UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
DIVISION
vs.
City of Fort Worth, et al.
Civil Action 4-00-Cv-816-Y
229 F. Supp. 2d 572
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1613
February 1, 2002
Terry R. Means
United States District Judge.
[*574]
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Pending before the Court is defendant Ralph
Mendoza’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Qualified Immunity [doc. # 30-1],
filed June 11, 2001. Having carefully considered the motion, response, and
reply, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
I. RELEVANT FACTS n1
On October 16, 1995, plaintiff Michael T.
Riggs “entered the police academy, as an employee of the city of Fort Worth,
Texas.” (Pl.’s Am. Or. Compl. (“Pl.’s Compl.”) P 6.) At that time, Thomas R.
Windham was the chief of police for the Fort Worth Police Department and
defendant Mendoza was the deputy chief of police. (Id. P 10.) At some point
after becoming a Fort Worth police officer, Plaintiff was assigned to the North
Division Bike Unit. (Id. P 16.)
On September 9, 1998, after discussion with
his supervisor, Plaintiff ordered the towing of a 1998 green Cadillac, which
later turned out to belong to the mayor of Fort Worth. (Id. P 17.) Plaintiff,
after completing a memorandum about the incident, was informed by his superiors
that he had done nothing wrong. (Id. P 19.)
Twenty-seven days after the towing
incident, Plaintiff, on October 6, received a notice from one of his superiors
that he was no longer authorized to wear bicycle shorts or short sleeve shirts
and that he was only authorized to wear a police uniform consisting of long
sleeves and long pants. (Pl.’s Compl. P 20.) On October 20, Plaintiff met with
Chief Windham to discuss the order. (Id. P 28.) Plaintiff alleges that during
the meeting Chief Windham indicated that the whole issue regarding Plaintiff’s
tattoos was first brought to the chief’s attention by the mayor after Plaintiff
ordered that the mayor’s vehicle be towed. (Id.) [*575]
In December 1998, Plaintiff was transferred
from the bike unit to the DWI unit. (Mendoza Aff. at 1; Pl.’s Compl. PP 35,
37.) Plaintiff claims that the transfer was “like being demoted or fired.”
(Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. P 10mm.) In a letter to Plaintiff dated January 28, 1999, Chief
Windham, explaining his reasons for requiring Plaintiff to wear long sleeves
and long pants, wrote, “You have extensive tattoos on your arms and legs which
I believe detract from the professionalism of a Fort Worth police officer if
the officer wears short sleeve shirt and shorts.” (App. Pl.’s Resp. Mot.
Summ. J. at 30.) On August 8, Plaintiff suffered from heat exhaustion while on
duty and was temporarily transferred to a desk job. On August 18, Plaintiff was
assigned to a “plain clothed” traffic-investigation unit and instructed not to
wear a uniform. (Riggs Aff. P 34.) He was later allowed to wear a uniform, but
only if it once again included long sleeves and long pants. (Pl.’s Rule 7(a)
Reply (“Pl.’s 7(a) Reply”) P 5vv.)
On August 19, 1999, Mendoza began his
duties as acting chief of police. On September 10, Plaintiff had a meeting with
Mendoza. Both parties agree that in the meeting Mendoza instructed Plaintiff
that he did not have to wear a protective vest if Plaintiff was too hot in long
sleeves. Plaintiff also
alleges that Mendoza stated that Plaintiff would never leave the desk job or be
promoted because of the tattoo issue. (Riggs Aff. P 35.)
In October 1999, Plaintiff was assigned to
the DWI unit midnight shift. (Mendoza Aff. at 2.) Mendoza was sworn in as chief
of police on February 2, 2000. On July 3, Plaintiff filed his original
complaint against the defendants. n2 Sometime later, Plaintiff was placed “back
on the streets.” (Pl.’s Mem. In Opp’n To Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) P
10eee.) On July 5, Plaintiff again suffered from heat exhaustion while on duty,
and his physician instructed him not to wear long sleeves in hot weather. (Id.
P 10jjj.) Plaintiff was placed on desk duty for a week and then reassigned to
street duty. (Riggs Aff. P 38.)
