AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Civil Liability of
Law Enforcement Agencies & Personnel
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Assault and Battery: Physical
Monthly Law
Journal Article: Civil Liability for the Use
of Handcuffs: Part II - Use of Force Against Handcuffed Persons, 2008
(11) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Force
and the Fatigue Threshold: The Point of No Return, 2010 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Teaching 4th Amendment Based
Use-of-Force, 2012 (7) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
A man was arrested by police officers in the woods when they found him lying in a shallow ravine with his pants unbuckled. They officers took him to the police station, where he became irrational and violent. The plaintiff pled guilty to several state criminal charges stemming from these incidents. He then sued the police officers who apprehended him in the woods and those who attempted to subdue him at the police station. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. A federal appeals court upheld this result, ruling that Heck v. Humphrey, #93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred his excessive force claims arising from the events in the woods; since his criminal conviction had not been set aside and the excessive force claims arising from the first portion of the incident were so interrelated factually with his state convictions arising from those events that a judgment in the arrestee's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of those convictions. The excessive force claims arising from the incidents at the police station failed as a matter of law because the officers did not use excessive force against him at the police station in light of his conduct. Indeed, a video of the incident showed that no force at all was used against the arrestee until after he started acting irrationally, cursing and threatening the officers, and trying to smash a glass window. O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, #18-1704, 943 F.3d 514 (1st Cir. 2019).
An officer encountered two suspicious men walking near a location where a man wanted for assaulting an officer had last been seen. He patted down one of the men, who promptly “took off,” but fell. The officer struggled with him, and the suspect stated that he was having a seizure. The officer threatened to use his Taser, and the suspect said that he felt like he was going to pass out. Aided by another officer, the first officer escorted the suspect to a vehicle while handcuffed. The man got away and started running. The first officer grabbed him, and the man kicked near the groin of the second officer, then fell to the ground along with the first officer. It was disputed what happened next, but the suspect was then lying on the ground, bleeding from his ears. A doctor determined that the suspect would not survive because his “skull was fractured in the rear near the spinal cord” and that his injuries were inconsistent with a backward fall unless “he had been on a ladder.” A medical examiner later found multiple contusions around his head, chest, back, and abdomen, and two “linear, full-thickness fractures” to the occipital bone at the base of the skull and categorized the manner of death as a homicide. The suspect reportedly had, earlier that day, jumped across the hood of a running car. In an excessive force lawsuit by his survivors, the trial court denied qualified immunity to the defendant officers, finding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding reasonableness and violation of the decedent’s clearly established rights. A federal appeals court dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was based on factual disputes and not questions of law. Adams v. Blount County, #19-5306, 946 F.3d 940 (5th Cir.2020).
A man fell three stories from a window before an officer arrested him. The arrestee claimed that the officer intentionally pushed him through the window, and then lied about him possessing a gun—backed up by other officers who also lied. The arrestee was convicted and sentenced to eight years in prison, but his conviction was overturned. He sued the officer who allegedly pushed him for excessive force. In an agreement between the plaintiff and the city (which was not a defendant in the lawsuit), the case was settled for $5,000 to release "all claims he had or has against Gonzalez [the officer], the city, and its future, current or former officers … , including but not limited to all claims he had, has, or may have in the future, under local, state, or federal law, arising either directly or indirectly out of the incident which was the basis of this litigation." The agreement stated that the plaintiff’s attorney read and explained it to the plaintiff. Three years later, the plaintiff filed another suit, naming the city, the officer, and the officers who corroborated his story. The second lawsuit focused on the alleged lie that he possessed a gun and his subsequent prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment. The trial court dismissed the second lawsuit, awarding the city $2,131.60 for the printing of transcripts of the arrestee’s state-court criminal proceedings. A federal appeals court upheld this result. The plaintiff released all claims “arising either directly or indirectly out of the incident.” Even if “the incident” referred to his fall rather than the arrest as a whole, his claims regarding the alleged cover-up plainly “aris[e] from” the incident being covered up. The release language encompasses his claims for wrongs committed after his arrest.” Crosby v. City of Chicago, #19-1439, 2020 U.S. App. Lexis 3459, 2020 WL 562279 (7th Cir.).
A patient showed up intoxicated at a rehab clinic, threatening both a therapist and the security guard. Police officers handcuffed him behind his back, placing him under arrest. Placed on the pavement near a patrol car and then on the grass, he managed to stand and started to walk away. The incident was captured on video. The arrestee shouted threats and racial epithets. One of the officers pulled him backwards, grabbing his cuffed hands. That failed to return the arrestee to the ground. The officer claimed he then used a leg sweep, but the arrestee argued that it was actually a “kick” intended to punish him and that this caused his fall and compound leg fracture.The video, characterized as “grainy,” did not make it clear which occurred. A federal appeals court upheld qualified immunity for the defendant officer. The plaintiff arrestee, who had told the officers that he wanted to “run away,” was not under control. When an attempt to regain control causes injury, “perhaps because it was poorly executed,” that does not lead to liability. The excessive-force inquiry is an objective one, rather than subjective, the court noted. If the force used was objectively “allowable,” the officer’s state of mind cannot make it unconstitutional. Johnson v. Rogers, #19-1366, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 37254, 2019 WL 6872509 (7th Cir).
After a controlled buy of drugs took place, a police officer obtained a warrant to search 12011 Bramell. His affidavit asserted that a reliable confidential informant had been at two Burnette addresses and 12011 Bramell (the target location) and that a certain drug dealer had been selling cocaine and heroin out of 9542 Burnette for several months. Burnette Street and Bramell are eight miles apart, so the informant could not have simultaneously observed the locations as stated in the affidavit. Detroit police executed the warrant at the Bramell residence, which was owned by a retiree with no prior convictions or links to drug operations. Officers asked for his ID, which he provided while stating that he had a concealed pistol license and was carrying a weapon. He was then handcuffed and a sergeant allegedly slammed him against a wall. He had sustained a serious neck injury during military service, resulting in a spinal fusion operation and a disability-based retirement. The slam allegedly reinjured him. From the house, the police recovered $3,702 cash, weapons, a bulletproof vest, and ibuprofen pills. No charges were filed against the resident. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the sergeant on an excessive force claim and reversed the denial of qualified immunity to an officer on a false affidavit claim. Assaulting an unarmed individual, if true, is a clearly-established violation of the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff was regarded as unarmed after his weapon was removed from his control. Removing alleged falsehoods from the affidavit, the officer who obtained the warrant had not personally seen suspicious activity at the Bramell residence but he corroborated what the informant stated about the Burnette addresses. Officers, the court noted, need not corroborate every detail provided by an informant to show the informant’s reliability. Even without personally observing any drug activity at the Bramell residence, the officer put enough in the affidavit for a magistrate to conclude that the informant “who was correct about everything else” would be right that Bramell was a “stash house,” even if it ultimately turned out not to be. Butler v. City of Detroit, #18-1605, 936 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2019).
A deputy sheriff was entitled to summary judgment in a lawsuit claiming that he used excessive force during an arrest. The federal appeals court ruled that he did not violate a clearly established Fourth Amendment right and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity. It was not clearly established at the time of the arrest that a deputy was forbidden to use a takedown maneuver to arrest a suspect who ignored the deputy’s instruction to “get back here” and instead continued to walk away. Kelsay v. Ernst, #17-2181, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 24059, 2019 WL 3783101 (8th Cir.).
A couple asserted claims arising from a School Resource Officer’s (SRO) treatment of their eight-year-old autistic son. Their claims were for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Their son, a second grader, was diagnosed with autism, oppositional defiant disorder, and separation anxiety disorder. He weighed approximately 87 pounds, and was about 58 inches tall. He received Special Education services. The child was serving an in-school suspension in the principal’s office and became visibly upset, using obscenities, crumpling papers, and throwing items on the floor. He referred to a weapon in his backpack and produced what he referred to as “home-built nunchucks,” which actually consisted of a jump rope provided by the school as part of a “Jump Rope for Heart” program. He twirled the jump rope and attempted to hit the principal, and threw a cup of coffee against the wall, before running into the hallway with his jump rope. An SRO arrived, handcuffed the boy, and took him back to the principal’s office. The officer allegedly sat face-to-face with the boy, screamed at him, called him names, including “punk” and “brat,” mocked him, and laughed at him. He allegedly continued antagonizing the boy and aggravating the situation until the parents arrived. When his mother asked the officer if he realized handcuffing a child with autism would traumatize him, he replied: “You know what? You're right, I don't know that. I'm not a psychologist.” He also said, You know what, he has no sign on his head that says, ‘I have autism, I hit people.’ You can't do that in a free society.” He then continued to laugh and make comments such as “Great parenting!” The parents and child were told by the officer to leave the school, and he filed various criminal charges against the boy. An internal affairs investigation found that the officer’s actions were “unprofessional and unreasonable,” as well as “demeaning, berating and antagonizing.” He was terminated by the city as a result.A federal appeals court overturned the grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment, finding that there were material disputes of fact and that this case was distinguishable from Hainze v. Richards, #99-50222, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000), a case involving an officer shooting a mentally disturbed suicidal man armed with a knife, because there were no exigent circumstances in the present case. The court ruled that a jump rope in the hands of an eight-year-old child was not a weapon, and was not capable of inflicting the same injuries or damage as a real weapon, even if he called the jump rope his “nunchucks.” At a minimum, the court stated, whether an eight year old twirling a child’s jump rope created a danger of physical harm or a potentially life-threatening situation was a dispute of material fact requiring further proceedings. Wilson v. City of Southlake, #18-10342, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 26069 (5th Cir.).
The plaintiff filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against a city and a number of its police officers for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The defendants presented plaintiff with an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 for $10,001 and reasonable attorney's fees, expenses, and costs incurred “to the date of [the] offer,” which the plaintiff accepted. But the parties disputed the amount of the attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs to be paid. The claims involved alleged excessive use of force during an arrest and the alleged improper issuance of three summonses for threatening behavior towards an officer, possession of an open liquor container, and littering, all of which were subsequently dismissed. A federal appeals court upheld the trial judge’s reduction of the attorneys’ reasonable hourly rate because of the simple nature of the case, and upheld the decision to lower the hours claimed through an across-the-board reduction reflecting the clerical work performed. The appeals court also overturned the decision to award the plaintiff $7,920 in attorneys’ fees for the work done preparing the fee application, since the express terms of the accepted Rule 68 offer of judgment limited the fees recoverable to those incurred to the date of the offer. That left a total award of attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs of $20,838.99. Lilly v. City of New York, #17-2823, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 24153, 2019 WL 3806446 (2nd Cir.).
Officers responded to a 911 call reporting two men trying to break into a parked car. They followed a trail of footprints in the fresh snow to a home. A man told officers outside the house that his son and a friend were inside. He claimed that he did not give them permission to go inside, while they claimed that he did. They entered and found the son asleep on a loveseat. The officers allegedly tried to wake him by poking him in the chest. An officer then allegedly him punched him in the face and yelled, “stop resisting.” The officers then flipped him onto his stomach and handcuffed him. He claimed that he did not resist but that the officers used his face to open the storm door as they dragged him out of the house, leaving him with injuries. The officers claim that he fought, kicked two officers, and pulled his arms away. He was acquitted of assaulting an officer. In an excessive force lawsuit, a federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity, ruling that that there were material disputes of fact over whether the officers unlawfully entered the home, whether they used excessive force when arresting the plaintiff, and whether the officers influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute for assaulting one of them. Coffey v. Carroll, #18-1314, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 23306, 2019 Fed. App. 0181P, 2019 WL 3540799 (6th Cir.).
In a case alleging excessive force and failure to train and supervise, a federal appeals court found that a defendant police officer was entitled to summary judgment. Under the circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed that the plaintiff was resisting arrest and posed a threat to his safety. The officer faced a “tense and unpredictable” situation and was the only officer on the scene, confronting two hostile and intoxicated persons who refused to leave a bar premises on request. The use of an arm-bar takedown to restrain and handcuff the plaintiff was objectively reasonable under these circumstances. Fischer v. Hoven, #18-2061, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 16572 (8th Cir.).
Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on unlawful detention, excessive force, and false reporting claims because video and audio evidence supported the assertion that they relied on the representations of credible persons to believe that the plaintiff’s son met the statutory criteria for apprehension. Even assuming that the officers violated his constitutional rights, she failed to show that clearly established law put the officers on notice that their conduct was illegal. As to the excessive force claim, the plaintiff had not shown that the officers violated clearly established law by moving her son, a person who was increasingly aggravated, repeatedly spitting at the officers, and failing to comply with instructions to stop, to the floor, even though he collided with a cabinet on the way down, and, as to the filing of false police reports claim, neither the trial court nor the plaintiff identified which constitutional rights were violated. Rich v. Palko, #18-40415, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 9856, 2019 WL 1468176 (5th Cir.).
Police responded to a 911 call from a woman about domestic violence at the apartment where she lived with her husband, her children, and a roommate. Officers arrested her husband, but he was later released. A month later, police received a 911 call from the roommate’; mother, who reported hearing the roommate and wife both screaming for help in a phone call that was quickly disconnected. Two officers dispatched to the residence spoke to the wife through an open window. A man inside the apartment told her to back away from the window. A man then opened the front door, came outside, closed the door despite orders not to do so, and tried to brush past an officer, who quickly took him to the ground and handcuffed him without hitting him or displaying any weapons. The man was the wife’s father, and he sued two officers for excessive use of force. A federal appeals court agreed that the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, but remanded as to excessive force claims, denying the officers qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed as to one officer and vacated as to the officer who took down the plaintiff and handcuffed him. The decision concerning the first was “quite puzzling,” the Court found, in light of the trial court’s conclusion that only the second officer was involved in the excessive force claim. As to that second officer, it did not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified immunity, and then remand for a trial on the question of reasonableness. An officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it. The appeals court’s formulation of the clearly established right was far too general as the court made no effort to explain how case law prohibited the second officer’s actions in this case. Escondido v. Emmons, #17-1660, 2019 U.S. Lexis 11.
A female motorist passed a state trooper’s marked vehicle. The trooper checked and discovered that the vehicle’s registration was expired and began a traffic stop, activating his emergency lights, spotlight, and sirens, and recording the incident on his dash-cam. The driver decelerated and pulled onto a narrow and unlit shoulder before returning to the road and accelerating to 35-38 mph, a speed maintained for the rest of the pursuit. When she continued past the last exit before the nearest city, the trooper initiated a Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT) maneuver, striking her right-rear fender with his left-front bumper, which caused her car to spin into a ditch, hitting a cement culvert. The motorist and her child were treated at a hospital and released. She was given citations for misdemeanors of expired tags and failure to yield to an emergency vehicle. A federal appeals court ruled that the trooper was entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims. The right to be free from a PIT maneuver in these circumstances was not clearly established. From a reasonable officer’s perspective, the motorist refused to comply with commands to pull over. At the time, the trooper was justified in using some force to secure compliance. Moore-Jones v. Quick, #18-1045, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 33339 (8th Cir.).
A police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a drunk woman’s claim that he used excessive force on her during an arrest when a jury could find that a reasonable officer in his position would not have interpreted her actions as noncompliance and would have known that she posed neither a flight risk not an immediate threat to anyone’s safety. Indeed, being drunk and argumentative with another resident in a home one lives in is not a crime. It was clearly established than an officer could not forcefully take down a person who was a nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanant who was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee in the violent and uncontrolled manner of slamming her to the ground that this officer allegedly did. Karels v. Storz, #17-2527, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 28917 (8th Cir.).
A man who had a fight with officers in the setting of acute methamphetamine intoxication died from a cardiac arrhythmia. The incident occurred as the officers responded to a domestic disturbance call and found the man attacking his girlfriend in a brutal manner. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants in an excessive force lawsuit brought by the decedent’s parents. The appeals court held that unsworn statements about the incident that paramedics had made to officers were properly excluded from evidence. Iowa’s state false statement law did not “implicitly swear” a declarant making a statement to officers. There also was no genuine dispute of material fact that the decedent posed a threat to the safety of both the officers and girlfriend and no admissible evidence rebutting the officers’ version of the incident. Tasers in the dart mode were used during the incident and a Taser video indicated that one Taser malfunctioned. Zubrod v. Hoch, #17-1202, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 29625 (8th Cir.).
A motorist was involved in a single-car accident while intoxicated. During his arrest, he was allegedly kicked in the face, breaking his eye socket. Two police officers and two state troopers involved in the arrest, as well as their employers, acknowledged that one officer kicked him. Each of the four law enforcement personnel involved in the incident asserted that he neither inflicted the injury nor saw who did so. The plaintiff, since his face was pinned to the pavement when the kick occurred, could not identify his alleged assailant. Because a defendant must have “personal involvement” in the alleged wrongs, the trial court ruled that the plaintiff’s inability to identify his attacker defeated his claims, and therefore granted the defendants summary judgment. A federal appeals court upheld the ruling as to an excessive force claim, but reversed as to a conspiracy claim. Despite the unfortunate situation created for plaintiffs who are unable to identify their attackers through no fault of their own, a plaintiff alleging that one or more officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must nevertheless establish the “personal involvement” of each named defendant to survive summary judgment. Despite this, however, where a plaintiff presents sufficient evidence of an after-the-fact conspiracy to cover up misconduct, even of an unidentified officer, he may be able to state a claim for the violation of the due process right of access to the courts. Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, #17-2594, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 25806 (3rd Cir.).
A police officer remained on top of an arrestee after he was handcuffed following a chase and takedown. The arrestee repeatedly stated that he could not breathe, even after the officer shifted his weight. A radio transmission from the officer at the time was recorded and the arrestee can be heard complaining about inability to breathe. The arrestee, a 22-year-old African American man in good physical shape, went limp when the officers lifted him up. He then began sweating and breathing heavily and, when he regained consciousness, would complain of being unable to breathe. Officers did not call for help until several minutes after he was discovered to have no pulse and to have stopped breathing. He apparently died in the squad car, and left three children. The cause of death was disputed. The arrestee’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The trial court denied a defense motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. A federal appeals court remanded for an individual analysis of each officer’s claim of qualified immunity. The court noted material issues of fact concerning whether the officers were on notice of the arrestee’s serious medical condition. Each officer had a different degree of contact with the decedent and had different assigned responsibilities with respect to his apprehension and investigation of the alleged armed robbery he was suspected of. Estate of Williams v. Cline, #17-2603, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 24836 (7th Cir.).
A police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on an arrestee’s claim that he used excessive force by bringing the arrestee to the ground using an arm-bar takedown. In the plaintiff’s version of the arrest, he neither posed a threat to anyone's safety nor resisted arrest. If true, his right to be free from unreasonable and excessive force was violated, and the right was clearly established at the time. Neal v. Ficcadenti, #17-2633, 895 F.3d 576 (8th Cir. 2018).
While upholding a trial court judgment finding that two officers used excessive force in their apprehension and arrest of the plaintiff and an award of damages, a federal appeals court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the deposition testimony of an unavailable medical expert witness. The expert qualified as an expert and had been extensively cross-examined during his deposition, he was unavailable, and defendants had notice. The trial court also did not err in submitting the plaintiff's punitive damage claim to the jury and the award of such damages against one defendant was supported by substantial evidence. Fletcher v. Tomlinson, #16-4399, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 19171 (8th Cir.).
Demonstrators claimed that police officers used excessive force against them by using a long-range acoustic device (LRAD or sound gun) to disperse non-violent protesters. Upholding a denial of qualified immunity to the defendants, a federal appeals court held that purposefully using a LRAD in a manner capable of causing serious injury to move non‐violent protesters to the sidewalks violated the Fourteenth Amendment under clearly established law. Edrei v. Bratton, #17-2065, 892 F.3d 525 (2d Cir. 2018).
Defendant police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff alleged that they violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. In this case, he claimed that the officers delivered repeated strikes, punches, and blows to the plaintiff while he pled with them to stop hitting him because he was not resisting arrest or doing anything wrong. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable officer standing in the defendants’ shoes would have understood that the amount of force used to subdue plaintiff was excessive, as was their action in purposefully dropping plaintiff face-first onto the sidewalk after he had been subdued and handcuffed. Burnikel v. Fong, #16-3930, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 8215 (8th Cir.).
Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity for their use of force against a paranoid schizophrenic who had not taken his antipsychotic medication. They knew that he could potentially be dangerous, he refused repeated requests to go to the hospital or lie on his stomach, pretended to shoot himself in the head, took a defensive position lying on the ground with his hands and feet up, and yelled “just shoot me.” Under these circumstances, the federal appeals court ruled, the deputies knew that there was a reasonable expectation of aggression and a resistant subject. One deputy acted reasonably in cuffing and shackling the plaintiff, and a second acted reasonably in applying an arm lock that broke the plaintiff's arm and by using nunchucks to obtain compliance. A third deputy acted reasonably by activating his Taser five times in stun mode on the plaintiff after giving warnings and attempting less intrusive methods. Further, even if the third deputy did not act reasonably, he was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff could not show that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right. Cravener v. Shuster, #17-1971, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 7671 (8th Cir.).
Two officers saw a group near a high school, including known street gang members. The youths crossed the street after the assistant principal told them to leave. When school was over, they harassed pedestrians and flashed gang signs. The officer told them to leave the area, and they moved a block away, in front of a house, and continued their actions. The officers told them to disperse or be arrested. One boy rode his bike back to the school’s lawn. The officers decided to arrest him for trespassing. They could have issued a simple citation but believed that he would continue to loiter. They instructed him to get off his bike and put his hands behind his back. He cooperated, and they escorted him to their squad car where an officer’s handling caused his arm to break. In a federal civil rights lawsuit, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. A federal appeals court reversed in part. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record established that he was fully cooperative when the officer moved his arm with enough force to break it, which does not support the conclusion that he was placing the plaintiff in handcuffs with objectively reasonable force. Avina v. Bohlen, #17-1902, 882 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2018).
An officer was entitled to qualified immunity and official immunity on federal and state excessive force claims. It was objectively reasonable for him to believe that the plaintiff motorist’s reach for the gearshift was an effort to shift her car to drive and to flee. He also had reason to believe the motorist was intoxicated and posed a potential threat to public safety, so he acted reasonably in reaching into the car and turning off the ignition, and then using force to remove her from the vehicle. Boude v. City of Raymore, #16-1183 855 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2017).
A deputy’s use of the arm-bar technique fell short of a constitutional violation when he had been sent to the bar based on reports of a man armed with a knife who allegedly threatened to stab people. While the plaintiff did not visibly possess a knife or attempt to resist arrest before the takedown, other factors supported the use of force. These included the severity of the suspect’s criminal conduct of threatening to stab various individuals, his refusal to comply with the officer’s repeated commands, the very real possibility that he still had a concealed knife on his person after exiting the vehicle, the resulting potential threat to the officer's safety, and the fact that the officer was making the arrest without any backup. Vester v. Hallock, #16-3389, 864 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2017).
Clearly established law showed that it was objectively unreasonable for several officers to tackle an individual who was not fleeing, not violent, not aggressive, and only resisted by pulling his arm away from an officer's grasp. Accordingly, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim. A factual issue existed as to whether a reasonable officer would have perceived the plaintiff as being a danger to others, considering that he had stepped away from the motorcycle and showed no intention of mounting and riding away on it, and considering that the motorcycle that was turned off and parked on a center stand. There was also a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the officers’ use of force was objectively unreasonable where a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff’s pulling his arms away from the officers, along with the other circumstances of the arrest, did not justify the officers’ ‘decision to tackle him to the ground. Trammell v. Fruge, #16-50981, 53 F.3d 738, (5th Cir. 2017).
A lawsuit claimed that a police officer investigating a tip that illegal drugs were being sold at a convenience store “sucker-punched” a store employee for no known reason, and then kept beating and kicking him for about two minutes as he attempted to get away. A store surveillance tape recorded the incident. At his federal criminal trial for willfully depriving the employee of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force inflicted by a law-enforcement officer, the officer wanted to introduce expert witness testimony from a former officer that his actions were consistent with police department standards. The trial court excluded the testimony, reasoning that departmental policy was immaterial to the Fourth Amendment standard to be applied and that the expert’s proposed testimony might include an improper opinion about the defendant’s state of mind. The jury returned a guilty verdict. A federal appeals court upheld this result, ruling that such expert testimony is sometimes unhelpful and irrelevant, especially when no specialized knowledge was needed to decide whether an officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable. The alleged misconduct in this case was “easily” within the grasp of lay jurors. U.S. v. Brown, #16-1603, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 17403 (7th Cir.).
A man leaving a train station was confronted by a plainclothes police officer who, with the assistance of other plainclothes officers, forced him to the ground. He was charged with resisting arrest and was acquitted, then sued the officers and the city for excessive use of force and malicious prosecution. He claimed the first officer had not identified himself as police, which the officer disputed, claiming that when he identified himself the plaintiff had fled to avoid being frisked. A federal appeals court overturned a verdict for the defendants. The trial court properly admitted evidence of the marijuana found in the plaintiff’s pocket. While the marijuana was unknown to the officers at the time, it arguably tended to corroborate their account of his behavior. The jury instructions on Terry investigatory stops, however, were inadequate. Over objection, the court instructed the jury only on investigatory stops but not frisks. The officer’s testimony indicated that he was starting a frisk when he first approached the plaintiff and that he did not have reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. The plaintiff was entitled to have the jury know that the attempted frisk, which produced the use of force, was unjustified. Further, the jury asked whether plainclothes officers must identify themselves when conducting a stop. The trial judge said no, while in all but the most unusual circumstances, where identification would itself make the situation more dangerous, plainclothes officers must identify themselves when initiating a stop. These errors were not harmless, requiring further proceedings. Doornbos v. City of Chicago, #16-1770, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 15696 (7th Cir.).
Two police officers arrested an obese man at his residence while executing a no-knock warrant for cocaine. In the course of the arrest, the officers allegedly threw him to the ground, twice activated a Taser in the dart mode, choked him, punched and kicked him in the face, pushed him into a face-down position, pressed his face into the ground, and pulled his hands behind his back to handcuff him. He had a heart attack during the arrest and died. A federal appeals court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the decedent was actively resisting arrest and whether the force used was excessive and unreasonable, so the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. If the decedent was not actively resisting arrest when he was thrown to the ground and the Taser was used, the force used would have been excessive. Darden v. City of Fort Worth, #16-11244, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14693 (5th Cir.).
A police officer on crowd-control duty was not entitled to qualified immunity in a post-verdict motion on an excessive force claim arising from an incident in which he allegedly grabbed a man from behind by the collar and dragged him backward and downward to the pavement after observing him “taunting” K-9 dogs. The jury found the defendant officer engaged in excessive force, awarding in $140,000 in damages. A reasonable officer in his position would have understood that his actions violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Ciolino v. Gikas, #16-2107, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 11599 (1st Cir.).
The plaintiff was stopped and questioned while he was at a car wash and he did not commit any crimes. Furthermore, he was not resisting arrest, and was not acting aggressively towards an officer or threatening an officer’s safety. Under these circumstances, the use of physical force against the plaintiff by a deputy on the scene and by an off-duty officer who intervened in the situation did not entitle the defendants to qualified immunity on excessive force claims. The plaintiff's right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established at the time. Perry v. Wolfe, #16-3229, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 9882 (8th Cir.).
While an arrestee’s nolo contendere (no contest) plea conceded probable cause for his arrest, defeating his false arrest claim, excessive force claims against the arresting deputy were reinstated. The injuries he sustained during his arrest for failing to have a driver’s license were not de minimis (minimal). Rather, the record showed that he suffered medically documented severe, permanent injuries from the deputy’s unprovoked and completely unnecessary frontal-body blows to his chest and throwing him against the car-door jamb in the course of arresting him. At the time, he was cooperating with officers and not resisting whatsoever, not even raising his voice. Applying the “obvious-clarity” method analysis, the appeals court concluded that no particularized preexisting case law was necessary for it to be clearly established that what the deputy did violated plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from the excessive use of force in his arrest. Stephens v. DeGiovanni, #15-10206, 852 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2017).
FBI agents and Bureau of Land Management agents searched 12 properties and
arrested 22 people in a number of Utah locations, targeting persons trafficking
illegally obtained Native American artifacts. One day after the search of a
doctor’s home as part of these raids, and his subsequent arrest and release on
bond, he killed himself. His estate sued, claiming that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by the use of excessive force during the incident. A
federal appeals court upheld a grant of summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. The agent who directed the raid did not use excessive force
in violation of the doctor's rights under the Fourth Amendment because he
directed other agents to detain the doctor, his wife, and his daughter while as
many as 22 agents, who were wearing soft body armor and carrying guns, searched
the house. Estate of James Redd v. Love, #16-4010, 848 F.3d 899 (10th Cir.
2017).
A motorist
stopped for a traffic offense met his burden of rebutting the defendant
officer’s qualified immunity defense. The court concluded that the
constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident,
and that the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of
then-existing clearly established law. In this case, he stopped the plaintiff
for a minor traffic offense and abruptly escalated to a takedown, The motorist
had presented no immediate threat or risk of flight. He allegedly offered, at
most, passive resistance, including asking whether he was under arrest, which
if true would not justify the level of force utilized.
The officer also had his Taser aimed at the motorist’s back while he stood
against his vehicle, facing away from the officer, with his empty hands
displayed behind his back, not presenting any threat. Hanks v. Rogers,
#15-11295, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 5927 (5th Cir.).
Because
West Virginia police officers have authority to make arrests for minor traffic
offenses, including the expired inspection sticker the plaintiff motorist had,
his arrest was supported by probable cause even though the officer made the
arrest for assault and obstruction rather than the expired sticker. As to his
excessive force claim, the plaintiff suffered only abrasions minor enough that
he treated them at home and did not seek medical attention. An efficient,
lawful arrest causing the arrestee to suffer only de minimis (minimal) injuries
cannot support a claim for excessive force. Pegg v.
Herrnberger. #15-1999, 845 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2017).
A motorist arrested for
DUI sued the arresting officer for allegedly using excessive force in making
the arrest. Rejecting this claim, a federal appeals court noted that the
arrestee resisted being arrested, trying to avoid being handcuffed, lurching to
the side and stating "no, no" while clearly drunk and obstinate. The
officer's actions in carrying out the initial takedown was not constitutionally
unreasonable founder clearly established law. There was no case law
establishing that it was unreasonable for the officer to use non-deadly punches
to gain control of the arms of a drunken, actively resisting arrestee. The
force used by the officer was the kind of "split-second" judgment in
a difficult situation which qualified immunity was intended to protect. Griggs
v. Brewer, #16-10221, 841 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2016).
A man who allegedly
ingested bath salts was engaged in erratic behavior, causing five police officers
to attempt to take him into protective custody. While trying to restrain him,
they placed him in a face-down position on the ground while two of them exerted
significant force on his shoulders and neck. He died during the incident. The
defendant officers were granted qualified immunity, except for claims against
two officers who allegedly used excessive force after the decedent ceased
resisting. A federal appeals court rejected an appeal, finding that disputed
material facts as to whether the use of force continued for five minutes after
resistance stopped, as the plaintiff claimed, or only 66 seconds, as the
officers argued, precluded summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
It was, the court found, clearly established in September 2012 that exerting
significant continued force on a person's back while he was in a face-down
prone position after being subdued constituted excessive force. McCue v. City
of Bangor, Maine, #15-2460, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17496 (1st Cir.).
Three
officers forcibly removed a man from his pickup truck when he refused to comply
with lawful orders to exit. He was heavily intoxicated, as well as morbidly
obese and handicapped. In the course of the extraction, he suffered a serious
injury that rendered him quadriplegic. He died a few months later. A federal
appeals court held that the defendant officers were entitled to qualified
immunity on excessive force claims because, even accepting the plaintiffs'
version of the facts, they did not violate the decedent's rights. The
approximately two minutes that one officer spent negotiating with him before
deciding to resort to force was not objectively unreasonable, especially in
light of the driver's explicit and repeated refusal to comply with requests to
exit the pickup and the possibility that he might have had access to a weapon
or could have tried to drive his huge, elevated truck into the police car. The
officers used no weapons, only their hands. Sullivan v. City of Round Rock,
#15-51204, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 16843 (5th Cir.).
An informant told police that a man was
engaged in selling crack cocaine from his apartment and answered his door with
a handgun in hand. A SWAT team executed a “High Risk Warrant Services”
form. Their plan for the raid called for a "dynamic entry" by 20
officers to secure the premises within 30 seconds and authorized the use of
flashbang grenades. At the time of the raid, the man's mother was visiting and
another of her sons was present along with the suspect's girlfriend. The
officers breached the door with a battering ram, and one of them saw the
suspect's mother move towards the door. Another officer looked through the
doorway, saw no one, and tossed a flashbang inside. The blast severely injured
the mother's leg. The raid found narcotics and a handgun. A federal appeals
court upheld a jury verdict for the defendants on the mother's excessive force
claim as supported by the evidence. A jury statement that “While we agree that
this was a horrible instance ... the errors made by the Chicago Police
Department as a whole cannot fall on the shoulders of these two defendants” was
consistent with the verdict. Flournoy v. City of
Chicago, #14-3776, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 13343 (7th Cir.).
A courtroom marshal was not entitled to absolute
immunity on excessive force claims by two bail enforcement agents removed from
a court room at a judge's request. He was not performing a judicial function,
and allegedly used force in excess of what the judge commanded and the
Constitution allows. He was, however, entitled to qualified immunity from
liability, since there was then "chaos" in the court room and
undisputed evidence that at least one of the two plaintiffs was intent on
disobeying the court's instructions. It was not "beyond debate" that
the marshal used an unreasonable level of force. Brooks v. Clark County,
#14-16424, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12510 (9th Cir.).
