An arrestee's claim that a federal marshal used excessive force against him during the arrest was not barred by his convictions for resisting arrest and assaulting federal officers. Those convictions did not exclude the possibility that officers used excessive force in response to the arrestee's unlawful actions during a lawful arrest. The federal appeals court, therefore, overturned the dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit against the marshal and other officers. Lora-Pena v. FBI, No. 07-3511, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13085 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     Journalists claimed that FBI agents, while executing a search warrant at a condominium building, grabbed and assaulted them, and used pepper spray and metal batons against them when they entered a gated area. The agents were using the building's fences and security structure in an attempt to restrict the flow of people into the area, and allegedly did not give them a chance to exit before using force against them. The court found that there was no special First Amendment right of access by the press to enter property that was not in the public domain. The court found, however, that some of the journalists' Fourth Amendment claims were improperly dismissed. The appeals court ruled that "mere obstinance" by a crowd did not justify the use of force when there is no showing that crowd members posed a public safety threat or that any other law enforcement considerations were at risk. The court ruled, therefore, that Fourth Amendment excessive force claims by individual journalists could proceed, while the rejection of all First Amendment claims was upheld. Asociacion de Periodistas de Puerto Rico v. Mueller, No. 07-2196, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12783 (1st Cir.).
     Officers did not use excessive force in response to a belligerent motorist who shouted and refused to comply with their directions to step to the curb, lower his voice, and calm down. When he resisted their attempts to place handcuffs on him, they tackled him to the ground and applied arm locks for purposes of restraint. After that too proved unsuccessful, they then used pepper spray. The court ruled that no reasonable officer would have thought that the defendant officers applied excessive force under the circumstances, and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mierzwa v. U.S., No. 07-3362, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13523 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     An off-duty officer tried to help a stranger who claimed he was being robbed, who turned out to be a drug dealer being chased by an on-duty police officer. The off-duty officer, when he realized what the situation was, placed himself in a prone position on the floor in an indication of surrender. The on-duty officer allegedly kicked the off-duty officer repeatedly and stomped on his buttocks and groin until he saw a police badge on the off-duty officer's neck. The injured off-duty officer sued the on-duty officer and the District of Columbia, asserting claims for excessive use of force. A federal appeals court ruled that the trial court acted erroneously in granting qualified immunity to the defendant on-duty officer. The facts, as presented by the plaintiff off-duty officer, showed that the on-duty officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and a reasonable officer would have known that the actions allegedly taken, under the circumstances, were not lawful. The common law negligence claims against the District were properly dismissed, however. The off-duty officer's exclusive remedy on those claims was to seek benefits under the Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act. A trial was ordered on the off-duty officer's civil rights claims. Johnson v. D.C., No. 06-7136, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13289 (D.C. Cir.).
     Despite the seriousness of an arrestee's crime of bank robbery, FBI agents' alleged response in using the force they did in apprehending and arresting him was not reasonable or proportionate. Accepting, for purposes of appeal, the arrestee's version of the incident, at the time of the arrest he was submitting to the agents' authority, was focused on self-protection, was in a passive position, and did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or anyone else. He allegedly also did not actively resist arrest or attempt to evade it. The agents were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Abel v. Harp, No. 06-4371, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11440 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Even if a woman's behavior at the time of her arrest was caused by her having suffered several seizures that day, the arresting officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in using force against her. Her conduct constituted fleeing, eluding, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer, and she posed an immediate threat to the officers and to other members of the public since she refused orders to place her vehicle in park at the conclusion of the chase, and it continued to push against a police cruiser. Under the circumstances, the officers couldn't be expected to know that her non-responsiveness to their requests was due to a seizure. Ryan v. Hazel Park, No. 07-1659, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11042 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     A deputy sheriff and a U.S. Forest Service officer didn't use excessive force by attempting to arrest a protester who had climbed a tree by denying her supplies, food, and water, subjecting her to a risk of severe dehydration. Her own decision to remain in the tree was the cause of her injuries, and the case she relied on for her argument that excessive force was used involved the direct use of force, such as pepper spray, in instances where police could have easily removed protesters without infliction of injury or pain. The defendants' actions in the immediate case were consistent with the court's ruling in that past case. The officers had no obligation to "care" for her while she was in the tree, since she was not in their custody. Smith v. Ball, No. 07-35080, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1059 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
     Officer did not use excessive force in restraining a DUI arrestee who was not compliant with directions to put his hands behind his back, but instead was moving his arms forward and flailing from side to side. Additionally, even if the force used was unnecessarily, it was minimal and caused only minor injury. Anderson v. City of Tampa, No. 8:07-CV-00993, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35931 (M.D. Fla.).
     A trial court's denial of summary judgment to a police officer in an excessive force lawsuit was not the same as a denial of qualified immunity, when the trial judge explicitly said that there was not enough information about the force used to make a qualified immunity determination. The denial of summary judgment, therefore, was not immediately appealable, as a denial of qualified immunity would have been. Watts v. Harrison, No. 07-7008, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11319 (Unpub. D.C. Cir.).
     Police officers had probable cause to arrest a man they found holding an iron bar while involved in a "heated, expletive-filled" argument with another person also holding such a bar. The officers were not required to wait until the two men actually came to blows before arresting them. There was, however, a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force used by the officers in twisting the arrestee's arms was excessive, based on the arrestee's assertion that he did not attempt to evade arrest or resist them. Zantello v. Shelby Township, No. 07-1640, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10014 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Arrestee who had pled guilty to resisting a police officer could pursue his claim that officers beat him, using excessive force while he was waiting to be handcuffed after he was apprehended. While the officers acted properly in arresting him, his claim that they then used excessive force was not barred by this, since that claim did not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, No. 06-4208, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 7657 (7th Cir.).
     Officers' use of force against a man found on the fifth floor ledge of an apartment building was not excessive. They believed that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and acted in a reasonable manner in handcuffing and restraining him while placing him in custody for protective purposes, while waiting for an ambulance to arrive. They also acted reasonably later in restraining him and using a rear leg sweep when he tried to get away from their control. Estate of Tapueluelu v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 06-15638, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5425 (9th Cir.).
      Officers did not use excessive force in restraining a man who responded in an "aggressive" manner when they asked him to leave a recording studio. The man refused to cooperate and pointed a pen at them, and they restrained him. When the officers sat him up, he was not breathing, and efforts to revive him failed. He was later pronounced dead from a heart attack. An autopsy showed that he suffered from severe heart disease, and was under the influence of marijuana. There was no sign that the man was choked by the officers. The force used, the court found, was reasonable given the suspect's resistance to the officers. Gregory v. County of Maui, No. 06-15374, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9244 (9th Cir.).
      An officer who allegedly punched an arrestee who did not pose a danger and who did not resist arrest at the time was not entitled to use any force at that time. A second officer present, however, could not be held liable for failure to intervene, since there was no evidence that he could have anticipated and stopped the first officer's action. Hadley v. Gutierrez, No. 06-12605, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9695 (11th Cir.).
     Federal officers were not shown to have used excessive force against an arrestee, so that the federal government had no liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680. The court found, applying Wyoming law, that the force used during the arrest was justified, and that any injuries suffered were "incidental" to the reasonable use of force. The court also found no evidence of negligence by the officers. The U.S. was entitled to a "common-law privilege" defense protecting police officers from liability for using reasonable force during a lawful arrest. The court also found that, even if the force used was found to be unreasonable, comparative fault by the arrestee in resisting the lawful arrest was over 50%, which would bar any liability for the government under Wyoming law. The plaintiff could not claim that his arrest was unlawful, as his attorney had previously agreed that no such claim was presented. Fienhold v. U.S.A., No. 07-8058, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8597 (10th Cir.).
     Business owners who claimed that a business license inspector physically assaulted them failed to show that the attack violated their substantive due process rights, since they failed to show that the abuse of governmental authority was an "integral element" of the attack. The inspector, while performing his job duties, was not authorized to use force, and did not rely on his official authority in attacking the plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, the inspector's actions may have been a state law assault and battery, but it did not amount to a violation of constitutional rights. Williams v. Berney, No. 06-1177, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5752 (10th Cir.).
     Deputy sheriff did not use excessive force or act unreasonably in detaining and tackling a man while a no-knock warrant to search for weapons and drugs was being executed on a neighbor's residence. The deputy tackled him and took him to the ground after he failed to get on the ground in response to a command. The deputy's belief that this use of force was needed was not unreasonable, based on the exigent circumstances of the quickly occurring situation. Chidester v. Utah County, No. 06-4255, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4918 (10th Cir.).
     Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether a bar owner ever physically touched a police officer (by putting a finger in his face) who then arrested him, summary judgment should not have been granted to the officer on claims that he used excessive force. He and two other officers allegedly tackled the bar owner. The incident took place in the parking lot of the bar after a shooting allegedly occurred there. Chelios v. Heavener, No. 06-4125, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5894 (7th Cir.).
     The legal standard for excessive use of force by police officers under the New Jersey state Constitution is the same as the objective reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Court rejects claims by a wife and her sister that officers, in arresting them following the wife's fight with her husband's girlfriend, used excessive force against them. The court found that the wife failed to comply with an officer's request to surrender a cell phone and enter a police vehicle voluntarily and the sister also refused to obey instructions from an officer, justifying the amount of force used. Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9067 (D.N.J.).
     Police officers were not shown to have used excessive force in executing warrants on suspect accused of burglary who was known to be a convicted felon who had previously been involved in crimes involving weapons, and who the officers believed to be dangerous. Even if the force used against the suspect and other plaintiffs present at the time had been excessive, it did not violate clearly established rights. Massaro v. Town of Trumbull, No. 3:05-CV-00786, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 91502 (D. Conn.).
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on claims that they unlawfully entered a woman's home without consent or exigent circumstances while responding to a domestic disturbance call. At the time of their entry, the domestic dispute had allegedly been "neutralized" and there were no facts that would have caused the officers to believe that any one was in danger inside the home. The court also found that there was evidence from which a jury could find that an officer used excessive force in arresting the woman, causing her injuries at a time when she had not committed a crime and did not pose a threat to anyone. Campbell v. Clay, No. 07-13040, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2928 (11th Cir.).
     Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit alleging that they used excessive force in removing a morbidly obese man from a courtroom after he was found in contempt of court, causing him to die after several deputies allegedly placed themselves on his back while he was on the floor. Hostility by the deputies to the man could support a finding that they were trying to punish him at the time. Both Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims were reinstated. Appeals court also rules that removal of the decedent's mother to another courtroom via wheelchair was necessary and did not involve the use of excessive force. Richman v. Sheahan, No. 07-1487, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 200 (7th Cir.).
     Arrestee who had no conscious memory of what happened when he claimed that police struck him as he lay motionless could not pursue his excessive force claim. The arrestee, who suffers from diabetes, pulled into a grocery store after having a hypoglycemic attack while driving. He intended to buy food to correct the imbalance in his blood sugar, but allegedly started acting erratically. There was a witness who stated that he was struggling with police as they attempted to handcuff him, and was out of control. Since the arrestee could not deny or affirm any of his actions during the incidents, and there was no witness that supported his version of the incident, the officers were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Wysong v. City of Hehath, No. 06-4433, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2192 (6th Cir.).
     Appeals court could not grant officers summary judgment when they failed to raise issues of law concerning whether their alleged conduct constituted an excessive use of force, but rather only factual issues concerning whether the arrestee refused to extend his hands for cuffing and was resisting arrest when they allegedly used force against him. Ling v. Banda, No. 07-10353, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2049 (5th Cir.).
