AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Civil Liability
of Law Enforcement Agencies & Personnel


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Firearms Related: Intentional Use

     Monthly Law Journal Article: Use of Force and the Hollywood Factor, by Jeffry L. Johnson, 2007 (4) AELE Mo. L.J. 501.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil Liability for Use of Deadly Force-- Part One, 2007 (11) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil Liability for Use of Deadly Force-- Part Two. Qualified Immunity and Inadequate Training, 2007 (12) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil Liability for Use of Deadly Force-- Part Three. Supervisory Liability and Negligent/Accidental Acts, 2008 (1) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Long v. Honolulu Police Sharpshooter Decision, 2008 (5) AELE Mo. L.J. 501.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Anatomy of a Fatal Police Shooting -- Allegations and Holdings, 2009 (2) AELE Mo. L. J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Force and the Fatigue Threshold: The Point of No Return, 2010 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Shooting at Moving Vehicles, 2010 (9) AELE Mo. L. J. 101
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Excessive Force Claims Concerning Pointing Firearms--Part 1, 2010 (10) AELE Mo. L. J. 101
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Excessive Force Claims Concerning Pointing Firearms--Part 2, 2010 (11) AELE Mo. L. J. 101
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Interagency Memorandums of Agreement for Officer-Involved Shooting Investigations, 2011 (1) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Weapon Confusion and Civil Liability, 2012 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Teaching 4th Amendment Based Use-of-Force, 2012 (7) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Drawing and Pointing Weapons During a Terry Investigative Stop, 2013 (7) AELE Mo. L. J. 101.
     Monthly Law Journal Article: Mandatory Nationwide Use of Force Reporting by Police and Correctional Agencies – and Why This is an Important Issue, 2015 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.

     Monthly Law Journal Article: Sixth Circuit Adopts New Test for Judging Reasonableness of Force Used in Non-Criminal Medical Situations, 2017 (7) AELE Mo. L. J. 101. 

     Monthly Law Journal Article: U.S. Supreme Court Rejects the Ninth Circuit’s Provocation Doctrine on Officer Shootings, 2017 (8) AELE Mo. L. J. 101. 

 

      A federal appeals court overturned a jury’s verdict that a police officer did not use excessive force in a fatal shooting. The court held that the jury instruction regarding the legal justification for the use of deadly force by a police officer did not comply with the court's prior decision in Rasanen v. Doe, #12-680, 723 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2013), making it clear that an officer's use of deadly force in a police shooting case was not reasonable unless that officer had probable cause to believe that the individual posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Because the error allowed the jury to decide the case on different grounds than case law allowed, it was not harmless error. Callahan v. City of Suffolk, #16-336, 863 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 2017).

     A man claimed that he was wrongly shot and wounded by a police officer as he was driving away to escape a mob that attacked him when he left a party. A federal appeals court overturned summary judgment for the defendant town, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether or not the plaintiff, in the way he was driving his car, posed an imminent threat to the officers or bystanders, and whether deadly force was necessary to mitigate that threat. Lee v. Town of Seaboard, #16-1447, 863 F.3d 323 (4th Cir. 2017). 

     A mother filed a lawsuit claiming excessive use of force and wrongful death after her son was shot approximately ten times by police and killed. Reversing the dismissal of the excessive force claim by the trial court, a federal appeals court found that there were at least two genuine disputed issues of material fact. The first was whether or not the officers saw the decedent throw his gun away and therefore knew that he was now disarmed. The second whether he was turning around to the officers with his hands raised to surrender. Because there was insufficient evidence that the officers acted with malice or in bad faith, however, the appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants on the state law wrongful death claims. Wealot v. Brooks, #16-1192, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 14335 (8th Cir.).

     An officer blocking a man’s path with his vehicle constituted a seizure. The plaintiff adequately alleged that he and his companion had not fled from the officer and had not resisted arrest. Accordingly, it was unreasonable for the officer to draw his gun and shoot twice, striking the companion in the arm. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity since the law was sufficiently clear to inform a reasonable officer that it was unlawful to use deadly force against nonviolent, suspected misdemeanants who were not fleeing or resisting arrest, posed little or no threat to the officer or public, and whose only action was to stop walking when a police car blocked their path. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, #16-1697,  2017 U.S. App. Lexis 13368 (8th Cir.).

     A dispatch center received reports that a male motorist had assaulted another man, had been drinking, and was driving erratically. An officer identified the suspect’s car, followed the vehicle into a parking lot, stopping alongside it. The motorist fled and a high-speed pursuit in the pouring rain ensued, reaching speeds of over 100 miles per hour through residential areas.

     The pursued car ran into a ditch in a national forest. The officer parked 63.6 feet away. The motorist exited his vehicle, looked towards the officer, then turned away and crouched towards the ground, appearing unarmed. As the officer slowly approached, his gun drawn, the motorist allegedly walked towards him with clenched fists, “wide eyes, coming directly ... towards me, ... refusing to listen to any of my direct commands.”  The officer fired a shot. The suspect hunched over slightly but continued moving purposefully toward the officer, who fired again, and the motorist collapsed and died. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment of qualified immunity in favor of the officer, noting that the confrontation took less than 20 seconds. Courts must make an “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments.” The court found that the officer had probable cause to believe that the deceased posed an immediate threat to the officer’s safety, the plaintiff was unable to point to a case holding that it was unconstitutional for an officer to shoot a criminal suspect under similar circumstances, and the officer did not violate any of the decedent’s clearly established rights. Mitchell v. Schlabach, #16-1522, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 12977, 2017 Fed. App. 156P (6th Cir.).

     The trial court properly denied officers motions for qualified immunity when the facts, as alleged by the decedent’s mother, if true violated clearly established rights. She asserted that the decedent, at the time he was punched and shot and killed, was complying with the officers’ demands. A reasonable jury could find that the officers acted with prohibited bad faith or malice. As to claims against the Board of Police Commissioners, because the trial court's individual liability determinations survived the appeal, the appeals court rejected the Board's argument that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because its officers did nothing wrong. Lancaster v. Board of Police Commissioners, #15-3769, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 13688 (8th Cir.).

     A U.S. Border Patrol agent standing on the U.S. side of the border with Mexico shot and killed an unarmed 15-year-old Mexican boy standing in Mexico. The decedent had been playing a game that included running up the embankment on the U.S. side of the border. The decedent’s parents filed a Bivens federal civil rights lawsuit for damages against the agent. A federal appeals court upheld dismissal of the lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court has vacated that ruling, ordering further proceedings. It noted that a direct Bivens implied right of damages against federal officers who allegedly violated a citizen’s constitutional rights is not available “where there are special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” On remand, the appeals court must consider “whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. In this case, the lower court concluded that the prohibition on excessive force did not apply to the decedent as a foreign national on foreign soil. But the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the boy’s nationality and the extent of his ties to the U.S. were unknown to the agent at the time of the shooting. Hernandez v. Mesa, #15-118, 2017 U.S. Lexis 4059.

 

     Two officers pulled over an 18-year-old male motorist for having a missing front license plate. They claimed that he fired a weapon towards their squad car and then ran away. They shot him three times in the back and he subsequently died. Two eyewitnesses testified that they thought that the motorist had no weapon. The defendants offered testimony that gunshot residue was found on the decedent’s hand and that casings were found at the site from which he shot. The gun found near the decedent was swabbed for DNA, but the samples were never tested by the state police. A jury returned a verdict for the defendant officers in an excessive force lawsuit. A federal appeals court upheld this result. It rejected an argument that the trial judge erroneously excluded evidence and argument concerning the failure to test the DNA swabs. The sole relevant issue was whether or not the officers were justified in shooting the decedent. A lack of DNA evidence, by itself, did not tend to prove or disprove justification. Further, nothing linked the officers who shot the decedent to the missing DNA evidence, and it would be unfair to assume that testing the DNA swabs would have helped or harmed the plaintiff’s case. Mitchell v. City of Chicago, #14-2957, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 11958 (7th Cir.).

     The U.S. Supreme Court has unanimously overturned a 9th Circuit federal appeals court decision that imposed liability on an officer’s use of deadly force even though the force was deemed justified at the time, rejecting a “provocation” doctrine that based that liability on a finding of illegal entry under the theory that the improper entry created the conditions that necessitated the use of force. A $4 million award of damages to the two individual plaintiffs was vacated. The Ninth Circuit's provocation rule, which held that an officer’s otherwise reasonable and lawful defensive use of force was unreasonable as a matter of law if the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent response and the provocation was an independent constitutional violation, conflated excessive force claims with other Fourth Amendment claims and improperly permitted excessive force claims that could not succeed on their own terms. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, #16-369, 2017 U.S. Lexis 3396, 2017 WL 2322832 (May 30, 2017).

     Because it was not clearly established on the date of the fatal shooting of a disturbed individual inside his home that using deadly force on an emotionally disturbed individual who grabbed a knife from his pocket despite orders to place his hands on his head would constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. That said, the appeals court did rule that a reasonable jury could find, under similar circumstances in the future, that the force used violated the Fourth Amendment.  S. B. v. County of San Diego, #15-56848, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 8452 (9th Cir.).

     A deputy knew that a man was dressed in a military uniform, carrying a rifle, and making rude gestures to passing vehicles as he walked along a roadway, and when the officer screamed a command to him to drop the gun, the man spun around, raised his rifle, and pointed it at the deputy so that the deputy reasonably believed that he was at risk of serious harm when he shot and killed the man. Under these circumstances, the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Although new information came to light after the shooting that the rifle was actually a pellet gun, a reasonable officer in the deputy's position could believe that man was pointing a gun and that there was a serious risk of harm. Dooley v. Tharp, #15-3368, 856 F.3d 1177 (8th Cir. 2017).

     When an animal cruelty officer went to a house to investigate a third complaint of animal cruelty allegedly taking place there, the male occupant did not come to the door. A female neighbor told the officer that the man had previously threatened her and that she was terrified of him. When more officers arrived, the man finally opened the door, gestured in a manner that suggested that he had a weapon, and then closed the door again. A second visit was also unsuccessful. The neighbor then told the animal control officer that the man had said that he would kill the officer if she returned. Members of TACT (the city’s version of SWAT) were summoned to assist with executing a search warrant. Officers announced “police” at both the front and back doors and threw flash-bangs inside. One of the officers saw the man entering his bedroom. To prevent a barricade situation, an officer threw a flash-bang into the bedroom. An officer then entered and saw the man holding a semi-automatic pistol, pointed at her. On the 911 tape, after the flash-bang, the officer can be heard yelling, “Hands, Don! Hands, hands, hands!” Seconds later, she fired at the man, killing him. His gun, still in his hand was fully loaded with a round in the chamber; he had another pistol in a holster. Officers found a rifle next to the front door and axes next to each door. His children sued, claiming excessive use of force. A federal appeals court found no merit in these claims, finding that the officers did not violate the decedent’s constitutional rights under these circumstances and that the use of deadly force was justified in self-defense. Moore v. City of Memphis, #16-5552, 853 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2017 ).

     A man was shot by a police officer while he was trying to defuse a situation where his former schoolmate had pulled out a gun and pointed it at a crowd. The man was in possession of the gun because he had taken it away from his schoolmate. He was shot several times and is now paralyzed from the neck down. He sued the officer for excessive force. A federal appeals court found that the officer’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable and the trial judge did not err in granting his motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officer ordered the plaintiff to stop, but the plaintiff did not hear him, continuing to run toward another officer with the gun in his hand. The plaintiff was two to three feet from the other officer before the defendant officer reasonably fired his gun. Malone v. Hinman, #15-3465, 847 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2017).

     A male motorist was driving a vehicle containing three persons, including his infant son, at 3 a.m. He saw that he was being followed by a police car with its lights and siren activated, but continued to drive on. Other officers responded to the scene, the motorist pulled over, several officers exited their vehicles, and one stepped in front of the stopped car. When the car started to move forward, that officer fired two rounds from a shotgun at the driver, severely injuring him. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity in an excessive force claim because it was objectively reasonable for him to use deadly force in self-defense when the car moved forward. Several officers were entitled to qualified immunity in the driver’s other excessive force claim because the video evidence refuted any claim that excessive force was used in removing him from the car. The officers were also entitled to qualified immunity for the infant child passenger’s unreasonable seizure claim based on the shots fired at the car because the law as to Fourth Amendment protection for a passenger in this situation was not clearly established. Carabajal v. City of Cheyenne, #15-8139, 847 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2017).

     A Utah state trooper tried to stop a car for speeding near an Indian reservation. The car entered the reservation and stopped about 25 miles later. The 17-year-old male driver and a 21-year-old male passenger emerged and started running away. The trooper caught the driver and requested backup. A police officer responded and allegedly shot and killed the passenger. The officer claimed that the passenger shot at him and then shot himself. An illegally purchased gun was found near the passenger. No medical assistance was allegedly provided to the passenger while awaiting an ambulance. FBI agents took charge of the scene and allegedly, along with the police, denied a tribal officer access. After the passenger was declared dead off the reservation, an officer allegedly photographed the decedent nude and manipulated his remains. A medical examiner found that the fatal bullet entered the back of the decedent’s head above and behind his left ear. The decedent was right-handed. No soot was found on the decedent’s hands. When the investigation of the gun was concluded, the FBI destroyed it. In prior litigation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, a federal trial court found that the pursuit was reasonable, and that the decedent had fired at the officer. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed this result, finding no liability. Jones v. Norton, #14-4040, 809 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 2015).The decedent’s family and the Indian tribe then sued the U.S. government in the Court of Claims under a1868 treaty with the Indian tribe and alleging a violation of the United States’ trust obligations, arising out of the same circumstances surrounding the shooting death. The estate claimed that officers concocted a false story that decedent shot himself, and failed to take custody of decedent's body and to secure it against desecration and spoliation of evidence. The Claims Court ruled that the treaty was limited to affirmative criminal acts committed on reservation lands and dismissed allegations regarding failure to take custody of and secure the decedent’s body against desecration, spoliation of evidence, failure to ensure a proper autopsy, and failure to protect the tribe’s reservation boundary and sovereign interest in the crime scene. The court found allegations concerning acts on the reservation barred by issue preclusion.The Federal Circuit vacated, holding that the Claims Court improperly limited the scope of claims cognizable under the treaty and erred in applying issue preclusion without considering the spoliation issue, an issue of the culpability of federal agents which had never been decided. Some of the alleged wrongs were a continuation of the conspiracy to cover-up the on-reservation killing; Jones v. United States, #15-5148, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 1479 (Fed. Cir.).
     A 911 call reported that a male motorist was a drunk driver on the highway. The women who made the call followed his car with their bright lights on. He pulled over at an off-ramp to confront them, and then drove to a secluded home where he lived with his brother. Two officers went to the residence after interviewing the women. The two men inside became aware of them and asked “who are you?” and “What do you want?” The officers said “Hey (expletive), we got you surrounded. Come out or we’re coming in,” and one shouted “Open the door, State Police, open the door.” The men inside allegedly only heard “we’re coming in” and not the identification,” They armed themselves and yelled “We have guns.” One of them fired two shotgun blasts from the back door at an officer. Then the second man opened a window and pointed a handgun in an officer’s direction.  An officer fired at him but missed. A third officer, who had arrived late on the scene, shot at this man and killed him. Both the trial court and a federal appeals court denied this officer qualified immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that the officer did not violate any clearly established law. The Court declined to consider whether a reasonable jury could infer that the third officer had witnessed the other officers’ deficient performance and should have realized that corrective action was necessary before using deadly force because neither lower court addressed that argument. The lower court erred in concluding that a police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim where no settled Fourth Amendment principle required the officer, who arrived late to the scene and witnessed shots being fired by one of several individuals in a house, to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his fellow officers or shout a warning to an armed occupant before shooting, and thus, there was no clearly established law that would have placed the constitutional question beyond debate. The Court expressed no opinion on whether the first two officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court found it necessary to clarify the test for granting qualified immunity to an officer: “Today, it is again necessary to reiterate the longstanding principle that ‘clearly established law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’ … As this Court explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case. Otherwise, ‘[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.’ …  The panel majority misunderstood the ‘clearly established’ analysis: It failed to identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the third officer] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the majority relied on Graham, Garner, and their Court of Appeals progeny, which—as noted above—lay out excessive-force principles at only a general level. Of course, ‘general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning’ to officers, but ‘in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent,’” White v. Pauly, #16-67, 137 S. Ct. 548, 196 L. Ed. 2d 463, 2017 U.S. Lexis 5, 85 U.S.L.W. 4027, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 409.
     A man engaged in a fight with a police officer that ended with the officer firing three shots and killing him. Overturning the trial court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officer on an excessive force claim, a federal appeals court found that the officer’s conduct prior to the shooting was neither excessive nor unreasonable; and because the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation, they failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in holding that—in the absence of video evidence—eyewitness testimony should not be considered for summary judgment purposes until subject to cross examination. In this case, the appeals court gave full weight to the undisputed eyewitness testimony concerning the incident. This showed that the officer used deadly force to protect himself because by the time the officer drew and fired his weapon, the decedent—who was physically larger and stronger than the officer—had already disobeyed verbal orders, put the officer in a headlock, wrestled the officer to the ground, and repeatedly reached for the officer's firearm. Orr v. Copeland, #16-50023, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 23100 (5th Cir.).
     An officer's use of deadly force to shoot and kill a fleeing man was not reasonable as a matter of law because the record did not show that the decedent committed the violent felony of aggravated assault or that the decedent posed a significant immediate threat to the safety of the officer or other bystanders. He was not holding a firearm at the time of the shooting, and the prior physical struggle was minimal. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Wallace v. Cumming, #15-3279, 843 F.3d 763 (8th Cir.).
Officers obtained a search warrant for a residence, and an Emergency Response Team was involved due to the subject’s criminal history, gang affiliations, possession of firearms, and possible possession of cocaine and heroin. Approaching the door, an officer could see dogs barking aggressively and “jumping.” The dogs, owned by the plaintiff, were pit bulls, weighing about 97 pounds and 53 pounds. The officer testified that he “did not feel [the officers] could safely clear the basement with those dogs down there.” The officers shot and killed the dogs.  A federal appeals court upheld dismissal of the lawsuit as there was no genuine issue of facts on either a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim or an inadequate training claim. The court agreed that the officers acted reasonably and that there was no history of “needless killing of animals in the course of searches in the municipality. The dogs posed an imminent threat to the officers while they were executing a search warrant looking for drugs in a house where a known gang member lived. Brown v. Battle Creek Police Department, #16-1575, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 22447, 2016 Fed. App. 293P (6th Cir.).
     Police responding to a report of a woman hacking at a tree with a knife arrived on the scene and observed a woman holding a kitchen knife walking down a driveway towards another woman. They were unable to approach the women because of a chain link fence. One of the officers shot her four times. A federal appeals court ruled that the officer was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The record did not support the officer's perception of an immediate threat. The plaintiff did not raise the knife she was holding and did not make any aggressive or threatening actions toward the other woman. She was described by a witness as composed and non-threatening. The facts presented the police shooting a woman who was committing no crime and holding a kitchen knife. While the woman with the knife may have been acting erratically, was approaching a third party, and did not immediately comply with orders to drop the knife, a rational jury—accepting the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff—could find that she had a constitutional right to walk down her driveway holding a knife without being shot. Hughes v. Kisela, #14-15059, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 21186 (9th Cir.).
     A police officer fatally shot a man on the street during an attempted arrest. The officer maintained in the trial court that he shot the decedent after he grabbed his police baton. According to him, the decedent was standing upright and was swinging the baton violently toward a second officer at head height when he was shot. According to the shooting officer, the man then fell to the ground. He claimed he shot the decedent again as he was getting up and again swinging the baton. The trial court granted summary judgment to the officer based on qualified immunity. Because evidence in the record contradicts his testimony, a federal appeals court reversed and remanded. The officer's credibility was genuinely in doubt. A reasonable jury could conclude that the officers were wrong when they claimed that the decedent grabbed the baton. In the alternative, a reasonable jury could conclude, given the trajectory of the bullets through the decedent's body, that even if he had grabbed the baton the officer could not have fired his first shot while the man was standing up and swinging the baton. Newmaker v. City of Fortuna, #14-15098,2016 U.S. App. Lexis 20932 (9th Cir.).