Two officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity in a female motorist's excessive force lawsuit. They violated clearly
established law prohibiting the use of force against a misdemeanant who did not
pose an immediate threat to herself or others if her version of the incident
was true. She claimed that after she was stopped for driving with a suspended
license, they started pounding on her car with batons, demanding that she exit
the vehicle. When she asked for assurances that she would not be hurt, they
allegedly smashed the car's windows, pulled her through a broken window by her
arms and hair, and threw her on the glass-littered pavement. Davis v. Clifford,
#15-139, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 10648 (10th Cir.).
False arrest claims were properly rejected where,
when the officers first viewed some photographs, they were justified in
concluding that they qualified as unlawful child pornography. The court also
properly found that the force used by named officers during the arrest was
reasonable under the circumstances, as they had to push him along because he
lightly resisted. The force they used caused him no injury, but the trial court
erred in finding as matter of law that named officers lacked a realistic
opportunity to intervene in an alleged assault on the plaintiff by an
unidentified officer. Figueroa v. Mazza, 14-4116, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 10152
(2nd Cir.).
An arrestee claimed that an officer used
excessive force during his arrest, specifically pulling him down three steps
after he surrendered, placing his knee on his back, and allowing a police dog
to continue to bite him. The officer claimed that he had released the dog only
after the plaintiff failed to respond to commands to come out of hiding. He
also contended that the dog could not hear the command to cease his attack
because of the plaintiff's screaming. Upholding a denial of qualified immunity,
a federal appeals court ruled that a jury could reasonably find, if the facts
were as alleged by the plaintiff, that the force used was excessive. It was
clearly established at the time of the incident that no more than minimal force
should be used during the arrest of a non-resisting or passively resisting
person. Becker v. Elfriech, #15-1363, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 8703 (7th
Cir.).
An officer and his
partner encounter a woman walking out into traffic with her face covered in
blood. She pointed to her husband, who she said struck her, and one of the
officers walked towards him, ordering him to stop, put his hands behind his
back, and stop screaming. The man ignored these orders and was grabbed. He
attempted to twist away, causing him to fall. After being handcuffed, he
continued to struggle and fell down again. Hours later, at the police station,
he complained of pain, and was taken to a hospital where an arm fracture was
diagnosed. He pled guilty to resisting arrest but sued for excessive force. The
trial judge stated a deadline for the plaintiff to disclose his expert witness.
He failed to provide the expert's report and failed to respond to a motion to
strike the expert's testimony. He was barred from presenting the expert at
trial. The federal appeals court upheld a verdict for the officer. Challenges
to evidentiary rulings were rejected as the plaintiff failed to provide
transcripts regarding tho challenged rulings. Hall v. Jung, #15-2102, 2016 U.S.
App. Lexis 6590 (7th Cir.).
Officers investigating an armed robbery gave
chase to a 16-year-old boy. A neighbor informed one of the officers that they
were chasing a boy with Down Syndrome, and the officer allegedly replied
"shut up, get out of my way." The boy stopped running at a parking
lot where his family was waiting. The same officer admitted that he saw the boy
surrendering, but allegedly grabbed him from behind, forcefully pulled him from
his mother's arms, and slammed him hard into a vehicle. The boy allegedly was
not resisting and was crying in pain as he was handcuffed, and was kept pinned
by the officer, who was twice his weight, for 15 minutes while telling the
boy's parents that they were lucky he "didn't shoot." The second
officer, according to the plaintiffs, did nothing, but did hurl racial slurs at
the Hispanic family. When the officers were informed by radio that the robbers
were caught, they released the boy. A federal appeals court upheld the denial
of qualified immunity, finding that, if the facts were as alleged, a jury could
conclude that excessive force was used, and that the second officer could be
held liable on a failure to intervene claim. Ortiz v. Kazimer, #15-3453, 811
F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2016).
Two African-American men and four female friends,
some of whom were Caucasian, walked past a police precinct while leaving an
entertainment district where they had spent the evening drinking. Off-duty
officers, including an African-American man, congregated in a nearby parking
lot and were drinking. The African-American officer approached the group
passing by and told them to move along, and referred to some of the females in
the group as "snow bunnies," intended as a racial slur. One of the
men questioned who the officer was. The officer allegedly said, "I'll show
you who I am," and attacked the man. Other off-duty officers then joined
in punching and kicking, and shouted "stop resisting arrest." Both
men were taken into custody and taken to a hospital. Charges of resisting,
public intoxication, and disorderly conduct were dismissed. Qualified immunity
was denied to the off-duty African-American officer, as a jury could reasonably
find that his conduct violated the arrestees' rights. McDonald v. Flake,
#14-6370, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 3627 (6th Cir.).
Officers pursuing a man's son following a
vehicular pursuit arrived at the father's house. The father claimed that while
the officers were attempting to subdue his son, who they mistakenly believed
had an outstanding arrest warrant, one of them kicked him and another tackled
him from behind. The officers disputed his version of the events. An appeals
court found that, under either version of events, the officers could reasonably
believe that the father was trying to interfere with a lawful arrest and
therefore did not use excessive force under the circumstances. Dawson v. Brown,
#15-1517, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 17581 (7th Cir.).
Summary judgment was improperly granted to a
police detective on a suspect's excessive force lawsuit. No officer in 2009
could reasonably have believed that it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment
to jump on the back of a prone and compliant suspect gratuitously with enough
force to break his spine and rib, as the plaintiff alleged. Rogoz v. City of
Hartford, #14-0876, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13945 (2nd Cir.).
Two homosexual men arrested at home in the early
morning on charges of assaulting an officer claimed that the arresting officers
refused to allow them to get additional clothing, forcing them to remain in
their boxer shorts and only issuing them jumpsuits after they got to the police
station. The plaintiffs had repeatedly changed their story, now contending that
officers repeatedly struck them and violated their equal protection rights as
homosexuals by forcing them to remain in their shorts. They also asserted
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The officers moved for
summary judgment and the plaintiffs then filed affidavits in response, based on
"personal knowledge and belief," for the first time revealing which
officers they claimed committed each act. The appeals court upheld the trial's
court's rulings striking the affidavits since it was not possible to tell which
statements in the affidavits were based on personal knowledge, as required, and
which were only based on mere belief. Without the affidavits, the defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, even construing any remaining
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The court also stated
that the complaint about being kept in boxer shorts, even if motivated in part
by reaction to the plaintiffs' homosexuality, was not unconstitutional. Ondo v.
City of Cleveland, #14-3527, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13474, 2015 Fed. App. 175P
(6th Cir.).
An officer was entitled to qualified immunity in
a female motorist's lawsuit claiming that he used excessive force against her
during a search of her car after stopping her for a suspected window tint
violation. He had probable cause to stop and search her car, and she refused to
let him search it, struggling with him to prevent the search and stop him from
taking her keys to turn off the car. The only force complained about was two
yanks to get her out of the driver's seat. The officer did not use any other
force or handcuff her, so his use of force did not violate clearly established
law under the circumstances. Merricks v. Adkisson, #14-12801, 785 F.3d 553
(11th Cir. 2015).
A man was working at his family's dairy farm when
a fight broke out which he and ten other people witnessed. Approximately 20
state and local police officers arrived on the scene after the fight ended. One
local officer questioned the man about what he had witnessed. A state trooper
then yelled at him to take his hands out of his pockets. The man claimed he
complied, although he remarked that his hands were cold as he had been milking
cows all day. He then started to walk away, having already told his story to
the officer. The trooper, subsequently assisted by other officers, then
allegedly grabbed, tackled, punched, kicked, and pepper sprayed the man. He
subsequently disputed the man's version of events, asserting that the
altercation began when the man resisted efforts to force his hands out of his
pockets, and that the man struck him and tackled him. Because of these factual
disputes, summary judgment for the officers on excessive force claims was
improper. Santini v. Fuentes, #14-2938, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13552 (3rd Cir.).
A male motorist who was an insulin-dependent
diabetic become lightheaded driving home, and pulled over on the shoulder of
the road. He took glucose tablets and either fell asleep or became unconscious.
A deputy approached the truck and knocked on the window, attempting to identify
himself. The driver stated in a mumble that he was trying to recover from low
blood sugar, but the deputy believed him to be intoxicated and radioed for
another officer engaged in DWI enforcement. The motorist, when the second
officer arrived, stated that he should "leave me the fuck alone." He
refused several requests that he exit the vehicle, so both officers pulled him
out by his legs, causing him to hit the ground. The driver continued to resist,
trying to return to the truck and stating that he had a gun in his waistband
when they tried to handcuff him. The gun was removed and thrown, and the
motorist asked the officers if they were "stupid," as the gun could
have discharged. The officers used pepper spray and struck the motorist. EMS
personnel arrived, and treated the motorist for hypoglycemia and a nosebleed.
Blood alcohol tests for intoxication were negative, and the driver had a broken
rib. Upholding a grant of qualified immunity to the officers, a federal appeals
court ruled that even had the officers realized that the driver was suffering
from hypoglycemia, the driver still refused to comply with orders and was belligerent
and impaired, justifying the use of force. The level of force used was
objectively reasonable. Schoettle v. Jefferson County, #14-1993, 2015 U.S. App.
Lexis 9729 (8th Cir.).
A male motorist who was an insulin-dependent
diabetic become lightheaded driving home, and pulled over on the shoulder of
the road. He took glucose tablets and either fell asleep or became unconscious.
A deputy approached the truck and knocked on the window, attempting to identify
himself. The driver stated in a mumble that he was trying to recover from low
blood sugar, but the deputy believed him to be intoxicated and radioed for
another officer engaged in DWI enforcement. The motorist, when the second
officer arrived, stated that he should "leave me the fuck alone." He
refused several requests that he exit the vehicle, so both officers pulled him
out by his legs, causing him to hit the ground. The driver continued to resist,
trying to return to the truck and stating that he had a gun in his waistband
when they tried to handcuff him. The gun was removed and thrown, and the
motorist asked the officers if they were "stupid," as the gun could
have discharged. The officers used pepper spray and struck the motorist. EMS
personnel arrived, and treated the motorist for hypoglycemia and a nosebleed.
Blood alcohol tests for intoxication were negative, and the driver had a broken
rib. Upholding a grant of qualified immunity to the officers, a federal appeals
court ruled that even had the officers realized that the driver was suffering from
hypoglycemia, the driver still refused to comply with orders and was
belligerent and impaired, justifying the use of force. The level of force used
was objectively reasonable. Schoettle v. Jefferson County, #14-1993, 2015 U.S.
App. Lexis 9729 (8th Cir.).
A man asserted that he had been assaulted by
several people, one of whom was an off-duty police officer. A police detective
assigned to investigate the incident was alleged to have done almost nothing on
the investigation for six weeks, interviewing no witnesses other than the
plaintiff, failing to inspect the crime scene, and following no leads, prior to
closing the case. The plaintiff sued the detective for violating his right of
access to the courts, claiming that the failure to properly investigate the
crime resulted in the spoilation of evidence in his lawsuit against his
assailants. He also assserted a claim for municipal liability against the city,
claiming that it perpetuated a "code of silence" that had the effect
of shielding officers from investigation and promoting misconduct. Summary
judgment for the defendants was upheld. A federal appeals court found no denial
of access to the courts because the defendants did not conceal any facts from
the plaintiff that interfered with him suing his assailants. The plaintiff
himself knew all the relevant facts of his case, so the detective was entitled
to qualified immunity. The appeals court found that, on the municipal liability
claim, there was insufficient evidence presented of any widespread practices by
the police department. The appeals court further found that the trial court
acted within its discretion in awarding costs to the city. Rossi v. City of
Chicago, #13-3795, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 10504 (7th Cir.).
A motorist claimed that a trooper who stopped him
screamed at him, pulled him out of the car, and injured him by beating him. The
trooper claimed, and the motorist denied, that the motorist bent over as if
reaching for something, and that a hammer was visible on the floor. The
motorist claimed that the hammer was under the seat and not visible. Following
the incident, the motorist's face was bruised and an MRI months later showed
"minimal disc bulging, Her claimed neck and upper back pain. Summary
judgment in favor of the defendant trooper was reversed by a federal appeals
court. There were disputed issues of fact, including as to the seriousness of
the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff's lack of a medical expert on the issue
was not fatal to his claim as the injuries of the type claimed were “within the
range of common experience.” A jury could weigh the credibility of the
plaintiff's version of the incident versus the trooper's and compare the
plaintiff's medical records and subjective assessment of pain against the
trooper's medical expert testimony. Ziesmer v. Hagen, #14-2229, 2015 U.S. App.
Lexis 7713 (8th Cir.).
A college student studying for exams sat in an
area of a D.C. public library reserved for children. A police officer asked her
to move, so she went to a young adult area after finding no seats available in
the adult area, although she was over the age for the young adult area also.
The officer asked her to move again and an altercation ensued, culminating with
her arrest. The student sued the officer and the District of Columbia for
excessive use of force. At trial, the officer and the arrestee disputed the
specifics of the incident and an "inconclusive" video of part of what
occurred was introduced. The defense also introduced the testimony of a
librarian, which supported the officer's version of events, but had not
identified him as a potential witness prior to trial. The librarian's testimony
was allowed as an impeachment witness to impeach the plaintiff's testimony. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A federal appeals court reversed,
ordering a new trial, and finding that the librarian's testimony was improperly
admitted as it went beyond impeachment to essentially collaborate the officer's
testimony in a case where the trial turned on the jury's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses, and the librarian's testimony likely influenced
the outcome. Standley v. Edmonds-Leach, #13-7104, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 6528
(D.C. Cir.).
A woman claimed that an officer who came to the
door of her home looking for a missing juvenile grabbed her arm, threw her to
the ground, punched her, jumped on her, handcuffed her, and pulled her to her
feet by her hair. A federal appeals court ruled that the officer was properly
denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. If her version of
the incident was believed, the officer had, at most, reason to believe that she
might be guilty of a misdemeanor of contributing to the minor's delinquency,
she answered all the officer's questions, gave no indication that she was inclined
to harm him, and was full compliant and responsive to all his instructions and
requests. Smith v. Ray, #12-1503, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 4391 (4th Cir.).
Police pulled over a female motorist based on
confusing statements concerning a male suspect heard by a 911 operator during a
phone call. The woman claimed that the officers ordered her out of her car at
gunpoint, threw her on the ground, handcuffed her, and detained her for
approximately ten minutes. The male suspect was not in the car. A federal
appeals court upheld a denial of qualified immunity to the officers. If the
woman's version of the incident were true, the officers used excessive force
against her despite the fact that she was clearly afraid and was completely
cooperating with their orders. While there had been reasonable suspicion to
make the stop, if the plaintiff's version of events were true, the incident
turned into an unlawful arrest when the officers continued after determining
that she was a woman alone in the car. Brown v. Lewis, #14-1392, 2015 U.S. App.
Lewis 2917, 2004 Fed. App. 354P (6th Cir.).
A hospital patient being treated for pneumonia
became aggressive and uncooperative. His condition was causing low oxygen
levels and may have impacted his mental state. After he started yelling that he
was "God," and that hospital staff were trying to kill him, officers
were summoned to try to control him and keep him from walking out. A Taser was
used once in the dart mode but seemed ineffective, followed by a use of a Taser
in the stun mode, which also appeared not to bring the patient under control,
and the officers physically fought with him, finally getting handcuffs on him,
whereupon hospital staff administered an injection of Haldol and Ativan. He
went limp, and vomited clear fluid. CPR failed to revive him and he died. The
cause of death was determined to be respiratory insufficiency secondary to
pneumonia, with the manner of death being natural, but the medical examiner
stated that the use of the Taser "certainly could" have increased the
patient's need for oxygen, with the physical struggle exertions exacerbating
his underlying pneumonia. The fact that he was placed in a prone position with
his hands cuffed behind his back also might have compromised his ability to
inhale and get oxygen. In a lawsuit claiming excessive use of force, a federal
appeals court upheld a denial of qualified immunity to the officers. A jury
could find that the officers violated the decedent's constitutional rights by
using a severe level of force against him despite their awareness of his mental
instability, the seriousness of his medical condition, and the fact that he
only posed a threat to himself and had committed no crime. It was clearly
established that it was not objectively reasonable to use a Taser as the
initial force employed against a non-criminal subject who was seriously ill,
was passively resisting, and only posed a threat to himself, whether or not a
warning was first given. Aldaba v. Marshall County, #13-7034, 2015 U.S. App.
Lexis 1822 (10th Cir.).
A man claimed that while he was in traffic court
a deputy beckoned him to a group of officers, warning him not to
"eyeball" them. When he objected that he was not doing so, an officer
allegedly told him to shut up, and grabbed him. When he asked the officer to
let go, he claimed, a number of officers handcuffed him, threw him against a
wall, causing a nose bleed, threw him to the floor and twice deployed a Taser
in the stun mode against him, before hog tying him and dragging him away. He
was subsequently found guilty of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to
arrest. A federal appeals court overturned the dismissal of an excessive force
claim. A finding of excessive force on the pat of the officers would not
necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction fr disorderly
conduct and resisting arrest, so that the conviction did not bar the civil
rights claim. Colbert v. City of Monticello, #13-3037, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis
24555 (8th Cir.).
A woman claimed that a deputy sheriff
subjected her to an unreasonable seizure and used excessive force at a
courthouse security checkpoint. Overturning summary judgment on her federal
civil rights claims, the appeals court ruled that the trial judge erroneously
applied a substantive due process/shocks the conscience legal standard rather
than the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. The defendant
deputy was, however, entitled to official immunity on Georgia state law claims. West v. Davis,
#13-14805, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 17319 (11th Cir.).
An arrestee stated a viable claim for excessive
force. If, as he claimed, his head was slammed against the pavement with
extreme force after he was handcuffed and was lying prone on the ground, the
force used would have been excessive, disproportionate, and unnecessary. This
would be the case even if he did lift his head off the hot pavement. Officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity, as it was clearly established that a
handcuffed, non-resisting arrestee had a right to be free from excessive force.
Saunders v. Duke, #12-11401, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 17334 (11th Cir.).
A motorist who had smoked marijuana and drunk
beer admitted to an officer who saw him exiting his car with a beer that he was
on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. He did not have a driver's
license and started to run away when the officer told him to take his hands out
of his pockets. Another officer captured him and took him to the ground, after
which the first officer jumped a fence and landed on him, which broke his jaw.
The plaintiff's version of events, if true, was one from which a rational jury
could decide that the first officer deliberately inflicted the blow that
resulted in the broken jaw. The second officer, however, could not be held liable for
failure to intervene as he had no reasonable opportunity to stop the first
officer from landing on the plaintiff. Miller v. Gonzalez, #11-2906, 2014 U.S.
App. Lexis 15085 (7th Cir.).
When two officers allegedly jerked a man up by
his arms at a time when he was already handcuffed and under control, and did so
with sufficient force to cause serious injury to his shoulder area, this claim,
if true, violated clearly established law, so the officers were properly denied
summary judgment. It was, however, reasonable for the officers to detain and
handcuff the man, who was the roommate of a parolee whose home they were
searching, since he was belligerent and refused to remain seated. Blazek v.
Iowa City, #12-3785, 12-3786, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 15008 (8th Cir.).
Officers responded to a 911 call reporting a
situation in which an ex-boyfriend was allegedly brandishing a rifle in an
argument with his former girlfriend after having been released from jail on a
domestic abuse charge. An officer encountering the man running in the area,
with no rifle visible, ordered him to the ground and used force to try to get
him down when he did not obey, including kicking and punching. The man fled
over a wood fence. Four officers eventually caught him, but he continued to
resist, gabbing the fence to try to pull himself up. They punched and kneed
him, struck him in the back with the butt of a shotgun, lay on top of him, and
repeatedly used a Taser in the dart mode on him in an attempt to subdue him.
They managed to use three sets of handcuffs to connect his arms behind his
back, and rolled him over. He was not breathing and he died. No weapon was seen
during the encounter, and none was found. The officer involved in the initial
encounter was entitled to qualified immunity, as a reasonable officer would not
have known that a decision to kick and hit the resisting man in an attempt to
detain him clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. The officers involved in the
second encounter were also entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiff
failed to show that any of the force used was unconstitutional. Further, even
if it had been unconstitutional, that was not clearly established at the time
under these circumstances. There was insufficient evidence that the officers
intentionally apprehended the decedent in a manner that they believed was
prohibited by law. A state law wrongful death claim and a vicarious liability
claim against the defendant city were both also rejected, with official
immunity applied to these claims. Smith v. City of Minneapolis, #13-1157, 2014
U.S. App. Lexis 10538 (8th Cir.).
A police officer allegedly made a
"high-risk" stop of a woman's vehicle, which he mistakenly identified
as stolen based on an automatic license plate reader's error. She was detained
for up to 20 minutes at gunpoint, forced to her knees, and handcuffed. The
dismissal of the lawsuit was reversed, as a rational jury could find for the
plaintiff on her wrongful seizure, false arrest, or excessive force claims.
Qualified immunity was not available as the court could not say, as a matter of
law, that the officer could have reasonably believed that the force used was
lawful under the alleged circumstances. There was no indication at the scene of
the incident that the motorist posed any threat. Green v. City and County of
San Francisco, #11-17892, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 8824 (9th Cir.).
Three men claimed that a group of officers
engaged in an unprovoked attack on them in the early morning hours outside a
nightclub. A jury awarded $36,000 to one plaintiff for one officer's use of
force against him. A settlement agreement was subsequently reached. On appeal,
the court found that the complaint had adequately stated a claim for bystander
liability, but found that this ruling only impacted the one officer against
whom the jury awarded damages, as he was the only defendant against whom any of
the plaintiff's claims survived dismissal, as to his possible bystander
liability for actions taken against the other two plaintiffs by
A man claimed that he was beaten by police
officers and sustained a fractured collarbone, a SLAP-type labral tear, and
facial injuries leaving permanent scarring and requiring two nose surgeries. He
also became legally deaf in one ear and has reduced hearing in the other. A
federal appeals court reversed the dismissal of a deliberate indifference
denial of medical care claim against the doctor at a hospital emergency room,
finding that if the complaint were amended to allege two things claimed in the
plaintiff's opposition to the doctor's motion to dismiss, it would show a
sufficiently culpable state of mind for a constitutional violation. Those two
things were that the officers falsely told the female doctor that one of the
officers he allegedly attacked was a woman, and that he should therefore be
"ignored and left alone." Nielsen v. Rabin, #12-4313, 2014 U.S. App.
Lexis 2745 (2nd Cir.).
A man claimed that officers attacked him while he
was standing on his porch in his yard, without specifying which officers did what.
The officers and a neighbor who had called police, believing him to be
intoxicated, testified that he had lunged at an officer, after which he was
taken down and arrested. A video of the incident showed the plaintiff hitting
his head against the cage of the patrol car several times, contradicting his
version of the incident. Summary judgment was granted on state law negligence
and battery claims. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on
federal civil rights claims of excessive force. Because the officers failed to
concede to the version of the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there was
a disputed issue of material fact barring a decision on appeal.
Younes v. Pellerito, #3-1103, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 385, 2014
Fed. App. 7P (6th Cir.).
A man arrested as a suspect in a double homicide
sued an officer, claiming that while he was being transported she had kicked
him in the face and hit him with a flashlight. In the civil rights lawsuit, the
plaintiff fired his appointed lawyer, acting as his own attorney but later
brought the lawyer back. He told the judge that he was ok with proceeding with
the jury despite the fact that they had seen him arguing with his lawyer, and
the jury returned a verdict for the officer. A federal appeals court ruled that
he had waived his right to challenge a jury he had tried at the beginning to
have removed for cause when he gave seemingly contradictory statements about
whether he had ever been involved in the justice system. Washington v.
Parkinson, #12-3042, 737 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2013).
A federal appeals court upheld the criminal
convictions of four police officers on charges related to the beating death of
a detainee while he was in their custody. The court rejected an argument that
the trial court erred by sentencing one of the defendants using the federal
sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the sentencing, rather than the
more favorable provisions of a guidelines manual in effect at the time of the
crime. The court rejected an argument that this violated the constitutional
provision against ex post facto punishments. U.S. v. Pagan-Ferrer, #10-1518,
2013 U.S. App. Lexis 23566 (1st Cir.).
A town has reached an $11.6 million settlement
with a family whose home was raided without a search warrant by officers in
2003, with officers allegedly arresting five family members without probably
cause and beating them up. No convictions were obtained on any of the charges.
The plaintiffs claimed that one family member, a boy who was 17 years old at
the time of the incident, subsequently developed a mental illness as a result
of the beating and an alleged threat by one officer to kill him if he didn't
leave town. They claimed that he now requires 24 hours a day supervision. Ramos
v. Cicero, #1:04-cv-02502, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill.).
A member of a “cop watch” group was holding a
video camera on the street while talking on a cell phone. An officer told him
that he had to move, and he replied that he was conducting a “cop watch.” The
man compiled with orders to “come here” and walked toward a police van. When he
got there, an officer allegedly exit the van, knocked the cell phone and video
camera out of his hands, told him to turn around, and handcuffed him, after
which two officers started to beat him. A chokehold was allegedly used on him,
and he was pushed into a police van without warning, causing him to fall and
strike his face against the floor. The trial court found that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim because, at the time
of the incident (2008), it was not clearly established in the 8th Circuit that
an officer violates the rights of an arrestee by applying force that causes
only "de minimis" (minimal) injuries. Here, the arrestee's contusions
and swelling were injuries classified as de minimis. The officers were not,
however, entitled to qualified immunity on an unlawful arrest claim since,
under the plaintiff's version of the incident, he was not trespassing or
obstructing the sidewalk, and no reasonable officers could have concluded that
he was committing those crimes. Robinson v. City of Minneapolis, #10-3067, 2013
U.S. Dist. Lexis 106342 (D. Minn.).
A 14-year-old boy claimed that police arrested
him without probable cause for disorderly conduct when he was standing outside
a building waiting for his mother, not doing anything illegal. He further
claimed that an officer later used excessive force by shoving him into a
holding cell, causing him to hit his head on a hard surface. The officers claimed
that he was drinking and fell because he was intoxicated. The jury returned a
verdict for the defendant officers. Reversing for a new trial, a federal
appeals court held that the defendants were improperly allowed to cross examine
the plaintiff about a subsequent unrelated underage drinking arrest to try to
convince the jury that he had been intoxicated at the time of his first arrest.
They were also improperly allowed to question him about a subsequent conviction
for possession of a stolen vehicle. The improper questioning was not harmless,
since it could not be said that it did not substantially sway the jury. Barber
v. City of Chicago, #12-2562, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 16047 (7th Cir.).
A man claimed that a deputy used excessive force
and tackled him as he reached for a fallen memory chip from a surveillance
camera set up near a property line that including a recording of statements the
man had made suggesting that he may have trespassed onto a nearby lot. The
deputy, on the other hand, said that he merely grabbed the plaintiff's arm to
prevent him from picking up the chip. The deputy was entitled to qualified
immunity as the plaintiff did not show a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right. The plaintiff had not identified any closely similar case
or established that the officer's use of force was so obviously excessive as to
defeat qualified immunity. Findlay v. Lendermon, #12-3881, 2013 U.S. App.
Lexis 12012 (7th Cir.).
When a man and a magistrate's daughter ended
their engagement, the man tried to retrieve a diamond engagement ring and other
items of personal property. Following that, allegations were made that he had
stolen his ex-girlfriend's dog. This resulted in a police chase down rural
roads and a brief arrest of the man and his father. Both arrestees then filed a
false arrest and conspiracy lawsuit against the magistrate, the deputy who made
the arrest, and the deputy's supervisor. A federal appeals court ruled that
there had been probable cause for the arrests, and that no excessive force was
used by the deputy in grabbing the son by the arm, forcing him to the ground,
placing him in handcuffs, and searching him, since the deputy could not have
known whether he was armed or would resist arrest. There was no real evidence
of conspiracy, and the magistrate did not act under color of law in reporting
the alleged theft of the dog. Myers v. Bowman, #11-14802, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis
7216 (11th Cir.).
Police encountered a running naked man speaking
nonsensically. When they tried to subdue him, he bit an officer and a physical
altercation ensued in which an officer fell on top of both the suspect and a
fellow officer. One officer folded his legs around the suspect and gripped his
chin with his arm, and a third officer kneeled on the suspect's calves. One
officer allegedly wrapped his arm around the suspect's neck. Two officers
allegedly continued to hold the man face down after he was secured. The man
became unresponsive and summoned paramedics could not revive him, so he died.
The coroner concluded the death was from an acute psychotic episode with
excited delirium due to LSD intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest. The
pathologist who carried out the autopsy noted injuries consistent with
asphyxia, and the plaintiffs in an excessive force lawsuit presented an opinion
that asphyxia caused the death. The police department had both a use of force
policy and a "positional asphyxia" policy warning that those who are
acting psychotic due to drugs, alcohol or mental illness can be particularly
susceptible to death. Two officers stated that they had not considered that
policy. The officers were properly denied qualified immunity. Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights, #11-4039, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7094, 2013 Fed. App. 0101P
(6th Cir.).
An officer who stopped a motorist for having a
cracked windshield began to suspect that he was intoxicated. In the course of
arresting him, the officer believed that the motorist was resisting, and threw
him to the ground. The driver suffered a traumatic brain injury. The officer
was entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, since it had
not been clearly established, as of May 14, 2005, the date of the incident,
that such a use of force against a possibly intoxicated person was excessive.
The appeals court reversed summary judgment in favor of the city, however, as,
if the driver, as he claimed, had not been resisting, and did not pose a threat
to the safety of the officer or anyone else, the takedown maneuver might not
have been justified. The trial court had rejected municipal liability on the
basis that the plaintiff's constitutional rights had not been violated. If they
were, there remained the question of whether a city policy or custom had been
the moving force behind the violation. Becker v. Bateman, #11-4054, 2013 U.S.
App. Lexis 4059 (10th Cir.).
A police chief, dressed in street clothes, and
without identifying himself as police, allegedly charged into a man, pushing
him ten to fifteen feet backward into the side of a pickup truck causing him
injuries. A federal appeals court found that the police chief was not entitled
to qualified immunity. If the facts were as the plaintiff claimed, a reasonable
jury could find that he used excessive force and unreasonably caused severe injuries
without justification. Under state law, the police chief was not a final
policymaker for the city, and no reasonable jury could find the city liable for
his actions. The city was properly granted summary judgment. Atkinson v. City
of Mountain View, #11-3352, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 2703 (8th Cir.).
A federal jury in Chicago returned a verdict in
favor of a plaintiff and against the city on a claim that the city had a
persistent widespread custom or practice of protecting officers from citizen complaints.
The suit had been brought by a female bartender who had been assaulted by an
off-duty officer. A persistent widespread custom or practice had been alleged
to constitute a de facto policy of concealing or suppressing investigations
into police officer misconduct, along with a “code of silence” within the
police department. The jury also found that the officer conspired with others
under color of law in violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to
free speech. It awarded $850,000 in damages.Obrycka v. City of Chicago, #07 C
2372, U.S. Dist. Court (N.D. Ill. November 13, 2012). The court subsequently
denied a motion to vacate the judgment concerning the "code of
silence." The court found that the "judgment’s precedential value
weighs against granting the parties’ motion to vacate the judgment."
Obrycka v. City of Chicago, #07 C 2372, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 179990 (NJ.D.
Ill.). The city stated that would pay the plaintiff compensatory damages in the
amount of $850,000, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount yet
to be determined. The city also stated that it will forego its right to appeal
pursuant to the parties’ postjudgment settlement. In an earlier decision, the
trial judge found that there was evidence that the defendant officer tried to
intimidate and threaten the victim from disclosing the videotape of the
incident because he knew, that without the tape, there would be no case against
him. Obrycka v. City of Chicago, #07 C 2372, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22818 (N.D.
Ill.).
Police stopped a motorist driving a stolen car.
Police officers smashed the car's window and dragged the driver through it. The
trial court found that this use of force was reasonable but allowed the issue
of whether the officers used excessive force by allegedly beating him with
batons after removing the arrestee from the car to go to the jury, which
returned a verdict for the officers. The appeals court ruled that because of a
factual dispute as to whether the arrestee's hands were on the steering wheel or
making furtive gestures when the officers smashed the window, it had been
erroneous to grant summary judgment on the initial use of force, since this was
relevant to whether he then posed a threat to the officers. The erroneous jury
instructions stating that the initial use of force was reasonable as a matter
of law required reversal of the jury verdict also, since it prevented them from
properly considering the totality of the circumstances. Coles v. Eagle,
#11-16471, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 24923 (9th Cir.).
A homeowner sued an officer for his warrantless
entry into her front yard. She claimed to have suffered injuries when he kicked
down the yard's front gate to enter in pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had, at
most, committed a misdemeanor offense of disobeying an officer's lawful order
to halt. Overturning qualified immunity for the officer, the appeals court
ruled that a reasonable officer should have known that his warrantless entry
into the curtilage of the home under these circumstances amounted to an
unconstitutional search not justified by exigent circumstances or the emergency
exception to the warrant requirement. Sims v. Stanton, #11-55401, 2012 U.S.
App. Lexis 24803 (9th Cir.).
A Vietnam veteran suffering from severe
post-traumatic stress disorder was combative and disoriented at a hospital
emergency room, where his family had brought him for treatment of an injury.