In January 2001, Plaintiff’s attendance at
a “DWI instructor’s school” was temporarily postponed so that other officers
could attend. (Pl.’s Mem. P 10fff.) Both parties agree that Mendoza temporarily
postponed Plaintiff’s training due to the “diversity make-up” of the current
DWI instructors on the police force. (Mendoza Aff. at 3; Pl.’s Compl. P 57.)
Mendoza claims that Plaintiff, along with two other officers whose training was
also postponed, were sent to the next available DWI instructor’s school.
(Mendoza Aff. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that in March he was advised by one of
his superiors that he was removed from the instructor’s list because he had
filed this suit against the defendants. (Riggs Aff. P 43.)
In late February, Plaintiff was informed
that he was not selected for “motorcycles” because he had used too many sick
and family days. (Pl.’s Mem. P 10hhh.) Plaintiff claims that his not being
chosen was in retaliation for his filing this suit against the defendants.
(Riggs Aff. P 38.) Plaintiff, on July 5, again suffered from heat exhaustion
and was ordered by his physician not to wear long sleeves in weather over 90
degrees. (Id. P 44.) On July 13, Plaintiff was suspended from the police
department without pay. (Pl.’s Mem. P 10sss; Riggs Aff. P 53.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when the record
establishes that no genuine [*576] issue as to any material fact exists, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Hill v. London, Stetelman, & Kirkwood, Inc., 906 F.2d 204, 207 (5th
Cir. 1990). To determine whether an issue of material fact exists, the Court
must first consult the applicable substantive law to ascertain what fact issues
are material to the disposition of the case. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. &
Tool Works, 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859, 114
S. Ct. 171, 126 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1993). The Court must then review the evidence
presented, viewing the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Newell v. Oxford Management Inc., 912 F.2d 793, 795 (5th Cir. 1990);
Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085, 1089 (5th Cir. 1989). However, the Court’s
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986). Where the movant bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense, he
must establish all elements of the claim or defense to prevail on summary
judgment. Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 651 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (S.D. Miss.
1987), aff’d, 824 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1987).
When the moving party has carried its
summary-judgment burden, the respondent “must do more than simply show there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986). The respondent must produce evidence, not merely argument, in response
to a movant’s properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Foval v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d
126, 129 (5th Cir. 1988); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d
547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).
Defendant Mendoza seeks summary judgment on
the basis that he is entitled to
qualified immunity for his actions toward the plaintiff. To the extent
Plaintiff seeks money damages directly from defendant Mendoza for his actions
taken under color of state law, Mendoza may invoke his right to qualified
immunity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 26, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991). Public officials performing
discretionary functions enjoy immunity from suits for damages, provided their
“conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). Because an
official is entitled to immunity from suit, not merely from liability, immunity
questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in the litigation.
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 116 L. Ed. 2d 589, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991).
When determining whether immunity exists,
the Fifth Circuit uses a three-part inquiry. See Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery County, Tex., 249 F.3d 337,
340 (5th Cir. 2001). First, a court must examine whether the plaintiff has
alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Id. Second, a court must
determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time
the defendant acted. Id. “For a right to be clearly established, there does not
have to be a prior case directly on point, but the unlawfulness of the
precipitating acts must be apparent in light of the existing law.” Hassan v.
Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995). Such an inquiry
requires an assessment of whether, at the time of the alleged violation, the
right was so clearly established that a “reasonable person” in the defendant’s
situation would have understood that his conduct violated that right. See
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277, [*577] 111 S. Ct.
1789 (1991); Conroe Creosoting Co., 249 F.3d at 340; Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3
F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1123, 127 L. Ed. 2d 397,
114 S. Ct. 1081 (1994). Finally, a court must “determine whether the record indicates
that the . . . defendant actually engaged in the conduct that violated the
clearly established right.” Conroe Creosoting Co., 249 F.3d at 340; see Morris
v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
In view of the law regarding qualified
immunity discussed above, the first issue is whether Plaintiff has demonstrated
a violation of a constitutional right. Here, Plaintiff has asserted claims
against Mendoza under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. n3 (Pl.’s 7(a) Reply
at 1.) Plaintiff makes two
basic allegations: (1) that Mendoza unlawfully removed him from his position in
the bike patrol unit to a less desirable job because Plaintiff has a number of
tattoos n4 on his body that were visible to the public when he wore the
bike-patrol uniform, and (2) that he has been ordered by Mendoza, in violation
of the Fort Worth Police Department’s dress code, n5 to wear long sleeves and
long pants to cover his tattoos. Plaintiff calls himself a white male of Celtic
descent and claims that he has been singled out because of his race, sex,
national origin, and his statements of expression. By “statements of
expression,” the Court understands Plaintiff to be referring to his tattoos.
n6 (Pl.’s Compl. P 56; Pl.’s 7(a) Reply P 5.)