     If, as the plaintiff claimed, officers pushed him against a wall, held him by the throat and squeezed it, and made him sit in a chair for ten minutes, again grabbing him when he attempted to leave, these actions were unreasonable, as he allegedly only came to the police station to speak with officers about a family member involved in a fight. The officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. Hamilton v. City of Jackson, Alabama, No. 07-12916, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 350 (11th Cir.).
     A sheriff's action, in pushing a mother out of his path, while taking her adult daughter into protective custody for a mental health evaluation, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, as the mother was not "seized." The sheriff claimed that he believed that the mother, who had become "argumentative," was about to attack him. While his push allegedly made her fall backwards, and hit a table and chair, it also did not constitute conduct shocking to the conscience for purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Because of the legitimate interest in custody of the daughter, his "split-second" method of clearing his path, regardless of the mother's true intent, was entitled to qualified immunity. Clark v. Edmunds, No. 07-4029, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1315 (10th Cir.).
     An arrestee himself escalated the possible safety threat to a state trooper who stopped his vehicle by refusing to comply with the trooper's orders, fighting with him, and actively resisting arrest when he was told to exit his truck after the trooper saw drug-related items in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, even if the trooper kneed him in the back, there was no excessive use of force under the circumstances. McNeil v. Anderson, No. 07-6132, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28464 (10th Cir.).
     Police officers did not use excessive force against woman detained on suspicion of shoplifting or in allegedly pushing her into a wall. She was only handcuffed for five minutes, the court noted, and any marks on her wrists from the handcuffs vanished within a day. Further, the push against the wall did not leave any mark or wound. Segura v. Jones, No. 07-1013, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29231 (10th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court overturned a trial court's summary judgment for police officers, their police chief, and the city that employed them in a lawsuit brought by an arrestee who was subjected to an arm-lock, a tackling, a Tasering, and a beating after he allegedly committed a misdemeanor in the officers' presence. The incident occurred when the plaintiff, after unsuccessfully attempting to defend himself against a traffic ticket, took the court file with him while walking to a courthouse parking lot to get money from his vehicle to pay his fine. The officers used force against him while he was on his way back to the courthouse. The appeals court found that the force used was not reasonable, given that the plaintiff was only suspected of "innocuously" engaging in conduct constituting a nonviolent misdemeanor, and did not resist arrest or attempt to flee. Under these circumstances, the court stated, a reasonable officer would not have taken these alleged actions.  Casey v. City of Federal Heights, No. 06-1426, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28537 (10th Cir.).
     A jury in a federal civil rights lawsuit found that an officer used excessive force against an arrestee and committed assault and battery under state law by striking the plaintiff in the face three times while other officers detained him. In state court, claims for indemnification under Pennsylvania state law were rejected on the basis that officer had been found, by the jury, to have engaged in willful misconduct. The officer did not use the force employed for the purpose of effecting the arrest or maintaining the detention of the arrestee, but rather because he perceived the arrestee to be a "smart aleck," which fell outside of the scope of conduct for which indemnification was provided. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2186 C.D. 2006, 2007 Pa. Commw. Lexis 625.
     When man arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol was intoxicated and uncooperative and had indicated that he would resist having his blood drawn at a hospital, as authorized by law, officers did not use excessive force. He resisted and kicked one of the officers in the stomach, and it took four officers to subdue him. Court rejects claim that officers or town were liable for alleged injuries arrestee suffered while his arms were handcuffed behind his back. Laskey v. Legates, C.A. No. 06-18-JJF, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77586 (D. Del.).
     Sheriff's deputy was not entitled to discretionary immunity under Nevada state law when he allegedly struck an arrestee in the face breaking his nose while removing him from a crowd which officers were trying to push through early on New Year's Day. His decision did not involve policy considerations, and he was authorized, under a statute, to use no more restraint than necessary to make the arrest. The arrestee had raised his hands and knee in an effort to protect himself, and a police investigator claimed that he had tried to "knee" him. In this case, there was no evidence that the arrestee was fleeing or resisting arrest when he was struck. Castaneda v. Planeta, No. 03:05-CV-0283, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 84328 (D. Nev.).
     Trial court did not make a mistake in excluding evidence that a plaintiff wanted to introduce concerning an officer's alleged motive for using excessive force against him in the course of his arrest. An officer's intent or motivation is irrelevant if the force used is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, so that proof of "evil" intentions would not have made an objectively reasonable use of force into a Fourth Amendment violation. Wilson v. Galyon, No. 07-6124, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 22977 (10th Cir.).
     If the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, the decedent was knee deep in water, unarmed, surrounded by police, and had ceased trying to escape arrest when he was shocked with a Taser five times, struck with a baton multiple times, and pushed into a position that submerged his head in water, causing him to drown. Under those circumstances, officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim. The officers should have known that striking the arrestee with a baton after he was no longer resisting violated clearly established constitutional rights. Prior case law indicating that the unwarranted use of pepper spray was excessive force was sufficient to put officers on notice that improper use of a Taser could be excessive force. Additionally, the officers should have known that it is almost always an excessive use of force to restrain an arrestee in a manner that places his head under water for a long period of time. Landis v. Cardoza, Civil No. 05-74013, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74838 (E.D. Mich.).
     Reversing judgment as a matter of law for an officer in an excessive force lawsuit, a federal appeals court ruled that a jury could have concluded that the level of force used was excessive. The officer allegedly applied a pain compliance control hold on the arrestee, shoved her outside, and slammed her against a car when she was calm, sober, an compliant. The trial court did, however, correctly rule that the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for battery when she touched his badge. McIntyre v. City of San Jose, No. 05-17005, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 25606 (9th Cir.).
     Undisputed evidence showed that a DUI arrestee was uncooperative and intoxicated and had shown that he would resist having his blood drawn at a hospital where he had been transported after his arrest. Under these circumstances, the officers had not used excessive force against him while his arms were handcuffed behind his back, and four officers were needed to subdue him. Laskey v. Legates, C.A. No. 06-18, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77586 (D. Del.).
     New Jersey state troopers were not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit by a traffic stop arrestee who claimed that he was grabbed by the neck and choked after he threatened to urinate in the officers' vehicle, and that they repeatedly hit him in the head with a flashlight while removing him from the car. The plaintiff also claimed that the officers kept kicking and punching him after he was restrained on the ground. If the arrestee's version of the incident were believed, a reasonable jury could find that the officers' actions were improper under the circumstances. Green v. New Jersey State Police, No. 06-4111, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 20693 (3rd Cir.).
     Off-duty deputy sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on woman's claim that he violated her rights and used excessive force against her by grabbing her without provocation, and then tossed her down the stairs after they engaged in an argument following a movie that they both separately attended. The deputy was allegedly upset about the woman's talking during the film, and had told her to "shut up" and made a racial slur about her Hispanic background. The appeals court found that it was without jurisdiction to hear the deputy's appeal of the trial court denial of his motion for qualified immunity, since he relied on his (disputed) version of the facts, rather than on a legal argument. Arnold v. Curtis, No. 06-4080, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18509 (10th Cir.).
     Evidence showed that a police officer's use of force to arrest a man during a party was reasonable under the circumstances, or that, in the alternative, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. While the arrestee claimed that the officer improperly beat him and choked him during the arrest, the record showed that attendees at the party outnumbered the officers present, and that the officer only succeeded in subduing the arrestee after the arrestee had successfully resisted the efforts of four other officers to place him under arrest. Duran v. Sirgedas, No. 05-4278, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 17305 (7th Cir.).
     An arrestee failed to assert anything other than "speculative allegations" concerning a supposed policy by the county and its drug task force to approve excessive use of force, so that claims against the county and drug task force were properly dismissed. The arrestee's assertion, however, that three officers, during the arrest, stomped on his back because they did not like his answers to their questions, and that they treated him brutally after taking him into custody, including fastening his handcuffs too tight, causing his right hand to become numb, were sufficient to state a federal civil rights claim. Chambers v. St. Louis, No. 06-2588, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18605 (8th Cir.).
     Jury's verdict in a criminal case in which the plaintiff was convicted of four counts of resisting arrest and assault necessarily included a conclusion that the U.S. Marshals making the arrest did not use excessive force, so that the arrestee's excessive force claim was barred, since the conviction had not been overturned. Lora-Pena v. U.S., 1:06-cv-00442, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51235 (D. Del.).
     Trial judge acted improperly in setting aside jury's determination that an officer used excessive force in making an arrest. The appeals court found that the arrestee's claim of excessive force was not based merely on the allegation that the officer used an ankle turn control technique, but rather on the allegation that the officer increased the amount of force he was using, breaking the arrestee's ankle, and did so after the arrestee had stopped resisting. Under these circumstances, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Jennings v. Jones, No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 19583 (1st Cir.).
     A videotape of the arrest incident refited the arrestee's claim that he was lying flat on his stomach after the officers ordered him to do so, but instead showed that he was twisting on his side when the officers approached him and tried to handcuff him. It further appeared from the video that when he rose to his feet, he was not under police control, as he claimed, but had instead successfully avoided their efforts to handcuff him. Summary judgment for the officers and city on his excessive force and inadequate training claims were therefore upheld. Mann v. Yarnell, No. 06-2326, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 19283 (8th Cir.).
     A battery claim by a protester allegedly hit by an officer was barred under a Florida state statute due to his alleged participation in a riot which occurred after an unlawful demonstration became violent. He linked arms with other demonstrators and refused orders to disperse. Court also rejects the claim that officers were inadequately trained, as significant training was provided in the use of batons. No evidence was found that supervisory personnel or another officer saw the demonstrator being hit but failed to intervene. Owaki v. City of Miami, No. 06-20737-CIV, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 44921 (S.D. Fla.).
     Officers who removed a man from his vehicle by using a "twist lock" were entitled to qualified immunity on his Fourth Amendment claim because reasonable officers could disagree as to whether the use of this twist lock was lawful under the circumstances. The officers had found the man in a fetal position in the back of a car while responding to a call reporting a "man down." The officer who applied the twist lock claimed that he only did so after he observed a handgun in the man's pocket. Novitsky v. City of Aurora, No. 05-1169, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 15959 (10th Cir.).
     Because the alleged excessive force used against an arrestee did not take place until after she was handcuffed, put into a patrol car, and then removed from it, she could pursue her claim despite her conviction for resisting arrest with violence. Success on her civil rights claim would not imply the invalidity of her conviction, which was based on her initial kick against the officer while being placed under arrest. The defendant officers were therefore not entitled to summary judgment. Dyer v. Lee, No. 06-14680, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12941 (11th Cir.).
     While an arrestee's excessive force lawsuit against one of two officers who arrested him was not barred by his conviction for resisting the other officer, there was no genuine issue of fact created by the plaintiff, based on the record, that the officer he sued had used more than "the force a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would use." Summary judgment for the defendant officer, the city, and the police chief was therefore upheld. Jones v. City of Anaheim, No. 05-55752, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9647 (9th Cir.).
     The plaintiff arrestee's claim that the officer had assaulted and thrashed him, beating him into unconsciousness was not supported by the history and physical examinations of the arrestee that night in a hospital room, which were not consistent with his version of events, but the plaintiff was entitled, under the Seventh Amendment, to a jury trial on that claim to determine the credibility of his version of the incident. On the other hand, any injuries that resulted from the officer's action in taking the arrestee down to the ground were based on the arrestee's own actions in attempting to evade arrest for intoxicated driving, based on which the officer could reasonably believe that he was non-compliant. Therrien v. Town of Jay, Civil No. 06-31, 483 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Maine 2007).