Two police officers placed him under arrest under a state mental hygiene law as
a person who appears mentally ill and acts in a way likely to cause serious
harm to himself or others. He and an officer subsequently fought while he was
handcuffed. The arrestee claimed that a beating from the officer aggravated his
existing back pain and post-traumatic stress disorder. The jury in an excessive
force lawsuit awarded $60,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive
damages. A federal appeals court upheld the award, although ruling that either
the plaintiff would have to accept a reduction of punitive damages to $100,000
or undergo a new trial on the punitive damages issue. The appeals court also
found that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying the
defendant officer's motion for a continuance after an illness prevented him
from attending the first three days of the five-day trial. Payne v. Jones,
#09-5201, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 20665 (2nd Cir.).
A group of men were outside one of their
residences when unmarked police cars pulled up, demanded to know what they were
doing, and ordered them to empty their pockets. When an officer seized keys for
the residence and walked toward it, the resident objected and he was handcuffed
and then forced to the pavement and allegedly hit and kicked. The officers
subsequently left without making any formal arrests. The detained resident sued
for false arrest, excessive force, and the failure of a number of officers to
intervene. A jury verdict in favor of the defendant officers was upheld on
appeal. The appeals court found that any possible flaws in the failure to
intervene claim instructions to the jury were harmless, as was the trial
court's ruling allowing evidence that the detained plaintiff had several prior
arrests. Sanchez v. City of Chicago, #10-3801, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 22555 (7th
Cir.).
A man's refusal to sign his $156 bar tab gave a
police officer probable cause to arrest him for theft of restaurant service,
even if the plaintiff was correct that he was not actually required to sign.
Rejecting an excessive force claim, the court found that any aggravation of the
arrestee's old shoulder injury was attributable to the routine police procedure
of handcuffing his hands behind his back, rather than any improper force.
Failure to train and supervise claims were properly rejected in light of the
lack of any underlying violation of the plaintiff's rights. Royster v. Nichols,
#10-3798, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 22355 (8th Cir.).
Officers did not use excessive force against an
arrestee when it was undisputed that he refused to obey orders to turn around
and give up his right arm. Verbal commands were attempted first, followed by an
attempt to grab the arrestee's arm, before a Taser was used briefly in the stun
mode and quickly withdrawn. The officers then pinned the arrestee down as he
kicked and screamed. When the officers realized that the arrestee was injured,
with his elbow dislocated, they immediately called for help. The forces used
were measured and ascending responses to noncompliance. Poole v. City of
Shreveport, #11-30158, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 17243 (5th Cir.).
DEA agents who executed a search warrant at a
mobile home occupied by suspected drug dealers allegedly pointed weapons at and
handcuffed two adults and two children who were present. They also pushed one
of the adults onto the floor. Rejecting assault and battery claims against the
agents for the force used against the adults, an appeals court found that the
dangerous situation of carrying out a search on premises occupied by drug
traffickers justified the force used. There were genuine issues of material
fact, however, as to whether the force used against the 11 and 14 year old
children was reasonable. The lawsuit was brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. Avina v. U.S., #11-55004, 681 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2012).
Officers allegedly detained a man at a gas
station, pointing a gun at him and handcuffing him. They then drove him to his
apartment where he claimed they planted a gun and some marijuana and proceeded
to conduct a search. When he refused to sign a consent to the search, an
officer hit him in his ribs with his fists and tried to choke him, according to
the plaintiff. Qualified immunity was not available on the excessive force
claim, regardless of whether the injuries suffered were minimal. No amount of
force was justified for the purpose of coercing a consent to a search. Hemphill
v. Hale, #11-3116, 677 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2012)
The dismissal of an arrestee's excessive force
claim on the basis that he could not prevail without offering expert witness
testimony on what level of force would have been reasonable was erroneous. In
the immediate case, the court concluded that there was nothing about the
particular use of force that required an expert witness to determine what a
reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances. The officers used a
Taser against the plaintiff twice in stun mode, as well as using direct
physical force while they engaged in a dispute with him over the alleged
violation of a child custody order and he brandished a rake. Allgoewer v. City
of Tracy, #C067636, 2012 Cal. App. Lexis 782 (3rd Dist.).
A police officer threw a man down on the ground
and arrested him for public intoxication. He did this while responding to a
domestic violence call when he saw the man advancing towards another man who
was allegedly backing up with his hands raised in a nonthreatening position.
The arrestee, who had heart problems, died three years later and his estate
sued he officer. A federal appeals court ruled that the officer's action amount
to an arrest rather than an investigative detention, and that the facts did not
support probable cause for an arrest at that time, since the man was unarmed
and was not within reach of the other man. The officer's use of force may have
been excessive, as the man was not trying to resist arrest or flee and posed
little threat to the safety of others. His right under these circumstances not
to be subject to a forceful takedown was clearly established. The officer was
not entitled to qualified immunity. Morris v. Noe, #11–5066, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir.
2012).
Police knocked on a man's door after a motorist
whose car had been vandalized reporting seeing him first in the parking lot and
then entering the apartment. When he came out of his door, he saw police and
turned around to go back inside. The officers grabbed him, and subjected him to
a leg sweep, and he chipped a tooth during the encounter. There was no probable
cause for an arrest or reasonable suspicion for a detention based solely on the
man's prior presence in the lot where the car had been vandalized. Under these
circumstances, the man had a right to walk away. The court found that the
unlawful arrest claim could continue, and ruled that the trial court should
evaluate the excessive force claim independently, as it was not necessarily
dependent on whether or not any arrest or detention was proper. Romero v.
Story, #11–2139, 672 F.3d 880 (10th Cir. 2012).
When President Bush was dining at a restaurant
during his 2004 reelection campaign, groups of demonstrators both in favor of
and opposed to his re-election attempted to gather outside. A federal appeals
court has ruled that, if the facts were as alleged, Secret Service agents
violated the First Amendment by forcing protesters opposed to the President to
move further away from the restaurant than where they permitted supporters of
the President to rally. This was enforcement of a content-based restriction.
The agents were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that
state and local police supervisors could not be held liable for the alleged use
of excessive force against the anti-Bush demonstrators, including the use of
pepper spray, clubs, and shoving, since there was no indication that they were
personally involved. Moss v. United States Secret Service, #10-3615, 2012 U.S.
App. Lexis 7077 (9th Cir.).
When three adults and two children walked into
the street to hug a number of their family members who were participants in a
"Caribbean Carnival Parade," they allegedly ignored police orders to
get back on the sidewalk. They claimed that officers used excessive force
against them, hitting the children with a baton, and shoving the adults to the
ground while beating them. A federal appeals court overturned the dismissal of
excessive force claims against some of the officers, finding that the alleged
beatings were more violent than what "we would expect in the course of a
routine arrest." Rudder v. Williams, #10-7101, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 910
(D.C. Cir.).
In an arrestee's lawsuit claiming that an officer
used excessive force against him during the arrest, the jury rejected the
federal civil rights claim, while awarding the plaintiff $125,000 on an
assertion that the officer was negligent under Maine state law in the use of
force against him. The trial court reduced the award to $10,000, since a state
statute limits the personal liability of a government employee to that amount
as a maximum recovery. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the statutory
limitation did not apply because the officer was covered by an insurance
policy, resulting in the possibility of higher liability awards (of either
$400,000 or the policy limit) for claims "against a governmental entity or
an employee" under the statute. The federal appeals court certified to the
Maine Supreme Court an unresolved issue of state law as to whether the higher
liability limit only applied to claims against government employees in their
official capacity, as opposed to those against them in their individual
capacities. The Maine court must also rule on how to interpret a possible
ambiguity in the insurance policy's coverage. Fortin v. Titcomb, #10-2370, 2012
U.S. App. Lexis 1422 (1st Cir.).
An excessive force claim against a police chief
lacked merit where he was not involved in the removal of an allegedly suicidal
man from his parked car by force, including the firing of pepper balls at him.
He also was not in a supervisory role over those who removed the man, who were
members of an inter-departmental emergency response team. Backes v. Village of
Peoria Heights, #10-3748, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 22652 (7th Cir.).
A sheriff's deputy grabbed the wrist of a
motorist who had not been wearing his seatbelt, and who attempted to flee on
foot when ordered to stop. When the man broke away, the deputy used a Taser on
him, subsequently also using pepper spray and placing his knee on the man's
back. In a lawsuit for excessive use of force, a federal appeals court upheld a
jury's decision to award only a dollar in nominal damages. It rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the pain of being tasered should always be enough to
support a more substantial amount of compensatory damages. The court noted that
the jury might have reasonably believed that the use of the Taser was
justifiable in this case, and that only the subsequent force used was
excessive. Frizzell v. Szabo, #10-2955, 647 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2011).
A man arrested for allegedly buying cocaine died
from the effects of cracked ribs he suffered during his arrest, which were
allegedly caused by a police beating. His mother was unable, after his death,
to find an attorney to file her federal civil rights lawsuit, however, as a
police sergeant allegedly came to her home and told her that her son had died
in the street due to a gang dispute over drugs. She was denied access to police
reports about the arrest and an investigation into her son's death. A report
filed in an internal affairs investigation indicating that there may have been
a beating and a "cover-up" of the beating was unavailable to her and
her prospective lawyers. Years later, after the FBI received an anonymous tip
concerning the police beating taking place, and launched an investigation, the
mother filed a lawsuit. The defendants argued that it was barred by the statute
of limitations. Addressing the issue of whether the statute of limitations was
"tolled" (extended) by the alleged cover-up, the appeals court ruled
that she could go ahead with her claim. "Equitable estoppel" applied
in a case where the plaintiff believed that she had a claim for excessive force
but she was "dissuaded from bringing the claim by affirmative
misrepresentations and stonewalling by the police" concerning the
circumstances that led to her son's death. Estate of Amaro v. City of Oakland,
#10-16152, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 15534 (9th Cir.).
While the plaintiff arrestee was not required to show
more than a "de minimus" injury to prevail on his excessive force
claim against arresting officers, the law on this subject was not yet clearly
established at the time of the incident in question (2005), so the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity. The officers allegedly held him on the
floor, handcuffed him, jammed guns into his back, and then kicked him several
times, subsequently choking him when he was in a police vehicle, while the
arrestee did not resist. Chambers v. Pennycook, #09-2195, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis
11392 (8th Cir.).
Officers who allegedly shoved one occupant of a
residence and pointed assault rifles at all of them while executing search and
arrest warrants were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive use of
force claim. They allegedly used this force well beyond the time it took to
arrest the suspect sought, who was taken into custody and removed almost
immediately after the officers entered. The rifles were pointed at the
plaintiffs while they were subdued and handcuffed in their rooms. The court
found that no reasonable officer would have thought that such conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances. They were, however, entitled to qualified immunity
for keeping the arrested suspect's teenage sister and parents detained in
handcuffs in the living room for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour
after the arrest while they searched for weapons believed to be present.
Mlodzinski v. Cormier, #10-1966, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 11117 (1st Cir.).
An arrestee adequately alleged that sheriff's
deputies used excessive force against him after entering his house to arrest
him for criminal contempt. He claimed that he was asleep alone at the time, and
unarmed, and was cooperative when woken. Despite this, the deputies allegedly
forcibly dragged him from his bed, pointed guns at him, threatened to shoot
him, and violently slammed him against a wall. Ansell v. Ross Twp, #10-1402,
2011 U.S. App. Lexis 6202 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Officers were properly denied qualified immunity
on an arrestee's excessive force claim when, according to the plaintiff's
version of events, they used "gratuitous" force when he had already
surrendered and submitted to arrest. It was undisputed that he did not attempt
to flee, resist arrest, or threaten the officers. If the officers did hit and
kick him after he surrendered, as he claimed, their use of force was excessive.
Wheeler v. City of Cleveland, #09-4089, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5755 (Unpub. 6th
Cir.).
Officers, allegedly mistakenly believing that a
man was the person wanted for assaulting a state trooper, pulled him from a car
in which he was a passenger, and hit him, causing him injury. They were not
entitled to qualified immunity, giving the conflicting stories concerning who
initiated the violence. Witt v. West Virginia State Police, #10-10008, 633 F.3d
272 (4th Cir. 2011).
An officer claimed that he arrested a man for
refusing to accept service of a temporary restraining order that his wife had
obtained against him, and used appropriate force when the man violently
resisted arrest. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the arrest had been in
response to his attempt to call 911 to complain about the officer, and that the
officer assaulted him. Refusing to overturn the trial court's denial of
qualified immunity to the officer, a federal appeals court noted that the
officer's arguments that he was entitled to qualified immunity were based on
entirely different facts than those asserted by the plaintiff. Zahn v. City of
Trenton, #07-4085, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16796 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A motorist suffered a diabetic episode resulting
in the loss of control of his vehicle, striking two other cars. A chief of
police who arrived at the scene of the accident received no response from the
motorist when he tried to question him, and mistakenly thought that he was
drunk. The motorist was suffering convulsions. The chief was concerned that the
motorist might try to flee, as he appeared to be ignoring requests to turn off
his engine, and forcibly removed him from his car, throwing him to the ground
and handcuffing him. The motorist later sued, claiming excessive force was used
in doing so, causing him a broken hip and bruised lung. A federal appeals court
upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the defendant, finding that the
plaintiff had adequately alleged that the chief's belief that he was
intoxicated was unreasonable, especially as he was wearing a medical alert
necklace, which the chief did not check for before using force to remove him.
McAllister v. Price, #10-1213, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16685 (7th Cir.).
An officer was investigating information
received that a woman may have been mistreating her minor niece, who was living
with her while the child's parents were going through a divorce. While speaking
to the officer, the woman came under the delusion that the officer was there to
"kidnap" the child, and tried to pull the girl away from the officer,
who was conducting a "welfare check" on the girl to see if she was
ok. A fight ensued, and the officer handcuffed and arrested the woman. Her
excessive force claim was rejected, as the officer's use of force against her,
resulting in a scraped cheek and a sore, perhaps sprained, ankle, was
reasonable under the circumstances. Her false arrest claim was also rejected.
Pearlman v. City of Fort Worth, #10-10056, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 23152 (Unpub.
5th Cir.).
A man sitting in his parked car in a public park
in the morning, with a bowl of water and a towel or rag in the car, preparing
to perform his morning ritual of reading the Bible there, was accused, by a
police officer, of having slept in the park overnight. The officer had seen his
car there the evening before, and now told him to leave. When he refused, he
was arrested for obstruction of an officer. He was also allegedly dragged out
of his car, pushed against the police car, and had his face pushed into the
hood. The officer had arguable probable cause to make the arrest, a federal
appeals court held, based on his observations. Staying in the park overnight
when it was closed would have violated local law, and the officer did not know
that the man allegedly had a personal ritual of returning to the park to read
the Bible or placing a wet cloth on his forehead preparatory to that reading.
The force used in making the arrest was also found to be minimal and not
excessive. Howell v. City of Lithonia, #09-11599, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20190
(Unpub. 11th Cir.).
A grandmother claimed that she suffered a heart
attack at her home because officers used excessive force during a raid there.
In her excessive force lawsuit, a federal appeals court held that the plaintiff
failed to present viable claims against three senior police officers involved
in the planning of the raid, or against the town based on the actions of its
police chief. Officers conducted a "surround and call out" operation
at her home aimed at apprehending one of her grandsons. All occupants of the
home were ordered to come out, one at a time, with their hands raised. The
grandmother, the first out, did not raise her hand as high as the officers
ordered, and was told to raise them higher or be shot. A pat-down found no
weapons, and she was restrained with her hands behind her back with a plastic
zip-tie, and seated on the ground next to a police vehicle, complaining of
chest pain. The grandson was arrested, but the grandmother remained restrained
and seated while officers obtained a signed consent from another family member
to search the house. She continued to sit restrained during the search, but was
later taken to a hospital by ambulance for her heart attack. Claims against the
three supervising officers who planned the operation lacked merit, the appeals
court found, as there was no allegation of any involvement on their part in the
alleged use of excessive force, and supervisory personnel cannot be held liable
for federal civil rights violations simply as a matter of vicarious liability
for the actions of their subordinates. The fact that allegedly excessive force
was not used against other women who were in the house indicated that it was
not plausible that the supervisors had directed or intended that such force be
used during the operation. As to the liability of the town, even if the police
chief were its final policymaker, the plaintiff failed to show that any plan of
his for the raid was the source of her alleged injury. Santiago v. Warminster
Township, #10-1294, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 25414 (3rd Cir.).
An officer stopped a motorist because his license plate
was not visible, and smelled alcohol on his breath. He was arrested for DUI and
then informed the officer that he needed medications from his car for a number
of illnesses, including AIDS. While the officer retrieved the medications, the
arrestee had trouble breathing and spit mucus into an empty paper cup in the
patrol car. The officer became afraid that the arrestee would spit on him and
infect him, and called for a deputy sheriff to come to the scene with a patrol
car with a protective divider to take the arrestee to jail. Walking the
arrestee out of the patrol car, the officer allegedly closed the trunk lid of
his car on the arrestee's thumb. The officer contended that this was an
accident, while the arrestee claimed that it was in retaliation for his having
spit mucus in the cup, and he sued. Upholding the denial of qualified immunity
to the officer, the appeals court ruled that if the facts were as the plaintiff
alleged, the force used against a non-resisting non-fleeing arrestee was
excessive. Schmidt v. Gray, #09-20570, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 22388 (Unpub. 5th
Cir.).
While EMS workers were transporting a man to the
hospital following a seizure, he began kicking, fighting, spitting, cursing,
and flailing in the back of the ambulance. A fire department lieutenant who is
also a part-time police officer then applied joint manipulation on the man's
wrist, resulting in him crying out "it hurts," but also ending his
thrashing around. The man suffered no injuries from the manipulation, but
nevertheless sued. An intermediate Ohio appeals court ruled that while the use
of the procedure may have been negligent, it was not malicious, wanton or
reckless, so that the individual defendants and the fire department should have
been granted summary judgment. Christie v. Violet Township Fire Department,
#09-CA-57, 2010 Ohio App. Lexis 2097 (Oh. App.5th Dis.).
An officer believed that a motorcycle rider had
committed a number of relatively minor infractions (failing to wear a helmet
while driving a motorcycle and failing to stop when signaled by police). These
infractions did not justify the force allegedly used by the officer in tackling
the plaintiff from his motorcycle and slamming him into the pavement, so that
the officer used excessive force and was not entitled to qualified immunity.
The appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff of $2,500 on both
federal civil rights and state law assault and battery claims. Raiche v.
Pietroski, #09-1910 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21977 (1st Cir.).
A motorist led state troopers on a 50-mile
high-speed chase, culminating in his arrest. He sued, claiming that the
troopers had used excessive force against him, and then unduly delayed his
receipt of needed medical care. A federal appeals court upheld the trial
court's grant of qualified immunity to the troopers, finding, on the basis of
videotapes of the incident, that one trooper's actions in apprehending the
plaintiff had been objectively reasonable, and that the tapes did not support
the motorist's claim that the trooper beat a restrained cooperating suspect.
Additionally, medical records did not show that the few minutes of delay before
receiving medical treatment had caused any substantial harm. Borneman v.
Rozier, #10-6045, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21316 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
When an officer responded to a burglar alarm at a
house, he observed that a basement window appeared to have been pried open. The
front door was open, and several items were on the porch. The officer observed
a man inside the house going through some papers. He was the son of the woman
who owned the house, was there alone, and admitted that he did not know how to
turn off the alarm. He became "confrontational" when the officer
asked him to exit the premises, he tried to head butt the officer, and he was
placed under arrest for disorderly conduct, a charge he pled no contest to. His
mother subsequently indicated that he had her permission to remove items from
the house. The next day, he returned to the police station to file a complaint
about his arrest. The sergeant taking his statement ran his driver's license
and learned that it had been suspended, and wrote him a citation for driving
with a suspended license, as he had driven to the station. He sued, asserting
claims for false arrest, excessive force, and illegal search in running his
driver's license. A federal appeals court found that the officer had probable
cause to arrest the plaintiff at his mother's house and reason to believe that
he was committing a crime being in the house, which was not his. There was no
evidence that he suffered any injury from any force the arresting officer used,
and he had attempted to head butt the officer. A claim of malicious prosecution
was meritless in light of his plea of no contest to the disorderly conduct
charge. Running of his license after he furnished it as identification did not
constitute an unlawful search. Crock v. Pennsylvania, #10-2001, 2010 U.S. App.
Lexis 21625 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
When it was undisputed that a pedestrian was
neither on the sidewalk nor in a crosswalk when he entered a "parking
turnout" on a street, officers had at least a reasonable belief that they
had probable cause to arrest him for jaywalking, so that they were entitled to
qualified immunity on his false arrest claim. An excessive force claim lacked
merit when all that happened was that an officer had allegedly swung his baton
at the arrestee without actually touching him. Burdett v. Reynoso, #08-15159,
2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21018 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
A man claimed that a number of police officers
assaulted him in his home, and that a second group of officers, also present,
failed to intervene to stop the unjustified use of force, which he contended
constituted gross negligence. Claims against the second group of officers were
settled for a total of $25,000, and a signed release agreement was entered into
which stated that it covered the discharge of "all other persons"
from the plaintiff's claims. The first group of officers, who were alleged to
have assaulted the plaintiff, argued that the release covered claims against
them as well as against the second group of officers, despite the fact that
they had not signed it, paid nothing under it, and were represented by separate
counsel and insurance companies. An intermediate Michigan appeals court upheld
these officers' interpretation. The Michigan Supreme Court has now reversed,
and in so doing overturned a prior state court decision barring the use of
testimony and other extrinsic evidence outside of the language of a release
when an unnamed party asserts third-party beneficiary rights based on broad
language in a liability release, and when there is an ambiguity as to the
intended scope of the coverage of the release. The plaintiff's intent, it was
argued, had been to only settle with the second group of officers. Further
proceedings were ordered on this issue. Shay v. Aldrich, #138908, 2010 Mich.
Lexis 1700.
An arrestee sued officers, claiming that they
lacked probable cause for her arrest, and that they used excessive force in
taking her into custody and taking her to a hospital for mental evaluation. The
arrestee herself, however, stated in her deposition that, based on her
statements to them, the officers could have reasonably concluded that she was
drug intoxicated. Her husband and 911 callers had told officers that she was
high on drugs, and probable cause existed, under the circumstances, to believe
that she possessed cocaine. Officers encountering her heard her make "paranoid"
comments, and the officers had reports that she had been seen under a car with
her son, screaming that someone was trying to kill her, and that she would kill
herself. She also clearly was actively resisting arrest, so the use of force to
subdue her was reasonable. Luchtel v. Hagemann, #09-35446, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis
20736 (9th Cir.).
A man stood outside his residence one evening,
waiting for his girlfriend. His aunt, who also lived there, was informed by her
son that the police were outside "harassing" her nephew. She went
outside and observed officers arresting her nephew, and placing him in the
backseat of a police car. Officers subsequently released her nephew, but the
arresting officer allegedly swung something at him as he was walking away. The
aunt then attempted to hold him in a bear hug to protect him from the officer,
who was preparing to taser him. Another officer then pulled her off her nephew,
and allegedly threw her to the ground. Her nephew was tasered and she attempted
twice more to intervene. She was sprayed with mace and arrested. Rejecting
claims in her excessive force lawsuit, the court found that her repeated
interference with the arrest endangered the officers and herself. The officers'
use of force against her was reasonable. The court ruled that a bystander to an
arrest does not have standing to challenge its legality, and that there is also
no right to resist an unlawful arrest or search. Further, while a person being
subjected to excessive force by an officer has a personal right to resist, that
right does not extend to a third party intervening in the incident Johnson v.
Carroll, #08-CV-6427, 2010 WL 3023407 (D. Minn. July 29, 2010).
An 83-year-old woman and her adult disabled son
visited a store. The son scratched his arm on a fire hose on the premises, and
store employees asked him to fill out some forms regarding the incident. A
dispute occurred as to whether the son and his mother could have copies of the
forms, and a store manager felt threatened by the son, who allegedly made a
gesture and then was asked to step back. The store summoned police for help,
indicating that the woman and her son were being disruptive. An officer
arrived, listened to both sides of the dispute, and then told the woman she
would have to leave at the manager's request or face arrest. When the officer
attempted to escort her to the door, she became agitated when he touched her
elbow, and began flailing her arms. She then left, and was not arrested. She
later filed an excessive force claim against the officer, and a failure to
train claim against the city. Upholding a judgment in favor of the officer and
city, a federal appeals court noted that "mere physical contact" by
an officer does not necessarily constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes,
and the jury was entitled to believe, based on the evidence, that the officer's
touching of the woman's arm was more "exhortatory" than
"commanding." Carlson v. Bukovic, #09-2578, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis
18383 (7th Cir.).
An officer who arrested a tavern owner was not
entitled to qualified immunity on his claim that the officer used excessive
force during his arrest. The tavern owner became involved in an argument and
fight with friends at his tavern. The officer claimed that the tavern owner poked
him several times, while the tavern owner denied this. The officer took the
plaintiff to the ground with a leg sweep, and handcuffed him. The plaintiff
denied being uncooperative, as the officer claimed. If the facts were as the
tavern owner claimed, the officer used excessive force. Shannon v. Koehler,
#09-3889, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 17123(8th Cir.).
A jury found that an officer used excessive force
in detaining a man who was involved in a late night fight outside a tavern. The
jury only awarded $1 in nominal damages, however, and no compensatory or
punitive damages. A federal appeals court found no inconsistency with the
jury's finding that the officer used excessive force and caused injury, as it
could have attributed the injury as resulting from the officer's other, lawful
actions, and not from his use of excessive force. The court also ruled that an
award of attorneys' fees was appropriate, since such an award would encourage
the city to make sure that officers do not use excessive force after subduing a
suspect. The appeals court therefore reversed the trial court's decision not to
award any attorneys' fees. Guy v. City of San Diego, #08-56024, 2010 U.S. App.
Lexis 12405 (9th Cir.).
Officers executing a search warrant at a man's home did
not use excessive force in taking his brother, who was present, into their
police vehicle. The brother had been smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol and
was found lying on the floor. Additionally, he had outstanding warrants
himself, and was unable to walk due to extreme intoxication. Expert testimony
on police practices was properly excluded as it was not needed to determine
that the amount of force used by the officers was not excessive. Legg v.
Pappas, #09-1188, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 12288 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A man who claimed that officers subjected him to
excessive force in pushing him towards the floor, where he allegedly struck his
head, had his claims rejected by a judge after a bench trial. In upholding the
result, the appeals court noted that the incident took place in a bar on Super
Bowl Sunday, that the plaintiff was drunk, refused to identify himself, refused
to leave voluntarily, resisted being escorted out, and assumed a
"fighting" stance both verbally and physically. Given these circumstances,
the trial judge did not "clearly err" in finding that the officers'
use of force was reasonable. Myser v. Spokane County, #09-35540, 2010 U.S. App.
Lexis 15163 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
An arrestee claimed that an officer used
excessive force in grabbing him, throwing him on the floor, and twisting his
arm. While he did not allege that a second officer used any force against him,
he did claim that this officer was present during the arrest, so it was
plausible that he had sufficient time to intervene and failed to do so,
therefore the plaintiff could proceed with a claim against him. Claims against
the police chief, however, were dismissed since no affirmative link was shown
between the alleged use of excessive force and any alleged failure of the chief
to provide training or supervision. An isolated incident of police misconduct
also could not be the basis for a claim for municipal liability. Philippe v.
Wallace, #09-11669, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53772 (D. Mass.).
An arrestee claimed that a deputy used excessive
force while arresting him for stealing a purse, hitting him in the head with a
gun and creating a wound that took 21 stitches to close. A federal appeals
court upheld a jury verdict for the defendant, ruling that the deputy could be
found to have acted reasonably, as the arrestee had refused to obey orders to
stop running and get on the ground. The deputy could have believed that the
force he used was necessary because the arrestee posed a danger to himself and
members of the public and might have been armed. Zaken v. Kelley, #09-10631,
2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6886 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
The city of Portland, Oregon has reached a $1.6
million settlement in a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the family of a
mentally ill man who died after a confrontation with police for urinating on a
sidewalk in which they allegedly threw him face-first into a concrete sidewalk,
further assaulted him, and covered up the incident, to which there were
numerous witnesses. An officer claimed to paramedics and other witnesses that
he had found cocaine on the suspect, when he allegedly knew that what he bagged
as evidence were bread crumbs. The city intended to argue at trial, before the
settlement was reached, that he died of excited delirium, and that fractures to
his ribs were the result of three CPR attempts by police and ambulance
personnel. The county previously reached a $925,000 settlement with the
plaintiffs, and an ambulance company settled claims against it for $600,000.
Chasse v. Humphreys, #3:07-cv-00189, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Ore.).
The City of Chicago has approved a $15.5 million
settlement of a federal class action civil rights lawsuit claiming that
officers engaged in abuse and unlawful detention practices in the handling of
suspects. The lawsuit claimed an "institutionalized system of police
torture," and included allegations of unlawful arrests without warrants,
the unnecessary shackling of suspects to walls or benches for prolonged periods
of time, and the denial of food and water or opportunities to use a bathroom.
The class was composed of persons detained overnight by Chicago police from
March 1999 through March of 2010. Over 500,000 people could be eligible to
share in the settlement, according to news reports, with most receiving between
$90 and $3,000. The city will pay $15 million towards the settlement with the
rest paid by an insurer. Up to $5 million in fees will go to the plaintiffs'
attorneys in fees and costs. Dunn v. City of Chicago, #04-CV-6804, U.S. Dist.
Ct. (N.D. Ill. May, 2010).
An arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest
contradicted his assertion that he did not oppose being taken into custody. Any
claim that no force was justified against him as he offered no resistance was
therefore barred, but he could pursue claims that excessive force was used to
effect his custody, and that he was beaten severely after he was taken into
custody, since those claims did not contradict his conviction. Evans v. Poskon,
#09-3140, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 7846 (7th Cir.).
A man accused two sheriff's deputies who were
serving as court security officers of false arrest and excessive use of force
in taking him into custody for disorderly conduct when he learned that his
motion to vacate his parking ticket conviction was not scheduled to be heard by
the court. The officers' motion for qualified immunity was denied by the
appeals court since there were disputed issues of fact as to whether the
plaintiff had been disruptive, and, if so, how much, as well as whether or not
he refused to stop resisting once he was handcuffed. There were questions
whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff or to use force
against hum. Levan v. George, #09-3223, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 8787 (7th Cir.).
A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict in
favor of a deputy sheriff in an excessive force lawsuit. It rejected arguments
that a pattern jury instruction on the use of excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment improperly allowed the jury to believe that the plaintiff's version
of events had transpired but still rule for the deputy on the basis of failure
to show that he acted with subjective malice. The instruction instead focused
on a requirement that the deputy had to use force intentionally applied,
instead of occurring as the result of accident, and did not mention subjective
intent at all. Hernandez v. Mascara, #09-11962, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 4399
(Unpub. 11th Cir.).
A tenant was found on the premises of an
apartment she had been evicted from and was arrested for criminal trespass. The
tenant, being legally blind, stated that she needed to go down the steps
slowly, but one of the officers allegedly repeatedly told her to hurry, and she
felt a shove or push from him, falling to the bottom of the landing, after
which she fell twice more and the officer angrily tried to raise her by pulling
on her handcuffs. The officer subsequently allegedly made a statement to her,
"no rallies for you today," purportedly referring to her involvement
in rallies against alleged police brutality. She sued the city for false
arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, and violation of federal civil rights.
The state trial court dismissed false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution claims, which were upheld on appeal, as the police had probable
cause, which was a complete defense to these claims. A jury awarded the tenant
$250,000 for violation of civil rights, $600,000 for past pain and suffering,
and $500,000 for future pain and suffering. The plaintiff claimed that an
officer violated her civil rights by deciding not to issue her a desk
appearance ticket, but the court noted that she herself declined the officer's
subsequent offer to give her a desk appearance ticket since she though that the
officers should transport her to a hospital instead of releasing her to go
there herself. The appeals court, therefore, overturned the civil rights award,
and ordered a new trial on the pain and suffering awards, unless the plaintiff
agreed to their reduction to $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $150,000
for future pain and suffering, as the amounts awarded by the jury were
excessive. Young v. City of New York, #2248, 25645/03, 2010 N.Y. App. Div.
Lexis 2647 (1st Dept.).
Because the arrestee had been convicted of
charges of aggravated assault, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and
unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon based on his encounter with the
defendant officer, his convictions barred his civil rights lawsuit against the
officer for excessive use of force arising from the same incident. Brown v. Chicago,
#08-4265, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6483 (7th Cir.).
An arrestee's convictions for resisting arrest
and obstruction did not bar her excessive force claims against her arresting
officer as she could have theoretically still proven that the officer's force
utilized in making the arrest was excessive without undermining the rationale
for her conviction. As it turned out, however, the evidence showed that the
officer's use of force was justified by the plaintiff's actions. Miller v.