The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no [*578] state shall “deny any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1. It “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). Before determining the
validity of any classification scheme under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court must first decide the proper standard of review. Generally, “legislation
is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn . . .
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
440; see Stefanoff v. Hays County,
Tex., 154 F.3d 523, 525 (stating that to establish a violation of the
constitutional right to equal protection, Plaintiff must prove that Defendant
created two or more classifications of similarly situated people that were
treated differently and that the classification had no rational relation to any
legitimate governmental objective). However, if the classification is based on
the “suspect” classifications of race, alienage, or national original or if a
fundamental right is involved, the classification will be subjected to strict
scrutiny and will only be upheld if the law is tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. See Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 440. If the classification is based on a “quasi-suspect” classification such
as gender, the classification “fails unless it is substantially related to a
sufficiently important governmental interest.” 473 U.S. at 440-41.
To make out an apparent equal-protection
claim, a plaintiff must show three things: (1) that he is a member of a
protected class, (2) that he is otherwise similarly situated to members of the
unprotected class, and (3) that he was treated differently from members of the
unprotected class. See McNabola v.
Chicago Transit. Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 513 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41, 87 L. Ed. 2d
313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). To prevail, the plaintiff then must demonstrate
that the defendant acted with a discriminatory purpose. See Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th
Cir. 1988). n7 That is, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “singled
out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of
action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable
group.” Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasis in
original); see Edwards v. Johnson, 209
F.3d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 2000).
Since Riggs alleges discrimination (being
required to wear long sleeves and long pants and being transferred out of the
bike unit) based on his race, sex, national origin, and his exercise of his
fundamental right of free expression, he invokes the Court’s strict scrutiny.
Thus, such discrimination, if any he can prove, will be excused only if it is employed
to serve a compelling state interest, or in the case of sex, it is
substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest. Even
so, to establish a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause,
Riggs must allege and prove his race, [*579] his sex, his national origin, or
his protected expressions; show how he is otherwise similarly situated to those
not of his race, sex, national origin or who have made protected expressions;
and demonstrate how he was treated differently. See McNabola, 10 F.3d at 513. Then, Riggs must show that Mendoza
intentionally treated him differently because of his race, sex, national
origin, or his protected expressions. See
Lavernia, 845 F.2d at 496; see also
Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that
in order to recover on a disparate treatment claim based on sex under Title
VII, which mirrors the proof required in order to recover on an equal
protection claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination
by showing that the “adverse employment decision would not have been made ‘but
for’ her sex”).
Even assuming Plaintiff has established the
first three elements of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiff fails to provide any
non-conclusory evidence n8 that Mendoza singled him out and forced him to wear
a uniform consisting of long sleeves and long pants or transferred him out of
the bike unit because he was either white, male, of Celtic descent, or a
combination of the three. In fact, Plaintiff has provided evidence that
indicates the contrary.
In the appendix accompanying his response
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff attaches a “List of
Officers with Tattoos” that lists 15 other police officers in the City of Fort
Worth Police Department that also allegedly have tattoos. The list contains the
15 individuals’ names, their sex, their race, and the location of each
individual’s tattoo(s). (App. Pl.’s Resp. Def.s’ Mot. Summ. J. at 47.) The
“List of Officers With Tattoos” shows that there are other white, male police
officers that have tattoos that have not been required to wear long sleeves and
long pants to cover their tattoos. See Pl.’s Amend. Compl. PP 56j, 56o, 66;
Pl.’s 7(a) Reply PP 5e. This evidence directly contradicts Plaintiff’s claim
that Mendoza discriminated against him based on his race or gender.
In addition, the plaintiff has provided no
evidence describing the national origin of any other police officer other than
himself or indicating that Mendoza made his decisions based on Plaintiff’s
Celtic origin. Thus, there is no proof that Mendoza intentionally discriminated
against Plaintiff because of his national origin.