     Despite the fact that the arrestee could not prove which of two officers allegedly beat him after he was arrested for intoxicated driving and handcuffed, officers who were present during the incident could be held liable if the facts were as alleged by the arrestee and they failed to intervene. Since both officers admitted that they were present at the scene, that, along with the arrestee's version of the event, would be sufficient for a jury, if it believed the arrestee, to find that both officers either used excessive force or that one did while the other failed to intervene. Summary judgment for the officers was therefore reversed. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, No. 05-13157, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9127 (11th Cir.).
     The arrestee's appearance and behavior at a bar was sufficient to provide officers with probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication. The arrestee also failed to present a viable claim for excessive use of force by the officers, especially in light of the fact that he admitted going limp and dropping to the ground when they attempted to arrest him. There was no evidence that the officers acted intentionally in allegedly hitting his head against the door of the police van while placing him in it, or that this caused him any injury. Jackson v. City of Erie, Pennsylvania, No. 06-2134, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 13670 (3rd Cir.).
    While the officers had probable cause to believe a man they arrested at a mall was trespassing because he had previously been evicted from it and permanently banned from entering again, there were material issues of fact as to whether the officers' "gang tackle" of the arrestee, punches made while making his arrest, and the use of hobble restraints constituted excessive use of force, precluding summary judgment.  Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, No. 04-55938, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 10856 (9th Cir.).
     Officers who allegedly forced a man to the floor and handcuffed him, even if they caused his injuries from a hit to the head, did not act unreasonably when he refused to comply with an officer's order to get on the floor when he was encountered holding down a crying and screaming female. Evidence subsequently showed that he had sexually and physically abused he woman. The officers could reasonably believe, under the circumstances, that they needed to act swiftly to subdue the suspect. Molnar v. Doerfler, No. 3:03CV00813, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35199 (D. Conn.).
     State troopers were not entitled to qualified immunity on motorist's claim that they used excessive force against him during a pat-down search during a traffic stop. The motorist was not able to produce a valid vehicle registration, and was asked to step out of his car. He told them, in response to orders that he put his hands behind his back, that he was unable to do so because of a shoulder injury. In response they allegedly forced him onto the hood of his cars, forced his arm up, and, once he screamed in pain, applied more pressure and pumped his arm up and down. If the motorist's version of the events was accurate, the troopers could not have reasonably believed that this use of force was proper under the circumstances. The fact that the motorist had 20-25 pens and pencils on his person, and a firearm in his auto (which the troopers were then unaware of) did not justify the amount of force used, nor did the motorist's belligerent manner of stating that he did not believe he was required to register his car. Winterrowd v. Nelson, No. 04-35855, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 7400 (9th Cir.).
     Officers who were allegedly present when another officer used excessive force against a handcuffed arrestee could be held liable for failure to intervene. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, No. 05-13157, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5821 (11th Cir.).
     Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when arrestee claimed he had increased his use of force after resistance to the arrest had ceased. Federal appeals court reinstates jury award in plaintiff's favor. Jennings v. Jones, No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5268 (1st Cir.).
     Videotape of incident did not conclusively establish what happened during an arrest, because the disputed contact between the officers and the arrestee was covered up by a time/date stamp on the tape. Further proceedings were therefore required to resolve the factual issue of whether the arrestee was resisting the officers in a way that justified their use of force against him. Gill v. Locricchio, No. 06-1659, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 4878 (6th Cir.).
     Officer's use of force against an unarmed arrestee, if as alleged, was sufficiently excessive to violate clearly established law, requiring reversal of trial court's grant of qualified immunity to officer. Davis v. City of Las Vegas, No. 04-17284, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 4580 (9th Cir.).
     Officers who responded to a report that a man was attempting to commit suicide were not liable to allegedly using excessive force against him while trying to subdue him. Among other things, his subsequent criminal conviction for attacking the officers excluded his recovery on his claim of excessive force, because awarding him damages would have implied the invalidity of that conviction, which had not been set aside. Roberts v. Anderson, No. 05-6828, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 759 (6th Cir.).[N/R]
     A reasonable officer would know that administering closed-fist punches and flashlight blows to the head, after an arrestee was handcuffed, and continuing to strike him after he had stopped resisting arrest -- and failing to place him in the proper position after hobbling him -- was excessive force. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Sallenger v. Oakes, #05-3470, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 436, 2007 WL 60422 (7th Cir.) [N/R]
     Because the evidence showed that an arrestee assaulted an officer without provocation, and then resisted the attempt to restrain him, and the officers had to act rapidly in less than 15 seconds to use force to respond, their actions could not be reasonably judged to be excessive. Koeiman v. City of New York, No. 9491, Index 23549/93, 2007 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 88 (1st Dept.). [N/R]
     U.S. Marshal did not use excessive force against homeowner by pointing a gun at her in the basement of the residence and telling her to go upstairs. The Marshal was present in the home after the homeowner consented to a search for a dangerous fugitive being sought. The Marshal was alone in the basement at the time of the incident, and on his knees, and was startled by the homeowner's approach, and his actions were not excessive under the circumstances. Komongnan v. U.S. Marshals Service, No. 06-909, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90769 (D.D.C.). [N/R]
     Arrestees who had allegedly surrendered before being hit in the head by a police officer created a genuine issue of whether the officer's use of force was excessive. Because the officer had no legitimate reason for striking them after such a surrender, if that was true, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Baker v. City of Hamilton, Ohio, No. 05-4390, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 31056 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court overturns summary judgment for defendants on claims for excessive force against arrestee, because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether they had beaten him severely after he had already been subdued, relieved of any weapons, and handcuffed. Arrington v. U.S., No. 05-5263, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 32026 (D.C. Cir.). [N/R]
     Arrestee's conviction for trespassing, based on a guilty plea, did not bar him from pursuing an excessive force claim against two of the arresting officers, who he alleged pushed his face into a sidewalk at a time when he was not resisting them and was intoxicated. Summary judgment was granted, however, as to a third officer and the municipality. Smith v. Jackson, No. CV-06-12, 2006 U.S.Dist. Lexis 85947 (D. Maine).  [N/R]
     City had no obligation under Pennsylvania law to indemnify a police officer found liable for excessive use of force which did not occur in connection with an arrest, but which instead was simply an assault and battery of the plaintiff by the officer for the intentional purpose of harming and punishing him. Under the statute, there is no duty for a municipality to indemnify an officer for conduct which amounts to a crime or willful misconduct. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2272, 2006 Phil. Ct. Com. Pl. Lexis 439 (Philadelphia County, Pa.). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court upholds $1.3 million award of compensatory and punitive damages against police officers for allegedly using excessive force against two arrestees. Evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to arrive at a finding of liability, and the defendants failed to preserve for appeal any question about whether the compensatory damages awarded were excessive. The punitive damages award of $250,000 against each of the four defendants was not excessive under the circumstances if the jury believed the plaintiffs' version of the incident, amounting to an unjustified assault by the officers. Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, No. 04-1303, 463 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.). [N/R]
     When it was not clear from the lawsuit whether the officer's alleged use of excessive force against an arrestee occurred before, at the time of, or following the arrestee's resistance to the officer, the court could not have decided whether the plaintiff's claim was barred, absent the overturning of his earlier conviction, and therefore, should not have dismissed the lawsuit. If the punch in question took place before the resistance or after the resistance had ended, an award of damages for excessive force would not have necessarily implied the invalidity of a conviction for assaulting the officer. Riddick v. Lott, No. 05-7882, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25473 (4th Cir). [N/R]
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he used excessive force against arrestee by slapping him, but was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that he used excessive force by making the handcuffs too tight. The officer himself did not justify the slap by a need to protect himself or others, or subdue the arrestee, but rather stated that it was administered because of the arrestee's "smart mouth." Nothing in the record, however, indicated that the arrestee had complained about the handcuffs being overly tight. Pigram v. Chaudoin, No. 05-6660, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25073 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
     Deputy did not use excessive force in restraining and handcuffing man being arrested on domestic battery charges, even though his actions led to an injury to the arrestee, when the man resisted and the incident took place in a crowd at the state fairgrounds in an atmosphere of "hostility" with crowbars and hammers readily available. Kenyon v. Edwards, No. 05-3487, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 22737 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Nov]
     Tennessee Highway Patrol officers were entitled to qualified immunity for stopping a vehicle containing three family members, based on mistaken dispatches giving them reason to believe that the occupants had been involved in a robbery. Appeals court reinstates, however, father's excessive force claim against two troopers who allegedly tackled him and threw him to the pavement face first while handcuffed when he reacted "with horror" to the shooting and killing of a family dog which ran out of the vehicle. Smoak v. Hall, No. 05-6511, 460 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2006). [2006 LR Nov]
     Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to summary judgment in an excessive force lawsuit by woman arrested them in her home pursuant to a warrant. Her version of the events, including that they beat her with a billy club and jumped on her after she was incapacitated by pepper spray and was only passively resisting, if true, showed an excessive use of force. The use of pepper spray was not excessive, however, since she was hiding from them under a blanket in a closet at the time, and could have been thought to be planning to "ambush" them. Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, No. 05-6271, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 16957 (6th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Officers acted reasonably, under their community care-taking function, in transporting a man to a hospital where a doctor placed him on a 72-hour hold when they believed he might be hallucinating, but were not entitled to qualified immunity on his claim that they used excessive force against him in restraining him or after he was restrained when he did not resist them. Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, No. 04-3332, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 18167 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Arrestee could pursue his complaint of excessive use of force, since it included both the basic facts of what occurred and the claim that this constituted unreasonable action under the Fourth Amendment, but his false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by his conviction of a criminal charge against him arising out of his arrest. Lynn v. Schertzberg, No. 05-1857, 169 Fed. Appx. 666 (3rd Cir. 2006).[N/R]
     A genuine issue of fact about whether the amount of force used by a deputy while attempting to collect on a judgment was unreasonable barred summary judgment for the deputy in a federal civil rights lawsuit. Frobel v. County of Broome, No. 3:03CV528, 419 F. Supp. 2d 212 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
     Man's affidavit stating that he was "attacked" by an officer and thrown out of a courthouse building, even if somewhat vague, was sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as to whether officer used excessive force in removing him from the premises. Lax v. City of South Bend, No. 05-4200, 449 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006). ) [2006 LR Aug]
     State troopers found liable by jury for $6.725 million for alleged excessive use of force against an occupant of a home being searched for drugs were entitled to a new trial based on prejudicial comments made by the plaintiff's attorney during closing arguments raising issues not before the jury, and the excessive amount of the award. Christopher v. State of Florida, No. 04-16319, 449 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. May 26, 2006) [2006 LR Aug]
     Off-duty, non-uniformed jail commander acted under color of law while allegedly beating motorist who rear-ended his pickup truck when he asserted his law enforcement authority by saying he was "a cop" in order to prevent bystanders from interfering with his assault. Anderson v. Warner, No. 04-15505, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 15996 (9th Cir. June 26, 2006). [2006 LR Aug]
     Handcuffing, shackling, and pushing of an alien during his arrest and forcible deportation by immigration and customs agents did not amount to excessive use of force, when it was used to get him to enter an airplane when he resisted. Adegbuji v. Fifteen Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, No. 05-1506, 169 Fed. Appx. 733 (3rd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