Village of Pinckney, #09-1096, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 3168 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Sheriff's deputies who arrested a man for
"resisting, evading or obstructing an officer" were not entitled to
qualified immunity in his lawsuit claiming that they used excessive force in
doing so. The suspected crime was a misdemeanor, and not a "severe"
crime, and the deputies themselves did not contest an assessment that a jury
could conclude that he posed no immediate danger to their safety. The plaintiff
asserted that he did not try to evade the deputies or resist their efforts to
arrest him, but that, despite this, they gang-tackled him, applying force
sufficient to tear his knee ligaments. The deputies also ultimately conceded
that attempted flight by the arrestee had been no more than possible, and was
perhaps "unlikely." It was clearly established, the court held, that
the "gratuitous" use of force against a non-resisting arrestee would
violate the Fourth Amendment. Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of
Commissioners, #09-2042, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1246 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
Sheriff's deputies who arrested a man for
"resisting, evading or obstructing an officer" were not entitled to
qualified immunity in his lawsuit claiming that they used excessive force in
doing so. The suspected crime was a misdemeanor, and not a "severe"
crime, and the deputies themselves did not contest an assessment that a jury
could conclude that he posed no immediate danger to their safety. The plaintiff
asserted that he did not try to evade the deputies or resist their efforts to
arrest him, but that, despite this, they gang-tackled him, applying force
sufficient to tear his knee ligaments. The deputies also ultimately conceded
that attempted flight by the arrestee had been no more than possible, and was
perhaps "unlikely." It was clearly established, the court held, that
the "gratuitous" use of force against a non-resisting arrestee would
violate the Fourth Amendment. Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of
Commissioners, #09-2042, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1246 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
In an excessive force lawsuit, officers contended
that an arrestee placed in a patrol car attempted to exit the vehicle and
struggled when they tried to subdue him, compelling them to use pepper spray
and physical force. The arrestee argued that the officers had placed him in the
vehicle with the heat running and the windows closed, sprayed him with mace,
and beat him with a flashlight, causing injuries that included black eyes, a
broken blood vessel, a damaged mouth, loose teeth, and lacerations. A federal
appeals court found that the injuries suffered were more than minor. While the
officers certainly were entitled to take action when the plaintiff refused to
put his feet back in the vehicle and subsequently broke a car window, their
alleged actions of dragging him out of the car, followed by kicking, punching,
and hitting him with a flashlight, if true, were disproportionate to the force
needed to subdue the handcuffed arrestee. Summary judgment for the officers was
improper, as there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force used was
excessive. Goffney v. Sauceda, #08-20233, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 15440 (Unpub.
5th Cir.).
A police sergeant, attending a movie in
plainclothes, flashed his badge and arrested a woman's friend. When she
attempted to intervene, he allegedly threw her down a flight of stairs in the
theater. The sergeant claimed that the woman tripped and fell down the stairs.
The trial court erred in failing to give the jury a Fourth Amendment excessive
force instruction, as there was sufficient evidence from which it could find
that he intended to throw her down the stairs, and therefore seized her in his
capacity as a police officer. The trial judge, in assuming that the officer's
actions were unintentional for purposes of the jury instructions, improperly
intervened into the role of the jury as a finder of fact, so a new trial was
required. Arnold v. Curtis, #08-3064, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 28718 (Unpub. 10th
Cir.).
A police officer sued for excessive use of force was
improperly denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, since a
videotape of the incident in question showed that, as a matter of law, his
actions were objectively reasonable. After the plaintiff, a motorist operating
a motorized scooter, refused to sign a citation she was being given for a
defective muffler and wearing an improper helmet, she claimed that the
defendant deputy grabbed her by the breast and threw her against a police
vehicle with enough force to cause bruising, then threw her into the street,
causing her to injure her head on the pavement. The court found that a
videotape of the incident, produced by a camera in a police vehicle, clearly
showed that the deputy did not grab the woman by the breast, throw her against
a police vehicle, or throw her on the street. What it did show was the
plaintiff resisting the deputy's efforts to handcuff her after she refused to
sign the citation, and her responding to his minimal use of force by striking
him across the face with her right hand, after which she lost her balance and
fell to the ground. Wallingford v. Olson, #09-1271, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis
1505(8th Cir.).
A police director was not entitled to qualified
immunity on claims based on the actions of two officers who allegedly interrogated
an arrestee for several hours, placed an ammonium packet under his nose, and
kicked and punched him. Supervisory personnel can be held liable for
constitutional violations carried out by subordinates, based on either personal
participation or a causal connection between the supervisor's actions and the
alleged violations. If the plaintiff's allegations were true, there had been
numerous prior instances in which one of the officers used force on arrestees.
These prior incidents, if they occurred, would have been enough to give the
director notice of misconduct that was rampant enough to require corrective
action, yet he allegedly failed to take any. Williams v. Santana, #09-10198,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 18014 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
Police were summoned to a park after a man shot a
gun into the air in reaction to an altercation his son became involved in.
Officers brought him to the ground and handcuffed him, subsequently placing him
in a patrol car. A federal appeals court rejected the arrestee's claim that the
officers used excessive force, which resulted in his broken wrist. The officers
were entitled to qualified immunity since their actions were objectively
reasonable. In the course of making split-second decisions, the officers could
reasonably believe that they faced a dangerous situation in light of the
arrestee's use of gunfire and his violent resistance to arrest. Provost v.
Nissen, #08-31234, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25425 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
After leaving a club intoxicated, a man and his
wife decided to sleep in their truck. The man subsequently resisted an
officer's attempt to wake him, and a second officer allegedly helped to drag
him out of the truck, delivering a hard knee strike to his thigh while he was
handcuffed. A federal appeals court rejected an unlawful detention claim,
ruling that the officers acted reasonably in connection with their concern for
the safety of the man and his wife. There was a genuine issue of material fact,
however, as to whether the force used, specifically the knee strike, was
excessive. Summary judgment for the city was properly granted, since liability
on the basis of ratification of the officers' conduct could not be imposed as
there was no "extreme" factual situation, and there was also no
evidence of inadequate training. While the plaintiff pointed to 27 prior
complaints concerning alleged officer misconduct, this was insufficient to show
a pattern of use of excessive force. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Texas,
#08-10258, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25183 (5th Cir.).
An arrestee contended that he had responded to an
officer's instructions to stop merely by turning and greeting him, but that the
officer then pushed him without provocation. When the arrestee pushed back, the
officer allegedly punched his face and took him to the ground, causing injuries
to his ribs, eye, and face that necessitated three days in the hospital. If the
facts were as alleged by the arrestee, a jury could find the force used
excessive, even if the arrestee pushed the officer, since the push may have
been minimal. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rohrbough v.
Hall, #08-3617, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 24588 (8th Cir.).
The estate of a detainee claimed that some
police officers assaulted him in the course of an arrest, that other officers
failed to prevent the assault, and that correctional officers subsequently
failed to provide him with needed medical attention for his injuries. He then
stopped breathing, and died, having suffered a neck fracture and spinal cord
injury. A federal appeals court found that it lacked jurisdiction over two
officers' appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, based on their claim that
there was insufficient evidence that their actions caused the death to hold
them liable. The court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to three
officers since there was evidence that could support a finding that they
unreasonably failed to stop an assault on the arrestee. Finally, the
correctional officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as there was insufficient
evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious
medical needs, in light of the fact that the detainee himself refused several
offers of medical attention, and that a medical technician, after conducting an
examination, found nothing abnormal in his condition. Krout v. Goemmer,
#08-2781, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21985 (8th Cir.).
A police chief stopped a vehicle that a woman was
driving, and in which her husband and two other persons were passengers,
believing that he had observed traffic violations. The husband, believing that
he saw the chief inappropriately touch his wife, who was being arrested for
refusing to comply with a sobriety test, exited the vehicle, yelling at the
chief and taking a step forward. The chief told the husband to get back in the
car and shocked him with a Taser, but he got up and started running at the
chief. The chief placed the wife in the front of the patrol car. The chief then
allegedly instructed the husband to get in the patrol car, and when he had
difficulty doing so, pushed him into the car, allegedly hitting his head on the
door. A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the police chief on a
Fourth Amendment "improper touching" claim. The chief's use of force
against the husband was objectively reasonable in light of the husband's
attempted interference with the wife's arrest and the wife's own
non-compliance. In the absence of a constitutional violation by the chief, the
plaintiffs could not assert a liability claim against the municipality. Cook v.
City of Bella Villa; #08-2712, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21681 (8th Cir.).
A detainee showed that a police officer
used excessive force against him after encountering him attempting to restrain
a developmentally delayed adult who had fled a residential facility where he
worked. He also showed that a second officer and a sergeant on the scene
improperly failed to intervene to end the first officer's use of force. The
defendants then made false reports about the incident, and caused the detainee
to be maliciously prosecuted. The plaintiff prevailed against the defendants
individually on both excessive force and malicious prosecution federal civil
rights claims, as well as state law negligence claims. While federal claims
against the city were rejected, the city was vicariously liable for the
officers' negligence. Claims of racial animus were rejected. The plaintiff was
awarded $125,155.20 in compensatory damages and $55,000 in punitive damages.
Knapps v. City of Oakland, #05-2935, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 67141 (N.D. Cal.).
An arrestee claimed that a police chief used
excessive force when arresting him in his home, and that, when his wife tried
to drive him to the hospital, the chief reached into the car and squeezed his
wife's breast. The 75-year-old arrestee, who was charged with failing, after a
warning, to remove debris from the home's driveway, claimed that the chief
applied handcuffs too tight and kneed him while placing him in a patrol car.
After the arrestee complained of pain from a prior back injury, and refused
treatment from paramedics summoned to the scene, the chief stated that he was
either going to a hospital or to jail, whereupon the wife started to drive to
the hospital. Upholding summary judgment for the defendant police chief on the
excessive force claim and a jury verdict for the chief on the wife's assault
and battery claim, a federal appeals court found that the chief used minimal
force which caused no physical injury and was insufficient to show a
constitutional violation, acting in an objectively reasonable manner. The wife
did not tell her husband about the chief allegedly squeezing her breast until
several days after the incident, and she returned home without reaching the
hospital after the chief ticketed her for lack of insurance, invalid plates,
and failure to signal. Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa; #08-2708, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 14807 (8th Cir.).
While police officers who handcuffed an arrestee
outside a nightclub and allegedly threw him against the hood of a car and then
pulled him off the hood by his arms did not use excessive force, the court
declined to enter summary judgment on claims against an officer who allegedly
slammed his face against the roof or door frame of his car, which knocked out
his teeth. There was no showing of a municipal policy of allowing excessive
force, or of inadequate training, discipline, or supervision, and therefore no
municipal liability. Edwards v. Two Unknown Male Chicago Police Officers, #06 C
6399, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47832 (N.D. Ill.).
An arrestee's claim that a city was liable for
false arrest and excessive use of force was rejected by a federal appeals
court. The plaintiff's main argument, the court noted, was that he faced
excessive force from an officer who allegedly kicked him in the ribs and then
handcuffed him. Further, he argued that such force was the result of a police
department custom that amounted to ignoring excessive force complaints, as well
as a "code of silence" among officers, and a failure to investigate
excessive force incidents. There was, however, no identification of a
policymaker prior to his argument on appeal, and no evidence that the then
identified policymaker, the city council members, were aware of the alleged
facts in the case or of the purported code of silence. McGregory v. City of
Jackson, Mississippi, #08-60944, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 13873 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A motorist stopped for a traffic violation
claimed that officers dragged him out of his car and used excessive force against
him after learning that he had outstanding felony arrest warrants. They
allegedly hit, kicked, and tasered him, as well as allowing his car to start
rolling away with his nine-year old child inside. The officers asserted that
they believed that the motorist was attempting to drive away. The court ruled
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity since the arrestee
suffered no injuries, indicating that the force used was minimal. Such minimal
force could not violate the Fourth Amendment, the court stated, in the context
of a valid arrest. The court also found that the officers were entitled to
immunity on an Alabama state law child endangerment claim, in the absence of
evidence of malice, since they were involved in performing discretionary acts
in the course of making the arrest. Wilson v. Tillman, #06-0540, 2009 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 38845 (S.D. Ala.).
An arrestee failed to show that officers used
excessive force against him while arresting him at the scene of a domestic
disturbance. He attempted to evade arrest and they were forced to drag him from
underneath a bush, administer baton strikes to his upper left thigh to try to
make him show his hands, and finally sprayed mace in his face, after which he
finally presented his hands for handcuffing. Even then, he refused to cooperate
by walking to a police vehicle. Additionally, officers had, early in the
incident, observed a silver object in his hands, which they thought might be a
gun, although it later turned out to be either a screwdriver or a pair of
handcuffs. The court found nothing in the record to support the arrestee's own
"contradictory" testimony that he cooperated with the officers, did
not resist, and that the officers gratuitously used excessive force against
him. Based on the officer's testimony and report and a medical assessment from
an emergency room doctor, the court found, no reasonable jury could believe the
arrestee's version of the incident. Reed v. City of St. Charles, No. 07-2713,
561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009).
A homeless arrestee claimed that he was picked up
by an officer for loitering, and then taken to a wooden area where the officer
beat and stabbed him. A federal appeals court ruled that a claim by the
arrestee that the county was liable for his injuries because it has an
unwritten policy that homeless people should be relocated to other counties
should have survived summary judgment because evidence was presented of five
officers who allegedly knew of the policy. Additionally, there was expert
testimony that such a policy made violations of the rights of homeless persons
foreseeable. A claim against the county for negligent hiring of the officer was
rejected because the only violent act in the officer's record was the shooting
of a home invader. The appeals court also rejected a claim against the county
for inadequate training or supervision. There was evidence that revealed that
the county investigated reports concerning the officer's handling of arrests,
provided the officer with counseling and retraining, and subjected him to
discipline, which did not show "deliberate indifference" to a known
problem. Williams v. DeKalb County, #07-14367, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 9839
(Unpub. 11th Cir.).
Despite the "de minimis" nature of an
arrestee's injuries, he could proceed with his excessive force claim based on
his assertion that the officer hit him after he was handcuffed and strapped
into a patrol car. The trial court had improperly chosen to believe the
officer's version of the incident rather than the arrestee's in granting
summary judgment for the officer. If the facts were as the arrestee claimed, a
rational juror could find that the officer acted in an objectively unreasonable
manner. Grass v. Johnson, #07-5152, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7955 (Unpub. 10th
Cir.).
Because of the "chaos" at the scene of
a bicycle and car accident, and the female doctor's refusal to present
available medical identification, it was reasonable for an officer to believe
that there was probable cause to arrest her, despite the fact that she had actually
stopped to attempt to provide medical assistance to a boy on a bike struck by
another vehicle. Her action in resisting the officer when he grabbed her arm
justified the force employed against her, and there was no evidence that
officers present knew of her heart condition before she suffered a
cardiopulmonary arrest and died after she was placed in a police vehicle.
Arshad v. Congemi, #08-30061, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 4792 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
Park police officer acted reasonably in applying
force to the arm of a man arrested for having his dogs off a leash and
assaulting the officer, when the man's refusal to obey orders indicated that he
might try to escape or resist. The fact that the arrestee did not suffer any
injury or bruise supported the conclusion that no more force was used than was
reasonable under the circumstances. Wasserman v. Rodacker, 07-5307, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 3556 (D.C. Cir.).
Sheriff and deputy were entitled to qualified
immunity on arrestee's claim that he had been subjected to excessive force when
he was arrested while having an epileptic seizure and then allegedly denied
medical attention. The trial court acted in error when it deferred ruling on
the motion for qualified immunity while granting the plaintiff time to conduct
further discovery. The defendants had not, however, claimed qualified immunity
on the plaintiff's disability discrimination, equal protection, or state law
claims, so those could proceed. Everson v. Leis, No. 07-4461, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 3288 (6th Cir.).
Police officers did not use excessive force in
restraining “psychotic and aggressive” man who refused to obey police orders to
leave premises of music studio, refused orders to drop a pen he was holding,
and resisted efforts to handcuff him. Medical evidence showed that he died from
a heart attack during the encounter, and was susceptible to one because of 90%
blockage in his arteries. Court finds no evidence that he died of asphyxia or
was choked, or that a purported inadequacy in training as to how to arrest
persons exhibiting signs of excited delirium syndrome caused his death. Gregory
v. County of Maui, #06-15374, 523 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2008), affirming Civ.
#04-00516, 414 F.Supp.2d 965 (D. Hawaii 2006).
Defendants in arrestee's excessive force lawsuit were
entitled to summary judgment based on officers' testimony that the suspect
actively resisted the arrest, when no evidence to the contrary was produced,
and the arrestee, who was sick and on medications, had no independent
recollection of the events. The plaintiff could not defeat the motion for
summary judgment merely by arguing that a jury might not believe the officers.
LaFrenier v. Kinirey, No. 07-1644, 550 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2008).
Officer who allegedly pushed an arrestee into a steel
cell door and a plexiglas window as they were both leaving an elevator used
minimal force that could not be the basis of an excessive force claim,
particularly when there was no challenge to the legality of the arrest, no
significant injuries resulted, and the officer contended that force was
necessary to subdue the arrestee, who he claimed acted in an aggressive manner.
The officer was entitled to qualified immunity even if the minimal force used
had been unprovoked. McCall v. Crosthwait, No. 2:07-CV-870, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 103772 (M.D. Ala.).
If the facts were as a fifteen year old arrestee
alleged, a reasonable officer should have known that the arrestee had
surrendered when he did not resist when the officer lifted him off the ground.
It would have been unnecessary for the arrestee to say anything verbally to
indicate that the further use of force was unnecessary. The arrestee claimed
that after he engaged in shoving the officer, he was swung into a car, fell to
the ground, and was picked up by the officer, who then slammed him into a car
twice, resulting in a broken jaw. Valladares v. Cordero, #07-1995, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 374 (4th Cir.).
U.S. Park Police and an off-duty city officer
used reasonable force to subdue a motorist stopped for a license tag who fled
on foot and shot one of the Park Police officers in the face. Evidence showed
that the arrestee refused to drop the gun before shooting, and was not immobile
without resisting when the officers beat him. Arrington v. U.S. Park Police
Service, Civil Action No. 01-1391, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 104579 (D.D.C.).
Ample evidence supported a jury's determination to
believe police officers and captains in a use of force lawsuit and to
disbelieve the plaintiff's version of the incident. Dixon v. Ragland, No. 03
Civ. 826, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 101458 (S.D. Cal.).
A court officer had no basis for using more than
a tap on the arm to direct a woman being arraigned before a judge. The state of
New York was therefore liable for injuries the woman suffered when the officer
instead allegedly suddenly grabbed her two shoulders, forced them together and
back, and then forcefully grabbed her right elbow, pushing and pulling on it,
and jerking it backwards, inflicting injuries requiring pain medication for two
to three weeks. Tomaino v. State of New York, #111174, 2008 N.Y. Misc. Lexis
7155 (Ct. of Claims).
When an arrestee received only $20,000 in damages in
settlement of his excessive force claim, or roughly one-fourth of the amount he
originally sought, further proceedings were required to reconsider a trial
court award of $200,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. His victory fell
"far short" of his goal, so that awarding more than a comparable
portion of the requested fees and costs was unreasonable. McCown v. City of
Fontana, No. 07-55896, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 26385 (9th Cir.).
Police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity, since the alleged facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, indicated that the plaintiff's son had been battered and subjected
to excessive force by the officer. Valladares v. Cordero, No. 07-1995,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 374 (4th Cir.).
While a police officer argued that he was entitled to
qualified immunity because the facts, correctly interpreted, showed neither
unlawful arrest nor excessive use of force against a mother and her adult son,
the court could not decide the disputed facts on appeal. Since the facts as
alleged by the plaintiffs, if true, would constitute constitutional violations,
the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Cardenas v. Fisher, No.
08-2036, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 245 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
While a reasonable person could believe that an
officer's actions after a prostitution sting backfired imposed restrictions on
her freedom of movement similar to those involved in a formal arrest, a federal
appeals court agreed that there was no unlawful detention. The officer,
however, was not entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive
force claim, since a reasonable jury could decide that the force used against
the plaintiff, which was severe enough to cause a rotator cuff tear, a
first-degree shoulder separation, and contusions, were disproportionate, since
she was, at most, a petty thief suspect, and was not resisting the officer.
Morelli v. Webster. No. 08-1759, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 115 January 7, 2009 (1st
Cir.).
Arrestee stated valid claims for excessive use of
force and failure to train arising out of incident in which he pointed a gun at
plain-clothes police officers who chased him, fearing they were criminals. He
allegedly continued to flee after they identified themselves as police, and
claimed that they inflicted a severe beating on him after he was subdued. Jones
v. Ritter, Civil Action No. 07-1674, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94383 (D.D.C.).
A sheriff's deputy who allegedly repeatedly
slammed a misdemeanor arrestee against a concrete wall after he was fully
compliant and subdued, causing a leaking aneurysm and breaking his ribs was not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability. He should have known that such
conduct was unlawful. Galvez v. Bruce, No. 08-10531, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 25478
(11th Cir.).
To establish liability for excessive force in the use
of handcuffs, a detainee must establish both that police applied the handcuffs
unnecessarily tightly, and that they ignored his complaints that the cuffs were
too tight. In this case, an officer was not shown to have violated the
plaintiff's rights, as the handcuffs were removed in response to the
plaintiff's complaints. The defendant officer was not, however, entitled to
qualified immunity on the plaintiff's claim that he used excessive force while
"cramming" him into the back seat of the patrol vehicle. Vance v.
Wade, #07-5930, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 23952 (6th Cir.).
A videotape of an incident in which police broke
a motorist's leg while removing him from his vehicle following a chase through
a residential area showed that the officers acted reasonably, and did not use
excessive force. The officers acted in order to neutralize what they reasonably
perceived as a threat after the motorist fled from an officer's vehicular
pursuit and then apparently refused orders to leave the vehicle at the end of
the chase. Although the chase began over an expired license, the motorist's
behavior justified the officer's suspicion that he was dangerous. Rejecting the
arrestee's argument that the jury should determine, from the videotape,
recorded from an officer's car, whether or not the force used was excessive,
the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, in similar circumstances,
instructed federal courts to determine, as a matter of law, from watching such
videotapes, whether the force depicted was excessive, taking the evidence in
the light most favorable to the arrestee. Dunn v. Matatall, No. 08-1094, 2008
U.S. App. Lexis 24305 (6th Cir.).
There was a viable jury question as to whether
Wyoming Highway Patrol officers acted reasonably in allegedly continuing to
apply weight to a suspect's upper torso for three minutes after it was no
longer necessary to restrain him and in a manner that they allegedly should
have reasonably known presented a significant danger of death from
asphyxiation. If the officers used deadly force that was not justified by a need
to protect the safety of the suspect, the officers, or the public, they were
not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions, which allegedly caused
the suspect's death. Weigel v. Broad, No. 05-8094, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21877
(10th Cir.).
If officers repeatedly beat arrestee while he was
lying still on the ground after being handcuffed, their actions violated
clearly established law, barring a defense of qualified immunity. Based on the
arrestee's version of the incident, if true, the officers also acted in bad
faith or maliciously for purposes of Alabama state law, and would also not be
entitled to immunity on state law claims for excessive use of force, although
they were entitled to such immunity on negligence and wantonness. Adams v. City
of Mobile, Civil Action 07-0864, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80149 (S.D. Ala.).
A motorist stopped and arrested for
speeding failed to present any medical evidence that the officer's actions
either caused or aggravated his injuries and pre-existing medical conditions.
With no demonstrated physical injury at all, the arrestee could not pursue an
excessive force claim. Phelps v. Szubinski, 04-CV-773, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis
72253 (E.D.N.Y.).
Federal appeals court upholds jury verdict in
favor of arrestee who claimed that he suffered a "knee drop" to his
head while he was pinned to the ground by officers outside a bar, suffering
five facial fractures, and bleeding into his brain. The plaintiff presented
evidence that he had not offered resistance to the officers, and he met his
burden of showing that excessive force was used. Plaintiff was properly awarded
$10,000 in compensatory damages, and the trial court acted correctly in
refusing to reduce the award by the $9,906.98 in medical bills paid for
treatment of his injury by his health insurer. Gill v. Maciejewski, No.
07-3451, 546 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2008).
Because there was no undisputed evidence that the
plaintiff had resisted arrest, and he claimed that he had been choked and had
his face smashed into the ground, there was a disputed issue as to whether the
officers used excessive force, and the defendant officers could not appeal the
denial of their motion for qualified immunity. Landis v Phalen, No.
07-4262, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21944 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Police officers did not use excessive force in
attempting to remove a motorist from his vehicle after he attempted to evade
them, and appeared to be non-compliant with demands to exit his car at the end
of a vehicle pursuit during which he ran several stop signs and traffic
signals. Even though the officers' actions resulted in the motorist suffering a
broken arm, "given the heightened suspicion and danger brought about by
the car chase and the fact that an officer could not know what other dangers
may have been in the car, forcibly removing" the driver from the car
"to contain those potential threats was objectively reasonable." Dunn
v. Matatall, No. 08-1094, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 24305 (6th Cir.).
Officers were properly denied qualified
immunity on federal excessive force claims and immunity under Michigan's
Governmental Tort Liability Act on state law assault and battery claims. The
decedent allegedly drowned after police beat him with a baton, held him down,
and used a Taser on him while he was lying in two feet of sediment, mud, and
water. They were arresting him on suspicion of blocking traffic on a highway
with moved construction equipment. If true, the officers' actions were
clearly unreasonable. Landis v. Baker, No. 07-2360, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21946
(Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Officers who failed to fully and timely raise and
address a qualified immunity defense before the trial court, even if they
allegedly failed to do so, as they claimed, because they believed that the
plaintiff's constitutional claims lacked merit, essentially waived the defense.
The appeals court could not address the issue on appeal without the benefit of
the trial court's reasoning on it. The case involved the killing of a person
inside a home during a "no knock" entry while executing a warrant.
Noel v. Artson, No. 07-1987, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 22060 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
When it was undisputed that an arrestee refused
to comply with officers' requests to calm down and ran into his house to
attempt to evade arrest, the officers used required force to restrain him in
order to take him into custody. Additional force was also used when the
arrestee, despite being cap-stunned, continued his resistance, and the force
used was clearly proportional to the need for it. Brown v. Rinehart, Civ. No.
07-023-SLR, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60463 (D. Del.).
An arrestee offered no evidence to dispute
declarations by an officer and a sergeant of the U.S. Secret Service that they
did not use physical force on her, or to show that excessive force was used and
caused an injury. She also failed to identify other witnesses who could dispute
the officers' version of the incident. Powers-Bunce v. D.C., Civil Action No.
06-1586, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69798 (D.D.C.).
A man arrested based on a complaint by his
neighbor failed to show that the arresting officer used excessive force against
him, with the court finding that, even if it believed the plaintiff's version
of the incident, the force allegedly used by the officer was minimal and resulted
in no physical injury. The plaintiff's claim that his neighbor was not arrested
under similar circumstances because he was related to a police officer was
purely a "conjecture," and did not constitute a viable equal
protection claim. Jennejahn v. Village of Avon, No. 06-CV-6054, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 67608 (W.D.N.Y.).
Homeowner who claimed that officers severely injured
her while beating her during a warrant-based search of her home could not
pursue Fourteenth Amendment due process claims for excessive use of force since
such claims may only be brought under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff also
failed to adequately show that the city engaged in inadequate training,
supervision, or disciplining of officers and that such inadequacies caused her injuries.
Torres v. City of Allentown, Civil No. 07-1934, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 50522 (E.D. Pa.).
Once a woman reacted to police officers' presence
on her property by pulling a court order away from an officer, it was
reasonable for officers to believe that a brief show of force was necessary to
make sure that she complied with their orders. They were there to aid a
neighbor in retrieving his property pursuant to a court order. The plaintiff
failed to show that the officers used more force than was necessary. Slusher v.
Terry, No. 07-1756, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18726 (6th Cir.).
Police officers were not entitled to summary
judgment in a lawsuit for injuries to a motorist occurring after a traffic stop
followed by a chase and an arrest. There were genuine issues of fact concerning
the amount of force used and, in particular, that used against the arrestee
after he was handcuffed. The court also rejected the argument that medical
evidence concerning the plaintiff's physical injuries was required to create a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Dukes v. Miami-Dade County, No.
08-10004, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18052 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
An African-American motorist was stopped by
several police vehicles that were searching for a similar car in the area, and
he was stunned and handcuffed, before they decided not to fully arrest or
charge him. The court declined to grant summary judgment to the officers on the
basis of qualified immunity, finding that there were factual issues concerning
whether an arrest was made, and whether probable cause existed for doing so, as
well as about the reasonableness of the force used. Thurman v. Village of Hazel
Crest, No. 06C7194, 2008 U.S.Dist. Lexis 59962 (N.D. Ill.).
Officers acted reasonably in pulling driver
from his car when he refused to get out as directed and placing him on the
ground to handcuff him. The motorist had allegedly driven in a manner that
caused his car to hit curbs and other objects. The court found that the force
used was not excessive under these circumstances. Wisler v. City of Fresno, No.
CV 06-1694, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50843 (E.D. Cal.).
An arrestee's claim that a federal marshal used
excessive force against him during the arrest was not barred by his convictions
for resisting arrest and assaulting federal officers. Those convictions did not
exclude the possibility that officers used excessive force in response to the
arrestee's unlawful actions during a lawful arrest. The federal appeals court,
therefore, overturned the dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit against the
marshal and other officers. Lora-Pena v. FBI, No. 07-3511, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
13085 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Journalists claimed that FBI agents, while
executing a search warrant at a condominium building, grabbed and assaulted
them, and used pepper spray and metal batons against them when they entered a
gated area. The agents were using the building's fences and security structure
in an attempt to restrict the flow of people into the area, and allegedly did
not give them a chance to exit before using force against them. The court found
that there was no special First Amendment right of access by the press to enter
property that was not in the public domain. The court found, however, that some
of the journalists' Fourth Amendment claims were improperly dismissed. The
appeals court ruled that "mere obstinance" by a crowd did not justify
the use of force when there is no showing that crowd members posed a public
safety threat or that any other law enforcement considerations were at risk.
The court ruled, therefore, that Fourth Amendment excessive force claims by
individual journalists could proceed, while the rejection of all First
Amendment claims was upheld. Asociacion de Periodistas de Puerto Rico v.
Mueller, No. 07-2196, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12783 (1st Cir.).
Officers did not use excessive force in response
to a belligerent motorist who shouted and refused to comply with their
directions to step to the curb, lower his voice, and calm down. When he
resisted their attempts to place handcuffs on him, they tackled him to the
ground and applied arm locks for purposes of restraint. After that too proved
unsuccessful, they then used pepper spray. The court ruled that no reasonable
officer would have thought that the defendant officers applied excessive force
under the circumstances, and that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity. Mierzwa v. U.S., No. 07-3362, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13523 (Unpub. 3rd
Cir.).
An off-duty officer tried to help a stranger who
claimed he was being robbed, who turned out to be a drug dealer being chased by
an on-duty police officer. The off-duty officer, when he realized what the
situation was, placed himself in a prone position on the floor in an indication
of surrender. The on-duty officer allegedly kicked the off-duty officer
repeatedly and stomped on his buttocks and groin until he saw a police badge on
the off-duty officer's neck. The injured off-duty officer sued the on-duty
officer and the District of Columbia, asserting claims for excessive use of
force. A federal appeals court ruled that the trial court acted erroneously in
granting qualified immunity to the defendant on-duty officer. The facts, as
presented by the plaintiff off-duty officer, showed that the on-duty officer violated
his Fourth Amendment rights, and a reasonable officer would have known that the
actions allegedly taken, under the circumstances, were not lawful. The common
law negligence claims against the District were properly dismissed, however.
The off-duty officer's exclusive remedy on those claims was to seek benefits
under the Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act. A trial was
ordered on the off-duty officer's civil rights claims. Johnson v. D.C., No.
06-7136, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13289 (D.C. Cir.).
Despite the seriousness of an arrestee's crime of
bank robbery, FBI agents' alleged response in using the force they did in
apprehending and arresting him was not reasonable or proportionate. Accepting,
for purposes of appeal, the arrestee's version of the incident, at the time of
the arrest he was submitting to the agents' authority, was focused on
self-protection, was in a passive position, and did not pose an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or anyone else. He allegedly also did not
actively resist arrest or attempt to evade it. The agents were therefore not
entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Abel v. Harp, No. 06-4371, 2008
U.S. App. Lexis 11440 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Even if a woman's behavior at the time of her arrest
was caused by her having suffered several seizures that day, the arresting
officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in using force against her.
Her conduct constituted fleeing, eluding, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing
an officer, and she posed an immediate threat to the officers and to other
members of the public since she refused orders to place her vehicle in park at
the conclusion of the chase, and it continued to push against a police cruiser.
Under the circumstances, the officers couldn't be expected to know that her
non-responsiveness to their requests was due to a seizure. Ryan v. Hazel Park,
No. 07-1659, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11042 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
A deputy sheriff and a U.S. Forest Service
officer didn't use excessive force by attempting to arrest a protester who had
climbed a tree by denying her supplies, food, and water, subjecting her to a
risk of severe dehydration. Her own decision to remain in the tree was the
cause of her injuries, and the case she relied on for her argument that
excessive force was used involved the direct use of force, such as pepper
spray, in instances where police could have easily removed protesters without
infliction of injury or pain. The defendants' actions in the immediate case
were consistent with the court's ruling in that past case. The officers had no
obligation to "care" for her while she was in the tree, since she was
not in their custody. Smith v. Ball, No. 07-35080, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1059
(Unpub. 9th Cir.).
Officer did not use excessive force in
restraining a DUI arrestee who was not compliant with directions to put his
hands behind his back, but instead was moving his arms forward and flailing
from side to side. Additionally, even if the force used was unnecessarily, it
was minimal and caused only minor injury. Anderson v. City of Tampa, No.
8:07-CV-00993, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35931 (M.D. Fla.).