Finally, the plaintiff presents evidence
that he was transferred out of the bike unit shortly after being required to
wear long sleeves and long pants. He also presents evidence showing that he has
suffered from heat exhaustion on at least three occasions since being required
to wear long sleeves and long pants. This evidence also weighs against any
intentional discrimination based on sex, gender, or national origin, and,
instead, points to health and safety concerns as plausible reasons for
Mendoza’s actions in transferring Plaintiff out of the bike unit. n9 [*580]
Plaintiff provides only two reasons, other
than race, sex or national origin, for Mendoza’s adverse treatment: (1) Mendoza
is discriminating against his protected expression--his tattoos--and (2)
Mendoza is carrying out former Chief
Windham’s retaliation against Plaintiff for unknowingly ordering the towing of
the mayor’s car in September 1998. (Pl.’s Compl. PP 17, 28, 56k, 64; Pl’s 7(a)
Reply PP 5k, 5v, 5eee.)
With respect to his tattoos, Plaintiff
appears to be arguing that his rights under the Equal Protection Clause are
being violated because he is being treated differently from similarly situated
persons with tattoos by being forced to cover his tattoos and, as a result,
being transferred out of the bike unit. Plaintiff claims that this anti-tattoo
discrimination is a violation of his fundamental right to freedom of expression
under the First Amendment. n10 See Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972) (stating that governmental
action permitting some to speak, but denying the opportunity to others, raises
an “equal protection claim [that] is closely intertwined with First Amendment
interests”).
As with any analysis regarding the First
Amendment, the threshold issue is whether tattoos are a form of expression or
speech that is protected by the First Amendment. Although few Courts have
considered the issue, those that have appear to agree that a tattoo is not
protected speech under the First Amendment. See Stephenson v. Davenport Comm. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d 1303 (8th Cir.
1997) (stating that “the tattoo is nothing more than ‘self-expression,’ unlike
other forms of expression or conduct which receive first amendment
protections”); People v. O’Sullivan, 96 Misc. 2d 52, 409 N.Y.S.2d 332
(N.Y.App.Div. 1978) (stating that tattooing is not speech or even symbolic
speech). n11 Because tattoos are not protected expressions under the
fundamental First Amendment [*581] right of free speech, strict scrutiny,
though invoked by Riggs, is inappropriate. Instead, his claimed classification
must merely be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976). In other
words, for his order to pass a constitutional challenge, Mendoza must merely
have some minimal justification for treating Plaintiff differently from other
police officers with tattoos. Id.
Mendoza claims that the reason he has
continued to enforce the policy requiring Plaintiff to wear long sleeves and
long pants is “to insure a professional uniform appearance to the public of
uniformed Forth Worth police officers.” (Mendoza Aff. at 2.) Mendoza states that he “felt
that displaying massive tattoos distracted from the uniform appearance
necessary to good police work” and that a “police officer’s uniform is not a
forum for fostering public discourse or expressing one’s personal beliefs.”
(Id.) Addressing the fact that Plaintiff is the only police officer required to
cover his tattoos, Mendoza states, “No other Fort Worth police officer has been
brought to my attention with such tattoos so as to rise to the level of
unprofessional appearance as does officer Riggs.” (Mendoza Aff. at 3.)
In Kelley v. Johnson, n12 425 U.S. 238,
247, 47 L. Ed. 2d 708, 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a law
enforcement agency’s “choice of organization, dress, and equipment for law
enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the same sort of presumption of
legislative validity as are state choices designed to promote other aims within
the cognizance of the State’s police power.” Courts have long held that “the
city through its police chief has the right to promote a disciplined,
identifiable, and impartial police force by maintaining its police uniform as a
symbol of neutral government authority, free from expressions of personal bent
or bias.” Daniels v. Arlington , 246 F.3d 500, 503(5th Cir. 2001); see United States Dep’t of Justice v. Federal
Labor Relations Auth., 955 F.2d 998, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1992). n13 As a result, the Court concludes that Mendoza
had legitimate, non-discriminatory [*582] reasons for requiring the only
officer in the Fort Worth Police Department who has tattoos covering his legs
and arms, plaintiff Michael T. Riggs, to wear a uniform that is not required of
other police officers.
