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Assault and Battery: Physical

     Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil Liability for the Use of Handcuffs: Part II - Use of Force Against Handcuffed Persons, 2008 (11) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Force and the Fatigue Threshold: The Point of No Return, 2010 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Teaching 4th Amendment Based Use-of-Force, 2012 (7) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.

     A man leaving a train station was confronted by a plainclothes police officer who, with the assistance of other plainclothes officers, forced him to the ground. He was charged with resisting arrest and was acquitted, then sued the officers and the city for excessive use of force and malicious prosecution. He claimed the first officer had not identified himself as police, which the officer disputed, claiming that when he identified himself the plaintiff had fled to avoid being frisked. A federal appeals court overturned a verdict for the defendants. The trial court properly admitted evidence of the marijuana found in the plaintiff’s pocket. While the marijuana was unknown to the officers at the time, it arguably tended to corroborate their account of his behavior. The jury instructions on Terry investigatory stops, however, were inadequate. Over objection, the court instructed the jury only on investigatory stops but not frisks. The officer’s testimony indicated that he was starting a frisk when he first approached the plaintiff and that he did not have reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. The plaintiff was entitled to have the jury know that the attempted frisk, which produced the use of force, was unjustified. Further, the jury asked whether plainclothes officers must identify themselves when conducting a stop. The trial judge said no, while in all but the most unusual circumstances, where identification would itself make the situation more dangerous, plainclothes officers must identify themselves when initiating a stop. These errors were not harmless, requiring further proceedings. Doornbos v. City of Chicago, #16-1770, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 15696 (7th Cir.).

     Officers responding to a 911 call arrested a man at the scene of an alleged domestic assault. He sued for excessive force and unlawful arrest, claiming that the officers lacked arguable probable cause to arrest him for either domestic assault or obstruction of legal process and were not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim because he did not pose a threat to the safety of officers or others, did not commit a crime in their presence, was not resisting arrest, and that he began complying with the officers before they used force. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the officers on the basis of qualified immunity. It concluded that the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest for domestic assault as they heard a heated argument while outside the residence, upon entry they saw the victim crying on the couch while the arrestee was yelling and standing over her, and the arrestee did not immediately comply with orders to get on the ground.  Additionally, the force used was not excessive since a reasonable officer could have concluded that the arrestee was committing domestic assault, which threatened the safety of another person, and the fact that the arrestee was slow in lowering himself to the ground, as directed by the officers, indicated that he was passively resistant. Hosea v. City of St. Paul, #16-3613, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 15022 (8th Cir.).

     Two police officers arrested an obese man at his residence while executing a no-knock warrant for cocaine. In the course of the arrest, the officers allegedly threw him to the ground, twice activated a Taser in the dart mode, choked him, punched and kicked him in the face, pushed him into a face-down position, pressed his face into the ground, and pulled his hands behind his back to handcuff him. He had a heart attack during the arrest and died.  A federal appeals court held that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the decedent was actively resisting arrest and whether the force used was excessive and unreasonable, so the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. If the decedent was not actively resisting arrest when he was thrown to the ground and the Taser was used, the force used would have been excessive. Darden v. City of Fort Worth, #16-11244, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14693 (5th Cir.).

     A police officer on crowd-control duty was not entitled to qualified immunity in a post-verdict motion on an excessive force claim arising from an incident in which he allegedly grabbed a man from behind by the collar and dragged him backward and downward to the pavement after observing him “taunting” K-9 dogs. The jury found the defendant officer engaged in excessive force, awarding in $140,000 in damages. A reasonable officer in his position would have understood that his actions violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Ciolino v. Gikas, #16-2107, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 11599 (1st Cir.).

     The plaintiff was stopped and questioned while he was at a car wash and he did not commit any crimes. Furthermore, he was not resisting arrest, and was not acting aggressively towards an officer or threatening an officer’s safety. Under these circumstances, the use of physical force against the plaintiff by a deputy on the scene and by an off-duty officer who intervened in the situation did not entitle the defendants to qualified immunity on excessive force claims. The plaintiff's right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established at the time. Perry v. Wolfe, #16-3229, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 9882 (8th Cir.).

     While an arrestee’s nolo contendere (no contest) plea conceded probable cause for his arrest, defeating his false arrest claim, excessive force claims against the arresting deputy were reinstated. The injuries he sustained during his arrest for failing to have a driver’s license were not de minimis (minimal). Rather, the record showed that he suffered medically documented severe, permanent injuries from the deputy’s unprovoked and completely unnecessary frontal-body blows to his chest and throwing him against the car-door jamb in the course of arresting him. At the time, he was cooperating with officers and not resisting whatsoever, not even raising his voice. Applying the “obvious-clarity” method analysis, the appeals court concluded that no particularized preexisting case law was necessary for it to be clearly established that what the deputy did violated plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from the excessive use of force in his arrest. Stephens v. DeGiovanni, #15-10206, 852 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2017).

     FBI agents and Bureau of Land Management agents searched 12 properties and arrested 22 people in a number of Utah locations, targeting persons trafficking illegally obtained Native American artifacts. One day after the search of a doctor’s home as part of these raids, and his subsequent arrest and release on bond, he killed himself. His estate sued, claiming that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the use of excessive force during the incident. A federal appeals court upheld a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The agent who directed the raid did not use excessive force in violation of the doctor's rights under the Fourth Amendment because he directed other agents to detain the doctor, his wife, and his daughter while as many as 22 agents, who were wearing soft body armor and carrying guns, searched the house. Estate of James Redd v. Love, #16-4010, 848 F.3d 899 (10th Cir. 2017).
     A motorist stopped for a traffic offense met his burden of rebutting the defendant officer’s qualified immunity defense. The court concluded that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the incident, and that the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of then-existing clearly established law. In this case, he stopped the plaintiff for a minor traffic offense and abruptly escalated to a takedown, The motorist had presented no immediate threat or risk of flight. He allegedly offered, at most, passive resistance, including asking whether he was under arrest, which if true would not justify the level of force utilized. The officer also had his Taser aimed at the motorist’s back while he stood against his vehicle, facing away from the officer, with his empty hands displayed behind his back, not presenting any threat. Hanks v. Rogers, #15-11295, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 5927 (5th Cir.).
     Because West Virginia police officers have authority to make arrests for minor traffic offenses, including the expired inspection sticker the plaintiff motorist had, his arrest was supported by probable cause even though the officer made the arrest for assault and obstruction rather than the expired sticker. As to his excessive force claim, the plaintiff suffered only abrasions minor enough that he treated them at home and did not seek medical attention.  An efficient, lawful arrest causing the arrestee to suffer only de minimis (minimal) injuries cannot support a claim for excessive force. Pegg v. Herrnberger. #15-1999, 845 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2017).
     A motorist arrested for DUI sued the arresting officer for allegedly using excessive force in making the arrest. Rejecting this claim, a federal appeals court noted that the arrestee resisted being arrested, trying to avoid being handcuffed, lurching to the side and stating "no, no" while clearly drunk and obstinate. The officer's actions in carrying out the initial takedown was not constitutionally unreasonable founder clearly established law. There was no case law establishing that it was unreasonable for the officer to use non-deadly punches to gain control of the arms of a drunken, actively resisting arrestee. The force used by the officer was the kind of "split-second" judgment in a difficult situation which qualified immunity was intended to protect. Griggs v. Brewer, #16-10221, 841 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2016).
     A man who allegedly ingested bath salts was engaged in erratic behavior, causing five police officers to attempt to take him into protective custody. While trying to restrain him, they placed him in a face-down position on the ground while two of them exerted significant force on his shoulders and neck. He died during the incident. The defendant officers were granted qualified immunity, except for claims against two officers who allegedly used excessive force after the decedent ceased resisting. A federal appeals court rejected an appeal, finding that disputed material facts as to whether the use of force continued for five minutes after resistance stopped, as the plaintiff claimed, or only 66 seconds, as the officers argued, precluded summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. It was, the court found, clearly established in September 2012 that exerting significant continued force on a person's back while he was in a face-down prone position after being subdued constituted excessive force. McCue v. City of Bangor, Maine, #15-2460, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17496 (1st Cir.).
     Three officers forcibly removed a man from his pickup truck when he refused to comply with lawful orders to exit. He was heavily intoxicated, as well as morbidly obese and handicapped. In the course of the extraction, he suffered a serious injury that rendered him quadriplegic. He died a few months later. A federal appeals court held that the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims because, even accepting the plaintiffs' version of the facts, they did not violate the decedent's rights. The approximately two minutes that one officer spent negotiating with him before deciding to resort to force was not objectively unreasonable, especially in light of the driver's explicit and repeated refusal to comply with requests to exit the pickup and the possibility that he might have had access to a weapon or could have tried to drive his huge, elevated truck into the police car. The officers used no weapons, only their hands. Sullivan v. City of Round Rock, #15-51204, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 16843 (5th Cir.).
     An informant told police that a man was engaged in selling crack cocaine from his apartment and answered his door with a handgun in hand. A SWAT team executed a “High Risk Warrant Services” form. Their plan for the raid called for a "dynamic entry" by 20 officers to secure the premises within 30 seconds and authorized the use of flashbang grenades. At the time of the raid, the man's mother was visiting and another of her sons was present along with the suspect's girlfriend. The officers breached the door with a battering ram, and one of them saw the suspect's mother move towards the door. Another officer looked through the doorway, saw no one, and tossed a flashbang inside. The blast severely injured the mother's leg. The raid found narcotics and a handgun. A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the defendants on the mother's excessive force claim as supported by the evidence. A jury statement that “While we agree that this was a horrible instance ... the errors made by the Chicago Police Department as a whole cannot fall on the shoulders of these two defendants” was consistent with the verdict. Flournoy v. City of Chicago, #14-3776, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 13343 (7th Cir.).
     A courtroom marshal was not entitled to absolute immunity on excessive force claims by two bail enforcement agents removed from a court room at a judge's request. He was not performing a judicial function, and allegedly used force in excess of what the judge commanded and the Constitution allows. He was, however, entitled to qualified immunity from liability, since there was then "chaos" in the court room and undisputed evidence that at least one of the two plaintiffs was intent on disobeying the court's instructions. It was not "beyond debate" that the marshal used an unreasonable level of force. Brooks v. Clark County, #14-16424, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12510 (9th Cir.).
     Two officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in a female motorist's excessive force lawsuit. They violated clearly established law prohibiting the use of force against a misdemeanant who did not pose an immediate threat to herself or others if her version of the incident was true. She claimed that after she was stopped for driving with a suspended license, they started pounding on her car with batons, demanding that she exit the vehicle. When she asked for assurances that she would not be hurt, they allegedly smashed the car's windows, pulled her through a broken window by her arms and hair, and threw her on the glass-littered pavement. Davis v. Clifford, #15-139, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 10648 (10th Cir.).
     False arrest claims were properly rejected where, when the officers first viewed some photographs, they were justified in concluding that they qualified as unlawful child pornography. The court also properly found that the force used by named officers during the arrest was reasonable under the circumstances, as they had to push him along because he lightly resisted. The force they used caused him no injury, but the trial court erred in finding as matter of law that named officers lacked a realistic opportunity to intervene in an alleged assault on the plaintiff by an unidentified officer. Figueroa v. Mazza, 14-4116, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 10152 (2nd Cir.).
     An arrestee claimed that an officer used excessive force during his arrest, specifically pulling him down three steps after he surrendered, placing his knee on his back, and allowing a police dog to continue to bite him. The officer claimed that he had released the dog only after the plaintiff failed to respond to commands to come out of hiding. He also contended that the dog could not hear the command to cease his attack because of the plaintiff's screaming. Upholding a denial of qualified immunity, a federal appeals court ruled that a jury could reasonably find, if the facts were as alleged by the plaintiff, that the force used was excessive. It was clearly established at the time of the incident that no more than minimal force should be used during the arrest of a non-resisting or passively resisting person.
Becker v. Elfriech, #15-1363, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 8703 (7th Cir.).
     An officer and his partner encounter a woman walking out into traffic with her face covered in blood. She pointed to her husband, who she said struck her, and one of the officers walked towards him, ordering him to stop, put his hands behind his back, and stop screaming. The man ignored these orders and was grabbed. He attempted to twist away, causing him to fall. After being handcuffed, he continued to struggle and fell down again. Hours later, at the police station, he complained of pain, and was taken to a hospital where an arm fracture was diagnosed. He pled guilty to resisting arrest but sued for excessive force. The trial judge stated a deadline for the plaintiff to disclose his expert witness. He failed to provide the expert's report and failed to respond to a motion to strike the expert's testimony. He was barred from presenting the expert at trial. The federal appeals court upheld a verdict for the officer. Challenges to evidentiary rulings were rejected as the plaintiff failed to provide transcripts regarding tho challenged rulings. Hall v. Jung, #15-2102, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 6590 (7th Cir.).
     Officers investigating an armed robbery gave chase to a 16-year-old boy. A neighbor informed one of the officers that they were chasing a boy with Down Syndrome, and the officer allegedly replied "shut up, get out of my way." The boy stopped running at a parking lot where his family was waiting. The same officer admitted that he saw the boy surrendering, but allegedly grabbed him from behind, forcefully pulled him from his mother's arms, and slammed him hard into a vehicle. The boy allegedly was not resisting and was crying in pain as he was handcuffed, and was kept pinned by the officer, who was twice his weight, for 15 minutes while telling the boy's parents that they were lucky he "didn't shoot." The second officer, according to the plaintiffs, did nothing, but did hurl racial slurs at the Hispanic family. When the officers were informed by radio that the robbers were caught, they released the boy. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity, finding that, if the facts were as alleged, a jury could conclude that excessive force was used, and that the second officer could be held liable on a failure to intervene claim. Ortiz v. Kazimer, #15-3453, 811 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2016).
     Two African-American men and four female friends, some of whom were Caucasian, walked past a police precinct while leaving an entertainment district where they had spent the evening drinking. Off-duty officers, including an African-American man, congregated in a nearby parking lot and were drinking. The African-American officer approached the group passing by and told them to move along, and referred to some of the females in the group as "snow bunnies," intended as a racial slur. One of the men questioned who the officer was. The officer allegedly said, "I'll show you who I am," and attacked the man. Other off-duty officers then joined in punching and kicking, and shouted "stop resisting arrest." Both men were taken into custody and taken to a hospital. Charges of resisting, public intoxication, and disorderly conduct were dismissed. Qualified immunity was denied to the off-duty African-American officer, as a jury could reasonably find that his conduct violated the arrestees' rights. McDonald v. Flake, #14-6370, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 3627 (6th Cir.).
     Officers pursuing a man's son following a vehicular pursuit arrived at the father's house. The father claimed that while the officers were attempting to subdue his son, who they mistakenly believed had an outstanding arrest warrant, one of them kicked him and another tackled him from behind. The officers disputed his version of the events. An appeals court found that, under either version of events, the officers could reasonably believe that the father was trying to interfere with a lawful arrest and therefore did not use excessive force under the circumstances. Dawson v. Brown, #15-1517, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 17581 (7th Cir.).
     Summary judgment was improperly granted to a police detective on a suspect's excessive force lawsuit. No officer in 2009 could reasonably have believed that it was permissible under the Fourth Amendment to jump on the back of a prone and compliant suspect gratuitously with enough force to break his spine and rib, as the plaintiff alleged. Rogoz v. City of Hartford, #14-0876, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13945 (2nd Cir.).
     Two homosexual men arrested at home in the early morning on charges of assaulting an officer claimed that the arresting officers refused to allow them to get additional clothing, forcing them to remain in their boxer shorts and only issuing them jumpsuits after they got to the police station. The plaintiffs had repeatedly changed their story, now contending that officers repeatedly struck them and violated their equal protection rights as homosexuals by forcing them to remain in their shorts. They also asserted claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The officers moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs then filed affidavits in response, based on "personal knowledge and belief," for the first time revealing which officers they claimed committed each act. The appeals court upheld the trial's court's rulings striking the affidavits since it was not possible to tell which statements in the affidavits were based on personal knowledge, as required, and which were only based on mere belief. Without the affidavits, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, even construing any remaining evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The court also stated that the complaint about being kept in boxer shorts, even if motivated in part by reaction to the plaintiffs' homosexuality, was not unconstitutional. Ondo v. City of Cleveland, #14-3527, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13474, 2015 Fed. App. 175P (6th Cir.).
     An officer was entitled to qualified immunity in a female motorist's lawsuit claiming that he used excessive force against her during a search of her car after stopping her for a suspected window tint violation. He had probable cause to stop and search her car, and she refused to let him search it, struggling with him to prevent the search and stop him from taking her keys to turn off the car. The only force complained about was two yanks to get her out of the driver's seat. The officer did not use any other force or handcuff her, so his use of force did not violate clearly established law under the circumstances. Merricks v. Adkisson, #14-12801, 785 F.3d 553 (11th Cir. 2015).
     A man was working at his family's dairy farm when a fight broke out which he and ten other people witnessed. Approximately 20 state and local police officers arrived on the scene after the fight ended. One local officer questioned the man about what he had witnessed. A state trooper then yelled at him to take his hands out of his pockets. The man claimed he complied, although he remarked that his hands were cold as he had been milking cows all day. He then started to walk away, having already told his story to the officer. The trooper, subsequently assisted by other officers, then allegedly grabbed, tackled, punched, kicked, and pepper sprayed the man. He subsequently disputed the man's version of events, asserting that the altercation began when the man resisted efforts to force his hands out of his pockets, and that the man struck him and tackled him. Because of these factual disputes, summary judgment for the officers on excessive force claims was improper. Santini v. Fuentes, #14-2938, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 13552 (3rd Cir.).
     A male motorist who was an insulin-dependent diabetic become lightheaded driving home, and pulled over on the shoulder of the road. He took glucose tablets and either fell asleep or became unconscious. A deputy approached the truck and knocked on the window, attempting to identify himself. The driver stated in a mumble that he was trying to recover from low blood sugar, but the deputy believed him to be intoxicated and radioed for another officer engaged in DWI enforcement. The motorist, when the second officer arrived, stated that he should "leave me the fuck alone." He refused several requests that he exit the vehicle, so both officers pulled him out by his legs, causing him to hit the ground. The driver continued to resist, trying to return to the truck and stating that he had a gun in his waistband when they tried to handcuff him. The gun was removed and thrown, and the motorist asked the officers if they were "stupid," as the gun could have discharged. The officers used pepper spray and struck the motorist. EMS personnel arrived, and treated the motorist for hypoglycemia and a nosebleed. Blood alcohol tests for intoxication were negative, and the driver had a broken rib. Upholding a grant of qualified immunity to the officers, a federal appeals court ruled that even had the officers realized that the driver was suffering from hypoglycemia, the driver still refused to comply with orders and was belligerent and impaired, justifying the use of force. The level of force used was objectively reasonable. Schoettle v. Jefferson County, #14-1993, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 9729 (8th Cir.).
     A male motorist who was an insulin-dependent diabetic become lightheaded driving home, and pulled over on the shoulder of the road. He took glucose tablets and either fell asleep or became unconscious. A deputy approached the truck and knocked on the window, attempting to identify himself. The driver stated in a mumble that he was trying to recover from low blood sugar, but the deputy believed him to be intoxicated and radioed for another officer engaged in DWI enforcement. The motorist, when the second officer arrived, stated that he should "leave me the fuck alone." He refused several requests that he exit the vehicle, so both officers pulled him out by his legs, causing him to hit the ground. The driver continued to resist, trying to return to the truck and stating that he had a gun in his waistband when they tried to handcuff him. The gun was removed and thrown, and the motorist asked the officers if they were "stupid," as the gun could have discharged. The officers used pepper spray and struck the motorist. EMS personnel arrived, and treated the motorist for hypoglycemia and a nosebleed. Blood alcohol tests for intoxication were negative, and the driver had a broken rib. Upholding a grant of qualified immunity to the officers, a federal appeals court ruled that even had the officers realized that the driver was suffering from hypoglycemia, the driver still refused to comply with orders and was belligerent and impaired, justifying the use of force. The level of force used was objectively reasonable. Schoettle v. Jefferson County, #14-1993, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 9729 (8th Cir.).
     A man asserted that he had been assaulted by several people, one of whom was an off-duty police officer. A police detective assigned to investigate the incident was alleged to have done almost nothing on the investigation for six weeks, interviewing no witnesses other than the plaintiff, failing to inspect the crime scene, and following no leads, prior to closing the case. The plaintiff sued the detective for violating his right of access to the courts, claiming that the failure to properly investigate the crime resulted in the spoilation of evidence in his lawsuit against his assailants. He also assserted a claim for municipal liability against the city, claiming that it perpetuated a "code of silence" that had the effect of shielding officers from investigation and promoting misconduct. Summary judgment for the defendants was upheld. A federal appeals court found no denial of access to the courts because the defendants did not conceal any facts from the plaintiff that interfered with him suing his assailants. The plaintiff himself knew all the relevant facts of his case, so the detective was entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals court found that, on the municipal liability claim, there was insufficient evidence presented of any widespread practices by the police department. The appeals court further found that the trial court acted within its discretion in awarding costs to the city. Rossi v. City of Chicago, #13-3795, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 10504 (7th Cir.).
     A motorist claimed that a trooper who stopped him screamed at him, pulled him out of the car, and injured him by beating him. The trooper claimed, and the motorist denied, that the motorist bent over as if reaching for something, and that a hammer was visible on the floor. The motorist claimed that the hammer was under the seat and not visible. Following the incident, the motorist's face was bruised and an MRI months later showed "minimal disc bulging, Her claimed neck and upper back pain. Summary judgment in favor of the defendant trooper was reversed by a federal appeals court. There were disputed issues of fact, including as to the seriousness of the plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiff's lack of a medical expert on the issue was not fatal to his claim as the injuries of the type claimed were “within the range of common experience.” A jury could weigh the credibility of the plaintiff's version of the incident versus the trooper's and compare the plaintiff's medical records and subjective assessment of pain against the trooper's medical expert testimony. Ziesmer v. Hagen, #14-2229, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 7713 (8th Cir.).
     A college student studying for exams sat in an area of a D.C. public library reserved for children. A police officer asked her to move, so she went to a young adult area after finding no seats available in the adult area, although she was over the age for the young adult area also. The officer asked her to move again and an altercation ensued, culminating with her arrest. The student sued the officer and the District of Columbia for excessive use of force. At trial, the officer and the arrestee disputed the specifics of the incident and an "inconclusive" video of part of what occurred was introduced. The defense also introduced the testimony of a librarian, which supported the officer's version of events, but had not identified him as a potential witness prior to trial. The librarian's testimony was allowed as an impeachment witness to impeach the plaintiff's testimony. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A federal appeals court reversed, ordering a new trial, and finding that the librarian's testimony was improperly admitted as it went beyond impeachment to essentially collaborate the officer's testimony in a case where the trial turned on the jury's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, and the librarian's testimony likely influenced the outcome. Standley v. Edmonds-Leach, #13-7104, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 6528 (D.C. Cir.).
     A woman claimed that an officer who came to the door of her home looking for a missing juvenile grabbed her arm, threw her to the ground, punched her, jumped on her, handcuffed her, and pulled her to her feet by her hair. A federal appeals court ruled that the officer was properly denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. If her version of the incident was believed, the officer had, at most, reason to believe that she might be guilty of a misdemeanor of contributing to the minor's delinquency, she answered all the officer's questions, gave no indication that she was inclined to harm him, and was full compliant and responsive to all his instructions and requests. Smith v. Ray, #12-1503, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 4391 (4th Cir.).
     Police pulled over a female motorist based on confusing statements concerning a male suspect heard by a 911 operator during a phone call. The woman claimed that the officers ordered her out of her car at gunpoint, threw her on the ground, handcuffed her, and detained her for approximately ten minutes. The male suspect was not in the car. A federal appeals court upheld a denial of qualified immunity to the officers. If the woman's version of the incident were true, the officers used excessive force against her despite the fact that she was clearly afraid and was completely cooperating with their orders. While there had been reasonable suspicion to make the stop, if the plaintiff's version of events were true, the incident turned into an unlawful arrest when the officers continued after determining that she was a woman alone in the car. Brown v. Lewis, #14-1392, 2015 U.S. App. Lewis 2917, 2004 Fed. App. 354P (6th Cir.).
     A hospital patient being treated for pneumonia became aggressive and uncooperative. His condition was causing low oxygen levels and may have impacted his mental state. After he started yelling that he was "God," and that hospital staff were trying to kill him, officers were summoned to try to control him and keep him from walking out. A Taser was used once in the dart mode but seemed ineffective, followed by a use of a Taser in the stun mode, which also appeared not to bring the patient under control, and the officers physically fought with him, finally getting handcuffs on him, whereupon hospital staff administered an injection of Haldol and Ativan. He went limp, and vomited clear fluid. CPR failed to revive him and he died. The cause of death was determined to be respiratory insufficiency secondary to pneumonia, with the manner of death being natural, but the medical examiner stated that the use of the Taser "certainly could" have increased the patient's need for oxygen, with the physical struggle exertions exacerbating his underlying pneumonia. The fact that he was placed in a prone position with his hands cuffed behind his back also might have compromised his ability to inhale and get oxygen. In a lawsuit claiming excessive use of force, a federal appeals court upheld a denial of qualified immunity to the officers. A jury could find that the officers violated the decedent's constitutional rights by using a severe level of force against him despite their awareness of his mental instability, the seriousness of his medical condition, and the fact that he only posed a threat to himself and had committed no crime. It was clearly established that it was not objectively reasonable to use a Taser as the initial force employed against a non-criminal subject who was seriously ill, was passively resisting, and only posed a threat to himself, whether or not a warning was first given. Aldaba v. Marshall County, #13-7034, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 1822 (10th Cir.).
     A man claimed that while he was in traffic court a deputy beckoned him to a group of officers, warning him not to "eyeball" them. When he objected that he was not doing so, an officer allegedly told him to shut up, and grabbed him. When he asked the officer to let go, he claimed, a number of officers handcuffed him, threw him against a wall, causing a nose bleed, threw him to the floor and twice deployed a Taser in the stun mode against him, before hog tying him and dragging him away. He was subsequently found guilty of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest. A federal appeals court overturned the dismissal of an excessive force claim. A finding of excessive force on the pat of the officers would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction fr disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, so that the conviction did not bar the civil rights claim. Colbert v. City of Monticello, #13-3037, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 24555 (8th Cir.).
     A woman claimed that a deputy sheriff subjected her to an unreasonable seizure and used excessive force at a courthouse security checkpoint. Overturning summary judgment on her federal civil rights claims, the appeals court ruled that the trial judge erroneously applied a substantive due process/shocks the conscience legal standard rather than the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. The defendant deputy was, however, entitled to official immunity on Georgia state law claims. West v. Davis, #13-14805, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 17319 (11th Cir.).
     An arrestee stated a viable claim for excessive force. If, as he claimed, his head was slammed against the pavement with extreme force after he was handcuffed and was lying prone on the ground, the force used would have been excessive, disproportionate, and unnecessary. This would be the case even if he did lift his head off the hot pavement. Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, as it was clearly established that a handcuffed, non-resisting arrestee had a right to be free from excessive force. Saunders v. Duke, #12-11401, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 17334 (11th Cir.).
     A motorist who had smoked marijuana and drunk beer admitted to an officer who saw him exiting his car with a beer that he was on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. He did not have a driver's license and started to run away when the officer told him to take his hands out of his pockets. Another officer captured him and took him to the ground, after which the first officer jumped a fence and landed on him, which broke his jaw. The plaintiff's version of events, if true, was one from which a rational jury could decide that the first officer deliberately inflicted the blow that resulted in the broken jaw.
The second officer, however, could not be held liable for failure to intervene as he had no reasonable opportunity to stop the first officer from landing on the plaintiff. Miller v. Gonzalez, #11-2906, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 15085 (7th Cir.).
     When two officers allegedly jerked a man up by his arms at a time when he was already handcuffed and under control, and did so with sufficient force to cause serious injury to his shoulder area, this claim, if true, violated clearly established law, so the officers were properly denied summary judgment. It was, however, reasonable for the officers to detain and handcuff the man, who was the roommate of a parolee whose home they were searching, since he was belligerent and refused to remain seated. Blazek v. Iowa City, #12-3785, 12-3786, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 15008 (8th Cir.).
     Officers responded to a 911 call reporting a situation in which an ex-boyfriend was allegedly brandishing a rifle in an argument with his former girlfriend after having been released from jail on a domestic abuse charge. An officer encountering the man running in the area, with no rifle visible, ordered him to the ground and used force to try to get him down when he did not obey, including kicking and punching. The man fled over a wood fence. Four officers eventually caught him, but he continued to resist, gabbing the fence to try to pull himself up. They punched and kneed him, struck him in the back with the butt of a shotgun, lay on top of him, and repeatedly used a Taser in the dart mode on him in an attempt to subdue him. They managed to use three sets of handcuffs to connect his arms behind his back, and rolled him over. He was not breathing and he died. No weapon was seen during the encounter, and none was found. The officer involved in the initial encounter was entitled to qualified immunity, as a reasonable officer would not have known that a decision to kick and hit the resisting man in an attempt to detain him clearly violated the Fourth Amendment. The officers involved in the second encounter were also entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiff failed to show that any of the force used was unconstitutional. Further, even if it had been unconstitutional, that was not clearly established at the time under these circumstances. There was insufficient evidence that the officers intentionally apprehended the decedent in a manner that they believed was prohibited by law. A state law wrongful death claim and a vicarious liability claim against the defendant city were both also rejected, with official immunity applied to these claims. Smith v. City of Minneapolis, #13-1157, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 10538 (8th Cir.).