     Police officers did not use excessive force in restraining "psychotic and aggressive" man who refused to obey police orders to leave premises of music studio, refused orders to drop a pen he was holding, and resisted efforts to handcuff him. Medical evidence showed that he died from a heart attack during the encounter, and was susceptible to one because of 90% blockage in his arteries. Court finds no evidence that he died of asphyxia or was choked, or that a purported inadequacy in training as to how to arrest persons exhibiting signs of excited delirium syndrome caused his death. Gregory v. County of Maui, No. Civ. 04-00516, 414 F. Supp. 2d 965 (D. Hawaii 2006). [N/R]
     Officers were not liable for the death of a cocaine-intoxicated man arrested after he engaged in bizarre behavior of continually kicking side door of police station and resisted their attempts to handcuff him. Decedent's estate failed to show either that there were no grounds for the arrest or that anything the officers did constituted excessive use of force. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 04-15055, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 8011 (9th Cir.). [2006 LR May]
     Factual issues as to whether officer had kicked down a motel apartment door, entered, and struck the occupant without an arrest or search warrant barred summary judgment for officer in resident's lawsuit for excessive use of force and unlawful entry. Goins v. City of Detroit, No. 03-CV-74758, 408 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D. Mich. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee stated a possible claim for excessive use of force in alleging that he was punched, clubbed, kicked, and slammed into the ground multiple times while handcuffed with his ankles restrained while being arrested for a "non-violent" misdemeanor of unlawful loitering in a public place with intent to engage in narcotics related activity. Phillips v. City of Fairfield, No. CIVS040377, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2005). [N/R]
     Appeals court upholds jury verdict in favor of police officers sued for allegedly using excessive force against arrestee who shot an officer prior to his capture. Testimony by the officer concerning his being shot was admissible because it was relevant to show the "perspective" of reasonable officers at the scene of the capture. Dodd v. Corbett, No. 03-3978, 154 Fed. Appx. 497 (7th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Wisconsin Supreme Court rules that preponderance of the evidence, rather than "clear and convincing evidence" was the proper standard in a federal civil rights lawsuit for excessive force, and orders a new trial on liability in the case based on the trial court's improper use of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for the burden of proof. Shaw v. Leatherberry, No. 2003AP2316, 706 N.W.2d 299 (Wis. 2005). [N/R]
     Even if arrestee's claim that officer had grabbed him and threw him to the floor during a DUI arrest were true, those actions did not constitute an excessive use of force in the absence of any proof that those actions caused his injuries of a broken hand and loose tooth. Alcoholic arrestee with a history of blackouts himself stated that he lost consciousness, and three officers stated that he subsequently injured his hand by punching his hand against the door in his holding cell. Thomsen v. Ross, No. 03-CV-1192, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Minn. 2005). [N/R]
     Officer was not entitled to summary judgment on arrestee's claim that he used excessive force by grabbing the handlebar of his moving motorcycle to prevent him from leaving a parking lot, resulting in injuries. Hastings v. Hubbard, No. 04-4403, 151 Fed. Appx. 357 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Police officers' alleged actions of continuing to beat handcuffed arrestee after he was subdued was malicious and therefore beyond the scope of their employment. The city which employed them was therefore not liable for their actions but rather immune from liability under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. City of Jackson v. Powell, No. 2003-CA-01013, 917 So. 2d 59 (Miss. 2005). [N/R]
     Sheriff was not individually liable for alleged use of excessive force against arrestee by deputy on the basis of failure to properly supervise him when there were no prior complaints about the deputy's conduct. Marley v. Crawford County, Arkansas, No. 04-2042, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (W.D. Ark. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee's excessive force claim against police officer was not barred by his conviction for resisting the officer, when he did not deny the resistance, but merely that the officer's response was excessive, including a beating to the face that caused broken bones and bruises. VanGilder v. Baker, No. 05-1119, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 810 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Mar]
     Police chief used a reasonable amount of force to subdue a motorist who had driven erratically, ignored attempts to pull him over, refused to get out of his vehicle, and appeared to be resisting being handcuffed. The chief had no reason to know, until the arrestee told him, that he was a diabetic suffering low blood sugar, rather than a belligerent drunk or a fleeing criminal. Wertish v. Krueger, No. 05-1031, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 431 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Mar]
     Police officer who allegedly struck and kicked a suspect who was struggling to prevent his handcuffing during an arrest did not use excessive force. Byther v. City of Mobile, No. Civ. A. 040404, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2005). [N/R]
     While motorist claimed that he suffered injuries to his wrists during an arrest, he could not proceed with his excessive force claim against the arresting officer when he failed to state how the injuries occurred or what actions by the officer he believed were excessive. Hudson v. Coxon, No. 05-1542, 149 Fed. Appx. 118 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Excessive force lawsuit against city and police officers was properly dismissed on the basis of the continued failure of the plaintiffs' attorney to respond to discovery requests, have his clients appear for depositions, provide medical records or other documents explaining their purported injuries, or appear at conferences at the courthouse concerning the status of the case. Harrington v. City of Chicago, No. 04-4326, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 3 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Feb]
     Police officers were not entitled to summary judgment on claim that they used excessive force against individuals seeking to file a complaint at a police station, but there was no evidence on which to base the plaintiffs' claims against the police superintendent and a police sergeant for supervisory liability. Vega v. Vivoni, No. CIV.02-1754, 389 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. Puerto Rico 2005). [N/R]
     Texas state troopers were entitled to qualified immunity for using force against vehicle passenger during traffic stop which resulted in her suffering a broken arm when there was reasonable suspicion to investigate whether she was guilty of public intoxication, and her "aggressive demeanor" and the possibility that she had a weapon justified a pat-down search and handcuffing. Her "further resistance" to the search and handcuffing provided the authorization for the amount of force used. Padilla v. Mason, No. 08-03-00123-CV, 169 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005). [N/R]
     Police officers who encountered an intoxicated man who threatened his wife, disabled her car, and refused to cooperate with being arrested and handcuffed did not act unreasonably in using physical force and mace to subdue him. They could reasonably believe, under the circumstances, that he posed a threat to his wife, children, others present, and themselves. Wilson v. Flynn, No. 04-2491, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 24555 (4th Cir.). [2006 LR Jan]
     Law enforcement agencies were not liable for the deaths of a mother and son shot and killed by their estranged husband and father, whose gun, previously taken away when officers responded to a domestic violence call, was subsequently returned to him and then used to shoot them. First, the estranged husband/father had access to another gun in any event, and secondly, the murder victims had no constitutionally protected property interest, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforcement of a domestic violence protective order entered under Pennsylvania law. Starr v. Price, No. 3:03 CV 636, 385 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D. Pa. 2005). [N/R]
     Evidence of threats that an arrestee allegedly made before his arrest, which were relayed to the officers who arrived on the scene were admissible in excessive force lawsuit to show officers' reason for entering a house with their weapons drawn and immediately rolling him from the sofa to the floor to handcuff him. Gallagher v. City of West Covina, No. 03-55391, 141 Fed. Appx. 577 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers did not use excessive force in pulling motorist from his vehicle and handcuffing him at the conclusion of a thirty-minute pursuit after observing his erratic driving. Officers could reasonably have believed he was intoxicated, and was uncooperative, and their actions were "measured" under the circumstances, as they did not then know that he was undergoing diabetic shock rather than intoxication. Janis v. Biesheuvel, No. 05-1660, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22991 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Dec]
     New York school burglar's claim that police officers beat him and then threw him out of a third-story school window, made for the first time nine months after the incident, and supported almost exclusively by his own testimony, was one that no reasonable jury could believe. Trial judge acted properly in granting summary judgment for the defendants based on a finding that the plaintiff's story was unbelievable and contradicted by his own prior inconsistent statements as well as by other evidence. Jeffreys v. City of New York, No. 03-257, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22317 (2d Cir.). [2005 LR Dec]
     Officer's use of force against motorist being arrested for driving under the influence was not excessive, but reasonable to prevent him from fleeing when the motorist was backing away from the officer as he asked him if he was the driver involved in an accident at the scene. Officer grabbed the motorist, throwing him onto the police car, and then handcuffed him. Officer had probable cause to arrest motorist who admitted that he was the driver of a car apparently at fault for a serious accident, and that he had been drinking. Ankele v. Hambrick, No. 03-4225, 136 Fed. Appx. 551 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee's excessive force claim arising out of his arrest was not barred by his plea of no contest to a charge of disorderly conduct, since probable cause for the arrest did not necessarily resolve the issue of whether the force used to make the arrest was proper. Defendants were, however, entitled to summary judgment, as the force used was found to be reasonable. Dye v. City of Warren, No. 4:03CV2593, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (N.D. Ohio 2005). [N/R]
     An arrestee's filing of a police brutality complaint with the internal affairs division of the county police department was not adequate to satisfy the requirements under the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act for notice of a claim before pursuing a civil lawsuit for damages. The fact that an officer allegedly told the arrestee to "take no action" while the internal affairs investigation was pending did not constitute an excuse for failing to file a timely notice of claim. White v. Prince George's County, No. 01293, 877 A.3d 1129 (Md. App. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee failed to show that any city policy or custom contributed to the alleged use of excessive force against him while in custody. City was entitled, therefore, to summary judgment. Niemyjski v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV. 03-1377, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D.N.M. 2005). [N/R]
     Appeals court reinstates lawsuit against one officer for using allegedly excessive force in the course of restraining a disturbed man, causing his death by kneeling on him while he was on the ground, and against other officers for allegedly failing to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, #04-4114, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19580 (7th Cir.). [2005 LR Nov]
     Jury properly awarded damages both for deputy sheriffs' excessive use of force against arrestee and for negligence under California state law in injuring him during the arrest while ousting him from an adult bookstore, as well as in reducing the negligence award for the contributory negligence of the arrestee. Prevailing plaintiff's time for filing a motion for an award of attorneys' fees was tolled (extended) pending the outcome of post-trial motions asking for a new trial. Bailey v. County of Riverside, #03-56545, 414 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Man arrested during officers' response to domestic violence call failed to show that excessive force was used against him. While officers allegedly hit him about the neck, shoulders, and wrist with their nightsticks and wrestled him to the ground, the arrestee refused to cooperate with the officers, fought with them, disarmed one of them, and grabbed a second officer by the groin. Under these circumstances, the amount of force used by the officers was not objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff arrestee also failed to establish, as he claimed, that the city had a "widespread practice" of abusing "men of color" who dated white women. McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, #03 CIV. 10037, 373 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
