In lawsuit claiming that officers used excessive force, including a chokehold, in attempting to place a man under arrest, resulting in his death, trial court found not to have abused its discretion in barring expert testimony concerning excessive force. The Plaintiff sought to introduce such testimony by a police department Office of Professional Standards inspector and a police sergeant who investigated the claim of excessive force during the arrest, and to ask them whether the officer used excessive force or violated departmental General Orders, policies or procedures. The appeals court upheld a trial court ruling that the "probative value" of such evidence was "substantially outweighed" by the danger of unfair prejudice, and that it would not assist the jury in reaching a decision, but rather would cause "confusion." Court also upholds ruling barring evidence concerning the department's General Orders on the appropriate use of force, since the issue of whether or not the officer violated a departmental regulation was different from whether his use of force was unconstitutional. Thompson v. City of Chicago, No. 04-3177, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 31138 (7th Cir. December 20, 2006)  [N/R]
     It was no abuse of discretion to exclude an expert witness's testimony in an excessive force case involving a police shooting when the court found that the expert's opinion that a reasonable officer would have been able to tell that the plaintiff was not holding a gun, bur rather a cell phone, had "no basis." Hickey v. City of New York, No. 05-1933-CV, 173 Fed. Appx. 893 (2nd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
     Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding plaintiff's expert witness in a lawsuit over state trooper's alleged excessive use of deadly force against her son when she failed, for approximately a year, to disclose requested information about his qualifications, publications, and prior testimony in other cases. Appeals court also upholds summary judgment for state troopers who shot and killed suspect, who had fired at them and at other police officers, and who was sought under two arrest warrants and an order for a mental health examination. Carr v. Deeds, No. 05-1472, 05-2186, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 17461 (4th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Experts in the use of deadly force could not provide testimony based on medical evidence or opinions because this was found by the court to be outside the area of their expertise, and there was no showing that such medical reports were the kind of materials that excessive force experts relied on. Richman v. Sheahan, No. 98C7350, 415 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2006). [N/R]
     Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the testimony of a medical expert in a detainee's lawsuit seeking damages for eye injuries allegedly caused by a police officer during the detention. The plaintiff failed to file the expert's report in a timely manner, and the report failed to provide a complete statement of the basis and reasons for the expert's opinion or state his qualification. Further, admission of the testimony at a late date had to be excluded to avoid prejudice because admitting the testimony and giving the defendant officer time to depose the expert would have resulted in the postponement of the trial. Brooks v. Price, No. 03-4608, 121 Fed. Appx. 961 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Erroneous admission of expert witness testimony which commented on the credibility of police officers involved in shooting required a new trial in case where jury returned a verdict against a suspect shot and paralyzed from the waist down. Nimely v. City of New York, No. 04-3240, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 12712 (2d Cir.). [2005 LR Aug]
     Expert witness's proposed flat rate fee for a deposition at his office in a federal civil rights lawsuit concerning alleged excessive use of force was "exorbitant and unreasonable," without an explanation as to why he blocked out a full day for a deposition, which might be a short one. Additionally, the court finds that the issues on which he was to render an opinion were not complex, and that the flat fee would amount to over $600 per hour. A reasonable fee, the court rules, would be $250 per hour. Massasoit v. Carter, No. 1:04CV00151, 227 F.R.D. 264 (M.D.N.C. 2005). [N/R]
     Jury could properly find that officer's use of police dog to detain suspect following high-speed pursuit of car was proper when he then believed she was a burglary suspect and was attempting to flee arrest. Exclusion of testimony of expert witness was not an abuse of discretion when his testimony would be irrelevant to whether the officer acted in a reasonable manner. Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, No. 02-2294, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 3299(10th Cir.). [2005 LR Apr]
     A Florida Highway Patrol traffic homicide investigator was properly allowed to testify as an expert witness in accident reconstruction in a wrongful death lawsuit brought by a deputy sheriff's estate against the owner and operator of a truck that struck the deputy. He testified, based on his work at the accident scene, that the deputy pulled out into the highway when the truck was so close that the truck driver did not have time to avoid the collision. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the investigator should have been barred as an expert because a jury would give a law enforcement officer's testimony undue weight. "When a law enforcement officer has been properly qualified as an expert, the officer may testify to matters that are within the officer's expertise." Alexander v. Penske Logistics, Inc., No. 3D02-2793, 867 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. 2003), rehearing denied, 2004. [N/R]