     A police officer allegedly made a "high-risk" stop of a woman's vehicle, which he mistakenly identified as stolen based on an automatic license plate reader's error. She was detained for up to 20 minutes at gunpoint, forced to her knees, and handcuffed. The dismissal of the lawsuit was reversed, as a rational jury could find for the plaintiff on her wrongful seizure, false arrest, or excessive force claims. Qualified immunity was not available as the court could not say, as a matter of law, that the officer could have reasonably believed that the force used was lawful under the alleged circumstances. There was no indication at the scene of the incident that the motorist posed any threat. Green v. City and County of San Francisco, #11-17892, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 8824 (9th Cir.).
     Three men claimed that a group of officers engaged in an unprovoked attack on them in the early morning hours outside a nightclub. A jury awarded $36,000 to one plaintiff for one officer's use of force against him. A settlement agreement was subsequently reached. On appeal, the court found that the complaint had adequately stated a claim for bystander liability, but found that this ruling only impacted the one officer against whom the jury awarded damages, as he was the only defendant against whom any of the plaintiff's claims survived dismissal, as to his possible bystander liability for actions taken against the other two plaintiffs by
     A man claimed that he was beaten by police officers and sustained a fractured collarbone, a SLAP-type labral tear, and facial injuries leaving permanent scarring and requiring two nose surgeries. He also became legally deaf in one ear and has reduced hearing in the other. A federal appeals court reversed the dismissal of a deliberate indifference denial of medical care claim against the doctor at a hospital emergency room, finding that if the complaint were amended to allege two things claimed in the plaintiff's opposition to the doctor's motion to dismiss, it would show a sufficiently culpable state of mind for a constitutional violation. Those two things were that the officers falsely told the female doctor that one of the officers he allegedly attacked was a woman, and that he should therefore be "ignored and left alone." Nielsen v. Rabin, #12-4313, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 2745 (2nd Cir.).
     A man claimed that officers attacked him while he was standing on his porch in his yard, without specifying which officers did what. The officers and a neighbor who had called police, believing him to be intoxicated, testified that he had lunged at an officer, after which he was taken down and arrested. A video of the incident showed the plaintiff hitting his head against the cage of the patrol car several times, contradicting his version of the incident. Summary judgment was granted on state law negligence and battery claims. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on federal civil rights claims of excessive force. Because the officers failed to concede to the version of the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there was a disputed issue of material fact barring a decision on appeal.    Younes v. Pellerito, #3-1103, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 385, 2014 Fed. App. 7P (6th Cir.).
     A man arrested as a suspect in a double homicide sued an officer, claiming that while he was being transported she had kicked him in the face and hit him with a flashlight. In the civil rights lawsuit, the plaintiff fired his appointed lawyer, acting as his own attorney but later brought the lawyer back. He told the judge that he was ok with proceeding with the jury despite the fact that they had seen him arguing with his lawyer, and the jury returned a verdict for the officer. A federal appeals court ruled that he had waived his right to challenge a jury he had tried at the beginning to have removed for cause when he gave seemingly contradictory statements about whether he had ever been involved in the justice system. Washington v. Parkinson, #12-3042, 737 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2013).
     A federal appeals court upheld the criminal convictions of four police officers on charges related to the beating death of a detainee while he was in their custody. The court rejected an argument that the trial court erred by sentencing one of the defendants using the federal sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the sentencing, rather than the more favorable provisions of a guidelines manual in effect at the time of the crime. The court rejected an argument that this violated the constitutional provision against ex post facto punishments. U.S. v. Pagan-Ferrer, #10-1518, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 23566 (1st Cir.).
     A town has reached an $11.6 million settlement with a family whose home was raided without a search warrant by officers in 2003, with officers allegedly arresting five family members without probably cause and beating them up. No convictions were obtained on any of the charges. The plaintiffs claimed that one family member, a boy who was 17 years old at the time of the incident, subsequently developed a mental illness as a result of the beating and an alleged threat by one officer to kill him if he didn't leave town. They claimed that he now requires 24 hours a day supervision. Ramos v. Cicero, #1:04-cv-02502, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill.).
     A member of a “cop watch” group was holding a video camera on the street while talking on a cell phone. An officer told him that he had to move, and he replied that he was conducting a “cop watch.” The man compiled with orders to “come here” and walked toward a police van. When he got there, an officer allegedly exit the van, knocked the cell phone and video camera out of his hands, told him to turn around, and handcuffed him, after which two officers started to beat him. A chokehold was allegedly used on him, and he was pushed into a police van without warning, causing him to fall and strike his face against the floor. The trial court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim because, at the time of the incident (2008), it was not clearly established in the 8th Circuit that an officer violates the rights of an arrestee by applying force that causes only "de minimis" (minimal) injuries. Here, the arrestee's contusions and swelling were injuries classified as de minimis. The officers were not, however, entitled to qualified immunity on an unlawful arrest claim since, under the plaintiff's version of the incident, he was not trespassing or obstructing the sidewalk, and no reasonable officers could have concluded that he was committing those crimes. Robinson v. City of Minneapolis, #10-3067, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 106342 (D. Minn.).
     A 14-year-old boy claimed that police arrested him without probable cause for disorderly conduct when he was standing outside a building waiting for his mother, not doing anything illegal. He further claimed that an officer later used excessive force by shoving him into a holding cell, causing him to hit his head on a hard surface. The officers claimed that he was drinking and fell because he was intoxicated. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant officers. Reversing for a new trial, a federal appeals court held that the defendants were improperly allowed to cross examine the plaintiff about a subsequent unrelated underage drinking arrest to try to convince the jury that he had been intoxicated at the time of his first arrest. They were also improperly allowed to question him about a subsequent conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle. The improper questioning was not harmless, since it could not be said that it did not substantially sway the jury. Barber v. City of Chicago, #12-2562, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 16047 (7th Cir.).
     A man claimed that a deputy used excessive force and tackled him as he reached for a fallen memory chip from a surveillance camera set up near a property line that including a recording of statements the man had made suggesting that he may have trespassed onto a nearby lot. The deputy, on the other hand, said that he merely grabbed the plaintiff's arm to prevent him from picking up the chip. The deputy was entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiff did not show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. The plaintiff had not identified any closely similar case or established that the officer's use of force was so obviously excessive as to defeat qualified immunity.  Findlay v. Lendermon, #12-3881, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 12012 (7th Cir.).
     When a man and a magistrate's daughter ended their engagement, the man tried to retrieve a diamond engagement ring and other items of personal property. Following that, allegations were made that he had stolen his ex-girlfriend's dog. This resulted in a police chase down rural roads and a brief arrest of the man and his father. Both arrestees then filed a false arrest and conspiracy lawsuit against the magistrate, the deputy who made the arrest, and the deputy's supervisor. A federal appeals court ruled that there had been probable cause for the arrests, and that no excessive force was used by the deputy in grabbing the son by the arm, forcing him to the ground, placing him in handcuffs, and searching him, since the deputy could not have known whether he was armed or would resist arrest. There was no real evidence of conspiracy, and the magistrate did not act under color of law in reporting the alleged theft of the dog. Myers v. Bowman, #11-14802, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7216 (11th Cir.).
     Police encountered a running naked man speaking nonsensically. When they tried to subdue him, he bit an officer and a physical altercation ensued in which an officer fell on top of both the suspect and a fellow officer. One officer folded his legs around the suspect and gripped his chin with his arm, and a third officer kneeled on the suspect's calves. One officer allegedly wrapped his arm around the suspect's neck. Two officers allegedly continued to hold the man face down after he was secured. The man became unresponsive and summoned paramedics could not revive him, so he died. The coroner concluded the death was from an acute psychotic episode with excited delirium due to LSD intoxication and cardiopulmonary arrest. The pathologist who carried out the autopsy noted injuries consistent with asphyxia, and the plaintiffs in an excessive force lawsuit presented an opinion that asphyxia caused the death. The police department had both a use of force policy and a "positional asphyxia" policy warning that those who are acting psychotic due to drugs, alcohol or mental illness can be particularly susceptible to death. Two officers stated that they had not considered that policy. The officers were properly denied qualified immunity. Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, #11-4039, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7094, 2013 Fed. App. 0101P (6th Cir.).
     An officer who stopped a motorist for having a cracked windshield began to suspect that he was intoxicated. In the course of arresting him, the officer believed that the motorist was resisting, and threw him to the ground. The driver suffered a traumatic brain injury. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim, since it had not been clearly established, as of May 14, 2005, the date of the incident, that such a use of force against a possibly intoxicated person was excessive. The appeals court reversed summary judgment in favor of the city, however, as, if the driver, as he claimed, had not been resisting, and did not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or anyone else, the takedown maneuver might not have been justified. The trial court had rejected municipal liability on the basis that the plaintiff's constitutional rights had not been violated. If they were, there remained the question of whether a city policy or custom had been the moving force behind the violation. Becker v. Bateman, #11-4054, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 4059 (10th Cir.).
     A police chief, dressed in street clothes, and without identifying himself as police, allegedly charged into a man, pushing him ten to fifteen feet backward into the side of a pickup truck causing him injuries. A federal appeals court found that the police chief was not entitled to qualified immunity. If the facts were as the plaintiff claimed, a reasonable jury could find that he used excessive force and unreasonably caused severe injuries without justification. Under state law, the police chief was not a final policymaker for the city, and no reasonable jury could find the city liable for his actions. The city was properly granted summary judgment. Atkinson v. City of Mountain View, #11-3352, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 2703 (8th Cir.).
     A federal jury in Chicago returned a verdict in favor of a plaintiff and against the city on a claim that the city had a persistent widespread custom or practice of protecting officers from citizen complaints. The suit had been brought by a female bartender who had been assaulted by an off-duty officer. A persistent widespread custom or practice had been alleged to constitute a de facto policy of concealing or suppressing investigations into police officer misconduct, along with a “code of silence” within the police department. The jury also found that the officer conspired with others under color of law in violation of the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights to free speech. It awarded $850,000 in damages.Obrycka v. City of Chicago, #07 C 2372, U.S. Dist. Court (N.D. Ill. November 13, 2012). The court subsequently denied a motion to vacate the judgment concerning the "code of silence." The court found that the "judgment’s precedential value weighs against granting the parties’ motion to vacate the judgment." Obrycka v. City of Chicago, #07 C 2372, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 179990 (NJ.D. Ill.). The city stated that would pay the plaintiff compensatory damages in the amount of $850,000, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount yet to be determined. The city also stated that it will forego its right to appeal pursuant to the parties’ postjudgment settlement. In an earlier decision, the trial judge found that there was evidence that the defendant officer tried to intimidate and threaten the victim from disclosing the videotape of the incident because he knew, that without the tape, there would be no case against him. Obrycka v. City of Chicago, #07 C 2372, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22818 (N.D. Ill.).
     Police stopped a motorist driving a stolen car. Police officers smashed the car's window and dragged the driver through it. The trial court found that this use of force was reasonable but allowed the issue of whether the officers used excessive force by allegedly beating him with batons after removing the arrestee from the car to go to the jury, which returned a verdict for the officers. The appeals court ruled that because of a factual dispute as to whether the arrestee's hands were on the steering wheel or making furtive gestures when the officers smashed the window, it had been erroneous to grant summary judgment on the initial use of force, since this was relevant to whether he then posed a threat to the officers. The erroneous jury instructions stating that the initial use of force was reasonable as a matter of law required reversal of the jury verdict also, since it prevented them from properly considering the totality of the circumstances. Coles v. Eagle, #11-16471, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 24923 (9th Cir.).
     A homeowner sued an officer for his warrantless entry into her front yard. She claimed to have suffered injuries when he kicked down the yard's front gate to enter in pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had, at most, committed a misdemeanor offense of disobeying an officer's lawful order to halt. Overturning qualified immunity for the officer, the appeals court ruled that a reasonable officer should have known that his warrantless entry into the curtilage of the home under these circumstances amounted to an unconstitutional search not justified by exigent circumstances or the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. Sims v. Stanton, #11-55401, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 24803 (9th Cir.).
     A Vietnam veteran suffering from severe post-traumatic stress disorder was combative and disoriented at a hospital emergency room, where his family had brought him for treatment of an injury. Two police officers placed him under arrest under a state mental hygiene law as a person who appears mentally ill and acts in a way likely to cause serious harm to himself or others. He and an officer subsequently fought while he was handcuffed. The arrestee claimed that a beating from the officer aggravated his existing back pain and post-traumatic stress disorder. The jury in an excessive force lawsuit awarded $60,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. A federal appeals court upheld the award, although ruling that either the plaintiff would have to accept a reduction of punitive damages to $100,000 or undergo a new trial on the punitive damages issue. The appeals court also found that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying the defendant officer's motion for a continuance after an illness prevented him from attending the first three days of the five-day trial. Payne v. Jones, #09-5201, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 20665 (2nd Cir.).
     A group of men were outside one of their residences when unmarked police cars pulled up, demanded to know what they were doing, and ordered them to empty their pockets. When an officer seized keys for the residence and walked toward it, the resident objected and he was handcuffed and then forced to the pavement and allegedly hit and kicked. The officers subsequently left without making any formal arrests. The detained resident sued for false arrest, excessive force, and the failure of a number of officers to intervene. A jury verdict in favor of the defendant officers was upheld on appeal. The appeals court found that any possible flaws in the failure to intervene claim instructions to the jury were harmless, as was the trial court's ruling allowing evidence that the detained plaintiff had several prior arrests. Sanchez v. City of Chicago, #10-3801, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 22555 (7th Cir.).
     A man's refusal to sign his $156 bar tab gave a police officer probable cause to arrest him for theft of restaurant service, even if the plaintiff was correct that he was not actually required to sign. Rejecting an excessive force claim, the court found that any aggravation of the arrestee's old shoulder injury was attributable to the routine police procedure of handcuffing his hands behind his back, rather than any improper force. Failure to train and supervise claims were properly rejected in light of the lack of any underlying violation of the plaintiff's rights. Royster v. Nichols, #10-3798, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 22355 (8th Cir.).
     Officers did not use excessive force against an arrestee when it was undisputed that he refused to obey orders to turn around and give up his right arm. Verbal commands were attempted first, followed by an attempt to grab the arrestee's arm, before a Taser was used briefly in the stun mode and quickly withdrawn. The officers then pinned the arrestee down as he kicked and screamed. When the officers realized that the arrestee was injured, with his elbow dislocated, they immediately called for help. The forces used were measured and ascending responses to noncompliance. Poole v. City of Shreveport, #11-30158, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 17243 (5th Cir.).
     DEA agents who executed a search warrant at a mobile home occupied by suspected drug dealers allegedly pointed weapons at and handcuffed two adults and two children who were present. They also pushed one of the adults onto the floor. Rejecting assault and battery claims against the agents for the force used against the adults, an appeals court found that the dangerous situation of carrying out a search on premises occupied by drug traffickers justified the force used. There were genuine issues of material fact, however, as to whether the force used against the 11 and 14 year old children was reasonable. The lawsuit was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Avina v. U.S., #11-55004, 681 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2012).
     Officers allegedly detained a man at a gas station, pointing a gun at him and handcuffing him. They then drove him to his apartment where he claimed they planted a gun and some marijuana and proceeded to conduct a search. When he refused to sign a consent to the search, an officer hit him in his ribs with his fists and tried to choke him, according to the plaintiff. Qualified immunity was not available on the excessive force claim, regardless of whether the injuries suffered were minimal. No amount of force was justified for the purpose of coercing a consent to a search. Hemphill v. Hale, #11-3116, 677 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2012)
     The dismissal of an arrestee's excessive force claim on the basis that he could not prevail without offering expert witness testimony on what level of force would have been reasonable was erroneous. In the immediate case, the court concluded that there was nothing about the particular use of force that required an expert witness to determine what a reasonable officer would have done under the circumstances. The officers used a Taser against the plaintiff twice in stun mode, as well as using direct physical force while they engaged in a dispute with him over the alleged violation of a child custody order and he brandished a rake. Allgoewer v. City of Tracy, #C067636, 2012 Cal. App. Lexis 782 (3rd Dist.).
     A police officer threw a man down on the ground and arrested him for public intoxication. He did this while responding to a domestic violence call when he saw the man advancing towards another man who was allegedly backing up with his hands raised in a nonthreatening position. The arrestee, who had heart problems, died three years later and his estate sued he officer. A federal appeals court ruled that the officer's action amount to an arrest rather than an investigative detention, and that the facts did not support probable cause for an arrest at that time, since the man was unarmed and was not within reach of the other man. The officer's use of force may have been excessive, as the man was not trying to resist arrest or flee and posed little threat to the safety of others. His right under these circumstances not to be subject to a forceful takedown was clearly established. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Morris v. Noe, #11–5066, 672 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2012).
     Police knocked on a man's door after a motorist whose car had been vandalized reporting seeing him first in the parking lot and then entering the apartment. When he came out of his door, he saw police and turned around to go back inside. The officers grabbed him, and subjected him to a leg sweep, and he chipped a tooth during the encounter. There was no probable cause for an arrest or reasonable suspicion for a detention based solely on the man's prior presence in the lot where the car had been vandalized. Under these circumstances, the man had a right to walk away. The court found that the unlawful arrest claim could continue, and ruled that the trial court should evaluate the excessive force claim independently, as it was not necessarily dependent on whether or not any arrest or detention was proper. Romero v. Story, #11–2139, 672 F.3d 880 (10th Cir. 2012).
     When President Bush was dining at a restaurant during his 2004 reelection campaign, groups of demonstrators both in favor of and opposed to his re-election attempted to gather outside. A federal appeals court has ruled that, if the facts were as alleged, Secret Service agents violated the First Amendment by forcing protesters opposed to the President to move further away from the restaurant than where they permitted supporters of the President to rally. This was enforcement of a content-based restriction. The agents were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that state and local police supervisors could not be held liable for the alleged use of excessive force against the anti-Bush demonstrators, including the use of pepper spray, clubs, and shoving, since there was no indication that they were personally involved. Moss v. United States Secret Service, #10-3615, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 7077 (9th Cir.).
     When three adults and two children walked into the street to hug a number of their family members who were participants in a "Caribbean Carnival Parade," they allegedly ignored police orders to get back on the sidewalk. They claimed that officers used excessive force against them, hitting the children with a baton, and shoving the adults to the ground while beating them. A federal appeals court overturned the dismissal of excessive force claims against some of the officers, finding that the alleged beatings were more violent than what "we would expect in the course of a routine arrest." Rudder v. Williams, #10-7101, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 910 (D.C. Cir.).
     In an arrestee's lawsuit claiming that an officer used excessive force against him during the arrest, the jury rejected the federal civil rights claim, while awarding the plaintiff $125,000 on an assertion that the officer was negligent under Maine state law in the use of force against him. The trial court reduced the award to $10,000, since a state statute limits the personal liability of a government employee to that amount as a maximum recovery. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the statutory limitation did not apply because the officer was covered by an insurance policy, resulting in the possibility of higher liability awards (of either $400,000 or the policy limit) for claims "against a governmental entity or an employee" under the statute. The federal appeals court certified to the Maine Supreme Court an unresolved issue of state law as to whether the higher liability limit only applied to claims against government employees in their official capacity, as opposed to those against them in their individual capacities. The Maine court must also rule on how to interpret a possible ambiguity in the insurance policy's coverage. Fortin v. Titcomb, #10-2370, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 1422 (1st Cir.).
     An excessive force claim against a police chief lacked merit where he was not involved in the removal of an allegedly suicidal man from his parked car by force, including the firing of pepper balls at him. He also was not in a supervisory role over those who removed the man, who were members of an inter-departmental emergency response team. Backes v. Village of Peoria Heights, #10-3748, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 22652 (7th Cir.).
      A sheriff's deputy grabbed the wrist of a motorist who had not been wearing his seatbelt, and who attempted to flee on foot when ordered to stop. When the man broke away, the deputy used a Taser on him, subsequently also using pepper spray and placing his knee on the man's back. In a lawsuit for excessive use of force, a federal appeals court upheld a jury's decision to award only a dollar in nominal damages. It rejected the plaintiff's argument that the pain of being tasered should always be enough to support a more substantial amount of compensatory damages. The court noted that the jury might have reasonably believed that the use of the Taser was justifiable in this case, and that only the subsequent force used was excessive. Frizzell v. Szabo, #10-2955, 647 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2011).
     A man arrested for allegedly buying cocaine died from the effects of cracked ribs he suffered during his arrest, which were allegedly caused by a police beating. His mother was unable, after his death, to find an attorney to file her federal civil rights lawsuit, however, as a police sergeant allegedly came to her home and told her that her son had died in the street due to a gang dispute over drugs. She was denied access to police reports about the arrest and an investigation into her son's death. A report filed in an internal affairs investigation indicating that there may have been a beating and a "cover-up" of the beating was unavailable to her and her prospective lawyers. Years later, after the FBI received an anonymous tip concerning the police beating taking place, and launched an investigation, the mother filed a lawsuit. The defendants argued that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Addressing the issue of whether the statute of limitations was "tolled" (extended) by the alleged cover-up, the appeals court ruled that she could go ahead with her claim. "Equitable estoppel" applied in a case where the plaintiff believed that she had a claim for excessive force but she was "dissuaded from bringing the claim by affirmative misrepresentations and stonewalling by the police" concerning the circumstances that led to her son's death. Estate of Amaro v. City of Oakland, #10-16152, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 15534 (9th Cir.).
    While the plaintiff arrestee was not required to show more than a "de minimus" injury to prevail on his excessive force claim against arresting officers, the law on this subject was not yet clearly established at the time of the incident in question (2005), so the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The officers allegedly held him on the floor, handcuffed him, jammed guns into his back, and then kicked him several times, subsequently choking him when he was in a police vehicle, while the arrestee did not resist. Chambers v. Pennycook, #09-2195, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 11392 (8th Cir.).
     Officers who allegedly shoved one occupant of a residence and pointed assault rifles at all of them while executing search and arrest warrants were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive use of force claim. They allegedly used this force well beyond the time it took to arrest the suspect sought, who was taken into custody and removed almost immediately after the officers entered. The rifles were pointed at the plaintiffs while they were subdued and handcuffed in their rooms. The court found that no reasonable officer would have thought that such conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. They were, however, entitled to qualified immunity for keeping the arrested suspect's teenage sister and parents detained in handcuffs in the living room for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour after the arrest while they searched for weapons believed to be present. Mlodzinski v. Cormier, #10-1966, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 11117 (1st Cir.).
     An arrestee adequately alleged that sheriff's deputies used excessive force against him after entering his house to arrest him for criminal contempt. He claimed that he was asleep alone at the time, and unarmed, and was cooperative when woken. Despite this, the deputies allegedly forcibly dragged him from his bed, pointed guns at him, threatened to shoot him, and violently slammed him against a wall. Ansell v. Ross Twp, #10-1402, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 6202 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     Officers were properly denied qualified immunity on an arrestee's excessive force claim when, according to the plaintiff's version of events, they used "gratuitous" force when he had already surrendered and submitted to arrest. It was undisputed that he did not attempt to flee, resist arrest, or threaten the officers. If the officers did hit and kick him after he surrendered, as he claimed, their use of force was excessive. Wheeler v. City of Cleveland, #09-4089, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5755 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Officers, allegedly mistakenly believing that a man was the person wanted for assaulting a state trooper, pulled him from a car in which he was a passenger, and hit him, causing him injury. They were not entitled to qualified immunity, giving the conflicting stories concerning who initiated the violence. Witt v. West Virginia State Police, #10-10008, 633 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
     An officer claimed that he arrested a man for refusing to accept service of a temporary restraining order that his wife had obtained against him, and used appropriate force when the man violently resisted arrest. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the arrest had been in response to his attempt to call 911 to complain about the officer, and that the officer assaulted him. Refusing to overturn the trial court's denial of qualified immunity to the officer, a federal appeals court noted that the officer's arguments that he was entitled to qualified immunity were based on entirely different facts than those asserted by the plaintiff. Zahn v. City of Trenton, #07-4085, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16796 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     A motorist suffered a diabetic episode resulting in the loss of control of his vehicle, striking two other cars. A chief of police who arrived at the scene of the accident received no response from the motorist when he tried to question him, and mistakenly thought that he was drunk. The motorist was suffering convulsions. The chief was concerned that the motorist might try to flee, as he appeared to be ignoring requests to turn off his engine, and forcibly removed him from his car, throwing him to the ground and handcuffing him. The motorist later sued, claiming excessive force was used in doing so, causing him a broken hip and bruised lung. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the defendant, finding that the plaintiff had adequately alleged that the chief's belief that he was intoxicated was unreasonable, especially as he was wearing a medical alert necklace, which the chief did not check for before using force to remove him. McAllister v. Price, #10-1213, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16685 (7th Cir.).
      An officer was investigating information received that a woman may have been mistreating her minor niece, who was living with her while the child's parents were going through a divorce. While speaking to the officer, the woman came under the delusion that the officer was there to "kidnap" the child, and tried to pull the girl away from the officer, who was conducting a "welfare check" on the girl to see if she was ok. A fight ensued, and the officer handcuffed and arrested the woman. Her excessive force claim was rejected, as the officer's use of force against her, resulting in a scraped cheek and a sore, perhaps sprained, ankle, was reasonable under the circumstances. Her false arrest claim was also rejected. Pearlman v. City of Fort Worth, #10-10056, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 23152 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     A man sitting in his parked car in a public park in the morning, with a bowl of water and a towel or rag in the car, preparing to perform his morning ritual of reading the Bible there, was accused, by a police officer, of having slept in the park overnight. The officer had seen his car there the evening before, and now told him to leave. When he refused, he was arrested for obstruction of an officer. He was also allegedly dragged out of his car, pushed against the police car, and had his face pushed into the hood. The officer had arguable probable cause to make the arrest, a federal appeals court held, based on his observations. Staying in the park overnight when it was closed would have violated local law, and the officer did not know that the man allegedly had a personal ritual of returning to the park to read the Bible or placing a wet cloth on his forehead preparatory to that reading. The force used in making the arrest was also found to be minimal and not excessive. Howell v. City of Lithonia, #09-11599, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20190 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     A grandmother claimed that she suffered a heart attack at her home because officers used excessive force during a raid there. In her excessive force lawsuit, a federal appeals court held that the plaintiff failed to present viable claims against three senior police officers involved in the planning of the raid, or against the town based on the actions of its police chief. Officers conducted a "surround and call out" operation at her home aimed at apprehending one of her grandsons. All occupants of the home were ordered to come out, one at a time, with their hands raised. The grandmother, the first out, did not raise her hand as high as the officers ordered, and was told to raise them higher or be shot. A pat-down found no weapons, and she was restrained with her hands behind her back with a plastic zip-tie, and seated on the ground next to a police vehicle, complaining of chest pain. The grandson was arrested, but the grandmother remained restrained and seated while officers obtained a signed consent from another family member to search the house. She continued to sit restrained during the search, but was later taken to a hospital by ambulance for her heart attack. Claims against the three supervising officers who planned the operation lacked merit, the appeals court found, as there was no allegation of any involvement on their part in the alleged use of excessive force, and supervisory personnel cannot be held liable for federal civil rights violations simply as a matter of vicarious liability for the actions of their subordinates. The fact that allegedly excessive force was not used against other women who were in the house indicated that it was not plausible that the supervisors had directed or intended that such force be used during the operation. As to the liability of the town, even if the police chief were its final policymaker, the plaintiff failed to show that any plan of his for the raid was the source of her alleged injury. Santiago v. Warminster Township, #10-1294, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 25414 (3rd Cir.).
    An officer stopped a motorist because his license plate was not visible, and smelled alcohol on his breath. He was arrested for DUI and then informed the officer that he needed medications from his car for a number of illnesses, including AIDS. While the officer retrieved the medications, the arrestee had trouble breathing and spit mucus into an empty paper cup in the patrol car. The officer became afraid that the arrestee would spit on him and infect him, and called for a deputy sheriff to come to the scene with a patrol car with a protective divider to take the arrestee to jail. Walking the arrestee out of the patrol car, the officer allegedly closed the trunk lid of his car on the arrestee's thumb. The officer contended that this was an accident, while the arrestee claimed that it was in retaliation for his having spit mucus in the cup, and he sued. Upholding the denial of qualified immunity to the officer, the appeals court ruled that if the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, the force used against a non-resisting non-fleeing arrestee was excessive. Schmidt v. Gray, #09-20570, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 22388 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     While EMS workers were transporting a man to the hospital following a seizure, he began kicking, fighting, spitting, cursing, and flailing in the back of the ambulance. A fire department lieutenant who is also a part-time police officer then applied joint manipulation on the man's wrist, resulting in him crying out "it hurts," but also ending his thrashing around. The man suffered no injuries from the manipulation, but nevertheless sued. An intermediate Ohio appeals court ruled that while the use of the procedure may have been negligent, it was not malicious, wanton or reckless, so that the individual defendants and the fire department should have been granted summary judgment. Christie v. Violet Township Fire Department, #09-CA-57, 2010 Ohio App. Lexis 2097 (Oh. App.5th Dis.).