     A police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims when he allegedly shot and killed an unarmed man during an attempted investigative stop. The decedent's suspected offense was a domestic dispute which had ended before the police became involved and the plaintiff contending that the decedent had not posed an immediate threat to the officer or others and was merely walking away at the time of the shooting. A police dispatcher had expressly told the officer that the suspect was not known to carry weapons. It was clearly established that seizing an unarmed non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead violated the Fourth Amendment. A. K. H. v. City of Tustin, #14-55184, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 16961 (9th Cir.).
     An officer went to an intersection after being told of a naked man standing in the street. The man ran toward the officer, yelling, naked, and unarmed, after being told to "come here." The officer fired a Taser in the dart mode into his chest, but he kept coming. The man, high on PCP, attacked the officer, slamming him into several cars, and attempted several times to remove the officer's handgun while striking him in the head. During the struggle, the officer shot and killed the man. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the officer on excessive force claims. Regardless of whether, as the plaintiff alleged, the officer unnecessarily started a one-on-one confrontation the resulted in the later fatal altercation, the man's violent attack on the officer was a "superseding cause" that severed the causal link between the officer's first actions and his later justified use of deadly force in self-defense. The court rejected arguments that the officer should have retreated and attempted to wait for backup. The plaintiff also suggested that the officer acted unreasonably in firing the Taser at the man when he was allegedly only walking towards him rather than running as the officer claimed. The man then removed the Taser prongs and stared at the officer long enough for him to place two phone calls. "No reasonable juror could conclude" that the man's subsequent physical attack was an "involuntary or foreseeable defensive response to the Taser strike." Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, #15-2346, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17138 (3rd Cir.).
     A man broke into his own home because he had forgotten his keys when returning from vacation. A babysitter present in the house had been told by the man's wife not to let him in because the couple had argued, so she called police when she heard him breaking in. She left the home, leaving two children inside, and told police that the man was not supposed to be inside and that the children were there. Officers entered the home without a warrant, based on the report and found the man holding a kitchen knife. When he refused to obey orders to drop it, an officer fired a Taser in the dart mode at him. He then fell down, dropped the knife, ran into a bathroom, and refused to come out. When the door opened, he allegedly was once again holding the knife, and a second officer fired a Taser in the dart mode at him again, but this failed to incapacitate him. He allegedly charged out of the bathroom heading towards a hallway that was the only exit from the area, with the kitchen knife raised and slashing. One officer shot him in the chest with a gun and a second officer shot him twice, with one bullet hitting him in the neck and the second in the head, killing him.
     A federal appeals court found the warrantless entry lawful based on exigent circumstances, including the presence of children. The uses of the Taser were also reasonable under the circumstances, based on the man's initial refusal to drop the knife and his continued non-cooperation and attempt to flee, even if he no longer held the knife when the second use of the Taser occurred, as the plaintiff claimed. There also could be no supervisory liability for the second use of the Taser, as it was not a constitutional violation. The use of deadly force, however, was a constitutional violation if the decedent actually was unarmed when he emerged from the bathroom, as there was no probable cause to believe he posed a threat of serious physical harm when he moved toward the only exit. He never made physical contact with the officers or explicitly threatened him. He had only committed misdemeanor offenses and was completely surrounded. His right to be free from the use of deadly force under those circumstances was clearly established, so the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the deadly force claim, which could proceed to trial. Smith v. LePage, #15-11632, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 15644, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 717 (11th Cir.).
     In a lawsuit over the death of a man shot by police in which the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate the trial of liability from the trial of damages. This resulted in the jury hearing graphic and prejudicial evidence about the decedent which had little, and in large part no, relevance to the issue of liability, such as his drug use and gang affiliation. The issue on liability was whether the officer acted within the law when he shot and killed the decedent. A retrial was ordered. On retrial, if the plaintiffs were willing to stipulate that he was a gang member (which they claim they tried to do during the first trial), no expert testimony about gangs - such as gang activities, tattoos, or monikers - should be admitted. Estate of Diaz v. City of Anaheim, #14-55644, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 15572 (9th Cir.). 
    A woman walking her brown Labrador retriever, named "Dog." encountered a gray and white pit bull off its leash which lunged at Dog's neck. An officer, driving to another location, received a radio report of a pit bull attacking another dog. The woman spoke to the officer and described her dog. The officer was colorblind, but had not informed the department of this. He shot at the animal that he thought was the aggressor, hitting Dog. The pit bull ran away, and Dog died. A federal appeals court upheld a verdict for the officer in an excessive force lawsuit, which was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The officer's written responses to discovery questions did not constitute a "script" which he had to recite verbatim in his trial testimony.
Saathoff v. Davis, #15-3415, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 11067 (7th Cir.).
     A motorist driving his car erratically on a two-lane highway nearly collided head-on with a police officer's vehicle and then sped away. The officer gave chase at high speed, and was also joined in the pursuit by a second officer. The motorist's car swerved, spun 360 degrees, and ran off the road into a ditch. One of the officers ran towards the crashed car and fired one round. The second officer then aimed at the car and fired 13 rounds. The motorist died from gunshot wounds. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims. If a jury believed the plaintiff's version of the facts, it could conclude that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that firing into the vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment when the motorist "had been seen to do nothing more than flee from police during the vehicular pursuit for potential driving under the influence." Thompson v. City of Lebanon, #14-5711, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 13589 (6th Cir.).
     A couple claimed that a deputy violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by making a warrantless entry onto their property with the intention of killing their two pet dogs. They also alleged that the deputy and a fellow officer both shot at the dogs even though they were not acting aggressively, killing one and missing the other. The deputies then allegedly moved the body of the dead dog to try to cover-up the fact that she had been shot on the couple's property. If the facts were as alleged by the plaintiffs, the defendant deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity. Mayfield v. Bethards, #15-3074, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 11096 (10th Cir.).
     An officer who shot a driver in the back during a traffic stop was entitled to qualified immunity. Given the plaintiff's intoxication, his resistance to the officer, his disregard for the officer's orders, the threat he and the other three men in his truck posed while unrestrained, and his action in reaching for his waistband (which was obscured from the officer's view), it was not unreasonable for the officer to perceive the plaintiff as threatening his safety and to use deadly force to protect himself. The officer was granted qualified immunity and municipal liability claims failed as a matter of law since the plaintiff failed to show that his rights were violated. Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, #15-20237, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 10854 (5th Cir.).
     A Border Patrol agent did not use excessive force in shooting and killing a man who violently and aggressively resisted him, striking him in the temple hard enough to concuss him, causing him to fear losing consciousness. While the decedent had run 15 feet away at the time he was shot, the defendant could still then reasonably believe that he posed a threat of serious harm to himself or others if his arrest was delayed. Mendez, Sr. v. Poitevent, #15-50790, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 9169 (5th Cir.).
      Officers responding to a call about a suspected drug dealer armed with a shotgun loitering in an apartment complex came upon a man there holding a long gun. When they ordered him to drop it, one officer allegedly used deadly force without providing a warning or sufficient time to comply, and without observing him point the gun at the officers or make any move towards the trigger. If the facts were as alleged, it stated a viable claim for an excessive use of force in shooting and killing the man. Because it was not clearly established at the time that this would be excessive force, however, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity under federal law but state law claims could continue as it was not found that the force used was objectively reasonable as a matter of law.
C. V. v. City of Anaheim, #14-55760, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 9561 (9th Cir.).
     A man left another man's home with cocaine that he had agreed to deliver for him. Police received information from a confidential informant about the drug packaging operation at the home and a description of the deliveryman's car. Two plain clothes officers in an unmarked car stopped the vehicle, exited their own car, and approached with guns drawn. The driver said he sat motionless with his hands on the steering wheel. He contended in his lawsuit that an officer shot him in that position, and he then became unable to control the car, which started to roll towards the officers. They shot 14 times and seven bullets hit him. He pled guilty to aggravated battery of an officer as well as drug charges, but sued for excessive use of force. Upholding summary judgment for the officers, the federal appeals court noted that convicted criminals may not sue for damages if their prevailing would call into question their conviction, unless it has been overturned. In this case, the plaintiff's lawsuit was based on a version of the events that would totally negate the basis for his conviction. Tolliver v. City of Chicago, #15-1924, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 6632 (7th Cir.).
     Officers approached a vehicle whose African-American driver had just finished pumping gas. They believed that the vehicle was the car one of them had followed the day before, which had expired tags not registered to that vehicle. The motorist started to drive away, and one of the officers stepped in front of the car with his gun drawn. The officers then fired a total of seven shots into the vehicle, killing the driver. His estate filed a lawsuit against the city, claiming that the police department had deficient policies and customs linked to the violation of the decedent's rights. A federal appeals court upheld a trial court denial of a motion to dismiss supervisory liability claim, as the complaint alleged facts supporting that the department's director “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers." He was denied qualified immunity. Peatross v. City of Memphis, #15-5288, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 5756, 2016 Fed. App. 0074P (6th Cir.).
     While executing a search warrant on a residence, two officers shot a woman's dog, resulting in its death. A federal appeals court reversed a grant of summary judgment to the officer who first shot the dog. If a jury believed the plaintiff's version of events, it could reasonably conclude that the dog was lying down and only acted aggressively towards the officers after first being shot. As for the second officer who shot the dog, she only did so after the dog bit her hard enough to puncture her leather boots, she did not act unreasonably in believing that the dog then posed an imminent threat. The plaintiff failed to establish, however, that the District of Columbia had notice of a pattern of likely unconstitutional conduct in the shooting of dogs and responded with deliberate indifference. Robinson v. Pezzat, #15-7040, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 5965 (D.C. Cir.).
     During the execution of a warrant to collect certain business records of a gold purchasing business, an officer fatally shot a male employee present on the premises at the time. The city's police chief was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiffs produced no evidence that he was involved in any way in the execution of the warrant or the man's death. The officer was also entitled to qualified immunity as the employee he shot was drawing his own gun at the time. The appeals court stated "that by choosing to conduct the raid with surprise and with guns drawn," the police "created a dangerous situation that led" to the employee's death, particularly as he saw nothing indicating that the man entering his office with a gun drawn was a police officer. On these facts, a reasonable jury could have found that the manner in which the raid was conducted was unreasonable, but the officer was still entitled to qualified immunity as he violated no clearly established law, and reasonably believed himself to be in immediate danger at the time he fired. Cass v. City of Abilene, #14-11134, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 3235 (5th Cir.).
     Two deputies, during a warrantless raid on a house, shot a homeless couple living in a shack in the backyard, including a man holding a BB gun. A federal appeals court upheld a determination that the entry into the shack constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. The shack was in the curtilage adjacent to the home. The entry violated the Fourth Amendment as the deputies could not show consent, exigent circumstances, or a lawful protective sweep. The deputies entry into the shack also violated the knock and announce rule, but the law on that subject in these circumstances was not clearly established in 2010, so the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on that claim, with an award of nominal damages on that claim overturned. Going forward, the court stated, officers must knock and announce their presence when they know or should reasonably know that an area within the curtilage of a home is a separate residence from the main house. While the shooting was not found to be excessive force, an award of damages was upheld under the provocation doctrine. When "an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation, he may be held liable for his otherwise defensive use of deadly force." The appeals court upheld an award of $4 million for the shooting and $1 in nominal damages for the unlawful search. Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, #13-56686, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 3847 2016 WL 805719 (9th Cir.).
      35 armed federal and state agents carried out a search of a water bottling facility as part of an IRS and Small Business Administration investigation of the business and its alleged fraud in connection with an application for a disaster relief loan. A federal appeals court found that neither the number of agents nor their possession of weapons made the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The detention of employees during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable. The detention prevented employees from fleeing if incriminating evidence was found and ensured that they were available to assist in the search, such as by opening locked file cabinets without force. The mere presence of armed officers did not constitute excessive force. Mountain Pure v. Roberts, #15-1656, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 3290 (8th Cir.).
     Three officers shot a man after he raised a gun in their direction. He survived and was charged with assault, but charges were dismissed on speedy trial grounds. He sued for excessive force, claiming that the officers failed to give a warning before firing on him. A jury returned a verdict for the officers. A federal appeals court upheld this result. The plaintiff "was adequately warned to drop a weapon he was wielding at the time of the shooting." Cordova v. City of Albuquerque, #14-2083, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 4309 (10th Cir.).
     A man was shot to death through a window of his home by one of three state police officers investigating an earlier highway road rage incident involving his brother. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the officers. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the issue was whether a jury could find the force used against the decedent excessive under circumstances. There was an officer outside the man's home in the dark of night with no probable cause to arrest anyone and behind the cover of a wall 50 feet away from a possible threat, and with no warning he shot a man pointing his gun out of his well-lighted window at an unknown person in his yard while the man's brother fired protective shots in the air from behind the house. An objectively reasonable officer in this position should know that a homeowner has the right to protect his home against intruders and that the officer had no right to immediately use deadly force in these circumstances, the court reasoned. Pauly v. White, #14-2035, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 2184 (10th Cir.).
     An officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when the decedent's estate offered evidence that it claimed proved that the defendant fatally shot a man in the back while he was compliant, unarmed, lying prone, and non-resisting. If the plaintiff's version of events was true, this would constitute excessive force in violation of clearly established law. Perez v. Suszczynski, #14-13619, 809 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2016).
     Police engaged in a high speed chase of a vehicle onto an Indian reservation. One of the passengers, a member of the Ute tribe, shot and killed himself with a gun after running away from the vehicle while being chased by an officer. As there was no evidence that the decedent had ever submitted to any show of authority or had been seized, there could be no possible liability for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. While an officer did fire at the decedent, he did so only after the man fired first at him. After that, the man put the gun to his head and killed himself. Jones v. Norton, #14-4040, 809 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 2015).
     A 15-year-old boy brandished a realistic replica of a semiautomatic pistol while playing cops and robbers with friends, and was shot by a deputy in the chest. It was disputed whether the boy complied with instructions or turned towards the deputy with the replica in his hands. He later entered a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of brandishing an immitation firearm so as to cause deputies and a third party fear of bodily harm. He served a term of informal probation after which the charges were dismissed. He then sued deputies and the county for excessive use of force and a jury awarded $1.1 million in damages. Attorneys' fees were also awarded. Reversing, an intermediate California appeals court ruled that the federal civil rights excessive force claim was barred by the principles in the U.S. Supreme Court decision Heck v. Humphrey, #93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), since the award would imply that the plea bargain and probation sentence were invalid, and they had not been invalidated or terminated in his favor. Fetters v. County of Los Angeles, #B252287, 2016 Cal. App. Lexis ____.
      An officer shot and killed a man when responding to a reported armed robbery. There was a break between the officer firing his first five shots and the allegedly fatal final two shots. He was not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim because, based on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that the decedent would have appeared incapacitated to an objectively reasonable officer when the final two shots were fired. Mason v. City of Lafayette, #14-30021, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19598 (5th Cir.).
     City police officers assigned to provide security outside a Black Family Reunion, were told that young African American males were throwing guns over a fence to persons already inside. When the officers approached them, they ran away, heading towards downtown. An officer later saw a 16-year-old black male walking with two persons he recognized from the group outside the event. The 16-year-old was holding and trying to conceal his right side and the officer suspected that he had a weapon. he held the youth to the ground, and the youth then brandished a gun and threw it 10-15 feet away. As the youth threw his weapon, the officer rose from a crouched position and fired twice. A video of the incident showed that no more than 5 seconds elapsed between the weapon being thrown and the officer firing his second shot. The youth died, and a federal appeals court, while terming the death a "tragedy," ruled that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity, as his "split-second" decision to fire was not objectively unreasonable. Mullins v. Cyranek, #14-3817, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19485, 2015 Fed. App. 0273P (6th Cir.).
     An officer, following a pursuit of a man's vehicle, shot the driver through the windshield and side window, killing him. The officer's appeal of the trial court's denial of his claim for qualified immunity basically challenged the court's determination that there were genuine disputes over issues of material fact, including whether or not the motorist was attempting to run the officer down with his car, so the appeals court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over his appeal, those disputes not being resolved. Thompson v. Murray, #14-2250, 800 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2015).
    Rather than submit to an officer armed with an arrest warrant, a man drove off in his car, leading officers on a high-speed chase. The pursued man twice called police dispatch, claiming that he had a gun and threatening to shoot the officers. The dispatcher broadcast these threats and the possibility that the motorist might be intoxicated. A tire spike strip was placed beneath a highway overpass in an attempt to stop the pursued vehicle. A state trooper drover to that location, radioing a plan to shoot and disable the car. He later spotted the vehicle and fired six shots. The car engaged the spikes, hit the median, and rolled. The motorist was killed by the trooper's shots. No shots hit the car's engine block, radiator, or hood. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a denial of qualified immunity to the trooper on an excessive force claim. The Court did no address whether firing at the vehicle in this manner under these circumstances was a Fourth Amendment violation, but rather ruled that the trooper was entitled to qualified immunity because prior precedents did not indicate that it was "beyond debate" that he acted unreasonably. He had confronted a fugitive that was reported to be intoxicated, who was trying to evade arrest through a high-speed car flight, and who had twice threatened to shoot officers. At the time of the shooting, the vehicle was moments away from reaching the trooper's location. Mullenix v. Luna, #14-1143, 2015 U.S. Lexis 7160.
