A federal district court ruled that the Google search engine company must provide private user data to the FBI pursuant to 17 out of 19 properly issued National Security Letters (NSLs), despite the fact that there was no judicially issued warrant for the information. The judge requested more information on the remaining two NSLs. NSLs allow FBI officials to send secret requests for "name, address, length of service," and other account information to online companies, banks, and other businesses as long as there is relevance to a national security investigation. In Re: National Security Letters, #C-13-80063, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2013).
     Target of government investigation was entitled to a preliminary injunction barring federal government agents from compelling his Internet service provider (ISP) to disclose the contents of his email without a warrant, notice, or a hearing. Such a disclosure would violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment, and a federal statute. A person retains a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the content of e-mail, even though they are stored with, sent, or received through a commercial ISP. The fact that such emails might be screened to exclude spam, viruses, and child pornography did not remove that reasonable expectation of privacy. The court did state that, if the defendant government could demonstrate factually that the plaintiff had waived his expectation of privacy in relation to the ISP, then disclosure of the emails through a mere notice to the ISP would be allowable. Warshak v. US, No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S. 14297 (6th Cir.).
     301:13 Police officers entitled to qualified immunity for seizing, pursuant to valid warrant, computer used to transmit obscene materials, even if it also contained non-obscene electronic mail belonging to users of on-line computer bulletin board; good faith reliance on search warrant gave officers complete statutory defense to claim under federal statute barring unauthorized interception of electronic communications. Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472 (10th Cir. 1997).