With respect to transferring Plaintiff out
of the bike unit, Mendoza’s testimony in his affidavit indicates that Plaintiff
has never been demoted in rank and that he has received periodic increases in
pay during his employment as a police officer. n14 In addition, Mendoza states
that he has never discriminated against or retaliated against Plaintiff.
Although Mendoza does not explicitly state a reason for Plaintiff’s transfer
(which was ordered by former Chief Windham), the evidence presented indicates
that Plaintiff was transferred to assignments that were more accommodating to
his required uniform of long sleeves and long pants and to his health and
safety.
Because Mendoza has set forth rational
reasons for his treatment of Plaintiff, to establish a constitutional
violation, Plaintiff now bears the burden of showing that Mendoza’s reasons are
“wholly arbitrary,” which means “having no rational basis.” See Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 616-618 (5th
Cir. 1972); see also Stefanoff, 154
F.3d at 525. Plaintiff argues that Mendoza’s alleged reasons for his actions
were merely a pretext to continue former police chief Windham’s retaliatory
policy against Plaintiff for ordering the towing of the mayor’s car. Plaintiff
claims that the timing of the order regarding Plaintiff’s uniform (a mere
twenty-seven days after the towing incident) and former Chief Windham’s own
statements show that Plaintiff was being disciplined in retaliation for towing
the mayor’s car.
However, the evidence, even if viewed in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, does not suggest that Mendoza’s uniform
policy is arbitrary. A
police officer’s uniform is not a forum for fostering public discourse or
expressing one’s personal beliefs. See
Daniels, 246 F.3d at 503. Mendoza believes that the massive tattoos that
were exposed on Plaintiff’s body if he wore short sleeves and short pants
distract from the uniform appearance necessary to good police work. The fact
that Plaintiff’s personal appearance was brought to the attention of former
Chief Windham by the mayor right after the mayor’s car was towed for being
illegally parked does not create a material factual dispute of whether the
uniform policy was arbitrary and retaliatory. Mendoza does not dispute the fact
that the uniform order was originally issued by Chief Windham a mere
twenty-seven days after the towing incident. Even if the mayor was upset that
Plaintiff had ordered his car to be towed, there is no evidence that the former
police chief retaliated against Plaintiff for Plaintiff’s actions.
In addition, although Plaintiff claims that
being transferred out of the bike unit was a demotion, Plaintiff presents no
evidence indicating that he was transferred out of the bike unit for any
irrational or arbitrary reason. n15 See Fiorenzo [*583] v. Nolan, 965 F.2d 348,
352 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that if the plaintiff fails to present evidence
refuting the testimony of a police chief about his intent in transferring three
black officers, then the plaintiff fails to prove a constitutional violation).
Plaintiff just makes conclusory statements, without proof, that the transfer
was a demotion and in retaliation for the towing of the mayor’s vehicle.
Because there is no evidence that the former police chief or Mendoza acted out
of retaliation when ordering Plaintiff to wear long sleeves and long pants or
transferring Plaintiff out of the bike unit, the Court concludes that Mendoza’s
actions toward Plaintiff were not arbitrary.
Plaintiff has failed to present evidence
showing that Mendoza treated Plaintiff differently based on Plaintiff’s race,
gender, national origin, or protected expression. He has also failed to make a
showing that Mendoza does not have a rational basis for his decision to treat
Plaintiff differently because of his tattoos. Plaintiff has not, consequently,
demonstrated the violation of a constitutional right. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313,
105 S. Ct. 3249; Stefanoff, 154 F.3d at 525. Mendoza is entitled to qualified
immunity. n16 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Court concludes
that defendant Mendoza’s motion for summary judgment as to qualified immunity
is GRANTED.
Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
a constitutional violation under the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution, Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of § 1983 of
Title 42 of the United States Code. n17 See
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261,
112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992); Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 1997)
(stating that because Plaintiff failed to establish a First Amendment
violation, Plaintiff failed to prove a case for a § 1983 claim of retaliation
for the exercise of free speech). n18 Consequently, Plaintiff’s
equal-protection and § 1983 claims against the City of Fort Worth, as well as
Mendoza, must be DISMISSED. [*584]
Therefore, it is ORDERED that defendant
Mendoza’s motion for summary judgment as to qualified immunity is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against defendant Mendoza are hereby DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. In addition, Plaintiff’s claims against the City of Fort Worth for
violations of the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code are also DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
February 1, 2002.