     An officer believed that a motorcycle rider had committed a number of relatively minor infractions (failing to wear a helmet while driving a motorcycle and failing to stop when signaled by police). These infractions did not justify the force allegedly used by the officer in tackling the plaintiff from his motorcycle and slamming him into the pavement, so that the officer used excessive force and was not entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiff of $2,500 on both federal civil rights and state law assault and battery claims. Raiche v. Pietroski, #09-1910 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21977 (1st Cir.).
     A motorist led state troopers on a 50-mile high-speed chase, culminating in his arrest. He sued, claiming that the troopers had used excessive force against him, and then unduly delayed his receipt of needed medical care. A federal appeals court upheld the trial court's grant of qualified immunity to the troopers, finding, on the basis of videotapes of the incident, that one trooper's actions in apprehending the plaintiff had been objectively reasonable, and that the tapes did not support the motorist's claim that the trooper beat a restrained cooperating suspect. Additionally, medical records did not show that the few minutes of delay before receiving medical treatment had caused any substantial harm. Borneman v. Rozier, #10-6045, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21316 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
     When an officer responded to a burglar alarm at a house, he observed that a basement window appeared to have been pried open. The front door was open, and several items were on the porch. The officer observed a man inside the house going through some papers. He was the son of the woman who owned the house, was there alone, and admitted that he did not know how to turn off the alarm. He became "confrontational" when the officer asked him to exit the premises, he tried to head butt the officer, and he was placed under arrest for disorderly conduct, a charge he pled no contest to. His mother subsequently indicated that he had her permission to remove items from the house. The next day, he returned to the police station to file a complaint about his arrest. The sergeant taking his statement ran his driver's license and learned that it had been suspended, and wrote him a citation for driving with a suspended license, as he had driven to the station. He sued, asserting claims for false arrest, excessive force, and illegal search in running his driver's license. A federal appeals court found that the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff at his mother's house and reason to believe that he was committing a crime being in the house, which was not his. There was no evidence that he suffered any injury from any force the arresting officer used, and he had attempted to head butt the officer. A claim of malicious prosecution was meritless in light of his plea of no contest to the disorderly conduct charge. Running of his license after he furnished it as identification did not constitute an unlawful search. Crock v. Pennsylvania, #10-2001, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21625 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     When it was undisputed that a pedestrian was neither on the sidewalk nor in a crosswalk when he entered a "parking turnout" on a street, officers had at least a reasonable belief that they had probable cause to arrest him for jaywalking, so that they were entitled to qualified immunity on his false arrest claim. An excessive force claim lacked merit when all that happened was that an officer had allegedly swung his baton at the arrestee without actually touching him. Burdett v. Reynoso, #08-15159, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21018 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
     A man claimed that a number of police officers assaulted him in his home, and that a second group of officers, also present, failed to intervene to stop the unjustified use of force, which he contended constituted gross negligence. Claims against the second group of officers were settled for a total of $25,000, and a signed release agreement was entered into which stated that it covered the discharge of "all other persons" from the plaintiff's claims. The first group of officers, who were alleged to have assaulted the plaintiff, argued that the release covered claims against them as well as against the second group of officers, despite the fact that they had not signed it, paid nothing under it, and were represented by separate counsel and insurance companies. An intermediate Michigan appeals court upheld these officers' interpretation. The Michigan Supreme Court has now reversed, and in so doing overturned a prior state court decision barring the use of testimony and other extrinsic evidence outside of the language of a release when an unnamed party asserts third-party beneficiary rights based on broad language in a liability release, and when there is an ambiguity as to the intended scope of the coverage of the release. The plaintiff's intent, it was argued, had been to only settle with the second group of officers. Further proceedings were ordered on this issue. Shay v. Aldrich, #138908, 2010 Mich. Lexis 1700.
     An arrestee sued officers, claiming that they lacked probable cause for her arrest, and that they used excessive force in taking her into custody and taking her to a hospital for mental evaluation. The arrestee herself, however, stated in her deposition that, based on her statements to them, the officers could have reasonably concluded that she was drug intoxicated. Her husband and 911 callers had told officers that she was high on drugs, and probable cause existed, under the circumstances, to believe that she possessed cocaine. Officers encountering her heard her make "paranoid" comments, and the officers had reports that she had been seen under a car with her son, screaming that someone was trying to kill her, and that she would kill herself. She also clearly was actively resisting arrest, so the use of force to subdue her was reasonable. Luchtel v. Hagemann, #09-35446, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20736 (9th Cir.).
     A man stood outside his residence one evening, waiting for his girlfriend. His aunt, who also lived there, was informed by her son that the police were outside "harassing" her nephew. She went outside and observed officers arresting her nephew, and placing him in the backseat of a police car. Officers subsequently released her nephew, but the arresting officer allegedly swung something at him as he was walking away. The aunt then attempted to hold him in a bear hug to protect him from the officer, who was preparing to taser him. Another officer then pulled her off her nephew, and allegedly threw her to the ground. Her nephew was tasered and she attempted twice more to intervene. She was sprayed with mace and arrested. Rejecting claims in her excessive force lawsuit, the court found that her repeated interference with the arrest endangered the officers and herself. The officers' use of force against her was reasonable. The court ruled that a bystander to an arrest does not have standing to challenge its legality, and that there is also no right to resist an unlawful arrest or search. Further, while a person being subjected to excessive force by an officer has a personal right to resist, that right does not extend to a third party intervening in the incident Johnson v. Carroll, #08-CV-6427, 2010 WL 3023407 (D. Minn. July 29, 2010).
     An 83-year-old woman and her adult disabled son visited a store. The son scratched his arm on a fire hose on the premises, and store employees asked him to fill out some forms regarding the incident. A dispute occurred as to whether the son and his mother could have copies of the forms, and a store manager felt threatened by the son, who allegedly made a gesture and then was asked to step back. The store summoned police for help, indicating that the woman and her son were being disruptive. An officer arrived, listened to both sides of the dispute, and then told the woman she would have to leave at the manager's request or face arrest. When the officer attempted to escort her to the door, she became agitated when he touched her elbow, and began flailing her arms. She then left, and was not arrested. She later filed an excessive force claim against the officer, and a failure to train claim against the city. Upholding a judgment in favor of the officer and city, a federal appeals court noted that "mere physical contact" by an officer does not necessarily constitute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and the jury was entitled to believe, based on the evidence, that the officer's touching of the woman's arm was more "exhortatory" than "commanding." Carlson v. Bukovic, #09-2578, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 18383 (7th Cir.).
     An officer who arrested a tavern owner was not entitled to qualified immunity on his claim that the officer used excessive force during his arrest. The tavern owner became involved in an argument and fight with friends at his tavern. The officer claimed that the tavern owner poked him several times, while the tavern owner denied this. The officer took the plaintiff to the ground with a leg sweep, and handcuffed him. The plaintiff denied being uncooperative, as the officer claimed. If the facts were as the tavern owner claimed, the officer used excessive force. Shannon v. Koehler, #09-3889, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 17123(8th Cir.).
     A jury found that an officer used excessive force in detaining a man who was involved in a late night fight outside a tavern. The jury only awarded $1 in nominal damages, however, and no compensatory or punitive damages. A federal appeals court found no inconsistency with the jury's finding that the officer used excessive force and caused injury, as it could have attributed the injury as resulting from the officer's other, lawful actions, and not from his use of excessive force. The court also ruled that an award of attorneys' fees was appropriate, since such an award would encourage the city to make sure that officers do not use excessive force after subduing a suspect. The appeals court therefore reversed the trial court's decision not to award any attorneys' fees. Guy v. City of San Diego, #08-56024, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 12405 (9th Cir.).
    Officers executing a search warrant at a man's home did not use excessive force in taking his brother, who was present, into their police vehicle. The brother had been smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol and was found lying on the floor. Additionally, he had outstanding warrants himself, and was unable to walk due to extreme intoxication. Expert testimony on police practices was properly excluded as it was not needed to determine that the amount of force used by the officers was not excessive. Legg v. Pappas, #09-1188, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 12288 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
     A man who claimed that officers subjected him to excessive force in pushing him towards the floor, where he allegedly struck his head, had his claims rejected by a judge after a bench trial. In upholding the result, the appeals court noted that the incident took place in a bar on Super Bowl Sunday, that the plaintiff was drunk, refused to identify himself, refused to leave voluntarily, resisted being escorted out, and assumed a "fighting" stance both verbally and physically. Given these circumstances, the trial judge did not "clearly err" in finding that the officers' use of force was reasonable. Myser v. Spokane County, #09-35540, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 15163 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
     An arrestee claimed that an officer used excessive force in grabbing him, throwing him on the floor, and twisting his arm. While he did not allege that a second officer used any force against him, he did claim that this officer was present during the arrest, so it was plausible that he had sufficient time to intervene and failed to do so, therefore the plaintiff could proceed with a claim against him. Claims against the police chief, however, were dismissed since no affirmative link was shown between the alleged use of excessive force and any alleged failure of the chief to provide training or supervision. An isolated incident of police misconduct also could not be the basis for a claim for municipal liability. Philippe v. Wallace, #09-11669, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 53772 (D. Mass.).
     An arrestee claimed that a deputy used excessive force while arresting him for stealing a purse, hitting him in the head with a gun and creating a wound that took 21 stitches to close. A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the defendant, ruling that the deputy could be found to have acted reasonably, as the arrestee had refused to obey orders to stop running and get on the ground. The deputy could have believed that the force he used was necessary because the arrestee posed a danger to himself and members of the public and might have been armed. Zaken v. Kelley, #09-10631, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6886 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     The city of Portland, Oregon has reached a $1.6 million settlement in a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the family of a mentally ill man who died after a confrontation with police for urinating on a sidewalk in which they allegedly threw him face-first into a concrete sidewalk, further assaulted him, and covered up the incident, to which there were numerous witnesses. An officer claimed to paramedics and other witnesses that he had found cocaine on the suspect, when he allegedly knew that what he bagged as evidence were bread crumbs. The city intended to argue at trial, before the settlement was reached, that he died of excited delirium, and that fractures to his ribs were the result of three CPR attempts by police and ambulance personnel. The county previously reached a $925,000 settlement with the plaintiffs, and an ambulance company settled claims against it for $600,000. Chasse v. Humphreys, #3:07-cv-00189, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Ore.).
    The City of Chicago has approved a $15.5 million settlement of a federal class action civil rights lawsuit claiming that officers engaged in abuse and unlawful detention practices in the handling of suspects. The lawsuit claimed an "institutionalized system of police torture," and included allegations of unlawful arrests without warrants, the unnecessary shackling of suspects to walls or benches for prolonged periods of time, and the denial of food and water or opportunities to use a bathroom. The class was composed of persons detained overnight by Chicago police from March 1999 through March of 2010. Over 500,000 people could be eligible to share in the settlement, according to news reports, with most receiving between $90 and $3,000. The city will pay $15 million towards the settlement with the rest paid by an insurer. Up to $5 million in fees will go to the plaintiffs' attorneys in fees and costs. Dunn v. City of Chicago, #04-CV-6804, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. May, 2010).
     An arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest contradicted his assertion that he did not oppose being taken into custody. Any claim that no force was justified against him as he offered no resistance was therefore barred, but he could pursue claims that excessive force was used to effect his custody, and that he was beaten severely after he was taken into custody, since those claims did not contradict his conviction. Evans v. Poskon, #09-3140, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 7846 (7th Cir.).
     A man accused two sheriff's deputies who were serving as court security officers of false arrest and excessive use of force in taking him into custody for disorderly conduct when he learned that his motion to vacate his parking ticket conviction was not scheduled to be heard by the court. The officers' motion for qualified immunity was denied by the appeals court since there were disputed issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff had been disruptive, and, if so, how much, as well as whether or not he refused to stop resisting once he was handcuffed. There were questions whether the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff or to use force against hum. Levan v. George, #09-3223, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 8787 (7th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict in favor of a deputy sheriff in an excessive force lawsuit. It rejected arguments that a pattern jury instruction on the use of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment improperly allowed the jury to believe that the plaintiff's version of events had transpired but still rule for the deputy on the basis of failure to show that he acted with subjective malice. The instruction instead focused on a requirement that the deputy had to use force intentionally applied, instead of occurring as the result of accident, and did not mention subjective intent at all. Hernandez v. Mascara, #09-11962, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 4399 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     A tenant was found on the premises of an apartment she had been evicted from and was arrested for criminal trespass. The tenant, being legally blind, stated that she needed to go down the steps slowly, but one of the officers allegedly repeatedly told her to hurry, and she felt a shove or push from him, falling to the bottom of the landing, after which she fell twice more and the officer angrily tried to raise her by pulling on her handcuffs. The officer subsequently allegedly made a statement to her, "no rallies for you today," purportedly referring to her involvement in rallies against alleged police brutality. She sued the city for false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, and violation of federal civil rights. The state trial court dismissed false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims, which were upheld on appeal, as the police had probable cause, which was a complete defense to these claims. A jury awarded the tenant $250,000 for violation of civil rights, $600,000 for past pain and suffering, and $500,000 for future pain and suffering. The plaintiff claimed that an officer violated her civil rights by deciding not to issue her a desk appearance ticket, but the court noted that she herself declined the officer's subsequent offer to give her a desk appearance ticket since she though that the officers should transport her to a hospital instead of releasing her to go there herself. The appeals court, therefore, overturned the civil rights award, and ordered a new trial on the pain and suffering awards, unless the plaintiff agreed to their reduction to $300,000 for past pain and suffering and $150,000 for future pain and suffering, as the amounts awarded by the jury were excessive. Young v. City of New York, #2248, 25645/03, 2010 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 2647 (1st Dept.).
     Because the arrestee had been convicted of charges of aggravated assault, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon based on his encounter with the defendant officer, his convictions barred his civil rights lawsuit against the officer for excessive use of force arising from the same incident. Brown v. Chicago, #08-4265, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6483 (7th Cir.).
     An arrestee's convictions for resisting arrest and obstruction did not bar her excessive force claims against her arresting officer as she could have theoretically still proven that the officer's force utilized in making the arrest was excessive without undermining the rationale for her conviction. As it turned out, however, the evidence showed that the officer's use of force was justified by the plaintiff's actions. Miller v. Village of Pinckney, #09-1096, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 3168 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Sheriff's deputies who arrested a man for "resisting, evading or obstructing an officer" were not entitled to qualified immunity in his lawsuit claiming that they used excessive force in doing so. The suspected crime was a misdemeanor, and not a "severe" crime, and the deputies themselves did not contest an assessment that a jury could conclude that he posed no immediate danger to their safety. The plaintiff asserted that he did not try to evade the deputies or resist their efforts to arrest him, but that, despite this, they gang-tackled him, applying force sufficient to tear his knee ligaments. The deputies also ultimately conceded that attempted flight by the arrestee had been no more than possible, and was perhaps "unlikely." It was clearly established, the court held, that the "gratuitous" use of force against a non-resisting arrestee would violate the Fourth Amendment. Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of Commissioners, #09-2042, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1246 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
     Sheriff's deputies who arrested a man for "resisting, evading or obstructing an officer" were not entitled to qualified immunity in his lawsuit claiming that they used excessive force in doing so. The suspected crime was a misdemeanor, and not a "severe" crime, and the deputies themselves did not contest an assessment that a jury could conclude that he posed no immediate danger to their safety. The plaintiff asserted that he did not try to evade the deputies or resist their efforts to arrest him, but that, despite this, they gang-tackled him, applying force sufficient to tear his knee ligaments. The deputies also ultimately conceded that attempted flight by the arrestee had been no more than possible, and was perhaps "unlikely." It was clearly established, the court held, that the "gratuitous" use of force against a non-resisting arrestee would violate the Fourth Amendment. Herrera v. Bernalillo County Board of Commissioners, #09-2042, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1246 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
     In an excessive force lawsuit, officers contended that an arrestee placed in a patrol car attempted to exit the vehicle and struggled when they tried to subdue him, compelling them to use pepper spray and physical force. The arrestee argued that the officers had placed him in the vehicle with the heat running and the windows closed, sprayed him with mace, and beat him with a flashlight, causing injuries that included black eyes, a broken blood vessel, a damaged mouth, loose teeth, and lacerations. A federal appeals court found that the injuries suffered were more than minor. While the officers certainly were entitled to take action when the plaintiff refused to put his feet back in the vehicle and subsequently broke a car window, their alleged actions of dragging him out of the car, followed by kicking, punching, and hitting him with a flashlight, if true, were disproportionate to the force needed to subdue the handcuffed arrestee. Summary judgment for the officers was improper, as there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force used was excessive. Goffney v. Sauceda, #08-20233, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 15440 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     A police sergeant, attending a movie in plainclothes, flashed his badge and arrested a woman's friend. When she attempted to intervene, he allegedly threw her down a flight of stairs in the theater. The sergeant claimed that the woman tripped and fell down the stairs. The trial court erred in failing to give the jury a Fourth Amendment excessive force instruction, as there was sufficient evidence from which it could find that he intended to throw her down the stairs, and therefore seized her in his capacity as a police officer. The trial judge, in assuming that the officer's actions were unintentional for purposes of the jury instructions, improperly intervened into the role of the jury as a finder of fact, so a new trial was required. Arnold v. Curtis, #08-3064, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 28718 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
    A police officer sued for excessive use of force was improperly denied summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, since a videotape of the incident in question showed that, as a matter of law, his actions were objectively reasonable. After the plaintiff, a motorist operating a motorized scooter, refused to sign a citation she was being given for a defective muffler and wearing an improper helmet, she claimed that the defendant deputy grabbed her by the breast and threw her against a police vehicle with enough force to cause bruising, then threw her into the street, causing her to injure her head on the pavement. The court found that a videotape of the incident, produced by a camera in a police vehicle, clearly showed that the deputy did not grab the woman by the breast, throw her against a police vehicle, or throw her on the street. What it did show was the plaintiff resisting the deputy's efforts to handcuff her after she refused to sign the citation, and her responding to his minimal use of force by striking him across the face with her right hand, after which she lost her balance and fell to the ground. Wallingford v. Olson, #09-1271, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1505(8th Cir.).
     A police director was not entitled to qualified immunity on claims based on the actions of two officers who allegedly interrogated an arrestee for several hours, placed an ammonium packet under his nose, and kicked and punched him. Supervisory personnel can be held liable for constitutional violations carried out by subordinates, based on either personal participation or a causal connection between the supervisor's actions and the alleged violations. If the plaintiff's allegations were true, there had been numerous prior instances in which one of the officers used force on arrestees. These prior incidents, if they occurred, would have been enough to give the director notice of misconduct that was rampant enough to require corrective action, yet he allegedly failed to take any. Williams v. Santana, #09-10198, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 18014 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     Police were summoned to a park after a man shot a gun into the air in reaction to an altercation his son became involved in. Officers brought him to the ground and handcuffed him, subsequently placing him in a patrol car. A federal appeals court rejected the arrestee's claim that the officers used excessive force, which resulted in his broken wrist. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity since their actions were objectively reasonable. In the course of making split-second decisions, the officers could reasonably believe that they faced a dangerous situation in light of the arrestee's use of gunfire and his violent resistance to arrest. Provost v. Nissen, #08-31234, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25425 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     After leaving a club intoxicated, a man and his wife decided to sleep in their truck. The man subsequently resisted an officer's attempt to wake him, and a second officer allegedly helped to drag him out of the truck, delivering a hard knee strike to his thigh while he was handcuffed. A federal appeals court rejected an unlawful detention claim, ruling that the officers acted reasonably in connection with their concern for the safety of the man and his wife. There was a genuine issue of material fact, however, as to whether the force used, specifically the knee strike, was excessive. Summary judgment for the city was properly granted, since liability on the basis of ratification of the officers' conduct could not be imposed as there was no "extreme" factual situation, and there was also no evidence of inadequate training. While the plaintiff pointed to 27 prior complaints concerning alleged officer misconduct, this was insufficient to show a pattern of use of excessive force. Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Texas, #08-10258, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25183 (5th Cir.).
    An arrestee contended that he had responded to an officer's instructions to stop merely by turning and greeting him, but that the officer then pushed him without provocation. When the arrestee pushed back, the officer allegedly punched his face and took him to the ground, causing injuries to his ribs, eye, and face that necessitated three days in the hospital. If the facts were as alleged by the arrestee, a jury could find the force used excessive, even if the arrestee pushed the officer, since the push may have been minimal. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Rohrbough v. Hall, #08-3617, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 24588 (8th Cir.).
      The estate of a detainee claimed that some police officers assaulted him in the course of an arrest, that other officers failed to prevent the assault, and that correctional officers subsequently failed to provide him with needed medical attention for his injuries. He then stopped breathing, and died, having suffered a neck fracture and spinal cord injury. A federal appeals court found that it lacked jurisdiction over two officers' appeal of the denial of qualified immunity, based on their claim that there was insufficient evidence that their actions caused the death to hold them liable. The court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to three officers since there was evidence that could support a finding that they unreasonably failed to stop an assault on the arrestee. Finally, the correctional officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as there was insufficient evidence that they acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, in light of the fact that the detainee himself refused several offers of medical attention, and that a medical technician, after conducting an examination, found nothing abnormal in his condition. Krout v. Goemmer, #08-2781, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21985 (8th Cir.).
     A police chief stopped a vehicle that a woman was driving, and in which her husband and two other persons were passengers, believing that he had observed traffic violations. The husband, believing that he saw the chief inappropriately touch his wife, who was being arrested for refusing to comply with a sobriety test, exited the vehicle, yelling at the chief and taking a step forward. The chief told the husband to get back in the car and shocked him with a Taser, but he got up and started running at the chief. The chief placed the wife in the front of the patrol car. The chief then allegedly instructed the husband to get in the patrol car, and when he had difficulty doing so, pushed him into the car, allegedly hitting his head on the door. A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the police chief on a Fourth Amendment "improper touching" claim. The chief's use of force against the husband was objectively reasonable in light of the husband's attempted interference with the wife's arrest and the wife's own non-compliance. In the absence of a constitutional violation by the chief, the plaintiffs could not assert a liability claim against the municipality. Cook v. City of Bella Villa; #08-2712, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21681 (8th Cir.).
      A detainee showed that a police officer used excessive force against him after encountering him attempting to restrain a developmentally delayed adult who had fled a residential facility where he worked. He also showed that a second officer and a sergeant on the scene improperly failed to intervene to end the first officer's use of force. The defendants then made false reports about the incident, and caused the detainee to be maliciously prosecuted. The plaintiff prevailed against the defendants individually on both excessive force and malicious prosecution federal civil rights claims, as well as state law negligence claims. While federal claims against the city were rejected, the city was vicariously liable for the officers' negligence. Claims of racial animus were rejected. The plaintiff was awarded $125,155.20 in compensatory damages and $55,000 in punitive damages. Knapps v. City of Oakland, #05-2935, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 67141 (N.D. Cal.).
     An arrestee claimed that a police chief used excessive force when arresting him in his home, and that, when his wife tried to drive him to the hospital, the chief reached into the car and squeezed his wife's breast. The 75-year-old arrestee, who was charged with failing, after a warning, to remove debris from the home's driveway, claimed that the chief applied handcuffs too tight and kneed him while placing him in a patrol car. After the arrestee complained of pain from a prior back injury, and refused treatment from paramedics summoned to the scene, the chief stated that he was either going to a hospital or to jail, whereupon the wife started to drive to the hospital. Upholding summary judgment for the defendant police chief on the excessive force claim and a jury verdict for the chief on the wife's assault and battery claim, a federal appeals court found that the chief used minimal force which caused no physical injury and was insufficient to show a constitutional violation, acting in an objectively reasonable manner. The wife did not tell her husband about the chief allegedly squeezing her breast until several days after the incident, and she returned home without reaching the hospital after the chief ticketed her for lack of insurance, invalid plates, and failure to signal. Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa; #08-2708, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 14807 (8th Cir.).
     While police officers who handcuffed an arrestee outside a nightclub and allegedly threw him against the hood of a car and then pulled him off the hood by his arms did not use excessive force, the court declined to enter summary judgment on claims against an officer who allegedly slammed his face against the roof or door frame of his car, which knocked out his teeth. There was no showing of a municipal policy of allowing excessive force, or of inadequate training, discipline, or supervision, and therefore no municipal liability. Edwards v. Two Unknown Male Chicago Police Officers, #06 C 6399, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 47832 (N.D. Ill.).
     An arrestee's claim that a city was liable for false arrest and excessive use of force was rejected by a federal appeals court. The plaintiff's main argument, the court noted, was that he faced excessive force from an officer who allegedly kicked him in the ribs and then handcuffed him. Further, he argued that such force was the result of a police department custom that amounted to ignoring excessive force complaints, as well as a "code of silence" among officers, and a failure to investigate excessive force incidents. There was, however, no identification of a policymaker prior to his argument on appeal, and no evidence that the then identified policymaker, the city council members, were aware of the alleged facts in the case or of the purported code of silence. McGregory v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, #08-60944, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 13873 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     A motorist stopped for a traffic violation claimed that officers dragged him out of his car and used excessive force against him after learning that he had outstanding felony arrest warrants. They allegedly hit, kicked, and tasered him, as well as allowing his car to start rolling away with his nine-year old child inside. The officers asserted that they believed that the motorist was attempting to drive away. The court ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity since the arrestee suffered no injuries, indicating that the force used was minimal. Such minimal force could not violate the Fourth Amendment, the court stated, in the context of a valid arrest. The court also found that the officers were entitled to immunity on an Alabama state law child endangerment claim, in the absence of evidence of malice, since they were involved in performing discretionary acts in the course of making the arrest. Wilson v. Tillman, #06-0540, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 38845 (S.D. Ala.).
     An arrestee failed to show that officers used excessive force against him while arresting him at the scene of a domestic disturbance. He attempted to evade arrest and they were forced to drag him from underneath a bush, administer baton strikes to his upper left thigh to try to make him show his hands, and finally sprayed mace in his face, after which he finally presented his hands for handcuffing. Even then, he refused to cooperate by walking to a police vehicle. Additionally, officers had, early in the incident, observed a silver object in his hands, which they thought might be a gun, although it later turned out to be either a screwdriver or a pair of handcuffs. The court found nothing in the record to support the arrestee's own "contradictory" testimony that he cooperated with the officers, did not resist, and that the officers gratuitously used excessive force against him. Based on the officer's testimony and report and a medical assessment from an emergency room doctor, the court found, no reasonable jury could believe the arrestee's version of the incident. Reed v. City of St. Charles, No. 07-2713, 561 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2009).
     A homeless arrestee claimed that he was picked up by an officer for loitering, and then taken to a wooden area where the officer beat and stabbed him. A federal appeals court ruled that a claim by the arrestee that the county was liable for his injuries because it has an unwritten policy that homeless people should be relocated to other counties should have survived summary judgment because evidence was presented of five officers who allegedly knew of the policy. Additionally, there was expert testimony that such a policy made violations of the rights of homeless persons foreseeable. A claim against the county for negligent hiring of the officer was rejected because the only violent act in the officer's record was the shooting of a home invader. The appeals court also rejected a claim against the county for inadequate training or supervision. There was evidence that revealed that the county investigated reports concerning the officer's handling of arrests, provided the officer with counseling and retraining, and subjected him to discipline, which did not show "deliberate indifference" to a known problem. Williams v. DeKalb County, #07-14367, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 9839 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
    Despite the "de minimis" nature of an arrestee's injuries, he could proceed with his excessive force claim based on his assertion that the officer hit him after he was handcuffed and strapped into a patrol car. The trial court had improperly chosen to believe the officer's version of the incident rather than the arrestee's in granting summary judgment for the officer. If the facts were as the arrestee claimed, a rational juror could find that the officer acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. Grass v. Johnson, #07-5152, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7955 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
     Because of the "chaos" at the scene of a bicycle and car accident, and the female doctor's refusal to present available medical identification, it was reasonable for an officer to believe that there was probable cause to arrest her, despite the fact that she had actually stopped to attempt to provide medical assistance to a boy on a bike struck by another vehicle. Her action in resisting the officer when he grabbed her arm justified the force employed against her, and there was no evidence that officers present knew of her heart condition before she suffered a cardiopulmonary arrest and died after she was placed in a police vehicle. Arshad v. Congemi, #08-30061, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 4792 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     Park police officer acted reasonably in applying force to the arm of a man arrested for having his dogs off a leash and assaulting the officer, when the man's refusal to obey orders indicated that he might try to escape or resist. The fact that the arrestee did not suffer any injury or bruise supported the conclusion that no more force was used than was reasonable under the circumstances. Wasserman v. Rodacker, 07-5307, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 3556 (D.C. Cir.).
     Sheriff and deputy were entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's claim that he had been subjected to excessive force when he was arrested while having an epileptic seizure and then allegedly denied medical attention. The trial court acted in error when it deferred ruling on the motion for qualified immunity while granting the plaintiff time to conduct further discovery. The defendants had not, however, claimed qualified immunity on the plaintiff's disability discrimination, equal protection, or state law claims, so those could proceed. Everson v. Leis, No. 07-4461, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 3288 (6th Cir.).
