In a false arrest and wrongful imprisonment lawsuit, where the trial judge had a conversation with another judge previously disqualified to sit on the case just before granting the defendant city's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial, regardless of any showing of prejudice, based on the "irregularity of the proceedings" and a reasonable concern that the trial judge could not then fairly decide the motion. Christie v. City of El Centro, No D044792 2006 Cal. App. Lexis 33 (Cal. App.). [2006 LR Mar]
      Judge's relationship with the President of the Board of Police Commissioners, which included appearances at the same bar association functions and large social events and several small group meetings over almost twenty five years was not a close enough relationship as to require his recusal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455(a) from presiding over a police officer's lawsuit against police officials for malicious prosecution and falsely accusing him of assault and use of excessive force against a mentally retarded person mistakenly identified as a burglar. Judge recuses himself anyhow, however, on other grounds. Moran v. Clarke, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (E.D. 2002).[N/R]
     Trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff arrestee's motion that he recuse himself. Plaintiff only made the allegation of judicial bias "well after judgment" against him in his federal civil rights lawsuit against arresting officers, and only asserted his claim of bias in a "conclusory manner" without stating any facts that would convince a reasonable person that personal or extrajudicial bias existed. Wilson v. Holt, #01-5298, 35 Fed. Appx. 189 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
      293:68 Trial court's comments in front of jury, using the term "fraud" to refer to defendant police officer's memo book because it was filled out at the end of the day, and other negative comments, resulted in an unfair trial, requiring overturning of jury's award to plaintiff who claimed officers assaulted him. Rivas v. Brattesani, 94 F.3d 802 (2nd Cir. 1996).