Terry R. Means
United States District Judge
Notes:
1
The Court notes that the chronology of facts set out by Plaintiff in his
amended original complaint, Rule 7(a) reply, and his other supporting documents
is, at times, unclear and confusing.
2
Plaintiff filed his original petition in state court. Defendants, on July 11,
removed the cause to federal court.
3
The Court notes that in Plaintiff’s amended original complaint, Plaintiff
asserts eight causes of action against the defendants, several of which have
already been disposed of by the Court in previous orders. Because neither the
defendant nor the plaintiff have addressed any additional causes of action
against Mendoza, the Court assumes that Plaintiff is not pursuing them.
4 A
newspaper article titled “Pedaling for Fund-Raiser” from the October 5, 1998,
edition of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram describes Plaintiff’s tattoos as
follows:
From wrist to shoulder his right arm has a Celtic
tribal design. His left arm has another Celtic design that includes ‘Cheryl,’
the name of his wife of 11 years. His right leg has a mermaid from knee to his
waist. There’s a family crest on his chest. Cartoon character Jessica Rabbit
(‘She’s not bad, she’s just tattooed that way’) is on his forearm. . . . .
But Riggs’
most astonishing piece of body art is a two-foot by two-foot full color
rendering on his back of St. Michael spearing Satan.
See
Appendix to Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment at 18.
5
The dress code, which is contained in Fort Worth Police Department General
Order 501, sets out various rules and regulations relating to the “Wearing of
the Police Uniform.” It does not contain any specific provisions regarding
tattoos. The dress code also provides that “police personnel in the department
shall wear such uniform and insignia as the Chief of Police prescribes.” Fort
Worth Police Department General Order § 501.01(B).
6
Race, sex, and national origin are protected categories under the Equal
Protection Clause. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). Race and national origin are
“suspect” categories and sex (gender) is a “quasi-suspect” category. See
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. Statements of expression can be considered speech
that is protected by the Equal Protection Clause as a fundamental right under
the First Amendment. See Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 41 L. Ed. 2d 842, 94 S. Ct. 2727 (1974) (stating that
certain conduct, if communicative in nature, amounts to protected speech); see
also City of Chicago Police Dep’t., 408
U.S. 92, 101, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972) (stating that the “Equal
Protection Clause requires that statutes affecting First Amendment rights be
narrowly tailored to their legitimate objectives”).
7
See also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1,
8, 88 L. Ed. 497, 64 S. Ct. 397 (1944) (stating that the “unlawful
administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting
in unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a
denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination”); Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health and
Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that to prevail on
a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show intentional
discrimination against him because of
his membership in a particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly
as an individual).
8
See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3, which states, “Mendoza has instituted his discriminatory
policy, not because of any unique safety concern associated with the police
department business, but rather, because of Officer Riggs’ race and sex which
has prompted the non-uniform application of the subject policy against persons
of Caucasian, male Celtic descent.
9
Plaintiff claims that Mendoza totally disregarded his health and safety by
requiring him to wear long sleeves and pants, especially in the hot Texas
summers and against the advice of Plaintiff’s physicians. Mendoza does not
dispute that he required Plaintiff to wear long sleeves and long pants.
However, both parties present evidence that Mendoza told Plaintiff that he did
not have to wear a protective vest if Plaintiff was too hot. In addition, the
evidence shows that Plaintiff was transferred to jobs more suitable to his
required uniform such as the DWI unit where he was in an air-conditioned
vehicle, the “plain clothes” investigation unit where he did not have to wear a
uniform, and temporary desk jobs where he was indoors.
10
The First Amendment protects freedom of speech, and certain conduct, if
communicative in character, amounts to protected speech. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707, 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978) (financial
contributions); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 41 L. Ed. 2d 842, 94 S. Ct.
2727 (1974) (display of American flag with a peace symbol attached); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284, 91 S. Ct. 1780 (1971) (wearing sign
on the back of a jacket); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969) (wearing armbands).