     Police officers did not use excessive force in restraining “psychotic and aggressive” man who refused to obey police orders to leave premises of music studio, refused orders to drop a pen he was holding, and resisted efforts to handcuff him. Medical evidence showed that he died from a heart attack during the encounter, and was susceptible to one because of 90% blockage in his arteries. Court finds no evidence that he died of asphyxia or was choked, or that a purported inadequacy in training as to how to arrest persons exhibiting signs of excited delirium syndrome caused his death. Gregory v. County of Maui, #06-15374, 523 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2008), affirming Civ. #04-00516, 414 F.Supp.2d 965 (D. Hawaii 2006).
    Defendants in arrestee's excessive force lawsuit were entitled to summary judgment based on officers' testimony that the suspect actively resisted the arrest, when no evidence to the contrary was produced, and the arrestee, who was sick and on medications, had no independent recollection of the events. The plaintiff could not defeat the motion for summary judgment merely by arguing that a jury might not believe the officers. LaFrenier v. Kinirey, No. 07-1644, 550 F.3d 166 (1st Cir. 2008).
     Officer who allegedly pushed an arrestee into a steel cell door and a plexiglas window as they were both leaving an elevator used minimal force that could not be the basis of an excessive force claim, particularly when there was no challenge to the legality of the arrest, no significant injuries resulted, and the officer contended that force was necessary to subdue the arrestee, who he claimed acted in an aggressive manner. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity even if the minimal force used had been unprovoked. McCall v. Crosthwait, No. 2:07-CV-870, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 103772 (M.D. Ala.).
     If the facts were as a fifteen year old arrestee alleged, a reasonable officer should have known that the arrestee had surrendered when he did not resist when the officer lifted him off the ground. It would have been unnecessary for the arrestee to say anything verbally to indicate that the further use of force was unnecessary. The arrestee claimed that after he engaged in shoving the officer, he was swung into a car, fell to the ground, and was picked up by the officer, who then slammed him into a car twice, resulting in a broken jaw. Valladares v. Cordero, #07-1995, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 374 (4th Cir.).
     U.S. Park Police and an off-duty city officer used reasonable force to subdue a motorist stopped for a license tag who fled on foot and shot one of the Park Police officers in the face. Evidence showed that the arrestee refused to drop the gun before shooting, and was not immobile without resisting when the officers beat him. Arrington v. U.S. Park Police Service, Civil Action No. 01-1391, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 104579 (D.D.C.).
    Ample evidence supported a jury's determination to believe police officers and captains in a use of force lawsuit and to disbelieve the plaintiff's version of the incident. Dixon v. Ragland, No. 03 Civ. 826, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 101458 (S.D. Cal.).
     A court officer had no basis for using more than a tap on the arm to direct a woman being arraigned before a judge. The state of New York was therefore liable for injuries the woman suffered when the officer instead allegedly suddenly grabbed her two shoulders, forced them together and back, and then forcefully grabbed her right elbow, pushing and pulling on it, and jerking it backwards, inflicting injuries requiring pain medication for two to three weeks. Tomaino v. State of New York, #111174, 2008 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 7155 (Ct. of Claims).
    When an arrestee received only $20,000 in damages in settlement of his excessive force claim, or roughly one-fourth of the amount he originally sought, further proceedings were required to reconsider a trial court award of $200,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. His victory fell "far short" of his goal, so that awarding more than a comparable portion of the requested fees and costs was unreasonable. McCown v. City of Fontana, No. 07-55896, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 26385 (9th Cir.).
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, since the alleged facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, indicated that the plaintiff's son had been battered and subjected to excessive force by the officer. Valladares v. Cordero, No. 07-1995, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 374 (4th Cir.).
    While a police officer argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity because the facts, correctly interpreted, showed neither unlawful arrest nor excessive use of force against a mother and her adult son, the court could not decide the disputed facts on appeal. Since the facts as alleged by the plaintiffs, if true, would constitute constitutional violations, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Cardenas v. Fisher, No. 08-2036, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 245 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
     While a reasonable person could believe that an officer's actions after a prostitution sting backfired imposed restrictions on her freedom of movement similar to those involved in a formal arrest, a federal appeals court agreed that there was no unlawful detention. The officer, however, was not entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's excessive force claim, since a reasonable jury could decide that the force used against the plaintiff, which was severe enough to cause a rotator cuff tear, a first-degree shoulder separation, and contusions, were disproportionate, since she was, at most, a petty thief suspect, and was not resisting the officer. Morelli v. Webster. No. 08-1759, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 115 January 7, 2009 (1st Cir.).
     Arrestee stated valid claims for excessive use of force and failure to train arising out of incident in which he pointed a gun at plain-clothes police officers who chased him, fearing they were criminals. He allegedly continued to flee after they identified themselves as police, and claimed that they inflicted a severe beating on him after he was subdued. Jones v. Ritter, Civil Action No. 07-1674, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94383 (D.D.C.).
     A sheriff's deputy who allegedly repeatedly slammed a misdemeanor arrestee against a concrete wall after he was fully compliant and subdued, causing a leaking aneurysm and breaking his ribs was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. He should have known that such conduct was unlawful. Galvez v. Bruce, No. 08-10531, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 25478 (11th Cir.).
     To establish liability for excessive force in the use of handcuffs, a detainee must establish both that police applied the handcuffs unnecessarily tightly, and that they ignored his complaints that the cuffs were too tight. In this case, an officer was not shown to have violated the plaintiff's rights, as the handcuffs were removed in response to the plaintiff's complaints. The defendant officer was not, however, entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff's claim that he used excessive force while "cramming" him into the back seat of the patrol vehicle. Vance v. Wade, #07-5930, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 23952 (6th Cir.).
     A videotape of an incident in which police broke a motorist's leg while removing him from his vehicle following a chase through a residential area showed that the officers acted reasonably, and did not use excessive force. The officers acted in order to neutralize what they reasonably perceived as a threat after the motorist fled from an officer's vehicular pursuit and then apparently refused orders to leave the vehicle at the end of the chase. Although the chase began over an expired license, the motorist's behavior justified the officer's suspicion that he was dangerous. Rejecting the arrestee's argument that the jury should determine, from the videotape, recorded from an officer's car, whether or not the force used was excessive, the court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court, in similar circumstances, instructed federal courts to determine, as a matter of law, from watching such videotapes, whether the force depicted was excessive, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the arrestee. Dunn v. Matatall, No. 08-1094, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 24305 (6th Cir.).
     There was a viable jury question as to whether Wyoming Highway Patrol officers acted reasonably in allegedly continuing to apply weight to a suspect's upper torso for three minutes after it was no longer necessary to restrain him and in a manner that they allegedly should have reasonably known presented a significant danger of death from asphyxiation. If the officers used deadly force that was not justified by a need to protect the safety of the suspect, the officers, or the public, they were not entitled to qualified immunity for their actions, which allegedly caused the suspect's death. Weigel v. Broad, No. 05-8094, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21877 (10th Cir.).
     If officers repeatedly beat arrestee while he was lying still on the ground after being handcuffed, their actions violated clearly established law, barring a defense of qualified immunity. Based on the arrestee's version of the incident, if true, the officers also acted in bad faith or maliciously for purposes of Alabama state law, and would also not be entitled to immunity on state law claims for excessive use of force, although they were entitled to such immunity on negligence and wantonness. Adams v. City of Mobile, Civil Action 07-0864, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80149 (S.D. Ala.).
     A motorist stopped and arrested for speeding failed to present any medical evidence that the officer's actions either caused or aggravated his injuries and pre-existing medical conditions. With no demonstrated physical injury at all, the arrestee could not pursue an excessive force claim. Phelps v. Szubinski, 04-CV-773, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 72253 (E.D.N.Y.).
     Federal appeals court upholds jury verdict in favor of arrestee who claimed that he suffered a "knee drop" to his head while he was pinned to the ground by officers outside a bar, suffering five facial fractures, and bleeding into his brain. The plaintiff presented evidence that he had not offered resistance to the officers, and he met his burden of showing that excessive force was used. Plaintiff was properly awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages, and the trial court acted correctly in refusing to reduce the award by the $9,906.98 in medical bills paid for treatment of his injury by his health insurer. Gill v. Maciejewski, No. 07-3451, 546 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2008).
     Because there was no undisputed evidence that the plaintiff had resisted arrest, and he claimed that he had been choked and had his face smashed into the ground, there was a disputed issue as to whether the officers used excessive force, and the defendant officers could not appeal the denial of their motion for qualified immunity.  Landis v Phalen, No. 07-4262, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21944 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Police officers did not use excessive force in attempting to remove a motorist from his vehicle after he attempted to evade them, and appeared to be non-compliant with demands to exit his car at the end of a vehicle pursuit during which he ran several stop signs and traffic signals. Even though the officers' actions resulted in the motorist suffering a broken arm, "given the heightened suspicion and danger brought about by the car chase and the fact that an officer could not know what other dangers may have been in the car, forcibly removing" the driver from the car "to contain those potential threats was objectively reasonable." Dunn v. Matatall, No. 08-1094, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 24305 (6th Cir.).
     Officers were properly denied qualified immunity on federal excessive force claims and immunity under Michigan's Governmental Tort Liability Act on state law assault and battery claims. The decedent allegedly drowned after police beat him with a baton, held him down, and used a Taser on him while he was lying in two feet of sediment, mud, and water. They were arresting him on suspicion of blocking traffic on a highway with moved construction equipment.  If true, the officers' actions were clearly unreasonable. Landis v. Baker, No. 07-2360, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21946 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Officers who failed to fully and timely raise and address a qualified immunity defense before the trial court, even if they allegedly failed to do so, as they claimed, because they believed that the plaintiff's constitutional claims lacked merit, essentially waived the defense. The appeals court could not address the issue on appeal without the benefit of the trial court's reasoning on it. The case involved the killing of a person inside a home during a "no knock" entry while executing a warrant. Noel v. Artson, No. 07-1987, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 22060 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     When it was undisputed that an arrestee refused to comply with officers' requests to calm down and ran into his house to attempt to evade arrest, the officers used required force to restrain him in order to take him into custody. Additional force was also used when the arrestee, despite being cap-stunned, continued his resistance, and the force used was clearly proportional to the need for it. Brown v. Rinehart, Civ. No. 07-023-SLR, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60463 (D. Del.).
     An arrestee offered no evidence to dispute declarations by an officer and a sergeant of the U.S. Secret Service that they did not use physical force on her, or to show that excessive force was used and caused an injury. She also failed to identify other witnesses who could dispute the officers' version of the incident. Powers-Bunce v. D.C., Civil Action No. 06-1586, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69798 (D.D.C.).
     A man arrested based on a complaint by his neighbor failed to show that the arresting officer used excessive force against him, with the court finding that, even if it believed the plaintiff's version of the incident, the force allegedly used by the officer was minimal and resulted in no physical injury. The plaintiff's claim that his neighbor was not arrested under similar circumstances because he was related to a police officer was purely a "conjecture," and did not constitute a viable equal protection claim. Jennejahn v. Village of Avon, No. 06-CV-6054, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 67608 (W.D.N.Y.).  
    Homeowner who claimed that officers severely injured her while beating her during a warrant-based search of her home could not pursue Fourteenth Amendment due process claims for excessive use of force since such claims may only be brought under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff also failed to adequately show that the city engaged in inadequate training, supervision, or disciplining of officers and that such inadequacies caused her injuries.  Torres v. City of Allentown, Civil No. 07-1934, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50522 (E.D. Pa.).
     Once a woman reacted to police officers' presence on her property by pulling a court order away from an officer, it was reasonable for officers to believe that a brief show of force was necessary to make sure that she complied with their orders. They were there to aid a neighbor in retrieving his property pursuant to a court order. The plaintiff failed to show that the officers used more force than was necessary. Slusher v. Terry, No. 07-1756, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18726 (6th Cir.).
     Police officers were not entitled to summary judgment in a lawsuit for injuries to a motorist occurring after a traffic stop followed by a chase and an arrest. There were genuine issues of fact concerning the amount of force used and, in particular, that used against the arrestee after he was handcuffed. The court also rejected the argument that medical evidence concerning the plaintiff's physical injuries was required to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Dukes v. Miami-Dade County, No. 08-10004, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18052 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     An African-American motorist was stopped by several police vehicles that were searching for a similar car in the area, and he was stunned and handcuffed, before they decided not to fully arrest or charge him. The court declined to grant summary judgment to the officers on the basis of qualified immunity, finding that there were factual issues concerning whether an arrest was made, and whether probable cause existed for doing so, as well as about the reasonableness of the force used. Thurman v. Village of Hazel Crest, No. 06C7194, 2008 U.S.Dist. Lexis 59962 (N.D. Ill.).
      Officers acted reasonably in pulling driver from his car when he refused to get out as directed and placing him on the ground to handcuff him. The motorist had allegedly driven in a manner that caused his car to hit curbs and other objects. The court found that the force used was not excessive under these circumstances. Wisler v. City of Fresno, No. CV 06-1694, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50843 (E.D. Cal.).
     An arrestee's claim that a federal marshal used excessive force against him during the arrest was not barred by his convictions for resisting arrest and assaulting federal officers. Those convictions did not exclude the possibility that officers used excessive force in response to the arrestee's unlawful actions during a lawful arrest. The federal appeals court, therefore, overturned the dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit against the marshal and other officers. Lora-Pena v. FBI, No. 07-3511, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13085 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     Journalists claimed that FBI agents, while executing a search warrant at a condominium building, grabbed and assaulted them, and used pepper spray and metal batons against them when they entered a gated area. The agents were using the building's fences and security structure in an attempt to restrict the flow of people into the area, and allegedly did not give them a chance to exit before using force against them. The court found that there was no special First Amendment right of access by the press to enter property that was not in the public domain. The court found, however, that some of the journalists' Fourth Amendment claims were improperly dismissed. The appeals court ruled that "mere obstinance" by a crowd did not justify the use of force when there is no showing that crowd members posed a public safety threat or that any other law enforcement considerations were at risk. The court ruled, therefore, that Fourth Amendment excessive force claims by individual journalists could proceed, while the rejection of all First Amendment claims was upheld. Asociacion de Periodistas de Puerto Rico v. Mueller, No. 07-2196, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12783 (1st Cir.).
     Officers did not use excessive force in response to a belligerent motorist who shouted and refused to comply with their directions to step to the curb, lower his voice, and calm down. When he resisted their attempts to place handcuffs on him, they tackled him to the ground and applied arm locks for purposes of restraint. After that too proved unsuccessful, they then used pepper spray. The court ruled that no reasonable officer would have thought that the defendant officers applied excessive force under the circumstances, and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Mierzwa v. U.S., No. 07-3362, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13523 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     An off-duty officer tried to help a stranger who claimed he was being robbed, who turned out to be a drug dealer being chased by an on-duty police officer. The off-duty officer, when he realized what the situation was, placed himself in a prone position on the floor in an indication of surrender. The on-duty officer allegedly kicked the off-duty officer repeatedly and stomped on his buttocks and groin until he saw a police badge on the off-duty officer's neck. The injured off-duty officer sued the on-duty officer and the District of Columbia, asserting claims for excessive use of force. A federal appeals court ruled that the trial court acted erroneously in granting qualified immunity to the defendant on-duty officer. The facts, as presented by the plaintiff off-duty officer, showed that the on-duty officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and a reasonable officer would have known that the actions allegedly taken, under the circumstances, were not lawful. The common law negligence claims against the District were properly dismissed, however. The off-duty officer's exclusive remedy on those claims was to seek benefits under the Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act. A trial was ordered on the off-duty officer's civil rights claims. Johnson v. D.C., No. 06-7136, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13289 (D.C. Cir.).
     Despite the seriousness of an arrestee's crime of bank robbery, FBI agents' alleged response in using the force they did in apprehending and arresting him was not reasonable or proportionate. Accepting, for purposes of appeal, the arrestee's version of the incident, at the time of the arrest he was submitting to the agents' authority, was focused on self-protection, was in a passive position, and did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or anyone else. He allegedly also did not actively resist arrest or attempt to evade it. The agents were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Abel v. Harp, No. 06-4371, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11440 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Even if a woman's behavior at the time of her arrest was caused by her having suffered several seizures that day, the arresting officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in using force against her. Her conduct constituted fleeing, eluding, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer, and she posed an immediate threat to the officers and to other members of the public since she refused orders to place her vehicle in park at the conclusion of the chase, and it continued to push against a police cruiser. Under the circumstances, the officers couldn't be expected to know that her non-responsiveness to their requests was due to a seizure. Ryan v. Hazel Park, No. 07-1659, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11042 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     A deputy sheriff and a U.S. Forest Service officer didn't use excessive force by attempting to arrest a protester who had climbed a tree by denying her supplies, food, and water, subjecting her to a risk of severe dehydration. Her own decision to remain in the tree was the cause of her injuries, and the case she relied on for her argument that excessive force was used involved the direct use of force, such as pepper spray, in instances where police could have easily removed protesters without infliction of injury or pain. The defendants' actions in the immediate case were consistent with the court's ruling in that past case. The officers had no obligation to "care" for her while she was in the tree, since she was not in their custody. Smith v. Ball, No. 07-35080, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1059 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
     Officer did not use excessive force in restraining a DUI arrestee who was not compliant with directions to put his hands behind his back, but instead was moving his arms forward and flailing from side to side. Additionally, even if the force used was unnecessarily, it was minimal and caused only minor injury. Anderson v. City of Tampa, No. 8:07-CV-00993, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35931 (M.D. Fla.).
     A trial court's denial of summary judgment to a police officer in an excessive force lawsuit was not the same as a denial of qualified immunity, when the trial judge explicitly said that there was not enough information about the force used to make a qualified immunity determination. The denial of summary judgment, therefore, was not immediately appealable, as a denial of qualified immunity would have been. Watts v. Harrison, No. 07-7008, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11319 (Unpub. D.C. Cir.).
     Police officers had probable cause to arrest a man they found holding an iron bar while involved in a "heated, expletive-filled" argument with another person also holding such a bar. The officers were not required to wait until the two men actually came to blows before arresting them. There was, however, a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force used by the officers in twisting the arrestee's arms was excessive, based on the arrestee's assertion that he did not attempt to evade arrest or resist them. Zantello v. Shelby Township, No. 07-1640, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10014 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Arrestee who had pled guilty to resisting a police officer could pursue his claim that officers beat him, using excessive force while he was waiting to be handcuffed after he was apprehended. While the officers acted properly in arresting him, his claim that they then used excessive force was not barred by this, since that claim did not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, No. 06-4208, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 7657 (7th Cir.).
     Officers' use of force against a man found on the fifth floor ledge of an apartment building was not excessive. They believed that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and acted in a reasonable manner in handcuffing and restraining him while placing him in custody for protective purposes, while waiting for an ambulance to arrive. They also acted reasonably later in restraining him and using a rear leg sweep when he tried to get away from their control. Estate of Tapueluelu v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 06-15638, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5425 (9th Cir.).
      An officer who allegedly punched an arrestee who did not pose a danger and who did not resist arrest at the time was not entitled to use any force at that time. A second officer present, however, could not be held liable for failure to intervene, since there was no evidence that he could have anticipated and stopped the first officer's action. Hadley v. Gutierrez, No. 06-12605, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9695 (11th Cir.).
     Federal officers were not shown to have used excessive force against an arrestee, so that the federal government had no liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b)(1), 2671-2680. The court found, applying Wyoming law, that the force used during the arrest was justified, and that any injuries suffered were "incidental" to the reasonable use of force. The court also found no evidence of negligence by the officers. The U.S. was entitled to a "common-law privilege" defense protecting police officers from liability for using reasonable force during a lawful arrest. The court also found that, even if the force used was found to be unreasonable, comparative fault by the arrestee in resisting the lawful arrest was over 50%, which would bar any liability for the government under Wyoming law. The plaintiff could not claim that his arrest was unlawful, as his attorney had previously agreed that no such claim was presented. Fienhold v. U.S.A., No. 07-8058, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8597 (10th Cir.).
     Business owners who claimed that a business license inspector physically assaulted them failed to show that the attack violated their substantive due process rights, since they failed to show that the abuse of governmental authority was an "integral element" of the attack. The inspector, while performing his job duties, was not authorized to use force, and did not rely on his official authority in attacking the plaintiffs. Under these circumstances, the inspector's actions may have been a state law assault and battery, but it did not amount to a violation of constitutional rights. Williams v. Berney, No. 06-1177, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5752 (10th Cir.).
     Deputy sheriff did not use excessive force or act unreasonably in detaining and tackling a man while a no-knock warrant to search for weapons and drugs was being executed on a neighbor's residence. The deputy tackled him and took him to the ground after he failed to get on the ground in response to a command. The deputy's belief that this use of force was needed was not unreasonable, based on the exigent circumstances of the quickly occurring situation. Chidester v. Utah County, No. 06-4255, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4918 (10th Cir.).
     Because there was a genuine dispute as to whether a bar owner ever physically touched a police officer (by putting a finger in his face) who then arrested him, summary judgment should not have been granted to the officer on claims that he used excessive force. He and two other officers allegedly tackled the bar owner. The incident took place in the parking lot of the bar after a shooting allegedly occurred there. Chelios v. Heavener, No. 06-4125, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5894 (7th Cir.).
     The legal standard for excessive use of force by police officers under the New Jersey state Constitution is the same as the objective reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Court rejects claims by a wife and her sister that officers, in arresting them following the wife's fight with her husband's girlfriend, used excessive force against them. The court found that the wife failed to comply with an officer's request to surrender a cell phone and enter a police vehicle voluntarily and the sister also refused to obey instructions from an officer, justifying the amount of force used. Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civil No. 04-2536, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9067 (D.N.J.).
     Police officers were not shown to have used excessive force in executing warrants on suspect accused of burglary who was known to be a convicted felon who had previously been involved in crimes involving weapons, and who the officers believed to be dangerous. Even if the force used against the suspect and other plaintiffs present at the time had been excessive, it did not violate clearly established rights. Massaro v. Town of Trumbull, No. 3:05-CV-00786, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 91502 (D. Conn.).
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on claims that they unlawfully entered a woman's home without consent or exigent circumstances while responding to a domestic disturbance call. At the time of their entry, the domestic dispute had allegedly been "neutralized" and there were no facts that would have caused the officers to believe that any one was in danger inside the home. The court also found that there was evidence from which a jury could find that an officer used excessive force in arresting the woman, causing her injuries at a time when she had not committed a crime and did not pose a threat to anyone. Campbell v. Clay, No. 07-13040, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2928 (11th Cir.).
     Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit alleging that they used excessive force in removing a morbidly obese man from a courtroom after he was found in contempt of court, causing him to die after several deputies allegedly placed themselves on his back while he was on the floor. Hostility by the deputies to the man could support a finding that they were trying to punish him at the time. Both Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims were reinstated. Appeals court also rules that removal of the decedent's mother to another courtroom via wheelchair was necessary and did not involve the use of excessive force. Richman v. Sheahan, No. 07-1487, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 200 (7th Cir.).
     Arrestee who had no conscious memory of what happened when he claimed that police struck him as he lay motionless could not pursue his excessive force claim. The arrestee, who suffers from diabetes, pulled into a grocery store after having a hypoglycemic attack while driving. He intended to buy food to correct the imbalance in his blood sugar, but allegedly started acting erratically. There was a witness who stated that he was struggling with police as they attempted to handcuff him, and was out of control. Since the arrestee could not deny or affirm any of his actions during the incidents, and there was no witness that supported his version of the incident, the officers were entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Wysong v. City of Hehath, No. 06-4433, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2192 (6th Cir.).
     Appeals court could not grant officers summary judgment when they failed to raise issues of law concerning whether their alleged conduct constituted an excessive use of force, but rather only factual issues concerning whether the arrestee refused to extend his hands for cuffing and was resisting arrest when they allegedly used force against him. Ling v. Banda, No. 07-10353, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2049 (5th Cir.).
     If, as the plaintiff claimed, officers pushed him against a wall, held him by the throat and squeezed it, and made him sit in a chair for ten minutes, again grabbing him when he attempted to leave, these actions were unreasonable, as he allegedly only came to the police station to speak with officers about a family member involved in a fight. The officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. Hamilton v. City of Jackson, Alabama, No. 07-12916, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 350 (11th Cir.).
     A sheriff's action, in pushing a mother out of his path, while taking her adult daughter into protective custody for a mental health evaluation, did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, as the mother was not "seized." The sheriff claimed that he believed that the mother, who had become "argumentative," was about to attack him. While his push allegedly made her fall backwards, and hit a table and chair, it also did not constitute conduct shocking to the conscience for purposes of a Fourteenth Amendment claim. Because of the legitimate interest in custody of the daughter, his "split-second" method of clearing his path, regardless of the mother's true intent, was entitled to qualified immunity. Clark v. Edmunds, No. 07-4029, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1315 (10th Cir.).
     An arrestee himself escalated the possible safety threat to a state trooper who stopped his vehicle by refusing to comply with the trooper's orders, fighting with him, and actively resisting arrest when he was told to exit his truck after the trooper saw drug-related items in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, even if the trooper kneed him in the back, there was no excessive use of force under the circumstances. McNeil v. Anderson, No. 07-6132, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28464 (10th Cir.).
     Police officers did not use excessive force against woman detained on suspicion of shoplifting or in allegedly pushing her into a wall. She was only handcuffed for five minutes, the court noted, and any marks on her wrists from the handcuffs vanished within a day. Further, the push against the wall did not leave any mark or wound. Segura v. Jones, No. 07-1013, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29231 (10th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court overturned a trial court's summary judgment for police officers, their police chief, and the city that employed them in a lawsuit brought by an arrestee who was subjected to an arm-lock, a tackling, a Tasering, and a beating after he allegedly committed a misdemeanor in the officers' presence. The incident occurred when the plaintiff, after unsuccessfully attempting to defend himself against a traffic ticket, took the court file with him while walking to a courthouse parking lot to get money from his vehicle to pay his fine. The officers used force against him while he was on his way back to the courthouse. The appeals court found that the force used was not reasonable, given that the plaintiff was only suspected of "innocuously" engaging in conduct constituting a nonviolent misdemeanor, and did not resist arrest or attempt to flee. Under these circumstances, the court stated, a reasonable officer would not have taken these alleged actions.  Casey v. City of Federal Heights, No. 06-1426, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28537 (10th Cir.).
     A jury in a federal civil rights lawsuit found that an officer used excessive force against an arrestee and committed assault and battery under state law by striking the plaintiff in the face three times while other officers detained him. In state court, claims for indemnification under Pennsylvania state law were rejected on the basis that officer had been found, by the jury, to have engaged in willful misconduct. The officer did not use the force employed for the purpose of effecting the arrest or maintaining the detention of the arrestee, but rather because he perceived the arrestee to be a "smart aleck," which fell outside of the scope of conduct for which indemnification was provided. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2186 C.D. 2006, 2007 Pa. Commw. Lexis 625.
     When man arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol was intoxicated and uncooperative and had indicated that he would resist having his blood drawn at a hospital, as authorized by law, officers did not use excessive force. He resisted and kicked one of the officers in the stomach, and it took four officers to subdue him. Court rejects claim that officers or town were liable for alleged injuries arrestee suffered while his arms were handcuffed behind his back. Laskey v. Legates, C.A. No. 06-18-JJF, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77586 (D. Del.).
     Sheriff's deputy was not entitled to discretionary immunity under Nevada state law when he allegedly struck an arrestee in the face breaking his nose while removing him from a crowd which officers were trying to push through early on New Year's Day. His decision did not involve policy considerations, and he was authorized, under a statute, to use no more restraint than necessary to make the arrest. The arrestee had raised his hands and knee in an effort to protect himself, and a police investigator claimed that he had tried to "knee" him. In this case, there was no evidence that the arrestee was fleeing or resisting arrest when he was struck. Castaneda v. Planeta, No. 03:05-CV-0283, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 84328 (D. Nev.).
     Trial court did not make a mistake in excluding evidence that a plaintiff wanted to introduce concerning an officer's alleged motive for using excessive force against him in the course of his arrest. An officer's intent or motivation is irrelevant if the force used is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, so that proof of "evil" intentions would not have made an objectively reasonable use of force into a Fourth Amendment violation. Wilson v. Galyon, No. 07-6124, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 22977 (10th Cir.).
     If the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, the decedent was knee deep in water, unarmed, surrounded by police, and had ceased trying to escape arrest when he was shocked with a Taser five times, struck with a baton multiple times, and pushed into a position that submerged his head in water, causing him to drown. Under those circumstances, officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim. The officers should have known that striking the arrestee with a baton after he was no longer resisting violated clearly established constitutional rights. Prior case law indicating that the unwarranted use of pepper spray was excessive force was sufficient to put officers on notice that improper use of a Taser could be excessive force. Additionally, the officers should have known that it is almost always an excessive use of force to restrain an arrestee in a manner that places his head under water for a long period of time. Landis v. Cardoza, Civil No. 05-74013, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 74838 (E.D. Mich.).