     Defendants in arrestee's excessive force lawsuit were not entitled to a stay in the proceedings until after the criminal proceedings against him were concluded. The excessive force claims had no bearing on the particular criminal charges against the arrestee. The court rejects, as valid reasons for a stay, the fact that the plaintiff arrestee could obtain, through the discovery process in the civil lawsuit, access to materials he would not otherwise obtain in the course of defending his criminal case, and the fact that he could, while the criminal prosecution was ongoing, assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to respond to the defendants' discovery requests in the civil case. Scheuerman v. City of Huntsville, Alabama, No. CIV.A.CV-05-S-843, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers who were aware that a man had made threats to "blow out his brain" with a gun and expressed threats of physical violence towards others did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or Missouri state law in placing him on a 96-hour psychiatric hold at a hospital. The detainee also failed to show that the officers used excessive force in restraining him, as he himself admitted that he resisted them when they attempted to take him into custody, requiring them to restrain him through force and handcuff him. Additionally, his restraint only caused minor cuts and abrasions. Lacy v. City of Bolivar, Missouri, No. 04-2702, 416 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's claims that they used excessive force against him during his arrest. Given the seriousness of the narcotics offenses of which he was suspected, they could reasonably believe that he was an immediate threat to them when they observed him reaching down by his feet while he was in his vehicle, and that they needed to take action to subdue him when he began to run away after he was handcuffed. Davis v. Lowers, No. 04-12816, 132 Fed. Appx. 302 (11th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Sheriff who was not present when his deputy entered a residence and allegedly used excessive force against an arrestee was not liable under theories of either inadequate supervision or training when the reports of both the deputy and children's service workers present during the arrest did not indicate either unlawful entry or excessive use of force, and no evidence of the inadequacy of the training provided. Loy v. Sexton, No. 04-3971, 132 Fed. Appx. 624 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Failure to instruct jury that it could impose punitive damages for officer's alleged excessive use of force against an arrestee if he acted in an "oppressive" manner required a new trial on the issue. Federal appeals court also orders recalculation of attorneys' fees award to determine whether hours plaintiff's attorney spent on unsuccessful claims were related to the time spent on the successful excessive force claim which resulted in $18,000 jury award of compensatory damages. Dang v. Cross, No. 03-55403, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17981 (9th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
     Dismissal of plaintiff's suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act is affirmed where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff has failed to show that defendants assaulted or maliciously prosecuted him under Ohio law. Harris v. U.S., No. 04-3520, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19058 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
     Police officer's actions in tackling an arrestee who had fled from the scene of a search warrant, and who was reasonably believed to be armed based on a radio transmission the officer had heard, were not an excessive use of force. Brown v. Pfaff, No. CIV.03-404, 357 F. Supp. 2d 781 (D. Del. 2005). [N/R]
     Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the testimony of a medical expert in a detainee's lawsuit seeking damages for eye injuries allegedly caused by a police officer during the detention. The plaintiff failed to file the expert's report in a timely manner, and the report failed to provide a complete statement of the basis and reasons for the expert's opinion or state his qualification. Further, admission of the testimony at a late date had to be excluded to avoid prejudice because admitting the testimony and giving the defendant officer time to depose the expert would have resulted in the postponement of the trial. Brooks v. Price, No. 03-4608, 121 Fed. Appx. 961 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Factual dispute between police officer, who claimed he used no force at all against motorist he stopped at road block, and motorist, who claimed that he grabbed her and repeatedly "slammed" her against a car made summary judgment in her excessive force lawsuit inappropriate. Murry v. Barnes, No. 04-1545, 122 Fed. Appx. 853 (7th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court reinstates claim by wheelchair-bound arrestee that officers injured him by attempting to place him in the back seat of a police cruiser even after he explained that his legs could not bend. St. John v. Hickey, No. 04-3388 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 11736 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Aug]
     City's emergency medical technicians did not violate patient's Fourth Amendment rights or his due process rights when they restrained him during an emergency call and "hogtied" him because he was resisting their efforts to diagnose and treat him. The patient was then resisting them because of a diabetic episode, and the court rules that he was not then "mentally present," and therefore could not possibly have communicated a refusal of treatment. Davidson v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:03-CV-343, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2005). [N/R]
     Jury's finding that officer used excessive force resulting in broken wrist for drunk driving arrestee, and its finding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity was not inconsistent, since it could have believed that the officer's use of force was excessive, but that he reasonably believed his conduct to be lawful under the circumstances. Kent v. Katz, No. 04-0880, 125 Fed. Appx. 334 (2nd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Motorist's allegation that an officer broke her arm during the course of an arrest by "jerking" her arms after she raised them in a "surrender" gesture stated a viable claim for excessive use of force, so that the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint. Byrd v. Cavenaugh, No. A04A2013, 604 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Claims for excessive use of force during drug possession arrest accrued on the date of the arrest, even though the plaintiff claimed not to realize the permanent nature of his injuries from the officers' alleged choking and hitting until three months later. His lawsuit, therefore, was time barred under the Ohio statute of limitations. Hodge v. City of Elyria, No. 03-3296, 126 Fed. Appx. 222 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on their alleged use of excessive force while executing a search warrant on the home of a dentist and his wife based on suspicion of growing marijuana, when there was no belief that the home's occupants were armed or would resist or flee. Appeals court finds that, if alleged lies by deputy were removed from affidavit for warrant, there would be nothing left justifying its the issuance. Baldwin v. Placer County, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6626 (9th Cir.). [2005 LR Jun]
     Jury instructions stating that a mistaken but reasonable belief that the use of force was justified in a situation as a state trooper perceived it were not improper and did not change the applicable legal standard as to whether force was reasonable from an objective to a subjective one. Jury verdict in favor of trooper in lawsuit by arrestee claiming excessive use of force upheld. Hung v. Evanko, No. 03-4475, 115 Fed. Appx. 553 (3rd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Claims by an arrestee's daughter for his death based on the alleged use of excessive force during the arrest were based on alleged intentional misconduct, rather than negligence, and therefore were excluded from the scope of a Texas state statute waiving sovereign immunity, so that complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. City of Garland, Texas v. Rivera, No. 05-04-00516-CV, 146 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers could not have reasonably believed that supervising officers were not violating arrestee's civil rights during execution of no-knock search warrant on home in allegedly conducting invasive body cavity searches of two women in front of male officers and visual body cavity searches of three men, or by allegedly physically assaulting persons present during the search without provocation. Defendants were not, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. Officer who allegedly misled the magistrate into issuing the warrant by omitting material facts was also not entitled to qualified immunity. Bolden v. Village of Monticello, No. 04 CIV.1372, 344 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
     Off-duty police officer had probable cause to arrest two women for being in a public park after closing hours even if local police department operating procedure would arguably have cautioned against an arrest under those circumstances. Department's operating procedures were also not relevant on federal civil rights claims for excessive force, when the issue was whether the officer's use of force was "reasonable, not optimal." Tanberg v. Sholtis, No. 03-2231, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 4332 (10th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR May]
     A police officer used reasonable force against a murder witness he was taking into protective custody when he placed his knee over the top of the witness's back and shoulder area while handcuffing him. The officer, at the time, had grounds to believe that the witness might pose a threat and did not have a description sufficient to distinguish the witness from the perpetrator. There were, however, genuine issues of material fact as to whether a second officer on the scene, who allegedly "pounced" on the center of the witness's back and injured him, used excessive force, precluding summary judgment for him. Davis v. Brouillette, No. 2:03-CV-175, 349 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D.Vt. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on claims arising out of the amount of force they used in arresting a man during a civil disturbance, including allegedly using a takedown technique that was "too aggressive," when he refused to leave the area after being told several times to do so, and he resisted arrest, subsequently being convicted of resisting. Under the circumstances, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer that their conduct violated the arrestee's rights. Rosenberger v. Kootenai County Sheriff's Department, No. 29777, 103 P.3d 466 (Idaho 2004). [N/R]
    Police officer working as hospital security guard did not use excessive force in stopping possibly intoxicated and hallucinating man who was running toward glass exit doors which were locked. Neither officer nor the city which employed him was liable for the man's subsequent death, allegedly from injuries suffered in a fall when the officer grabbed him. McVay v. Sears, No. 03-3948 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 3626 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Apr]
     Defendant mayor and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit in which political opponent of mayor claimed both attacked him while he was driving a sound truck for an opposition party. Summary judgment was not granted on the basis of widely different factual accounts of what actually happened. Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Ortiz-Velez, No. 03-2123 391 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2004) [2005 LR Apr]
     The applicable three-year statute of limitations on an attorney's federal civil rights claim against court officers who allegedly physically assaulted him started to run on the date of the alleged assault. The fact that an allegedly "related" claim was pending in state court did not toll (extend) the three-year time period, so the complaint was properly dismissed as untimely. Keane v. Navarro, No. Civ.A.03-CV-10154, 345 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
     City could not be held liable for police officers' alleged actions of seizing and beating a robbery suspect without justification merely on the basis that it was the officers' employer. Arrestee failed to allege that any of the purported violations of his constitutional rights were the result of the city's policies. Hales v. City of Montgomery, Civil Action No. 03-M-593, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (M.D. Ala. 2004). [N/R]
     While officers properly arrested woman for poking one of them in the chest, and had a right to use some force in light of her allegedly "intoxicated and belligerent" conduct, factual disputes over the degree of force used precluded summary judgment on her excessive force claims. It was disputed, for example, whether an officer did in fact twist her arm behind her back, push his knee into her kneecap to bring her to the ground and then deliberately lay on top of her prone body to subdue her or rather accidentally fall on top of her. It was also disputed as to how much force was reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest under the circumstances. Elliott v. County of Monroe, #04-0746-CV, 115 Fed. Apx. 497 (2nd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers' alleged actions of repeatedly striking suspect on his ribs, back and head after he fully submitted to arrest was unreasonable so that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Alleged unprovoked beating would be sufficiently outrageous under Tennessee law to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Alexander v. Newman, #02-2983-DV, 345 F. Supp. 2d 876 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). [N/R]
     When an arrestee was uncertain as to which of two officers allegedly placed a knee on his neck, and there was no evidence as to which officer did so, this barred a finding that either of the officers used excessive force while involved, with others, in making the arrest. Birdine v. City of Coatesville, No. CIV. A.03-5569, 347 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D. Pa. 2004). [N/R]
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's claim that he struck him in the eye while he was surrendering by laying on the ground after ending a chase. The officer's alleged conduct of striking an unarmed suspect about the face after he voluntarily surrendered, if true, was objectively unreasonable. Dubay v. Craze, No. 03-71553, 327 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2004). [N/R]
     As of December of 1999, it was clearly established that a police officer could not reasonably believe that it was constitutional to "take down" or physically assault an arrestee who was not actively resisting arrest, attempting to escape, or posing a threat to others, and that other officers present had a duty to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force by a fellow officer. Defendant officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's excessive force claims. Hays v. Ellis, #CIV.A.01-K-2316, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Colo. 2004). [N/R]
     Arrestee's conviction for resisting an officer did not bar him from pursuing a federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged excessive use of force against him. Ninth Circuit federal appeals court, overturning prior ruling, adopts Model Penal Code definition of "deadly force," but leaves it to trial court to decide whether the use of a police dog against the arrestee was deadly force in this case. Smith v. City of Hemet, No. 03-56445, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 336 (9th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Feb]
     Deputy acted in an objectively reasonable manner in putting his foot on an arrestee's face when he raised his head as he lay on the ground being handcuffed after disobeying orders to immediately drop his shotgun. The arrestee was "not docile," and subsequently was found to possess another gun on his person. Crosby v. Monroe County, No. 03-13716, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 26973 (11th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
     Michigan appeals court upholds jury award of $533,087.62 against police officer for asphyxiation death of cocaine-intoxicated man who threatened to kill the officer and his partner. While jury found the decedent to be 50% responsible for his own death, it did not clearly attribute his comparative negligence solely to his drug use, which would have barred liability. Smith v. Detroit, #247154, 2004 Mich. App. Lexis 3500 (Unpub. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