     A sheriff's deputy providing back-up during a drug bust of a vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger thought that the vehicle was accelerating and trying to run him down, and he fell to the ground, firing shots at the car as he did so. One of the shots hit the plaintiff passenger, and he sued for excessive use of force. A federal appeals court, reversing the trial court, held that the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity. Firing at the car to try to stop it was not excessive force when he would have reasonably perceived that he was in imminent danger of being run over. Singletary v. Vargas, #14-14424, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 18835 (11th Cir.).
     Police responding to a report of suicidal man armed with a knife came into a residence. The man did not drop the knife in response to commands and stepped forward, but was holding the small kitchen knife loosely near his side. One officer shot him and a second officer fired a Taser in the dart mode at him. The lawsuit alleged that the use of deadly force was excessive and in violation of clearly established law on two theories--the first that the officer shot him without probable cause to believe that he posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officers or any other person, and the second that the officers recklessly created the situation that led to the use of deadly force. The federal appeals court, upholding a denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the officer, found that the evidence would support a finding of a violation of clearly established rights under the first theory, and therefore declined to discuss the second theory. When the man was shot, according to his version of events, he was not charging the officers, had made no aggressive moves, was not within walking distance of the officers, and the plaintiff had not been given sufficient time to comply with an order to drop the knife. The opinion does not discuss whether the use of the Taser was reasonable under these circumstances. Tenorio v. Pitzer, #14-2114, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 17540 (10th Cir.).
     Allegations that two officers shot and severely injured a 17-year-old when he was holding a gun to his own head, and not pointing it at the officers as they claimed, if true, would constitute excessive force. Based on this dispute of material fact, a federal appeals court dismissed the appeal of the denial of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim for lack of jurisdiction. The appeals court also upheld the trial court's refusal to dismiss a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim that after the incident an officer intentionally fabricated evidence to cover up his colleagues' actions and get the teenager falsely charged with aggravated assault on the officers. Cole v. Hunter, #14-10228, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 17011 (5th Cir.).
     An officer who shot a man as he sped away from breaking into his estranged wife's apartment was entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment. It was not clearly established, at the date of the incident, that it was unconstitutional to shoot a fleeing driver to protect persons whom his flight might endanger. In this case, the officer consistently maintained that his actions were motivated by fear for his own life as well as the life of another officer, as the suspect's car lurched forward towards the officers, and the firing officer, holding onto the car door, was briefly turned around by its motion. Mitchell v.Miller, #14-2116, 790 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2015).
     A married couple argued on their wedding anniversary. The husband then went to the garage, drank half of a bottle of vodka, and put a shotgun barrel in his mouth, although he was unable to pull the trigger. The wife called 911 and the deputy who responded shot the man four times. The suicidal man was injured but survived. The deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity, as he kicked in the door within three minutes of arriving, and made no attempt to communicate with the man before entering, so he lacked a reasonable belief that the man posed a threat. Weinmann v. McClone, #14-1794, 787 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2015).
     Two female officers were working off-duty as secondary employment, patrolling an apartment complex. They noticed that the door to a 67-year-old man's apartment was open, and observed him sitting on his couch, leaning on his cane. They attempted to start a conversation with him, and he told them he did not want any attention or help. One of the officers thought the man was being "mouthy," and wanted to keep him from shutting his door. When both officers stepped inside the apartment, the man approached and a fight ensued when one of them allegedly pushed him and he pushed back. The officers allegedly repeatedly struck the man and knocked off his glasses. He repeatedly told them to get out of his residence. One of the officers, who had exited to call for backup, reached inside to pull the other officer out. The man refused to obey an instruction to lie down, and he was allegedly getting his cane. One of the officers then fired two shots into the apartment, killing the man. It was not clear whether the man was holding his cane when he was shot. A federal appeals court held that neither officer was entitled to qualified immunity on unlawful entry claims, and that the officer who fired the shots was not entitled to qualified immunity on on excessive use of lethal force claim, but that both officers were entitled to qualified immunity on claims concerning the use of non-lethal force which caused minimal injury. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it could not be said that the officers had any basis for an unconsented warrantless entry into the apartment, despite the officers' argument that they thought the man might have needed assistance, or that there was any legal basis to shoot and kill the man, A reasonable jury could find that the officer used deadly force against a person who did not pose an immediate threat of serious physical injury or death. The appeals court had to assume, for purposes of its decision, that the decedent was not swinging his cane at the officers when he was shot. Ellison v. Lesher, #13-3371, 788 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2015).
     An officer was not entitled to qualified immunity when she shot and kicked an arrestee. The arrestee's initial crime had only been yelling and cussing at passing cars, and at the time force was used, he was retreating, apparently unarmed, and outside of striking distance when he was shot. The officer allegedly gave no warning before firing and kicked his had after he was already shot, handcuffed, and lying face down on the road. Another deputy allegedly then used a Taser in the dart mode on him multiple times after he had been shot. Several activations of the Taser were allegedly after the plaintiff had been handcuffed. The probes struck the man's chest and back. The deputy who used the Taser stated that he believed, during the later activations of the Taser, that the man was reaching for something in his pocket. The arrestee died at the scene, with the death attributed to blood loss from the gunshot wound. A federal appeals court further ruled that the first deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that she improperly failed to intervene on the second deputy's repeated use of the Taser against the arrestee, even after he was handcuffed. The appeals court rejected, however, claims against the sheriff as a single failure to investigate an incident, which the sheriff was unaware of until after the fact, could not constitute ratification.
Salvato v. Miley, #14-12112, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 10758 (11th Cir.).
     A motorist's van started backfiring and he pulled over. Someone else called 911 and reported the backfiring as supposed shots fired. When two officers arrived and pulled up behind the motorist's van, the van backfired again, and the motorist got out of his vehicle, failing to hear an order to get back in. The driver told the officers that his van was backfiring, and one of them disputed this. The motorist them obeyed orders to walk towards the officers. Subsequently when there was additional backfire, the officers thought they were being shot at and ambushed, or that the driver was attempting "suicide by cop" and they fired at him, possibly grazing him. Their firing at him was justified as they had probable cause to believe that he posed a serious risk of harm to them, based on their belief that they were being fired on. As there were disputed issues of fact, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Ransom v. Grisafe, #14-2204, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 10441 (8th Cir.).
     A warrant was issued for the arrest of an alleged parole violator. A member of a Fugitive Apprehension Unit got a tip abut where the man was, and, in a well-lit parking lot in front of the building where he went to find the suspect, he observed him exiting a vehicle. He informed the man that he had a warrant for his arrest for parole violation. The officer placed his hand on the man's left shoulder, and when the man started to run away, the officer fired two shots, killing him. A jury rejected a federal civil rights claim for excessive force, but awarded $1 million on state law wrongful death clam. A federal appeals court upheld this result, finding that there was sufficient evidence to defeat the officer's motion for judgment as a matter of law, and that the damages award did not require a new trial. The evidence was sufficient to find that he had acted with reckless indifference to the parolee's rights and the damages awarded were not excessive. Estate of Snyder v. Julian, #13-3012, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 10242 (8th Cir.).
     A man's father called police to report that his son, who was bipolar, was acting up, was on drugs (prescription medicine), had threatened to kill himself, and probably had a gun. Deputies were dispatched to the home and entered the disturbed man's bedroom in order to transport him for mental health evaluation. A lawsuit claimed that he was on the bed with a shotgun loosely held on his lap, looking down at it, and did not raise it against the officers, but that one deputy fired two shot from his gun at him, knocking him off the bed, that another deputy deployed a Taser against him while he was on the ground, and that he was also beaten while on the ground. A federal appeals court reversed the dismissal of an excessive force claim against the deputies, as well as cover-up claims against the deputies, who allegedly created a false story about the man's actions with his gun during their entry, stating that he pointed his gun and it discharged, but rejected cover-up claims against the sheriff's office. The trial court had dismissed the claims now upheld on the basis of defective pleading, but those claims were informative enough to permit a court to determine if they were claims on which relief could be granted, if true. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, #13-14396, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 11750 (11th Cir.).
     A woman living in a group home for the mentally ill started to act erratically and threatened to kill her social worker. Two officers were sent to the home to escort her to a facility for temporary evaluation and treatment. When they entered her room, she grabbed a knife, threatening to kill them. They retreated and closed the door, but later reentered, concerned about what was going on within the room, and allegedly without considering if they could accommodate her disability. She again confronted them with the knife, and after pepper spray failed to subdue her, they shot her multiple times. She sued the city for alleged disability discrimination in arresting her without accommodating her disability, and the two officers for allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment rights. A federal appeals court ruled that the Americans with Disabilities Act applied and that the issue of whether the plaintiff's disability should have been accommodated should be decided by a jury. It also held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, since it was clearly established that, in the absence of a need for immediate entry, officers cannot forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill person who has been acting irrationally and threatened everyone who entered.  The U.S. Supreme Court granted review, but dismissed its review of the issue of whether the ADA "requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody" as "improvidently granted." A review of this issue was based on the assumption that the city would argue that the ADA does not apply when officers face an armed and dangerous person. Instead, the city argued that the plaintiff was not "qualified" for an accommodation because she posed a direct threat to others, a threat which could not "be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services." Since the court below had not addressed the issues in that context, review by the U.S. Supreme Court was not proper. The Court also noted that the parties in the case had also failed to address the related question of whether a public entity such as the defendant city could be vicariously liable for damages under Title II of the ADA for an arrest made by its officers. The Court did hold, however, that the two individual defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims. They did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they opened her door the first time, and could, without a doubt, also have opened her door the second time if she had not been disabled. Their use of force in response to her threats with the knife was reasonable. So the only remaining question was whether they violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they opened her door the second time rather than attempting to accommodate her disability. As there was no clearly established law on that issue, they were entitled to qualified immunity. City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, #13-1412, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 2015 U.S. Lexis 3200.
     A deputy shot and killed a man while responding to a report of an assault that was no longer in progress. The decedent's parents sued, claiming that the defendant shot the decedent in the back when he was unarmed. The deputy claimed that the decedent had charging towards him while armed with a weapon at the time the fatal shot was fired. A federal appeals court upheld a denial of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, since there was a factual dispute as to what occurred. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, if the facts were as they alleged, deadly force was used against a suspect who did not pose a threat of serious bodily injury or death, which would be clearly unconstitutional. Capps v. Olson, #14-1782, 780 F.3d 879 (8th Cir. 2015).
     A rape suspect led officer on a highway car chase before crossing the median, accelerating the wrong way, and ramming his vehicle head-on into a semitrailer. Officers fatally shot the suspect after he reached down into the car disobeying commands to show his hands, and then clasped his hands together in a shooting posture, pointing towards the officers, who then fired 80 shots. No weapon was foundf in the suspect's car. A federal appeals court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim. They had probable cause to believe that the decedent had a gun and posed a threat of serious physical harm.. From radio reports, they knew thar he was suspected of a serious crime, wanted to avoid arrest, and might be armed. They were told that he had a concealed-crry permt. The fact that he had no such permit and was actually unarmed did not change the result, as their belief to the contrary was reasonable and they "did not and could not have known" anything to the contrary. Pollard v. City of Columbus, #13-4142, 780 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2015).
       A 16-year-old boy had pulled over into an apartment building parking lot where police officers were waiting to serve an eviction order. When officers attempted to speak to him, he tried to drive off in his car and two officers opened fire on him, hitting him after he clipped an officer with the car's side mirror. Rejecting an excessive force claim, a federal appeals court found that the officers had not violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law as a juvenile court's prior ruling that the plaintiff had committed felony assault determined that moments before the shooting, his driving had posed a "grave risk of causing significant bodily injury to an officer." Fenwick v. Pudimott, #13-5130, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 2264 (D.C. Cir.).
     The city of New York has reached a $3.9 million settlement with the family of an 18-year-old man shot and killed by an officer in his home in 2012. The officer chased the man into his home from the street and contended that he had been involved in a drug deal. A small quantity of marijuana was found in the home. The officer asserted that he believed that the decedent had a gun at the time of the incident, but no such gun was found. The decedent's estate will recieve $2.95 million, his brother will receive $500,000, and his grandmother will receive $450,000. Both the brother and grandmother were in the house at the time of the shooting. His mother, who was not present, will receive an additional $40,000. Estate of Graham v. City of New York, #1:13-cv-02015, U.S. Dist. Ct. (Jan. 30, 2015, S.D.N.Y).
    A police officer responding to a 911 call reporting that males with guns were walking on a street shot and killed a 14-year-old boy he encountered there. The officer claimed that the boy drew a gun and aimed it at officers before he was shot. A federal appeals court upheld the rejection of the officer's motion for qualified immunity on the excessive force claim, finding that there were disputed issues of material fact. The plaintiff claimed that the boy had thrown the gun over a fence before he was shot, and was unarmed and no threat at the time he was killed. Additionally, still shots from a police video appeared to show the boy pinned to the fence, and there was evidence that his weapon had no blood on it while the fence was splattered with blood. The court also mentioned that the boy was shot only once while there was an officer training protocol that called for officers to fire multiple shots when faced with imminent danger. Harris v. Lasseigne, #14-1033, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 1931, 2015 Fed. App. 0020P (6th Cir.).
     Riding home from a bar with his aunt and her boyfriend, a man talked about killing himself. When the car got to his apartment, he jumped out, ran inside, and locked the door. His aunt called 911 to report a possible suicide. Multiple officers arrived, heard the apartment door crash open and observed the suicidal man holding a shotgun in one and with his aunt holding his other arm. The ordered him to drop the gun, and the aunt fell, freeing his other arm. The officers stated that the man chambered a round and aimed the gun at them before they fired, hitting him in the eye, forearm, hands, groin, hip, and shin. A live round was found in the shotgun's chamber and the man was convicted of terrorizing. The aunt claimed that her nephew had been putting the shotgun down when the officers opened fire on him. Reversing a trial court denial of qualified immunity to the officers on an excessive force claim, a federal appeals court reasoned that, while it was possible that the officers were mistaken about the man aiming the gun at them, their mistake was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Partlow v. Stadler, #14-1281, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 24131 (8th Cir.).
     A 22-year-old an was in his apartment at night with two friends when police knocked on the door, yelled "police, search warrant," and started to force open the front door. The man ran upstairs to his bedroom, grabbed an unloaded shotgun and pointed it at the officers as they followed him up the stairs. An officer shot him dead. The man's estate, in a lawsuit claiming that the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, argued that there was no need to conduct it after dark because the officers were only searching for loot of "modest value." It was also argued that the man, when looking out the front window after the knocking, had seen one of the officers holding an automatic rifle, dressed in a dark hoodie, having long hair, earrings, a goatee, and sideburns, and yelled something like "we are getting robbed again" before fleeing upstairs to get the shotgun. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the shooting officer, agreeing that even if he may have exceeded proper constitutional bounds in leading the search, given his undercover appearance, he was still entitled to qualified immunity. There was insufficient evidence to support claims against the county when the plaintiff's lawyer failed to authenticate an expert witness report that could not be admitted into evidence absent a signed affidavit.
Estate of Brown v. Thomas, #14-1867, 771 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2014).
    A federal court jury awarded a total of approximately $97.5 million for the police shooting death of a man who was the former mayor of Cottageville, South Carolina. Damages awarded included $7.5 million in compensatory damages, as well as $90 million in punitive damages--$60 million against the town and $30 million against the officer. The officer who shot the decedent had been hired by the department after being previously fired by a number of other police departments for insubordination, dangerous use of firearms, and other alleged infractions. The officer claimed that the shooting was in self-defense because the decedent threw "wild" punches at him. His attorney argued that the decedent suffered from a bipolar disorder and was enraged during the incident. The plaintiffs contended that the decedent had complained about the officer, who wrote traffic tickets worth over $600,000 from 2008 to 2011, more than any other officer on the force, and that the shooting was retaliatory for the decedent's complaints intended to get rid of the officer because of his aggressive policing. Reeves v. Town of Cottageville, #2:12-cv-02765, U.S. Dist Ct., (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2014). In an earlier decision, the trial judge commented that evidence of the officer's departure from six other law enforcement agencies in seven years was "obviously admissible" against him with respect to the claim that the town and police department negligently hired, retained, and supervised the officer, and a claim for municipal liability for violation of civil rights. This evidence, the court ruled, had a bearing on whether the municipal defendants properly evaluated the officer's credentials befire hiring him. Reeves v. Town of Cottageville, #2:12-cv-02765, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 120619 (D.S.C.).
     A deputy sheriff shot and killed a man in his home, entering without a warrant while responding to a 911 call that the man was sitting in his truck threatening to commit suicide. He had been holding a loaded gun to his head. It was not a Fourth Amendment violation to enter the home, as the deputy had an objectively reasonable belief that the decedent would imminently injure himself. The deputy was entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims, since the decedent was arrmed and moving toward him. The deputy fired believing it necessary to protect himself and others. Claims against the sheriff were also rejected, as was a claim to collect accidental death benefits under a life insirance policy, as there was ample evidence that the death was not accidental. Rice v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co, #13-30639, 770 F.3d 1122 (5th Cir. 2014).
     A detective did not use excessive force in shooting and killing a passenger in a moving vehicle, despite the fact that the decedent had not been the intended target. The officer was trying to stop the car by shooting at the driver who had hit him with the vehicle, and after hearing a fellow officer fire in what he thought was self-defense. The defendant officer's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable, entitling all defendants to summary judgment. The appeals court stated that the “calculus of reasonableness” takes into account the fact that police officers must often “make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” Accordingly, an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment where, although ultimately wrong in his or her assessment of the circumstances, “a dangerous situation evolved quickly to a safe one before the police officer had a chance to realize the change.” Cass v. City of Dayton, #13-4409, 770 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2014).
