Click Back Button to Return to Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT
MARKOS PAPPAS,
PLAINTIFF,
v.
NEW HAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS
CIV. NO. 3:98 CV 981 (HBF)
August 28, 2003, Filed
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL
I. INTRODUCTION
This case
was tried to a jury from November 19 to November 21, 2002. As articulated in
the responses to interrogatories submitted to it, the jury found that plaintiff
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendants Thomas Benedetto
and Karen Hale Roberts acted under color of state law; that neither of those
[*299] defendants proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was probable
cause to arrest plaintiff or that plaintiff consented to being in custody; and
that plaintiff proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that plaintiff's
arrest without probable cause was a proximate cause of the constitutional
violation of which plaintiff complained. [Revised Jury Interrogatories (doc. #
109) at PP 1-6.] The jury also found that plaintiff proved, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that defendant Brian Sullivan acted under color of state law,
and caused defendants Benedetto and Hale Roberts to commit or continue the
constitutional violation, and that the conduct of defendant Sullivan was a
proximate cause of the constitutional violation. [Id. PP 7-9.] The jury further
found that the municipal defendant - the City of New Haven - both had a policy
with a causal connection to the deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional
rights, and failed to train or supervise its employees in an area likely to
lead to the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights. [Id. PP 10-11.]
As a result, the jury awarded plaintiff actual damages in the amount of $4,000,
and punitive damages in the amount of $20,000 ( $5,000 each against defendants
Benedetto and Hale Roberts; and $10,000 against defendant Sullivan). [Id. PP
12-14.] Finally, the jury answered special interrogatories on factual issues
likely to affect the issue of damages and the court's determination of certain
legal issues, including qualified immunity. [Id. PP 15-17. n1]
On December
6, 2002, defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law, and,
in the alternative, moved for a new trial. [Doc. # 110.] Plaintiff timely
opposed that motion. [Doc. # 113.] For the reasons stated below, the motion is
DENIED.
II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
On March 14, 2001, the court ruled on defendants' first motion
for summary judgment. [Doc. # 43. n2] In that Ruling and Order, the court
granted defendants' motion "as to all claims against the New Haven Police
Department and claims that he was improperly arrested for possession of the cocaine
found in the police car" and denied the motion "in all other
respects." [Id. at 20-21.]
On July 24, 2001, the City of New Haven moved for summary
judgment on plaintiff's newly added municipal liability count. [See docs. ##
58, 65.] On November 16, 2001, the court denied the municipal defendant's
motion, holding that "a reasonable jury could be convinced that ... the
City's policymakers should have known that inadequate training or supervision
was so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the City can reasonably be said to have been indifferent to the
need." [Doc. # 66 at 14-15 (citations and internal quotations omitted;
bracketed form in original).]
On November 20, 2002, at the close of plaintiff's case at trial,
defendants moved orally for judgment as
a matter of law. On November 21, 2002, the court issued a written ruling [doc.
# 103], granting in [*300] part and denying in part the oral motion for judgment.
The motion was granted as to all claims against defendant Rodriguez, and denied
as to defendants Hale Roberts, Benedetto, Sullivan, and the City of New Haven.
[Doc. # 103 at 16.] Decision was reserved on the issues of qualified immunity
for each of the individual defendants until after the jury made its findings.
[Id.]
Defendants filed their renewed motion for judgment or, in the
alternative, for a new trial [doc. # 110] on December 6, 2002. Plaintiff
opposed the motion on January 23, 2003. [Doc. # 113.]
Prior to the filing of plaintiff's opposition, but after the
filing of defendants' motion, the
court, on January 10, 2003, issued its Ruling on Reserved Issue of Qualified
Immunity. [Doc. # 111.] In that decision, the court ruled as follows:
In light of the jury's findings, the defendants' admissions, the
state judge's specific denial of a search warrant as to plaintiff, and the
officers' admission that they believed there was no probable cause to detain
plaintiff at the gas station, the court finds no reason to alter its original decision
on summary judgment that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity [see
Ruling and Order (doc. # 43) (holding that, in light of the degree of intrusion
evidenced in this case and the state court judge's prior determination that the
officers lacked probable cause to search plaintiff, the actions of defendants
were not objectively reasonable)].
Accordingly, defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law,
and motion for directed verdict on the grounds of qualified immunity are
DENIED.
[Doc. # 111 at 1-2.] The
court specifically noted that it was not ruling on defendants' renewed motion
for judgment, but rather was deciding the issue of qualified immunity that it
reserved at trial. [Id. at 2 n. 1.]
Defendants' pending motion therefore renews, postjudgment, the
motion made at the close of plaintiff's case, which motion was initially
disposed of in two opinions: (1) the Ruling on Motion for Judgment as a Matter
of Law issued on November 21, 2002 [doc. # 103]; and (2) the Ruling on Reserved
Issue of Qualified Immunity issued on January 10, 2003 [doc. # 111].
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for judgment as a matter of law is brought pursuant to
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The standard under Rule 50
is similar to the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56. In reviewing a
motion for judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the non-movant and grant that party every reasonable inference that the jury
might have drawn in its favor. See Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d
12, 14 (2d Cir. 1993). Thereafter, a court may enter judgment as a matter of
law only if: (1) there is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the
verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer
surmise and conjecture; or (2) there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence
in favor of the movant that reasonable and fair minded jurors could not arrive
at a verdict against the movant. See Ahern v. County of Nassau, 118 F.3d
118, 120 (2d Cir. 1997). The court may
not weigh the credibility of the witnesses or evaluate the weight of the
evidence. Williams v. County of Westchester, 171 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1999).