     Reversing judgment as a matter of law for an officer in an excessive force lawsuit, a federal appeals court ruled that a jury could have concluded that the level of force used was excessive. The officer allegedly applied a pain compliance control hold on the arrestee, shoved her outside, and slammed her against a car when she was calm, sober, an compliant. The trial court did, however, correctly rule that the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for battery when she touched his badge. McIntyre v. City of San Jose, No. 05-17005, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 25606 (9th Cir.).
     Undisputed evidence showed that a DUI arrestee was uncooperative and intoxicated and had shown that he would resist having his blood drawn at a hospital where he had been transported after his arrest. Under these circumstances, the officers had not used excessive force against him while his arms were handcuffed behind his back, and four officers were needed to subdue him. Laskey v. Legates, C.A. No. 06-18, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77586 (D. Del.).
     New Jersey state troopers were not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit by a traffic stop arrestee who claimed that he was grabbed by the neck and choked after he threatened to urinate in the officers' vehicle, and that they repeatedly hit him in the head with a flashlight while removing him from the car. The plaintiff also claimed that the officers kept kicking and punching him after he was restrained on the ground. If the arrestee's version of the incident were believed, a reasonable jury could find that the officers' actions were improper under the circumstances. Green v. New Jersey State Police, No. 06-4111, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 20693 (3rd Cir.).
     Off-duty deputy sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on woman's claim that he violated her rights and used excessive force against her by grabbing her without provocation, and then tossed her down the stairs after they engaged in an argument following a movie that they both separately attended. The deputy was allegedly upset about the woman's talking during the film, and had told her to "shut up" and made a racial slur about her Hispanic background. The appeals court found that it was without jurisdiction to hear the deputy's appeal of the trial court denial of his motion for qualified immunity, since he relied on his (disputed) version of the facts, rather than on a legal argument. Arnold v. Curtis, No. 06-4080, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18509 (10th Cir.).
     Evidence showed that a police officer's use of force to arrest a man during a party was reasonable under the circumstances, or that, in the alternative, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. While the arrestee claimed that the officer improperly beat him and choked him during the arrest, the record showed that attendees at the party outnumbered the officers present, and that the officer only succeeded in subduing the arrestee after the arrestee had successfully resisted the efforts of four other officers to place him under arrest. Duran v. Sirgedas, No. 05-4278, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 17305 (7th Cir.).
     An arrestee failed to assert anything other than "speculative allegations" concerning a supposed policy by the county and its drug task force to approve excessive use of force, so that claims against the county and drug task force were properly dismissed. The arrestee's assertion, however, that three officers, during the arrest, stomped on his back because they did not like his answers to their questions, and that they treated him brutally after taking him into custody, including fastening his handcuffs too tight, causing his right hand to become numb, were sufficient to state a federal civil rights claim. Chambers v. St. Louis, No. 06-2588, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18605 (8th Cir.).
     Jury's verdict in a criminal case in which the plaintiff was convicted of four counts of resisting arrest and assault necessarily included a conclusion that the U.S. Marshals making the arrest did not use excessive force, so that the arrestee's excessive force claim was barred, since the conviction had not been overturned. Lora-Pena v. U.S., 1:06-cv-00442, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51235 (D. Del.).
     Trial judge acted improperly in setting aside jury's determination that an officer used excessive force in making an arrest. The appeals court found that the arrestee's claim of excessive force was not based merely on the allegation that the officer used an ankle turn control technique, but rather on the allegation that the officer increased the amount of force he was using, breaking the arrestee's ankle, and did so after the arrestee had stopped resisting. Under these circumstances, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Jennings v. Jones, No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 19583 (1st Cir.).
     A videotape of the arrest incident refited the arrestee's claim that he was lying flat on his stomach after the officers ordered him to do so, but instead showed that he was twisting on his side when the officers approached him and tried to handcuff him. It further appeared from the video that when he rose to his feet, he was not under police control, as he claimed, but had instead successfully avoided their efforts to handcuff him. Summary judgment for the officers and city on his excessive force and inadequate training claims were therefore upheld. Mann v. Yarnell, No. 06-2326, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 19283 (8th Cir.).
     A battery claim by a protester allegedly hit by an officer was barred under a Florida state statute due to his alleged participation in a riot which occurred after an unlawful demonstration became violent. He linked arms with other demonstrators and refused orders to disperse. Court also rejects the claim that officers were inadequately trained, as significant training was provided in the use of batons. No evidence was found that supervisory personnel or another officer saw the demonstrator being hit but failed to intervene. Owaki v. City of Miami, No. 06-20737-CIV, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 44921 (S.D. Fla.).
     Officers who removed a man from his vehicle by using a "twist lock" were entitled to qualified immunity on his Fourth Amendment claim because reasonable officers could disagree as to whether the use of this twist lock was lawful under the circumstances. The officers had found the man in a fetal position in the back of a car while responding to a call reporting a "man down." The officer who applied the twist lock claimed that he only did so after he observed a handgun in the man's pocket. Novitsky v. City of Aurora, No. 05-1169, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 15959 (10th Cir.).
     Because the alleged excessive force used against an arrestee did not take place until after she was handcuffed, put into a patrol car, and then removed from it, she could pursue her claim despite her conviction for resisting arrest with violence. Success on her civil rights claim would not imply the invalidity of her conviction, which was based on her initial kick against the officer while being placed under arrest. The defendant officers were therefore not entitled to summary judgment. Dyer v. Lee, No. 06-14680, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12941 (11th Cir.).
     While an arrestee's excessive force lawsuit against one of two officers who arrested him was not barred by his conviction for resisting the other officer, there was no genuine issue of fact created by the plaintiff, based on the record, that the officer he sued had used more than "the force a reasonable and prudent law enforcement officer would use." Summary judgment for the defendant officer, the city, and the police chief was therefore upheld. Jones v. City of Anaheim, No. 05-55752, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9647 (9th Cir.).
     The plaintiff arrestee's claim that the officer had assaulted and thrashed him, beating him into unconsciousness was not supported by the history and physical examinations of the arrestee that night in a hospital room, which were not consistent with his version of events, but the plaintiff was entitled, under the Seventh Amendment, to a jury trial on that claim to determine the credibility of his version of the incident. On the other hand, any injuries that resulted from the officer's action in taking the arrestee down to the ground were based on the arrestee's own actions in attempting to evade arrest for intoxicated driving, based on which the officer could reasonably believe that he was non-compliant. Therrien v. Town of Jay, Civil No. 06-31, 483 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Maine 2007).
     Despite the fact that the arrestee could not prove which of two officers allegedly beat him after he was arrested for intoxicated driving and handcuffed, officers who were present during the incident could be held liable if the facts were as alleged by the arrestee and they failed to intervene. Since both officers admitted that they were present at the scene, that, along with the arrestee's version of the event, would be sufficient for a jury, if it believed the arrestee, to find that both officers either used excessive force or that one did while the other failed to intervene. Summary judgment for the officers was therefore reversed. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, No. 05-13157, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9127 (11th Cir.).
     The arrestee's appearance and behavior at a bar was sufficient to provide officers with probable cause to arrest him for public intoxication. The arrestee also failed to present a viable claim for excessive use of force by the officers, especially in light of the fact that he admitted going limp and dropping to the ground when they attempted to arrest him. There was no evidence that the officers acted intentionally in allegedly hitting his head against the door of the police van while placing him in it, or that this caused him any injury. Jackson v. City of Erie, Pennsylvania, No. 06-2134, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 13670 (3rd Cir.).
    While the officers had probable cause to believe a man they arrested at a mall was trespassing because he had previously been evicted from it and permanently banned from entering again, there were material issues of fact as to whether the officers' "gang tackle" of the arrestee, punches made while making his arrest, and the use of hobble restraints constituted excessive use of force, precluding summary judgment.  Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, No. 04-55938, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 10856 (9th Cir.).
     Officers who allegedly forced a man to the floor and handcuffed him, even if they caused his injuries from a hit to the head, did not act unreasonably when he refused to comply with an officer's order to get on the floor when he was encountered holding down a crying and screaming female. Evidence subsequently showed that he had sexually and physically abused he woman. The officers could reasonably believe, under the circumstances, that they needed to act swiftly to subdue the suspect. Molnar v. Doerfler, No. 3:03CV00813, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35199 (D. Conn.).
     State troopers were not entitled to qualified immunity on motorist's claim that they used excessive force against him during a pat-down search during a traffic stop. The motorist was not able to produce a valid vehicle registration, and was asked to step out of his car. He told them, in response to orders that he put his hands behind his back, that he was unable to do so because of a shoulder injury. In response they allegedly forced him onto the hood of his cars, forced his arm up, and, once he screamed in pain, applied more pressure and pumped his arm up and down. If the motorist's version of the events was accurate, the troopers could not have reasonably believed that this use of force was proper under the circumstances. The fact that the motorist had 20-25 pens and pencils on his person, and a firearm in his auto (which the troopers were then unaware of) did not justify the amount of force used, nor did the motorist's belligerent manner of stating that he did not believe he was required to register his car. Winterrowd v. Nelson, No. 04-35855, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 7400 (9th Cir.).
     Officers who were allegedly present when another officer used excessive force against a handcuffed arrestee could be held liable for failure to intervene. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, No. 05-13157, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5821 (11th Cir.).
     Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when arrestee claimed he had increased his use of force after resistance to the arrest had ceased. Federal appeals court reinstates jury award in plaintiff's favor. Jennings v. Jones, No. 05-2522, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 5268 (1st Cir.).
     Videotape of incident did not conclusively establish what happened during an arrest, because the disputed contact between the officers and the arrestee was covered up by a time/date stamp on the tape. Further proceedings were therefore required to resolve the factual issue of whether the arrestee was resisting the officers in a way that justified their use of force against him. Gill v. Locricchio, No. 06-1659, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 4878 (6th Cir.).
     Officer's use of force against an unarmed arrestee, if as alleged, was sufficiently excessive to violate clearly established law, requiring reversal of trial court's grant of qualified immunity to officer. Davis v. City of Las Vegas, No. 04-17284, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 4580 (9th Cir.).
     Officers who responded to a report that a man was attempting to commit suicide were not liable to allegedly using excessive force against him while trying to subdue him. Among other things, his subsequent criminal conviction for attacking the officers excluded his recovery on his claim of excessive force, because awarding him damages would have implied the invalidity of that conviction, which had not been set aside. Roberts v. Anderson, No. 05-6828, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 759 (6th Cir.).[N/R]
     A reasonable officer would know that administering closed-fist punches and flashlight blows to the head, after an arrestee was handcuffed, and continuing to strike him after he had stopped resisting arrest -- and failing to place him in the proper position after hobbling him -- was excessive force. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Sallenger v. Oakes, #05-3470, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 436, 2007 WL 60422 (7th Cir.) [N/R]
     Because the evidence showed that an arrestee assaulted an officer without provocation, and then resisted the attempt to restrain him, and the officers had to act rapidly in less than 15 seconds to use force to respond, their actions could not be reasonably judged to be excessive. Koeiman v. City of New York, No. 9491, Index 23549/93, 2007 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 88 (1st Dept.). [N/R]
     U.S. Marshal did not use excessive force against homeowner by pointing a gun at her in the basement of the residence and telling her to go upstairs. The Marshal was present in the home after the homeowner consented to a search for a dangerous fugitive being sought. The Marshal was alone in the basement at the time of the incident, and on his knees, and was startled by the homeowner's approach, and his actions were not excessive under the circumstances. Komongnan v. U.S. Marshals Service, No. 06-909, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90769 (D.D.C.). [N/R]
     Arrestees who had allegedly surrendered before being hit in the head by a police officer created a genuine issue of whether the officer's use of force was excessive. Because the officer had no legitimate reason for striking them after such a surrender, if that was true, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Baker v. City of Hamilton, Ohio, No. 05-4390, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 31056 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court overturns summary judgment for defendants on claims for excessive force against arrestee, because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether they had beaten him severely after he had already been subdued, relieved of any weapons, and handcuffed. Arrington v. U.S., No. 05-5263, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 32026 (D.C. Cir.). [N/R]
     Arrestee's conviction for trespassing, based on a guilty plea, did not bar him from pursuing an excessive force claim against two of the arresting officers, who he alleged pushed his face into a sidewalk at a time when he was not resisting them and was intoxicated. Summary judgment was granted, however, as to a third officer and the municipality. Smith v. Jackson, No. CV-06-12, 2006 U.S.Dist. Lexis 85947 (D. Maine).  [N/R]
     City had no obligation under Pennsylvania law to indemnify a police officer found liable for excessive use of force which did not occur in connection with an arrest, but which instead was simply an assault and battery of the plaintiff by the officer for the intentional purpose of harming and punishing him. Under the statute, there is no duty for a municipality to indemnify an officer for conduct which amounts to a crime or willful misconduct. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, No. 2272, 2006 Phil. Ct. Com. Pl. Lexis 439 (Philadelphia County, Pa.). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court upholds $1.3 million award of compensatory and punitive damages against police officers for allegedly using excessive force against two arrestees. Evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to arrive at a finding of liability, and the defendants failed to preserve for appeal any question about whether the compensatory damages awarded were excessive. The punitive damages award of $250,000 against each of the four defendants was not excessive under the circumstances if the jury believed the plaintiffs' version of the incident, amounting to an unjustified assault by the officers. Casillas-Diaz v. Palau, No. 04-1303, 463 F.3d 77 (1st Cir.). [N/R]
     When it was not clear from the lawsuit whether the officer's alleged use of excessive force against an arrestee occurred before, at the time of, or following the arrestee's resistance to the officer, the court could not have decided whether the plaintiff's claim was barred, absent the overturning of his earlier conviction, and therefore, should not have dismissed the lawsuit. If the punch in question took place before the resistance or after the resistance had ended, an award of damages for excessive force would not have necessarily implied the invalidity of a conviction for assaulting the officer. Riddick v. Lott, No. 05-7882, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25473 (4th Cir). [N/R]
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he used excessive force against arrestee by slapping him, but was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that he used excessive force by making the handcuffs too tight. The officer himself did not justify the slap by a need to protect himself or others, or subdue the arrestee, but rather stated that it was administered because of the arrestee's "smart mouth." Nothing in the record, however, indicated that the arrestee had complained about the handcuffs being overly tight. Pigram v. Chaudoin, No. 05-6660, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25073 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
     Deputy did not use excessive force in restraining and handcuffing man being arrested on domestic battery charges, even though his actions led to an injury to the arrestee, when the man resisted and the incident took place in a crowd at the state fairgrounds in an atmosphere of "hostility" with crowbars and hammers readily available. Kenyon v. Edwards, No. 05-3487, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 22737 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Nov]
     Tennessee Highway Patrol officers were entitled to qualified immunity for stopping a vehicle containing three family members, based on mistaken dispatches giving them reason to believe that the occupants had been involved in a robbery. Appeals court reinstates, however, father's excessive force claim against two troopers who allegedly tackled him and threw him to the pavement face first while handcuffed when he reacted "with horror" to the shooting and killing of a family dog which ran out of the vehicle. Smoak v. Hall, No. 05-6511, 460 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2006). [2006 LR Nov]
     Deputy sheriffs were not entitled to summary judgment in an excessive force lawsuit by woman arrested them in her home pursuant to a warrant. Her version of the events, including that they beat her with a billy club and jumped on her after she was incapacitated by pepper spray and was only passively resisting, if true, showed an excessive use of force. The use of pepper spray was not excessive, however, since she was hiding from them under a blanket in a closet at the time, and could have been thought to be planning to "ambush" them. Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, No. 05-6271, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 16957 (6th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Officers acted reasonably, under their community care-taking function, in transporting a man to a hospital where a doctor placed him on a 72-hour hold when they believed he might be hallucinating, but were not entitled to qualified immunity on his claim that they used excessive force against him in restraining him or after he was restrained when he did not resist them. Samuelson v. City of New Ulm, No. 04-3332, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 18167 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Arrestee could pursue his complaint of excessive use of force, since it included both the basic facts of what occurred and the claim that this constituted unreasonable action under the Fourth Amendment, but his false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by his conviction of a criminal charge against him arising out of his arrest. Lynn v. Schertzberg, No. 05-1857, 169 Fed. Appx. 666 (3rd Cir. 2006).[N/R]
     A genuine issue of fact about whether the amount of force used by a deputy while attempting to collect on a judgment was unreasonable barred summary judgment for the deputy in a federal civil rights lawsuit. Frobel v. County of Broome, No. 3:03CV528, 419 F. Supp. 2d 212 (N.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
     Man's affidavit stating that he was "attacked" by an officer and thrown out of a courthouse building, even if somewhat vague, was sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as to whether officer used excessive force in removing him from the premises. Lax v. City of South Bend, No. 05-4200, 449 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006). ) [2006 LR Aug]
     State troopers found liable by jury for $6.725 million for alleged excessive use of force against an occupant of a home being searched for drugs were entitled to a new trial based on prejudicial comments made by the plaintiff's attorney during closing arguments raising issues not before the jury, and the excessive amount of the award. Christopher v. State of Florida, No. 04-16319, 449 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. May 26, 2006) [2006 LR Aug]
     Off-duty, non-uniformed jail commander acted under color of law while allegedly beating motorist who rear-ended his pickup truck when he asserted his law enforcement authority by saying he was "a cop" in order to prevent bystanders from interfering with his assault. Anderson v. Warner, No. 04-15505, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 15996 (9th Cir. June 26, 2006). [2006 LR Aug]
     Handcuffing, shackling, and pushing of an alien during his arrest and forcible deportation by immigration and customs agents did not amount to excessive use of force, when it was used to get him to enter an airplane when he resisted. Adegbuji v. Fifteen Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents, No. 05-1506, 169 Fed. Appx. 733 (3rd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
     Officers were not liable for the death of a cocaine-intoxicated man arrested after he engaged in bizarre behavior of continually kicking side door of police station and resisted their attempts to handcuff him. Decedent's estate failed to show either that there were no grounds for the arrest or that anything the officers did constituted excessive use of force. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 04-15055, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 8011 (9th Cir.). [2006 LR May]
     Factual issues as to whether officer had kicked down a motel apartment door, entered, and struck the occupant without an arrest or search warrant barred summary judgment for officer in resident's lawsuit for excessive use of force and unlawful entry. Goins v. City of Detroit, No. 03-CV-74758, 408 F. Supp. 2d 387 (E.D. Mich. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee stated a possible claim for excessive use of force in alleging that he was punched, clubbed, kicked, and slammed into the ground multiple times while handcuffed with his ankles restrained while being arrested for a "non-violent" misdemeanor of unlawful loitering in a public place with intent to engage in narcotics related activity. Phillips v. City of Fairfield, No. CIVS040377, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2005). [N/R]
     Appeals court upholds jury verdict in favor of police officers sued for allegedly using excessive force against arrestee who shot an officer prior to his capture. Testimony by the officer concerning his being shot was admissible because it was relevant to show the "perspective" of reasonable officers at the scene of the capture. Dodd v. Corbett, No. 03-3978, 154 Fed. Appx. 497 (7th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Wisconsin Supreme Court rules that preponderance of the evidence, rather than "clear and convincing evidence" was the proper standard in a federal civil rights lawsuit for excessive force, and orders a new trial on liability in the case based on the trial court's improper use of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard for the burden of proof. Shaw v. Leatherberry, No. 2003AP2316, 706 N.W.2d 299 (Wis. 2005). [N/R]
     Even if arrestee's claim that officer had grabbed him and threw him to the floor during a DUI arrest were true, those actions did not constitute an excessive use of force in the absence of any proof that those actions caused his injuries of a broken hand and loose tooth. Alcoholic arrestee with a history of blackouts himself stated that he lost consciousness, and three officers stated that he subsequently injured his hand by punching his hand against the door in his holding cell. Thomsen v. Ross, No. 03-CV-1192, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961 (D. Minn. 2005). [N/R]
     Officer was not entitled to summary judgment on arrestee's claim that he used excessive force by grabbing the handlebar of his moving motorcycle to prevent him from leaving a parking lot, resulting in injuries. Hastings v. Hubbard, No. 04-4403, 151 Fed. Appx. 357 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Police officers' alleged actions of continuing to beat handcuffed arrestee after he was subdued was malicious and therefore beyond the scope of their employment. The city which employed them was therefore not liable for their actions but rather immune from liability under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. City of Jackson v. Powell, No. 2003-CA-01013, 917 So. 2d 59 (Miss. 2005). [N/R]
     Sheriff was not individually liable for alleged use of excessive force against arrestee by deputy on the basis of failure to properly supervise him when there were no prior complaints about the deputy's conduct. Marley v. Crawford County, Arkansas, No. 04-2042, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (W.D. Ark. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee's excessive force claim against police officer was not barred by his conviction for resisting the officer, when he did not deny the resistance, but merely that the officer's response was excessive, including a beating to the face that caused broken bones and bruises. VanGilder v. Baker, No. 05-1119, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 810 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Mar]
     Police chief used a reasonable amount of force to subdue a motorist who had driven erratically, ignored attempts to pull him over, refused to get out of his vehicle, and appeared to be resisting being handcuffed. The chief had no reason to know, until the arrestee told him, that he was a diabetic suffering low blood sugar, rather than a belligerent drunk or a fleeing criminal. Wertish v. Krueger, No. 05-1031, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 431 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Mar]
     Police officer who allegedly struck and kicked a suspect who was struggling to prevent his handcuffing during an arrest did not use excessive force. Byther v. City of Mobile, No. Civ. A. 040404, 398 F. Supp. 2d 1222 (S.D. Ala. 2005). [N/R]
     While motorist claimed that he suffered injuries to his wrists during an arrest, he could not proceed with his excessive force claim against the arresting officer when he failed to state how the injuries occurred or what actions by the officer he believed were excessive. Hudson v. Coxon, No. 05-1542, 149 Fed. Appx. 118 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Excessive force lawsuit against city and police officers was properly dismissed on the basis of the continued failure of the plaintiffs' attorney to respond to discovery requests, have his clients appear for depositions, provide medical records or other documents explaining their purported injuries, or appear at conferences at the courthouse concerning the status of the case. Harrington v. City of Chicago, No. 04-4326, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 3 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Feb]
     Police officers were not entitled to summary judgment on claim that they used excessive force against individuals seeking to file a complaint at a police station, but there was no evidence on which to base the plaintiffs' claims against the police superintendent and a police sergeant for supervisory liability. Vega v. Vivoni, No. CIV.02-1754, 389 F. Supp. 2d 160 (D. Puerto Rico 2005). [N/R]
     Texas state troopers were entitled to qualified immunity for using force against vehicle passenger during traffic stop which resulted in her suffering a broken arm when there was reasonable suspicion to investigate whether she was guilty of public intoxication, and her "aggressive demeanor" and the possibility that she had a weapon justified a pat-down search and handcuffing. Her "further resistance" to the search and handcuffing provided the authorization for the amount of force used. Padilla v. Mason, No. 08-03-00123-CV, 169 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2005). [N/R]
     Police officers who encountered an intoxicated man who threatened his wife, disabled her car, and refused to cooperate with being arrested and handcuffed did not act unreasonably in using physical force and mace to subdue him. They could reasonably believe, under the circumstances, that he posed a threat to his wife, children, others present, and themselves. Wilson v. Flynn, No. 04-2491, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 24555 (4th Cir.). [2006 LR Jan]
     Law enforcement agencies were not liable for the deaths of a mother and son shot and killed by their estranged husband and father, whose gun, previously taken away when officers responded to a domestic violence call, was subsequently returned to him and then used to shoot them. First, the estranged husband/father had access to another gun in any event, and secondly, the murder victims had no constitutionally protected property interest, protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforcement of a domestic violence protective order entered under Pennsylvania law. Starr v. Price, No. 3:03 CV 636, 385 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D. Pa. 2005). [N/R]
     Evidence of threats that an arrestee allegedly made before his arrest, which were relayed to the officers who arrived on the scene were admissible in excessive force lawsuit to show officers' reason for entering a house with their weapons drawn and immediately rolling him from the sofa to the floor to handcuff him. Gallagher v. City of West Covina, No. 03-55391, 141 Fed. Appx. 577 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers did not use excessive force in pulling motorist from his vehicle and handcuffing him at the conclusion of a thirty-minute pursuit after observing his erratic driving. Officers could reasonably have believed he was intoxicated, and was uncooperative, and their actions were "measured" under the circumstances, as they did not then know that he was undergoing diabetic shock rather than intoxication. Janis v. Biesheuvel, No. 05-1660, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22991 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Dec]
     New York school burglar's claim that police officers beat him and then threw him out of a third-story school window, made for the first time nine months after the incident, and supported almost exclusively by his own testimony, was one that no reasonable jury could believe. Trial judge acted properly in granting summary judgment for the defendants based on a finding that the plaintiff's story was unbelievable and contradicted by his own prior inconsistent statements as well as by other evidence. Jeffreys v. City of New York, No. 03-257, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22317 (2d Cir.). [2005 LR Dec]
     Officer's use of force against motorist being arrested for driving under the influence was not excessive, but reasonable to prevent him from fleeing when the motorist was backing away from the officer as he asked him if he was the driver involved in an accident at the scene. Officer grabbed the motorist, throwing him onto the police car, and then handcuffed him. Officer had probable cause to arrest motorist who admitted that he was the driver of a car apparently at fault for a serious accident, and that he had been drinking. Ankele v. Hambrick, No. 03-4225, 136 Fed. Appx. 551 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee's excessive force claim arising out of his arrest was not barred by his plea of no contest to a charge of disorderly conduct, since probable cause for the arrest did not necessarily resolve the issue of whether the force used to make the arrest was proper. Defendants were, however, entitled to summary judgment, as the force used was found to be reasonable. Dye v. City of Warren, No. 4:03CV2593, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (N.D. Ohio 2005). [N/R]
     An arrestee's filing of a police brutality complaint with the internal affairs division of the county police department was not adequate to satisfy the requirements under the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act for notice of a claim before pursuing a civil lawsuit for damages. The fact that an officer allegedly told the arrestee to "take no action" while the internal affairs investigation was pending did not constitute an excuse for failing to file a timely notice of claim. White v. Prince George's County, No. 01293, 877 A.3d 1129 (Md. App. 2005). [N/R]
     Arrestee failed to show that any city policy or custom contributed to the alleged use of excessive force against him while in custody. City was entitled, therefore, to summary judgment. Niemyjski v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV. 03-1377, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D.N.M. 2005). [N/R]
     Appeals court reinstates lawsuit against one officer for using allegedly excessive force in the course of restraining a disturbed man, causing his death by kneeling on him while he was on the ground, and against other officers for allegedly failing to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force. Abdullahi v. City of Madison, #04-4114, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19580 (7th Cir.). [2005 LR Nov]
     Jury properly awarded damages both for deputy sheriffs' excessive use of force against arrestee and for negligence under California state law in injuring him during the arrest while ousting him from an adult bookstore, as well as in reducing the negligence award for the contributory negligence of the arrestee. Prevailing plaintiff's time for filing a motion for an award of attorneys' fees was tolled (extended) pending the outcome of post-trial motions asking for a new trial. Bailey v. County of Riverside, #03-56545, 414 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Man arrested during officers' response to domestic violence call failed to show that excessive force was used against him. While officers allegedly hit him about the neck, shoulders, and wrist with their nightsticks and wrestled him to the ground, the arrestee refused to cooperate with the officers, fought with them, disarmed one of them, and grabbed a second officer by the groin. Under these circumstances, the amount of force used by the officers was not objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff arrestee also failed to establish, as he claimed, that the city had a "widespread practice" of abusing "men of color" who dated white women. McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, #03 CIV. 10037, 373 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
     Defendants in arrestee's excessive force lawsuit were not entitled to a stay in the proceedings until after the criminal proceedings against him were concluded. The excessive force claims had no bearing on the particular criminal charges against the arrestee. The court rejects, as valid reasons for a stay, the fact that the plaintiff arrestee could obtain, through the discovery process in the civil lawsuit, access to materials he would not otherwise obtain in the course of defending his criminal case, and the fact that he could, while the criminal prosecution was ongoing, assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to respond to the defendants' discovery requests in the civil case. Scheuerman v. City of Huntsville, Alabama, No. CIV.A.CV-05-S-843, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Ala. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers who were aware that a man had made threats to "blow out his brain" with a gun and expressed threats of physical violence towards others did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or Missouri state law in placing him on a 96-hour psychiatric hold at a hospital. The detainee also failed to show that the officers used excessive force in restraining him, as he himself admitted that he resisted them when they attempted to take him into custody, requiring them to restrain him through force and handcuff him. Additionally, his restraint only caused minor cuts and abrasions. Lacy v. City of Bolivar, Missouri, No. 04-2702, 416 F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's claims that they used excessive force against him during his arrest. Given the seriousness of the narcotics offenses of which he was suspected, they could reasonably believe that he was an immediate threat to them when they observed him reaching down by his feet while he was in his vehicle, and that they needed to take action to subdue him when he began to run away after he was handcuffed. Davis v. Lowers, No. 04-12816, 132 Fed. Appx. 302 (11th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Sheriff who was not present when his deputy entered a residence and allegedly used excessive force against an arrestee was not liable under theories of either inadequate supervision or training when the reports of both the deputy and children's service workers present during the arrest did not indicate either unlawful entry or excessive use of force, and no evidence of the inadequacy of the training provided. Loy v. Sexton, No. 04-3971, 132 Fed. Appx. 624 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Failure to instruct jury that it could impose punitive damages for officer's alleged excessive use of force against an arrestee if he acted in an "oppressive" manner required a new trial on the issue. Federal appeals court also orders recalculation of attorneys' fees award to determine whether hours plaintiff's attorney spent on unsuccessful claims were related to the time spent on the successful excessive force claim which resulted in $18,000 jury award of compensatory damages. Dang v. Cross, No. 03-55403, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17981 (9th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
     Dismissal of plaintiff's suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act is affirmed where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that plaintiff has failed to show that defendants assaulted or maliciously prosecuted him under Ohio law. Harris v. U.S., No. 04-3520, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19058 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
     Police officer's actions in tackling an arrestee who had fled from the scene of a search warrant, and who was reasonably believed to be armed based on a radio transmission the officer had heard, were not an excessive use of force. Brown v. Pfaff, No. CIV.03-404, 357 F. Supp. 2d 781 (D. Del. 2005). [N/R]
     Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the testimony of a medical expert in a detainee's lawsuit seeking damages for eye injuries allegedly caused by a police officer during the detention. The plaintiff failed to file the expert's report in a timely manner, and the report failed to provide a complete statement of the basis and reasons for the expert's opinion or state his qualification. Further, admission of the testimony at a late date had to be excluded to avoid prejudice because admitting the testimony and giving the defendant officer time to depose the expert would have resulted in the postponement of the trial. Brooks v. Price, No. 03-4608, 121 Fed. Appx. 961 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Factual dispute between police officer, who claimed he used no force at all against motorist he stopped at road block, and motorist, who claimed that he grabbed her and repeatedly "slammed" her against a car made summary judgment in her excessive force lawsuit inappropriate. Murry v. Barnes, No. 04-1545, 122 Fed. Appx. 853 (7th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court reinstates claim by wheelchair-bound arrestee that officers injured him by attempting to place him in the back seat of a police cruiser even after he explained that his legs could not bend. St. John v. Hickey, No. 04-3388 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 11736 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Aug]
     City's emergency medical technicians did not violate patient's Fourth Amendment rights or his due process rights when they restrained him during an emergency call and "hogtied" him because he was resisting their efforts to diagnose and treat him. The patient was then resisting them because of a diabetic episode, and the court rules that he was not then "mentally present," and therefore could not possibly have communicated a refusal of treatment. Davidson v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:03-CV-343, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2005). [N/R]
     Jury's finding that officer used excessive force resulting in broken wrist for drunk driving arrestee, and its finding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity was not inconsistent, since it could have believed that the officer's use of force was excessive, but that he reasonably believed his conduct to be lawful under the circumstances. Kent v. Katz, No. 04-0880, 125 Fed. Appx. 334 (2nd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Motorist's allegation that an officer broke her arm during the course of an arrest by "jerking" her arms after she raised them in a "surrender" gesture stated a viable claim for excessive use of force, so that the trial court improperly dismissed the complaint. Byrd v. Cavenaugh, No. A04A2013, 604 S.E.2d 655 (Ga. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Claims for excessive use of force during drug possession arrest accrued on the date of the arrest, even though the plaintiff claimed not to realize the permanent nature of his injuries from the officers' alleged choking and hitting until three months later. His lawsuit, therefore, was time barred under the Ohio statute of limitations. Hodge v. City of Elyria, No. 03-3296, 126 Fed. Appx. 222 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on their alleged use of excessive force while executing a search warrant on the home of a dentist and his wife based on suspicion of growing marijuana, when there was no belief that the home's occupants were armed or would resist or flee. Appeals court finds that, if alleged lies by deputy were removed from affidavit for warrant, there would be nothing left justifying its the issuance. Baldwin v. Placer County, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 6626 (9th Cir.). [2005 LR Jun]