     Occupants of a home sued two officers and a city for a warrantless entry into the home's yard to investigate a tip that two guns were in an abandoned vehicle on the property, in the course of which one of the officers shot and killed the family dog. A federal appeals court found that the officers had no warrant, no probable cause plus exigent circumstances, and had not offered any other basis that would make their entry lawful. The officers therefore violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights and were not entitled to qualified immunity as their actions, under the undisputed facts, would not have been objectively reasonable. Harris v. O’Hare, #12-4350, 770 F.3d 224 (2nd Cir. 2014).
     Police were told by a confidential informant that a man was a gang member who carried a gun and sold methamphetamine. An officer learned that the man had prior convictions including one for a felony involving a gun. The informant then told the officer where the man was, what his vehicle looked like, that he was then armed and carrying the weapon on his waistband, and that he had said that "he was not going back to prison." Observing that the man's vehicle exhibited a broken tail light, officers executed a traffic stop and surrounded his vehicle in a parking lot. The suspect backed his vehicle into a patrol car, attempting to escape, but stopped. Officers claimed that he ignored orders to get on the ground as he started exiting his vehicle and was reaching for his waistband when they fired 20 shots, killing him. His dead body was tangled in and hanging from his seatbelt, and he had no weapon on him, but a loaded nine-millimeter gun was found on the passenger seat. Commenting on the case, a federal appeals court said "Nobody likes a game of 'he said, she said,' but far worse is the game of 'we said, he's dead.' Sadly, this is too often what we face in police shooting cases like this one." The appeals court reversed the trial court's summary judgment on four of the five officers, finding "curious and material factual discrepancies" between their version of events and contradicting evidence. A reasonable jury could find it more likely than not that the suspect did not reach for his waistband because he did not have a gun on him, and based on the testimony of the only non-police eyewitness, a jury might also find that the suspect was trying to get out of the car but got caught in his seat belt. The appeals court upheld summary judgment for the fifth officer, who stated that he couldn't see whether the man reached for his waistband, but fired his weapon because he perceived an immediate threat when he heard shots fired. Cruz v. City of Anaheim, #12-55481, 765 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014).
     Police officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner when they shot and killed a man, who repeatedly ignored orders to drop a gun he was holding. No evidence contradicted the testimony that many officers present perceived that the decedent posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to them. The appeals court rejected the argument that the trial court erroneously "disregarded" news helicopter video footage of the incident, finding that the video was viewed but was deemed not to be that helpful in determining objective reasonableness from the perspective of an officer on the ground. At most, the video might have supported an inference that the decedent intended to surrender, but the fact remain that he had refused repeated prior demands to drop his gun. Aipperspach v. McInerney, #13-2942, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 17201 (8th Cir.).
     Because of genuine disputed issues of material fact, a Texas state trooper who shot and killed a driver during a high-speed chase was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. At the time the driver was shot from a bridge in his approaching vehicle, the risk posed by his flight was disputed. Based on the evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that he did not pose a substantial and immediate risk, since traffic on the divided highway at the time was light, non-lethal methods of stopping him that had already been prepared were not given a chance to work, and there were no pedestrians, businesses, or residences along the highway there. The fact that the driver had previously threatened to shoot the officers did not establish that he posed an immediate risk at the time that he was shot. Luna v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, #13-10899, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 16785 (5th Cir.).
     The city of Albuquerque, New Mexico has been ordered to pay over $6 million for the death of a schizophrenic man shot and punched by officers in his backyard. The trial judge ruled that the officers were not acting in self-defense when they shot the man in the back at close range while serving an arrest warrant arising out of a carjacking case. Police said that the man tried to punch one of the officers and grabbed his gun during an altercation in the back yard. The trial judge stated that the officers failed to present their arrest warrant during the confrontation and also failed to contact a Crisis Intervention Team officer or the man's family before confronting him. The court found that the two police detectives engaged in an "unnecessary escalation of events," and that their own "aggressive acts" at the home created the "unnecessarily dangerous situation" in which the man was shot to death. Torres v. Albuquerque Police Dept., #D-202-CV-2011-06551, Second Judicial District, County of Bernalillo, New Mexico (June 10, 2014).
     Editor's Note: The U.S. Department of Justice on April 10, 2014 issued a report on its investigation into the alleged use of excessive force, including deadly force by the Albuquerque New Mexico Police Department, making recommendations for remedial measures. On July 24, 2014, the city and the Justice Department issued a three page joint statement of principles in which the city agreed that there was a need for systemic reform in its police department in relation to the use of force.
     Officers did not use excessive force in shooting and killing a 16-year-old motorist at the conclusion of a car chase. The officers initially were responding to an activated burglar alarm at a liquor store before the car chase began, and when one of the officers exited his vehicle, the teenager drove towards him. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would have believed that the motorist posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officer his car was advancing on, justifying the use of deadly force. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as there was no prior case "that clearly establishes the unconstitutionality of using deadly force to end a car chase that threatened the physical safety of the officers and others in the area." McGrath v. Tavares, #12-2277, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 14776 (1st Cir.).
     Officers who used deadly force to kill a man while responding to a domestic violence call were entitled to qualified immunity when the decedent made threats and possessed a firearm at the time of the shooting. The officers were also entitled to official immunity on state law claims since the evidence showed that they acted reasonably to a significant threat of death or physical harm. Smith v. City of Brooklyn Park, #13-1640, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 12594 (8th Cir.).
     A Border Patrol agent shot and killed a 15-year-old Mexican boy who was standing in Mexico across the border from the U.S. Claims against the U.S. government were properly rejected as the federal government had not waived sovereign immunity on claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort Statute did not waive sovereign immunity. The plaintiff failed to show that any of the supervisory personnel sued were personally responsible for the agent's actions. A Fifth Amendment due process claim, however, could continue against the agent, and the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. The boy and his friends, at the time of the shooting, were playing a game in which they ran up the incline of the culvert on their side of the border, touched the barbed-wire fence, and then ran back down the incline. Hernandez. v. United States, #12-50301, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 12307 (5th Cir.).
     Police mistook a Hispanic teenage boy and his friends, who were in his own home, for two white male intruders being sought. They pointed guns at them, entered the home without a warrant, and shot and killed the family's pet dog. An excessive force claim could go forward, as the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, indicated that they fully complied with the officers' orders at all times. An unlawful entry claim could also go forward as the officers did not have probable cause in the absence of any information to suggest that the boys were illegally on the premises, and the lack of an objective basis for applying an emergency aid exception, as well as disputed issues of fact as to whether any violence was imminent. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The shooting of the dog did not amount to a deprivation of a familial relationship.
Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro Police Dep't., #12-15654, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 12395 (9th Cir.).
     An autistic Muslim man was shot and killed by a police officer after allegedly lunging at him with a knife. In a lawsuit by his family, his estate, and thee organizations, it was also claimed that the coroner took custody of his body but did not notify his family until twenty-one days later and the delay prevented his family from burying him in accordance with the religions customs of Islam. A jury awarded $1 million in excessive force damages to the estate, which was struck by the trial judge. $700,000 in state law wrongful death damages was also awarded. A federal appeals court reversed in part, finding that a California state statute disallowing awards for pre-death pain and suffering did not apply to a federal civil rights excessive force claim. The trial court erroneously erred in dismissing certain state law claims as duplicative, as under state law, an award of a multiplier of the attorneys' fees could be awarded, something not available on the federal claims. Substantive due process and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims brought by the decedent's siblings were properly rejected. A negligence claim against the coroner for failure to provide timely notice of the death was reinstated, as there was a mandatory duty under state law to make a reasonable effort to locate the decedent's family. The coroner did not, however, violate equal protection, as he did not act with intent to discriminate on the basis of religion, and he did not deprive the parents of a property right. Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, #11-55820, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 9208 (9th Cir.), and 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 9226 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
     The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that officers did not use excessive force when they shot the driver of a vehicle fleeing from a traffic stop to end a dangerous high-speed car chase. Both the driver and his passenger died. While the Court ruled that this conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if it had, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity when no cases were cited that clearly established the unconstitutionality of using deadly force to end a high-speed car chase. Firing a total of 15 shots during the 10-second span was reasonable when the driver never abandoned his attempt to flee. While ordinarily, a trial court order denying summary judgment is not a final decision and therefore not immediately appealable, a denial based on a qualified immunity claim can be immediately appealed, and therefore the federal appeals court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but erroneously did not grant the officers qualified immunity. Plumhoff v. Rickard, #12-1117, 2014 U.S. Lexis 3816
     A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court ordered further proceedings in an excessive force lawsuit brought by a unarmed man who a police officer fired three shots at, with one of the bullets puncturing his right lung. At the time, the plaintiff was approximately 15 to 20 feet away from the officer on the front porch of his parents' home. The Court found that the appeals court, in upholding summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for the officer, had erred by failing to view the evidence on summary judgment in the light most favorable to the plaintiff on the facts. Instead, the appeals court improperly resolved disputed issues concerning the lighting present, the demeanor of the plaintiff's mother, the plaintiff's positioning during the shooting, and whether he had shouted a direct threat, in favor of the officer, the moving party on the summary judgment motion. Tolan v. Cotton, #13-551, 2014 U.S. Lexis 3112.
     Police went to a man's home after his wife called 911, concerned that he might have taken an overdose of sleeping pills. He had committed no crime and the officers were not there to arrest him. After breaching the barricaded door to his bedroom, an officer shot three times and killed the man when he raised a knife above his head and advanced towards the police. The entire incident was recorded by cameras in two Tasers carried by the officers. Prior to firing guns, a Taser was fired in the dart mode at the man while he was still in his bed but disobeying orders to put the knife down, but one of the two darts missed him, and no electric shock was administered. When the man stood up, a second Taser was fired in the dart mode, but also failed to work, as the man was not incapacitated, and verbally indicated that he would not drop the knife, then raised above his head in a stabbing position. The use of deadly force was justified by the man's actions causing the officers to reasonably fear for their safety. The officer's version of the incident was confirmed by the Taser video evidence. The entry into the bedroom was justified by the wife's consent. The appeals court stated that it was expressing no opinion about the appropriateness of the officer's conduct prior to the shooting. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the use of deadly force and municipal liability claims against the city were also properly dismissed. Harris v. Serpas, #13-30337, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 4643, 2014 WL 960843 (5th Cir.).
     A motorist led police on a high speed chase for approximately 45 minutes before his vehicle could be disabled. When he then exited his truck, in a period of four minutes he attempted to seriously hurt himself, tried to provoke the officers to shoot him, threw rocks at the officers, and ignored orders to stop, moving forward to the officers while threatening them with a rock that was football size held over his head. Under these circumstances, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing him, as it was objectively reasonable for them to fear immediate serious physical harm. The fact that he might have intended to commit "suicide by cop" did not alter the fact that the officers acted reasonably. Lal v. California, #2-15266, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 5890 (9th Cir.).
     A woman suffering from a mental illness and resisting officers' attempts to take her to a mental health facility claimed that the officers violated her rights by entering her residence without a warrant and shooting her five or six times when she threatened them with a knife. The officers were justified in the initial entry into the home under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement because they had an objectively reasonable belief that she was in need of assistance. There were, however, triable issues of fact as to whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment in forcing a second entry and thereby allegedly provoking a near fatal confrontation, leading to an unnecessary use of deadly force that could have been avoided. The appeals court also held that federal disability discrimination statutes apply to arrests, and that there was a triable issue as to whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate her disability when they forced their way into her room, arguably failing to take her mental illness into account or to utilize generally accepted law enforcement practices for peacefully resolving such a confrontation with a mentally ill person.  Sheehan v. City and County of San Francisco, #11-16401, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 3321 (9th Cir.).
     A man sought under a warrant engaged in a six-hour stalemate at his house with officers seeking to arrest him. He was armed with a semi-automatic handgun. When he walked into his yard carrying water and a cup, an emergency response team activated a flash bang device to distract him and to try to prevent him from again retreating inside the house. The officers said that he turned and tried to draw his gun and they then shot him multiple times. He claimed that he did not reach for his gun until after the device went off and shots were already fired. He later pled guilty to resisting the officers with a deadly weapon. A federal appeals court held that his excessive force claim was barred because his version of events would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. Under the facts needed to support the conviction, the officers acted reasonably, and the conviction had not been set aside. Helman v. Duhaime, #12-3428, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 2302 (7th Cir.).
     A woman called 911 to report that her sometime boyfriend, highly intoxicated and suicidal had just left her home despite a protective order that barred him from coming near her. Police observed his vehicles and gave chase. When he stopped, officers approached with guns drawn and ordered him to turn off the car and show his hands. Instead, he put his car in reverse, rammed a police vehicle, moving it 30 feet. Officers opened fire, severely wounding him, and removed him from the car. After pleading guilty to DUI, fleeing or evading police, and wanton endangerment, he sued for excessive force. A federal appeals court ruled that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity under these circumstances. Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep't., 13-5341, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 24930, 2013 Fed App. 0349P (6th Cir.).
     The daughter of a man shot and killed by police while responding to a domestic disturbance call did not have standing to bring federal civil rights claims when she failed to allege that she was the personal representative of his estate or his successor in interest. The court also upheld the rejection of a substantive due process claim, as there was absolutely no evidence that the officers fired for any reason except self defense when the man was armed with a knife. Further proceedings, though, were ordered on California wrongful death claims because reasonable jurors could find that the use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable and whether he posed a threat to the officers was a disputed issue.
Hayes v. County of San Diego, #09-55644, 736 F.3d 1223, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 23939 (9th Cr.).
     A man went outside his mobile home at night in a rural area carrying a shotgun after hearing sounds of unknown persons outside. As he opened his front door, he was shot by police. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claims, as a reasonable officer would not have probable cause to feel threatened under the circumstances, and the right to not have deadly force inflicted when a person poses no threat was clearly established. Cooper v. Sheehan, #13-1071, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 22616 (4th Cir.).
      Officers who shot and killed a man were sued for excessive force and deliberate indifference to a known serious medical need, the need for treatment of his wounds. The jury found in favor of the officers after being instructed that the plaintiffs had to prove that deliberate indifference caused the man's death. A federal appeals court upheld the trial judge's grant of a new trial on the medical indifference claim. In such a delay of treatment case, it is not necessary to show that the delay in providing medical care caused the death when a layperson would find it obvious that a delay in treatment created a risk of serious harm. The defendants failed to show that a substantial ground for a difference of opinion existed on the correctness of the trial decision. Miedzianowski v. City of Clare, #13-101, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 17375, 2013 Fed App. 243P (6th Cir.).
    Sheriff's deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity for fatally shooting a 64-year-old homeowner on the patio of his residence while responding to a domestic disturbance call. While he was armed with a gun at the time, the plaintiff, claimed that the decedent had not objectively provoked the officers, was walking with the use of his walker at the time, and had his gun trained on the ground. If a jury believed the plaintiff's version of the incident, it could find that the use of deadly force was unreasonable and that the decedent had not posed an immediate threat to the officer's safety. George v. Morris, #11-55956, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 15579 (9th Cir.).
     Officers arrived at a man's home after his mother called 911 to report that he was having a psychotic episode and had attacked a family member. The officers were told that he might have a knife or a screwdriver. He was uncooperative with orders to lie down. A struggle ensued, during which officers claimed that he reached under a pillow and pulled out a knife that he swung at an officer. An officer fired six shots from his gun, hitting him several times. In a lawsuit, the man denied attacking officers with a knife. A federal appeals court found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on disability discrimination claims as there was no clearly established law that the officers had a duty to accommodate the arrestee's disability of schizophrenia while trying to secure him and take him into custody. The officer who fired the shots, however, was not entitled to qualified immunity, as there was a disputed issue of fact as to whether the arrestee at that time posed an objectively reasonable threat of violence towards the officers. The court rejected a failure to train claim against the city.  Roberts v. City of Omaha, #12-3426, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 15624 (8th Cir.).
     Officers stopped a man who fit the description of a suspect in a domestic tire-slashing incident. Before he could be patted down, he removed his hands from the hood of a car, ignoring police orders, and started running away. Multiple times, officers fired Tasers in the dart mode, and one also shot him with a gun when the Taser did not seem to stop him. The officer who shot the plaintiff claimed that he was brandishing a knife, but the plaintiff claimed he was only holding a cell phone and attempting to record the incident. There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the use of deadly force was justified. The initial use of the Tasers during the pursuit, however, was objectively reasonable, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff was brandishing a knife, as the officers were aware that he had a knife, he was argumentative, he fled, and he disobeyed orders to stop. The court did find that if some of the deployments of the Taser occurred after the plaintiff had been subdued (after being shot twice), summary judgment was not appropriate on those excessive force claims. Arnold v. Buck, #3:11-cv-1343, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 108629 (D. Ct.).
     When officers believed that a motorist detained for a traffic stop was committing and attempting to conceal a drug offense, and the situation quickly escalated, with the driver disobeying orders, including as to where in his vehicle he reached, the use of force, including deadly force to shoot and kill the motorist was not excessive, but rather objectively reasonable. At the time of the shooting, the motorist was driving on with an officer who entered the vehicle to grapple with him still in the passenger seat. Due process claims were rejected as there was nothing in the officers' conduct indicating that they had an ulterior motive for their use of force. Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim, #11-56360, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 9607 (9th Cir.).