Moreover, since granting a motion for judgment would essentially deprive the
party of a determination of the facts by a jury, it should be cautiously and
sparingly granted. See Weldy v. Piedmont Airlines, Inc., 985 F.2d 57, 59 (2d
Cir. 1993).
[*301] A post-trial motion for judgment under Rule 50 is a
renewal of an earlier motion made at the close of the evidence, and can be
granted only on grounds advanced in the pre-verdict motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50
advisory committee's note (re 1991 Amendment, Subdivision (b)) (citing Kutner
Buick, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 868 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1989)). It cannot
assert new grounds; the rules limit the grounds for post-verdict judgment as a
matter of law to those "specifically raised" in the pre-verdict
motion. Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations
and internal quotations omitted).
A motion for a new trial is brought pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, a motion for new trial
should not be granted unless, in the opinion of the district court, the jury
has reached a seriously erroneous result, or the verdict is a miscarriage of
justice. See Song v. Ives Labor, Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992).
Unlike a motion for judgment, a new trial may be granted even if there is
substantial evidence supporting the verdict, and the court is free to weigh the
evidence. However, a new trial should be granted only if the jury's verdict is
egregious. DLC Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 133-34 (2d
Cir. 1998). As the Court of Appeals has warned, a jury's verdict should rarely
be disturbed. Peggy Farrior v. Waterford Board of Education, 277 F.3d 633, 635
(2d Cir. 2002). The decision to grant a new trial is "committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge." Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d
350, 363 (2d Cir. 1992).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants raise several issues in their postjudgment motion:
(1) that the individual defendants are each entitled to qualified immunity; (2)
that the court erroneously shifted the burden of proof in this civil damage
lawsuit to the defendants on the claim of consent; (3) that the court
erroneously precluded the jury from considering the defense theories based on
(a) the principles of Michigan v. Summers, and (b) an investigative detention;
(4) that, as a matter of law, there was sufficient probable cause to arrest
plaintiff after the search of 94 Foster Street; (5) that there was insufficient
basis to support the verdict against the City of New Haven, or, alternatively,
that the jury was misinstructed as to the relevance of State oversight and
certification; (6) that the amount of compensatory damages is excessive as a
matter of law, and that only an award of nominal damages is supported by the
record; and (7) that there is no basis for an award of punitive damages against
the individual defendants. [Def.s' Mot. (doc. # 110) at 2-25.] The court
addresses each argument, seriatim.
A. Defendants' argument that the individual defendants are each
entitled to qualified immunity
Defendants
argue, primarily, that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the
evidence was undisputed that their actions were consistent with the training
they received from the City of New Haven and State of Connecticut. Secondarily, defendants argue that there is some
legal authority to support their actions and, "Police Officers are not
required to anticipate future refinements or other evolution in the law."
[Def.s' Mot. at 7 (citing Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 237 (2d
Cir. 2001).] Plaintiff responds that defendants mischaracterize this case; that
it is an "arrest without probable cause" case, not a Michigan v.
Summers case; and that the right to be free from arrest absent probable cause,
and the prohibition against [*302]exceeding a warrant's limitations, have been
established for decades. [Pl.'s Opp. at 4-7.]
Defendants
have argued their claim of qualified immunity on several occasions. In its
first summary judgment ruling, this court rejected that claim. Specifically,
the court held that, because there was clear Second Circuit authority holding
that "a seizure accompanied by the degree of intrusion evidenced in this
case must be supported by more than a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, " and because "a state court judge
had just determined that the officers lacked probable cause to search
[plaintiff]," ... the actions of defendants Hale and Benedetto were not
objectively reasonable." [Doc. # 43 at 16-17.] Accordingly, the court
denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on that ground. [Id. at 17.]
The court again
considered this issue in its Ruling on Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
[doc. # 103]. Although "easily rejecting" defendants' argument that
no constitutional violation occurred, the court noted that defendants' argument
on qualified immunity "is a closer call." [Id. at 4.] However,
because the court had already rejected "a virtually identical argument in
denying defendants' motion for summary judgment," defendants had "the
burden of showing why the court should stray from its original decision."
[Id.]
The court analyzed the case law relied on by defendants -
specifically Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340, 101 S.
Ct. 2587 (1981) , which held that a warrant to search for contraband founded on
probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. In Summers, the
Supreme Court "approved the detention of occupants of a house being
searched as a logical extension of [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d
889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)]," which itself was an exception to the
probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. [Ruling on
Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at 6.] This court noted, however, that, in the twenty-one years
since Summers was decided, several courts have held or suggested "that the
exception to the probable cause requirement approved in Summers did not extend
to situations where the police found and transported an individual from another
location to the scene of the search." [Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at
6-8 (and cases cited within).]
Moreover, although this court did recognize that there is some
Second Circuit authority "for applying the Summers rule outside the
home" [id. at 9 (citing United States v. Fullwood, 86 F.3d 27, 29-30 (2d
Cir. 1996)], it also recognized the factual dissimilarity between any authority
on which defendants might rely and this case. Indeed, the court found that
"arguably all three of the governmental interests noted in Summers were
present" in Fullwood, but "none of the governmental interest appear
to be present" in our case. [Id. (emphasis in original).] n3 However,
recognizing that certain factual findings by the jury could impact defendants'
defense of qualified immunity, the court reserved decision on this defense.