     Trial court was not required to make a detailed analysis of the reliability of psychiatric expert testimony, and it could take judicial notice of the admissibility of expert testimony in "well-known areas" of accepted expertise, such as psychiatry. Psychiatrist's testimony, therefore, that an arrestee falsified or exaggerated some of her symptoms stemming from force used during her arrest was admissible. Judgment in favor of defendant city and officers upheld. Samaniego v. City of Kodiak, No. S-10378, 80 P.3d 216 (Alaska 2003). [N/R]
     Psychiatrists were qualified to testify as expert witnesses as to the psychological impact on juveniles attending a basketball tournament of allegedly unlawful detentions and searches of them by police officers. Since psychiatrists did not need forensic training or board-certification in child psychology to treat juveniles, their lack of these qualifications did not bar them from testifying. Psychiatric team leader who relied on data collected by a team member and did not himself personally examine the civil rights plaintiffs could testify as to his opinion. Williams v. Brown, 244 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Ill. 2003). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court upholds criminal conviction of officer for violating suspect's civil rights by allegedly releasing police dog to bite him without any warning while he had his hands up, was not resisting police orders, and had not made any sudden moves. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of officer's alleged subsequent involvement in the misuse of police dogs, or in allowing the government to present rebuttal expert witness testimony that the officer's use of her dog in the immediate case was improper. U.S.A. v. Mohr, #01-5002, 318 F.3d 613 (4th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Apr]
     No hearing was required to resolve a plaintiff arrestee's objections to the admission of an expert psychiatrist's report and testimony about his mental state at the time of his arrest when the basis for the objection was disagreement with disputed factual evidence on which the expert relied. The plaintiff, who claimed excessive use of force during the arrest, could explore, during cross-examination, the reliance that the expert put on the disputed evidence in drawing his conclusion that the plaintiff had been psychotic at the time so that his perception of events were impaired and unreliable. He could also argue to the jury that, if it rejected the underlying factual premises of the expert's report, it should also reject the expert's opinion. Walker v. Gordon, #01-4106, 46 Fed. Appx. 691 (3rd Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Instructors at college's police academy, who had testified against police as expert witnesses in an excessive force case had no constitutionally protected property interest which was violated by chiefs of police and sheriffs allegedly seeking non-renewal of their contractors in retaliation for the testimony. Police chiefs and sheriffs were not, however, entitled to qualified immunity on instructors' claim that they kept their personnel out of the instructors' classes, in violation of their First Amendment rights, in retaliation. Plaintiffs also asserted a valid claim under Texas state law for tortious interference with instructors' contract relationship with the academy, and the defendants were not entitled to official immunity from that claim. Kinney v. Weaver, #00-40557, 301 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2002).[N/R]
     Trial judge rules, in excessive force case involving off-duty officer, that expert witness could provide testimony concerning the proper police procedures to be followed and how and when an officer should decide to go from off-duty to on-duty status, but could not state a specific opinion about the specific facts of the case. The jury, the judge ruled, could determine on its own whether or not the officer kicked the plaintiff in the head. McCloughan v. City of Springfield, 208 F.R.D. 236 (C.D. Ill. 2002). [2002 LR Sep]
     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing expert witness testimony on the ultimate issue in the case of whether a deputy's use of force was proper against a Vietnam veteran who was fatally shot by a deputy responding to a domestic violence call. Crawford v. Bundick, No. 01-2864, 32 Fed. Appx. 785 (8th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Expert witness testimony that officers should not have shot a fleeing suspect was admissible in excessive force lawsuit, even though the question of whether the officers actually saw the suspect possessing a weapon did not determine whether they could use deadly force. Expert's opinion could help the jury decide whether the officers' use of force was reasonable under the circumstances. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 160 F. Supp. 2d 1038 (S.D. Iowa 2001). [N/R]
       279:38 Expert witness testimony on "hedonic damages" (the enjoyment value of human life) barred by trial court in lawsuit over police shooting of individual. Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F.Supp. 1049 (N.D.Ill. 1995).
     Federal rules of civil procedure allow admission of scientific evidence/expert testimony regardless of whether Frye "general acceptance" test is met; federal trial judge must ensure that expert testimony is relevant and is based on a "reliable" foundation Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
     Federal trial court bars expert testimony on the reasonableness of officer's use of force; holds that such testimony "would interfere inappropriately" with jury's judgment process Wells v. Smith, 778 F.Supp. 7 (D.Md 1991).
     Police expert's testimony on proper level of force to be
     used in disarming suspects was properly admitted in excessive force lawsuit, although plaintiff had not been armed Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1987).
     Defendant officers entitled to advance knowledge of substance of expert witness testimony to be offered against them at trial Williams v. McNamara, 118 F.R.D. 294 (D. Mass 1988).
     Legal expert should not have been allowed to testify as to what legal conclusions he would draw from evidence in civil rights case. Spect v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988), en banc, reversing 832 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1987).