11
Even assuming that tattoos were found to be speech protected by the First
Amendment, it would appear that Mendoza’s uniform policy as applied to
Plaintiff would survive even the stricter standard for reviewing restrictions
on government employee speech promulgated by the Supreme Court in Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968). In
Pickering, the Supreme Court set out a test that requires the Court to balance
“the interests of the [employee] , as citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interests of the State, as employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs though its employees.” Id. at
568. Additionally, a public employee’s speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection only when that speech involves a matter of public concern as opposed
to a matter of personal interest. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 75
L. Ed. 2d 708, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (“When employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment”).
With respect to the tattoos that could be
seen by the public if Plaintiff were not required to wear long sleeves and
pants, Plaintiff claims that his “tattoo of Celtic tribal designs is an
expression of his heritage and a statement of his ethnicity” and his other
tattoos are “artistic expression.” (Pl.’s Rule 7(a) Reply PP 7, 8.) But clearly
Plaintiff’s tattoos are a way for him to express his personal views and beliefs
and are not speech addressing a “legitimate public concern,” as might be the
case if the tattoos were to state, for example, some political message.
See Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246
F.3d 500, 503-04 (indicating that a police officer’s desire to wear a cross pin
on his uniform was not speech on a legitimate public concern but was, instead,
a “symbolic conveyance of his religious beliefs” and “intensely personal in
nature”). Thus, even if tattoos were found to be speech protected by the First
Amendment, such speech, at least in this case, is not speech addressing a
“legitimate public concern.” See Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of
Control, 224 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2000). Consequently, as long as Mendoza
has a rational basis for treating Plaintiff differently, then his policy will
be upheld. See discussion infra.
12
In this case, the president of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association
challenged the constitutionality of a county regulation limiting the length of
hair worn by male county police officers.
13
With respect to a police department policy regarding the length of a police
officer’s hair, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated:
We reject the idea that community standards provide a legitimate basis in weighing constitutional rights guaranteed to the individual. Whether public acceptance or rejection of a particular hair style exists in one community or another should not be a standard of concern to a federal court. What must be controlling to the court in evaluating competing interests is whether the policy of the state espouses a societal interest which outweighs the individual concern. Thus, what is essential here is that the Public Safety Department stresses the need for public respect of its officers and that it feels such respect flows in part from the officers’ individual appearance. If [the police chief] misjudges, as plaintiff suggests, what necessary measures should be taken to achieve community respect, this basically must be the department’s concern, not ours.
Stradley
v. Andersen, 478 F.2d 188, 190-91 (8th cir. 1973).
14
According to Mendoza, Plaintiff is currently at the entry-level rank of police
officer and has been so since his commissioning in 1996. (Mendoza Aff. at 2.)
In addition, Mendoza states that in October 1998, Plaintiff earned $16.92 per
hour. As of June 2001, he earned $21.36 per hour. (Id.)
15
The Court notes that job reassignments may, in certain circumstances, be the
basis of a civil-rights claim, but as to claims asserting violations other than
equal protection, Courts have often stated that “it is insufficient for a
plaintiff to show merely that he has been transferred from a job he likes to
one that he considers less desirable.” Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d
479, 483 (5th Cir. 2001); see Forsyth
v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996)
16
Even if the Court found that Plaintiff had asserted a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause in that tattoos are expressions protected under the First
Amendment, such a right was clearly not established at the time Mendoza acted.
Few courts have even considered whether tattoos are expressions protected under the First Amendment. Of
those that have, the majority have found that tattoos are not protected under
the First Amendment. See Stephenson v.
Davenport Comm. Sch. Dist., 110 F.3d at 1307. Thus, it was not clearly established
that it was unlawful for Mendoza to discriminate against Plaintiff because of
the massive number of tattoos on his body. Therefore, Defendant would still be
entitled to qualified immunity. See
Conroe Creosoting Co., 249 F.3d at 340.
17
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code imposes liability upon
“every person who, under color of state law or custom, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
“Rather than creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for
the rights that it designates.” Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist.,
869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989). In order to state a valid claim under §
1983, Plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the
Constitution or law of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person [or entity] acting under color of state
law. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights; 503 U.S. 115, 120, 117 L. Ed. 2d
261, 112 S. Ct. 1061. (1992); Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir.
1997).
18
See also Miller v. City of Nederland,
977 F. Supp. 432, 438 (E.D.Tex. 1997).