[*303]
After the jury returned its verdict, the court denied defendants' motion for
judgment as a matter of law on their qualified immunity defense. The court
relied on the jury's determination that defendants Sullivan, Hale, and
Benedetto are liable for compensatory and punitive damages; defendants'
admission that plaintiff was immediately handcuffed, transported to the scene
of the search, and kept under guard in the police car, still handcuffed n4;
defendants' admission that they believed there was no probable cause to detain
plaintiff at the gas station; and the state judge's specific denial of a search
warrant as to plaintiff. The court found no reason to alter its original
decision on summary judgment [doc. # 43] that defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity. The question now is whether defendants' renewed motion
demonstrates such a reason. It does not.
The
individual defendants' primary argument is that they are entitled to qualified
immunity because their acts were consistent with the training they received, and therefore those acts were
objectively reasonable. Defendants' witness testified to this training at
trial. As this court explained in its ruling on defendants' first motion for
judgment:
The City's training expert specifically testified that it is regular
practice that, if New Haven police officers see the target (or suspect) of an
investigation at a location different from the place to be searched pursuant to
a lawful warrant, they will seize that individual and bring him to the scene of
the search as a matter of course. n5
[Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at 14.] It is this training on which
the individual defendants rely for their qualified immunity defense.
The court
has already ruled on the illegality of this training. The court held:
Regardless of any ambiguities in the law that might justify a finding
of qualified immunity, it is clearly not the law that police officers may, as a
matter of course, seize and transport targets of investigations whenever they
have a search warrant related to that investigation. At a minimum, it is a
reasonableness determination based on the governmental interests described in
Summers in relation to the level of intrusion on the suspect. Moreover,
exceptions to the probable cause requirement under the Fourth Amendment are
just that - exceptions. Just as defendants rely on Kerman v. City of New York,
261 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2001), for the proposition that "reasonable
police officer cannot be expected to anticipate developments in the law,"
nor can police officers or its municipal
employer rely on anticipated extensions of exceptions to the probable cause and
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
[Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. #
103) at 14-15.] The court further noted, by way of example, that, "when a Supreme Court decision is
written in limiting terms, acknowledging that a general rule exists, but
recognizing [*304]an exception to that rule, it is not necessarily reasonable
to teach or rely on an interpretation that extends that exception beyond that
specifically permitted by the Court." [Id. at 15 n.16.]
Given this prior decision, to which this court adheres, the
question becomes whether individual
police officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they rely on training
that is clearly contrary to the law. Although defendants cite no case law on
this issue, the court has found several opinions from courts in this Circuit
discussing it.
In Sampson v. City of Schenectady, 160 F. Supp. 2d 336, 349-50
(N.D.N.Y. 2001), n6 the court was confronted with similar issues, and similar
argument from counsel.
First, the court noted that, like defendants in our case, the
Sampson defendants relied on a "lack of existing case law directly on
point with the instant case." Id. at 349. [Cf. Def.s' Mot. (doc. # 110) at
7 (noting that defendants have found "no clear cases applying [Summers] to
precisely the same circumstances at issue in this lawsuit").] However, as
the Sampson court noted, that "misstates the relevant inquiry." 160
F. Supp. 2d at 349.
The Court's concern is not
with the fact that no explicit case law expressly declared that [defendant's
exact actions were illegal]. Instead, the question is whether "in light of
pre-existing case law," the unlawfulness of that action was apparent.
Id. (quoting Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999)).
Second, the defendants in Sampson - like defendants in this case
- argued that, even if their actions violated clearly established law, the
incorrect or negligent training they received gave rise to "extraordinary
circumstances" that might still support their qualified immunity claims.
Sampson, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 349. [Cf. Def.s' Mot. at 5 (noting that defendants'
actions were consistent with city and state training).] On that issue, the
Sampson court explained the rule that,
because an official municipal policy, custom, or negligent training is
relevant only to the extent that the policy makes otherwise unlawful conduct
reasonable, "it 'of course could not make reasonable a belief that was
contrary to a decided body of case law.'" Sampson, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 350
(quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617).
Accordingly, the issue is whether defendants' training was "contrary
to a decided body of case law." n7 This court has already held that it is.
[Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at 14-15 ("it is clearly not the law that
police officers may, as a matter of course, seize and transport targets of
investigations whenever they have [*305] a search warrant related to that
investigation; at a minimum, it is a reasonableness determination based on the
governmental interests described in Summers in relation to the level of
intrusion on the suspect").] Again, it is not because there is binding
precedent holding that defendants' exact actions are unconstitutional, but
because "'in light of pre-existing case law,' the unlawfulness [of those
actions] was apparent." See Sampson, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (quoting
Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617).
First, as this court held in its ruling on defendants' first
motion for judgment, "at a
minimum, [the appropriate inquiry] is a reasonableness determination based on the
governmental interests described in Summers in relation to the level of intrusion
on the suspect," not whether these actions can be taken as a matter of
course. [Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at 14.]