     Federal appeals court upholds qualified immunity for police officer who broke motorist's arm in the process of arresting her for intoxicated driving. While trial judge erroneously submitted the qualified immunity issue to the jury, the motorist failed to object or submit alternative instructions, and the submission was not the kind of "plain error" that threatened the fairness or integrity or public reputation of the judicial process. Littrell v. Franklin, No. 03-2534, 388 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Jan]
     Officer had probable cause to remove motorist from his vehicle when he refused a lawful order to produce his driver's license, and did not use excessive force in doing so when he could reasonably believe that he was attempting to evade arrest and posed a possible danger to pedestrians and others in the area. Lawrence v. Kenosha County, No. 04-1472, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 24830 (7th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Jan]
     Defendant state troopers were not entitled to summary judgment on excessive force claim merely because neither suspect nor his father, also present at the incident, could identify which of the two of them allegedly stomped on the suspect's ankle. The suspect was handcuffed and pinned face down at the time, and both he and his father had been pepper sprayed at the time. If one of the troopers did, in fact, stomp on the suspect's ankle while he was prone on the ground in handcuffs, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Williams v. Atkins, No. 00 CIV. 8257(SCR), 333 F. Supp. 2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers' use of chemical spray against an arrestee and pushing of him was not excessive force when he was on top of a man on the floor with blood on the floor around them when they arrived at his apartment, and the arrestee was not cooperative with them. Officers had no obligation to believe arrestee's claim that he had acted in self-defense after the other man, his brother-in-law, had attacked him in an intoxicated condition. Lindsay v. Bogle, No. 02-6201, 92 Fed. Appx. 165 (6th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Louisiana man who claimed that four officers detained him during a Mardi Gras parade, with one of them intentionally handling him in a way that dislocated his shoulders adequately asserted a claim for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against the city, its insurer, and the city police department under a vicarious liability theory. Doss v. Morris, #02-31215, 86 Fed Appx. 25 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that officers used excessive force against him was barred under the principles in Heck v. Humphrey, No. 93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), since he had been convicted of resisting an officer, and that conviction had not been set aside. The plaintiff did not claim that the officers used excessive force after he stopped resisting or that they used excessive force to stop his resistance, but instead that they attacked him with no reason to do so. Accordingly, his federal civil rights lawsuit was an improper challenge to the validity of his conviction. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 03-30941, 100 Fed. Appx. 321 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Arrestee's claim that officer transporting him to county jail "kind of manhandled me around" and "roughly transported" him in the "manner in which" the officer "took me out of the car and stuff like that" was insufficient to state a claim for excessive use of force. Dimmitt v. Ockenfels, # 03-170-P-DMC, 220 F.R.D. 116 (D. Me. 2004). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court overturns trial judge's grant of summary judgment on arrestee's claim that officer used excessive force against her in allegedly shoving her headfirst into a police vehicle, causing her to strike her head on the metal partition inside. Maxwell v. City of New York, #03-0245, 380 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Nov]
     While an arrestee's claim that officers used excessive force against him after handcuffing him could move forward, based on genuine issues of fact as to what happened, and whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability, the plaintiff failed to make any showing that an official policy or custom of the city or its police department led to his injuries. Claims for municipal liability, therefore, were properly rejected. Arrestee's testimony in a deposition that he "might" have been yelling and waving his arms, and making a fist at the officers as he approached them, and his admission that he reached for one officer's gun belt and touched it, warranted summary judgment for the defendant officers on his claims that they also used excessive force against him prior to handcuffing him. Ross v. City of Toppenish, No. 03-35234, 104 Fed. Appx. 26 (9th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Jury's finding that a police officer used excessive force in breaking a motorist's wrist during an arrest for intoxicated driving was not inconsistent with its finding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from damages for the use of such force. The jury could, from the evidence, decided that the officer reasonably believed that he was justified in using the level of force he employed, while he was not actually justified, in fact, in doing so. Kent v. Katz, 327 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Vt. 2004). [N/R]
     There were genuine issues of fact as to whether police officers arresting anti-abortion demonstrators who had chained themselves together had used excessive force, precluding summary judgment in the demonstrators' federal civil rights lawsuit. There were also factual issues as to whether the town failed to adequately supervise its officers, but no evidence that the town inadequately trained its officers on the use of force. Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, #03-7332, 361 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer's suspicion that vehicle was speeding was objectively reasonable despite his reliance on his own observations rather than on use of radar device when he followed the vehicle for approximately a third of a mile to confirm that it was traveling at an excessive speed. His stop of the vehicle was therefore proper, and the officer acted properly in directing a passenger to exit the vehicle following the valid stop when the car contained four persons and the stop was in a "high-crime" area. Further proceedings were needed, however, on passenger's claim that the officer used excessive force against him in the course of the stop and on the issue of whether the passenger cooperated with the officer's instructions or was validly arrested for obstruction of justice. Veney v. Ojeda, 321 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Va. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer did not use excessive force in screaming at a truck's occupants to raise their hands, placing his hand near his holstered weapon, and threatening the incarcerate one of the suspects, following a chase that occurred because the officer suspected a passenger of firing a shot at an antelope, a protected species. Because the suspected offense involved the firing of a loaded firearm, the officer could reasonably perceive a risk of injury or danger, and he therefore acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Wheeler v. Scarafiotti, No. 02-2297, 85 Fed. Appx. 696 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Plaintiff who was awarded $10,000 in damages against one officer for alleged excessive use of force against him at his apartment was entitled to an attorneys' fee award as a "prevailing party," even though he would not receive any of the $10,000 award because he had previously entered into a $25,000 settlement with other defendants in the case, which fully compensated him for damages in excess of those the jury found occurred. Concession by plaintiff's attorney that the jury's award was to be set-off by the prior settlement did not deprive the plaintiff of "prevailing party" status. Attorneys' fees and expenses of $10,572.74 were therefore awarded. Baim v. Notto, 316 F. Supp. 2d 113 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court finds that plaintiff who was awarded $87,000 in damages for alleged battery by two police officers at veterans' hospital was improperly also awarded $49,000 in attorneys' fees. While evidence showed, for purposes of award under Federal Tort Claims Act, that officers acted "wantonly," the U.S. government did not act "wantonly" in presenting a defense against the plaintiff's claims. Stive v. U.S., No. 03-2151, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8346 (7th Cir.). [2004 LR Jun]
     Jury award of $300,000 in compensatory and $1 million in punitive damages to arrestee and estate of second arrestee (who committed suicide months after arrest) on excessive force claims was not excessive. Diaz v. Vivoni, 301 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Puerto Rico 2003). [N/R]
     Jury's verdict, finding both that motorist did not resist arrest after he stopped his car, and that officers who arrested him did not use excessive force during the arrest was not inconsistent and did not require a new trial on arrestee's claim, even though he was injured in the course of the arrest. Jury must have believed that officers' use of force was reasonable because of their belief that motorist was attempting to flee or resist arrest, based on prior pursuit which ranged over eleven miles. Brown v. City of McComb Mississippi Police Dept., #03-60034, 84 Fed. Appx. 404 (5th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     The alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation of a single incident of police officers' purported excessive use of force was insufficient to show the existence of a municipal policy as required for governmental liability. Byrd v. District of Columbia, 297 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2003). [N/R]
     Genuine issue of fact as to whether off-duty housing authority police officers acted in the scope of their employment or for "wholly personal reasons" in assaulting two men precluded summary judgment for housing authority. Beauchamp v. City of New York, 771 N.Y.S.2d 129 (A.D. 2d Dept. 2004). [N/R]
     Police officers who participated in the execution of a search warrant, but were not accused of use of physical force against a resident of the premises being searched could not be held "derivatively" liable for the actions of an officer who the plaintiff claimed struck him. Claims against these officers were therefore properly dismissed before jury trial which returned a verdict in favor of the remaining defendant officer. Willis v. Freeman, No. 02-1757. 93 Fed. Appx. 803 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Motorist who asserted claims for assault and battery and negligence against officer he claimed pulled him out of his car and beat him failed to make a case for a separate claim of negligence, requiring the court to overturn a jury verdict in his favor on the negligence claim. (The jury returned a verdict for the officer on the assault and battery claim). The conduct alleged was intentional conduct by the officer, and the plaintiff failed to allege any "negligence" other than the purported use of excessive force. District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701 (D.C. 2003). [N/R]
     Dispute as to whether police officer intentionally used his car to run down suspect in order to arrest him or whether, as officer argued, he was only positioning his patrol car so that he could exit the vehicle and pursue the suspect on foot, when the suspect ran into the patrol car, made trial court's dismissal of arrestee's lawsuit inappropriate. Day v. Rogers, 71 Fed. Appx. 337 (5th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Trial judge's refusal to give jury instructions concerning the plaintiff's degenerative disc disease which purportedly made him more prone to injuries such as ruptured discs as a result of allegedly being stomped or kicked by officers was no basis for a new trial in his excessive force lawsuit. Rejected instructions related to the issue of damages to be awarded, which the jury did not even need, as they returned a verdict in favor of the defendant officers, rejecting the claim that excessive force had been used. Dawson v. Page, 286 F. Sup. 2d 617 (M.D.N.C. 2003). [N/R]
     Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he shot a mentally ill man in the stomach as he pointed a butcher knife towards himself with suicidal intentions, as deadly force is only permissible when a suspect poses an imminent threat to an officer or to others. Buchanan v. City of Milwaukee, 290 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis. 2003). [2004 LR Mar]
     Plaintiff who received $25,000 settlement from city on excessive force claim was a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorneys' fees after trial court incorporated settlement agreement into its dismissal order, but, under terms of settlement agreement, defendant city was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claims prior to the determination of a reasonable amount of an attorneys' fee award. Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 03-12113, 353 F.3d 901 (11th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Mar]
     Arrestee who claimed officers had used excessive force in arresting him following a traffic stop was not entitled to a reversal in his appeal of a jury verdict in favor of the defendant officers when he failed to point to any evidentiary or other legal rulings by the trial court that might have caused a reversible error. McIntosh v. Green, No. 03-6038, 82 Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers alleged continued use of physical force after a man was subdued and restrained violated clearly established law and, if as plaintiff described, was excessive as used against a man who had committed no crime. Officers also lacked probable cause to restrain him for an involuntary mental evaluation solely on the basis of a neighbor's 911 call reporting that he was suicidal. Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 02-1761, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Feb]
     Videotaped footage of incident was sufficient to confirm police officers' testimony and contradict enough of the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses to entitle defendant police officers to summary judgment on lawsuit claiming that they improperly used excessive force which resulted in store patron's injuries and death. Videotape which showed other store patrons walking calmly by at the time plaintiff's witnesses claimed officers were beating decedent in store aisle indicated that there was not actually an altercation going on when and where the plaintiff's witnesses testified. Stewart v. Prince George's County, Maryland, #02-2071, 75 Fed. Appx. 198 (4th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Police detective did not have any duty under federal law to investigate claims that arresting officer engaged in criminal activity in using allegedly excessive force against arrestee, and was therefore entitled to summary judgment on federal civil rights claim against him asserted by arrestee. Hale v. Vance, 267 F. Supp. 2d 725 (S.D. Ohio 2003). [N/R]