A trial court's denial of summary judgment to a
police officer in an excessive force lawsuit was not the same as a denial of
qualified immunity, when the trial judge explicitly said that there was not
enough information about the force used to make a qualified immunity
determination. The denial of summary judgment, therefore, was not immediately
appealable, as a denial of qualified immunity would have been. Watts v.
Harrison, No. 07-7008, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11319 (Unpub. D.C. Cir.).
Police officers had probable cause to arrest a
man they found holding an iron bar while involved in a "heated,
expletive-filled" argument with another person also holding such a bar.
The officers were not required to wait until the two men actually came to blows
before arresting them. There was, however, a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the force used by the officers in twisting the arrestee's arms was
excessive, based on the arrestee's assertion that he did not attempt to evade
arrest or resist them. Zantello v. Shelby Township, No. 07-1640, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 10014 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Arrestee who had pled guilty to resisting a
police officer could pursue his claim that officers beat him, using excessive
force while he was waiting to be handcuffed after he was apprehended. While the
officers acted properly in arresting him, his claim that they then used
excessive force was not barred by this, since that claim did not necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction. Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, No.
06-4208, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 7657 (7th Cir.).
Officers' use of force against a man found on the
fifth floor ledge of an apartment building was not excessive. They believed
that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and acted in a reasonable
manner in handcuffing and restraining him while placing him in custody for
protective purposes, while waiting for an ambulance to arrive. They also acted
reasonably later in restraining him and using a rear leg sweep when he tried to
get away from their control. Estate of Tapueluelu v. City and County of San
Francisco, No. 06-15638, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5425 (9th Cir.).
An officer who allegedly punched an
arrestee who did not pose a danger and who did not resist arrest at the time
was not entitled to use any force at that time. A second officer present,
however, could not be held liable for failure to intervene, since there was no
evidence that he could have anticipated and stopped the first officer's action.
Hadley v. Gutierrez, No. 06-12605, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9695 (11th Cir.).
Federal officers were not shown to have used
excessive force against an arrestee, so that the federal government had no
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b)(1),
2671-2680. The court found, applying Wyoming law, that the force used during
the arrest was justified, and that any injuries suffered were
"incidental" to the reasonable use of force. The court also found no
evidence of negligence by the officers. The U.S. was entitled to a
"common-law privilege" defense protecting police officers from
liability for using reasonable force during a lawful arrest. The court also
found that, even if the force used was found to be unreasonable, comparative
fault by the arrestee in resisting the lawful arrest was over 50%, which would
bar any liability for the government under Wyoming law. The plaintiff could not
claim that his arrest was unlawful, as his attorney had previously agreed that
no such claim was presented. Fienhold v. U.S.A., No. 07-8058, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 8597 (10th Cir.).
Business owners who claimed that a business
license inspector physically assaulted them failed to show that the attack
violated their substantive due process rights, since they failed to show that
the abuse of governmental authority was an "integral element" of the
attack. The inspector, while performing his job duties, was not authorized to
use force, and did not rely on his official authority in attacking the
plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, the inspector's actions may have been a
state law assault and battery, but it did not amount to a violation of
constitutional rights. Williams v. Berney, No. 06-1177, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
5752 (10th Cir.).
Deputy sheriff did not use excessive force or act
unreasonably in detaining and tackling a man while a no-knock warrant to search
for weapons and drugs was being executed on a neighbor's residence. The deputy
tackled him and took him to the ground after he failed to get on the ground in
response to a command. The deputy's belief that this use of force was needed
was not unreasonable, based on the exigent circumstances of the quickly
occurring situation. Chidester v. Utah County, No. 06-4255, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 4918 (10th Cir.).
Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether
a bar owner ever physically touched a police officer (by putting a finger in
his face) who then arrested him, summary judgment should not have been granted
to the officer on claims that he used excessive force. He and two other
officers allegedly tackled the bar owner. The incident took place in the
parking lot of the bar after a shooting allegedly occurred there. Chelios v.
Heavener, No. 06-4125, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5894 (7th Cir.).
The legal standard for excessive use of force by
police officers under the New Jersey state Constitution is the same as the
objective reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Court rejects claims by a wife and her sister that officers, in
arresting them following the wife's fight with her husband's girlfriend, used
excessive force against them. The court found that the wife failed to comply
with an officer's request to surrender a cell phone and enter a police vehicle
voluntarily and the sister also refused to obey instructions from an officer,
justifying the amount of force used. Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No.
04-2536, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9067 (D.N.J.).
Police officers were not shown to have used
excessive force in executing warrants on suspect accused of burglary who was
known to be a convicted felon who had previously been involved in crimes
involving weapons, and who the officers believed to be dangerous. Even if the
force used against the suspect and other plaintiffs present at the time had
been excessive, it did not violate clearly established rights. Massaro v. Town
of Trumbull, No. 3:05-CV-00786, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 91502 (D. Conn.).
Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
on claims that they unlawfully entered a woman's home without consent or
exigent circumstances while responding to a domestic disturbance call. At the
time of their entry, the domestic dispute had allegedly been
"neutralized" and there were no facts that would have caused the
officers to believe that any one was in danger inside the home. The court also
found that there was evidence from which a jury could find that an officer used
excessive force in arresting the woman, causing her injuries at a time when she
had not committed a crime and did not pose a threat to anyone. Campbell v.
Clay, No. 07-13040, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2928 (11th Cir.).
Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to qualified
immunity in a lawsuit alleging that they used excessive force in removing a
morbidly obese man from a courtroom after he was found in contempt of court,
causing him to die after several deputies allegedly placed themselves on his
back while he was on the floor. Hostility by the deputies to the man could
support a finding that they were trying to punish him at the time. Both Fourth
Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims were reinstated. Appeals court also rules
that removal of the decedent's mother to another courtroom via wheelchair was
necessary and did not involve the use of excessive force. Richman v. Sheahan,
No. 07-1487, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 200 (7th Cir.).
Arrestee who had no conscious memory of what
happened when he claimed that police struck him as he lay motionless could not
pursue his excessive force claim. The arrestee, who suffers from diabetes,
pulled into a grocery store after having a hypoglycemic attack while driving.
He intended to buy food to correct the imbalance in his blood sugar, but
allegedly started acting erratically. There was a witness who stated that he
was struggling with police as they attempted to handcuff him, and was out of
control. Since the arrestee could not deny or affirm any of his actions during
the incidents, and there was no witness that supported his version of the
incident, the officers were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. Wysong v. City of Hehath, No. 06-4433, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
2192 (6th Cir.).
Appeals court could not grant officers summary
judgment when they failed to raise issues of law concerning whether their
alleged conduct constituted an excessive use of force, but rather only factual
issues concerning whether the arrestee refused to extend his hands for cuffing
and was resisting arrest when they allegedly used force against him. Ling v.
Banda, No. 07-10353, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2049 (5th Cir.).
If, as the plaintiff claimed, officers pushed him
against a wall, held him by the throat and squeezed it, and made him sit in a
chair for ten minutes, again grabbing him when he attempted to leave, these
actions were unreasonable, as he allegedly only came to the police station to
speak with officers about a family member involved in a fight. The officers
were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. Hamilton v. City of Jackson,
Alabama, No. 07-12916, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 350 (11th Cir.).
A sheriff's action, in pushing a mother out of
his path, while taking her adult daughter into protective custody for a mental
health evaluation, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, as the mother
was not "seized." The sheriff claimed that he believed that the
mother, who had become "argumentative," was about to attack him.
While his push allegedly made her fall backwards, and hit a table and chair, it
also did not constitute conduct shocking to the conscience for purposes of a
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Because of the legitimate interest in custody of
the daughter, his "split-second" method of clearing his path,
regardless of the mother's true intent, was entitled to qualified immunity.
Clark v. Edmunds, No. 07-4029, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1315 (10th Cir.).
An arrestee himself escalated the possible safety
threat to a state trooper who stopped his vehicle by refusing to comply with
the trooper's orders, fighting with him, and actively resisting arrest when he
was told to exit his truck after the trooper saw drug-related items in the
vehicle. Under these circumstances, even if the trooper kneed him in the back,
there was no excessive use of force under the circumstances. McNeil v.
Anderson, No. 07-6132, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28464 (10th Cir.).
Police officers did not use excessive force
against woman detained on suspicion of shoplifting or in allegedly pushing her
into a wall. She was only handcuffed for five minutes, the court noted, and any
marks on her wrists from the handcuffs vanished within a day. Further, the push
against the wall did not leave any mark or wound. Segura v. Jones, No. 07-1013,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29231 (10th Cir.).
A federal appeals court overturned a trial
court's summary judgment for police officers, their police chief, and the city
that employed them in a lawsuit brought by an arrestee who was subjected to an
arm-lock, a tackling, a Tasering, and a beating after he allegedly committed a
misdemeanor in the officers' presence. The incident occurred when the
plaintiff, after unsuccessfully attempting to defend himself against a traffic
ticket, took the court file with him while walking to a courthouse parking lot
to get money from his vehicle to pay his fine. The officers used force against
him while he was on his way back to the courthouse. The appeals court found
that the force used was not reasonable, given that the plaintiff was only
suspected of "innocuously" engaging in conduct constituting a
nonviolent misdemeanor, and did not resist arrest or attempt to flee. Under
these circumstances, the court stated, a reasonable officer would not have
taken these alleged actions. Casey v. City of Federal Heights, No.
06-1426, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28537 (10th Cir.).
A jury in a federal civil rights lawsuit found
that an officer used excessive force against an arrestee and committed assault
and battery under state law by striking the plaintiff in the face three times
while other officers detained him. In state court, claims for indemnification
under Pennsylvania state law were rejected on the basis that officer had been
found, by the jury, to have engaged in willful misconduct. The officer did not
use the force employed for the purpose of effecting the arrest or maintaining
the detention of the arrestee, but rather because he perceived the arrestee to
be a "smart aleck," which fell outside of the scope of conduct for
which indemnification was provided. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2186
C.D. 2006, 2007 Pa. Commw. Lexis 625.
When man arrested for driving under the influence
of alcohol was intoxicated and uncooperative and had indicated that he would
resist having his blood drawn at a hospital, as authorized by law, officers did
not use excessive force. He resisted and kicked one of the officers in the
stomach, and it took four officers to subdue him. Court rejects claim that
officers or town were liable for alleged injuries arrestee suffered while his arms
were handcuffed behind his back. Laskey v. Legates, C.A. No. 06-18-JJF, 2007
U.S. Dist. Lexis 77586 (D. Del.).
Sheriff's deputy was not entitled to
discretionary immunity under Nevada state law when he allegedly struck an
arrestee in the face breaking his nose while removing him from a crowd which
officers were trying to push through early on New Year's Day. His decision did
not involve policy considerations, and he was authorized, under a statute, to
use no more restraint than necessary to make the arrest. The arrestee had
raised his hands and knee in an effort to protect himself, and a police
investigator claimed that he had tried to "knee" him. In this case,
there was no evidence that the arrestee was fleeing or resisting arrest when he
was struck. Castaneda v. Planeta, No. 03:05-CV-0283, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis
84328 (D. Nev.).
Trial court did not make a mistake in excluding
evidence that a plaintiff wanted to introduce concerning an officer's alleged
motive for using excessive force against him in the course of his arrest. An
officer's intent or motivation is irrelevant if the force used is objectively
reasonable under the circumstances, so that proof of "evil"
intentions would not have made an objectively reasonable use of force into a
Fourth Amendment violation. Wilson v. Galyon, No. 07-6124, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis
22977 (10th Cir.).
If the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, the
decedent was knee deep in water, unarmed, surrounded by police, and had ceased
trying to escape arrest when he was shocked with a Taser five times, struck
with a baton multiple times, and pushed into a position that submerged his head
in water, causing him to drown. Under those circumstances, officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim. The officers should
have known that striking the arrestee with a baton after he was no longer
resisting violated clearly established constitutional rights. Prior case law
indicating that the unwarranted use of pepper spray was excessive force was sufficient
to put officers on notice that improper use of a Taser could be excessive
force. Additionally, the officers should have known that it is almost always an
excessive use of force to restrain an arrestee in a manner that places his head
under water for a long period of time. Landis v. Cardoza, Civil No. 05-74013,
2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74838 (E.D. Mich.).
Reversing judgment as a matter of law for an
officer in an excessive force lawsuit, a federal appeals court ruled that a
jury could have concluded that the level of force used was excessive. The
officer allegedly applied a pain compliance control hold on the arrestee,
shoved her outside, and slammed her against a car when she was calm, sober, an
compliant. The trial court did, however, correctly rule that the officer had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for battery when she touched his badge.
McIntyre v. City of San Jose, No. 05-17005, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 25606 (9th
Cir.).
Undisputed evidence showed that a DUI arrestee
was uncooperative and intoxicated and had shown that he would resist having his
blood drawn at a hospital where he had been transported after his arrest. Under
these circumstances, the officers had not used excessive force against him
while his arms were handcuffed behind his back, and four officers were needed
to subdue him. Laskey v. Legates, C.A. No. 06-18, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77586
(D. Del.).
New Jersey state troopers were not entitled to
qualified immunity in a lawsuit by a traffic stop arrestee who claimed that he
was grabbed by the neck and choked after he threatened to urinate in the
officers' vehicle, and that they repeatedly hit him in the head with a
flashlight while removing him from the car. The plaintiff also claimed that the
officers kept kicking and punching him after he was restrained on the ground.
If the arrestee's version of the incident were believed, a reasonable jury
could find that the officers' actions were improper under the circumstances.
Green v. New Jersey State Police, No. 06-4111, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 20693 (3rd
Cir.).
Off-duty deputy sheriff was not entitled to
qualified immunity on woman's claim that he violated her rights and used
excessive force against her by grabbing her without provocation, and then
tossed her down the stairs after they engaged in an argument following a movie
that they both separately attended. The deputy was allegedly upset about the
woman's talking during the film, and had told her to "shut up" and
made a racial slur about her Hispanic background. The appeals court found that
it was without jurisdiction to hear the deputy's appeal of the trial court
denial of his motion for qualified immunity, since he relied on his (disputed)
version of the facts, rather than on a legal argument. Arnold v. Curtis, No.
06-4080, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18509 (10th Cir.).
Evidence showed that a police officer's use of
force to arrest a man during a party was reasonable under the circumstances, or
that, in the alternative, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. While
the arrestee claimed that the officer improperly beat him and choked him during
the arrest, the record showed that attendees at the party outnumbered the
officers present, and that the officer only succeeded in subduing the arrestee
after the arrestee had successfully resisted the efforts of four other officers
to place him under arrest. Duran v. Sirgedas, No. 05-4278, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis
17305 (7th Cir.).
An arrestee failed to assert anything other than
"speculative allegations" concerning a supposed policy by the county
and its drug task force to approve excessive use of force, so that claims
against the county and drug task force were properly dismissed. The arrestee's
assertion, however, that three officers, during the arrest, stomped on his back
because they did not like his answers to their questions, and that they treated
him brutally after taking him into custody, including fastening his handcuffs
too tight, causing his right hand to become numb, were sufficient to state a
federal civil rights claim. Chambers v. St. Louis, No. 06-2588, 2007 U.S. App.
Lexis 18605 (8th Cir.).
Jury's verdict in a criminal case in which the
plaintiff was convicted of four counts of resisting arrest and assault
necessarily included a conclusion that the U.S. Marshals making the arrest did
not use excessive force, so that the arrestee's excessive force claim was
barred, since the conviction had not been overturned. Lora-Pena v. U.S.,
1:06-cv-00442, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51235 (D. Del.).
Trial judge acted improperly in setting aside
jury's determination that an officer used excessive force in making an arrest.
The appeals court found that the arrestee's claim of excessive force was not
based merely on the allegation that the officer used an ankle turn control technique,
but rather on the allegation that the officer increased the amount of force he
was using, breaking the arrestee's ankle, and did so after the arrestee had
stopped resisting. Under these circumstances, the officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity. Jennings v. Jones, No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 19583
(1st Cir.).
A videotape of the arrest incident refited the
arrestee's claim that he was lying flat on his stomach after the officers
ordered him to do so, but instead showed that he was twisting on his side when
the officers approached him and tried to handcuff him. It further appeared from
the video that when he rose to his feet, he was not under police control, as he
claimed, but had instead successfully avoided their efforts to handcuff him.
Summary judgment for the officers and city on his excessive force and
inadequate training claims were therefore upheld. Mann v. Yarnell, No. 06-2326,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 19283 (8th Cir.).
A battery claim by a protester allegedly hit by
an officer was barred under a Florida state statute due to his alleged
participation in a riot which occurred after an unlawful demonstration became
violent. He linked arms with other demonstrators and refused orders to
disperse. Court also rejects the claim that officers were inadequately trained,
as significant training was provided in the use of batons. No evidence was
found that supervisory personnel or another officer saw the demonstrator being
hit but failed to intervene. Owaki v. City of Miami, No. 06-20737-CIV, 2007
U.S. Dist. Lexis 44921 (S.D. Fla.).
Officers who removed a man from his vehicle by
using a "twist lock" were entitled to qualified immunity on his
Fourth Amendment claim because reasonable officers could disagree as to whether
the use of this twist lock was lawful under the circumstances. The officers had
found the man in a fetal position in the back of a car while responding to a
call reporting a "man down." The officer who applied the twist lock
claimed that he only did so after he observed a handgun in the man's pocket.
Novitsky v. City of Aurora, No. 05-1169, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 15959 (10th
Cir.).
Because the alleged excessive force used against
an arrestee did not take place until after she was handcuffed, put into a
patrol car, and then removed from it, she could pursue her claim despite her
conviction for resisting arrest with violence. Success on her civil rights
claim would not imply the invalidity of her conviction, which was based on her
initial kick against the officer while being placed under arrest. The defendant
officers were therefore not entitled to summary judgment. Dyer v. Lee, No.
06-14680, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12941 (11th Cir.).
While an arrestee's excessive force lawsuit
against one of two officers who arrested him was not barred by his conviction
for resisting the other officer, there was no genuine issue of fact created by
the plaintiff, based on the record, that the officer he sued had used more than
"the force a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would
use." Summary judgment for the defendant officer, the city, and the police
chief was therefore upheld. Jones v. City of Anaheim, No. 05-55752, 2007 U.S.
App. Lexis 9647 (9th Cir.).
The plaintiff arrestee's claim that the officer
had assaulted and thrashed him, beating him into unconsciousness was not
supported by the history and physical examinations of the arrestee that night
in a hospital room, which were not consistent with his version of events, but
the plaintiff was entitled, under the Seventh Amendment, to a jury trial on
that claim to determine the credibility of his version of the incident. On the
other hand, any injuries that resulted from the officer's action in taking the
arrestee down to the ground were based on the arrestee's own actions in
attempting to evade arrest for intoxicated driving, based on which the officer
could reasonably believe that he was non-compliant. Therrien v. Town of Jay,
Civil No. 06-31, 483 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Maine 2007).
Despite the fact that the arrestee could not
prove which of two officers allegedly beat him after he was arrested for
intoxicated driving and handcuffed, officers who were present during the
incident could be held liable if the facts were as alleged by the arrestee and
they failed to intervene. Since both officers admitted that they were present
at the scene, that, along with the arrestee's version of the event, would be
sufficient for a jury, if it believed the arrestee, to find that both officers
either used excessive force or that one did while the other failed to
intervene. Summary judgment for the officers was therefore reversed. Velazquez
v. City of Hialeah, No. 05-13157, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9127 (11th Cir.).
The arrestee's appearance and behavior at a bar
was sufficient to provide officers with probable cause to arrest him for public
intoxication. The arrestee also failed to present a viable claim for excessive
use of force by the officers, especially in light of the fact that he admitted
going limp and dropping to the ground when they attempted to arrest him. There
was no evidence that the officers acted intentionally in allegedly hitting his
head against the door of the police van while placing him in it, or that this
caused him any injury. Jackson v. City of Erie, Pennsylvania, No. 06-2134, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 13670 (3rd Cir.).
While the officers had probable cause to believe a man
they arrested at a mall was trespassing because he had previously been evicted
from it and permanently banned from entering again, there were material issues
of fact as to whether the officers' "gang tackle" of the arrestee,
punches made while making his arrest, and the use of hobble restraints
constituted excessive use of force, precluding summary
judgment. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, No. 04-55938, 2007 U.S.
App. Lexis 10856 (9th Cir.).
Officers who allegedly forced a man to the floor
and handcuffed him, even if they caused his injuries from a hit to the head,
did not act unreasonably when he refused to comply with an officer's order to
get on the floor when he was encountered holding down a crying and screaming
female. Evidence subsequently showed that he had sexually and physically abused
he woman. The officers could reasonably believe, under the circumstances, that
they needed to act swiftly to subdue the suspect. Molnar v. Doerfler, No.
3:03CV00813, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35199 (D. Conn.).
State troopers were not entitled to qualified
immunity on motorist's claim that they used excessive force against him during
a pat-down search during a traffic stop. The motorist was not able to produce a
valid vehicle registration, and was asked to step out of his car. He told them,
in response to orders that he put his hands behind his back, that he was unable
to do so because of a shoulder injury. In response they allegedly forced him
onto the hood of his cars, forced his arm up, and, once he screamed in pain,
applied more pressure and pumped his arm up and down. If the motorist's version
of the events was accurate, the troopers could not have reasonably believed
that this use of force was proper under the circumstances. The fact that the
motorist had 20-25 pens and pencils on his person, and a firearm in his auto
(which the troopers were then unaware of) did not justify the amount of force
used, nor did the motorist's belligerent manner of stating that he did not
believe he was required to register his car. Winterrowd v. Nelson, No.
04-35855, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 7400 (9th Cir.).
Officers who were allegedly present when another
officer used excessive force against a handcuffed arrestee could be held liable
for failure to intervene. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, No. 05-13157, 2007 U.S.
App. Lexis 5821 (11th Cir.).
Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity
when arrestee claimed he had increased his use of force after resistance to the
arrest had ceased. Federal appeals court reinstates jury award in plaintiff's
favor. Jennings v. Jones, No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5268 (1st Cir.).
Videotape of incident did not conclusively establish
what happened during an arrest, because the disputed contact between the
officers and the arrestee was covered up by a time/date stamp on the tape.
Further proceedings were therefore required to resolve the factual issue of
whether the arrestee was resisting the officers in a way that justified their
use of force against him. Gill v. Locricchio, No. 06-1659, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis
4878 (6th Cir.).
Officer's use of force against an unarmed
arrestee, if as alleged, was sufficiently excessive to violate clearly
established law, requiring reversal of trial court's grant of qualified
immunity to officer. Davis v. City of Las Vegas, No. 04-17284, 2007 U.S. App.
Lexis 4580 (9th Cir.).
Officers who responded to a report that a man was
attempting to commit suicide were not liable to allegedly using excessive force
against him while trying to subdue him. Among other things, his subsequent
criminal conviction for attacking the officers excluded his recovery on his
claim of excessive force, because awarding him damages would have implied the
invalidity of that conviction, which had not been set aside. Roberts v.
Anderson, No. 05-6828, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 759 (6th Cir.).[N/R]
A reasonable officer would know that
administering closed-fist punches and flashlight blows to the head, after an
arrestee was handcuffed, and continuing to strike him after he had stopped
resisting arrest -- and failing to place him in the proper position after
hobbling him -- was excessive force. The officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity. Sallenger v. Oakes, #05-3470, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 436,
2007 WL 60422 (7th Cir.) [N/R]
Because the evidence showed that an arrestee
assaulted an officer without provocation, and then resisted the attempt to
restrain him, and the officers had to act rapidly in less than 15 seconds to
use force to respond, their actions could not be reasonably judged to be
excessive. Koeiman v. City of New York, No. 9491, Index 23549/93, 2007 N.Y.
App. Div. Lexis 88 (1st Dept.). [N/R]
U.S. Marshal did not use excessive force against
homeowner by pointing a gun at her in the basement of the residence and telling
her to go upstairs. The Marshal was present in the home after the homeowner
consented to a search for a dangerous fugitive being sought. The Marshal was
alone in the basement at the time of the incident, and on his knees, and was
startled by the homeowner's approach, and his actions were not excessive under
the circumstances. Komongnan v. U.S. Marshals Service, No. 06-909, 2006 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 90769 (D.D.C.). [N/R]
Arrestees who had allegedly surrendered before
being hit in the head by a police officer created a genuine issue of whether
the officer's use of force was excessive. Because the officer had no legitimate
reason for striking them after such a surrender, if that was true, he was not
entitled to qualified immunity. Baker v. City of Hamilton, Ohio, No. 05-4390,
2006 U.S. App. Lexis 31056 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
Federal appeals court overturns summary judgment
for defendants on claims for excessive force against arrestee, because there
was a genuine issue of fact as to whether they had beaten him severely after he
had already been subdued, relieved of any weapons, and handcuffed. Arrington v.
U.S., No. 05-5263, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 32026 (D.C. Cir.). [N/R]
Arrestee's conviction for trespassing, based on a
guilty plea, did not bar him from pursuing an excessive force claim against two
of the arresting officers, who he alleged pushed his face into a sidewalk at a
time when he was not resisting them and was intoxicated. Summary judgment was
granted, however, as to a third officer and the municipality. Smith v. Jackson,
No. CV-06-12, 2006 U.S.Dist. Lexis 85947 (D. Maine). [N/R]
City had no obligation under Pennsylvania law to
indemnify a police officer found liable for excessive use of force which did
not occur in connection with an arrest, but which instead was simply an assault
and battery of the plaintiff by the officer for the intentional purpose of
harming and punishing him. Under the statute, there is no duty for a
municipality to indemnify an officer for conduct which amounts to a crime or
willful misconduct. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2272, 2006 Phil. Ct.
Com. Pl. Lexis 439 (Philadelphia County, Pa.). [N/R]
Federal appeals court upholds $1.3 million award
of compensatory and punitive damages against police officers for allegedly
using excessive force against two arrestees. Evidence was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to arrive at a finding of liability, and the defendants failed
to preserve for appeal any question about whether the compensatory damages
awarded were excessive. The punitive damages award of $250,000 against each of
the four defendants was not excessive under the circumstances if the jury believed
the plaintiffs' version of the incident, amounting to an unjustified assault by
the officers. Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, No. 04-1303, 463 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.).
[N/R]
When it was not clear from the lawsuit whether
the officer's alleged use of excessive force against an arrestee occurred
before, at the time of, or following the arrestee's resistance to the officer,
the court could not have decided whether the plaintiff's claim was barred,
absent the overturning of his earlier conviction, and therefore, should not
have dismissed the lawsuit. If the punch in question took place before the
resistance or after the resistance had ended, an award of damages for excessive
force would not have necessarily implied the invalidity of a conviction for
assaulting the officer. Riddick v. Lott, No. 05-7882, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis
25473 (4th Cir). [N/R]
Police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity on claim that he used excessive force against arrestee by slapping
him, but was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that he used excessive
force by making the handcuffs too tight. The officer himself did not justify
the slap by a need to protect himself or others, or subdue the arrestee, but
rather stated that it was administered because of the arrestee's "smart
mouth." Nothing in the record, however, indicated that the arrestee had
complained about the handcuffs being overly tight. Pigram v. Chaudoin, No.
05-6660, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25073 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
Deputy did not use excessive force in restraining
and handcuffing man being arrested on domestic battery charges, even though his
actions led to an injury to the arrestee, when the man resisted and the
incident took place in a crowd at the state fairgrounds in an atmosphere of
"hostility" with crowbars and hammers readily available. Kenyon v.
Edwards, No. 05-3487, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 22737 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Nov]
Tennessee Highway Patrol officers were entitled
to qualified immunity for stopping a vehicle containing three family members,
based on mistaken dispatches giving them reason to believe that the occupants
had been involved in a robbery. Appeals court reinstates, however, father's
excessive force claim against two troopers who allegedly tackled him and threw
him to the pavement face first while handcuffed when he reacted "with
horror" to the shooting and killing of a family dog which ran out of the
vehicle. Smoak v. Hall, No. 05-6511, 460 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2006). [2006 LR
Nov]
Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to summary
judgment in an excessive force lawsuit by woman arrested them in her home
pursuant to a warrant. Her version of the events, including that they beat her
with a billy club and jumped on her after she was incapacitated by pepper spray
and was only passively resisting, if true, showed an excessive use of force.
The use of pepper spray was not excessive, however, since she was hiding from
them under a blanket in a closet at the time, and could have been thought to be
planning to "ambush" them. Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court,
No. 05-6271, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 16957 (6th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
Officers acted reasonably, under their community
care-taking function, in transporting a man to a hospital where a doctor placed
him on a 72-hour hold when they believed he might be hallucinating, but were
not entitled to qualified immunity on his claim that they used excessive force
against him in restraining him or after he was restrained when he did not
resist them. Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, No. 04-3332, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis
18167 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
Arrestee could pursue his complaint of excessive
use of force, since it included both the basic facts of what occurred and the
claim that this constituted unreasonable action under the Fourth Amendment, but
his false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by his conviction of
a criminal charge against him arising out of his arrest. Lynn v. Schertzberg,
No. 05-1857, 169 Fed. Appx. 666 (3rd Cir. 2006).[N/R]
A genuine issue of fact about whether the amount
of force used by a deputy while attempting to collect on a judgment was
unreasonable barred summary judgment for the deputy in a federal civil rights
lawsuit. Frobel v. County of Broome, No. 3:03CV528, 419 F. Supp. 2d 212
(N.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
Man's affidavit stating that he was
"attacked" by an officer and thrown out of a courthouse building,
even if somewhat vague, was sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as to
whether officer used excessive force in removing him from the premises. Lax v.
City of South Bend, No. 05-4200, 449 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006). ) [2006 LR Aug]
State troopers found liable by jury for $6.725
million for alleged excessive use of force against an occupant of a home being
searched for drugs were entitled to a new trial based on prejudicial comments
made by the plaintiff's attorney during closing arguments raising issues not
before the jury, and the excessive amount of the award. Christopher v. State of
Florida, No. 04-16319, 449 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. May 26, 2006) [2006 LR Aug]
Off-duty, non-uniformed jail commander acted
under color of law while allegedly beating motorist who rear-ended his pickup
truck when he asserted his law enforcement authority by saying he was "a
cop" in order to prevent bystanders from interfering with his assault.
Anderson v. Warner, No. 04-15505, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 15996 (9th Cir. June 26,
2006). [2006 LR Aug]
Handcuffing, shackling, and pushing of an alien
during his arrest and forcible deportation by immigration and customs agents
did not amount to excessive use of force, when it was used to get him to enter
an airplane when he resisted. Adegbuji v. Fifteen Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agents, No. 05-1506, 169 Fed. Appx. 733 (3rd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
Officers were not liable for the death of a
cocaine-intoxicated man arrested after he engaged in bizarre behavior of
continually kicking side door of police station and resisted their attempts to
handcuff him. Decedent's estate failed to show either that there were no
grounds for the arrest or that anything the officers did constituted excessive
use of force. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 04-15055, 2006
U.S. App. Lexis 8011 (9th Cir.). [2006 LR May]
Factual issues as to whether officer had kicked
down a motel apartment door, entered, and struck the occupant without an arrest
or search warrant barred summary judgment for officer in resident's lawsuit for
excessive use of force and unlawful entry. Goins v. City of Detroit, No.
03-CV-74758, 408 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D. Mich. 2005). [N/R]
Arrestee stated a possible claim for excessive
use of force in alleging that he was punched, clubbed, kicked, and slammed into
the ground multiple times while handcuffed with his ankles restrained while
being arrested for a "non-violent" misdemeanor of unlawful loitering
in a public place with intent to engage in narcotics related activity. Phillips
v. City of Fairfield, No. CIVS040377, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
[N/R]
Appeals court upholds jury verdict in favor of
police officers sued for allegedly using excessive force against arrestee who
shot an officer prior to his capture. Testimony by the officer concerning his
being shot was admissible because it was relevant to show the
"perspective" of reasonable officers at the scene of the capture.
Dodd v. Corbett, No. 03-3978, 154 Fed. Appx. 497 (7th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Wisconsin Supreme Court rules that preponderance
of the evidence, rather than "clear and convincing evidence" was the
proper standard in a federal civil rights lawsuit for excessive force, and
orders a new trial on liability in the case based on the trial court's improper
use of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for the burden of
proof. Shaw v. Leatherberry, No. 2003AP2316, 706 N.W.2d 299 (Wis. 2005). [N/R]
Even if arrestee's claim that officer had grabbed
him and threw him to the floor during a DUI arrest were true, those actions did
not constitute an excessive use of force in the absence of any proof that those
actions caused his injuries of a broken hand and loose tooth. Alcoholic
arrestee with a history of blackouts himself stated that he lost consciousness,
and three officers stated that he subsequently injured his hand by punching his
hand against the door in his holding cell. Thomsen v. Ross, No. 03-CV-1192, 368
F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Minn. 2005). [N/R]
Officer was not entitled to summary judgment on
arrestee's claim that he used excessive force by grabbing the handlebar of his
moving motorcycle to prevent him from leaving a parking lot, resulting in
injuries. Hastings v. Hubbard, No. 04-4403, 151 Fed. Appx. 357 (6th Cir. 2005).