Second, as this court held in ruling on defendants' first motion
for judgment, "exceptions to the
probable cause requirement under the Fourth Amendment are just that exceptions
." [Id. at 14.] Thus, "just as defendants rely on Kerman v. City of
New York, 261 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2001), for the proposition that
'reasonable police officers cannot be expected to anticipate developments in
the law,'" neither can police officers and municipal employees "rely
on anticipated extensions of exceptions to the probable cause and warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment." [Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at
14-15.] In Summers, the Supreme Court articulated several important
governmental interests that justified an exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirements. It was not reasonable for the City or its officers to think
they could extend that exception (by actually bringing plaintiff to the scene
of the search) under circumstances where they could articulate the existence of
none of those governmental interests.
Finally,
regardless of whether, in general, defendants' actions were clearly contrary to
established case law, the specific facts of this case preclude any finding of
qualified immunity. Defendants in this case applied for a warrant to search
plaintiff in advance, and that application was denied. The state judge found
that there was no probable cause to search plaintiff. In light of that finding,
it was not objectively reasonable to arrest n8 plaintiff en route to the search
of the apartment. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (specifically noting that
the detention of the defendant in that case was "substantially less intrusive"
than an arrest). Under the "search
incident to arrest" doctrine, officers may lawfully search a suspect
incident to arrest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763, 23
L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). See also U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973) ("It is the fact of the lawful
arrest which establishes the authority to search"); U.S. v. Morgan, 936
F.2d 1561, 1578 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Robinson stands for the proposition
that, after a proper custodial arrest has been made, it is unnecessary to
obtain a warrant to search the arrestee's person and clothing because [*306] it
is the arrest that constitutes the significant intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; the search of the person is incidental and does not require
additional justification"). Moreover, defendants testified that they did not believe they had
probable cause to search or seize plaintiff. It was therefore unreasonable for
the defendants to believe that, despite being denied a search warrant as to
plaintiff, they had the authority to arrest plaintiff (pursuant to which they
would have the authority to search plaintiff). n9
For all of these reasons, defendants' motion for judgment or new
trial on qualified immunity grounds is denied. n10
B. Defendants' argument that the court erroneously shifted the
burden of proof in this civil damage lawsuit to the defendants on the claim of consent
Defendants argue that the court erroneously shifted the burden
of proof to defendants on their claim of consent. Plaintiff argues that the
court properly instructed the jury, but also argues that "consent" is
an affirmative defense that defendants waived, and there was not enough
evidence to even submit this claim to a jury. Because of the acknowledged split
in decisions within this Circuit, the burden of proof issue will have to be
decided by the Court of Appeals, but perhaps not in this case.
The dispute about which party bears the burden of proof on the
issue of consent arose at the last minute, as the jury was about to be charged.
n11 The court charged the jury that, "in determining whether [plaintiff]
consented to accompanying Officers Hale and Benedetto, I instruct you that the
defendants have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
consent was 'freely and voluntarily given.'" [Jury Charge at 38.] This
issue was argued by both parties, and the court also conducted its own
research. There are three lines of authority on this issue.
One line of authority in this Circuit holds or suggests that
plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all issues on a § 1983 claim, including
proving non-consent (or lack of probable cause in a warrantless arrest). See
Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) ("A further important
distinction is that the burden in the state action was on the state to prove
that an exception to the warrant requirement applied, whereas here the burden
is on [the plaintiff] to establish that the search was unlawful") (citing
Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 563 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussed infra). Cf.
1 L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Inst. 87-74B cmt. at nn.
4-8 ("Although [*307] there may be questions regarding the burden of
proving an unlawful arrest that underlies a section 1983 claim, the courts seem
uniformly to agree that the plaintiff, and only the plaintiff, bears the burden
of proving an unlawful search"). n12
A second line of authority in this Circuit holds or suggests
that consent (or probable cause in a warrantless arrest) is an issue on which
defendants bear the burden of proof. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 222, 248, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (holding, in the context of a
habeas corpus case, that the government has the burden of proving that the
consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given) n13; Anobile v. Pelligrino,
303 F.3d 107, 124 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that "consent" was an
exception to the warrant requirement,
and holding that "the official claiming that a search was consensual
has the burden of demonstrating that the consent was given freely and
voluntarily") (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222); McCardle v. Haddad,
131 F.3d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1997) ("...the defendant bears the burden of
showing that the search was valid because it fell within one of the exceptions
to the warrant requirement ... The principal exceptions include searches on
consent ...") (citing, inter alia, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222; other
citations omitted); Raysor v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 768
F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that [a] warrantless arrest is
presumptively unlawful under New York law," that "plaintiff need not
prove either malice or want of probable cause," and that, "similarly,
a deprivation of liberty without 'reasonable cause' is a section 1983 violation
as to which the defendant bears the burden of proving reasonableness ...")
(citations omitted); Hernandez v. City of Rochester, 260 F. Supp. 2d 599, 2003
WL 21026414, *12 n.6 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Raysor for the proposition that
defendants bear the burden of proving lawfulness of a warrantless arrest); Doe
v. Bridgeport Police Department,2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19329, No.
3:00cv2167(JCH), 2000 WL 33116540, * 4 (D. Conn. Nov. 15, 2000) (Hall, J.)
(quoting McCardle for the proposition that "the defendant has the burden
of showing that the search was valid because it fell within one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement.... The principal exceptions include
searches on consent ..."); LoSacco v. [*308] City of Middletown, 745 F.
