
Though courts have an institutional incentive to recognize the greatest scope
for judicial authority, they also have an institutional duty to allow that
other institutions surpass them when the law so requires. Thus, the court finds
that the Bureau has greater authority to assign prisoners to CCCs than the
court itself does. It is the job of the court, under the statutory scheme, to
impose sentences. It is the job of the Bureau to decide where those sentences
are to be served.
It is for this reason that the court finds
the bulk of the reasoning of the Government's arguments based on the OLC Memo
to be a series of non sequiturs because that document relies on a misconception
of the authority of the Sentencing
Commission. The Commission clearly has
the statutory authority to limit the discretion of the federal district courts
in sentencing matters. And, the federal district courts are explicitly directed
to conform their sentences to the Sentencing Commission Guidelines. n96 But,
the Commission's authority does not touch that of the Bureau and the Bureau's
discretion is nowhere hemmed in by the Guidelines.
[*542] This is because the Commission's enabling statute gives it
authority only over the sentencing of the courts, not the decisions of the
Bureau. Section 994(a) calls on the Commission to "promulgate and
distribute to all courts of the United States and to the United States
Probation System--(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a
sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case,
including" whether to impose a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or a
fine, the appropriate quantum of such punishment, whether to include a term of
supervised release, and whether terms will run consecutively or concurrently.
n97 No provision in the Commission's enabling statute even mentions places of
imprisonment, much less the statutory section that purports to give the Bureau
its authority. In fact, section 994 makes no mention of authority over the
Bureau at all. The only reference in that section to the Bureau is as a
partner. n98 Indeed, it is evident from the relevant statutes that the
Sentencing Commission has authority over sentencing while the Bureau has
authority over designating where and carrying sentences out. Therefore, the court
concludes that the Sentencing Commission has no authority over placement
matters and that its Guidelines are not binding on the Bureau.
Yet, the Government relies for its
interpretation of "imprisonment" in 18 U.S.C. § 3621 largely on the
way that the Sentencing Commission has used the terms "imprisonment"
and "community confinement" in promulgating the Guidelines. The
Government is specifically concerned that there be some measure of consistency
between the language of Guideline § 5C1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Subsection (d)
of that Guideline provides:
If the applicable
guideline range is in Zone C of the Sentencing Table, the minimum term may be
satisfied by --
(1) a sentence
of imprisonment; or
II. a sentence
of imprisonment that includes a [*543] term of supervised release with a
condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to
the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one-half of the minimum
term is satisfied by imprisonment. n99
It is evident,
the Government argues, that the Sentencing Commission does not regard placement
in a community confinement center to be imprisonment. Otherwise, it would not
allow placement in a CCC, only then to require that at least half of each term
be satisfied by "imprisonment. " If a CCC term were a term of
"imprisonment," there would be no need for this caveat. Therefore,
the Government concludes, service of a sentence in a CCC is not
"imprisonment" under that Guideline.
As an initial matter, the court believes
that the Government's interpretation is mistaken. As the court reads it, this
particular Guideline treats community confinement as a subclass of
imprisonment. When a court under Guideline § 5C1.1(d) decides it is appropriate
to split the sentence of a person convicted of a Zone C felony, this Guideline
actually allows the court to substitute a lesser for greater form of
confinement. The Guideline commentary is helpful on this point.
For example, where the guideline range is
8-14 months, a sentence of four months imprisonment followed by a term of
supervised release with a condition requiring four months community confinement
or home detention would satisfy the minimum term of imprisonment required by
the guideline range. n100
Thus, where the
Guideline table requires a minimum term of imprisonment, the Guidelines are the
federal courts to satisfy it by either service of the sentence in a prison or
in a community confinement center.
While the Guidelines do draw a distinction
here between community confinement and imprisonment, the more natural reading
is that community confinement is a form of imprisonment rather than a distinct
classification of punishment. The Guidelines say that a court may impose a
"sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with
a condition that substitutes community confinement." This language
suggests that community confinement is part of the term of imprisonment because
the overall term is supposed to be a "term of imprisonment" and the
Guidelines permit courts to impose a term of supervised release for half of
that term.
But, the courts can only avail themselves
of that option if they require that supervised release portion to be served in
a CCC or by home detention. Thus, if one views time spent in a CCC is a term of
imprisonment, then the Guidelines are actually requiring the courts to put
these convicts in places of imprisonment for their entire sentence. So, while
the Guidelines permit courts to have the added authority to designate a
particular CCC in this "split sentence" scenario, the convict is
still committed to the Bureau for the other half of the imprisonment term.
Under the reading of the statute adopted by this court--and by the rest of the
world before December of 2002--the Bureau would then have the discretion to
place such convicts into either prisons, jails, or community confinement
centers for that half of the imprisonment term.
In any event, the court need not find that
the Sentencing Commission regards community confinement as a form of
imprisonment to decide that the Government's interpretation based on the OLC
Memo is impermissible because the Sentencing Commission does not have any
authority over the Bureau. Even if the Sentencing Commission was steadfastly
committed to the distinction between community confinement and imprisonment,
that fact would not affect the discretion of the Bureau under 18 U.S.C. § 3621
because the Commission lacks the requisite authority.
The second
source of authority proposed by the Government for its interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 3621 are several judicial opinions interpreting the terms
"imprisonment" and "community confinement" in the
Sentencing Guidelines. n101 These citations are inapt for the same reason. If
the [*544]Sentencing Commission has no authority to constrain the Bureau, then
judicial opinions interpreting the meaning of the Guidelines as they apply to
the courts are irrelevant. These opinions address the question whether
"community confinement" is "imprisonment" within the
meaning of the Guidelines. It is a separate question whether community
confinement is a form of imprisonment under a statute that fleshes out the concept
of "place of imprisonment" by using the term "any penal or
correctional facility." Hence, the OLC, and subsequently, the Government,
were mistaken to rely so heavily for their interpretation on these decisions.
The final source of authority
relied on by the Government is 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c), which concerns pre-release
custody. According to the OLC Memo, and subsequently, the Government, that
section specifically constrains the Bureau's discretion to place inmates
directly into community confinement centers. In fact, the Government's position
is that this section demands that the Bureau never place anyone sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of any kind to a CCC for more than ten percent of her term
of imprisonment and, even then, never for more than six months. The statute
reads:
The Bureau of
Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner serving a term
of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last
10 percentum of the term to be served under the conditions that will afford the
priosoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's
re-entry into the community. The authority provided by this subsection may be
used to place a prisoner in home confinement. n102
This portion of the Government's rationale is almost worth preserving for the marvelous irony it foists upon the world. As the court reads this subsection, Congress is directing the Bureau to do its level best to assure that everyone who has served time get a decent opportunity to go through a period of readjustment