[N/R]
Police officers' alleged actions of continuing to
beat handcuffed arrestee after he was subdued was malicious and therefore
beyond the scope of their employment. The city which employed them was
therefore not liable for their actions but rather immune from liability under
the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. City of Jackson v. Powell, No. 2003-CA-01013,
917 So. 2d 59 (Miss. 2005). [N/R]
Sheriff was not individually liable for alleged
use of excessive force against arrestee by deputy on the basis of failure to
properly supervise him when there were no prior complaints about the deputy's
conduct. Marley v. Crawford County, Arkansas, No. 04-2042, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1129
(W.D. Ark. 2005). [N/R]
Arrestee's excessive force claim against police
officer was not barred by his conviction for resisting the officer, when he did
not deny the resistance, but merely that the officer's response was excessive,
including a beating to the face that caused broken bones and bruises. VanGilder
v. Baker, No. 05-1119, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 810 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Mar]
Police chief used a reasonable amount of force to
subdue a motorist who had driven erratically, ignored attempts to pull him
over, refused to get out of his vehicle, and appeared to be resisting being
handcuffed. The chief had no reason to know, until the arrestee told him, that
he was a diabetic suffering low blood sugar, rather than a belligerent drunk or
a fleeing criminal. Wertish v. Krueger, No. 05-1031, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 431
(8th Cir.). [2006 LR Mar]
Police officer who allegedly struck and kicked a
suspect who was struggling to prevent his handcuffing during an arrest did not
use excessive force. Byther v. City of Mobile, No. Civ. A. 040404, 398 F. Supp.
2d 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2005). [N/R]
While motorist claimed that he suffered injuries
to his wrists during an arrest, he could not proceed with his excessive force
claim against the arresting officer when he failed to state how the injuries
occurred or what actions by the officer he believed were excessive. Hudson v.
Coxon, No. 05-1542, 149 Fed. Appx. 118 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Excessive force lawsuit against city and police officers
was properly dismissed on the basis of the continued failure of the plaintiffs'
attorney to respond to discovery requests, have his clients appear for
depositions, provide medical records or other documents explaining their
purported injuries, or appear at conferences at the courthouse concerning the
status of the case. Harrington v. City of Chicago, No. 04-4326, 2006 U.S. App.
Lexis 3 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Feb]
Police officers were not entitled to summary
judgment on claim that they used excessive force against individuals seeking to
file a complaint at a police station, but there was no evidence on which to
base the plaintiffs' claims against the police superintendent and a police
sergeant for supervisory liability. Vega v. Vivoni, No. CIV.02-1754, 389 F.
Supp. 2d 160 (D. Puerto Rico 2005). [N/R]
Texas state troopers were entitled to qualified
immunity for using force against vehicle passenger during traffic stop which
resulted in her suffering a broken arm when there was reasonable suspicion to
investigate whether she was guilty of public intoxication, and her
"aggressive demeanor" and the possibility that she had a weapon
justified a pat-down search and handcuffing. Her "further resistance"
to the search and handcuffing provided the authorization for the amount of
force used. Padilla v. Mason, No. 08-03-00123-CV, 169 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.--El
Paso 2005). [N/R]
Police officers who encountered an intoxicated
man who threatened his wife, disabled her car, and refused to cooperate with being
arrested and handcuffed did not act unreasonably in using physical force and
mace to subdue him. They could reasonably believe, under the circumstances,
that he posed a threat to his wife, children, others present, and themselves.
Wilson v. Flynn, No. 04-2491, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 24555 (4th Cir.). [2006 LR
Jan]
Law enforcement agencies were not liable for the
deaths of a mother and son shot and killed by their estranged husband and
father, whose gun, previously taken away when officers responded to a domestic
violence call, was subsequently returned to him and then used to shoot them.
First, the estranged husband/father had access to another gun in any event, and
secondly, the murder victims had no constitutionally protected property
interest, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
enforcement of a domestic violence protective order entered under Pennsylvania
law. Starr v. Price, No. 3:03 CV 636, 385 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
[N/R]
Evidence of threats that an arrestee allegedly
made before his arrest, which were relayed to the officers who arrived on the
scene were admissible in excessive force lawsuit to show officers' reason for
entering a house with their weapons drawn and immediately rolling him from the
sofa to the floor to handcuff him. Gallagher v. City of West Covina, No.
03-55391, 141 Fed. Appx. 577 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Officers did not use excessive force in pulling
motorist from his vehicle and handcuffing him at the conclusion of a thirty-minute
pursuit after observing his erratic driving. Officers could reasonably have
believed he was intoxicated, and was uncooperative, and their actions were
"measured" under the circumstances, as they did not then know that he
was undergoing diabetic shock rather than intoxication. Janis v. Biesheuvel,
No. 05-1660, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22991 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Dec]
New York school burglar's claim that police
officers beat him and then threw him out of a third-story school window, made
for the first time nine months after the incident, and supported almost
exclusively by his own testimony, was one that no reasonable jury could
believe. Trial judge acted properly in granting summary judgment for the
defendants based on a finding that the plaintiff's story was unbelievable and
contradicted by his own prior inconsistent statements as well as by other
evidence. Jeffreys v. City of New York, No. 03-257, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22317
(2d Cir.). [2005 LR Dec]
Officer's use of force against motorist being arrested
for driving under the influence was not excessive, but reasonable to prevent
him from fleeing when the motorist was backing away from the officer as he
asked him if he was the driver involved in an accident at the scene. Officer
grabbed the motorist, throwing him onto the police car, and then handcuffed
him. Officer had probable cause to arrest motorist who admitted that he was the
driver of a car apparently at fault for a serious accident, and that he had
been drinking. Ankele v. Hambrick, No. 03-4225, 136 Fed. Appx. 551 (3rd Cir.
2005). [N/R]
Arrestee's excessive force claim arising out of
his arrest was not barred by his plea of no contest to a charge of disorderly
conduct, since probable cause for the arrest did not necessarily resolve the
issue of whether the force used to make the arrest was proper. Defendants were,
however, entitled to summary judgment, as the force used was found to be
reasonable. Dye v. City of Warren, No. 4:03CV2593, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (N.D.
Ohio 2005). [N/R]
An arrestee's filing of a police brutality
complaint with the internal affairs division of the county police department
was not adequate to satisfy the requirements under the Maryland Local
Government Tort Claims Act for notice of a claim before pursuing a civil
lawsuit for damages. The fact that an officer allegedly told the arrestee to
"take no action" while the internal affairs investigation was pending
did not constitute an excuse for failing to file a timely notice of claim.
White v. Prince George's County, No. 01293, 877 A.3d 1129 (Md. App. 2005).
[N/R]
Arrestee failed to show that any city policy or
custom contributed to the alleged use of excessive force against him while in
custody. City was entitled, therefore, to summary judgment. Niemyjski v. City
of Albuquerque, No. CIV. 03-1377, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D.N.M. 2005). [N/R]
Appeals court reinstates lawsuit against one
officer for using allegedly excessive force in the course of restraining a
disturbed man, causing his death by kneeling on him while he was on the ground,
and against other officers for allegedly failing to intervene to prevent the
excessive use of force. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, #04-4114, 2005 U.S. App.
Lexis 19580 (7th Cir.). [2005 LR Nov]
Jury properly awarded damages both for deputy
sheriffs' excessive use of force against arrestee and for negligence under
California state law in injuring him during the arrest while ousting him from
an adult bookstore, as well as in reducing the negligence award for the contributory
negligence of the arrestee. Prevailing plaintiff's time for filing a motion for
an award of attorneys' fees was tolled (extended) pending the outcome of
post-trial motions asking for a new trial. Bailey v. County of Riverside,
#03-56545, 414 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Man arrested during officers' response to
domestic violence call failed to show that excessive force was used against
him. While officers allegedly hit him about the neck, shoulders, and wrist with
their nightsticks and wrestled him to the ground, the arrestee refused to
cooperate with the officers, fought with them, disarmed one of them, and
grabbed a second officer by the groin. Under these circumstances, the amount of
force used by the officers was not objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff arrestee
also failed to establish, as he claimed, that the city had a "widespread
practice" of abusing "men of color" who dated white women.
McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, #03 CIV. 10037, 373 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). [N/R]
Defendants in arrestee's excessive force lawsuit
were not entitled to a stay in the proceedings until after the criminal
proceedings against him were concluded. The excessive force claims had no
bearing on the particular criminal charges against the arrestee. The court
rejects, as valid reasons for a stay, the fact that the plaintiff arrestee
could obtain, through the discovery process in the civil lawsuit, access to
materials he would not otherwise obtain in the course of defending his criminal
case, and the fact that he could, while the criminal prosecution was ongoing,
assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to
respond to the defendants' discovery requests in the civil case. Scheuerman v.
City of Huntsville, Alabama, No. CIV.A.CV-05-S-843, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D.
Ala. 2005). [N/R]
Officers who were aware that a man had made
threats to "blow out his brain" with a gun and expressed threats of
physical violence towards others did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or
Missouri state law in placing him on a 96-hour psychiatric hold at a hospital.
The detainee also failed to show that the officers used excessive force in
restraining him, as he himself admitted that he resisted them when they
attempted to take him into custody, requiring them to restrain him through
force and handcuff him. Additionally, his restraint only caused minor cuts and
abrasions. Lacy v. City of Bolivar, Missouri, No. 04-2702, 416 F.3d 723 (8th
Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on
arrestee's claims that they used excessive force against him during his arrest.
Given the seriousness of the narcotics offenses of which he was suspected, they
could reasonably believe that he was an immediate threat to them when they
observed him reaching down by his feet while he was in his vehicle, and that
they needed to take action to subdue him when he began to run away after he was
handcuffed. Davis v. Lowers, No. 04-12816, 132 Fed. Appx. 302 (11th Cir. 2005).
[N/R]
Sheriff who was not present when his deputy
entered a residence and allegedly used excessive force against an arrestee was
not liable under theories of either inadequate supervision or training when the
reports of both the deputy and children's service workers present during the
arrest did not indicate either unlawful entry or excessive use of force, and no
evidence of the inadequacy of the training provided. Loy v. Sexton, No.
04-3971, 132 Fed. Appx. 624 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Failure to instruct jury that it could impose
punitive damages for officer's alleged excessive use of force against an
arrestee if he acted in an "oppressive" manner required a new trial
on the issue. Federal appeals court also orders recalculation of attorneys' fees
award to determine whether hours plaintiff's attorney spent on unsuccessful
claims were related to the time spent on the successful excessive force claim
which resulted in $18,000 jury award of compensatory damages. Dang v. Cross,
No. 03-55403, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17981 (9th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
Dismissal of plaintiff's suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act is affirmed where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
plaintiff has failed to show that defendants assaulted or maliciously
prosecuted him under Ohio law. Harris v. U.S., No. 04-3520, 2005 U.S. App.
Lexis 19058 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
Police officer's actions in tackling an arrestee
who had fled from the scene of a search warrant, and who was reasonably
believed to be armed based on a radio transmission the officer had heard, were
not an excessive use of force. Brown v. Pfaff, No. CIV.03-404, 357 F. Supp. 2d
781 (D. Del. 2005). [N/R]
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
excluding the testimony of a medical expert in a detainee's lawsuit seeking
damages for eye injuries allegedly caused by a police officer during the
detention. The plaintiff failed to file the expert's report in a timely manner,
and the report failed to provide a complete statement of the basis and reasons
for the expert's opinion or state his qualification. Further, admission of the
testimony at a late date had to be excluded to avoid prejudice because
admitting the testimony and giving the defendant officer time to depose the
expert would have resulted in the postponement of the trial. Brooks v. Price,
No. 03-4608, 121 Fed. Appx. 961 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Factual dispute between police officer, who
claimed he used no force at all against motorist he stopped at road block, and
motorist, who claimed that he grabbed her and repeatedly "slammed"
her against a car made summary judgment in her excessive force lawsuit
inappropriate. Murry v. Barnes, No. 04-1545, 122 Fed. Appx. 853 (7th Cir.
2004). [N/R]
Federal appeals court reinstates claim by
wheelchair-bound arrestee that officers injured him by attempting to place him
in the back seat of a police cruiser even after he explained that his legs
could not bend. St. John v. Hickey, No. 04-3388 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 11736 (6th
Cir.). [2005 LR Aug]
City's emergency medical technicians did not
violate patient's Fourth Amendment rights or his due process rights when they
restrained him during an emergency call and "hogtied" him because he
was resisting their efforts to diagnose and treat him. The patient was then
resisting them because of a diabetic episode, and the court rules that he was
not then "mentally present," and therefore could not possibly have
communicated a refusal of treatment. Davidson v. City of Jacksonville, No.
3:03-CV-343, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2005). [N/R]
Jury's finding that officer used excessive force
resulting in broken wrist for drunk driving arrestee, and its finding that the
officer was entitled to qualified immunity was not inconsistent, since it could
have believed that the officer's use of force was excessive, but that he
reasonably believed his conduct to be lawful under the circumstances. Kent v.
Katz, No. 04-0880, 125 Fed. Appx. 334 (2nd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Motorist's allegation that an officer broke her
arm during the course of an arrest by "jerking" her arms after she
raised them in a "surrender" gesture stated a viable claim for
excessive use of force, so that the trial court improperly dismissed the
complaint. Byrd v. Cavenaugh, No. A04A2013, 604 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. App. 2004).
[N/R]
Claims for excessive use of force during drug
possession arrest accrued on the date of the arrest, even though the plaintiff
claimed not to realize the permanent nature of his injuries from the officers'
alleged choking and hitting until three months later. His lawsuit, therefore,
was time barred under the Ohio statute of limitations. Hodge v. City of Elyria,
No. 03-3296, 126 Fed. Appx. 222 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
on their alleged use of excessive force while executing a search warrant on the
home of a dentist and his wife based on suspicion of growing marijuana, when
there was no belief that the home's occupants were armed or would resist or
flee. Appeals court finds that, if alleged lies by deputy were removed from
affidavit for warrant, there would be nothing left justifying its the issuance.
Baldwin v. Placer County, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6626 (9th Cir.). [2005 LR Jun]
Jury instructions stating that a mistaken but
reasonable belief that the use of force was justified in a situation as a state
trooper perceived it were not improper and did not change the applicable legal
standard as to whether force was reasonable from an objective to a subjective
one. Jury verdict in favor of trooper in lawsuit by arrestee claiming excessive
use of force upheld. Hung v. Evanko, No. 03-4475, 115 Fed. Appx. 553 (3rd Cir.
2004). [N/R]
Claims by an arrestee's daughter for his death
based on the alleged use of excessive force during the arrest were based on
alleged intentional misconduct, rather than negligence, and therefore were
excluded from the scope of a Texas state statute waiving sovereign immunity, so
that complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. City of Garland, Texas v.
Rivera, No. 05-04-00516-CV, 146 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2004). [N/R]
Officers could not have reasonably believed that
supervising officers were not violating arrestee's civil rights during
execution of no-knock search warrant on home in allegedly conducting invasive
body cavity searches of two women in front of male officers and visual body
cavity searches of three men, or by allegedly physically assaulting persons
present during the search without provocation. Defendants were not, therefore,
entitled to qualified immunity. Officer who allegedly misled the magistrate
into issuing the warrant by omitting material facts was also not entitled to
qualified immunity. Bolden v. Village of Monticello, No. 04 CIV.1372, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
Off-duty police officer had probable cause to
arrest two women for being in a public park after closing hours even if local
police department operating procedure would arguably have cautioned against an
arrest under those circumstances. Department's operating procedures were also
not relevant on federal civil rights claims for excessive force, when the issue
was whether the officer's use of force was "reasonable, not optimal."
Tanberg v. Sholtis, No. 03-2231, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 4332 (10th Cir. 2005).
[2005 LR May]
A police officer used reasonable force against a
murder witness he was taking into protective custody when he placed his knee
over the top of the witness's back and shoulder area while handcuffing him. The
officer, at the time, had grounds to believe that the witness might pose a
threat and did not have a description sufficient to distinguish the witness
from the perpetrator. There were, however, genuine issues of material fact as
to whether a second officer on the scene, who allegedly "pounced" on
the center of the witness's back and injured him, used excessive force,
precluding summary judgment for him. Davis v. Brouillette, No. 2:03-CV-175, 349
F. Supp. 2d 847 (D.Vt. 2004). [N/R]
Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on
claims arising out of the amount of force they used in arresting a man during a
civil disturbance, including allegedly using a takedown technique that was
"too aggressive," when he refused to leave the area after being told
several times to do so, and he resisted arrest, subsequently being convicted of
resisting. Under the circumstances, it would not be clear to a reasonable
officer that their conduct violated the arrestee's rights. Rosenberger v.
Kootenai County Sheriff's Department, No. 29777, 103 P.3d 466 (Idaho 2004).
[N/R]
Police officer working as hospital security guard did
not use excessive force in stopping possibly intoxicated and hallucinating man
who was running toward glass exit doors which were locked. Neither officer nor
the city which employed him was liable for the man's subsequent death,
allegedly from injuries suffered in a fall when the officer grabbed him. McVay
v. Sears, No. 03-3948 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 3626 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Apr]
Defendant mayor and police officer were not
entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit in which political opponent of mayor
claimed both attacked him while he was driving a sound truck for an opposition
party. Summary judgment was not granted on the basis of widely different
factual accounts of what actually happened. Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Ortiz-Velez,
No. 03-2123 391 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2004) [2005 LR Apr]
The applicable three-year statute of limitations
on an attorney's federal civil rights claim against court officers who
allegedly physically assaulted him started to run on the date of the alleged
assault. The fact that an allegedly "related" claim was pending in
state court did not toll (extend) the three-year time period, so the complaint
was properly dismissed as untimely. Keane v. Navarro, No. Civ.A.03-CV-10154,
345 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
City could not be held liable for police
officers' alleged actions of seizing and beating a robbery suspect without
justification merely on the basis that it was the officers' employer. Arrestee
failed to allege that any of the purported violations of his constitutional
rights were the result of the city's policies. Hales v. City of Montgomery,
Civil Action No. 03-M-593, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (M.D. Ala. 2004). [N/R]
While officers properly arrested woman for poking
one of them in the chest, and had a right to use some force in light of her
allegedly "intoxicated and belligerent" conduct, factual disputes
over the degree of force used precluded summary judgment on her excessive force
claims. It was disputed, for example, whether an officer did in fact twist her
arm behind her back, push his knee into her kneecap to bring her to the ground
and then deliberately lay on top of her prone body to subdue her or rather
accidentally fall on top of her. It was also disputed as to how much force was
reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest under the circumstances. Elliott
v. County of Monroe, #04-0746-CV, 115 Fed. Apx. 497 (2nd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Officers' alleged actions of repeatedly striking
suspect on his ribs, back and head after he fully submitted to arrest was
unreasonable so that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Alleged
unprovoked beating would be sufficiently outrageous under Tennessee law to
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Alexander v.
Newman, #02-2983-DV, 345 F. Supp. 2d 876 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). [N/R]
When an arrestee was uncertain as to which of two
officers allegedly placed a knee on his neck, and there was no evidence as to
which officer did so, this barred a finding that either of the officers used
excessive force while involved, with others, in making the arrest. Birdine v.
City of Coatesville, No. CIV. A.03-5569, 347 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
[N/R]
Police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity on arrestee's claim that he struck him in the eye while he was
surrendering by laying on the ground after ending a chase. The officer's
alleged conduct of striking an unarmed suspect about the face after he
voluntarily surrendered, if true, was objectively unreasonable. Dubay v. Craze,
No. 03-71553, 327 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2004). [N/R]
As of December of 1999, it was clearly
established that a police officer could not reasonably believe that it was
constitutional to "take down" or physically assault an arrestee who
was not actively resisting arrest, attempting to escape, or posing a threat to
others, and that other officers present had a duty to intervene to prevent the
use of excessive force by a fellow officer. Defendant officers were therefore
not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's excessive force claims. Hays
v. Ellis, #CIV.A.01-K-2316, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Colo. 2004). [N/R]
Arrestee's conviction for resisting an officer
did not bar him from pursuing a federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged
excessive use of force against him. Ninth Circuit federal appeals court,
overturning prior ruling, adopts Model Penal Code definition of "deadly
force," but leaves it to trial court to decide whether the use of a police
dog against the arrestee was deadly force in this case. Smith v. City of Hemet,
No. 03-56445, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 336 (9th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Feb]
Deputy acted in an objectively reasonable manner
in putting his foot on an arrestee's face when he raised his head as he lay on
the ground being handcuffed after disobeying orders to immediately drop his
shotgun. The arrestee was "not docile," and subsequently was found to
possess another gun on his person. Crosby v. Monroe County, No. 03-13716, 2004
U.S. App. Lexis 26973 (11th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
Michigan appeals court upholds jury award of
$533,087.62 against police officer for asphyxiation death of
cocaine-intoxicated man who threatened to kill the officer and his partner.
While jury found the decedent to be 50% responsible for his own death, it did
not clearly attribute his comparative negligence solely to his drug use, which
would have barred liability. Smith v. Detroit, #247154, 2004 Mich. App. Lexis
3500 (Unpub. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
Federal appeals court upholds qualified immunity
for police officer who broke motorist's arm in the process of arresting her for
intoxicated driving. While trial judge erroneously submitted the qualified
immunity issue to the jury, the motorist failed to object or submit alternative
instructions, and the submission was not the kind of "plain error"
that threatened the fairness or integrity or public reputation of the judicial
process. Littrell v. Franklin, No. 03-2534, 388 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2004). [2005
LR Jan]
Officer had probable cause to remove motorist
from his vehicle when he refused a lawful order to produce his driver's
license, and did not use excessive force in doing so when he could reasonably
believe that he was attempting to evade arrest and posed a possible danger to
pedestrians and others in the area. Lawrence v. Kenosha County, No. 04-1472,
2004 U.S. App. Lexis 24830 (7th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Jan]
Defendant state troopers were not entitled to
summary judgment on excessive force claim merely because neither suspect nor
his father, also present at the incident, could identify which of the two of
them allegedly stomped on the suspect's ankle. The suspect was handcuffed and
pinned face down at the time, and both he and his father had been pepper
sprayed at the time. If one of the troopers did, in fact, stomp on the
suspect's ankle while he was prone on the ground in handcuffs, he was not
entitled to qualified immunity. Williams v. Atkins, No. 00 CIV. 8257(SCR), 333
F. Supp. 2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
Officers' use of chemical spray against an
arrestee and pushing of him was not excessive force when he was on top of a man
on the floor with blood on the floor around them when they arrived at his
apartment, and the arrestee was not cooperative with them. Officers had no
obligation to believe arrestee's claim that he had acted in self-defense after
the other man, his brother-in-law, had attacked him in an intoxicated
condition. Lindsay v. Bogle, No. 02-6201, 92 Fed. Appx. 165 (6th Cir. 2004).
[N/R]
Louisiana man who claimed that four officers
detained him during a Mardi Gras parade, with one of them intentionally
handling him in a way that dislocated his shoulders adequately asserted a claim
for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against the city, its insurer, and
the city police department under a vicarious liability theory. Doss v. Morris,
#02-31215, 86 Fed Appx. 25 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit claiming
that officers used excessive force against him was barred under the principles
in Heck v. Humphrey, No. 93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), since he had been
convicted of resisting an officer, and that conviction had not been set aside.
The plaintiff did not claim that the officers used excessive force after he
stopped resisting or that they used excessive force to stop his resistance, but
instead that they attacked him with no reason to do so. Accordingly, his
federal civil rights lawsuit was an improper challenge to the validity of his
conviction. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 03-30941, 100 Fed. Appx. 321 (5th
Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Arrestee's claim that officer transporting him to
county jail "kind of manhandled me around" and "roughly
transported" him in the "manner in which" the officer "took
me out of the car and stuff like that" was insufficient to state a claim
for excessive use of force. Dimmitt v. Ockenfels, # 03-170-P-DMC, 220 F.R.D.
116 (D. Me. 2004). [N/R]
Federal appeals court overturns trial judge's
grant of summary judgment on arrestee's claim that officer used excessive force
against her in allegedly shoving her headfirst into a police vehicle, causing
her to strike her head on the metal partition inside. Maxwell v. City of New
York, #03-0245, 380 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Nov]
While an arrestee's claim that officers used
excessive force against him after handcuffing him could move forward, based on
genuine issues of fact as to what happened, and whether officers were entitled
to qualified immunity from liability, the plaintiff failed to make any showing
that an official policy or custom of the city or its police department led to
his injuries. Claims for municipal liability, therefore, were properly
rejected. Arrestee's testimony in a deposition that he "might" have
been yelling and waving his arms, and making a fist at the officers as he
approached them, and his admission that he reached for one officer's gun belt
and touched it, warranted summary judgment for the defendant officers on his claims
that they also used excessive force against him prior to handcuffing him. Ross
v. City of Toppenish, No. 03-35234, 104 Fed. Appx. 26 (9th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Jury's finding that a police officer used
excessive force in breaking a motorist's wrist during an arrest for intoxicated
driving was not inconsistent with its finding that the officer was entitled to
qualified immunity from damages for the use of such force. The jury could, from
the evidence, decided that the officer reasonably believed that he was justified
in using the level of force he employed, while he was not actually justified,
in fact, in doing so. Kent v. Katz, 327 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Vt. 2004). [N/R]
There were genuine issues of fact as to whether
police officers arresting anti-abortion demonstrators who had chained
themselves together had used excessive force, precluding summary judgment in
the demonstrators' federal civil rights lawsuit. There were also factual issues
as to whether the town failed to adequately supervise its officers, but no
evidence that the town inadequately trained its officers on the use of force.
Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, #03-7332, 361 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir.
2004). [N/R]
Officer's suspicion that vehicle was speeding was
objectively reasonable despite his reliance on his own observations rather than
on use of radar device when he followed the vehicle for approximately a third
of a mile to confirm that it was traveling at an excessive speed. His stop of
the vehicle was therefore proper, and the officer acted properly in directing a
passenger to exit the vehicle following the valid stop when the car contained
four persons and the stop was in a "high-crime" area. Further
proceedings were needed, however, on passenger's claim that the officer used
excessive force against him in the course of the stop and on the issue of
whether the passenger cooperated with the officer's instructions or was validly
arrested for obstruction of justice. Veney v. Ojeda, 321 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D.
Va. 2004). [N/R]
Officer did not use excessive force in screaming
at a truck's occupants to raise their hands, placing his hand near his
holstered weapon, and threatening the incarcerate one of the suspects,
following a chase that occurred because the officer suspected a passenger of
firing a shot at an antelope, a protected species. Because the suspected
offense involved the firing of a loaded firearm, the officer could reasonably
perceive a risk of injury or danger, and he therefore acted in an objectively
reasonable manner. Wheeler v. Scarafiotti, No. 02-2297, 85 Fed. Appx. 696 (10th
Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Plaintiff who was awarded $10,000 in damages
against one officer for alleged excessive use of force against him at his
apartment was entitled to an attorneys' fee award as a "prevailing
party," even though he would not receive any of the $10,000 award because
he had previously entered into a $25,000 settlement with other defendants in
the case, which fully compensated him for damages in excess of those the jury
found occurred. Concession by plaintiff's attorney that the jury's award was to
be set-off by the prior settlement did not deprive the plaintiff of
"prevailing party" status. Attorneys' fees and expenses of $10,572.74
were therefore awarded. Baim v. Notto, 316 F. Supp. 2d 113 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).
[N/R]
Federal appeals court finds that plaintiff who
was awarded $87,000 in damages for alleged battery by two police officers at
veterans' hospital was improperly also awarded $49,000 in attorneys' fees.
While evidence showed, for purposes of award under Federal Tort Claims Act,
that officers acted "wantonly," the U.S. government did not act
"wantonly" in presenting a defense against the plaintiff's claims.
Stive v. U.S., No. 03-2151, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8346 (7th Cir.). [2004 LR Jun]
Jury award of $300,000 in compensatory and $1
million in punitive damages to arrestee and estate of second arrestee (who
committed suicide months after arrest) on excessive force claims was not
excessive. Diaz v. Vivoni, 301 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Puerto Rico 2003). [N/R]
Jury's verdict, finding both that motorist did
not resist arrest after he stopped his car, and that officers who arrested him
did not use excessive force during the arrest was not inconsistent and did not
require a new trial on arrestee's claim, even though he was injured in the
course of the arrest. Jury must have believed that officers' use of force was
reasonable because of their belief that motorist was attempting to flee or
resist arrest, based on prior pursuit which ranged over eleven miles. Brown v.
City of McComb Mississippi Police Dept., #03-60034, 84 Fed. Appx. 404 (5th Cir.
2003). [N/R]
The alleged failure to conduct an adequate
investigation of a single incident of police officers' purported excessive use
of force was insufficient to show the existence of a municipal policy as
required for governmental liability. Byrd v. District of Columbia, 297 F. Supp.
2d 136 (D.D.C. 2003). [N/R]
Genuine issue of fact as to whether off-duty
housing authority police officers acted in the scope of their employment or for
"wholly personal reasons" in assaulting two men precluded summary
judgment for housing authority. Beauchamp v. City of New York, 771 N.Y.S.2d 129
(A.D. 2d Dept. 2004). [N/R]
Police officers who participated in the execution
of a search warrant, but were not accused of use of physical force against a
resident of the premises being searched could not be held
"derivatively" liable for the actions of an officer who the plaintiff
claimed struck him. Claims against these officers were therefore properly
dismissed before jury trial which returned a verdict in favor of the remaining
defendant officer. Willis v. Freeman, No. 02-1757. 93 Fed. Appx. 803 (7th Cir.
2003). [N/R]
Motorist who asserted claims for assault and
battery and negligence against officer he claimed pulled him out of his car and
beat him failed to make a case for a separate claim of negligence, requiring
the court to overturn a jury verdict in his favor on the negligence claim. (The
jury returned a verdict for the officer on the assault and battery claim). The
conduct alleged was intentional conduct by the officer, and the plaintiff
failed to allege any "negligence" other than the purported use of
excessive force. District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701 (D.C. 2003). [N/R]
Dispute as to whether police officer
intentionally used his car to run down suspect in order to arrest him or
whether, as officer argued, he was only positioning his patrol car so that he
could exit the vehicle and pursue the suspect on foot, when the suspect ran
into the patrol car, made trial court's dismissal of arrestee's lawsuit
inappropriate. Day v. Rogers, 71 Fed. Appx. 337 (5th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Trial judge's refusal to give jury instructions
concerning the plaintiff's degenerative disc disease which purportedly made him
more prone to injuries such as ruptured discs as a result of allegedly being
stomped or kicked by officers was no basis for a new trial in his excessive
force lawsuit. Rejected instructions related to the issue of damages to be
awarded, which the jury did not even need, as they returned a verdict in favor
of the defendant officers, rejecting the claim that excessive force had been
used. Dawson v. Page, 286 F. Sup. 2d 617 (M.D.N.C. 2003). [N/R]
Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on
claim that he shot a mentally ill man in the stomach as he pointed a butcher
knife towards himself with suicidal intentions, as deadly force is only
permissible when a suspect poses an imminent threat to an officer or to others.
Buchanan v. City of Milwaukee, 290 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis. 2003). [2004 LR
Mar]
Plaintiff who received $25,000 settlement from
city on excessive force claim was a prevailing party entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees after trial court incorporated settlement agreement into its
dismissal order, but, under terms of settlement agreement, defendant city was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's underlying
claims prior to the determination of a reasonable amount of an attorneys' fee
award. Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 03-12113, 353 F.3d 901 (11th Cir.
2003). [2004 LR Mar]
Arrestee who claimed officers had used excessive
force in arresting him following a traffic stop was not entitled to a reversal
in his appeal of a jury verdict in favor of the defendant officers when he
failed to point to any evidentiary or other legal rulings by the trial court
that might have caused a reversible error. McIntosh v. Green, No. 03-6038, 82
Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Officers alleged continued use of physical force
after a man was subdued and restrained violated clearly established law and, if
as plaintiff described, was excessive as used against a man who had committed
no crime. Officers also lacked probable cause to restrain him for an
involuntary mental evaluation solely on the basis of a neighbor's 911 call
reporting that he was suicidal. Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 02-1761, 349 F.3d 731
(4th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Feb]
Videotaped footage of incident was sufficient to
confirm police officers' testimony and contradict enough of the testimony of
the plaintiff's witnesses to entitle defendant police officers to summary
judgment on lawsuit claiming that they improperly used excessive force which
resulted in store patron's injuries and death. Videotape which showed other
store patrons walking calmly by at the time plaintiff's witnesses claimed
officers were beating decedent in store aisle indicated that there was not
actually an altercation going on when and where the plaintiff's witnesses
testified. Stewart v. Prince George's County, Maryland, #02-2071, 75 Fed. Appx.
198 (4th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Police detective did not have any duty under
federal law to investigate claims that arresting officer engaged in criminal
activity in using allegedly excessive force against arrestee, and was therefore
entitled to summary judgment on federal civil rights claim against him asserted
by arrestee. Hale v. Vance, 267 F. Supp. 2d 725 (S.D. Ohio 2003). [N/R]
Officers used unreasonable force in
attempting to detain man with high blood pressure and diabetes who had
committed no crime, but had simply changed his mind about waiting with them for
requested ambulance to arrive after previously telling them that he was not
feeling well. Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for using force
to detain him, and allegedly continuing to use force against him after he was
handcuffed. Thompson v. Douds, No.2D02-3972, 852 So. 2d 299 (Fla. App. 2003).
[N/R]
Man arrested for burglary did not convince trial
court that officers had thrown him out of a third story window of a school he
was burglarizing, when his claim was asserted, for the first time, nine months
later, and he had earlier admitted jumping from the window. Additionally,
medical records showed no signs of an injury to his head, refuting his claim
that the officers had hit him with a flashlight. Summary judgment entered for
defendant officers. Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
[N/R]
Officers acted in an objectively unreasonably
manner in their use of force during arrest of motorist when they allegedly
kicked him and subjected him to knee strikes after he was subdued and further
use of force was unnecessary. Coleman v. Rieck, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Neb.