Supp. 812, 816 (D. Conn. 1990) (Nevas, J.) (quoting and relying on Raysor). Cf.
1 L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Inst. 87-74A cmt. at nn.
2-5 (noting that, while "some courts conclude that the burden [of proving
unlawfulness of arrests] resides with the plaintiff, ... other courts seem to
impose the burden of proof on the defendant") (citing the Second Circuit's
decision in Raysor and Judge Nevas' decision in LoSacco).
A third line of authority in this Circuit affirms the validity
of a "charge neutral with respect to the burden of proof on consent."
Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 563 (2d Cir. 1991). The Ruggiero court
held that "it is true that searches and seizures conducted without
warrants are presumptively unreasonable," but the "operation of this
presumption ... cannot serve to place on the defendant the burden of proving
that the official action was reasonable." Id. Rather, according to that
court, "the presumption may cast upon
the defendant the duty of producing evidence of consent or search
incident to an arrest or other exceptions to the warrant requirement." Id.
However, "the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the
plaintiff in accordance with established principles governing civil trials."
Id. (citations omitted). Because the trial judge instructed the jury about
"the customary burden of proof in
a civil action and the requirement that plaintiffs must prove all the essential
elements of a section 1983 claim," the Court of Appeals affirmed what it
characterized as a "neutral charge." Id. n14
In light of the inconsistent statements in several opinions, n15
defendants have not persuaded the court that its charge was erroneous. n16 At
some point, the Court of Appeals may have to resolve the issue of which party
bears the burden of proving consent (or the existence of probable cause) in a §
1983 case. n17 However, in light of the evidence submitted to the jury, as
explained immediately below, it might not be decided in this case. n18
[*309]
Plaintiff argues, and the court agrees, that, regardless of where the burden
was placed, there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding of
consent. As plaintiff notes, every defendant officer who testified stated that
plaintiff was not free to leave. Also, defendants admitted in their pleadings
that plaintiff was immediately handcuffed, transported to the scene of the
search, and kept under guard in the police car, still handcuffed. The claim
that plaintiff consented to accompany the officers was never asserted as an
affirmative defense, never raised in any pleading, and was not argued in the
motion for summary judgment. The claim was made for the first time at trial.
n19 Indeed, plaintiff argues that defendants have waived this claim by failing
to assert it previously. The court need not consider that argument, however,
because the court finds that, based on the pleadings (and how this case has
been framed over the last five years), and in light of the evidence offered at
trial, no reasonable juror could have found that plaintiff's transport to the
apartment in handcuffs and under guard was consensual, even if the burden was
on plaintiff to prove nonconsent . In other words, no reasonable juror could
have found that plaintiff failed to prove non-consent by a preponderance of the
evidence. Accordingly, in the alternative, even if the court's charge were
erroneous, plaintiff would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the
issue of consent.
C. Defendants' argument that the court erroneously precluded the
jury from considering certain defense theories.
Defendants argue that the jury should have been instructed on
defense theories permitting brief detentions of individuals based on a
"reasonable suspicion" of wrongdoing. Specifically, defendants argue
that the evidence could have supported a finding of "reasonable
suspicion." Defendants' argument misses the point, however. The court held
as early as March 14, 2001, that the degree of intrusion evidenced in this case
must be supported by more than a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. [Doc. #
43.] Consequently, whether a "reasonable suspicion" existed is
immaterial, because the court has held, and reaffirms, that, as a matter of
law, "probable cause" was required to support the level of intrusion
in this case. n20 The court also reaffirms its prior holding that Michigan v.
Summers does not apply to the type of seizure present [*310] in this case.
Therefore, defendants' motion for judgment or new trial on this ground is
denied.
D. Defendants' argument that, as a matter of law, there was
sufficient probable cause to arrest plaintiff after the search of 94 Foster
Street
The jury has found that defendants did not have probable cause
to arrest plaintiff after the search of 94 Foster Street. [Revised Jury
Interrogatories (doc # 109) at P 15.] Defendants have not shown such a complete
absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only
have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or that there was such an
overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of defendants that reasonable and fair minded jurors could not have arrived at
a verdict against them on the issue of probable cause. Accordingly, defendants'
motion for judgment is denied on this ground. Nor have defendants shown that
the jury reached a seriously erroneous result, or that the verdict was
egregious or a miscarriage of justice, on the issue of probable cause.
Consequently, this court, in its discretion, denies defendants' motion for new
trial on this ground. n21
E. Defendants' argument that there was insufficient basis to
support the verdict against the City of New Haven, or, alternatively, that the
jury was misinstructed as to the relevance of State oversight and certification
On the issue of municipal liability, there was undisputed
evidence (relied on by defendants' counsel on qualified immunity) that the City
trains its officers to seize, as a matter of course, individuals thought to be
associated with premises for which they have a search warrant. That is
unquestionably not the law. Even the most liberal reading of Michigan v.
Summers requires a balancing of several governmental interests, none of which -
this court has already noted - were articulated by the defendant officers in
this case. The defendant officers testified that their actions were taken
pursuant to this faulty training. n22 The City's motion for judgment or new
trial is therefore denied. n23
[*311] F. Defendants' argument that the amount of compensatory
damages is excessive as a matter of law, and that only an award of nominal
damages is supported by the record
The jury
found that plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of
$4,000, representing actual damages suffered as the result of defendants'
violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. [Revised Jury Interrogatories (doc. # 109) at P
12.] The constitutional violation was the arrest without probable cause. The
jury also found that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff after the
packets of cocaine were found near where plaintiff was sitting in the police
car (which charges were later nolled by the state prosecutor). [Id. P 16.]