    Federal agents and deputy sheriffs carried out an inspection at a border checkpoint. A father and a number of others were detained when his son fled the checkpoint in a vehicle. Three months after this incident, the father and a passenger in that vehicle were stopped while driving in a national park on the basis of a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) report that had issued on the father's vehicle after the prior incident. Unlawful search and seizure claims were rejected because the rangers who stopped the vehicle had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle might contain a fleeing felon or weapons. The appeals court denied, however, federal agents' motion to thrown out a false imprisonment claim under an exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims arising from the detention of goods. No goods were then being detained after the son fled the checkpoint in the vehicle. The court also rejected excessive force claims against the rangers based on them drawing their weapons and handcuffing the father and his passenger during their traffic stop since they had reason to believe that those in the car might be dangerous. Davila v. United States, #12-50044, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 6749 (5th Cir.).
      A police officer shot and killed a female motorist at the conclusion of a high-speed chase of a stolen vehicle, firing twelve rounds into the car which had stopped after ramming a police car several times. The woman had yelled "Fuck you!" in response to orders to turn off her car. The woman's children sued the officer for violation of their due process rights. The officer's motion for qualified immunity was denied, with the trial judge concluding that the jury could, based on the alleged facts, conclude that the officer had used deadly force with a purpose to harm the woman unrelated to any legitimate law enforcement objective. The jury awarded $30,000 in damages to both of the decedent's minor children. A federal appeals court upheld the pretrial denial of qualified immunity and the jury's verdict, finding it reasonable. Further proceedings were ordered, however, on an award of attorneys' fees and costs, with the appeals court finding that the trial judge should consider the amounts discussed in settlement negotiations when determining the reasonable amount of fees to award, based on an intervening change in the law reflected in In re Kekauoha-Alisa, #09-60019, 674 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2012); and Ingram v. Oroudjian, #09-57022, 647 F.3d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 2011), cases decided after the fee award, but before the appeals court's decision. A.D. v. State of California Highway Patrol, #09-16460, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 6689 (9th Cir.).
     A police officer shot and killed a motorist behind the driver's wheel of his car. The officer claimed that when he fired, the motorist was accelerating the car directly towards him, which the plaintiff, a passenger in the vehicle, suing him for excessive force, disputed. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity as he had not shown that the plaintiff's version of events was so blatantly contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury could believe it. An accident reconstruction report and ballistic expert's findings did not disprove the plaintiff's version and could be interpreted as confirming either version, since they did not establish when, during the car's motion sequence, the officer fired. Campos v. Van Ness, #12-1109, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 6528 (1st Cir.).
     A federal court jury awarded a total of $6.5 million to the family of a man shot twelve times and killed by officers who mistakenly believed that a water hose nozzle he was holding and possibly pointing at them was a handgun. The jury found both that the officers violated the decedent's civil rights and that they were negligent under California state law. The plaintiffs argued that the officers never gave any verbal warnings and that one officer fired by mistake, causing a second officer to also shoot, believing that he was under fire. Officers came to the area in response to reports of a man with a gun. R.S. v. City of Long Beach, #SACV11-00536, U.S.Dist. Ct. (C.D. Cal., April 4, 2013).
     An officer went to a hotel room in response to a call that someone was trying to break in. When the officer arrived, a woman walked out of the room, and he entered. Inside, he encountered a man in the bathroom, talking to a woman who was the mother of his child. Neither of them were armed or involved in any crime. The officer pushed the bathroom door open, knocked the man to the floor, used his Taser on him, knocking him to the ground a second time and then shot him several times, killing him. He then planted a handgun taken from his patrol car on the deceased. There was no evidence of gun powder on the dead man's hands and no fingerprint evidence showing that he had handled the gun. The dead man's mother did not sue the officer, but sued the sheriff in his official capacity, claiming that the officer's actions were based on an unofficial policy of falsely accusing unarmed people of posing a threat to justify using deadly force against them, planting guns at the scene of a shooting, and giving false statements to justify the use of deadly force. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendant. The evidence showed no indication of any policy or custom that was the moving force behind the officer's actions. The court's opinion did not discuss whether the use of the Taser had been justified, or in what mode, dart or stun, the Taser had been deployed. Gandy v. Reid, # 11-14828, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 2209 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     An officer who shot a man seven times while he was sitting in his car in a park paralyzing him was not entitled to qualified immunity. If the facts were as the plaintiff described them, no reasonable officer would have used deadly force against the motorist. The officer claimed that the motorist was accelerating his car, threatening the life of another nearby officer. According to the motorist, he never accelerated his car, but was nevertheless shot after he put his car in park. Morton v. Kirkwood, #12-11436, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 2754 (11th Cir.).
     A 13-year-old boy and his friends were playing cops and robbers in a park at night, using toy guns. Two officers on patrol came through the park, and saw the boy standing behind a parked car. One of them ordered the boy not to move and then shot him when he stepped out from behind the van. The bullet resulted in the boy being hit in the chest and paralyzed. A jury awarded a total of $24 million on claims for negligence and excessive force. The award was reduced to $19.2 million. The jury found the officer 80 percent negligent, the boy's mother 15 percent negligent, possibly for buying the realistic looking toy gun, and the boy 5 percent negligent. The officer claimed to have seen the boy holding the toy gun, which he assumed was real, and said that he had feared for his life. Eriza v. Abarca, #BC-453870, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles, CA (Dec. 14, 2012).
    A federal appeals court upheld a jury verdict in favor of a city and its officers in a lawsuit over the shooting and killing of a suicidal cocaine intoxicated man armed with a powerful gun with a long range. Negotiations by an emergency response team sent to his apartment failed to persuade him to drop his weapon or come out, and the use of tear gas had been justified to try and subdue him because it was believed that he posed an imminent threat to others in the area. Given that the room was dark and filled with tear gas, and that the officers' accounts differed as to how far his arm was extended when an officer shot and killed him, the fact that he had not previously verbally threatened others during the standoff did not establish that he had not pointed his gun at officers as they entered. Estate of Escobedo v. Martin, #11-2426, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 25443 (7th Cir.).
     A police officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a drunk, out-of-control man who he had been informed was armed with a gun. He had taken cover upon arriving on the scene, and observed the man climbing out of his truck and engaging in a "nose-to-nose" argument with his brother-in-law. Under these circumstances, the officer could reasonably believe that he needed to pull his gun, and did so, ordering the man to get on the ground. When, instead of complying, the man advanced on the officer, it was reasonable to fire eight times at him. The officer did not know that the advancing man had thrown away his gun in the snow or that the object on his hip was a cell phone rather than a holster. Loch v. City of Litchfield, #11-3618, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 18099 (8th Cir.).
     A police officer was not liable for shooting and killing an intoxicated man while responding to a domestic disturbance call. The decedent had been armed with a knife, attempted to conceal it, and, before the shooting, raised his leg as if getting ready to move towards the officer. Under these circumstances, the officer could reasonably believe that the man posed a threat of substantial and imminent bodily harm, and he failed to comply with orders to drop the knife. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Estate of Morgan v. Cook, #11–3376, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 14021 (8th Cir.).
     An African-American motorist fleeing from police stopped his car, and then started moving backwards in a circular path. An officer, believing that he might be run over, fired four or five shots, killing the driver. The decedent's mother sued the municipality, claiming that it exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of black people. A federal appeals court rejected this claim, finding no evidence that a "policymaking official was aware of constitutional injury, or the risk of constitutional injury, but failed to take appropriate action." It noted that "isolated acts of excessive force by non-policymaking municipal employees are generally not sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom, policy, or usage that would justify municipal liability." Jones v. Town of East Haven, #10–4731, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 15928 (2nd Cir.).
     Police responded to 911 calls indicating that a man had threatened to kill his ex-girlfriend's parents. They believed that he might be armed with a gun. In a heavily wooded area, he ignored orders to show his hands, allegedly yelled that he had a gun, and had been drinking and acting in a mentally disturbed manner. An officer's attempt to use a Taser on him failed because of a heavy coat he had on. He brandished a silver object which turned out to be a phone. An officer who believed it might have been a gun shot and killed him. Under these circumstances, the use of deadly force was justified, despite the fact that, with hindsight, it turned out that he was unarmed. Simmonds v. Genesee County, #10-1470, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 12347 (6th Cir.).
     A man and a woman running away from police officers leave a stolen car and go into a pickup truck. The man drove the pickup into a police vehicle, with officers standing behind it. He then put the truck in reverse and backed up at a high rate of speed, moving towards an officer who shot and killed him. In an excessive force lawsuit by the decedent's parents, a federal appeals court ruled that the claim was barred under the principles in Heck v. Humphrey, #93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), as a judgment against the officers on the claim would tend to undermine the validity of the conviction of the decedent's female accomplice for assault of an officer with a deadly weapon during the incident. The jury that convicted the accomplice had already determined that the officer's use of force was not excessive. Beets v. County of Los Angeles, #10-55036, 669 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2012).
     An off-duty police officer driving home was upset by a van's driver tailgating his vehicle. Exiting his car, he pulled out his weapon and shot the van's driver a total of nineteen times, hitting him with eight shots and killing him. The officer claimed that the motorist had threatened him with a weapon, but none was found. The officer later committed suicide. A jury found that the officer had used unreasonable force under color of law and awarded $1.85 million in damages. It also found, however, that the officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when he fired his weapon, with the result that the judgment could only be collected from the officer's small estate rather than from the city. A statute required the city to pay judgments against officers for actions taken within the scope of their employment and off-duty officers were required to take action against lawbreakers. A federal appeals court held that a "police officer can grossly exceed his authority to use force and still be found to have acted within the scope of his employment." It ordered further proceedings on the issue of whether the officer was acting within the scope of his employment in this case, finding that the jury had not been properly instructed on the issue. The jury may also have been confused by the admission into evidence of the homicide and perjury charges lodged against the officer prior to his suicide death. Javier v. City of Milwaukee, #10-3816, 670 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2012).
     Officers stopped a vehicle driving down a street late at night without its headlights on. Inside the car, two friends were high on crack cocaine. They exited the vehicle and were ordered to kneel down. One complied, but the other hopped back in the car and drove off. An officer managed to place himself in the open doorway of the car, as the driver attempted to make a U-turn in his direction. The officer continued to run alongside the vehicle as it moved forward, repeatedly warning the suspect to stop the car. The vehicle's door and frame struck the officer's body. After multiple warnings, the officer fired two shots, killing the driver. A federal appeals court found that the use of deadly force by the officer was reasonable under these circumstances. The driver was using his vehicle in a manner endangering the safety of the officer. Terrell v. Smith, #10–14908, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 1689 (5th Cir.).
     Police responded to a 911 call concerning a schizophrenic, bipolar, and suicidal man who had stopped taking his medication and was threatening to harm his mother. The officers weren't liable for shooting and killing him when he came towards them armed with knives as they entered his locked and barricaded bedroom. They acted in reasonable self-defense, and they were entitled to qualified immunity on their warrantless entry into the bedroom based on their belief that there were exigent circumstances justifying their entry because the man constituted a threat to himself. Rockwell v. Brown, #10–11053, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 24980 (5th Cir.).
     Police responded to a 911 call concerning an intoxicated man threatening to kill himself with a pocket knife. He ignored their orders to drop the knife, instead holding it to his throat. The officers used a beanbag shot gun to subdue and disarm him. When he stepped away, and moved towards his parents' house, they shot and killed him. A federal appeals court ruled that the use of the beanbag shotgun may have been excessive, noting that the officers had the option of using the less extreme force of a Taser, but did not do so. The court stated that it was not aware of any published cases holding it reasonable to use a significant amount of force to try to stop someone from attempting suicide." The subsequent gunfire may also have been excessive. Summary judgment for the defendants was reversed, and further proceedings were ordered on the excessive force claims. Glenn v. Washington County, #10-35636, 661 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 2011).
     A woman called 911 to report that her 72-year-old grandfather was acting peculiarly and might be having a stroke. When officers arrived to check on him, he allegedly threatened to get a gun and shoot them, after which he emerged from his residence with a shotgun in his possession. A federal appeals court ruled that no purely legal issue was present in an officer's appeal of a decision refusing to grant him qualified immunity for shooting and killing the grandfather. Disputed issue of fact first had to be resolved as to whether or not the decedent had actually pointed his weapon at the officers or others. Sabo v. City of Mentor, #10-4358, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 18822 (6th Cir.).
     A police officer who claimed that she intended to use her Taser on a handcuffed detainee, but instead shot him in the chest with a semiautomatic pistol, was not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit over his death. At the time of the shooting, the detainee was kicking a police vehicle's rear door from the inside. The appeals court noted that the officer had had prior difficulty in drawing the correct weapon. A "jury might question," the court stated, "the reasonableness of choosing to send 1,200 volts of electricity through a person when the alleged concern is for that person's safety." A jury could also possibly find the officer's mistake reasonable, but the trial court should not have reached that conclusion on summary judgment. Torres v. City of Madera, #09-16573, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 17459 (9th Cir.)
     An officer who fatally shot a man running away who was only suspected of a misdemeanor failure to pay child support was not entitled to summary judgment. Even though the officer claimed he intended to use his Taser rather than his gun, a jury could view the shooting as objectively unreasonable. The decedent posed no threat of death or serious bodily injury to anyone. As for the officer's alleged confusion between his gun and his Taser, the appeals court noted that the Taser was holstered approximately a foot lower than his gun was, had no thumb safety, unlike his gun, and only weighed half as much as his gun. Because of these facts, the officer should have realized he was holding and shooting his gun. Henry v. Purnell, #08-7433, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 14391 (4th Cir. en banc).
     A police detective was not liable for fatally shooting an arrestee struggling with him who was wrapping his arms around his neck and threatening him, at a time when the officer was having trouble breathing. English v. District of Columbia, #09–7150, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 13383 (D.C. Cir.).
     SWAT officers were not liable for the death of a 19-month-old girl whom they accidentally shot while trying to rescue her from her cocaine using father, who was holding her hostage. They had justification for the use of deadly force against the father, who had threatened to kill the child, himself, and anyone who entered his auto shop, and was armed. The officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner after the father shot at them while holding the child. Lopez v. City of Los Angeles, #B219499, 2011 Cal. App. Lexis 729 (Cal. App.).
     A jury properly found that SWAT officers executing a search warrant for narcotics did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they performed a no-knock entry into a house, shot a woman twice as she spun towards an officer while holding a revolver, and shot her fatally a third time when she moved her hand back toward the gun. Noel v. Artson, #09-1562, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 11110 (4th Cir.).
     A highway patrol officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a female motorist who had, shortly before, led officers on a high-speed chase, and who appeared to him to be trying to use her car as a weapon against other officers. No prior case law would have put him on notice that using deadly force under these circumstances would shock the conscience, Casey v. Markgraf (In re A.D.), #09-16460, 636 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 2011).
     In a lawsuit over a deputy's shooting and killing of an unarmed motorist following a high-speed pursuit, the trial court acted erroneously in denying a number of defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs' inadequate training claims. Other than "bare assertions" by the plaintiffs, there was "not a scintilla" of proof that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference and thereby created a training program so deficient that it caused the motorist's death. Harvey v. Campbell County, #09-5041, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 9656 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     A motorist stopped for speeding by officers presented identification and claimed to be a CIA agent. Officers learned that he had a concealed handgun license. Asked to step out of his vehicle, the motorist instead fled, leading officers on a 15-minute car chase. When the motorist stopped, he appeared to be coming out of his vehicle swinging his hands, one of which was grasping an object, around towards an officer. An officer fired through the car, hitting the motorist in the back, causing injuries that killed him. While the motorist did not have a weapon on him, he had three guns in the car, one of which was within reach of the driver's seat. Officers had a reasonable basis to believe that he was about to bring a firearm to bear on them, so the use of deadly force was reasonable. Carnaby v. City of Houston, #09-20825, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5846 (5th Cir.).
     A deputy who fired 12 shots at a truck he claimed was coming towards him and his partner, killing the driver, was not entitled to qualified immunity in an excessive force and unreasonable seizure lawsuit brought by a passenger in the vehicle who was not shot. The plaintiff claimed that the driver was not moving his truck towards the officers, but towards the only exit available to him, eight feet from any officer. She claimed that the deputy continued firing shots after the truck went by him. The appeals court noted that by shooting the driver, the deputy intended to stop the car, effectively seizing everyone in the vehicle, including the passenger, who was injured when the car crashed. Further proceedings were ordered on her claims. Rodriguez v. Passinault, #09-1949, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 6206 (6th Cir.).
     A man convicted of kidnapping an officer, but acquitted of possessing a gun during that same incident, sued the officer for excessive use of deadly force. Holding that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, a federal appeals court held that if the officer, as alleged, shot the plaintiff twice, and then shot him six more times while he was on the ground and unarmed, there was no necessity for the use of deadly force after the initial shooting. Brockington v. Boykins, #09-2308, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5728 (4th Cir.).
     In a case where officers shot and killed a man armed with a knife while responding to a domestic disturbance call concerning his prior suicide attempt, factual disputes over whether or not a warning before firing had been feasible required a jury determination of whether or not the officers acted reasonably. Hayes v. County of San Diego, #09-55644, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5723 (9th Cir.).
     A California Highway Patrol officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a female motorist at the conclusion of a high-speed pursuit of an allegedly stolen vehicle. The motorist refused to surrender, yelled obscenities at the officer, and put the car into reverse to ram the police car several times. The officer feared that the motorist would run over other officers present at the scene. While the jury, in awarding damages to the woman's minor children, decided that the officer had acted with a purpose to cause the motorist harm unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement purpose, the federal appeals court found that "the question is not whether an objectively reasonable officer would believe it was constitutional to harm without a legitimate law enforcement objective, but whether such an officer would believe, in the circumstances" faced, that "a legitimate law enforcement objective existed." No prior case law "would have alerted him that his split-second decision in dealing with someone who had just led police on a dangerous high-speed chase and who was using her car as a weapon shocked the conscience." A. D. v. State of California Highway Patrol, #09-17635, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 6906 (9th Cir.).