2003). [N/R]
Deputy sheriff's use of force in removing
arrestee from his automobile, which allegedly caused injuries resulting in
paraplegia, is found to be objectively reasonable when arrestee may well have
been trying to retrieve a weapon or attempt to flee, and he did not outwardly
exhibit "typical signs" of serious pain. Johnson v. County of Los
Angeles, No. 02-55881, 340 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Dec]
Disputed issues of fact as to whether plaintiff
physically resisted arrest and whether officers "slammed" her into a
car and kicked her in the ankle made summary judgment on her excessive force
claims inappropriate. Minchella v. Bauman, #02-1454, 73 Fed. Appx. 405 (6th
Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Two arrestees who obtained $8,000 settlement from
officer and city after prevailing at trial on their excessive force claims are
awarded a total of $25,071.64 in attorneys' fees and expenses, rather than the
$77,935.74 they requested. Trial court reduces the number of compensable hours
for each of the plaintiffs' attorneys by 50% due to their failure to provide
"sufficiently detailed contemporaneous time records, and court also
reduces appropriate hourly rates for chief counsel from $350 to $225, for a
junior associate attorney from $200 to $120, and for law students from $90 to
$60. Martinez v. Hodgson, 265 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2003). [N/R]
A finding at an arrestee's parole revocation
hearing that he had struck a police officer did not have a "collateral estoppel"
effect barring his lawsuit against the officer for excessive use of force,
since the officer still could possibly be found to have used excessive force
whether or not the arrestee struck him. Curry v. City of Syracuse, No. 01-9211,
316 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Evidence was sufficient for jury to award $15,000
to man beaten by police officer while sergeant stood by, but an award of $2
million in punitive damages was excessive, federal trial court rules, citing
new U.S. Supreme Court case on proportionality of punitive damages to
compensatory damages. Trial judge orders reduction of punitives to 45,000 or
else a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. Waits v. City of Chicago,
No. 01C4010, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003, reported in Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin, p. 1 (June 9, 2003). [2003 LR Jul]
Deputies who were busy with other things in
arrestee's residence when a fellow officer allegedly struck arrestee across the
face and nose with a flashlight while she was restrained on the floor could not
be held liable when they had no reason to anticipate this action nor could they
have intervened in time to prevent it. Dixon v. Campbell, No. 02-1260, 58 Fed.
Appx. 180 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
State and federal agents who detained and
handcuffed employees for three and a half hours in 1996 while executing a
search warrant for unlawful drugs on a workplace were entitled to qualified
immunity. Such a search warrant carries with it limited authority to detain the
occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted, and it was not
shown either that the length of the detention was unreasonable under the
circumstances or that the agents were unreasonable in their belief that they
were not violating clearly established law when they displayed drawn guns, and
pushed one of the employees to the ground when he failed to obey an order to
"get down." Pikel v. Garrett, #01-3850, 55 Fed. Appx. 29 (3rd Cir.
2002). [N/R]
Jury could reasonably conclude that an arresting
officer used excessive force in light of arrestee's claim that he was an
"innocent bystander" and had done nothing to provoke the officer
except express his concern about alleged mistreatment of others, and that the
officer continued to use force against him after he was in custody and subdued.
Force allegedly used included throwing the arrestee to the ground after he was
handcuffed, striking him in the back of the head, and kneeing him. Award of
$5,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages was not excessive
when plaintiff had injuries resulting in $173 in medical expenses and claimed
that he suffered fear, pain, and humiliation because of the officer's actions.
Burbank v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D. Maine 2003). [N/R]
Probable cause did not exist to arrest television
news cameraman filming demonstration in support of 6-year-old Cuban refugee
boy. Arrestee, at the time he was seized, was in the process of complying with
police orders to get out of a street then blocked to traffic, and force used appeared
to be disproportionate to need. Durruthy v. City of Miami, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1291
(S.D. Fla. 2002). [2003 LR May]
Probable cause existed for the plaintiff's arrest
when he failed to disperse and challenged police authority to take others into
custody as part of an eight-person crowd in a parking lot, but there were
factual issues as to whether the plaintiff resisted arrest and whether the
officer's use of force in making the arrest was excessive. Burbank v. Davis,
227 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2002). [N/R]
Officers were properly granted summary judgment
in lawsuit brought by suicidal man armed with knives who threatened his wife
and officers and then was subdued by shooting him with "beanbag"
rounds. Officers use of force was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances, and appeals court expresses agreement with trial judge that
plaintiff should have "thanked" rather than sued the officers. Bell
v. Irwin, #02-2262, 321 F.3d 637, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 3415 (7th Cir.). [2003
LR Apr]
Jury instructions on issue of officers'
alleged use of excessive force against motorist were adequate when the jury was
told that they should find for the defendants unless they found from all facts
and circumstances as they appeared to the officers at the scene that no
reasonable officer would have done what those officers did. These instructions
properly told the jury to evaluate the use of force from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene and from an objective standard. The phrase
"unless no reasonable officer" used in the instructions was merely
the "double negative equivalent" of "a reasonable officer."
Miller v. City of Nichols Hills Police Dept., No. 01-6128, 42 Fed. Appx. 212
(10th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Officers' use of force in subduing fleeing drug suspect
who struck one of them and continued to resist arrest was objectively
reasonable when it resulted only in "minor injuries." Moreland v.
Dorsey, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2002). [2003 LR Mar]
Officers did not use excessive force in carrying
a 79-year-old woman to their squad car after she refused to walk following her
arrest for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and battery on an officer. The
officers were not required to retreat in the face of her resistance to a lawful
arrest. Grauerholz v. Adcock, 02-3083, 51 Fed. Appx. 298 (10th Cir. 2002).
[N/R]
Arresting officers were entitled to qualified
immunity from a landowner's claim that they violated her Fourth Amendment
rights and used excessive force during her arrest for interference with a gas
company's easement over her property. The plaintiff did not dispute that she
attempted to take a gun from one officer's holster when officers were trying to
arrest her husband, so they acted reasonably in believing that they were using appropriate
force in subduing her by pushing her to the ground. Pulice v. Enciso, #01-3748,
39 Fed. Appx. 692 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
No hearing was required to resolve a plaintiff
arrestee's objections to the admission of an expert psychiatrist's report and
testimony about his mental state at the time of his arrest when the basis for
the objection was disagreement with disputed factual evidence on which the
expert relied. The plaintiff, who claimed excessive use of force during the
arrest, could explore, during cross-examination, the reliance that the expert
put on the disputed evidence in drawing his conclusion that the plaintiff had
been psychotic at the time so that his perception of events were impaired and
unreliable. He could also argue to the jury that, if it rejected the underlying
factual premises of the expert's report, it should also reject the expert's
opinion. Walker v. Gordon, #01-4106, 46 Fed. Appx. 691 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Plaintiff could, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15, amend his complaint, seven years after it had been filed, to add
three officers as defendants, when the original complaint mentioned all three
of them as having been involved in the alleged use of excessive force against
him, but he could not amend it to now name as a defendant an officer who was
named only as a witness in the original complaint, since he was not on notice
that he could be named as a defendant. Mosley v. Jablonsky, 209 F.R.D. 48
(E.D.N.Y. 2002).[N/R]
Officers did not use excessive force in
attempting to restrain a possibly intoxicated man whose mental condition was in
question and who was swinging his arms wildly and struck at least one officer.
No liability imposed for arrestee's subsequent death, allegedly from positional
asphyxiation, when it took the efforts of three officers and the use of pepper
spray to subdue him. Fernandez v. City of Cooper City, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1371
(S.D. Fla. 2002). [2002 LR Nov]
Police officers did not use excessive force in
the process of putting a detainee into their patrol car, even if they did act
"roughly" in pushing and pulling him into the car. They acted in
circumstances where the detainee refused to take a preliminary breath test or
to have his photograph and fingerprints taken, and he yelled to protest his
arrest and threatened to sue the officers, as well as actively resisting the
officers' efforts to put him in the vehicle. Lockett v. Donnellon, #00-2169, 38
Fed. Appx. 289 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Officer may have had probable cause for arresting a
motorist for a "horn-honking" offense in arguable violation of a
local noise ordinance, but the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity
on the motorist's excessive force claim, as no reasonable officer could believe
that the officer's alleged physical abuse of the motorist was legal after the
arrest had been fully achieved. Lee v. Ferraro, #00-16054, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th
Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Oct]
After two separate juries, in successive trials
on an arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit, both returned verdicts for the
defendant officer on an arrestee's claim that excessive use had been used
following his arrest, a federal appeals court upholds the verdicts and the
refusal of the trial court to grant a third trial, ruling that the jury could,
based on the evidence, find that the injuries suffered by the arrestee were
sustained prior to his arrest. Caldwell v. Davis, #01-0183, 31 Fed. Appx. 34
(2nd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Federal appeals court rules that trial judge
improperly granted judgment as a matter of law to officers in excessive force
claim brought by paranoid schizophrenic who testified that he had no
recollection of the precise acts engaged in by the officers who apprehended
him. The issue of whether the officers used excessive force under the
circumstances was still for the jury to determine, and there was other evidence
which could be used to make the determination. Santos v. Gates, #00-56114, 287
F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest did
not bar him from asserting a federal civil rights claim for excessive use of
force. Since arrestee had pled no contest to the charge, he did not have an
actual opportunity to litigate the issue of the officer's use of force, and it
was possible that the officers used excessive force at some point during the
encounter. Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Ohio 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
Officers did not act unreasonably in
"escalating" their use of force against large naked man running
around hotel premises after their initial attempts to restrain him with lesser
force failed, and they had reason to believe that he posed a risk to himself
and others, including the officers. Officers were not liable for his subsequent
death, found to have been caused by cardiovascular disease and the effects of
multiple drugs, after a lengthy altercation. Caricofe v. Mayor and City Council
of Ocean City, Maryland, #01-1809, 32 Fed. Appx. 62 (4th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Officer was entitled to official immunity from false
arrest and assault lawsuit under Texas law based on his authority to inspect
the record of a commercial vehicle, since his decision concerning whether to
arrest the driver for failure to produce the record was discretionary rather
than ministerial. Kersey v. Wilson, # 2-01-226-CV, 69 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.
2002). [2002 LR Jul]
Officers acted objectively reasonably in forcing
a diabetic motorist to a stop and forcibly removing him from his truck through
the use of pepper spray, baton blows, and bites from a police dog when his
erratic driving was serious enough that people might have been killed by it,
and he refused to comply with lawful orders once he was stopped. Moore v.
Winer, 190 F. Supp. 22d 804 (D. Maryland 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
Officer's alleged action in striking the
arrestee's face and slamming his face into the floor after he had been subdued,
if true, violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on excessive force so that
officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Appeals court
could decide legal issue on appeal despite officer's dispute of arrestee's
version of the facts. Phelphs v. Coy, #00-4257, 356 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002).
[2002 LR Jul]
In a lawsuit claiming an assault on an individual
by a traffic enforcement agent, the city's failure to produce, for a
deposition, a particular traffic enforcement agent after also failing to
produce his incident report, did not, standing alone result in a conclusion
that the agent committed the assault, so that summary judgment for plaintiff
was properly denied. Quezada v. City of New York, 737 N.Y.S.2d 84 (A.D. 2002).
[N/R]
Jury properly awarded compensatory damages of
$15,184 and punitive damages of $37,916 to bystander documenting police conduct
at event who claimed that an officer assaulted him and tackled him to the
ground while he had his hands up in the air. Defendant officer was not unfairly
prejudiced by the admission of evidence concerning the conduct of other
officers present on the occasion. Cummings v. Libby, 176 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.
Maine 2001). [2002 LR May]
Officer did not "shock the conscience"
by hitting a protester who grabbed him from behind while the officer was
attempting to arrest another protester during a demonstration. Officer's action
of swinging his arm backwards after protester had grabbed his ankles was also
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Darrah v. City of Oak Park,
No. 00-1253, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2001). [N/R]
Arrested taxi passenger's claim that arresting
officers "were apparently prejudiced against" his Iranian nationality
and therefore "treated him inferiorly" was a "mere bald
assertion and conclusory statement" which failed to state a claim for
national origin discrimination. State troopers had probable cause for
warrantless misdemeanor arrest of passenger for allegedly cutting taxi seat
with a sharp object he was in possession of, but were not entitled to qualified
immunity on excessive force claim that they dragged him in handcuffs across the
floor when he had not resisted arrest. Tavakoli-Nouri v. State of Maryland, No.
0048, 779 A.2d 992 (Md. App. 2001). [N/R]
Sheriff was not liable for failure to
"implement a policy for the handling of physical humor" based on
alleged assault by deputies, including beating and pepper spraying of
handcuffed arrested motorist who claimed that his licking of a state trooper's
face was meant as a joke; deputies involved in alleged beating, however, were
not entitled to qualified immunity, as their alleged actions were not objectively
reasonable. Small v. St. Tammany Parish, No. 00-3441, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis
21809 (E.D. La.). [2002 LR Apr]
Deputy sheriff did not use excessive force when
he inadvertently broke an intoxicated and combative arrestee's nose while
trying to subdue him. Intoxicated arrestee had called 911 and asked to be taken
to jail. Jones v. Buchanan, No. 1:00CV-27-C, 164 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D.N.C.
2001). [2002 LR Apr]
Officer's shoving of a pedestrian who was asking
for directions, which resulted in severe injuries requiring back surgery, was
not conduct "shocking to the conscience" sufficiently egregious to
state a claim for violation of the injured party's federal due process rights.
Cummings v. McIntire, No. 01-1301, 271 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Mar]
Officer did not use excessive force in knocking
arrestee's feet out from under him and grabbing him around the chest. Arrestee,
who had just been taken into custody for being incapacitated by alcohol, said
"no" as the officer attempted to handcuff him, and started walking
away towards his house, where the officer knew the arrestee kept a BB gun.
Flanigan v. Town of Colchester, 171 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Vt. 2001). [N/R]
A court security officer and two sheriffs'
deputies did not use excessive force, as alleged, while taking plaintiff into
custody at the conclusion of court hearing for violating a protection order
concerning his ex-wife. Evidence failed to support plaintiff's story that the
alleged "assault" rendered him "comatose" for several
hours, and judge's affidavit supported officers' versions of events that he
resisted being placed in handcuffs. Covillion v. Alsop, 145 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.
Me. 2001). [N/R]
Officer's use of "slight" force in
arresting motorist who subsequently suffered a heart attack was not excessive.
$175,000 jury verdict overturned. Hendon v. City of Piedmont, No. CV
00-PT-2421-E, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ala. 2001). [2002 LR Feb]
A $150,000 settlement was reached by New York
City in an excessive force/false arrest lawsuit filed by an arrestee Grant v.
City of New York, No. 22691/89 (Kings Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct.), reported in The
National Law Journal, p. B3 (Nov. 13, 2001). [N/R]
Arrestee's
conviction for resisting arrest did not bar her excessive force claim since it
is possible that the officer used the allegedly excessive force after placing
her under arrest. Sanford v. Motts, No. 00-56926, 258 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.
2001). [2002 LR Jan]
Defendant police officers were entitled to
summary judgment on lawsuit alleging that one of them had hit the plaintiff in
the mouth with a nightstick while he was attempting to obtain the identifying
number of a police car for purposes of lodging a complaint about the officers'
behavior in allegedly beating his friends. Plaintiff was unable to identify
which of the two officers allegedly assaulted him, and did not claim either
that both officers attacked him or that one stood idly by while the other
committed the assault, so that individual capacity claims against the two
officers could not be supported. Roberts v. Prince George's County, Md., No.
Civ. A. 2000-186, 157 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D. Md. 2001). [N/R]
345:131 New York City reaches $8.7 million
settlement in Louima case; lawsuit stated that arrestee was tortured with a
broken broomstick being placed in his rectum. Louima v. New York City, U.S.
Dist. Ct. (S.D.N.Y. 2001), reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p.
1 (July 13, 2001).
344:115 Military police officer who shoved
protester into a van while arresting him at the scene of a speech by the U.S.
Vice President at a military based was entitled to qualified immunity; U.S.
Supreme Court rules that inquiry on qualified immunity is whether an officer
would have clearly known that his use of force was improper under the
particular circumstances faced, not merely whether the use of force is
ultimately judged reasonable. Saucier v. Katz, No. 99-1977, 121 S. Ct. 2151
(2001).
344:116 Officer was entitled to qualified
immunity from claim that he kicked an arrestee "very hard" in his
foot while making a custodial arrest for a vehicle offense. Gross v. Pirtle,
No. 00-2130, 245 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2001).
344:117 Federal jury awards $50,000 in damages to
motorist allegedly stopped without justification and illegally searched and
battered by officer. Morrison v. Simmons, No. 98-CV-560, U.S. Dist. Ct. Dayton,
Oh., June 2, 2001, reported in The National Law Journal, p. A7 (June 25, 2001).
343:105 Introduction of evidence of arrestee's
later second arrest for domestic violence was no basis, in the absence of
proper objection, for setting aside jury's verdict in favor of arresting
officers on his false arrest/excessive force claims. Udemba v. Nicoli,
#00-1246, 237 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001).
342:84 Man who suffered permanent brain damage
after an assault by police officers was properly awarded $700,000 for past and
future pain and suffering, but was also properly denied any award for lost
earnings when he was unemployed at the time of the incident and receiving
"social security benefits," according to his own testimony. Ramirez
v. City of New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 289 (A.D. 2001).
343:105 Federal trial court bars evidence of
prior unrelated departmental disciplinary actions against officer
accused by arrestee of excessive use of force, as
well as evidence about the existence of liability insurance; testimony about
whether the arrestee actually hit his wife before the police arrived was not
relevant to whether the officer used improper force. Munley v. Carlson, 125 F.
Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
340:52 Two troopers acted reasonably in grabbing,
disarming, and restraining a man who was talking to another trooper with a
knife in his hand; they could legitimately believe, based on what they saw,
that the man was a threat to the other trooper's life, even if, in actuality,
he only had the knife in order to cut up a chicken for lunch. Lawson v. Hulm,
No. 99-41388D, 223 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2000).
339:36 African-American arrestees stated claim
for racial discrimination based on assertion of city practice or custom of
using pepper spray and excessive force against them based on race; alleged
breaking of arrestee's arm, use of pepper spray against him, and biting by
police dog during "unnecessary" subduing was conduct which, if true,
no reasonable officers could have believed was warranted. Wilkerson v. Thrift,
124 F. Supp. 2d 322 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
337:3 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest
and harassment of an officer did not preclude his claim against officer for
excessive use of force; plaintiff was still not entitled to a new trial on his
excessive force claim when he failed to object to jury instructions limiting
its consideration to events occurring prior to his handcuffing by the officer.
Sullivan v. Gagnier, No. 99-7207, 225 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir. 2000).
333:131 "Uncomfortable" search of
youth's groin area and use of "minimal" force while arresting and
handcuffing him did not constitute excessive use of force; officer was entitled
to qualified immunity when conduct caused bruising which arrestee admitted
disappeared quickly and for which he did not seek medical treatment. Nolin v.
Isbeli, #99-10040, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000).
334:147 Police officer acted reasonably in
opening cell door to quiet yelling arrestee and make sure that intoxicated
arrestee was not harming himself; no liability for injuries to arrestee who was
knocked unconscious by cell door opening; officer was unable to see that
arrestee was standing behind cell door and would be hit by it. Wilson v. Spain,
No. 99-2224, 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).
335:163 New York jury awards over $3 million to
51-year-old woman mistakenly arrested by undercover police officer as drug
suspect; $2.75 million of award was for alleged excessive use of force by
officer, who plaintiff contended did not identify himself as police and
$250,000 was awarded for false arrest. Morales v. Leone, U.S. Dist. Ct.
S.D.N.Y. October 5, 2000, reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p.
C26 (Oct. 6, 2000).
335:164 Arrestee who claimed that officers beat
him while he was handcuffed, despite the lack of resistance on his part, did
not have to show direct monetary losses to recover compensatory damages;
damages could be based on pain and suffering or emotional distress, and, even
without actual injury, he might be entitled to nominal damages. Slicker v.
Jackson, No. 99-10592, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000).
335:167 Officers' actions in detaining an
autistic youth for questioning after he reportedly acted strangely while
trespassing in a homeowner's garage was a proper investigatory stop; ensuing
confrontation with youth and his subsequent arrest for assaulting an officer
were not a violation of either the Fourth Amendment or federal disability
discrimination statutes. Bates v. Chesterfield County, Va., #99-1663, 216 F.3d
367 (4th Cir. 2000).
330:85 Federal appeals court upholds $245,000
award of compensatory and punitive damages to three 17- year-old boys, two
African-American and one white, on claim that two police officers illegally
stopped and searched their vehicle and used excessive force, including pulling
and squeezing their testicles, during pat-down search, and were motivated by
racial bias in carrying out one-hour stop, search and detention; alleged racial
bias was a proper basis for punitive damages award. Price v. Kramer, #97-56580,
#98-55484, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000).
331:99 $4.95 million settlement reached in
lawsuit over death of man, who allegedly was beaten by officer, when police
used pepper spray on his brother during a traffic stop. Plaintiffs claimed the
action was racially motivated. Smith v. Village of Hoffman Estates, No. 97
L-605, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill.), June 27, 2000, reported in Chicago Tribune,
Sec. 2, p. 1 (June 28, 2000).
331:99 Washington state intermediate appeals
court rules that it was not an abuse of discretion to award $9,920 in
attorneys' fees to plaintiff in excessive force claim who was awarded only $1
in nominal damages. Ermine v. City of Spokane, #18253-3-III, 996 P.2d 624
(Wash. App. 2000).
332:115 A small cut and scrapes on the knee and
calf were sufficient evidence to support claim that arrestee had been subjected
to excessive force in the course of the arrest, and factual disputes over what
happened required the denial of officers' claim for qualified immunity. Lambert
v. City of Dumas, #99-1081, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999).
[N/R] Force used to detain juvenile during his
arrest was objectively reasonable, as police chief's testimony established that
restraints, including eventual hogtying, was necessary to prevent juvenile from
harming himself. Brandt v. Davis, No. 99-1128, 191 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1999).
329:73 New York trial judge properly exercised
discretion in denying arrestee's motion to compel production of arresting
officer's employment records and district attorney's entire file on the arrest
in arrestee's lawsuit claiming assault by officer. Tsachalis v. City of Mount
Vernon, 690 N.Y.S.2d 746 (A.D.N.Y. 1999).
330:84 Jury properly heard evidence of alleged
affair between mayor and arrestee's wife, and trial court properly declined to
instruct jury that arrestee had a duty to submit to an arrest without
resistance even if it was unjustified; appeals court upholds awards totaling
$114,000 against police chief and mayor in lawsuit claiming that improper
arrest was made with excessive force based on a purely personal dispute between
mayor and arrestee. Goff v. Bise, # 98-2849, 173 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1999).
326:22 Illinois federal jury awards $28 million,
($18 million on excessive force claim and $10 million for denial of medical
care), to PCP user who suffered an incapacitating stroke after an officer
allegedly knocked him down. Regalado v. Chicago, No. 96-C-3634, U.S. Dist. Ct.
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1999), reported in The National Law Journal, p. A10 (Nov.
22, 1999).
326:30 Police officer use of a racial epithet in
response to a request for his name and badge number did not, standing alone,
constitute a violation of the equal
protection rights of the person so addressed;
claim that another officer engaged in choking suspect during and after search
of his mouth for drugs reinstated because of disputed facts. Williams v.
Bramer, #98-10254, 180 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1999).
327:35 Officers who allegedly choked an arrestee,
threw him down the stairs, and stepped on his face were not entitled to
qualified immunity from liability; a portion of their actions was captured on
videotape and clearly established law gave the plaintiff the right to be free
of the alleged misconduct. Johnston v. City of Bloomington, #97- 4396, 170 F.3d
825 (8th Cir. 1999).
327:35 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest
did not bar his claim that officers used excessive force in subduing him.
Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, No. 98- 2235, 184 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1999).
328:51 Assertion that officer stuck his hand out
of his vehicle and that this caused the fall of an intoxicated bicyclist on the
street stated a claim for excessive use of force. Hullett v. Smiedendorg, 52
F.Supp. 2d 817 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
The fact that no police official accepted the
plaintiff's assault complaint against an officer does not state a claim under
42 U.S.Code §1983. No right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by the
Constitution or federal laws is implicated by a civilian complaint to a police
department. Johnson v. Police Officer #17969, 99 Civ. 3964, 2000 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 18521 (S.D.N.Y.). {N/R}
323:170 Police officer acted properly in shooting
and killing armed man who fired at him first; the fact that the officer was
mistakenly at the wrong address and therefore was confronting a store owner and
his armed brother, rather than burglars, did not alter the result; second
officer's single kick, aimed at subduing store keeper, was objectively
reasonable. Saman v. Robbins, #96-55672, 97-56683, 97-56684, 97-5524 and
97-55789, 173 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999).
323:163 Officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity in lawsuit claiming that he pushed a man through a car window; officer
did not claim that man used any force against him; attorneys' fee award based
on $200 per hour was appropriate. Weyel v. Catania, 728 A.2d 512 (Conn. App.
1999).
322:155 Arrestee outside motor vehicle office
raised genuine issue of fact as to whether officers had probable cause to
arrest him for attempting to register stolen vehicle when he did not fit the
description of the suspect phoned in earlier by office employee, and another
man present in the office fit the description exactly. Robinson v. Clemons, 987
F.Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1998).
322:147 Jury properly awarded $1 in nominal
damages and $20,000 in punitive damages (later reduced to $15,000) against
officer who allegedly used excessive force against arrestee during booking
process; trial court improperly dismissed claims against city following trial
of claims against individual officers, since plaintiff could pursue city's
liability even if he was barred from receiving anything more than $1 in damages
against municipality. Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., #97-9623, 170
F.3d 311 (2nd Cir. 1999).
321:141 No federal constitutional claim could be
asserted for police detective's alleged destruction of man's bus pass, since he
had an adequate post-deprivation remedy of filing a state lawsuit for the value
of his lost property; failure of detective to read man Miranda rights did not
violate constitutional rights; detective's alleged threats to use force against
man did state a possible claim. Harris v. St. Louis Police Dept., #98-1810, 164
F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 1998).
{N/R} Police dept. settles case for $200,000; the
plaintiff claimed the officer used excessive force, denied him medical care,
and falsified a police report pertaining to the incident. Caton v. London,
#CV-F-96-6108 (E.D. Cal. 1998), noted 42 ATLA Law Rptr. #8.
320:116 Officers used appropriate force to subdue
members of crowd who were challenging their authority to arrest a woman;
factual issue precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether they used
excessive force in subduing first arrestee, however, since no crowd was then
present and she did not appear to pose a threat to them and did not resist.
Quesinberry v. Rouppasong, 503 S.E.2d 717 (S.C. 1998).
319:101 N.Y.C. reaches $2.75 million settlement
with man allegedly beaten on his way to work by five police officers solely
because he fit the very general description of a black suspect sought for
brandishing a knife. Dusenbury v. N.Y.C.(S.D.N.Y.), reported in The New York
Times, Natl. Edit., p. A23 (April 26, 1999).
318:83 Police board's finding, in disciplinary
hearing, that crossing guard violated various departmental rules and Illinois
law when stopped by housing authority police officers did not bar her from
pursuing her excessive force claim against those officers; excessive force may
occur during a lawful arrest. Banks v. Chicago Housing Auth., 13 F.Supp.2d 793
(N.D. Ill. 1998).
317:69 Arrestee could not sue arresting officers
for "negligent" assault under N.Y. state law. Wertzberger v. City of
New York, 680 N.Y.S.2d 260 (A.D. 1998).
316:51 Officer's alleged action in slamming
6-year-old boy to the ground, jarring one of his teeth loose, while arresting
him for allegedly smashing windows in a trailer, was sufficient to state a
claim for excessive use of force even if no prior similar caselaw could be
found; officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Borrero v. Metro- Dade
Co., 19 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
315:36 Grabbing arrestee's arm and turning her
body before ordering her to get into police vehicle was not an excessive use of
force, even if unnecessary to effect the arrest. Curd v. City Court of
Judsonia, Ark., #97-2858, 141 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 1998).
302:27 Update: Full federal appeals court
reinstates summary judgment for police detective who allegedly slapped arrestee
in interrogation room; court rejects claim that this occurred during custodial
interrogation when no questions were being asked and detective's conduct was
not intended to, and did not, elicit any incriminating statement. Riley v.
Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997).
303:35 Port Authority employee arrested by
officers for entering restricted area without showing identification or obeying
commands to stop awarded $46,000 in damages for excessive force during arrest,
despite ruling that officers had probable cause to arrest him, since they
reasonably thought that he was a trespasser; intermediate state appeals court
rules that damages awarded were inadequate. Freeman v. Port Authority of New
York, 659 N.Y.S.2d 13 (A.D. 1997).
303:35 Motorist awarded $2.79 million against two
officers who allegedly severely beat him in front of his family after stopping
him for minor traffic violation. Sudul v. Robinson, 92-204061NO (Cir. Ct. Wayne
Co., Mich.), Sept. 23, 1997, reported in The Natl. Law Jour. p. A7 (Nov. 24,
1997).
304:52 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest
barred his claim of excessive use of force during arrest; force used to subdue
him during detention was objectively reasonable, given his drug intoxication,
attack on officer, and threats to kill officer. Caridi v. Forte, 967 F.Supp. 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
304:53 Arrestee's convictions for obstructing an
officer and assaulting an officer barred his federal civil rights lawsuit for
alleged excessive use of force during his arrest, when convictions had not been
overturned. Franklin v. Co. of Riverside, 971 F.Supp. (C.D. Cal. 1997).
305:67 Police department employee, allegedly
assaulted by two officers as she reported to work at jail in civilian clothes,
awarded $1,957,120 for negligence and excessive force. Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, BC053303, L.A. Super. Ct., Calif., Jan. 15, 1998, reported in L.A.
Daily J. (Verd. & Stl.) Vol. 111, No. 30, p. 5 (Feb. 13, 1998).
305:69 Officer who did not see second officer's
gun butt strike arrestee's head could not be held liable for alleged second
impact, in absence of knowledge or opportunity to prevent the impact; officer
should have been granted qualified immunity by trial court. Turner v. Scott,
119 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 1997).
306:84 Plaintiff was properly awarded $7,500 in
attorneys' fees in lawsuit in which he was awarded $5,429.66 on state law
battery claim against county, but denied any recovery on federal civil rights
claim; award of attorneys' fees authorized under federal civil rights statute
under these circumstances as long as state law claim arose from the same
incident. Prior v. Co. of Saratoga, 664 N.Y.S.2d 871 (A.D. 1997).
306:84 Jury awards $45 million to surviving
family of 25- year-old double amputee motorist who died following altercation
with officer who pulled him over; pepper spray and neck hold used to restrain
motorist. Mallet v. City of Phoenix, Phoenix Superior Court, Phoenix, Arizona,
reported in The Chicago Tribune, p. 16 (March 13, 1998).
307:100 Arrestee awarded $16,000 in damages for
injury to finger from officer allegedly slamming his hand with a pair of
handcuffs; while complaint alleged "negligent" use of excessive
force, trial judge did not abuse discretion in allowing plaintiff to amend it
to allege intentional action, as required for liability. Miami, City of, v.
Ross, 695 So.2d 486 (Fla. App. 1997).
308:118 County agrees to pay $750,000 in damages
plus $40,000 in medical expenses to intoxicated arrestee who fell on his face
after officer administered forceful "hip check" and allegedly dragged
arrestee over the floor by pulling on his handcuffed hands. Deising v. Bd. of
Comm'rs, Mich., St. Clair Co. Cir. Ct., No. 97- 001727-NO, July 1, 1997,
reported in 41 ATLA Law Rptr. 9 (Feb. 1998).
309:131 Officer used only necessary force in
subduing burglary suspect who ignored orders to halt and sought to flee.
Robinson v. Brown, 987 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
309:131 Officers who allegedly failed to report
use of excessive force by another officer in making an arrest were entitled to
qualified immunity; federal trial court finds no "clearly
established" legal requirement that officers report another officer's use
of excessive force. Franklin v. City of Kansas City, 959 F.Supp. 1380 (D. Kan.
1997).
310:153 Alleged municipal policy of encouraging
officers to make arrests by awarding them "productivity points" could
not be the basis of municipal liability in federal civil rights claim alleging
excessive force; plaintiff did not allege any relationship between policy and
the use of excessive force. DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger, 980 F.Supp. 955 (N.D.Ill.
1997).
{N/R} Genuine issue of fact existed as to whether
arrestee, who had previously threatened officer and fled from him, offered
further resistance, requiring use of force which broke his arm, after he was on
the ground prior to being handcuffed. Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir.
1997).
{N/R} Motorist's assertion that officer
"violently" poked and pushed him during traffic stop stated
constitutional claim for excessive use of force. Lanigan v. Vil. of East Hazel
Crest, 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997).
290:24 Arrestee should be allowed to pursue his
civil rights lawsuit against detective for allegedly slapping and scratching
him during custodial interrogation, despite lack of "significant
injuries," federal appeals court rules Riley v. Dorton, 93 F.3d 113 (4th
Cir. 1996).
292:51 Officers were entitled to "heat of
battle" instruction to jury that appropriate standard in judging the
reasonableness of force used while making an arrest includes "allowances
for the fact" that officers must make "split-second judgments"
in tense, uncertain, and "rapidly evolving" circumstances. Cox v.
Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996).