Defendants
argue that the $4,000 award is excessive, given the length of time of the
violation (which defendants argue was "about fifteen (15) minutes").
[Def.s' Mot. at 23-24. Defendants provide the court with no authority to
support this argument. Plaintiff, however, argues that the reasonableness of
the award is supported by Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1994).
In Oliveira, a jury awarded each plaintiff $20,000 in compensatory damages for
an illegal arrest that lasted approximately thirty minutes, and Judge Daly, in
the District of Connecticut, entered judgment on that verdict. Id. at 644-45.
The Court of Appeals reversed in part,
on the ground that certain issues relating to qualified immunity should have
been submitted to the jury, but left to the "discretion of the District
Court whether the jury considering the immunity issue should also redetermine
the amount of damages in the event that it rejects the immunity defense."
Id. at 650. The fact that the Court of Appeals left the damages issue to the
district court suggests that the amount was reasonable, n24 as does Judge
Daly's acceptance of the award when he denied the defendants' post-trial
motions and entered judgment in that amount. Because plaintiff has cited some
authority supporting the verdict, and defendants - who carry the burden on this
issue - have [*312] not, defendants' motion for new trial (or remittitur) is
denied. n25
G.
Defendants' argument that there is no basis for an award of punitive damages
against the individual defendants
Defendants argue that
"the same evidence that supports granting qualified immunity to the
individual defendants also demonstrates the absence of a basis for awarding
punitive damages." [Def.s' Mot. at 25.]
On the issue of punitive
damages, the court instructed the jury as follows:
If you find
by a preponderance of the evidence that any individual defendant acted with
malicious intent to violate [plaintiff's] constitutional rights or unlawfully
injure him, or if you find that a defendant acted with a callous or reckless
disregard of [plaintiff's] rights, then you may award punitive damages. An award of punitive damages,
however, is discretionary; that is, if you find that legal requirements for
punitive damages are satisfied, then you may decide to award punitive damages,
or you may decide not to award them. It's up to you.
In making
this decision, you should consider the underlying purpose of punitive damages.
Punitive damages are awarded in the jury's discretion to punish a defendant for
outrageous conduct or to deter the defendant and others like him or her from
similar conduct in the future. Thus, in deciding whether to award punitive
damages, you should consider whether the defendant you are considering may be
adequately punished by an award of actual damages only, or whether the conduct
is so extreme and outrageous that actual damages are inadequate to punish the
wrongful conduct. You should also consider whether actual damages standing
alone are likely to deter or prevent a defendant from again performing any
wrongful acts he or she may have performed, or whether punitive damages are
necessary to provide deterrence. Finally, you should consider whether punitive damages are
likely to deter or prevent other persons from performing wrongful acts similar
to those the defendant may have committed.
If you decide to award
punitive damages, these same purposes should be considered by you in
determining the appropriate sum of money to be awarded as punitive damages.
That is, in fixing the sum to be awarded, you should consider the degree to
which a defendant should be punished for his or her wrongful conduct, and the
degree to which an award of one sum or another will deter the defendant or
persons like the defendant from committing wrongful acts in the future.
Such punitive damages may be
awarded even in the absence of actual damages; their amount need not be based
on the amount of any compensatory damages. In this case, if you find any
individual defendant liable to [plaintiff] for a violation of his
constitutional rights, you must consider the question of whether to award
punitive damages.
Punitive damages may not be
awarded against the City of New Haven.
[[*313] Jury Charge at 60-62.] Defendants do not argue that this charge
was erroneous. Moreover, it would not be unreasonable if the jury found that
defendants' acts constituted a callous or reckless disregard of the state
judge's determination (and plaintiff's rights), found that to be
"outrageous conduct," and/or sought to deter defendants and others
like them from similar conduct in the future. The jury could have found that
defendants willfully disregarded the decision of a neutral and detached state
court judge, and, as a result, callously or recklessly disregarded plaintiff's
right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The court cannot find that there
is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the award of punitive
damages, or that there is such an overwhelming amount of evidence that
defendants' actions were not so punishable. Nor does the court believe that the
jury reached a seriously erroneous result, or that the verdict is a miscarriage
of justice. Therefore, defendants' motion for judgment or new trial, on the
ground that punitive damages are not warranted as a matter of law, is denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed in this memorandum of decision,
defendants' renewed motion for judgment, or, in the alternative, new trial
[doc. # 110] is DENIED, and the CLERK SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT ON THE JURY
VERDICT.
This is not a recommended ruling. The parties consented to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge [doc. # 24] on June 13, 2000,
with appeal to the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
Entered this of June
2003 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.