     Jury instructions stating that a mistaken but reasonable belief that the use of force was justified in a situation as a state trooper perceived it were not improper and did not change the applicable legal standard as to whether force was reasonable from an objective to a subjective one. Jury verdict in favor of trooper in lawsuit by arrestee claiming excessive use of force upheld. Hung v. Evanko, No. 03-4475, 115 Fed. Appx. 553 (3rd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Claims by an arrestee's daughter for his death based on the alleged use of excessive force during the arrest were based on alleged intentional misconduct, rather than negligence, and therefore were excluded from the scope of a Texas state statute waiving sovereign immunity, so that complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. City of Garland, Texas v. Rivera, No. 05-04-00516-CV, 146 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers could not have reasonably believed that supervising officers were not violating arrestee's civil rights during execution of no-knock search warrant on home in allegedly conducting invasive body cavity searches of two women in front of male officers and visual body cavity searches of three men, or by allegedly physically assaulting persons present during the search without provocation. Defendants were not, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. Officer who allegedly misled the magistrate into issuing the warrant by omitting material facts was also not entitled to qualified immunity. Bolden v. Village of Monticello, No. 04 CIV.1372, 344 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
     Off-duty police officer had probable cause to arrest two women for being in a public park after closing hours even if local police department operating procedure would arguably have cautioned against an arrest under those circumstances. Department's operating procedures were also not relevant on federal civil rights claims for excessive force, when the issue was whether the officer's use of force was "reasonable, not optimal." Tanberg v. Sholtis, No. 03-2231, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 4332 (10th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR May]
     A police officer used reasonable force against a murder witness he was taking into protective custody when he placed his knee over the top of the witness's back and shoulder area while handcuffing him. The officer, at the time, had grounds to believe that the witness might pose a threat and did not have a description sufficient to distinguish the witness from the perpetrator. There were, however, genuine issues of material fact as to whether a second officer on the scene, who allegedly "pounced" on the center of the witness's back and injured him, used excessive force, precluding summary judgment for him. Davis v. Brouillette, No. 2:03-CV-175, 349 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D.Vt. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity on claims arising out of the amount of force they used in arresting a man during a civil disturbance, including allegedly using a takedown technique that was "too aggressive," when he refused to leave the area after being told several times to do so, and he resisted arrest, subsequently being convicted of resisting. Under the circumstances, it would not be clear to a reasonable officer that their conduct violated the arrestee's rights. Rosenberger v. Kootenai County Sheriff's Department, No. 29777, 103 P.3d 466 (Idaho 2004). [N/R]
    Police officer working as hospital security guard did not use excessive force in stopping possibly intoxicated and hallucinating man who was running toward glass exit doors which were locked. Neither officer nor the city which employed him was liable for the man's subsequent death, allegedly from injuries suffered in a fall when the officer grabbed him. McVay v. Sears, No. 03-3948 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 3626 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Apr]
     Defendant mayor and police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit in which political opponent of mayor claimed both attacked him while he was driving a sound truck for an opposition party. Summary judgment was not granted on the basis of widely different factual accounts of what actually happened. Rodriguez-Rodriguez v. Ortiz-Velez, No. 03-2123 391 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2004) [2005 LR Apr]
     The applicable three-year statute of limitations on an attorney's federal civil rights claim against court officers who allegedly physically assaulted him started to run on the date of the alleged assault. The fact that an allegedly "related" claim was pending in state court did not toll (extend) the three-year time period, so the complaint was properly dismissed as untimely. Keane v. Navarro, No. Civ.A.03-CV-10154, 345 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
     City could not be held liable for police officers' alleged actions of seizing and beating a robbery suspect without justification merely on the basis that it was the officers' employer. Arrestee failed to allege that any of the purported violations of his constitutional rights were the result of the city's policies. Hales v. City of Montgomery, Civil Action No. 03-M-593, 347 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (M.D. Ala. 2004). [N/R]
     While officers properly arrested woman for poking one of them in the chest, and had a right to use some force in light of her allegedly "intoxicated and belligerent" conduct, factual disputes over the degree of force used precluded summary judgment on her excessive force claims. It was disputed, for example, whether an officer did in fact twist her arm behind her back, push his knee into her kneecap to bring her to the ground and then deliberately lay on top of her prone body to subdue her or rather accidentally fall on top of her. It was also disputed as to how much force was reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest under the circumstances. Elliott v. County of Monroe, #04-0746-CV, 115 Fed. Apx. 497 (2nd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers' alleged actions of repeatedly striking suspect on his ribs, back and head after he fully submitted to arrest was unreasonable so that they were not entitled to qualified immunity. Alleged unprovoked beating would be sufficiently outrageous under Tennessee law to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Alexander v. Newman, #02-2983-DV, 345 F. Supp. 2d 876 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). [N/R]
     When an arrestee was uncertain as to which of two officers allegedly placed a knee on his neck, and there was no evidence as to which officer did so, this barred a finding that either of the officers used excessive force while involved, with others, in making the arrest. Birdine v. City of Coatesville, No. CIV. A.03-5569, 347 F. Supp. 2d 182 (E.D. Pa. 2004). [N/R]
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on arrestee's claim that he struck him in the eye while he was surrendering by laying on the ground after ending a chase. The officer's alleged conduct of striking an unarmed suspect about the face after he voluntarily surrendered, if true, was objectively unreasonable. Dubay v. Craze, No. 03-71553, 327 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2004). [N/R]
     As of December of 1999, it was clearly established that a police officer could not reasonably believe that it was constitutional to "take down" or physically assault an arrestee who was not actively resisting arrest, attempting to escape, or posing a threat to others, and that other officers present had a duty to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force by a fellow officer. Defendant officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity from arrestee's excessive force claims. Hays v. Ellis, #CIV.A.01-K-2316, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (D. Colo. 2004). [N/R]
     Arrestee's conviction for resisting an officer did not bar him from pursuing a federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged excessive use of force against him. Ninth Circuit federal appeals court, overturning prior ruling, adopts Model Penal Code definition of "deadly force," but leaves it to trial court to decide whether the use of a police dog against the arrestee was deadly force in this case. Smith v. City of Hemet, No. 03-56445, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 336 (9th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Feb]
     Deputy acted in an objectively reasonable manner in putting his foot on an arrestee's face when he raised his head as he lay on the ground being handcuffed after disobeying orders to immediately drop his shotgun. The arrestee was "not docile," and subsequently was found to possess another gun on his person. Crosby v. Monroe County, No. 03-13716, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 26973 (11th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
     Michigan appeals court upholds jury award of $533,087.62 against police officer for asphyxiation death of cocaine-intoxicated man who threatened to kill the officer and his partner. While jury found the decedent to be 50% responsible for his own death, it did not clearly attribute his comparative negligence solely to his drug use, which would have barred liability. Smith v. Detroit, #247154, 2004 Mich. App. Lexis 3500 (Unpub. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
     Federal appeals court upholds qualified immunity for police officer who broke motorist's arm in the process of arresting her for intoxicated driving. While trial judge erroneously submitted the qualified immunity issue to the jury, the motorist failed to object or submit alternative instructions, and the submission was not the kind of "plain error" that threatened the fairness or integrity or public reputation of the judicial process. Littrell v. Franklin, No. 03-2534, 388 F.3d 578 (8th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Jan]
     Officer had probable cause to remove motorist from his vehicle when he refused a lawful order to produce his driver's license, and did not use excessive force in doing so when he could reasonably believe that he was attempting to evade arrest and posed a possible danger to pedestrians and others in the area. Lawrence v. Kenosha County, No. 04-1472, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 24830 (7th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Jan]
     Defendant state troopers were not entitled to summary judgment on excessive force claim merely because neither suspect nor his father, also present at the incident, could identify which of the two of them allegedly stomped on the suspect's ankle. The suspect was handcuffed and pinned face down at the time, and both he and his father had been pepper sprayed at the time. If one of the troopers did, in fact, stomp on the suspect's ankle while he was prone on the ground in handcuffs, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. Williams v. Atkins, No. 00 CIV. 8257(SCR), 333 F. Supp. 2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers' use of chemical spray against an arrestee and pushing of him was not excessive force when he was on top of a man on the floor with blood on the floor around them when they arrived at his apartment, and the arrestee was not cooperative with them. Officers had no obligation to believe arrestee's claim that he had acted in self-defense after the other man, his brother-in-law, had attacked him in an intoxicated condition. Lindsay v. Bogle, No. 02-6201, 92 Fed. Appx. 165 (6th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Louisiana man who claimed that four officers detained him during a Mardi Gras parade, with one of them intentionally handling him in a way that dislocated his shoulders adequately asserted a claim for assault, battery, and false imprisonment against the city, its insurer, and the city police department under a vicarious liability theory. Doss v. Morris, #02-31215, 86 Fed Appx. 25 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that officers used excessive force against him was barred under the principles in Heck v. Humphrey, No. 93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), since he had been convicted of resisting an officer, and that conviction had not been set aside. The plaintiff did not claim that the officers used excessive force after he stopped resisting or that they used excessive force to stop his resistance, but instead that they attacked him with no reason to do so. Accordingly, his federal civil rights lawsuit was an improper challenge to the validity of his conviction. Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, No. 03-30941, 100 Fed. Appx. 321 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Arrestee's claim that officer transporting him to county jail "kind of manhandled me around" and "roughly transported" him in the "manner in which" the officer "took me out of the car and stuff like that" was insufficient to state a claim for excessive use of force. Dimmitt v. Ockenfels, # 03-170-P-DMC, 220 F.R.D. 116 (D. Me. 2004). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court overturns trial judge's grant of summary judgment on arrestee's claim that officer used excessive force against her in allegedly shoving her headfirst into a police vehicle, causing her to strike her head on the metal partition inside. Maxwell v. City of New York, #03-0245, 380 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Nov]
     While an arrestee's claim that officers used excessive force against him after handcuffing him could move forward, based on genuine issues of fact as to what happened, and whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity from liability, the plaintiff failed to make any showing that an official policy or custom of the city or its police department led to his injuries. Claims for municipal liability, therefore, were properly rejected. Arrestee's testimony in a deposition that he "might" have been yelling and waving his arms, and making a fist at the officers as he approached them, and his admission that he reached for one officer's gun belt and touched it, warranted summary judgment for the defendant officers on his claims that they also used excessive force against him prior to handcuffing him. Ross v. City of Toppenish, No. 03-35234, 104 Fed. Appx. 26 (9th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Jury's finding that a police officer used excessive force in breaking a motorist's wrist during an arrest for intoxicated driving was not inconsistent with its finding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from damages for the use of such force. The jury could, from the evidence, decided that the officer reasonably believed that he was justified in using the level of force he employed, while he was not actually justified, in fact, in doing so. Kent v. Katz, 327 F. Supp. 2d 302 (D. Vt. 2004). [N/R]
     There were genuine issues of fact as to whether police officers arresting anti-abortion demonstrators who had chained themselves together had used excessive force, precluding summary judgment in the demonstrators' federal civil rights lawsuit. There were also factual issues as to whether the town failed to adequately supervise its officers, but no evidence that the town inadequately trained its officers on the use of force. Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford, #03-7332, 361 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer's suspicion that vehicle was speeding was objectively reasonable despite his reliance on his own observations rather than on use of radar device when he followed the vehicle for approximately a third of a mile to confirm that it was traveling at an excessive speed. His stop of the vehicle was therefore proper, and the officer acted properly in directing a passenger to exit the vehicle following the valid stop when the car contained four persons and the stop was in a "high-crime" area. Further proceedings were needed, however, on passenger's claim that the officer used excessive force against him in the course of the stop and on the issue of whether the passenger cooperated with the officer's instructions or was validly arrested for obstruction of justice. Veney v. Ojeda, 321 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Va. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer did not use excessive force in screaming at a truck's occupants to raise their hands, placing his hand near his holstered weapon, and threatening the incarcerate one of the suspects, following a chase that occurred because the officer suspected a passenger of firing a shot at an antelope, a protected species. Because the suspected offense involved the firing of a loaded firearm, the officer could reasonably perceive a risk of injury or danger, and he therefore acted in an objectively reasonable manner. Wheeler v. Scarafiotti, No. 02-2297, 85 Fed. Appx. 696 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Plaintiff who was awarded $10,000 in damages against one officer for alleged excessive use of force against him at his apartment was entitled to an attorneys' fee award as a "prevailing party," even though he would not receive any of the $10,000 award because he had previously entered into a $25,000 settlement with other defendants in the case, which fully compensated him for damages in excess of those the jury found occurred. Concession by plaintiff's attorney that the jury's award was to be set-off by the prior settlement did not deprive the plaintiff of "prevailing party" status. Attorneys' fees and expenses of $10,572.74 were therefore awarded. Baim v. Notto, 316 F. Supp. 2d 113 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court finds that plaintiff who was awarded $87,000 in damages for alleged battery by two police officers at veterans' hospital was improperly also awarded $49,000 in attorneys' fees. While evidence showed, for purposes of award under Federal Tort Claims Act, that officers acted "wantonly," the U.S. government did not act "wantonly" in presenting a defense against the plaintiff's claims. Stive v. U.S., No. 03-2151, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 8346 (7th Cir.). [2004 LR Jun]
     Jury award of $300,000 in compensatory and $1 million in punitive damages to arrestee and estate of second arrestee (who committed suicide months after arrest) on excessive force claims was not excessive. Diaz v. Vivoni, 301 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Puerto Rico 2003). [N/R]
     Jury's verdict, finding both that motorist did not resist arrest after he stopped his car, and that officers who arrested him did not use excessive force during the arrest was not inconsistent and did not require a new trial on arrestee's claim, even though he was injured in the course of the arrest. Jury must have believed that officers' use of force was reasonable because of their belief that motorist was attempting to flee or resist arrest, based on prior pursuit which ranged over eleven miles. Brown v. City of McComb Mississippi Police Dept., #03-60034, 84 Fed. Appx. 404 (5th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     The alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation of a single incident of police officers' purported excessive use of force was insufficient to show the existence of a municipal policy as required for governmental liability. Byrd v. District of Columbia, 297 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.D.C. 2003). [N/R]
     Genuine issue of fact as to whether off-duty housing authority police officers acted in the scope of their employment or for "wholly personal reasons" in assaulting two men precluded summary judgment for housing authority. Beauchamp v. City of New York, 771 N.Y.S.2d 129 (A.D. 2d Dept. 2004). [N/R]
     Police officers who participated in the execution of a search warrant, but were not accused of use of physical force against a resident of the premises being searched could not be held "derivatively" liable for the actions of an officer who the plaintiff claimed struck him. Claims against these officers were therefore properly dismissed before jury trial which returned a verdict in favor of the remaining defendant officer. Willis v. Freeman, No. 02-1757. 93 Fed. Appx. 803 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Motorist who asserted claims for assault and battery and negligence against officer he claimed pulled him out of his car and beat him failed to make a case for a separate claim of negligence, requiring the court to overturn a jury verdict in his favor on the negligence claim. (The jury returned a verdict for the officer on the assault and battery claim). The conduct alleged was intentional conduct by the officer, and the plaintiff failed to allege any "negligence" other than the purported use of excessive force. District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701 (D.C. 2003). [N/R]
     Dispute as to whether police officer intentionally used his car to run down suspect in order to arrest him or whether, as officer argued, he was only positioning his patrol car so that he could exit the vehicle and pursue the suspect on foot, when the suspect ran into the patrol car, made trial court's dismissal of arrestee's lawsuit inappropriate. Day v. Rogers, 71 Fed. Appx. 337 (5th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Trial judge's refusal to give jury instructions concerning the plaintiff's degenerative disc disease which purportedly made him more prone to injuries such as ruptured discs as a result of allegedly being stomped or kicked by officers was no basis for a new trial in his excessive force lawsuit. Rejected instructions related to the issue of damages to be awarded, which the jury did not even need, as they returned a verdict in favor of the defendant officers, rejecting the claim that excessive force had been used. Dawson v. Page, 286 F. Sup. 2d 617 (M.D.N.C. 2003). [N/R]
     Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he shot a mentally ill man in the stomach as he pointed a butcher knife towards himself with suicidal intentions, as deadly force is only permissible when a suspect poses an imminent threat to an officer or to others. Buchanan v. City of Milwaukee, 290 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis. 2003). [2004 LR Mar]
     Plaintiff who received $25,000 settlement from city on excessive force claim was a prevailing party entitled to an award of attorneys' fees after trial court incorporated settlement agreement into its dismissal order, but, under terms of settlement agreement, defendant city was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claims prior to the determination of a reasonable amount of an attorneys' fee award. Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 03-12113, 353 F.3d 901 (11th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Mar]
     Arrestee who claimed officers had used excessive force in arresting him following a traffic stop was not entitled to a reversal in his appeal of a jury verdict in favor of the defendant officers when he failed to point to any evidentiary or other legal rulings by the trial court that might have caused a reversible error. McIntosh v. Green, No. 03-6038, 82 Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers alleged continued use of physical force after a man was subdued and restrained violated clearly established law and, if as plaintiff described, was excessive as used against a man who had committed no crime. Officers also lacked probable cause to restrain him for an involuntary mental evaluation solely on the basis of a neighbor's 911 call reporting that he was suicidal. Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 02-1761, 349 F.3d 731 (4th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Feb]
     Videotaped footage of incident was sufficient to confirm police officers' testimony and contradict enough of the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses to entitle defendant police officers to summary judgment on lawsuit claiming that they improperly used excessive force which resulted in store patron's injuries and death. Videotape which showed other store patrons walking calmly by at the time plaintiff's witnesses claimed officers were beating decedent in store aisle indicated that there was not actually an altercation going on when and where the plaintiff's witnesses testified. Stewart v. Prince George's County, Maryland, #02-2071, 75 Fed. Appx. 198 (4th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Police detective did not have any duty under federal law to investigate claims that arresting officer engaged in criminal activity in using allegedly excessive force against arrestee, and was therefore entitled to summary judgment on federal civil rights claim against him asserted by arrestee. Hale v. Vance, 267 F. Supp. 2d 725 (S.D. Ohio 2003). [N/R]
     Officers used unreasonable force in attempting to detain man with high blood pressure and diabetes who had committed no crime, but had simply changed his mind about waiting with them for requested ambulance to arrive after previously telling them that he was not feeling well. Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for using force to detain him, and allegedly continuing to use force against him after he was handcuffed. Thompson v. Douds, No.2D02-3972, 852 So. 2d 299 (Fla. App. 2003). [N/R]
     Man arrested for burglary did not convince trial court that officers had thrown him out of a third story window of a school he was burglarizing, when his claim was asserted, for the first time, nine months later, and he had earlier admitted jumping from the window. Additionally, medical records showed no signs of an injury to his head, refuting his claim that the officers had hit him with a flashlight. Summary judgment entered for defendant officers. Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers acted in an objectively unreasonably manner in their use of force during arrest of motorist when they allegedly kicked him and subjected him to knee strikes after he was subdued and further use of force was unnecessary. Coleman v. Rieck, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (D. Neb. 2003). [N/R]
     Deputy sheriff's use of force in removing arrestee from his automobile, which allegedly caused injuries resulting in paraplegia, is found to be objectively reasonable when arrestee may well have been trying to retrieve a weapon or attempt to flee, and he did not outwardly exhibit "typical signs" of serious pain. Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, No. 02-55881, 340 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Dec]
     Disputed issues of fact as to whether plaintiff physically resisted arrest and whether officers "slammed" her into a car and kicked her in the ankle made summary judgment on her excessive force claims inappropriate. Minchella v. Bauman, #02-1454, 73 Fed. Appx. 405 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Two arrestees who obtained $8,000 settlement from officer and city after prevailing at trial on their excessive force claims are awarded a total of $25,071.64 in attorneys' fees and expenses, rather than the $77,935.74 they requested. Trial court reduces the number of compensable hours for each of the plaintiffs' attorneys by 50% due to their failure to provide "sufficiently detailed contemporaneous time records, and court also reduces appropriate hourly rates for chief counsel from $350 to $225, for a junior associate attorney from $200 to $120, and for law students from $90 to $60. Martinez v. Hodgson, 265 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2003). [N/R]
     A finding at an arrestee's parole revocation hearing that he had struck a police officer did not have a "collateral estoppel" effect barring his lawsuit against the officer for excessive use of force, since the officer still could possibly be found to have used excessive force whether or not the arrestee struck him. Curry v. City of Syracuse, No. 01-9211, 316 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Evidence was sufficient for jury to award $15,000 to man beaten by police officer while sergeant stood by, but an award of $2 million in punitive damages was excessive, federal trial court rules, citing new U.S. Supreme Court case on proportionality of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Trial judge orders reduction of punitives to 45,000 or else a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. Waits v. City of Chicago, No. 01C4010, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill. June 6, 2003, reported in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, p. 1 (June 9, 2003). [2003 LR Jul]
     Deputies who were busy with other things in arrestee's residence when a fellow officer allegedly struck arrestee across the face and nose with a flashlight while she was restrained on the floor could not be held liable when they had no reason to anticipate this action nor could they have intervened in time to prevent it. Dixon v. Campbell, No. 02-1260, 58 Fed. Appx. 180 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
      State and federal agents who detained and handcuffed employees for three and a half hours in 1996 while executing a search warrant for unlawful drugs on a workplace were entitled to qualified immunity. Such a search warrant carries with it limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted, and it was not shown either that the length of the detention was unreasonable under the circumstances or that the agents were unreasonable in their belief that they were not violating clearly established law when they displayed drawn guns, and pushed one of the employees to the ground when he failed to obey an order to "get down." Pikel v. Garrett, #01-3850, 55 Fed. Appx. 29 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
    Jury could reasonably conclude that an arresting officer used excessive force in light of arrestee's claim that he was an "innocent bystander" and had done nothing to provoke the officer except express his concern about alleged mistreatment of others, and that the officer continued to use force against him after he was in custody and subdued. Force allegedly used included throwing the arrestee to the ground after he was handcuffed, striking him in the back of the head, and kneeing him. Award of $5,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages was not excessive when plaintiff had injuries resulting in $173 in medical expenses and claimed that he suffered fear, pain, and humiliation because of the officer's actions. Burbank v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 2d 317 (D. Maine 2003). [N/R]
     Probable cause did not exist to arrest television news cameraman filming demonstration in support of 6-year-old Cuban refugee boy. Arrestee, at the time he was seized, was in the process of complying with police orders to get out of a street then blocked to traffic, and force used appeared to be disproportionate to need. Durruthy v. City of Miami, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2002). [2003 LR May]
     Probable cause existed for the plaintiff's arrest when he failed to disperse and challenged police authority to take others into custody as part of an eight-person crowd in a parking lot, but there were factual issues as to whether the plaintiff resisted arrest and whether the officer's use of force in making the arrest was excessive. Burbank v. Davis, 227 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D. Me. 2002). [N/R]
     Officers were properly granted summary judgment in lawsuit brought by suicidal man armed with knives who threatened his wife and officers and then was subdued by shooting him with "beanbag" rounds. Officers use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and appeals court expresses agreement with trial judge that plaintiff should have "thanked" rather than sued the officers. Bell v. Irwin, #02-2262, 321 F.3d 637, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 3415 (7th Cir.). [2003 LR Apr]
      Jury instructions on issue of officers' alleged use of excessive force against motorist were adequate when the jury was told that they should find for the defendants unless they found from all facts and circumstances as they appeared to the officers at the scene that no reasonable officer would have done what those officers did. These instructions properly told the jury to evaluate the use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and from an objective standard. The phrase "unless no reasonable officer" used in the instructions was merely the "double negative equivalent" of "a reasonable officer." Miller v. City of Nichols Hills Police Dept., No. 01-6128, 42 Fed. Appx. 212 (10th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
    Officers' use of force in subduing fleeing drug suspect who struck one of them and continued to resist arrest was objectively reasonable when it resulted only in "minor injuries." Moreland v. Dorsey, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (N.D. Ga. 2002). [2003 LR Mar]
     Officers did not use excessive force in carrying a 79-year-old woman to their squad car after she refused to walk following her arrest for disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and battery on an officer. The officers were not required to retreat in the face of her resistance to a lawful arrest. Grauerholz v. Adcock, 02-3083, 51 Fed. Appx. 298 (10th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity from a landowner's claim that they violated her Fourth Amendment rights and used excessive force during her arrest for interference with a gas company's easement over her property. The plaintiff did not dispute that she attempted to take a gun from one officer's holster when officers were trying to arrest her husband, so they acted reasonably in believing that they were using appropriate force in subduing her by pushing her to the ground. Pulice v. Enciso, #01-3748, 39 Fed. Appx. 692 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     No hearing was required to resolve a plaintiff arrestee's objections to the admission of an expert psychiatrist's report and testimony about his mental state at the time of his arrest when the basis for the objection was disagreement with disputed factual evidence on which the expert relied. The plaintiff, who claimed excessive use of force during the arrest, could explore, during cross-examination, the reliance that the expert put on the disputed evidence in drawing his conclusion that the plaintiff had been psychotic at the time so that his perception of events were impaired and unreliable. He could also argue to the jury that, if it rejected the underlying factual premises of the expert's report, it should also reject the expert's opinion. Walker v. Gordon, #01-4106, 46 Fed. Appx. 691 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Plaintiff could, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, amend his complaint, seven years after it had been filed, to add three officers as defendants, when the original complaint mentioned all three of them as having been involved in the alleged use of excessive force against him, but he could not amend it to now name as a defendant an officer who was named only as a witness in the original complaint, since he was not on notice that he could be named as a defendant. Mosley v. Jablonsky, 209 F.R.D. 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).[N/R]
     Officers did not use excessive force in attempting to restrain a possibly intoxicated man whose mental condition was in question and who was swinging his arms wildly and struck at least one officer. No liability imposed for arrestee's subsequent death, allegedly from positional asphyxiation, when it took the efforts of three officers and the use of pepper spray to subdue him. Fernandez v. City of Cooper City, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2002). [2002 LR Nov]
     Police officers did not use excessive force in the process of putting a detainee into their patrol car, even if they did act "roughly" in pushing and pulling him into the car. They acted in circumstances where the detainee refused to take a preliminary breath test or to have his photograph and fingerprints taken, and he yelled to protest his arrest and threatened to sue the officers, as well as actively resisting the officers' efforts to put him in the vehicle. Lockett v. Donnellon, #00-2169, 38 Fed. Appx. 289 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
    Officer may have had probable cause for arresting a motorist for a "horn-honking" offense in arguable violation of a local noise ordinance, but the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on the motorist's excessive force claim, as no reasonable officer could believe that the officer's alleged physical abuse of the motorist was legal after the arrest had been fully achieved. Lee v. Ferraro, #00-16054, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Oct]
     After two separate juries, in successive trials on an arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit, both returned verdicts for the defendant officer on an arrestee's claim that excessive use had been used following his arrest, a federal appeals court upholds the verdicts and the refusal of the trial court to grant a third trial, ruling that the jury could, based on the evidence, find that the injuries suffered by the arrestee were sustained prior to his arrest. Caldwell v. Davis, #01-0183, 31 Fed. Appx. 34 (2nd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court rules that trial judge improperly granted judgment as a matter of law to officers in excessive force claim brought by paranoid schizophrenic who testified that he had no recollection of the precise acts engaged in by the officers who apprehended him. The issue of whether the officers used excessive force under the circumstances was still for the jury to determine, and there was other evidence which could be used to make the determination. Santos v. Gates, #00-56114, 287 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
     Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest did not bar him from asserting a federal civil rights claim for excessive use of force. Since arrestee had pled no contest to the charge, he did not have an actual opportunity to litigate the issue of the officer's use of force, and it was possible that the officers used excessive force at some point during the encounter. Jones v. Marcum, 197 F. Supp. 2d 991 (S.D. Ohio 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
     Officers did not act unreasonably in "escalating" their use of force against large naked man running around hotel premises after their initial attempts to restrain him with lesser force failed, and they had reason to believe that he posed a risk to himself and others, including the officers. Officers were not liable for his subsequent death, found to have been caused by cardiovascular disease and the effects of multiple drugs, after a lengthy altercation. Caricofe v. Mayor and City Council of Ocean City, Maryland, #01-1809, 32 Fed. Appx. 62 (4th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Officer was entitled to official immunity from false arrest and assault lawsuit under Texas law based on his authority to inspect the record of a commercial vehicle, since his decision concerning whether to arrest the driver for failure to produce the record was discretionary rather than ministerial. Kersey v. Wilson, # 2-01-226-CV, 69 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App. 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     Officers acted objectively reasonably in forcing a diabetic motorist to a stop and forcibly removing him from his truck through the use of pepper spray, baton blows, and bites from a police dog when his erratic driving was serious enough that people might have been killed by it, and he refused to comply with lawful orders once he was stopped. Moore v. Winer, 190 F. Supp. 22d 804 (D. Maryland 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     Officer's alleged action in striking the arrestee's face and slamming his face into the floor after he had been subdued, if true, violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on excessive force so that officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Appeals court could decide legal issue on appeal despite officer's dispute of arrestee's version of the facts. Phelphs v. Coy, #00-4257, 356 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     In a lawsuit claiming an assault on an individual by a traffic enforcement agent, the city's failure to produce, for a deposition, a particular traffic enforcement agent after also failing to produce his incident report, did not, standing alone result in a conclusion that the agent committed the assault, so that summary judgment for plaintiff was properly denied. Quezada v. City of New York, 737 N.Y.S.2d 84 (A.D. 2002). [N/R]
     Jury properly awarded compensatory damages of $15,184 and punitive damages of $37,916 to bystander documenting police conduct at event who claimed that an officer assaulted him and tackled him to the ground while he had his hands up in the air. Defendant officer was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of evidence concerning the conduct of other officers present on the occasion. Cummings v. Libby, 176 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D. Maine 2001). [2002 LR May]
     Officer did not "shock the conscience" by hitting a protester who grabbed him from behind while the officer was attempting to arrest another protester during a demonstration. Officer's action of swinging his arm backwards after protester had grabbed his ankles was also objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, No. 00-1253, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2001). [N/R]
     Arrested taxi passenger's claim that arresting officers "were apparently prejudiced against" his Iranian nationality and therefore "treated him inferiorly" was a "mere bald assertion and conclusory statement" which failed to state a claim for national origin discrimination. State troopers had probable cause for warrantless misdemeanor arrest of passenger for allegedly cutting taxi seat with a sharp object he was in possession of, but were not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim that they dragged him in handcuffs across the floor when he had not resisted arrest. Tavakoli-Nouri v. State of Maryland, No. 0048, 779 A.2d 992 (Md. App. 2001). [N/R]
     Sheriff was not liable for failure to "implement a policy for the handling of physical humor" based on alleged assault by deputies, including beating and pepper spraying of handcuffed arrested motorist who claimed that his licking of a state trooper's face was meant as a joke; deputies involved in alleged beating, however, were not entitled to qualified immunity, as their alleged actions were not objectively reasonable. Small v. St. Tammany Parish, No. 00-3441, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21809 (E.D. La.). [2002 LR Apr]
     Deputy sheriff did not use excessive force when he inadvertently broke an intoxicated and combative arrestee's nose while trying to subdue him. Intoxicated arrestee had called 911 and asked to be taken to jail. Jones v. Buchanan, No. 1:00CV-27-C, 164 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D.N.C. 2001). [2002 LR Apr]
     Officer's shoving of a pedestrian who was asking for directions, which resulted in severe injuries requiring back surgery, was not conduct "shocking to the conscience" sufficiently egregious to state a claim for violation of the injured party's federal due process rights. Cummings v. McIntire, No. 01-1301, 271 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Mar]
     Officer did not use excessive force in knocking arrestee's feet out from under him and grabbing him around the chest. Arrestee, who had just been taken into custody for being incapacitated by alcohol, said "no" as the officer attempted to handcuff him, and started walking away towards his house, where the officer knew the arrestee kept a BB gun. Flanigan v. Town of Colchester, 171 F. Supp. 2d 361 (D. Vt. 2001). [N/R]
     A court security officer and two sheriffs' deputies did not use excessive force, as alleged, while taking plaintiff into custody at the conclusion of court hearing for violating a protection order concerning his ex-wife. Evidence failed to support plaintiff's story that the alleged "assault" rendered him "comatose" for several hours, and judge's affidavit supported officers' versions of events that he resisted being placed in handcuffs. Covillion v. Alsop, 145 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2001). [N/R]
     Officer's use of "slight" force in arresting motorist who subsequently suffered a heart attack was not excessive. $175,000 jury verdict overturned. Hendon v. City of Piedmont, No. CV 00-PT-2421-E, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ala. 2001). [2002 LR Feb]
     A $150,000 settlement was reached by New York City in an excessive force/false arrest lawsuit filed by an arrestee Grant v. City of New York, No. 22691/89 (Kings Co., N.Y. Sup. Ct.), reported in The National Law Journal, p. B3 (Nov. 13, 2001). [N/R]
           Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest did not bar her excessive force claim since it is possible that the officer used the allegedly excessive force after placing her under arrest. Sanford v. Motts, No. 00-56926, 258 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Jan]
     Defendant police officers were entitled to summary judgment on lawsuit alleging that one of them had hit the plaintiff in the mouth with a nightstick while he was attempting to obtain the identifying number of a police car for purposes of lodging a complaint about the officers' behavior in allegedly beating his friends. Plaintiff was unable to identify which of the two officers allegedly assaulted him, and did not claim either that both officers attacked him or that one stood idly by while the other committed the assault, so that individual capacity claims against the two officers could not be supported. Roberts v. Prince George's County, Md., No. Civ. A. 2000-186, 157 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D. Md. 2001). [N/R]
     345:131 New York City reaches $8.7 million settlement in Louima case; lawsuit stated that arrestee was tortured with a broken broomstick being placed in his rectum. Louima v. New York City, U.S. Dist. Ct. (S.D.N.Y. 2001), reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p. 1 (July 13, 2001).