292:52 Fact that convicted plaintiff's conviction
and sentence had not been overturned did not bar federal civil rights claim for
alleged excessive use of force during the arrest. Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d
951 (9th Cir. 1996).
293:68 Trial court's comments in front of jury,
using the term "fraud" to refer to defendant police officer's memo
book because it was filled out at the end of the day, and other negative
comments, resulted in an unfair trial, requiring overturning of jury's award to
plaintiff who claimed officers assaulted him. Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802
(2nd Cir. 1996).
296:115 Estate of man who died from asphyxia after
being placed face down while hog-tied receives $805,000 settlement from city on
inadequate supervision and training lawsuit. Kinneer v. Gall, U.S. Dist. Ct.,
SD Ohio, No C2-95-504, Sept 6, 1996, 40 ATLA L.Rptr. 132 (May 1997).
297:132 Officers used reasonable force in
restraining resisting arrestee and placing her in squad car, but officer was
not entitled to qualified immunity from claim that he struck arrestee on the
way to the police station while she was restrained, and used a racial epithet
Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997).
297:132 Jury's finding that officer was not
liable for assault and battery, but that $10,000 should be awarded on federal
civil rights excessive force claim was not inconsistent Jarvis v. Govt. of
Virgin Islands, 919 F.Supp. 177 (D.V.I. 1996).
{N/R} Evidence was sufficient to support jury's
finding that officer used excessive force in removing arrestee's wedding ring,
even if force did not leave major marks and was not life-threatening. Holmes v.
City of Massillos, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041 (6th Cir. 1996).
286:157 Trial court improperly ruled that
unannounced entry into residence was necessarily unlawful; court order gave
state troopers right to enter to enforce child visitation, and circumstances
could be interpreted as providing a basis to believe that the occupant inside
was preparing to use "physical violence" to avoid compliance with
court order; even if entry was illegal, this did not automatically make any use
of force to arrest plaintiff excessive. Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393 (3rd
Cir. 1995).
287:171 Alabama Supreme Court rules that
municipality may not be sued, under state law, for malicious prosecution, but
rejects argument that municipality was also immune from liability for false
arrest/imprisonment or assault and battery allegedly carried out by one of its
police officers. Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848 (Ala 1995).
284:121 Jury awards $201,001 in damages against
police officer for malicious prosecution and assault and battery; court finds
sufficient evidence to support jury's conclusion that officer maliciously filed
false report stating that arrestee attacked him and resisted arrest; assault
and battery award, under state law, was not contradictory to jury's finding of
no Fourth Amendment unreasonable force violation Lee v. Edwards, 906 F.Supp. 94
(D.Conn 1995).
277:9 Officer's act of drawing and pointing a gun
at an unarmed felony suspect, without any indication that he intended or
attempted to fire, did not violate suspect's rights. Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d
155 (8th Cir. 1995).
279:35 Officers who asserted that they did not
act "under color of law," but rather as private citizens in arresting
motorist in a state outside their jurisdiction could not claim qualified
immunity or appeal its denial; such immunity is only available to "public
officials," and their claim to have acted as private citizens contradicted
that defense Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203 (7th Cir. 1995).
278:21 Trooper was not entitled to qualified
immunity for allegedly using excessive force in arresting woman on warrant when
she was on her way home for weekend pass from mental hospital; psychological
damage constituted "significant injury" required at the time of the
incident for assertion of an excessive force claim. Dunn v. Denk, 54 F.3d 248
(5th Cir. 1995).
281:68 Governmental immunity was not available as
a defense to deputies who allegedly assaulted and battered father while
assisting state agency in removing children from his home; governmental
immunity under Michigan state law does not apply to intentional misconduct.
Burns v. Malak, 897 F.Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich 1995).
287:165 Officers were entitled to absolute
immunity for following judge's order to take attorney into immediate custody
after he summarily found her guilty of criminal contempt of court; excessive
force claim against officers once she was in custody should be judged on Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment standard rather than Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard. Sharp v. Kelsey, 918 F.Supp. 1115 (WDMich 1996).
285:132 Federal appeals court upholds award of
$151,05558 in compensatory damages and $81,37722 in attorneys' fees and costs
to man allegedly beaten in his home by officer responding to domestic
disturbance call; trial court did not err in admitting evidence of future lost
profits from plaintiff's business of rehabbing and selling residential real
estate or in using a higher per-hour dollar figure for plaintiff's attorneys
than is typical in the same market area for defense lawyers in federal civil
rights lawsuits. Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996).
281:67 Jury awards $200,000 to arrestee for
officer's alleged use of excessive force during arrest; finds city and police chief
liable for policy of inadequate training, supervision, and discipline Hogan v.
Franco, 896 F.Supp. 1313 (NDNY 1995).
277:3 County Sheriff's Department liable for $159
million for raid by 100 deputies on Samoan/American bridal shower at which deputies
allegedly falsely arrested 36, used excessive force, and shouted racial
epithets Dole v. Co. of Los Angeles Sheriffs, No C751398, LA Superior Central
Ct., Calif, Aug 16, 1995, Vol. 108 No. 167 L.A. Daily Journal (Verd. &
Stl.), p. 4 [Cross-references: False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant;
Governmental Liability: Policy/Custom; Malicious Prosecution]
278:19 County could not be held liable for
deputy's alleged battering of arrestee when incident arose as a result of
arrestee stating that deputy would no longer be welcome at his business, a
personal dispute McGhee v. Volusia Co., 654 So.2d 157 (Fla App. 1995).
278:19 City reaches $162,000 settlement in suit
alleging that off-duty officer beat 12-year-old boy at shopping mall while
making anti- Arab statements Barakat v. City of Chicago, U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D.
Ill., Nov 1, 1995, reported in Chicago Sun Times, p. 12 (Nov 2, 1995).
[Cross-reference: Off-Duty/Color of Law]
280:51 City and ambulance service liable for $16
million for death of obese woman allegedly dragged down stairs by officers
serving her with civil commitment papers McCabe v. City of Lynn, U.S. Dist. Ct.
D Mass, No 92-12179-NG, Jan 25, 1995, reported in 38 ATLA L.Rptr. No 10, p. 368
(Dec 1995).
280:52 $1 million settlement in lawsuit by
motorist who lost dexterity in both hands as a result of tight handcuffing
following traffic stop Levine v. City of New York, N.Y. Bronx Co. Sup. Ct,
#17942/86, March 28, 1995, reported in 38 ATLA L.Rptr. No 10, pgs 368- 369 (Dec
1995).
287:164 Officer could not be held liable for
failure to prevent another officer from allegedly pushing a 12-year-old girl
down some stairs suddenly for "no reason"; if facts were as plaintiff
alleged, there was no warning of this pushing and officer had no reasonable
opportunity to intervene Joyner v. Taft, 920 F.Supp. 273 (D.Conn 1995).
285:131 N.Y. jury awards $2 million to man who
suffered brain damage when allegedly repeatedly beat on his head by officers
who dragged him down a flight of stairs from his apartment. Grey v. City of New
York, N.Y., Kings Co. Sup. Ct., No 9229/89, Oct 10, 1995, reported in 39 ATLA
L. Rep.64 (March 1996).
266:19 Jury awards $44 million against city to
man who came to the assistance of officers attempting to apprehend teenagers;
officer hit man in the head, mistakenly believing him to be one of the alleged
offenders Annis v. City of New York, #31999/91, Oct 7, 1994 (Sup. Ct., Kings
Co., N.Y.), reported in The Natl. Law Jour., p. A13 (Nov 21, 1994).
267:35 Use of "pain compliance"
techniques such as nonchakus to effect arrest of non-compliant anti-abortion
demonstrators did not constitute excessive force; force used was reasonable in
light of demonstrators' resistance, "substantial interest" in preventing
"organized lawlessness," and officers' concerns about risk of injury
to others Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 1994).
267:36 Family of homeless man who died after
officer applied a carotid choke hold on him awarded $470,000 in wrongful death/civil
rights lawsuit. Scott Bennett-Nava v. City of Dublin, C931309CW, U.S. Dist. Ct.
N.D. Cal Dec 2, 1994, reported in Vol. 107 (#242). L.A. Daily Journal p. 4 (Dec
16, 1994).
268:51 City reaches $375,000 settlement with
arrestees who claimed that officers beat and kicked them after they were
handcuffed, following jury's determination of liability. Irigoyen v. City of
Long Beach, SOC86776 c/w NC008291, L.A. Super. Ct., Cal. Dec. 8, 1994, reported
in Vol 108 Los Ang. Daily Jour. (Verd. & Stl.), No 9, p. 5 (Jan 13, 1995).
268:52 Trial judge awards Rodney King $16 million
in attorneys' fees against city, disallowing portions of attorneys' fee request
which included fees for time spent appearing on television talk shows,
accompanying plaintiff to the movies, and going to the plaintiffs' birthday
party. King v. City of Los Angeles, U.S. Dist. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal., Jan 13,
1995, Chicago Tribune, p. 19, Jan 19, 1995
269:67 Tape recording of arrest and alleged
beating of arrestee which revealed that officer directed a racial epithet at
arrestee should have been admitted into evidence as it was relevant to the
jury's task of deciding whether force used was reasonable under the
circumstances; appeals court rules that exclusion of this portion of tape was
an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial in civil rights suit brought by
arrestee. Brown v. City of Hialeah, 30 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1994).
270:84 Officer who assaulted storekeeper after
allegedly attempting to steal an item of merchandise from his store liable for
$230,000; officer's partner could also be held liable for failure to intervene
to prevent first officer's abuse of storekeeper. Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282
(7th Cir. 1994).
273:132 Pennsylvania Supreme Court upholds
$1,54344 jury award to arrestee on claim that officer used excessive force in
making arrest; jury's failure to award damages for lost wages or pain and
suffering did not require a new trial, as the issue of what damages resulted
from officer's conduct was for the jury to determine. Catalano v. Bujak, 642
A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
274:148 Jury awards $151,000 in damages to man
allegedly beaten in his home by officers responding to complaint about domestic
disturbance; trial judge awards $76,300 in attorneys' fees. Malloy v. City
& Co. of Denver, U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Colo., No. 91 N 2136, Aug 8, 1994,
reported in 38 ATLA L. Rep.No 2, p. 48 (March 1995).
Mere fact that there was testimony by witnesses
that they saw officers beat an arrestee using their hands, flashlight, and
billy club, did not require judgment for plaintiff arrestee as a matter of law;
issue of whether officers used reasonable force under the circumstances was for
the jury to decide; judgment for defendant officers upheld. Estwick v. City of
Omaha, 9 F.3d 56 (8th Cir. 1993).
Officer did not use excessive force in grabbing
an arrestee and throwing him to the floor, reinjuring a finger arrestee had
fractured earlier playing basketball. Ford v. Retter, 840 F.Supp. 489 (N.D.Ohio
1993).
Prior conviction for resisting arrest did not,
standing alone, bar arrestee from filing suit alleging use of excessive force
during the arrest. Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1993).
City settles Rodney King case for $38 million
payment; plaintiff's claim for $4 million in attorneys' fees is still pending.
King v. City of Los Angeles, reported in Chicago Tribune, p. 7 (Aug 4, 1994);
The New York Times, Natl. Edit., p. 10 (Sept 11, 1994).
Detainee who claimed he was beaten by deputy
sheriffs to coerce his confession to killing off-duty deputy was barred from
bringing excessive force civil rights claim; issue of whether detainee was
beaten was previously decided by trial court in criminal proceeding which
declined to suppress confession on grounds of coercion and could not be
relitigated. Gray v. Farley, 13 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 1993).
Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury
that law enforcement officer has a duty to intervene to prevent an assault by a
fellow officer if he has a reasonable opportunity to prevent harm. Anderson v.
Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994).
Officer did not use excessive force in hitting
fleeing narcotics suspect three times on top of the head with police radio.
Brawley v. Sapp, 811 F.Supp. 172 (D.Del. 1993).
Jury awards $38 million against city in Rodney
King case, and finds that two officers acted with malice in beating him, but
declines to award punitive damages against individual defendants; former police
chief dismissed as a defendant in case before it was sent to the jury King v.
City of Los Angeles, U.S. Dist. Ct. L..A Calif, New York Times, p.1 (June 2,
1994).
Motorist allegedly struck with a night stick and
threatened with being shot during an arrest after he changed lanes without
using a turn signal awarded $525,000 in damages. Cox v. Dist. of Columbia, U.S.
Dist. Ct., D.D.C. No. 91-2004 (JHG), Apr 26, 1993, reported in 37 (2). ATLA L.
Rep.49 (March 1994).
Federal appeals court holds that state trooper's
conduct in placing her hand around arrestee's neck and applying "moderate
force" to restrain him when she thought he was rising from a chair in a
threatening manner was objectively reasonable. Pride v. Dos, 997 F.2d 712 (10th
Cir. 1993).
Appeals court overturns $312,18719 award against
transit police officer who allegedly used excessive force against female subway
passenger; trial court improperly allowed plaintiff's attorney to introduce
evidence of five unsubstantiated prior civilian complaints against officer.
Kourtalis v. City of New York, 594 N.Y.S.2d 325 (A.D. 1993).
State liable for trooper's "negligent"
causing of injuries to 76-year-old motorist arrested for driving while
intoxicated; trooper did not intend to cause injury, but mishandled motorist,
given their relative strength, motorist's age, and the nature of the offense.
LaBauve v. State, 618 So.2d 1187 (La App. 1993).
Defense attorney awarded $114,880 against deputy
she claimed battered her when she was at the county jail for the purpose of
appearing at the video arraignment of her client. Mesecher v. Co. of San Diego,
12 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 (Cal. App. 1992).
Four officers liable for a total of $50,000, two
for beating arrestee after he dropped weapon and was handcuffed, and all four
for conspiring to violate his rights Haner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570 (4th Cir.
1992).
Arrestee awarded $1,716,34980 by jury for
officers' alleged excessive use of force while responding to domestic
disturbance complaint; appeals court overturns award because of erroneous
denial of defendant's request for jury instruction and prejudicial expert
witness testimony Easley v. City of New York, 592 N.Y.S.2d 690 (A.D. 1993).
Officer liable for $216,000 for excessive force
used against arrestee who suffered fractured cheekbones from blow to the face;
court overturns award for malicious prosecution and orders new trial on false
arrest claim. Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2nd Cir. 1992).
Arrestees who claimed that they were repeatedly
struck while handcuffed were entitled to a new trial after jury verdict in
favor of defendant officers when testimony of a dozen witnesses supported their
version of the events in question. King v. Davis, 980 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir.
1992).
Homeless man allegedly beaten by transit police
officers during an arrest awarded $475,000 for assault and battery. Svendsen v.
Port Auth, N.Y., N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct., No. 3925/90, Oct 8, 1992, reported in 36
ATLA L. Rep.8 (Feb 1993).
Two homosexual men could sue federal drug agents
on claim that they arrested and assaulted them without provocation because of
their sexual orientation; federal agents were not entitled to qualified
immunity because they should have known that the alleged assaults on account of
homosexual status were violations of the right to equal protection. Anderson v.
Branen, 799 F.Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Award of $1625 million to man assaulted without
provocation by several police officers was not excessive in light of his
permanent disfigurement, later suicide attempts, and incapacity. Suarez v. City
of New York, 589 N.Y.S.2d 10 (A.D. 1992).
Federal appeals court upholds $366,320 excessive
force award against two officers for beating an arrestee in custody while he
was handcuffed to a chair. Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1992).
Female officer did not use excessive force in
placing her hand around arrestee's neck when she believed that he was
attempting to lunge at her while in custody; reports of his earlier alleged
conduct and his threats against her gave her reason to believe that she needed
to restrain him. Pride v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 793 F.Supp. 279 (D.Kan 1992).
$243,500 settlement in suit over alleged police
brutality during predominantly gay neighborhood AIDS demonstration Bringardner
v. Cairns, No 920-290, Super. Ct., San Francisco, Cal, reported in Los Ang.
Daily Jour., p. 3 (Oct 7, 1992).
Illinois Supreme Court upholds $748 million award
against city for officers' alleged excessive use of force against man injured
in altercation in liquor store; plaintiff's alleged negligence in the incident
could not be used to reduce an award based on the officers' "willful and
wanton" conduct. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart Inc, 148 Ill 2d 429,
593 N.E.2d 522, 170 Ill Dec 633 (1992).
City liable for $16,491 to man battered by two
police officers, even though all four police officers present were found not
liable; court fond that two of the officers assaulted the plaintiff, but could
not identify which two of the four defendant officers were responsible Perez v.
City of Huntington Park, 9 Cal.Rptr. 2 258 (Cal. App. 1992).
Man who shot and killed a police officer who was
forcing his way into his home awarded a total of $15 million in damages against
six officers; plaintiff alleged that officers beat him after both he and the
officer were shot. Sanders v. Coleman, U.S. Dist. Ct. Indianapolis, Ind,
reported in Chicago Tribune Sec 1, p. 7 (Nov 25, 1992).
Arrestee who alleged he was beaten and choked
while handcuffed receives $130,000 settlement in suit against officers and city
Shoults v. Iwan, U.S. Dist. Ct., D.N.D., No AZ-91-197, May 14, 1992, reported
in ATLA Law Rptr. 256 (Sept 1992).
City settles for $127,000 suits by eleven
alleging that officers attacked them at anti-war rally following
"rap" concert. Gottschalk v. City of Chicago, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D.
Ill., reported in Chicago Sun-Times, p. 4 (May 8, 1992).
Officers used reasonably necessary force in
subduing driver who attempted to ram tractor-trailer into police vehicle.
Williams v. Adams, 780 F.Supp. 635 (E.D. Mo 1991).
Female arrestee awarded $30,000 on her claim that
officer "kneed" her in the back; appeals court holds that even if
arrest was based on probable cause, that would not justify excessive use of
force alleged in suit. City of Homestead v. Suarez, 591 So.2d 1125 (Fla. App.
1992).
Officers used excessive force in macing and
beating 80-yearold arrestee with alzheimer's stopped for erratic driving;
$65,000 compensatory and $200,000 in punitive damages were not excessive for
injuries requiring nine day hospitalization. Fleck v. Caudill, 582 N.E.2d 385
(Ind App. 1991).
Three officers liable for $125,000 in
compensatory damages and total of $4,000 in punitive damages for alleged
unprovoked assault on catering truck operator; evidence of plaintiff's prior
arrests were properly excluded at trial. Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537 (10th
Cir. 1991).
Arrestees' claims of police assault were subject
to Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard rather than due process standard
when they had not yet been arraigned; Idaho Supreme Court holds that Graham
decision should be applied retroactively. Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 813 P.2d
880 (Idaho 1991).
Pregnant woman awarded $400,000 in damages for
beating by officers, reduced from jury's initial award of $1 million; appeals
court holds that $200,000 award for future damages was not excessive. Ruiz v.
Gonzalez Caraballo 929 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1991).
Damages of $100,000 was not excessive award to
black man called a "pimp" and detained for three hours after officers
assaulted and arrested him at hospital where he had brought his white
stepdaughter for medical treatment. Bert v. Port Authority of NY and NJ, 561
N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div 1990).
Robbery suspect allegedly punched, kicked, and
racially insulted by officers who forced him to strip to the waist and placed
him in a freezing room in an attempt to elicit a confession awarded $581,977
compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 571
A.2d 518 (Pa/Cmwlth. 1990).
Police officer's review of two police reports was
an inadequate basis for his opinion testimony that an arrestee had a propensity
for violence; new trial ordered on assault and battery case against officers
Lombardi v. Graham, 794 P.2d 610 (Colo. 1990).
Jury award of $650,000 in compensatory and
$150,000 in punitive damages against officer for unjustified assault on
arrestee was not excessive, federal appeals court finds. Ismail v. Cohen, 899
F.2d 183 (2nd Cir. 1990).
Award of $1 million for two unprovoked beatings
of grocer by officers upheld on appeal. DeLaCruz v. City of New York, 557
N.Y.S.2d 381 (A.D. 1990).
Officer's pushing of arrestee back into chair
while awaiting breathalyzer test was not excessive force. Evans v. Hawley, 559
So.2d 500 (La App. 1990).
Officer liable for kicking arrestee in the groin
while he was lying on his stomach; punitive damages not awardable for
"loss of temper" Pastre v. Weber, 717 F.Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y., 1989).
Store owner assaulted by state troopers during
unwarranted arrest awarded $27,256; co-owners who witnessed assault were not
entitled to mental anguish damages. Fisher v. Dept of Public Safety, 555 So.2d
626 (La App. 1989).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that claims against law
enforcement officials for excessive use of force in making arrests are to be
analyzed under a fourth amendment objective reasonableness standard. Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989).
City was liable for death by beating of employee
of club when policy allowed private clubs to police themselves. Horton v.
Charles, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).
Fourth amendment reasonableness standard governed
arrestee's claim for excessive force after arrest but before arraignment. Henson
v. Thezan, 717 F.Supp. 1330 (N.D.Ill. 1989).
Forceable taking of blood sample of DUI suspect
was not unreasonable use of force. Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir.
1989).
Trial court should not have told jury to consider
officers' subjective state of mind on excessive force claim. Miller v. Lovett,
879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989).
New trial ordered when jury marked verdict form
that excessive force was not used, but constitutional rights were violated.
Skon v. Milstead, 541 So.2d 662 (Fla App. 1989).
Force used by officer was reasonable when stopped
motorist admitted resisting and resistance continued until he was subdued
Gassner v. City of Garland, Tex,, 864 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1989).
Arrestee who shot two officers alleged scheme of
harassment of his "liberal life style" of "casual encounters
with females"; police chief and supervisor not liable, claim against
arresting officer for excessive force allowed to proceed. Cullen v. Mattaliano,
690 F.Supp. 93 (D.Mass 1988).
Connecticut Supreme Court finds assault and
battery lawsuit against officers barred by prior award of damages in federal
civil rights lawsuit over same incident. Virgo v. Lyons, 551 A.2d 1243 (Conn
1988).
Man falsely arrested and beaten by officers, who
mistook him for a bank robber, awarded $275,000. Dist. of Columbia v. Gandy,
450 A.2d 896 (DC App. 1982).
Mother may sue for damages on behalf of her
injured fetus Douglas v. Town of Hartford, Conn, 542 F.Supp. 1267 (D. Conn
1982).
Officer not liable for using violence necessary
to contain female arrestee. Alberts v. City of New York, 549 F.Supp. 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Quadriplegic alleges officers used excessive
force when they arrested him for misdemeanor. Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita,
657 P.2d 582 (Kan. App. 1983).
Supreme Court overturns injunction issued against
LA police regarding use of choke holds. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S.Ct.
1660 (1983).
Officer used reasonable force when he
"yanked" speeding motorist out of her car. Clark v. Dept of Pub.
Safety, State of La., 431 So.2d 83 (La App. 1983).
New trial ordered for determination of whether
officers used excessive force when they flipped plaintiff to pavement causing
him to become quadriplegic. Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 667 P.2d 380 (Kan
1983, on appeal from 657 P.2d 582).
City does not have to indemnify officer held
liable for kicking handcuffed arrestee. Rosignol v. Hirnschal, 463 A.2d 240
(Conn. 1983).
Officers liable for arresting and beating plaintiff
accused of stealing gas. Kelly v. Kane, 470 N.Y.S.2d 816 (App. 1983).
Police could be liable for use of excessive force
during arrest after called to scene by security guard. Linkogel v. Baker
Protective Services, Inc, 659 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App. 1983); on rehearing from 626
S.W.2d 380 (Mo App. 1981).
City, chief, and officers could be liable for
beatings during sobriety test. Caplinger v. Carter, 676 P.2d 1300 (Kan App.
1984).
Force used during arrest was reasonable. Smith v.
Giarrusso, 446 So.2d 343 (La App. 1984).
Officer not guilty of pistol whipping plaintiff
after highspeed chase. Ricard v. State, 446 So.2d 901 (La App. 1984).
Section 1983 suit against police for intentional
assault on intoxicated man to continue. Anton v. Lehpamer, 584 F.Supp. 1382
(N.D.Ill. 1984).
Police beating case to continue to federal court
despite availability of state remedies. Frost v. City and Co. of Honolulu, 584
F.Supp. 356 (D. Hawaii 1984).
City not liable for on-duty officer's sexual
assault, despite prior incidents. Wedgeworth v. Harris, 592 F.Supp. 155 (W.D.
Wis. 1984).
County dismissed from suit with past complaints
of excessive force. Savage v. Dane County, 588 F.Supp. 1129 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
Citizen complaints properly excluded as hearsay.
English Clark v. Tucson, 69O P.2d 1235 (Ariz. App. 1984).
Police chief's alleged sexual harassment of young
trainees not grounds to think he trained his officers to do the same; police
officer accused of grabbing woman by her breasts to remove her from car.
Varelia v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1984).
Failure to intervene in police grounds for
liability; those accused of beating dismissed from suit. Webb v. Arresting
Officers, 749 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1984); on remand from 713 F.2d 405 (1983).
Arrestee claims several officers beat him and
threatened to kill him for shooting at one of them. Dobson v. Green, 596
F.Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
No liability for police failure to intervene when
fellow officer struck plaintiff; nighttime arrests pursuant to warrant upheld.
Willhauck v. Halpin, 599 F.Supp. 282 (D.Mass 1984).
Use of force on arrestee, even if he was
resisting, was improper. Stratton v. Hatch, 597 F.Supp. 128 (D. Vt. 1984).
Deputy liable for $10,000 punitive damages for
injuries to bystander during his assault on someone else. Day v. Lea, 599
F.Supp. 25 (M.D. La. 1984).
Former deputy sentenced for beating arrestee to
death Gordon v. State, 681 S.W. 629 (Tex.App. 1984).
Failure to conduct independent investigation of
retail theft reported by security guard results in liability to city and police
officer. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc, 749 F.2d 1423 (1Oth Cir. 1984).
Two officers liable for $30,000 for harassing and
assaulting plaintiff following near collision with them. Flores Caraballo v.
Lopez, 601 F.Supp. 14 (D.P.R. 1984).
Arrestee may forcibly resist excessive force.
Jackson v. State, 463 So.2d 372 (Fla.App. 1985).
No showing of excessive force on arrestee seen
with guns. Arnold v. State, 486 N.Y.S.2d 94 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1985).
Plaintiff sues officers and city for assault;
officers sue city for improper dismissal Arancibia v. Berry, 603 F.Supp. 931.
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Grabbing woman's arm to take her into custody for
mental observation was excessive force. LeSavage v. White, 755 F.2d 814 (11th
Cir. 1985).
Officer not protected by state's 11th amendment
immunity for alleged "willful" acts. Meola v. Machado, 602 F.Supp. 3
(D. Mass 1984).
Evidence of conviction for resisting arrest
admissible in assault and battery claim Banek v. Thomas, 697 P.2d 743 (Colo
App. 1984).
Court upholds $18,000 judgment against city for
police misconduct Consolidated City of Jacksonville v. Teage, 424 So.2d 67 (Fla
App. 1982).
Citizen's aggressive reputation admissible in
police assault suit. Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 491 A.2d 1386, (Pa. Super.
1985).
Statistics on police complaints inadequate to
allege policy; pleadings insufficient Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765
(7th Cir. l985).
Mental anguish and suffering from beating
supports $900,000 award. Spell v. McDaniel, 606 F.Supp. 1416 (E.D. N.C. 1985).
Police officer personally liable for batter;
city's liability limited to $50,000. City of North Bay Village v. Braelow, 469
So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1985).
Mistaking diabetic for drunk and assaulting him
results in liability against various defendants; city ordinance waiving
immunity not inconsistent with state law. City of Philadelphia v. Middleton,
492 A.2d 763 Pa. Cmwlth. l985).
$300,000 too much money to award for
73-year-old's injuries from police abuse. Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608
F.Supp. 458 (D.C. Tex. 1985).
Police have duty to intervene when witnessing
beating by private citizens. Armster v. City of Riverside, 611 F.Supp. 103
(D.C. Cal. 1985).
Officers' military psychological exams ordered
disclosed; counter suits given strong approval by court Smith v. City of New
York, 611 F.Supp. 1080 (D.C. N.Y. 1985).
Hiring officer knowing he hadn't completed state
training not grounds for municipal liability. Vippolis v. Vil. of Haverstraw,
768 F.2d 40 (2nd Cir. 1985).
Tape-recorded testimony of witness who died
before trial inadmissible. Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985).
Civilian Complaints protected by immunity. Miner
v. Novotny, 498 A.2d 269 (Md. 1985).
Punitive damages awarded against officers in
excessive force case Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff can continue suit without certainty
which police beat him. Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, (9th Cir. 1985); San
Francisco Recorder, California, 11/22/86.
Officer unsuccessfully sought to enjoin
investigation of brutality complaint sworn to by minor. Walker v. Lindsey, 500
A.2d 1061 (Md. App. 1985).
Breaking finger grounds to sue under Section
1983. Bowman v. Casler, 622 F.Supp. 836 (D.C. N.Y. l985).
Two deputies sued for assaulting investigator not
wanted at Christmas party. Moore v. Floro, 614 F.Supp. 328 (D.C. Ill 1985).
Existence of team of officers with guns not
grounds for section 1983 liability, absent physical injury. Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985).
Force was reasonable in restraining speeding
motorcyclist, whose finger and thumb were severed Johnson v. Pike, 624 F.Supp.
390 (N.D.Ohio 1985).
Third-party claims of brutality properly admitted
regardless of their validity; police chief conducted only
"superficial" investigations of complaints. Fiacco v. City of
Rensselaer, NY, 783 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1986).
Officer sued for brutality on female over drunk
driving. Byrd, v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1986).
Important decision puts burden on police that
force was reasonable. Valdrez v. Abney, 227 Cal.Rptr. 706 (App. 1986).
Statements in disciplinary proceeding not
admissible Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).
No inconsistency in finding excessive force but
no assault and battery. Waggoner v. Mosti, 792 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1986).
No error in admitting prior arrests and drug use
in excessive force suit. Lewis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
City grossly negligent in training on a multitude
of areas Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1986).
Over $100,000 awarded for assault by officer with
known violent propensities; attorney's fees exceed judgment. Brandon v. Allen,
645 F.Supp. 1261 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
Statute bars personal liability for police
officers' negligent acts. City of North Bay Village v. Braelow, 498 So.2d 417
(Fla 1986).
City vicariously liable for act committed outside
jurisdiction; insurance policy doesn't provide coverage Lamkin v. Brooks, 498
So.2d 1068.
Plaintiff's inability to identify officer in
assault suit not grounds for summary judgment when there are witnesses
Summerlin v. Edgar, 809 F.2d 1034 (4th Cir. 1987).
Large number of merit less citizen complaints
don't prove officer is violent; city not required to administer polygraphs to
police following citizen complaints; and citizen review committees not
necessary. Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1987).
Police officer ordered to pay damages for
malicious prosecution and assault of assistant fire chief, who allegedly
"flipped off" officer en route to fire. Chapman v. Duraski, 721
S.W.2d 184 (Mo App. 1986).
Complaint that police assaulted infant dismissed
for failure to identify which officer committed the brutal act Santos v. City
of New York, 515 N.Y.S.2d 58 (A.D. 2 Dept 1987).
No showing city condoned police brutality or
ignored citizen complaints. Stengel v. City of Hartford, 652 F.Supp. 572 (D.
Conn. 1987).
Police officer liable for $17,000 for allegedly
beating plaintiff; city not liable. White v. City of Vassar, 403 N.W.2d 124
(Mich. App. 1987).
Federal court rules bondsman is a "state
actor" who can be sued under section 1983. Jackson v. Pantazies, 810 F.2d
426 (4th Cir. 1987).
Jury could properly find that officer did not
violate minor's constitutional rights despite officer's admission that he used
excessive force. Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1987).
Over $100,000 awarded for kicking of arrestee in
domestic disturbance, resulting in fractured leg. Hagge v. Bauer, 827 F.2d 101
(7th Cir. 1987).
Court will not review case in which city will pay
11 million to man kneed in groin by police officer. City of Fayetteville, N.C.
v. Spell, 824 F.2d 138O (4th Cir), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 752 (1988).
Sexual assault : When is there liability by
department or supervisors? Jeffrey Scott E v. Central Baptist Church, 242
Cal.Rptr. 128. (Cal.App. 1988); Kimberly M v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.,
242 Cal.Rptr. 612 (Cal.App. 1987).
Award of $80,000 in compensatory, $185,000 in
punitive damages was not excessive for use of excessive force on arrestee.
O'Neil v. Krzeminiski, 839 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1988).
Fetus was not a "person" entitled to
bring civil rights suit on basis that officers allegedly beat him in womb when
mother was nine months pregnant. Ruiz Romero v. Gonzales Carabello, 681 F.Supp.
123 (D. Puerto Rico, 1988).
Former mayoral candidate arrested at forum
awarded $30,000 for excessive force; loses on false arrest claim . Popham v.
City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiff in assault case could not appeal from
portion of arbitration award once he agreed to arbitration of case and award
was final. Supple v. City of Los Angeles, 247 Cal.Rptr. 554 (Cal.App. 1988).
Arrestee can sue police officer for failure to
aid him during alleged unprovoked beating at police station. Negron Riviera v.
Diaz, 679 F.Supp. 161 (D. Puerto Rico, 1988).
Wife of man who alleged police wrongfully beat
him could not sue for mental anguish when she was not involved in incident.
Soto Gomez v. Lopez Feliciano, 698 F.Supp. 28 (D.Puerto Rico, 1988).
" See also: Defenses: Statute
of Limitations, Defenses: Notice
of Claim, Negligence
Arrestees, Search
and Seizure: Person.