HOLLY B. FITZSIMMONS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
FOOTNOTES:
n1 The jury found that there
was insufficient evidence to answer interrogatory 17.
n2 As the court noted in its
Discussion section, defendants raised "six grounds in support of their
motion for summary judgment: (1) plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he
seeks; (2) there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff before the search; (3)
there was a reasonable suspicion to detain plaintiff before the search; (4) the
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (5) defendants Ratti,
Coppola and Collier were neither present at nor participated in plaintiff's
detention; and (6) the New Haven Police Department is not an entity that can be
sued." [Doc. # 43 at 7.]
n3 The governmental
interests recognized by the Supreme Court in Summers were: "(1) the
legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found; (2) minimizing the risk of harm to the
officers; and (3) the orderly completion of the search, which ay be facilitated
if the occupants of the premises are present." [Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. #
103) at 5-6, n.4 (citing Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment (3d Ed.) § 4.9(e) at p. 645).]
n4 These admissions appears
in defendants' Answer. Most, if not all, of the defendants claimed at trial
that they had never seen the Answer, and never provided the subject information
to their attorney. As the court held in its first ruling on defendants' motion
for judgment, "defendants never moved to amend their answer, and it is
signed by counsel on behalf of all defendants[; therefore, t]his formal
judicial admission is conclusive against [defendants] in this action."
[Ruling on Mot. J. at 10 n.8 (citations and internal quotations omitted.]
n5 The court also noted
that, "on a follow-up question by defense counsel, the witnesses specified
that the suspect would have to be somewhere 'near' the location of the
search." [Ruling on Mot. J. (doc. # 103) at 14 n.15.]
n6 Although this court
discusses only the Sampson opinion at length, the issue has arisen, in various
contexts, in other courts in this Circuit. See, e.g., Dunton v. County of
Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907-10 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting counsel's potential
conflict of interest); Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Authority, 796 F.
Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same). See also Sampson, 160 F. Supp. 2d at
349-50 (cases cited within).
N7 Although not briefed by
the parties, the court recognizes that, because "a municipality is immune
from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616, 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981), and because
an officer may in some circumstances be entitled to qualified immunity based on
inadequate training, there may exist an incentive in some indemnification cases
such as this to "blame" a constitutional violation on inadequate
training by the City rather than on the officers themselves. Because the court
upholds the jury verdict awarding punitive damages, it need not address that
potential problem in this case.
n8 The court has already
held that plaintiff was "arrested." [See Revised Jury Charge at 37-38
("as a matter of law, the degree of restriction imposed on [plaintiff]
constituted an 'arrest' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution"); cf. Ruling and Order (doc. # 43) at 15 (officers' actions
were not objectively reasonable because the Second Circuit made it clear in
United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1980) that the "degree of
intrusion on [plaintiff's] liberty must be supported by more that a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing").]
n9 Although defendants had
some information about plaintiff visiting the target apartment from a
confidential informant, the only evidence suggesting plaintiff resided at the
apartment was found during the search, after plaintiff was arrested and
transported there. In other words, plaintiff was transported to the search of
an apartment at which he was not known to reside.
n10 Defendants also argue
that they should not be required to anticipate changes in the law. However,
this court's decision is not based on any "change" in the law.
Rather, the court relies on well-established principles of law. It is
defendants' position that would constitute a change in the law.
n11 At trial, defendants
also argued that the court erroneously shifted the burden of proving
"probable cause" to defendants. The court based its charge on consent
and probable cause, in part, on case law holding that a warrantless arrest is
presumptively unreasonable. Because it does not appear in their motion,
defendants apparently do not challenge the shifting of the burden with respect
to the issue of probable cause.
n12 The comment cites the
Second Circuit's decision in Ruggiero (see infra), a case on which defendants
rely. However, this comment does not necessarily support defendants' position.
First, the comment adds that, "while the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion
would remain with the plaintiff, the defendants might still have the duty of
producing evidence of consent or of other exceptions to the warrant
requirement." 1 L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Inst.
87-74B cmt. at n.6. It further adds that "the circuits are not in
agreement as to who bears the burden of proving a voluntary consent to a
search, something that the Supreme Court has determined is a question of fact
to be determined from the totality of all of the circumstances." Id. at
n.6.1 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854,
93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973)). But, it also cites Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269,
1278-79 (7th Cir. 1997), which acknowledges a split in the circuits and cites
Ruggiero for the proposition that the Second Circuit requires defendants only
to produce evidence of consent, and does not place on them the burden of
persuasion. In any event, this section deals with the burden of proving the
illegality of a search. It specifically disclaims the application of the rule
to arrests, and, in fact, later argues that, in the arrest context, the burden
is on the defendants. [See infra.] This adds to the confusion because, although
the comment suggests that the law differs depending on whether a search or
arrest is at issue, there is case law both ways with respect to both searches
and arrests. [See infra.]
n13 Although habeas corpus cases
are significantly different from § 1983 cases, Schneckloth is cited here
because it is relied on by other courts in § 1983 actions.
n14 If given only two
choices - burden on plaintiff or burden on defendant - Ruggiero would seem to
suggest placing the burden on the plaintiff. However, because it affirms an
essentially "neutral" charge, the court lists this as an example of a
third line of authority.
n15 At trial, the court
acknowledged the split in the case law, but noted that its charge was consistent
with several Court of Appeals' decisions, including the most recent decision,
and Judge Sand's Modern Federal Jury Instructions. It is also consistent with
the manner in which the issue was raised: at trial, by defendants, without
notice to plaintiff, and as an attempt to vitiate plaintiff's claim (much like
an affirmative defense).
n16 Aside from the split in
the case law, the undersigned believes - at least under the facts of this case
- that it was appropriate to assign defendants the burden of proving both
probable cause and consent. It would be peculiar to place the burden of proving
the absence of consent on the individual who was handcuffed and kept under
guard in the caged rear seat of a police car. It would also be peculiar to
place the burden of proving the absence of probable cause on the individual
whose name was crossed off the warrant by a neutral and detached state court
judge.
n17 Of course, different
panels of the Court of Appeals have decided this issue in different contexts,
but, as noted, those opinions are inconsistent, and generally do not recognize
the existence of contrary authority.
n18 Certainly, it would be
helpful to the district courts if the Court of Appeals resolved the conflict.