     344:115 Military police officer who shoved protester into a van while arresting him at the scene of a speech by the U.S. Vice President at a military based was entitled to qualified immunity; U.S. Supreme Court rules that inquiry on qualified immunity is whether an officer would have clearly known that his use of force was improper under the particular circumstances faced, not merely whether the use of force is ultimately judged reasonable. Saucier v. Katz, No. 99-1977, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
     344:116 Officer was entitled to qualified immunity from claim that he kicked an arrestee "very hard" in his foot while making a custodial arrest for a vehicle offense. Gross v. Pirtle, No. 00-2130, 245 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2001).
     344:117 Federal jury awards $50,000 in damages to motorist allegedly stopped without justification and illegally searched and battered by officer. Morrison v. Simmons, No. 98-CV-560, U.S. Dist. Ct. Dayton, Oh., June 2, 2001, reported in The National Law Journal, p. A7 (June 25, 2001).
     343:105 Introduction of evidence of arrestee's later second arrest for domestic violence was no basis, in the absence of proper objection, for setting aside jury's verdict in favor of arresting officers on his false arrest/excessive force claims. Udemba v. Nicoli, #00-1246, 237 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001).
     342:84 Man who suffered permanent brain damage after an assault by police officers was properly awarded $700,000 for past and future pain and suffering, but was also properly denied any award for lost earnings when he was unemployed at the time of the incident and receiving "social security benefits," according to his own testimony. Ramirez v. City of New York, 719 N.Y.S.2d 289 (A.D. 2001).
     343:105 Federal trial court bars evidence of prior unrelated departmental disciplinary actions against officer
     accused by arrestee of excessive use of force, as well as evidence about the existence of liability insurance; testimony about whether the arrestee actually hit his wife before the police arrived was not relevant to whether the officer used improper force. Munley v. Carlson, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
     340:52 Two troopers acted reasonably in grabbing, disarming, and restraining a man who was talking to another trooper with a knife in his hand; they could legitimately believe, based on what they saw, that the man was a threat to the other trooper's life, even if, in actuality, he only had the knife in order to cut up a chicken for lunch. Lawson v. Hulm, No. 99-41388D, 223 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2000).
     339:36 African-American arrestees stated claim for racial discrimination based on assertion of city practice or custom of using pepper spray and excessive force against them based on race; alleged breaking of arrestee's arm, use of pepper spray against him, and biting by police dog during "unnecessary" subduing was conduct which, if true, no reasonable officers could have believed was warranted. Wilkerson v. Thrift, 124 F. Supp. 2d 322 (W.D.N.C. 2000).
     337:3 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest and harassment of an officer did not preclude his claim against officer for excessive use of force; plaintiff was still not entitled to a new trial on his excessive force claim when he failed to object to jury instructions limiting its consideration to events occurring prior to his handcuffing by the officer. Sullivan v. Gagnier, No. 99-7207, 225 F.3d 161 (2nd Cir. 2000).
     333:131 "Uncomfortable" search of youth's groin area and use of "minimal" force while arresting and handcuffing him did not constitute excessive use of force; officer was entitled to qualified immunity when conduct caused bruising which arrestee admitted disappeared quickly and for which he did not seek medical treatment. Nolin v. Isbeli, #99-10040, 207 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2000).
     334:147 Police officer acted reasonably in opening cell door to quiet yelling arrestee and make sure that intoxicated arrestee was not harming himself; no liability for injuries to arrestee who was knocked unconscious by cell door opening; officer was unable to see that arrestee was standing behind cell door and would be hit by it. Wilson v. Spain, No. 99-2224, 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).
     335:163 New York jury awards over $3 million to 51-year-old woman mistakenly arrested by undercover police officer as drug suspect; $2.75 million of award was for alleged excessive use of force by officer, who plaintiff contended did not identify himself as police and $250,000 was awarded for false arrest. Morales v. Leone, U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y. October 5, 2000, reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p. C26 (Oct. 6, 2000).
     335:164 Arrestee who claimed that officers beat him while he was handcuffed, despite the lack of resistance on his part, did not have to show direct monetary losses to recover compensatory damages; damages could be based on pain and suffering or emotional distress, and, even without actual injury, he might be entitled to nominal damages. Slicker v. Jackson, No. 99-10592, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000).
     335:167 Officers' actions in detaining an autistic youth for questioning after he reportedly acted strangely while trespassing in a homeowner's garage was a proper investigatory stop; ensuing confrontation with youth and his subsequent arrest for assaulting an officer were not a violation of either the Fourth Amendment or federal disability discrimination statutes. Bates v. Chesterfield County, Va., #99-1663, 216 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 2000).
     330:85 Federal appeals court upholds $245,000 award of compensatory and punitive damages to three 17- year-old boys, two African-American and one white, on claim that two police officers illegally stopped and searched their vehicle and used excessive force, including pulling and squeezing their testicles, during pat-down search, and were motivated by racial bias in carrying out one-hour stop, search and detention; alleged racial bias was a proper basis for punitive damages award. Price v. Kramer, #97-56580, #98-55484, 200 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2000).
     331:99 $4.95 million settlement reached in lawsuit over death of man, who allegedly was beaten by officer, when police used pepper spray on his brother during a traffic stop. Plaintiffs claimed the action was racially motivated. Smith v. Village of Hoffman Estates, No. 97 L-605, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill.), June 27, 2000, reported in Chicago Tribune, Sec. 2, p. 1 (June 28, 2000).
     331:99 Washington state intermediate appeals court rules that it was not an abuse of discretion to award $9,920 in attorneys' fees to plaintiff in excessive force claim who was awarded only $1 in nominal damages. Ermine v. City of Spokane, #18253-3-III, 996 P.2d 624 (Wash. App. 2000).
     332:115 A small cut and scrapes on the knee and calf were sufficient evidence to support claim that arrestee had been subjected to excessive force in the course of the arrest, and factual disputes over what happened required the denial of officers' claim for qualified immunity. Lambert v. City of Dumas, #99-1081, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999).
     [N/R] Force used to detain juvenile during his arrest was objectively reasonable, as police chief's testimony established that restraints, including eventual hogtying, was necessary to prevent juvenile from harming himself. Brandt v. Davis, No. 99-1128, 191 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1999).
     329:73 New York trial judge properly exercised discretion in denying arrestee's motion to compel production of arresting officer's employment records and district attorney's entire file on the arrest in arrestee's lawsuit claiming assault by officer. Tsachalis v. City of Mount Vernon, 690 N.Y.S.2d 746 (A.D.N.Y. 1999).
     330:84 Jury properly heard evidence of alleged affair between mayor and arrestee's wife, and trial court properly declined to instruct jury that arrestee had a duty to submit to an arrest without resistance even if it was unjustified; appeals court upholds awards totaling $114,000 against police chief and mayor in lawsuit claiming that improper arrest was made with excessive force based on a purely personal dispute between mayor and arrestee. Goff v. Bise, # 98-2849, 173 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1999).
     326:22 Illinois federal jury awards $28 million, ($18 million on excessive force claim and $10 million for denial of medical care), to PCP user who suffered an incapacitating stroke after an officer allegedly knocked him down. Regalado v. Chicago, No. 96-C-3634, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1999), reported in The National Law Journal, p. A10 (Nov. 22, 1999).
     326:30 Police officer use of a racial epithet in response to a request for his name and badge number did not, standing alone, constitute a violation of the equal
     protection rights of the person so addressed; claim that another officer engaged in choking suspect during and after search of his mouth for drugs reinstated because of disputed facts. Williams v. Bramer, #98-10254, 180 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1999).
     327:35 Officers who allegedly choked an arrestee, threw him down the stairs, and stepped on his face were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability; a portion of their actions was captured on videotape and clearly established law gave the plaintiff the right to be free of the alleged misconduct. Johnston v. City of Bloomington, #97- 4396, 170 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 1999).
     327:35 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest did not bar his claim that officers used excessive force in subduing him. Martinez v. City of Albuquerque, No. 98- 2235, 184 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1999).
     328:51 Assertion that officer stuck his hand out of his vehicle and that this caused the fall of an intoxicated bicyclist on the street stated a claim for excessive use of force. Hullett v. Smiedendorg, 52 F.Supp. 2d 817 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
     The fact that no police official accepted the plaintiff's assault complaint against an officer does not state a claim under 42 U.S.Code §1983. No right, privilege or immunity guaranteed by the Constitution or federal laws is implicated by a civilian complaint to a police department. Johnson v. Police Officer #17969, 99 Civ. 3964, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18521 (S.D.N.Y.). {N/R}
     323:170 Police officer acted properly in shooting and killing armed man who fired at him first; the fact that the officer was mistakenly at the wrong address and therefore was confronting a store owner and his armed brother, rather than burglars, did not alter the result; second officer's single kick, aimed at subduing store keeper, was objectively reasonable. Saman v. Robbins, #96-55672, 97-56683, 97-56684, 97-5524 and 97-55789, 173 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999).
     323:163 Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit claiming that he pushed a man through a car window; officer did not claim that man used any force against him; attorneys' fee award based on $200 per hour was appropriate. Weyel v. Catania, 728 A.2d 512 (Conn. App. 1999).
     322:155 Arrestee outside motor vehicle office raised genuine issue of fact as to whether officers had probable cause to arrest him for attempting to register stolen vehicle when he did not fit the description of the suspect phoned in earlier by office employee, and another man present in the office fit the description exactly. Robinson v. Clemons, 987 F.Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1998).
     322:147 Jury properly awarded $1 in nominal damages and $20,000 in punitive damages (later reduced to $15,000) against officer who allegedly used excessive force against arrestee during booking process; trial court improperly dismissed claims against city following trial of claims against individual officers, since plaintiff could pursue city's liability even if he was barred from receiving anything more than $1 in damages against municipality. Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., #97-9623, 170 F.3d 311 (2nd Cir. 1999).
     321:141 No federal constitutional claim could be asserted for police detective's alleged destruction of man's bus pass, since he had an adequate post-deprivation remedy of filing a state lawsuit for the value of his lost property; failure of detective to read man Miranda rights did not violate constitutional rights; detective's alleged threats to use force against man did state a possible claim. Harris v. St. Louis Police Dept., #98-1810, 164 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 1998).
     {N/R} Police dept. settles case for $200,000; the plaintiff claimed the officer used excessive force, denied him medical care, and falsified a police report pertaining to the incident. Caton v. London, #CV-F-96-6108 (E.D. Cal. 1998), noted 42 ATLA Law Rptr. #8.
     320:116 Officers used appropriate force to subdue members of crowd who were challenging their authority to arrest a woman; factual issue precluded summary judgment on the issue of whether they used excessive force in subduing first arrestee, however, since no crowd was then present and she did not appear to pose a threat to them and did not resist. Quesinberry v. Rouppasong, 503 S.E.2d 717 (S.C. 1998).
     319:101 N.Y.C. reaches $2.75 million settlement with man allegedly beaten on his way to work by five police officers solely because he fit the very general description of a black suspect sought for brandishing a knife. Dusenbury v. N.Y.C.(S.D.N.Y.), reported in The New York Times, Natl. Edit., p. A23 (April 26, 1999).
     318:83 Police board's finding, in disciplinary hearing, that crossing guard violated various departmental rules and Illinois law when stopped by housing authority police officers did not bar her from pursuing her excessive force claim against those officers; excessive force may occur during a lawful arrest. Banks v. Chicago Housing Auth., 13 F.Supp.2d 793 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
     317:69 Arrestee could not sue arresting officers for "negligent" assault under N.Y. state law. Wertzberger v. City of New York, 680 N.Y.S.2d 260 (A.D. 1998).
     316:51 Officer's alleged action in slamming 6-year-old boy to the ground, jarring one of his teeth loose, while arresting him for allegedly smashing windows in a trailer, was sufficient to state a claim for excessive use of force even if no prior similar caselaw could be found; officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Borrero v. Metro- Dade Co., 19 F.Supp.2d 1310 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
     315:36 Grabbing arrestee's arm and turning her body before ordering her to get into police vehicle was not an excessive use of force, even if unnecessary to effect the arrest. Curd v. City Court of Judsonia, Ark., #97-2858, 141 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 1998).
     302:27 Update: Full federal appeals court reinstates summary judgment for police detective who allegedly slapped arrestee in interrogation room; court rejects claim that this occurred during custodial interrogation when no questions were being asked and detective's conduct was not intended to, and did not, elicit any incriminating statement. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997).
     303:35 Port Authority employee arrested by officers for entering restricted area without showing identification or obeying commands to stop awarded $46,000 in damages for excessive force during arrest, despite ruling that officers had probable cause to arrest him, since they reasonably thought that he was a trespasser; intermediate state appeals court rules that damages awarded were inadequate. Freeman v. Port Authority of New York, 659 N.Y.S.2d 13 (A.D. 1997).
     303:35 Motorist awarded $2.79 million against two officers who allegedly severely beat him in front of his family after stopping him for minor traffic violation. Sudul v. Robinson, 92-204061NO (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich.), Sept. 23, 1997, reported in The Natl. Law Jour. p. A7 (Nov. 24, 1997).
     304:52 Arrestee's conviction for resisting arrest barred his claim of excessive use of force during arrest; force used to subdue him during detention was objectively reasonable, given his drug intoxication, attack on officer, and threats to kill officer. Caridi v. Forte, 967 F.Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
     304:53 Arrestee's convictions for obstructing an officer and assaulting an officer barred his federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged excessive use of force during his arrest, when convictions had not been overturned. Franklin v. Co. of Riverside, 971 F.Supp. (C.D. Cal. 1997).
     305:67 Police department employee, allegedly assaulted by two officers as she reported to work at jail in civilian clothes, awarded $1,957,120 for negligence and excessive force. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, BC053303, L.A. Super. Ct., Calif., Jan. 15, 1998, reported in L.A. Daily J. (Verd. & Stl.) Vol. 111, No. 30, p. 5 (Feb. 13, 1998).
     305:69 Officer who did not see second officer's gun butt strike arrestee's head could not be held liable for alleged second impact, in absence of knowledge or opportunity to prevent the impact; officer should have been granted qualified immunity by trial court. Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 1997).
     306:84 Plaintiff was properly awarded $7,500 in attorneys' fees in lawsuit in which he was awarded $5,429.66 on state law battery claim against county, but denied any recovery on federal civil rights claim; award of attorneys' fees authorized under federal civil rights statute under these circumstances as long as state law claim arose from the same incident. Prior v. Co. of Saratoga, 664 N.Y.S.2d 871 (A.D. 1997).
     306:84 Jury awards $45 million to surviving family of 25- year-old double amputee motorist who died following altercation with officer who pulled him over; pepper spray and neck hold used to restrain motorist. Mallet v. City of Phoenix, Phoenix Superior Court, Phoenix, Arizona, reported in The Chicago Tribune, p. 16 (March 13, 1998).
     307:100 Arrestee awarded $16,000 in damages for injury to finger from officer allegedly slamming his hand with a pair of handcuffs; while complaint alleged "negligent" use of excessive force, trial judge did not abuse discretion in allowing plaintiff to amend it to allege intentional action, as required for liability. Miami, City of, v. Ross, 695 So.2d 486 (Fla. App. 1997).
     308:118 County agrees to pay $750,000 in damages plus $40,000 in medical expenses to intoxicated arrestee who fell on his face after officer administered forceful "hip check" and allegedly dragged arrestee over the floor by pulling on his handcuffed hands. Deising v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Mich., St. Clair Co. Cir. Ct., No. 97- 001727-NO, July 1, 1997, reported in 41 ATLA Law Rptr. 9 (Feb. 1998).
     309:131 Officer used only necessary force in subduing burglary suspect who ignored orders to halt and sought to flee. Robinson v. Brown, 987 F.Supp. 1470 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
     309:131 Officers who allegedly failed to report use of excessive force by another officer in making an arrest were entitled to qualified immunity; federal trial court finds no "clearly established" legal requirement that officers report another officer's use of excessive force. Franklin v. City of Kansas City, 959 F.Supp. 1380 (D. Kan. 1997).
     310:153 Alleged municipal policy of encouraging officers to make arrests by awarding them "productivity points" could not be the basis of municipal liability in federal civil rights claim alleging excessive force; plaintiff did not allege any relationship between policy and the use of excessive force. DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger, 980 F.Supp. 955 (N.D.Ill. 1997).
     {N/R} Genuine issue of fact existed as to whether arrestee, who had previously threatened officer and fled from him, offered further resistance, requiring use of force which broke his arm, after he was on the ground prior to being handcuffed. Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416 (11th Cir. 1997).
     {N/R} Motorist's assertion that officer "violently" poked and pushed him during traffic stop stated constitutional claim for excessive use of force. Lanigan v. Vil. of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997).
     290:24 Arrestee should be allowed to pursue his civil rights lawsuit against detective for allegedly slapping and scratching him during custodial interrogation, despite lack of "significant injuries," federal appeals court rules Riley v. Dorton, 93 F.3d 113 (4th Cir. 1996).
     292:51 Officers were entitled to "heat of battle" instruction to jury that appropriate standard in judging the reasonableness of force used while making an arrest includes "allowances for the fact" that officers must make "split-second judgments" in tense, uncertain, and "rapidly evolving" circumstances. Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996).
     292:52 Fact that convicted plaintiff's conviction and sentence had not been overturned did not bar federal civil rights claim for alleged excessive use of force during the arrest. Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996).
     293:68 Trial court's comments in front of jury, using the term "fraud" to refer to defendant police officer's memo book because it was filled out at the end of the day, and other negative comments, resulted in an unfair trial, requiring overturning of jury's award to plaintiff who claimed officers assaulted him. Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802 (2nd Cir. 1996).
     296:115 Estate of man who died from asphyxia after being placed face down while hog-tied receives $805,000 settlement from city on inadequate supervision and training lawsuit. Kinneer v. Gall, U.S. Dist. Ct., SD Ohio, No C2-95-504, Sept 6, 1996, 40 ATLA L.Rptr. 132 (May 1997).
     297:132 Officers used reasonable force in restraining resisting arrestee and placing her in squad car, but officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from claim that he struck arrestee on the way to the police station while she was restrained, and used a racial epithet Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997).
     297:132 Jury's finding that officer was not liable for assault and battery, but that $10,000 should be awarded on federal civil rights excessive force claim was not inconsistent Jarvis v. Govt. of Virgin Islands, 919 F.Supp. 177 (D.V.I. 1996).
     {N/R} Evidence was sufficient to support jury's finding that officer used excessive force in removing arrestee's wedding ring, even if force did not leave major marks and was not life-threatening. Holmes v. City of Massillos, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041 (6th Cir. 1996).
     286:157 Trial court improperly ruled that unannounced entry into residence was necessarily unlawful; court order gave state troopers right to enter to enforce child visitation, and circumstances could be interpreted as providing a basis to believe that the occupant inside was preparing to use "physical violence" to avoid compliance with court order; even if entry was illegal, this did not automatically make any use of force to arrest plaintiff excessive. Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393 (3rd Cir. 1995).
     287:171 Alabama Supreme Court rules that municipality may not be sued, under state law, for malicious prosecution, but rejects argument that municipality was also immune from liability for false arrest/imprisonment or assault and battery allegedly carried out by one of its police officers. Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848 (Ala 1995).
     284:121 Jury awards $201,001 in damages against police officer for malicious prosecution and assault and battery; court finds sufficient evidence to support jury's conclusion that officer maliciously filed false report stating that arrestee attacked him and resisted arrest; assault and battery award, under state law, was not contradictory to jury's finding of no Fourth Amendment unreasonable force violation Lee v. Edwards, 906 F.Supp. 94 (D.Conn 1995).
     277:9 Officer's act of drawing and pointing a gun at an unarmed felony suspect, without any indication that he intended or attempted to fire, did not violate suspect's rights. Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155 (8th Cir. 1995).
     279:35 Officers who asserted that they did not act "under color of law," but rather as private citizens in arresting motorist in a state outside their jurisdiction could not claim qualified immunity or appeal its denial; such immunity is only available to "public officials," and their claim to have acted as private citizens contradicted that defense Rambo v. Daley, 68 F.3d 203 (7th Cir. 1995).
     278:21 Trooper was not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly using excessive force in arresting woman on warrant when she was on her way home for weekend pass from mental hospital; psychological damage constituted "significant injury" required at the time of the incident for assertion of an excessive force claim. Dunn v. Denk, 54 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 1995).
     281:68 Governmental immunity was not available as a defense to deputies who allegedly assaulted and battered father while assisting state agency in removing children from his home; governmental immunity under Michigan state law does not apply to intentional misconduct. Burns v. Malak, 897 F.Supp. 985 (E.D. Mich 1995).
     287:165 Officers were entitled to absolute immunity for following judge's order to take attorney into immediate custody after he summarily found her guilty of criminal contempt of court; excessive force claim against officers once she was in custody should be judged on Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment standard rather than Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. Sharp v. Kelsey, 918 F.Supp. 1115 (WDMich 1996).