     Officers shot and killed a suspected car thief during a standoff. Immediately before the shooting, he had been standing with his right hand concealed in his waistband, and he appeared to be concealing an object. When asked to surrender, he allegedly suddenly pulled his hand out of his waistband as though he were drawing a gun. The officers responded by firing 39 shots over 10 seconds, killing him. The object he was holding was a crack pipe. A federal appeals court upheld in part, but also reversed in part summary judgment for the defendant officers. It held that the decedent's abrupt threatening movement justified the initial use of deadly force, but that a jury should have been allowed to decide whether the use of such force became unreasonable before the time that the officers ceased firing when his hand became visible and they could arguably see that the object he was holding was not a gun. Lamont v. New Jersey, #09-1845, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 4104 (3rd Cir.).
     A woman sued the California Highway Patrol and a number of its officers for shooting and killing her husband, claiming excessive use of force. The lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute because her attorney failed to meet court deadlines or attend hearings. A federal appeals court rule that the lawyer's "gross negligence" was an "extraordinary circumstance" not attributable to the plaintiff, so that she should be granted relief from the dismissal and have her claim reinstated. When she learned of her attorney's conduct, she hired a new attorney and filed a motion to set aside the dismissal. The court found that the attorney had virtually abandoned his client and also attempted to mislead her about the status of the case. Lal v. State of Calif., #08-15645, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
     During a shootout between an officer and a suspect, the officer accidentally shot a female innocent bystander who died. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the officer and the city in a federal civil rights lawsuit brought by the woman's estate. The officer was returning fire at a suspect who was armed with a shotgun and who had previously threatened another man with that gun. The officer had no intention of harming the decedent, and did not even know that she was in the line of fire. Bystanders are not "seized," for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim "when struck by an errant bullet in a shootout." Simpson v. City of Fort Smith, Arkansas; #09-2617, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16666 (Unpub. 8th Cir.).
     Officers shot and killed a suicidal man who lunged at them with a knife, after having stabbed himself, and who had not been subdued by the prior use of a Taser. The Ohio Supreme Court held that, in a federal civil rights and state excessive force case, the trial judge's denial of qualified immunity to officers on the federal claims, and denial of summary judgment to the city on failure to train claims were final appealable orders under state law. An intermediate state appeals court therefore erred in dismissing the defendants' appeal of those denials. Summerville v. City of Forest Park, #2009-2106, 2010 Ohio Lexis 3294.
     A police officer was justified in using deadly force and repeatedly shooting an armed suspect who was lying in wait following a car chase and foot pursuit after fleeing from the scene of an armed burglary. The officer reasonably perceived the situation as an ambush, a situation justifying the use of deadly force for his own safety. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, #10-11129, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 24870 (11th Cir.).
     A woman posed a significant threat to officers and others who might be hit by the police car which she put in rear gear while handcuffed with her hands behind her back after being arrested on a drug charge and placed in the front passenger seat of the vehicle, which had the engine running. An officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting her. She admittedly was in a moving vehicle that she could not control, and even if the officer would have been able to side-step the car by the time he fired, as the plaintiff's experts argued, his action, as an attempt to stop the car, was still justified by the threat to others present. Olseth v. Larson, #10-4015, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20305 (Unpub. 10th Cr.).
     A woman's disturbed son, who had murdered his wife years ago, stopped taking his medication, obtained a gun, and threatened to kidnap certain family members. Officers seeking to have him committed went to his apartment, and his mother tried to get him to come out, but instead he started shooting. The plan of extraction developed by a police investigator had involved the mother knocking on the front door while officers remained in front of the house, but out of sight of the son. Both the mother and her son were shot and killed during the ensuing gun battle. The decedents' estates and family members sued, claiming that the officers were responsible for the deaths under a "state-created danger" theory of liability. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the state-created danger theory was not clearly established in the 5th Circuit at the time of the incident. Judgment was also entered for the city, as the plaintiffs did not successfully create an issue of fact as to whether the city's review of the officers' conduct violated department rules in a manner that rose to the level of "ratification" so that the city would be liable for the officers' conduct. Saenz v. City of McAllen, #09-41072, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20464 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     An arrestee fled on foot when a deputy attempted to arrest him with a warrant. The deputy gave chase, and mistakenly drew his gun when he actually intended to draw his Taser to apprehend the fleeing suspect. He shot the arrestee in the elbow. The arrestee filed an excessive force lawsuit, but the trial court held that the deputy's mistake in drawing his firearm rather than his Taser under these circumstances was a reasonable one, so that he was entitled to summary judgment. The appeals court held that the trial court erred in its analysis by focusing solely on the adequacy of the deputy's weapons training instead of looking at the totality of the circumstances the deputy faced. The appeals court ruled that the deputy could not have been on notice that confusing his firearm for his Taser was clearly established as an excessive use of force because there was no prior caselaw to provide him fair warning on the issue. Summary judgment was overturned, however, on state law claims. Henry v. Purnell, #08-7433, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 19823 (4th Cir.).
     A man who encountered deputies while armed and investigating a possible trespass on his land claimed that they used excessive force in disarming him. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the deputies. There were genuine issues of fact as to whether they identified themselves to him, what position his gun was in at the time, and whether one deputy should have intervened to prevent the other deputy's use of force. While the deputies claimed that they identified themselves and repeatedly warned him, a radio transmission from the scene of the incident did not record them speaking before they fired their guns. Additionally, the deputies provided inconsistent statements about the position of the man's gun during the incident, as well as admitting that the plaintiff, a white male, did not match the description of the suspects they were searching for, who were Hispanic, and that they thought it likely that the plaintiff was the owner of the property they were on. Given all this, a reasonable jury could find that the deputies violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights through their use of force. Swofford v. Eslinger, #09-16162, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 18281 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     An arrestee claimed that officers illegally entered his home and then used excessive force in attempting to arrest him, including a restrained police dog and the brief display of a shotgun when he emerged suddenly from a bathroom. A federal appeals court found that a female resident of the home consented to their entry. The decision to enter the premises with a restrained police dog and to briefly display the shotgun was not excessive given the arrestee's prior flight from officers, and his involvement in a crime of aggression, child molestation, which he was subsequently convicted of. Harris v. Smith, #09-1130, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 15599 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
    An officer started following a group of young men on bicycles. Two of the bicyclists then jumped a curb and rode away and the officer activated his lights and followed them onto the grassy area of a school's grounds. He allegedly saw one bicyclist pass a gun to the other. The officer continued chasing the youth with the gun, and the chase ended when the officer shot and killed him, believing that his own life was in danger. A jury returned a verdict for the officer in an excessive force lawsuit. The appeals court found that expert witness testimony that the youth did not have a gun in his hand in seven images from the school's surveillance cameras was properly excluded at trial. This opinion would have not aided the jury, but instead told it what result to reach. Evidence that youth was a gang member should have been excluded, but its admission was harmless. Lee v. Andersen, #09-2771, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16702 (8th Cir.).
     Officers in SWAT gear, with the word "POLICE" displayed on the officers' chests, entered a home to serve a search warrant. An occupant ran towards his bedroom. When the officers knocked down the door, and entered the bedroom, yelling "Police," the man raised and pointed a gun at them, and they shot and killed him. An unreasonable search and seizure claim against the city failed, as the plaintiff could not establish that the city had a custom or policy of entering homes to execute search warrants without first knocking and announcing police presence. Ample testimony established that standard police procedure was to knock and announce, and the plaintiff's ability to point to a small handful of cases in which officers did not do so was insufficient to show an unconstitutional policy or custom. Whittier v. City of Sunrise, #10-10032, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 19140 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     Officers did not use excessive force in shooting a suspect after he fled the scene of a violent crime, a burglary involving a gun. Either the suspect or his accomplice shot at the deputies at close range when they responded to a call reporting the burglary. Both burglars fled the scene of the crime. A federal appeals court upheld the trial court's determination that no Fourth Amendment seizure of the plaintiff occurred, as the officers did not gain "intentional acquisition of physical control," as he continued to flee, so that their actions did not cause the officers to terminate his movement. The mere show of authority alone, or use of physical force, without termination of movement, or a suspect's submission, is not a seizure, even if the plaintiff was struck by a bullet. The suspect was only apprehended three days later. Brooks v. Gaenzle, #09-1489, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 16488 (10th Cir.).
     Officers responded to a 911 call for assistance, going to the home of a couple whose depressed son had locked himself inside, refusing to allow them to enter. Officers spoke to the son, trying to get him to come out, but he refused to either do so or let them in. Officers decided to forcibly enter the home, although the son was not a suspect in any criminal investigation and he had not threatened either the officers or himself. The son allegedly had a hammer and charged at officers when they entered, and he was shot and killed. His parents sued the city, claiming that the officers used excessive force in entering the home and shooting their son, and that the city had failed to properly train the officers. A federal appeals court ruled that, while the decision to enter the home may have been the "moving force" behind the shooting, the decision was not made by a final policymaker for the city, so there could be no municipal liability. The plaintiffs also failed to show that inadequate training caused their son's death. Valle v. Houston, #09-20624, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 15776 (5th Cir.).
     A 15-year-old boy in Florida had modified his plastic air pistol to look like a real gun. He brought it to school, brandishing it to briefly hold a classmate hostage, and then went into a bathroom. When deputies arrived, the boy walked back and forth in the bathroom, pointing the plastic air pistol alternately at the deputies and at his own chin. A sergeant started negotiating with the boy, but while he did so, a lieutenant shot the boy in the head and killed him. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity in the federal civil rights and wrongful death lawsuit brought by the boy's parents. The officers reasonably believed that the boy posed a real threat to the lives of themselves and others in the school and that he was armed with a real weapon. The boy also repeatedly refused to drop the pistol and there was evidence that he was pointing it at the lieutenant at the time he was shot. Penley v. Eslinger, #09-13092, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 9106 (11th Cir.).
     A suspect in a double homicide was allegedly unarmed when he was shot and killed by police. A witness indicated that she saw an officer fire multiple times at the suspect at a time when his hands were at his sides and he had stopped running away. A sergeant admitted to having shot the suspect in the back of the head after he had already been shot twice and was being subdued by other officers while lying on the ground. The defendant officers, however, claimed that the suspect, while on the ground, was pressing his arm up against the inside of his shirt and that they feared that he was doing this to aim a gun. A federal appeals court ruled that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, since a jury could find that the decedent posed no immediate threat to the officers and that they used excessive force against him. Sanchez v. Fraley, #09-50821, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 9046 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
Firearms Related: Intentional Use
     Two officers went to a home after a 911 hang-up call was received from there. They entered the home, seeing that the front door was wide open, concerned that someone might be hurt or in need of assistance. They first announced their presence and entered after receiving no response. At one point, they encountered a man, who did not answer their question about why he had not responded to their calls. Instead, he jumped on one officer, and a fight began. The man grabbed one officer's gun hand, and that officer yelled to the second officer that the man was going for his gun. The second officer shouted repeatedly at the man to get down, and then fired at him. The man then charged this officer and hit him with enough force to briefly knock him out. The man then died from being shot. He was bipolar, and off his medication, and his wife called 911 and hung up, and then called a second time, telling the dispatcher of the medical situation, but this information never reached the officers. In a lawsuit by the wife against the city, the court ruled that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment. The officers' warrantless entry into the home was justified by exigent circumstances. Johnson v. City of Memphis, 09-5046, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 17658 (6th Cir.).
     An officer shot and killed a man driving a stolen minivan in a residential yard where officers were on foot. In a lawsuit by his estate asserting claims for excessive use of force, a federal appeals court held that the officer was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because his use of force was reasonable as a matter of law. Another officer had to walk or jump out of the way of the vehicle so that he wouldn't get run over, and the shooting officer, seeing the other officer fall, actually believed that he had been run over, and that the minivan was accelerating towards him. Under these circumstances, he could use deadly force to defend both himself and others. Wilkinson v. Torres, $09-35098, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13720 (9th Cir.).
     The mother of a man shot in the head and killed by an officer sued the city for wrongful death. A jury awarded damages. An intermediate appeals court found that the trial judge had properly set aside $3 million in damages awarded for conscious pain and suffering, as the man's death was almost instantaneous and there was no evidence of his consciousness for any period of time following the shooting. The appeals court upheld, however, jury awards of $55,020 for loss of past economic support, $261,091 for past and future loss of services, and punitive damages of $2.7 million, finding them amply supported by the evidence. The appeals court stated that the trial judge had improperly concluded that the jury awarded punitive damages in part on a finding that the officer had negligently handled his weapon. The appeals court found that the jury award of punitive damages was based on a finding of excessive force, and conduct that was wanton, reckless or malicious. Ferguson v. City of New York, #2630, 18951/01, 2010 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 4428 (1st Dept.).
     An officer shot a man who allegedly sat up and began to lower a weapon towards him and another officer present. The testimony of a forensic pathologist as to the pattern of the plaintiff's bullet wounds was "entirely consistent" with the officer's version of the incident. Based on this, the officer had probable cause to believe that he could use deadly force because he and his partner faced a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm. Brothers v. Akshar, #07-3204, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13368 (Unpub. 2nd Cir.).
     In a lawsuit filed by a man shot by a Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) agent, a federal appeals court noted that a court considering the issue of summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity must ordinarily consider disputed facts from the perspective most favorable to the plaintiff. That was not true, however, when there is clear contrary video evidence of the incident at issue. The man shot by the ATF agent had been an occupant of a vehicle transporting crack cocaine for a planned sale, and the confrontation, which involved ATF agents dressed in plainclothes, as well as a uniformed state trooper, occurred in a parking lot, and the occupants attempted to drive off, at one point placing one of the agents in possible danger. The driver was shot in the head and the plaintiff suffered a gunshot wound to his leg. The appeals court noted that the use of deadly force is justified when an officer is threatened by a weapon, which may include a vehicle attempting to run over an officer, as arguably occurred here. The agent argued that the car was accelerating towards him and that he had no way to escape, justifying the use of deadly force. While there was a dispute about the speed of the car, this could be observed on the marked patrol car's videotape. While the plaintiff claimed that the car slowed or perhaps even stopped, the court found that this was contradicted by the video evidence. Indeed, the vehicle did strike the agent. Under these circumstances, the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the vehicle occupants were "harmless" individuals who had merely been stopped for a routine traffic violation, since the driver engaged in an assault on the agents, narrowly missing one with his car and actually striking the other. Thomas v. Durastanti, #07-3343, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 11458 (10th Cir.).
     A police officer did not use excessive force in shooting and killing a fifteen-year-old boy who modified a plastic air pistol to look like a real weapon and brought it to school. The decedent pointed the weapon directly at the officer, and refused to comply with the officer's orders to drop the weapon, so it was reasonable for the officer to believe he was in danger. Penley v. Eslinger, #09-13092, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 9106 (11th Cir.).
     After two men robbed a restaurant, assaulting several employees, and used an employee as a hostage, they were shot by police when they exited the premises. One of them sued police officers for alleged excessive use of force and failure to intervene. Three officers shot at him, and he sustained two gunshot wounds. He claimed that he had been running away with his arms raised and slowed down to face the officers. Even if this were true, a federal appeals court held, it did not mean that the officers acted unreasonably in shooting him, since they could still reasonably believe that he posed an immediate threat to them and to the public at the time. Gilbert v. French, #08-20296, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 2202 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court could not decide officers' appeal of the denial of qualified immunity to them in a lawsuit claiming they improperly shot and killed a suspect when there were disputed factual issues as to whether the domestic violence suspect was then grappling to gain control of an officer's gun, so that he was shot in an act of necessary self-defense, or was instead then lying on the ground on his back or his stomach, and not threatening the officers. Felder v. King, #09-1814, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6179 (8th Cir.).
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit over their shooting and killing of a man. They deployed tear gas into his apartment in an attempt to extricate him from the unit where he had isolated himself threatening to commit suicide. After he still refused to come out, the officers used additional tear gas and flash bang grenades to enter the apartment, setting fire to the exterior room before throwing the flash bang grenades into the darkened bedroom inches from his head and rendering him blind and deaf before shooting him to death. The appeals court ruled that it could be found that the excessive use of tear gas and flash-bang grenades in this manner against a "non-threatening, non-violent, non-resisting individual" violated clearly established rights. Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, #08-2365, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 7016 (7th Cir.).
     Officers sent to a woman's home encountered her son, who came from the kitchen with a knife in one hand and a cigarette in the other. An officer shot and killed him. Summary judgment for the officer in an excessive force lawsuit was improper, since it was disputed whether or not the decedent had posed an immediate threat to the officer at the time of the shooting. The court also rejected a claim for liability against the officer's supervisor, as no connection was shown between any failure to supervise and the shooting. Reyes v. Bridgwater, #09-10076, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1502 (Unpub. 5th Cir.). In a related decision, the appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendant city, as the plaintiffs failed to identify any municipal policy or custom linked to the shooting. The plaintiffs also failed to produce evidence that the chief of police was an official policymaker for the city. Reyes v. City of Plainview, #09-10412, .2010 U.S. App. Lexis 1681 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     A police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in an excessive force lawsuit filed by a suspect who was permanently injured during a chase. Even if it were assumed that the initial use of deadly force was justified, the officer's alleged firing of an additional 10 to 12 shots while the plaintiff was unarmed on the ground and incapacitated, if true, was unjustified. The right not to be subject to further use of deadly force under such circumstances was clearly established. Jean-Baptist v. Gutierrez, #07-21728, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2498 (S.D. Fla.).
     A man shot and injured by two officers while fleeing from an armed robbery of a store claimed that one of the officers began shooting immediately after directing him to freeze, and that he was not then holding his gun in his hand. The officer, on the other hand, stated that the suspect had his gun in his hand, and ignored instructions to stop, turning towards the officers in a manner that made him believe that he was going to shoot. Based on these disputed facts, this officer was not entitled to summary judgment. Dismissal of claims against the second officer, however, was justified, based on insufficient service of process. Mack v. Dillon, #09-1295, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 2746 (8th Cir.).