However, this court recognizes that, unless this court is reversed on its
alternative ground as well, that resolution would be dictum. On the other hand,
even dictum - as long as it recognizes the different lines of authority - would
be helpful; and this court respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals
offer some guidance on this issue.
n19 On the first day of
trial (November 19, 2002), defendant Benedetto testified that plaintiff was
pulled over and detained because, if the police found evidence in the Foster
Street apartment, plaintiff would be subject to arrest and likely to flee; and
the police wanted to prevent that flight. (Defendant Benedetto also testified
that plaintiff was placed in the squad car per the order of defendant
Sullivan.) Although defendant Benedetto later testified that plaintiff was
"free to go," he quickly recanted that testimony when plaintiff
pointed out that such testimony was inconsistent with his prior testimony that
the police were attempting to prevent plaintiff's flight. Defendant Benedetto
then testified that there was reasonable suspicion justifying the detention.
Defendant Hale also testified at the end of the day on November
19, 2002, that plaintiff had consented
to the transport and was therefore free to leave whenever he wanted. The next
morning, defendant Hale changed her testimony and stated that plaintiff was not
free to leave, but maintained that plaintiff willingly accompanied defendants.
n20 The defendants in
general, and defendant Sullivan specifically, had difficulty recognizing a
distinction between "probable cause" and "reasonable
suspicion," while testifying at trial. At one point, when plaintiff was
inquiring about whether defendants claimed there was "probable cause"
or "reasonable suspicion" to detain plaintiff, defendant Sullivan
accused plaintiff of mincing words.
n21 Jury Interrogatories 15
and 16 were relevant to the quantification of damages. There was a question
about whether plaintiff was entitled to damages based on the 23 days he was
jailed as a result of the arrest, or whether probable cause arose prior to that
jailing. Plaintiff specifically argued, among other things, that a utility bill
found in the Foster Street apartment with plaintiff's name on it was
insufficient to create probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Given the jury's finding
of probable cause in Jury Interrogatory 16 (that probable cause arose after the
packets were found in the police car), it is unclear why defendants press this
issue.
n22 The jury found not only
that the City had a policy, custom, or practice that caused the deprivation of
plaintiff's constitutional rights [Revised Jury Interrogatories (doc. # 109) at
P 10(a), (b)], but also that the City failed to adequately train its officers,
in that it knew to a moral certainty that its officers would confront a
situation in which a judge denied them authorization to search or seize a
person, that such a situation would present the officer with a difficult choice
of the sort that training or supervision would make less difficult, and that the wrong choice would frequently cause
the deprivation of a citizen's constitutional rights [id. P 11(a), (b), (c)].
Although the former finding independently supports an award against the city,
the court notes that there was evidence to support the latter finding as well.
n23 Defendants also argue
that the court failed to adequately consider the importance of "State
oversight." This court has already held that conformity with state or local rules is no defense to a federal
constitutional violation. [See Ruling on Def.'s Mot. Recons. (doc. # 69) at 4
(the Constitution is "the supreme source of law - to which police officers
must conform their conduct) (citing U.S. Const. art. VI; Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (emphasis in original)).
Moreover, defendants' counsel's argument suggesting that the actions of the
defendant officers were the result of "periodic misunderstandings by
individual officers" rather than "any defect in the policies or
training by the City" is inconsistent with the evidence, and inconsistent
with counsel's argument on qualified immunity (where he argued that the
officers should be entitled to immunity because "it is undisputed that the
actions of the individual defendants ... [were] pursuant to training that
permitted temporarily detaining and transporting the target of an investigation
while executing a search warrant for a premises nearby, and that such training
either was affirmatively taught in both the City and the State Police Academies
or was the result of instruction in both the City and the State Police
Academies..."). As such, defendants' motion for judgment or new trial on
the ground that the court failed to instruct on the relevance of "State
oversight" is denied.
n24 To the extent defendants
argue that, as a matter of law, a jury may award only nominal damages when an
unlawful arrest lasts only a brief period time and there are no physical
injuries, the court disagrees. See, e.g., Peterson v. County of Nassau, 995 F.
Supp. 305, 323-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (and cases cited within, under New York law);
Kerr v. Quinn, 533 F. Supp. 1329, 1333 (D. Conn. 1982) (and cases cited
within), rev'd on other grounds, 692 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1982); Manfredonia v.
Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 773 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (and cases cited within).
However, to the extent defendants' argument is limited to the facts of this
case, defendants have failed to direct the court to any authority holding that
$4,000 in damages is excessive in cases similar to this. Absent such authority,
the court is disinclined to second guess the jury's award of damages.
n25 In light of the Seventh
Amendment concerns, the court construes defendants' motion for judgment that
plaintiff "is entitled to a nominal damage award as compensation" as
a motion for remittitur or new trial.