     285:132 Federal appeals court upholds award of $151,05558 in compensatory damages and $81,37722 in attorneys' fees and costs to man allegedly beaten in his home by officer responding to domestic disturbance call; trial court did not err in admitting evidence of future lost profits from plaintiff's business of rehabbing and selling residential real estate or in using a higher per-hour dollar figure for plaintiff's attorneys than is typical in the same market area for defense lawyers in federal civil rights lawsuits. Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 1996).
     281:67 Jury awards $200,000 to arrestee for officer's alleged use of excessive force during arrest; finds city and police chief liable for policy of inadequate training, supervision, and discipline Hogan v. Franco, 896 F.Supp. 1313 (NDNY 1995).
     277:3 County Sheriff's Department liable for $159 million for raid by 100 deputies on Samoan/American bridal shower at which deputies allegedly falsely arrested 36, used excessive force, and shouted racial epithets Dole v. Co. of Los Angeles Sheriffs, No C751398, LA Superior Central Ct., Calif, Aug 16, 1995, Vol. 108 No. 167 L.A. Daily Journal (Verd. & Stl.), p. 4 [Cross-references: False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant; Governmental Liability: Policy/Custom; Malicious Prosecution]
     278:19 County could not be held liable for deputy's alleged battering of arrestee when incident arose as a result of arrestee stating that deputy would no longer be welcome at his business, a personal dispute McGhee v. Volusia Co., 654 So.2d 157 (Fla App. 1995).
     278:19 City reaches $162,000 settlement in suit alleging that off-duty officer beat 12-year-old boy at shopping mall while making anti- Arab statements Barakat v. City of Chicago, U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill., Nov 1, 1995, reported in Chicago Sun Times, p. 12 (Nov 2, 1995). [Cross-reference: Off-Duty/Color of Law]
     280:51 City and ambulance service liable for $16 million for death of obese woman allegedly dragged down stairs by officers serving her with civil commitment papers McCabe v. City of Lynn, U.S. Dist. Ct. D Mass, No 92-12179-NG, Jan 25, 1995, reported in 38 ATLA L.Rptr. No 10, p. 368 (Dec 1995).
     280:52 $1 million settlement in lawsuit by motorist who lost dexterity in both hands as a result of tight handcuffing following traffic stop Levine v. City of New York, N.Y. Bronx Co. Sup. Ct, #17942/86, March 28, 1995, reported in 38 ATLA L.Rptr. No 10, pgs 368- 369 (Dec 1995).
     287:164 Officer could not be held liable for failure to prevent another officer from allegedly pushing a 12-year-old girl down some stairs suddenly for "no reason"; if facts were as plaintiff alleged, there was no warning of this pushing and officer had no reasonable opportunity to intervene Joyner v. Taft, 920 F.Supp. 273 (D.Conn 1995).
     285:131 N.Y. jury awards $2 million to man who suffered brain damage when allegedly repeatedly beat on his head by officers who dragged him down a flight of stairs from his apartment. Grey v. City of New York, N.Y., Kings Co. Sup. Ct., No 9229/89, Oct 10, 1995, reported in 39 ATLA L. Rep.64 (March 1996).
     266:19 Jury awards $44 million against city to man who came to the assistance of officers attempting to apprehend teenagers; officer hit man in the head, mistakenly believing him to be one of the alleged offenders Annis v. City of New York, #31999/91, Oct 7, 1994 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., N.Y.), reported in The Natl. Law Jour., p. A13 (Nov 21, 1994).
     267:35 Use of "pain compliance" techniques such as nonchakus to effect arrest of non-compliant anti-abortion demonstrators did not constitute excessive force; force used was reasonable in light of demonstrators' resistance, "substantial interest" in preventing "organized lawlessness," and officers' concerns about risk of injury to others Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 1994).
     267:36 Family of homeless man who died after officer applied a carotid choke hold on him awarded $470,000 in wrongful death/civil rights lawsuit. Scott Bennett-Nava v. City of Dublin, C931309CW, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Cal Dec 2, 1994, reported in Vol. 107 (#242). L.A. Daily Journal p. 4 (Dec 16, 1994).
     268:51 City reaches $375,000 settlement with arrestees who claimed that officers beat and kicked them after they were handcuffed, following jury's determination of liability. Irigoyen v. City of Long Beach, SOC86776 c/w NC008291, L.A. Super. Ct., Cal. Dec. 8, 1994, reported in Vol 108 Los Ang. Daily Jour. (Verd. & Stl.), No 9, p. 5 (Jan 13, 1995).
     268:52 Trial judge awards Rodney King $16 million in attorneys' fees against city, disallowing portions of attorneys' fee request which included fees for time spent appearing on television talk shows, accompanying plaintiff to the movies, and going to the plaintiffs' birthday party. King v. City of Los Angeles, U.S. Dist. Ct., Los Angeles, Cal., Jan 13, 1995, Chicago Tribune, p. 19, Jan 19, 1995
     269:67 Tape recording of arrest and alleged beating of arrestee which revealed that officer directed a racial epithet at arrestee should have been admitted into evidence as it was relevant to the jury's task of deciding whether force used was reasonable under the circumstances; appeals court rules that exclusion of this portion of tape was an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial in civil rights suit brought by arrestee. Brown v. City of Hialeah, 30 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1994).
     270:84 Officer who assaulted storekeeper after allegedly attempting to steal an item of merchandise from his store liable for $230,000; officer's partner could also be held liable for failure to intervene to prevent first officer's abuse of storekeeper. Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1994).
     273:132 Pennsylvania Supreme Court upholds $1,54344 jury award to arrestee on claim that officer used excessive force in making arrest; jury's failure to award damages for lost wages or pain and suffering did not require a new trial, as the issue of what damages resulted from officer's conduct was for the jury to determine. Catalano v. Bujak, 642 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1994).
     274:148 Jury awards $151,000 in damages to man allegedly beaten in his home by officers responding to complaint about domestic disturbance; trial judge awards $76,300 in attorneys' fees. Malloy v. City & Co. of Denver, U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Colo., No. 91 N 2136, Aug 8, 1994, reported in 38 ATLA L. Rep.No 2, p. 48 (March 1995).
     Mere fact that there was testimony by witnesses that they saw officers beat an arrestee using their hands, flashlight, and billy club, did not require judgment for plaintiff arrestee as a matter of law; issue of whether officers used reasonable force under the circumstances was for the jury to decide; judgment for defendant officers upheld. Estwick v. City of Omaha, 9 F.3d 56 (8th Cir. 1993).
     Officer did not use excessive force in grabbing an arrestee and throwing him to the floor, reinjuring a finger arrestee had fractured earlier playing basketball. Ford v. Retter, 840 F.Supp. 489 (N.D.Ohio 1993).
     Prior conviction for resisting arrest did not, standing alone, bar arrestee from filing suit alleging use of excessive force during the arrest. Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1993).
     City settles Rodney King case for $38 million payment; plaintiff's claim for $4 million in attorneys' fees is still pending. King v. City of Los Angeles, reported in Chicago Tribune, p. 7 (Aug 4, 1994); The New York Times, Natl. Edit., p. 10 (Sept 11, 1994).
     Detainee who claimed he was beaten by deputy sheriffs to coerce his confession to killing off-duty deputy was barred from bringing excessive force civil rights claim; issue of whether detainee was beaten was previously decided by trial court in criminal proceeding which declined to suppress confession on grounds of coercion and could not be relitigated. Gray v. Farley, 13 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 1993).
     Trial court improperly refused to instruct jury that law enforcement officer has a duty to intervene to prevent an assault by a fellow officer if he has a reasonable opportunity to prevent harm. Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir. 1994).
     Officer did not use excessive force in hitting fleeing narcotics suspect three times on top of the head with police radio. Brawley v. Sapp, 811 F.Supp. 172 (D.Del. 1993).
     Jury awards $38 million against city in Rodney King case, and finds that two officers acted with malice in beating him, but declines to award punitive damages against individual defendants; former police chief dismissed as a defendant in case before it was sent to the jury King v. City of Los Angeles, U.S. Dist. Ct. L..A Calif, New York Times, p.1 (June 2, 1994).
     Motorist allegedly struck with a night stick and threatened with being shot during an arrest after he changed lanes without using a turn signal awarded $525,000 in damages. Cox v. Dist. of Columbia, U.S. Dist. Ct., D.D.C. No. 91-2004 (JHG), Apr 26, 1993, reported in 37 (2). ATLA L. Rep.49 (March 1994).
     Federal appeals court holds that state trooper's conduct in placing her hand around arrestee's neck and applying "moderate force" to restrain him when she thought he was rising from a chair in a threatening manner was objectively reasonable. Pride v. Dos, 997 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1993).
     Appeals court overturns $312,18719 award against transit police officer who allegedly used excessive force against female subway passenger; trial court improperly allowed plaintiff's attorney to introduce evidence of five unsubstantiated prior civilian complaints against officer. Kourtalis v. City of New York, 594 N.Y.S.2d 325 (A.D. 1993).
     State liable for trooper's "negligent" causing of injuries to 76-year-old motorist arrested for driving while intoxicated; trooper did not intend to cause injury, but mishandled motorist, given their relative strength, motorist's age, and the nature of the offense. LaBauve v. State, 618 So.2d 1187 (La App. 1993).
     Defense attorney awarded $114,880 against deputy she claimed battered her when she was at the county jail for the purpose of appearing at the video arraignment of her client. Mesecher v. Co. of San Diego, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 (Cal. App. 1992).
     Four officers liable for a total of $50,000, two for beating arrestee after he dropped weapon and was handcuffed, and all four for conspiring to violate his rights Haner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1992).
     Arrestee awarded $1,716,34980 by jury for officers' alleged excessive use of force while responding to domestic disturbance complaint; appeals court overturns award because of erroneous denial of defendant's request for jury instruction and prejudicial expert witness testimony Easley v. City of New York, 592 N.Y.S.2d 690 (A.D. 1993).
     Officer liable for $216,000 for excessive force used against arrestee who suffered fractured cheekbones from blow to the face; court overturns award for malicious prosecution and orders new trial on false arrest claim. Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2nd Cir. 1992).
     Arrestees who claimed that they were repeatedly struck while handcuffed were entitled to a new trial after jury verdict in favor of defendant officers when testimony of a dozen witnesses supported their version of the events in question. King v. Davis, 980 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1992).
     Homeless man allegedly beaten by transit police officers during an arrest awarded $475,000 for assault and battery. Svendsen v. Port Auth, N.Y., N.Y. Co. Sup. Ct., No. 3925/90, Oct 8, 1992, reported in 36 ATLA L. Rep.8 (Feb 1993).
     Two homosexual men could sue federal drug agents on claim that they arrested and assaulted them without provocation because of their sexual orientation; federal agents were not entitled to qualified immunity because they should have known that the alleged assaults on account of homosexual status were violations of the right to equal protection. Anderson v. Branen, 799 F.Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
     Award of $1625 million to man assaulted without provocation by several police officers was not excessive in light of his permanent disfigurement, later suicide attempts, and incapacity. Suarez v. City of New York, 589 N.Y.S.2d 10 (A.D. 1992).
     Federal appeals court upholds $366,320 excessive force award against two officers for beating an arrestee in custody while he was handcuffed to a chair. Niehus v. Liberio, 973 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1992).
     Female officer did not use excessive force in placing her hand around arrestee's neck when she believed that he was attempting to lunge at her while in custody; reports of his earlier alleged conduct and his threats against her gave her reason to believe that she needed to restrain him. Pride v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 793 F.Supp. 279 (D.Kan 1992).
     $243,500 settlement in suit over alleged police brutality during predominantly gay neighborhood AIDS demonstration Bringardner v. Cairns, No 920-290, Super. Ct., San Francisco, Cal, reported in Los Ang. Daily Jour., p. 3 (Oct 7, 1992).
     Illinois Supreme Court upholds $748 million award against city for officers' alleged excessive use of force against man injured in altercation in liquor store; plaintiff's alleged negligence in the incident could not be used to reduce an award based on the officers' "willful and wanton" conduct. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart Inc, 148 Ill 2d 429, 593 N.E.2d 522, 170 Ill Dec 633 (1992).
     City liable for $16,491 to man battered by two police officers, even though all four police officers present were found not liable; court fond that two of the officers assaulted the plaintiff, but could not identify which two of the four defendant officers were responsible Perez v. City of Huntington Park, 9 Cal.Rptr. 2 258 (Cal. App. 1992).
     Man who shot and killed a police officer who was forcing his way into his home awarded a total of $15 million in damages against six officers; plaintiff alleged that officers beat him after both he and the officer were shot. Sanders v. Coleman, U.S. Dist. Ct. Indianapolis, Ind, reported in Chicago Tribune Sec 1, p. 7 (Nov 25, 1992).
     Arrestee who alleged he was beaten and choked while handcuffed receives $130,000 settlement in suit against officers and city Shoults v. Iwan, U.S. Dist. Ct., D.N.D., No AZ-91-197, May 14, 1992, reported in ATLA Law Rptr. 256 (Sept 1992).
     City settles for $127,000 suits by eleven alleging that officers attacked them at anti-war rally following "rap" concert. Gottschalk v. City of Chicago, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill., reported in Chicago Sun-Times, p. 4 (May 8, 1992).
     Officers used reasonably necessary force in subduing driver who attempted to ram tractor-trailer into police vehicle. Williams v. Adams, 780 F.Supp. 635 (E.D. Mo 1991).
     Female arrestee awarded $30,000 on her claim that officer "kneed" her in the back; appeals court holds that even if arrest was based on probable cause, that would not justify excessive use of force alleged in suit. City of Homestead v. Suarez, 591 So.2d 1125 (Fla. App. 1992).
     Officers used excessive force in macing and beating 80-yearold arrestee with alzheimer's stopped for erratic driving; $65,000 compensatory and $200,000 in punitive damages were not excessive for injuries requiring nine day hospitalization. Fleck v. Caudill, 582 N.E.2d 385 (Ind App. 1991).
     Three officers liable for $125,000 in compensatory damages and total of $4,000 in punitive damages for alleged unprovoked assault on catering truck operator; evidence of plaintiff's prior arrests were properly excluded at trial. Street v. Parham, 929 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1991).
     Arrestees' claims of police assault were subject to Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard rather than due process standard when they had not yet been arraigned; Idaho Supreme Court holds that Graham decision should be applied retroactively. Grant v. City of Twin Falls, 813 P.2d 880 (Idaho 1991).
     Pregnant woman awarded $400,000 in damages for beating by officers, reduced from jury's initial award of $1 million; appeals court holds that $200,000 award for future damages was not excessive. Ruiz v. Gonzalez Caraballo 929 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1991).
     Damages of $100,000 was not excessive award to black man called a "pimp" and detained for three hours after officers assaulted and arrested him at hospital where he had brought his white stepdaughter for medical treatment. Bert v. Port Authority of NY and NJ, 561 N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div 1990).
     Robbery suspect allegedly punched, kicked, and racially insulted by officers who forced him to strip to the waist and placed him in a freezing room in an attempt to elicit a confession awarded $581,977 compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 571 A.2d 518 (Pa/Cmwlth. 1990).
     Police officer's review of two police reports was an inadequate basis for his opinion testimony that an arrestee had a propensity for violence; new trial ordered on assault and battery case against officers Lombardi v. Graham, 794 P.2d 610 (Colo. 1990).
     Jury award of $650,000 in compensatory and $150,000 in punitive damages against officer for unjustified assault on arrestee was not excessive, federal appeals court finds. Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183 (2nd Cir. 1990).
     Award of $1 million for two unprovoked beatings of grocer by officers upheld on appeal. DeLaCruz v. City of New York, 557 N.Y.S.2d 381 (A.D. 1990).
     Officer's pushing of arrestee back into chair while awaiting breathalyzer test was not excessive force. Evans v. Hawley, 559 So.2d 500 (La App. 1990).
     Officer liable for kicking arrestee in the groin while he was lying on his stomach; punitive damages not awardable for "loss of temper" Pastre v. Weber, 717 F.Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y., 1989).
     Store owner assaulted by state troopers during unwarranted arrest awarded $27,256; co-owners who witnessed assault were not entitled to mental anguish damages. Fisher v. Dept of Public Safety, 555 So.2d 626 (La App. 1989).
     U.S. Supreme Court holds that claims against law enforcement officials for excessive use of force in making arrests are to be analyzed under a fourth amendment objective reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989).
     City was liable for death by beating of employee of club when policy allowed private clubs to police themselves. Horton v. Charles, 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).
     Fourth amendment reasonableness standard governed arrestee's claim for excessive force after arrest but before arraignment. Henson v. Thezan, 717 F.Supp. 1330 (N.D.Ill. 1989).
     Forceable taking of blood sample of DUI suspect was not unreasonable use of force. Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989).
     Trial court should not have told jury to consider officers' subjective state of mind on excessive force claim. Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989).
     New trial ordered when jury marked verdict form that excessive force was not used, but constitutional rights were violated. Skon v. Milstead, 541 So.2d 662 (Fla App. 1989).
     Force used by officer was reasonable when stopped motorist admitted resisting and resistance continued until he was subdued Gassner v. City of Garland, Tex,, 864 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1989).
     Arrestee who shot two officers alleged scheme of harassment of his "liberal life style" of "casual encounters with females"; police chief and supervisor not liable, claim against arresting officer for excessive force allowed to proceed. Cullen v. Mattaliano, 690 F.Supp. 93 (D.Mass 1988).
     Connecticut Supreme Court finds assault and battery lawsuit against officers barred by prior award of damages in federal civil rights lawsuit over same incident. Virgo v. Lyons, 551 A.2d 1243 (Conn 1988).
     Man falsely arrested and beaten by officers, who mistook him for a bank robber, awarded $275,000. Dist. of Columbia v. Gandy, 450 A.2d 896 (DC App. 1982).
     Mother may sue for damages on behalf of her injured fetus Douglas v. Town of Hartford, Conn, 542 F.Supp. 1267 (D. Conn 1982).
     Officer not liable for using violence necessary to contain female arrestee. Alberts v. City of New York, 549 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
     Quadriplegic alleges officers used excessive force when they arrested him for misdemeanor. Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 657 P.2d 582 (Kan. App. 1983).
     Supreme Court overturns injunction issued against LA police regarding use of choke holds. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S.Ct. 1660 (1983).
     Officer used reasonable force when he "yanked" speeding motorist out of her car. Clark v. Dept of Pub. Safety, State of La., 431 So.2d 83 (La App. 1983).
     New trial ordered for determination of whether officers used excessive force when they flipped plaintiff to pavement causing him to become quadriplegic. Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita, 667 P.2d 380 (Kan 1983, on appeal from 657 P.2d 582).
     City does not have to indemnify officer held liable for kicking handcuffed arrestee. Rosignol v. Hirnschal, 463 A.2d 240 (Conn. 1983).
     Officers liable for arresting and beating plaintiff accused of stealing gas. Kelly v. Kane, 470 N.Y.S.2d 816 (App. 1983).
     Police could be liable for use of excessive force during arrest after called to scene by security guard. Linkogel v. Baker Protective Services, Inc, 659 S.W.2d 300 (Mo. App. 1983); on rehearing from 626 S.W.2d 380 (Mo App. 1981).
     City, chief, and officers could be liable for beatings during sobriety test. Caplinger v. Carter, 676 P.2d 1300 (Kan App. 1984).
     Force used during arrest was reasonable. Smith v. Giarrusso, 446 So.2d 343 (La App. 1984).
     Officer not guilty of pistol whipping plaintiff after highspeed chase. Ricard v. State, 446 So.2d 901 (La App. 1984).
     Section 1983 suit against police for intentional assault on intoxicated man to continue. Anton v. Lehpamer, 584 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D.Ill. 1984).
     Police beating case to continue to federal court despite availability of state remedies. Frost v. City and Co. of Honolulu, 584 F.Supp. 356 (D. Hawaii 1984).
     City not liable for on-duty officer's sexual assault, despite prior incidents. Wedgeworth v. Harris, 592 F.Supp. 155 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
     County dismissed from suit with past complaints of excessive force. Savage v. Dane County, 588 F.Supp. 1129 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
     Citizen complaints properly excluded as hearsay. English Clark v. Tucson, 69O P.2d 1235 (Ariz. App. 1984).
     Police chief's alleged sexual harassment of young trainees not grounds to think he trained his officers to do the same; police officer accused of grabbing woman by her breasts to remove her from car. Varelia v. Jones, 746 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1984).
     Failure to intervene in police grounds for liability; those accused of beating dismissed from suit. Webb v. Arresting Officers, 749 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1984); on remand from 713 F.2d 405 (1983).
     Arrestee claims several officers beat him and threatened to kill him for shooting at one of them. Dobson v. Green, 596 F.Supp. 122 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
     No liability for police failure to intervene when fellow officer struck plaintiff; nighttime arrests pursuant to warrant upheld. Willhauck v. Halpin, 599 F.Supp. 282 (D.Mass 1984).
     Use of force on arrestee, even if he was resisting, was improper. Stratton v. Hatch, 597 F.Supp. 128 (D. Vt. 1984).
     Deputy liable for $10,000 punitive damages for injuries to bystander during his assault on someone else. Day v. Lea, 599 F.Supp. 25 (M.D. La. 1984).
     Former deputy sentenced for beating arrestee to death Gordon v. State, 681 S.W. 629 (Tex.App. 1984).
     Failure to conduct independent investigation of retail theft reported by security guard results in liability to city and police officer. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc, 749 F.2d 1423 (1Oth Cir. 1984).
     Two officers liable for $30,000 for harassing and assaulting plaintiff following near collision with them. Flores Caraballo v. Lopez, 601 F.Supp. 14 (D.P.R. 1984).
     Arrestee may forcibly resist excessive force. Jackson v. State, 463 So.2d 372 (Fla.App. 1985).
     No showing of excessive force on arrestee seen with guns. Arnold v. State, 486 N.Y.S.2d 94 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1985).
     Plaintiff sues officers and city for assault; officers sue city for improper dismissal Arancibia v. Berry, 603 F.Supp. 931. (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
     Grabbing woman's arm to take her into custody for mental observation was excessive force. LeSavage v. White, 755 F.2d 814 (11th Cir. 1985).
     Officer not protected by state's 11th amendment immunity for alleged "willful" acts. Meola v. Machado, 602 F.Supp. 3 (D. Mass 1984).
     Evidence of conviction for resisting arrest admissible in assault and battery claim Banek v. Thomas, 697 P.2d 743 (Colo App. 1984).
     Court upholds $18,000 judgment against city for police misconduct Consolidated City of Jacksonville v. Teage, 424 So.2d 67 (Fla App. 1982).
     Citizen's aggressive reputation admissible in police assault suit. Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 491 A.2d 1386, (Pa. Super. 1985).
     Statistics on police complaints inadequate to allege policy; pleadings insufficient Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. l985).
     Mental anguish and suffering from beating supports $900,000 award. Spell v. McDaniel, 606 F.Supp. 1416 (E.D. N.C. 1985).
     Police officer personally liable for batter; city's liability limited to $50,000. City of North Bay Village v. Braelow, 469 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1985).
     Mistaking diabetic for drunk and assaulting him results in liability against various defendants; city ordinance waiving immunity not inconsistent with state law. City of Philadelphia v. Middleton, 492 A.2d 763 Pa. Cmwlth. l985).
     $300,000 too much money to award for 73-year-old's injuries from police abuse. Smith v. City of Seven Points, 608 F.Supp. 458 (D.C. Tex. 1985).
     Police have duty to intervene when witnessing beating by private citizens. Armster v. City of Riverside, 611 F.Supp. 103 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
     Officers' military psychological exams ordered disclosed; counter suits given strong approval by court Smith v. City of New York, 611 F.Supp. 1080 (D.C. N.Y. 1985).
     Hiring officer knowing he hadn't completed state training not grounds for municipal liability. Vippolis v. Vil. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40 (2nd Cir. 1985).
     Tape-recorded testimony of witness who died before trial inadmissible. Nicholson v. Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426 (9th Cir. 1985).
     Civilian Complaints protected by immunity. Miner v. Novotny, 498 A.2d 269 (Md. 1985).
     Punitive damages awarded against officers in excessive force case Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1985).
     Plaintiff can continue suit without certainty which police beat him. Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, (9th Cir. 1985); San Francisco Recorder, California, 11/22/86.
     Officer unsuccessfully sought to enjoin investigation of brutality complaint sworn to by minor. Walker v. Lindsey, 500 A.2d 1061 (Md. App. 1985).
     Breaking finger grounds to sue under Section 1983. Bowman v. Casler, 622 F.Supp. 836 (D.C. N.Y. l985).
     Two deputies sued for assaulting investigator not wanted at Christmas party. Moore v. Floro, 614 F.Supp. 328 (D.C. Ill 1985).
     Existence of team of officers with guns not grounds for section 1983 liability, absent physical injury. Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395 (7th Cir. 1985).
     Force was reasonable in restraining speeding motorcyclist, whose finger and thumb were severed Johnson v. Pike, 624 F.Supp. 390 (N.D.Ohio 1985).
     Third-party claims of brutality properly admitted regardless of their validity; police chief conducted only "superficial" investigations of complaints. Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, NY, 783 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1986).
     Officer sued for brutality on female over drunk driving. Byrd, v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1986).
     Important decision puts burden on police that force was reasonable. Valdrez v. Abney, 227 Cal.Rptr. 706 (App. 1986).
     Statements in disciplinary proceeding not admissible Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1986).
     No inconsistency in finding excessive force but no assault and battery. Waggoner v. Mosti, 792 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1986).
     No error in admitting prior arrests and drug use in excessive force suit. Lewis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
     City grossly negligent in training on a multitude of areas Wierstak v. Heffernan, 789 F.2d 968 (1st Cir. 1986).
     Over $100,000 awarded for assault by officer with known violent propensities; attorney's fees exceed judgment. Brandon v. Allen, 645 F.Supp. 1261 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
     Statute bars personal liability for police officers' negligent acts. City of North Bay Village v. Braelow, 498 So.2d 417 (Fla 1986).
     City vicariously liable for act committed outside jurisdiction; insurance policy doesn't provide coverage Lamkin v. Brooks, 498 So.2d 1068.
     Plaintiff's inability to identify officer in assault suit not grounds for summary judgment when there are witnesses Summerlin v. Edgar, 809 F.2d 1034 (4th Cir. 1987).
     Large number of merit less citizen complaints don't prove officer is violent; city not required to administer polygraphs to police following citizen complaints; and citizen review committees not necessary. Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1987).
     Police officer ordered to pay damages for malicious prosecution and assault of assistant fire chief, who allegedly "flipped off" officer en route to fire. Chapman v. Duraski, 721 S.W.2d 184 (Mo App. 1986).
     Complaint that police assaulted infant dismissed for failure to identify which officer committed the brutal act Santos v. City of New York, 515 N.Y.S.2d 58 (A.D. 2 Dept 1987).
     No showing city condoned police brutality or ignored citizen complaints. Stengel v. City of Hartford, 652 F.Supp. 572 (D. Conn. 1987).
     Police officer liable for $17,000 for allegedly beating plaintiff; city not liable. White v. City of Vassar, 403 N.W.2d 124 (Mich. App. 1987).
     Federal court rules bondsman is a "state actor" who can be sued under section 1983. Jackson v. Pantazies, 810 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1987).
     Jury could properly find that officer did not violate minor's constitutional rights despite officer's admission that he used excessive force. Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1987).
     Over $100,000 awarded for kicking of arrestee in domestic disturbance, resulting in fractured leg. Hagge v. Bauer, 827 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1987).
     Court will not review case in which city will pay 11 million to man kneed in groin by police officer. City of Fayetteville, N.C. v. Spell, 824 F.2d 138O (4th Cir), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 752 (1988).
     Sexual assault : When is there liability by department or supervisors? Jeffrey Scott E v. Central Baptist Church, 242 Cal.Rptr. 128. (Cal.App. 1988); Kimberly M v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 242 Cal.Rptr. 612 (Cal.App. 1987).
     Award of $80,000 in compensatory, $185,000 in punitive damages was not excessive for use of excessive force on arrestee. O'Neil v. Krzeminiski, 839 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1988).
     Fetus was not a "person" entitled to bring civil rights suit on basis that officers allegedly beat him in womb when mother was nine months pregnant. Ruiz Romero v. Gonzales Carabello, 681 F.Supp. 123 (D. Puerto Rico, 1988).
     Former mayoral candidate arrested at forum awarded $30,000 for excessive force; loses on false arrest claim . Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570 (11th Cir. 1987).
     Plaintiff in assault case could not appeal from portion of arbitration award once he agreed to arbitration of case and award was final. Supple v. City of Los Angeles, 247 Cal.Rptr. 554 (Cal.App. 1988).
     Arrestee can sue police officer for failure to aid him during alleged unprovoked beating at police station. Negron Riviera v. Diaz, 679 F.Supp. 161 (D. Puerto Rico, 1988).
     Wife of man who alleged police wrongfully beat him could not sue for mental anguish when she was not involved in incident. Soto Gomez v. Lopez Feliciano, 698 F.Supp. 28 (D.Puerto Rico, 1988).
     " See also: Defenses: Statute of Limitations, Defenses: Notice of Claim, Negligence Arrestees, Search and Seizure: Person.


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