     A police officer responding to reports of gunfire in the area on New Year's Eve shot and injured a woman as she stood in the doorway of her home. He stated that he believed that she was firing at him, but she turned out to be unarmed. Accepting the plaintiff's version of the facts as true for purposes of appeal, the court upheld the denial of qualified immunity to the officer. A jury should resolve the factual dispute, and, depending on that determination, it still might be possible that the officer could be entitled to qualified immunity, if he reasonably, although mistakenly, believed that she was firing at him. Jefferson v. Lewis, #08-2116, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 2348 (6th Cir.).
     A California Highway Patrol officer shot and killed a man during a struggle while on duty. The decedent had a long history of schizophrenia, accompanied by drug and alcohol abuse. He was unemployed and survived on Social Security benefits and support from his mother. A lawsuit by the man's estate and by his mother resulted in jury awards of $1 each on a federal civil rights excessive force claim and a state law wrongful death claim, based in part on evidence that appeared to refute the officer's assertion that, at the time of the shooting, the decedent had been swinging a flashlight at him. Subsequently, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs $136,687.35 in attorneys' fees. A federal appeals court upheld the attorneys' fee award, based on findings that the legality of the use of deadly force under these circumstances was an important legal issue, even if substantial damages were not awarded, and that the award of attorneys' fees would be likely to deter the officer from similar future unconstitutional conduct. Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, #08-15694, 593 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2010).
      Officers were justified in using deadly force against a suspect they knew had been convicted of multiple felonies and had a history of fighting with police, after he dragged a hostage into a bathroom and began to kick through a wall. At the time, the suspect allegedly yelled that he was going to cut the hostage's throat in order to kill her. An officer fired one shot, hitting the suspect in the face, and fired a second shot, which killed him, several seconds to a minute later. The fact that it was disputed whether the suspect was incapacitated or standing and yelling at the time the officer fired the second, fatal, shot did not alter the result. The officer faced a dangerous and chaotic situation, and had to make split-second decisions, the court reasoned. Pethel v. West Virginia State Police, #08-2098, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 28727 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     Three officers who were not shown to have fired any shots at the plaintiff were entitled to summary judgment since there was no showing that they participated in any conduct that resulted in the deprivation of any right. There was also no showing of any municipal policy or practice on which to base departmental liability, and summary judgment was also properly granted on state law claims of negligent training and supervision. Bryan v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, #08-15992, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 22102 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
    A man claimed that an officer shot and injured him when he was unarmed and speaking to a 911operator on his cell phone. He also claimed that the officer failed to order him to halt or drop his "weapon," and that, at the time, the person sought for an assault had already been caught. The officer contended that the plaintiff appeared to be holding a small revolver instead of a cell phone, and failed to respond to repeated orders to drop it. Because of disputed factual issues, the officer was not entitled to summary judgment, and if the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, the officer could be found to have used excessive force. Giardina v. Lawrence, #09-30437, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 26649 (Unpub.5th Cir.).
     After the defendants had admitted liability for the wrongful death of a woman's son, shooting and killing him while arresting another person, a jury awarded $12.5 million in damages following a trial that was supposed to be limited to the issue of damages. The manner of death and the question of whether or not the officer, in firing, had acted willfully and wantonly were immaterial to assessment of damages, so that an instruction on willful and wanton conduct was confusing and improperly given, and repeated comments by the plaintiff's lawyer asking the jury to "examine willful and wanton admitted conduct" were not based on the evidence, but were instead appeals to prejudice and emotion. A new trial on damages was therefore required. Pleasance v. City of Chicago, #1-08-1510, 2009 Ill. App. Lexis 1230 (1st Dist.).
     When the arrestee had engaged in what both he and the officer described as a life and death struggle, the officer did not use excessive force in shooting him. The arrestee had placed his own gun to the officer's head and said he would kill him. While the arrestee claimed he had become unarmed before the shooting, there was no indication that the officer knew that he had lost control of his weapon. The arrestee had exited his vehicle late at night in a secluded area displaying a gun, and the officer reasonably feared that he was armed and dangerous. A reasonable jury could not find that the officer's use of force was excessive. Jones v. Mullins Police Dept., #08-6256, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 26906 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     Deputies pursuing two felony car burglary suspects encountered a property owner, armed, on his own property, and shot at him. In a lawsuit by the property owner, the sheriff failed to offer any evidence concerning how officers were trained on the proper use of deadly force, and admitted that the decision to use firearms was completely up to the deputies. The need to train officers in the proper use of deadly force is so obvious that the failure to do so can be characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. Deliberate indifference could also be found in the sheriff's failure to provide proper supervision and training for K-9 teams. The sheriff was denied summary judgment. Swofford v. Eslinger, #6:08-cv-00066, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 111121 (M.D. Fla.).
    There was ballistic evidence and forensic evidence that suggested that a motorist was shot from 3 to 6 inches away, and that the officer may have reached into the car and shot him from a closer distance than he asserted, creating genuine disputed material facts concerning the reasonableness of the shooting. If, as the motorist's surviving adoptive parents argued, he was an unarmed suspect whose left arm was restrained by a wrist lock and whose right arm was in the air at the time, he would not have posed a risk of harm to the officer, and the force used would have been excessive. The appeals court did not overturn the denial of qualified immunity. Ougel v. Amite City Police Dept., #09-30080, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 24750 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     Officers watching a convenience store which they had been told was going to be robbed observed two men walking towards an apartment complex near the store, and one of them had a toy gun in his waistband. The officers told them to drop to the ground and drop the gun. One man complied, but the man with the toy gun remained standing, and an officer shot and killed him. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, when it was disputed whether they had identified themselves as officers, whether they had seen the decedent holding the "gun" in his hand, and whether they reasonably feared for their safety, as well as whether a warning was given before deadly force was used. Nance v. Sammis, #09-1353, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 24612 (8th Cir.).
     A man claimed that officers used excessive force against him while taking him into custody on an arrest warrant and that they "wanted to kill him because he refused to help certain corrupt police officers participate in drug trafficking." Summary judgment was properly granted to the officers. The evidence showed that the plaintiff, who claimed to have been unarmed, was armed and shot first. Additionally, he was only shot five times, not 14 or 16 times, as he claimed. A jury in the plaintiff's criminal trial found him guilty of three charges of attempted murder, rejecting his defense of justification, and supporting the conclusion that he was armed and had fired at officers. Brookins v. County of Allegheny, #09-2453, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 23543 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     An officer responding to a call concerning a man "out of control" who was "trashing" a house, observed that a car had been driven through a garage door. As the husband came towards him, he charged holding two golf clubs over his head, and the officer fired three times, killing him. The officer claimed that he felt trapped by the crashed car and unable to safely retreat, as well as threatened by the husband. Neighbors, however, stated that they saw nothing in the decedent's hands. A federal appeals court held that it had no jurisdiction over a denial of qualified immunity to the officer, since the resolution depended on disputed material facts. Hanson v. City of Fairview Park, Ohio, #08-4238, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 22866 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     A deputy responding, with other officers, to a call reporting that a man with a gun was threatening his wife, released a police dog to locate the husband in the neighborhood, and then shot and killed the husband when he refused to obey orders to put down his weapon, instead aiming the gun at the officers. The use of the dog, under these circumstances, was neither a use of deadly force nor excessive. Shooting the husband was justified, as it was reasonable to think that he posed an immediate threat to the officers and others. The deputy was entitled to qualified immunity, and the county was not liable on a theory of alleged inadequate training. Thomson v. Salt Lake County, Utah, #06-4304, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 23677 (10th Cir.).
     Officers conducting a protective sweep of a home prior to carrying out a search authorized by a warrant encountered a fifteen-year-old lurking in a dark closet in his own bedroom. He emerged coming towards the officers with a knife held up. Because he ignored their orders to halt and drop the knife, they shot and killed him. Under the circumstances, the officers' split-second decision to use deadly force was not objectively unreasonable, entitling them to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity in an excessive force lawsuit. Chappell v. City of Cleveland, #08-4456, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 24149 (6th Cir.).
     A police officer fatally shot a male motorist when responding to a report that a vehicle was idling on some railroad tracks. His surviving children sued the officer. A federal appeals court found that it was undisputed that the motorist reached under his seat and moved as if he had obtained the object he sought just prior to the shooting. Under these circumstances, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity for using deadly force. Manis v. Lawson, #08-30987, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 22755 (5th Cir.).
     A suspect was wanted in connection with a number of bank robberies, including one in which he allegedly threatened to kill a bank teller, which occurred on the day of his arrest. He subsequently claimed that a deputy improperly used deadly force against him after he had surrendered, shooting him in the chest and spine. The officers encountered the suspect when he was in a motel room with a woman who they believed was a hostage. The arrestee claimed that, before exiting the room, he yelled out that he was surrendering, and then waved a white towel and made gestures with his hands that amounted to a "surrender position." The officer who shot him, however, disputed this, and stated that he appeared to be holding up a "dark object" as he exited the room. Four other officers said they saw the arrestee holding a towel and saw no weapon in his hands. Because of a dispute in material facts as to whether a reasonable officer could have believed that deadly force was justified because the suspect was armed, the defendant officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. Caruthers v. McCawley, #08-16538, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 17476 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
     In a lawsuit claiming that excessive force was used against a suspect shot and killed by police, judgment for the defendants was upheld on appeal, based in part on expert witness testimony indicating that the suspect's conduct was consistent with trying to commit "suicide by cop." The suspect's alleged resistance to the officers was made more probable by a number of facts, including his prior lawsuits against the police department, knowledge that his family might collect significant damages from a lawsuit if he was killed by police, and his writing of "rap" music lyrics in favor of the murder of police officers. The decedent had a criminal history, including two attempted kidnappings that resulted in a high-speed chase, and that indicated that he might receive a long sentence if prosecuted rather than killed. The expert witness testimony concerning "suicide by cop" satisfied legal standards for the admission of such evidence. The expert testified on his knowledge of approximately ten peer-reviewed articles and four other articles on the subject. The court found that the "suicide by cop" theory seems to be "generally accepted" in the relevant professional community. The literature indicates that persons attempting "suicide by cop" frequently have deep resentment and hatred towards police officers. Boyd v. C. & C. of San Francisco, #07-16993, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 17615 (9th Cir.).
     In a lawsuit filed after a motorist was shot and killed by a deputy sheriff during a traffic stop and arrest, a federal appeals court rejected a claim for county liability. Even if the plaintiff could show that the county had a policy of inadequately investigating officer-involved shootings, there was a lack of evidence that the deputy had any knowledge of this purported policy, and it therefore could not have been the "moving force" behind any alleged violation of the motorist's rights by the deputy. James v. Harris County, #07-20725, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 17318 (5th Cir.).
     In response to a 911 call reporting a potentially suicidal armed teenager, a city dispatched both an ambulance and law enforcement officers. The teenager's mother subsequently filed a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that a failure to properly respond to the call caused her daughter to be shot and injured by an officer. The plaintiff did not establish that the city had a special duty to her or her daughter, and the court ruled that there also was no showing of negligence on the part of the city, or of a policy or custom of failing to respond appropriately to calls for emergency assistance. Perkins v. City of Rochester, #06-CV-6585, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55490 (W.D.N.Y.).
     A federal appeals court has upheld a $5 million jury award against a deputy who shot and killed a bicycle rider, including $2 million in compensatory and $3 million in punitive damages. The rider allegedly refused to stop when approached by the deputy for riding without a light on the wrong side of a road. The rider allegedly assaulted the deputy. The deputy released his dog, and the rider then allegedly tried to drown the dog in a puddle, as well as reaching into his pocket and extracting a "shiny" object, whereupon the deputy shot and killed him. Despite the fact that the officer was the sole surviving witness to the incident, the appeals court found that there was evidence that supported the jury's apparent disbelief of his version of the incident. This included evidence that the officer's uniform was not muddied, despite his claim that the decedent pushed him and that they then struggled in the mud, and medical evidence indicating that the decedent's right arm was "virtually useless" due to a prior gunshot wound from three months before. This contradicted the officer's statement that he saw the decedent reach for a shiny object (a pair of pliers later recovered from the scene) in his right back pocket. There was also testimony that it would have been impossible for the deputy "to have seen anything from the claimed view-point." The lesions and bite-marks on the decedent's body, the court remarked, were as consistent with "protective wounds as with an attempt to drown" the dog. A reasonable jury, the court stated, could find that it was unreasonable for the defendant to use deadly force on a "disabled suspect who was attempting to protect himself from the officer's canine." The court upheld the rejection of various claims against the county for inadequate training and supervision, or policies resulting in the excessive use of force. Goodman v. Harris County, #07-20816, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 12663 (5th Cir.).
     An officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a suicidal man armed with a gun that he refused to drop, and which he pointed first at his own head and then at the officers just before they shot him. Garczynski v. Bradshaw, No. 08-16100, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 15179 (11th Cir.).
     The family of a suspect shot and killed following a police chase lost a lawsuit in federal court claiming excessive use of force. Because state law wrongful death claims had been dismissed in the case, they then sued in California state court. An intermediate California appeals court has held that the result in the federal lawsuit barred (collaterally estopped) the plaintiffs from recovering damages on their claim that officers were negligent in using deadly force in shooting and killing the suspect, who was unarmed, but who they thought had a gun and was firing. (The shots heard were actually one of the officers firing at the suspect). The appeals court found that the issue of whether the officers used reasonable care in using deadly force was submitted and actually decided in the federal case and could not be relitigated. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, #S149499, 2009 Cal. Lexis 4630.
     Relatives of a motorist shot and killed by a police officer at the conclusion of a vehicular pursuit sued the officer and city for excessive use of force. During the pursuit, the motorist had run a red light, tried to ram a police vehicle, and drove on the wrong side of a highway. The officer was attempting to deploy drop sticks, and the motorist then swerved his vehicle towards him. This was followed by the officer firing four or five times, striking the motorist in the back of the head and killing him. Affirming summary judgment for both the officer and the city, a federal appeals court first stated that the facts hypothetically could constitute an excessive use of force if, as the defendants accepted for purposes of appeal, the officer did not face immediate danger and no innocent bystanders were nearby. Qualified immunity, however, was still proper for the officer, since he did not act unreasonably in believing that the potential danger to others justified the use of deadly force under the circumstances. There was no showing of a policy or custom of the city causing the death as required for municipal liability. Cordova v. Aragon, #08-1222, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 13043 (10th Cir.).
     A police officer went to a suspect's home to investigate reports that he had pulled a gun on a pizza deliveryman. The officer saw the suspect approaching the door with a handgun, and the suspect refused to respond to a command to drop it. The officer then shot the suspect through a windowpane in the door, killing him. The court found that the use of force was reasonable, because the suspect posed a danger to the safety of the officer. The court found no legal authority for the argument that firing a gun into the home constituted an "unlawful search." Denning v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, #08-5884, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 10573 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court ruled that an officer was not liable for shooting and killing a suspect who he observed reaching into a boot, possibly to get a weapon. The shooting officer was engaged, along with his fellow SWAT team members, in executing an arrest warrant for two persons, one being the man he shot. This man had allegedly pistol whipped a second man and threatened to kill him, then going into his mobile home, purportedly to "test" his rifle. Entering the home, the officer observed his feet moving below a closed bedroom door and then saw him reaching into the boot when the door yielded slightly. "This court has upheld the use of deadly force where a suspect moved out of the officer's line of sight and could have reasonably been interpreted as reaching for a weapon." Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Texas, #08-20081, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 6909 (5th Cir.).
     An officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit filed by a man he shot twice when he answered the officer's knock on his trailer door by coming out holding a rifle. The officers were present on the property searching for an arrestee who had escaped from probation officers. The man claimed that he grabbed his rifle because he believed a "predator" was raiding his chicken coops, that the rifle was pointed at the ground, and that the officer fired without any warning. The court stated that the mere presence of the rifle under these circumstances was insufficient to justify the use of deadly force. The court also found that the search of the curtilage of the trailer violated the trailer resident's Fourth Amendment rights. The appeals court rejected claims of racial discrimination, however. Pena v. Porter, #07-1891, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 5324 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court rejected claims of excessive force against officers who shot at a fleeing grocery store shoplifter. The shoplifter had resisted an officer trying to detain him after he admitted stealing merchandise when confronted outside the store, prevented the officer from using a Taser on him, and fled in his car at high speed. He drove recklessly, and avoided a rolling police roadblock. Officers on foot shot him as his vehicle came towards them, and when they feared for their safety and the safety of others. The officers who shot mistakenly believed, based on radio transmissions, that the suspect was armed. "We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to think that [the plaintiff] seriously endangered officers and innocent bystanders, and it was reasonable for the officers to discharge their firearms in [his] direction to stop him. Thus, there was no Fourth Amendment violation." Marion v. City of Corydon, #08-2592, 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2009).
     Detectives acted reasonably in using deadly force to prevent the escape of a man suspected of having committed a carjacking and murder. They perceived, at the time, that he was potentially armed or otherwise posed a threat of harm to others. Their shooting and killing of the suspect as he tried to evade capture, therefore, did not violate either his Fourth Amendment or substantive due process rights. The plaintiffs in a lawsuit arising out of the incident also failed to show that the suspect's death was caused by a police department policy or custom. Lopez v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., #2:06-cv-00951, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17596 (D. Nev.).