     Officers used unreasonable force in attempting to detain man with high blood pressure and diabetes who had committed no crime, but had simply changed his mind about waiting with them for requested ambulance to arrive after previously telling them that he was not feeling well. Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for using force to detain him, and allegedly continuing to use force against him after he was handcuffed. Thompson v. Douds, No.2D02-3972, 852 So. 2d 299 (Fla. App. 2003). [N/R]
     Man arrested for burglary did not convince trial court that officers had thrown him out of a third story window of a school he was burglarizing, when his claim was asserted, for the first time, nine months later, and he had earlier admitted jumping from the window. Additionally, medical records showed no signs of an injury to his head, refuting his claim that the officers had hit him with a flashlight. Summary judgment entered for defendant officers. Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers acted in an objectively unreasonably manner in their use of force during arrest of motorist when they allegedly kicked him and subjected him to knee strikes after he was subdued and further use of force was unnecessary. Coleman v. Rieck, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Neb. 2003). [N/R]
     Deputy sheriff's use of force in removing arrestee from his automobile, which allegedly caused injuries resulting in paraplegia, is found to be objectively reasonable when arrestee may well have been trying to retrieve a weapon or attempt to flee, and he did not outwardly exhibit "typical signs" of serious pain. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, No. 02-55881, 340 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Dec]
     Disputed issues of fact as to whether plaintiff physically resisted arrest and whether officers "slammed" her into a car and kicked her in the ankle made summary judgment on her excessive force claims inappropriate. Minchella v. Bauman, #02-1454, 73 Fed. Appx. 405 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Two arrestees who obtained $8,000 settlement from officer and city after prevailing at trial on their excessive force claims are awarded a total of $25,071.64 in attorneys' fees and expenses, rather than the $77,935.74 they requested. Trial court reduces the number of compensable hours for each of the plaintiffs' attorneys by 50% due to their failure to provide "sufficiently detailed contemporaneous time records, and court also reduces appropriate hourly rates for chief counsel from $350 to $225, for a junior associate attorney from $200 to $120, and for law students from $90 to $60. Martinez v. Hodgson, 265 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2003). [N/R]
     A finding at an arrestee's parole revocation hearing that he had struck a police officer did not have a "collateral estoppel" effect barring his lawsuit against the officer for excessive use of force, since the officer still could possibly be found to have used excessive force whether or not the arrestee struck him. Curry v. City of Syracuse, No. 01-9211, 316 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Evidence was sufficient for jury to award $15,000 to man beaten by police officer while sergeant stood by, but an award of $2 million in punitive damages was excessive, federal trial court rules, citing new U.S. Supreme Court case on proportionality of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Trial judge orders reduction of punitives to 45,000 or else a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. Waits v. City of Chicago, No. 01C4010, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003, reported in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, p. 1 (June 9, 2003). [2003 LR Jul]
     Deputies who were busy with other things in arrestee's residence when a fellow officer allegedly struck arrestee across the face and nose with a flashlight while she was restrained on the floor could not be held liable when they had no reason to anticipate this action nor could they have intervened in time to prevent it. Dixon v. Campbell, No. 02-1260, 58 Fed. Appx. 180 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
      State and federal agents who detained and handcuffed employees for three and a half hours in 1996 while executing a search warrant for unlawful drugs on a workplace were entitled to qualified immunity. Such a search warrant carries with it limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted, and it was not shown either that the length of the detention was unreasonable under the circumstances or that the agents were unreasonable in their belief that they were not violating clearly established law when they displayed drawn guns, and pushed one of the employees to the ground when he failed to obey an order to "get down." Pikel v. Garrett, #01-3850, 55 Fed. Appx. 29 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
    Jury could reasonably conclude that an arresting officer used excessive force in light of arrestee's claim that he was an "innocent bystander" and had done nothing to provoke the officer except express his concern about alleged mistreatment of others, and that the officer continued to use force against him after he was in custody and subdued. Force allegedly used included throwing the arrestee to the ground after he was handcuffed, striking him in the back of the head, and kneeing him. Award of $5,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages was not excessive when plaintiff had injuries resulting in $173 in medical expenses and claimed that he suffered fear, pain, and humiliation because of the officer's actions. Burbank v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D. Maine 2003). [N/R]
     Probable cause did not exist to arrest television news cameraman filming demonstration in support of 6-year-old Cuban refugee boy. Arrestee, at the time he was seized, was in the process of complying with police orders to get out of a street then blocked to traffic, and force used appeared to be disproportionate to need. Durruthy v. City of Miami, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2002). [2003 LR May]
     Probable cause existed for the plaintiff's arrest when he failed to disperse and challenged police authority to take others into custody as part of an eight-person crowd in a parking lot, but there were factual issues as to whether the plaintiff resisted arrest and whether the officer's use of force in making the arrest was excessive. Burbank v. Davis, 227 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2002). [N/R]
     Officers were properly granted summary judgment in lawsuit brought by suicidal man armed with knives who threatened his wife and officers and then was subdued by shooting him with "beanbag" rounds. Officers use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and appeals court expresses agreement with trial judge that plaintiff should have "thanked" rather than sued the officers. Bell v. Irwin, #02-2262, 321 F.3d 637, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 3415 (7th Cir.). [2003 LR Apr]
      Jury instructions on issue of officers' alleged use of excessive force against motorist were adequate when the jury was told that they should find for the defendants unless they found from all facts and circumstances as they appeared to the officers at the scene that no reasonable officer would have done what those officers did. These instructions properly told the jury to evaluate the use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and from an objective standard. The phrase "unless no reasonable officer" used in the instructions was merely the "double negative equivalent" of "a reasonable officer." Miller v. City of Nichols Hills Police Dept., No. 01-6128, 42 Fed. Appx. 212 (10th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
    Officers' use of force in subduing fleeing drug suspect who struck one of them and continued to resist arrest was objectively reasonable when it resulted only in "minor injuries." Moreland v. Dorsey, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2002). [2003 LR Mar]
     Officers did not use excessive force in carrying a 79-year-old woman to their squad car after she refused to walk following her arrest for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and battery on an officer. The officers were not required to retreat in the face of her resistance to a lawful arrest. Grauerholz v. Adcock, 02-3083, 51 Fed. Appx. 298 (10th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity from a landowner's claim that they violated her Fourth Amendment rights and used excessive force during her arrest for interference with a gas company's easement over her property. The plaintiff did not dispute that she attempted to take a gun from one officer's holster when officers were trying to arrest her husband, so they acted reasonably in believing that they were using appropriate force in subduing her by pushing her to the ground. Pulice v. Enciso, #01-3748, 39 Fed. Appx. 692 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     No hearing was required to resolve a plaintiff arrestee's objections to the admission of an expert psychiatrist's report and testimony about his mental state at the time of his arrest when the basis for the objection was disagreement with disputed factual evidence on which the expert relied. The plaintiff, who claimed excessive use of force during the arrest, could explore, during cross-examination, the reliance that the expert put on the disputed evidence in drawing his conclusion that the plaintiff had been psychotic at the time so that his perception of events were impaired and unreliable. He could also argue to the jury that, if it rejected the underlying factual premises of the expert's report, it should also reject the expert's opinion. Walker v. Gordon, #01-4106, 46 Fed. Appx. 691 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Plaintiff could, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, amend his complaint, seven years after it had been filed, to add three officers as defendants, when the original complaint mentioned all three of them as having been involved in the alleged use of excessive force against him, but he could not amend it to now name as a defendant an officer who was named only as a witness in the original complaint, since he was not on notice that he could be named as a defendant. Mosley v. Jablonsky, 209 F.R.D. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).[N/R]
     Officers did not use excessive force in attempting to restrain a possibly intoxicated man whose mental condition was in question and who was swinging his arms wildly and struck at least one officer. No liability imposed for arrestee's subsequent death, allegedly from positional asphyxiation, when it took the efforts of three officers and the use of pepper spray to subdue him. Fernandez v. City of Cooper City, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2002). [2002 LR Nov]
     Police officers did not use excessive force in the process of putting a detainee into their patrol car, even if they did act "roughly" in pushing and pulling him into the car. They acted in circumstances where the detainee refused to take a preliminary breath test or to have his photograph and fingerprints taken, and he yelled to protest his arrest and threatened to sue the officers, as well as actively resisting the officers' efforts to put him in the vehicle. Lockett v. Donnellon, #00-2169, 38 Fed. Appx. 289 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
    Officer may have had probable cause for arresting a motorist for a "horn-honking" offense in arguable violation of a local noise ordinance, but the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on the motorist's excessive force claim, as no reasonable officer could believe that the officer's alleged physical abuse of the motorist was legal after the arrest had been fully achieved. Lee v. Ferraro, #00-16054, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Oct]
     After two separate juries, in successive trials on an arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit, both returned verdicts for the defendant officer on an arrestee's claim that excessive use had been used following his arrest, a federal appeals court upholds the verdicts and the refusal of the trial court to grant a third trial, ruling that the jury could, based on the evidence, find that the injuries suffered by the arrestee were sustained prior to his arrest. Caldwell v. Davis, #01-0183, 31 Fed. Appx. 34 (2nd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court rules that trial judge improperly granted judgment as a matter of law to officers in excessive force claim brought by paranoid schizophrenic who testified that he had no recollection of the precise acts engaged in by the officers who apprehended him. The issue of whether the officers used excessive force under the circumstances was still for the jury to determine, and there was other evidence which could be used to make the determination. Santos v. Gates, #00-56114, 287 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
     Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest did not bar him from asserting a federal civil rights claim for excessive use of force. Since arrestee had pled no contest to the charge, he did not have an actual opportunity to litigate the issue of the officer's use of force, and it was possible that the officers used excessive force at some point during the encounter. Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Ohio 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
     Officers did not act unreasonably in "escalating" their use of force against large naked man running around hotel premises after their initial attempts to restrain him with lesser force failed, and they had reason to believe that he posed a risk to himself and others, including the officers. Officers were not liable for his subsequent death, found to have been caused by cardiovascular disease and the effects of multiple drugs, after a lengthy altercation. Caricofe v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, Maryland, #01-1809, 32 Fed. Appx. 62 (4th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Officer was entitled to official immunity from false arrest and assault lawsuit under Texas law based on his authority to inspect the record of a commercial vehicle, since his decision concerning whether to arrest the driver for failure to produce the record was discretionary rather than ministerial. Kersey v. Wilson, # 2-01-226-CV, 69 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App. 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     Officers acted objectively reasonably in forcing a diabetic motorist to a stop and forcibly removing him from his truck through the use of pepper spray, baton blows, and bites from a police dog when his erratic driving was serious enough that people might have been killed by it, and he refused to comply with lawful orders once he was stopped. Moore v. Winer, 190 F. Supp. 22d 804 (D. Maryland 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     Officer's alleged action in striking the arrestee's face and slamming his face into the floor after he had been subdued, if true, violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on excessive force so that officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Appeals court could decide legal issue on appeal despite officer's dispute of arrestee's version of the facts. Phelphs v. Coy, #00-4257, 356 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     In a lawsuit claiming an assault on an individual by a traffic enforcement agent, the city's failure to produce, for a deposition, a particular traffic enforcement agent after also failing to produce his incident report, did not, standing alone result in a conclusion that the agent committed the assault, so that summary judgment for plaintiff was properly denied. Quezada v. City of New York, 737 N.Y.S.2d 84 (A.D. 2002). [N/R]
     Jury properly awarded compensatory damages of $15,184 and punitive damages of $37,916 to bystander documenting police conduct at event who claimed that an officer assaulted him and tackled him to the ground while he had his hands up in the air. Defendant officer was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of evidence concerning the conduct of other officers present on the occasion. Cummings v. Libby, 176 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D. Maine 2001). [2002 LR May]
     Officer did not "shock the conscience" by hitting a protester who grabbed him from behind while the officer was attempting to arrest another protester during a demonstration. Officer's action of swinging his arm backwards after protester had grabbed his ankles was also objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, No. 00-1253, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2001). [N/R]
     Arrested taxi passenger's claim that arresting officers "were apparently prejudiced against" his Iranian nationality and therefore "treated him inferiorly" was a "mere bald assertion and conclusory statement" which failed to state a claim for national origin discrimination. State troopers had probable cause for warrantless misdemeanor arrest of passenger for allegedly cutting taxi seat with a sharp object he was in possession of, but were not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim that they dragged him in handcuffs across the floor when he had not resisted arrest. Tavakoli-Nouri v. State of Maryland, No. 0048, 779 A.2d 992 (Md. App. 2001). [N/R]
     Sheriff was not liable for failure to "implement a policy for the handling of physical humor" based on alleged assault by deputies, including beating and pepper spraying of handcuffed arrested motorist who claimed that his licking of a state trooper's face was meant as a joke; deputies involved in alleged beating, however, were not entitled to qualified immunity, as their alleged actions were not objectively reasonable. Small v. St. Tammany Parish, No. 00-3441, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21809 (E.D. La.). [2002 LR Apr]
     Deputy sheriff did not use excessive force when he inadvertently broke an intoxicated and combative arrestee's nose while trying to subdue him. Intoxicated arrestee had called 911 and asked to be taken to jail. Jones v. Buchanan, No. 1:00CV-27-C, 164 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D.N.C. 2001). [2002 LR Apr]
     Officer's shoving of a pedestrian who was asking for directions, which resulted in severe injuries requiring back surgery, was not conduct "shocking to the conscience" sufficiently egregious to state a claim for violation of the injured party's federal due process rights. Cummings v. McIntire, No. 01-1301, 271 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Mar]
     Officer did not use excessive force in knocking arrestee's feet out from under him and grabbing him around the chest. Arrestee, who had just been taken into custody for being incapacitated by alcohol, said "no" as the officer attempted to handcuff him, and started walking away towards his house, where the officer knew the arrestee kept a BB gun. Flanigan v. Town of Colchester, 171 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Vt. 2001). [N/R]
     A court security officer and two sheriffs' deputies did not use excessive force, as alleged, while taking plaintiff into custody at the conclusion of court hearing for violating a protection order concerning his ex-wife. Evidence failed to support plaintiff's story that the alleged "assault" rendered him "comatose" for several hours, and judge's affidavit supported officers' versions of events that he resisted being placed in handcuffs. Covillion v. Alsop, 145 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2001). [N/R]
     Officer's use of "slight" force in arresting motorist who subsequently suffered a heart attack was not excessive. $175,000 jury verdict overturned. Hendon v. City of Piedmont, No. CV 00-PT-2421-E, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ala. 2001). [2002 LR Feb]
     A $150,000 settlement was reached by New York City in an excessive force/false arrest lawsuit filed by an arrestee Grant v. City of New York, No. 22691/89 (Kings Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct.), reported in The National Law Journal, p. B3 (Nov. 13, 2001). [N/R]
           Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest did not bar her excessive force claim since it is possible that the officer used the allegedly excessive force after placing her under arrest. Sanford v. Motts, No. 00-56926, 258 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Jan]
     Defendant police officers were entitled to summary judgment on lawsuit alleging that one of them had hit the plaintiff in the mouth with a nightstick while he was attempting to obtain the identifying number of a police car for purposes of lodging a complaint about the officers' behavior in allegedly beating his friends. Plaintiff was unable to identify which of the two officers allegedly assaulted him, and did not claim either that both officers attacked him or that one stood idly by while the other committed the assault, so that individual capacity claims against the two officers could not be supported. Roberts v. Prince George's County, Md., No. Civ. A. 2000-186, 157 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D. Md. 2001). [N/R]
     345:131 New York City reaches $8.7 million settlement in Louima case; lawsuit stated that arrestee was tortured with a broken broomstick being placed in his rectum. Louima v. New York City, U.S. Dist. Ct. (S.D.N.Y. 2001), reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p. 1 (July 13, 2001).
     344:115 Military police officer who shoved protester into a van while arresting him at the scene of a speech by the U.S. Vice President at a military based was entitled to qualified immunity; U.S. Supreme Court rules that inquiry on qualified immunity is whether an officer would have clearly known that his use of force was improper under the particular circumstances faced, not merely whether the use of force is ultimately judged reasonable. Saucier v. Katz, No. 99-1977, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
     344:116 Officer was entitled to qualified immunity from claim that he kicked an arrestee "very hard" in his foot while making a custodial arrest for a vehicle offense. Gross v. Pirtle, No. 00-2130, 245 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2001).
     344:117 Federal jury awards $50,000 in damages to motorist allegedly stopped without justification and illegally searched and battered by officer. Morrison v. Simmons, No. 98-CV-560, U.S. Dist. Ct. Dayton, Oh., June 2, 2001, reported in The National Law Journal, p. A7 (June 25, 2001).
     343:105 Introduction of evidence of arrestee's later second arrest for domestic violence was no basis, in the absence of proper objection, for setting aside jury's verdict in favor of arresting officers on his false arrest/excessive force claims. Udemba v. Nicoli, #00-1246, 237 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001).
     342:84 Man who suffered permanent brain damage after an assault by police officers was properly awarded $700,000 for past and future pain and suffering, but was also properly denied any award for lost earnings when he was unemployed at the time of the incident and receiving "social security benefits," according to his own testimony. Ramirez v. City of New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 289 (A.D. 2001).
     343:105 Federal trial court bars evidence of prior unrelated departmental disciplinary actions against officer
     accused by arrestee of excessive use of force, as well as evidence about the existence of liability insurance; testimony about whether the arrestee actually hit his wife before the police arrived was not relevant to whether the officer used improper force. Munley v. Carlson, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
     340:52 Two troopers acted reasonably in grabbing, disarming, and restraining a man who was talking to another trooper with a knife in his hand; they could legitimately believe, based on what they saw, that the man was a threat to the other trooper's life, even if, in actuality, he only had the knife in order to cut up a chicken for lunch. Lawson v. Hulm, No. 99-41388D, 223 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2000).
     339:36 African-American arrestees stated claim for racial discrimination based on assertion of city practice or custom of using pepper spray and excessive force against them based on race; alleged breaking of arrestee's arm, use of pepper spray against him, and biting by police dog during "unnecessary" subduing was conduct which, if true, no reasonable officers could have believed was warranted. Wilkerson v. Thrift, 124 F. Supp. 2d 322 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
     337:3 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest and harassment of an officer did not preclude his claim against officer for excessive use of force; plaintiff was still not entitled to a new trial on his excessive force claim when he failed to object to jury instructions limiting its consideration to events occurring prior to his handcuffing by the officer. Sullivan v. Gagnier, No. 99-7207, 225 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir. 2000).
     333:131 "Uncomfortable" search of youth's groin area and use of "minimal" force while arresting and handcuffing him did not constitute excessive use of force; officer was entitled to qualified immunity when conduct caused bruising which arrestee admitted disappeared quickly and for which he did not seek medical treatment. Nolin v. Isbeli, #99-10040, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000).
     334:147 Police officer acted reasonably in opening cell door to quiet yelling arrestee and make sure that intoxicated arrestee was not harming himself; no liability for injuries to arrestee who was knocked unconscious by cell door opening; officer was unable to see that arrestee was standing behind cell door and would be hit by it. Wilson v. Spain, No. 99-2224, 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).
     335:163 New York jury awards over $3 million to 51-year-old woman mistakenly arrested by undercover police officer as drug suspect; $2.75 million of award was for alleged excessive use of force by officer, who plaintiff contended did not identify himself as police and $250,000 was awarded for false arrest. Morales v. Leone, U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y. October 5, 2000, reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p. C26 (Oct. 6, 2000).
     335:164 Arrestee who claimed that officers beat him while he was handcuffed, despite the lack of resistance on his part, did not have to show direct monetary losses to recover compensatory damages; damages could be based on pain and suffering or emotional distress, and, even without actual injury, he might be entitled to nominal damages. Slicker v. Jackson, No. 99-10592, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000).
     335:167 Officers' actions in detaining an autistic youth for questioning after he reportedly acted strangely while trespassing in a homeowner's garage was a proper investigatory stop; ensuing confrontation with youth and his subsequent arrest for assaulting an officer were not a violation of either the Fourth Amendment or federal disability discrimination statutes. Bates v. Chesterfield County, Va., #99-1663, 216 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 2000).
     330:85 Federal appeals court upholds $245,000 award of compensatory and punitive damages to three 17- year-old boys, two African-American and one white, on claim that two police officers illegally stopped and searched their vehicle and used excessive force, including pulling and squeezing their testicles, during pat-down search, and were motivated by racial bias in carrying out one-hour stop, search and detention; alleged racial bias was a proper basis for punitive damages award. Price v. Kramer, #97-56580, #98-55484, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000).
     331:99 $4.95 million settlement reached in lawsuit over death of man, who allegedly was beaten by officer, when police used pepper spray on his brother during a traffic stop. Plaintiffs claimed the action was racially motivated. Smith v. Village of Hoffman Estates, No. 97 L-605, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill.), June 27, 2000, reported in Chicago Tribune, Sec. 2, p. 1 (June 28, 2000).
     331:99 Washington state intermediate appeals court rules that it was not an abuse of discretion to award $9,920 in attorneys' fees to plaintiff in excessive force claim who was awarded only $1 in nominal damages. Ermine v. City of Spokane, #18253-3-III, 996 P.2d 624 (Wash. App. 2000).
     332:115 A small cut and scrapes on the knee and calf were sufficient evidence to support claim that arrestee had been subjected to excessive force in the course of the arrest, and factual disputes over what happened required the denial of officers' claim for qualified immunity. Lambert v. City of Dumas, #99-1081, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999).
     [N/R] Force used to detain juvenile during his arrest was objectively reasonable, as police chief's testimony established that restraints, including eventual hogtying, was necessary to prevent juvenile from harming himself. Brandt v. Davis, No. 99-1128, 191 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1999).
     329:73 New York trial judge properly exercised discretion in denying arrestee's motion to compel production of arresting officer's employment records and district attorney's entire file on the arrest in arrestee's lawsuit claiming assault by officer. Tsachalis v. City of Mount Vernon, 690 N.Y.S.2d 746 (A.D.N.Y. 1999).
     330:84 Jury properly heard evidence of alleged affair between mayor and arrestee's wife, and trial court properly declined to instruct jury that arrestee had a duty to submit to an arrest without resistance even if it was unjustified; appeals court upholds awards totaling $114,000 against police chief and mayor in lawsuit claiming that improper arrest was made with excessive force based on a purely personal dispute between mayor and arrestee. Goff v. Bise, # 98-2849, 173 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1999).
     326:22 Illinois federal jury awards $28 million, ($18 million on excessive force claim and $10 million for denial of medical care), to PCP user who suffered an incapacitating stroke after an officer allegedly knocked him down. Regalado v. Chicago, No. 96-C-3634, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1999), reported in The National Law Journal, p. A10 (Nov. 22, 1999).
     326:30 Police officer use of a racial epithet in response to a request for his name and badge number did not, standing alone, constitute a violation of the equal
     protection rights of the person so addressed; claim that another officer engaged in choking suspect during and after search of his mouth for drugs reinstated because of disputed facts. Williams v. Bramer, #98-10254, 180 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1999).
     327:35 Officers who allegedly choked an arrestee, threw him down the stairs, and stepped on his face were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability; a portion of their actions was captured on videotape and clearly established law gave the plaintiff the right to be free of