     A man who claimed he was shot four times by police while holding an axe in a "non-threatening" manner and slowly and quietly walking down his driveway with a "non-violent protesting" state of mind stated a possible claim for excessive use of force when he was 25 feet from the officers at the time, and there was no indication that he was escaping or had been warned before being shot, even though the officers believed that he had committed a robbery and he did not comply with their orders to drop the axe. Jennis v. Rood, 07-0545, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 3230 (Unpub. 2nd Cir.).
     Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a motorist who refused to pull his truck over, led them on a high speed chase, refused to show his hands after finally pulling over, and then drove his vehicle in the direction of a deputy standing nearby. The decedent used his truck in an aggressive manner justifying the belief that he posed a risk of death or serious physical harm to officers or the public. Deputies could also reasonably believe that he was trying to escape, and provided him with an adequate warning before firing. McCullough v. Antolini, No. 08-10176, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 3874 (11th Cir.).
     An officer was entitled to summary judgment on California state law battery and negligence claims by a bystander struck and injured by fragments from a stray bullet fired at a murder suspect. At the time of the shooting, the suspect was driving up on the curb of a strip mall and heading in the direction of two officers, one of whom had fallen to the ground just before the shooting. The shooting was a reasonable attempt to prevent the suspect from escaping, or from injuring an officer or members of the public. Brown v. Ransweiler, D051983, 2009 Cal. App. Lexis 200 (4th Dist.).
     Federal judge declines to overturn a jury verdict in favor of a police officer in a lawsuit brought by the estate of a man found dead from a bullet wound a day after a high speed police pursuit of a suspect was conducted near his home. There were disputes as to whether shots were fired at the time of the chase, whether a shot was fired by the officer, whether any shots fired were fired before the officer arrived on the scene, or whether no shots at all were fired on the evening of the pursuit. It was not certain how the bullet had come to be in the decedent, and it was for the jury to determine which version of events to believe. Estate of Tejada v. Flores, Civil No. 02-1209, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9237 (D.P.R.).
     A detective acted reasonably in shooting an armed man fleeing him and running towards another person in a dark alley. Arrington v. D.C., Civil Action No. 07-0170, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11680 (D.D.C.).
     In an excessive force civil rights case arising from police officers' firing of seventeen shots into the body of a suspect who was already lying on the ground, killing him, a jury awarded no actual or nominal damages, despite the plaintiff's demand for $500,000 in actual/compensatory damages, but awarded a total of $40,000 in punitive damages. The trial court then declined to award any attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, A federal appeals court found that the trial court was mistaken in failing to award attorneys' fees, that the plaintiff qualified as a "prevailing" plaintiff, who should ordinarily be awarded attorneys' fees, unless such an award would result in injustice, and ordered further proceedings to determine the proper amount of attorneys' fees to award. Nazario v. Rodriguez, No. 07-2265, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 2906 (1st Cir.).
     Two officers who fired shots at a vehicle that was coming towards themselves and other officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner. A third officer who fired at the driver and another occupant, believing that the shots fired by the first two officers came from within the car, was also acting in an objectively reasonable manner, since he also believed that he was acting in self-defense. No gun was found inside the vehicle, although drugs were found, and the vehicle occupants had ignored orders to raise their hands and leave the car, instead knocking an officer over and threatening police with the vehicle. Additionally, one of the occupants was observed moving his hands near his waistband and discarding something as he ran to the car. Swann v. City of Richmond, No. 07-1981, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 1479 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     Parents claimed that an officer used excessive force when she shot and killed their son, who had attacked two officers and was on top of one of them when she shot. The trial judge had ruled that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable trier of fact could have believed that she shot the man "because he was trying to obtain her gun, or because she thought he had her Taser, or disbelieve both accounts," thereby creating a disputed issue of material fact. The appeals court dismissed the appeal of this ruling. It noted that, in many cases, a defendant's violent attack on the officers results in a grant of qualified immunity. It found, however, that this case was different, because the officer who shot the decedent was disciplined and later fired by the police department on the basis of the incident, that the officer who was being attacked at the time expressed doubt over the use of lethal force, and that "despite the need for split-second decision-making, it is possible a 'reasonable' officer would have known that a Taser shot would not be lethal" to the officer being attacked and could have noticed that the man had no weapon in his hands. Rocha v. Schroeder, #07-50916, 283 Fed. Appx. 305, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13598 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
    Police officer did not act recklessly in shooting at person pointing a shotgun at him and his partner, who appeared to be getting ready to shoot at them. He therefore was not liable for injuries suffered by a storeowner struck by a stray bullet. The man shot at was outside the store, the officer acted to defend himself and others, and there was no evidence that the officer fired with the knowledge that it was essentially certain that if he did so that a bystander would suffer injuries. Scott v. Longworth, No. C-080313, 2008 Ohio App. Lexis 5410 (1st Dist.).
     Police officer's shooting and killing of a pet dog in a woman's backyard was a Fourth Amendment seizure, but disputed issues of fact barred consideration on appeal of whether police were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions. The officers entered the backyard after receiving reports that a wanted criminal, accompanied by a pit bull, had entered the home, and they encountered the pet dog, who was in the backyard with the woman, her boyfriend, his parents, and her elderly mother. Villo v. Eyre, No. 08-1627, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 22302 (7th Cir.).
     Plaintiff in lawsuit over death of suspect killed by police after he initiated gunfire failed to demonstrate that officers unlawfully deprived him of his life, and plaintiff decedent's estate failed to pursue an asserted equal protection claim. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, No. 072169, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 24217 (1st Cir.).
     Shooting and killing of a suspect was justified when he failed, during a foot chase, to obey commands, and he tried to take a deputy's gun after wrestling him to the ground, as well as grabbing the deputy's flashlight, and using it to strike him in a manner that almost made him unconscious. Even if there was, as the plaintiff claimed, 21 feet between the deputy and the decedent at the time of the shooting, this distance was merely a factor to be considered and did not, standing alone, make the shooting unreasonable. Any error in deciding to pursue the suspect on foot was, at most negligence, which could not be a basis for a federal civil rights claim. Beckett-Crabtree v. Hair, No. 07-5181, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 22393 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
     In a case involving the roadside killing of a man by an Alaska State trooper while investigating a suspicious car parked along a highway, a federal appeals court ruled that acting with deliberate indifference is not an adequate standard to constitute conduct "shocking to the conscience" for purposes of stripping the trooper of the defense of qualified immunity on due process claims by the decedent's family. Instead, it must be shown that the trooper acted for the purpose of causing harm which is unrelated to law enforcement objectives. The officers found the decedent asleep inside what they thought was an abandoned vehicle, and woke him with demands that he exit the vehicle, pepper spraying him, in response to which he reacted in pain, driving his vehicle slowly towards the patrol vehicle, whereupon a trooper fired five shots and killed him. Because the trial court, in denying a motion for qualified immunity, used the deliberate indifference standard rather than the more demanding measure of culpability of whether the trooper "acted with a purpose to harm" the man "without regard to legitimate law enforcement objectives," further proceedings were required. Porter v. Osborn, No. 07-35974, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21878 (9th Cir.).
     Police officers' decision to shoot and kill a man threatening grocery store clerks with a knife was reasonable under the circumstances, particularly based on their reasonable belief that the suspect, who also possessed a screwdriver, was also engaging in aggressive actions threatening the officers. The officers did attempt first to use non-lethal force to subdue the suspect, but he continued to resist them. Gregory v. Zumult, No. 07-1282, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 20551 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     Police officers acted reasonably in shooting and injuring an arrestee during his arrest. The suspect had previously told a detective investigating him for alleged sexual contact with a 13-year-old girl that he would "not go back" to jail, that he had a handgun, and that he would "take care of the problem." Officers arriving at his residence reasonably believed that he was both armed and suicidal, and he fled the officers in his vehicle. When he exited the vehicle, officers saw that he had something in his hand, which was a handgun, and he refused to comply with their orders. Under these circumstances, they acted reasonably in firing at him. Ramirez v. Knoulton, No. 07-50785, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18334 (5th Cir.).
     A bank robber who pled guilty to discharging his gun from his car during a pursuit following a failed robbery, by doing so, essentially admitted that the officers acted reasonably in firing at him. He could not, therefore, pursue claims for excessive use of force under either federal or Louisiana state law. He was not unlawfully seized, since he also pled guilty to a charge of attempted burglary. Allowing a federal civil rights claim for either excessive use of force or unlawful seizure to go forward, under these circumstances, would improperly imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's convictions should he be awarded damages, and his underlying convictions had not been set aside. Connors v. Graves, No. 08-30163, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 16480 (5th Cir.).
     A family's assertion that a man was unarmed and posing no threat to anyone when police officers shot and killed him during a drug raid on a housing project stated a viable claim for excessive use of force. The plaintiffs further stated a viable possible claim for supervisory liability based on their allegations that a drug unit supervisor directly participated in the raid and that a police department superintendent and the supervisor both failed to adequately train, discipline, and monitor the police officers involved in the incident. Rivera v. Sanchez-Ramos, Civil No. 05-2146, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 60303 (D. P.R.).
     Officers who reasonably believed that a suspect who was inside a house after escaping federal custody was armed and dangerous, acted reasonably in shooting and killing him when he ignored their commands and threatened to kill a hostage who was screaming for help. The threat to the officers and the hostage did not end after one officer fired a non-lethal shot which injured the suspect, so that a second officer acted reasonably in firing a lethal shot that killed the suspect shortly thereafter. Pethtel v. Lemmon, Civil Action No. 5:06CV87, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58156 (N.D.W.Va.).
     There was a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether an officer's shooting and killing of a suspect was justified, based on a statement by a witness that she saw "every bit" of the incident, and that the suspect raised his hands in the air after being tackled by the officer, and prior to the shooting. The officer was not, therefore, entitled to summary judgment.  Reed v. Rose, No. 07-3274, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15090 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
     Officer who shot a suspect acted reasonably because he kept his left hand concealed during a standoff, and he told officers that he "had something" to make the officers do what he "could not," as well as having previously told a 911 operator that he could easily provoke an officer to shoot him. The officer who shot the plaintiff believed that he had made a threatening movement with his concealed hand.  Dague v. Dumesic, No. 07-15317, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15511 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
    A federal appeals court upheld the conviction of two Border Patrol agents who shot and injured an unarmed, fleeing drug smuggler who escaped across the border into Mexico, running on foot from his stopped van, which contained 743 pounds of marijuana. The agents were also accused of engaging in a "cover-up," including a clean-up of the area of spent shells, and a failure by the agents to report the weapon-firing incident, as required by Border Patrol policies. The charges made against the agents included unlawfully discharging their weapons and concealing their offense. The appeals court rejected the agents' argument that they should have been allowed to introduce evidence of other drug trafficking conduct which the man they shot allegedly engaged in after the incident. "The district court entered a pretrial order ruling that introducing such evidence would be confusing, misleading to the jury, and highly prejudicial to the conduct of the trial and would therefore not be allowed. ..." The suspect's guilt of this alleged later crime could have become an irrelevant "mini-trial" within the trial, according to the court, diverting the attention of the jury from the details of the incident at issue. The trial court, therefore, did not engage in an abuse of discretion in barring that evidence under Fed. R. Evidence 403. The appeals court did reverse and vacate, however, convictions of the two agents for "obstruction of justice," because a Border Patrol investigation they allegedly obstructed did not constitute an "official proceeding" within the meaning of the federal statute they were charged under. The court therefore ordered resentencing of the agents on the basis of the other convictions, with the "obstruction of justice" charges excluded.  The agents were previously sentenced to 12 and 11 years and 1 month in prison respectively. U.S.A. v. Ramos, No. 06-51489, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15961 (5th Cir.).
     Editor's Note: The prosecution of these two Border Patrol agents has resulted in much controversy in the press and on the Internet, as well as from some public officials. See letters from U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) to the U.S. Attorney General and to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, questioning the sentences given to the two Border Patrol Agents. The office of the U.S. Attorney, (Western District of Texas) which prosecuted the case, issued a "fact sheet" reacting to the controversy, and responding to what it characterized as "myths" that have been circulated in behalf of the officers. The National Border Patrol Council of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) (AFL-CIO), which represents Border Patrol employees, also issued a "rebuttal" to the statement of the U.S. Attorney's Office "fact sheet."
     Based on disputes about the facts of the incident in which officers shot and killed a man as he tried to flee a traffic stop, the officers were properly denied qualified immunity. While the officers claimed that they feared for their safety even under the facts alleged by the plaintiffs, those allegations were that the motorist's truck was moving non-aggressively and slowly, and could not have hit the officers, and also that it was stationary at the time of the shooting. Under those circumstances, if true, no reasonable officer could have believed that the motorist posed a threat to them. Further, under these circumstances, the officers would have had time to assess the situation before firing several times at the motorist. Officers may not, the court noted, fire at a fleeing felon who is not posing a threat to anyone. Estate of Kirby v. Duva, No. 06-1976, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13573 (6th Cir.).
     The fact that the officer who shot and killed the plaintiffs' son may have made conflicting subjective statements about her motivation for her actions did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she acted in an objectively reasonable manner in shooting the decedent, for purposes of determining whether she was entitled to qualified immunity. Given factual disputes about that, the appeals court could not rule on the issue of qualified immunity. Rocha v. Schroeder, No. 07-50916, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13598 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     A police officer's shooting and killing of a man charging at her from 10 to 15 feet away was not excessive, entitling her to qualified immunity. The officer was responding to a 911 call from the man's sister stating that he was drunk and physically abusive, and the suspect vandalized nearby apartments and threatened a resident before the officer arrived. The officer was not required to use the "least intrusive amount of force" possible when the suspect was larger than her and posed an immediate threat to her and to others. Lehman v. Leichliter, No. 07-30405, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11268 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
     When a trial judge's instructions about the legal standard for excessive use of force were correct, the judge's error concerning instructions about the proper use of a police investigator's report concerning the shooting of a suspect were harmless. The report, containing statements the shooting officer made to a supervisor after the shooting, while "hearsay within hearsay" could have properly been considered as admissions by a party-opponent in the lawsuit. The trial court had, however, allowed the report to be entered into evidence, and the statements in the report were mostly useful for purposes of impeachment. As the plaintiff's attorney used the statements for that purpose, any error in instructions concerning the use of the report were harmless. Alicea v. Ralston, No. 06-4521, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10736 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
     A police officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a suspect armed with a box cutter who brandished it while advancing upon her despite her commands for him to drop the weapon. Even though the blade of the box cutter was not then extended, the officer could reasonably believe that the suspect constituted a serious threat of death or serious physical injury. The suspect was only two feet away from the officer at the time, and the officer was back up against her police cruiser. Njang v. Montgomery County, Maryland, No. 07-1815, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10394 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
     Since it is well established that a police officer may not use deadly force against a non-dangerous and unarmed person, and the other officer present at the scene of the plaintiff's shooting stated that the plaintiff did not act in any way that would have justified the shooting, the officer who shot the plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity. The shooting officer did not give any warning before shooting, and the plaintiff alleged that, at the time of the shooting, he had stopped advancing towards the officer and did not making threatening movements. Kiles v. City of North Las Vegas, No. 06-16420, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9958 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
New York high court upholds decision providing that a man paralyzed after being shot by a police officer, initially awarded $76.4 million by a jury, shall receive nothing, based on his failure to appear at a second trial in the case, at which a second jury still awarded him $51 million despite his absence. Details follow:
     The highest court in New York, in a brief one-line order in Barnes v. City of New York, has upheld an intermediate appeals court decision which results in a man shot and paralyzed by a police officer twenty years ago, and who was initially awarded $76.4 million by a jury receiving nothing, and being assessed $100 for court costs. The plaintiff had fired a gun at a police officer who chased him while he was running with a Tec-9 semiautomatic pistol. The officer returned fire, resulting in spinal injuries, which paralyzed the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the officer shot him in the back after he dropped a gun he picked up during a fight with two other men. He also claimed that he did not see the officer, who was in plain clothes. A jury awarded him $76.4 million, which was later reduced to $8.9 million by a trial court before a new trial was ordered by an intermediate New York appeals court, based on the improper exclusion of evidence at the trial that the plaintiff was a member of a group that believed in resisting arrests with violence. A jury at a second trial awarded the plaintiff $51 million, which was subsequently reduced to $10.75 million by the trial judge. In Barnes v. City of New York, #9969, 2007 NY Slip Op 06260, 44 A.D. 3d 39, 840 N.Y. Supp. 2d 582, 2007 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 8781 (1st Dept.), an intermediate New York appeals court overturned that second award of damages, based on the plaintiff's failure to appear at the second trial. The appeals court stated that:
     "By avoiding his obligation to testify at a trial in which he was seeking millions of dollars, plaintiff was able to frustrate the City's fundamental common-law right to cross-examine a witness. Plaintiff, of course, had good reason to avoid coming to court to testify. His strategy denied the City the opportunity to confront and test his credibility on such matters as his assertion that he had no familiarity with guns and that he did not fire at the officer, and to impeach him by way of his plea of guilty to attempted assault in the first degree (i.e., by means of a deadly weapon). That deadly weapon was found at plaintiff's feet with two empty shell casings, thus corroborating the officer's account that plaintiff had fired the gun at him."
     In a case where a police officer accidentally shot and killed a suspect, drawing her gun while thinking it was her Taser, a federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the Taser manufacturer on a products liability design defect claim. The court noted that the Taser and holster were not "used" when the injury occurred, and such use was necessary for the design defect claim. The court also found that the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in choosing a gun-shaped design for the Taser, when the only evidence presented on the decision-making process indicated that a handgun-shape was better for accuracy and feedback from training officers indicated that they preferred a handgun-shaped design. The court also rejected failure to warn, negligent warning, and training claims. Torrest v. City of Madera, No. 05-16468, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10169 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
     When an officer shot at an allegedly stolen vehicle, intending to stop it, his intent was to seize both the driver and a passenger, even though the passenger, who was shot, was not the intended object of the gunfire. The passenger was therefore "seized" for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim. Since a jury could also determine, under these circumstances, that the officer was not in danger, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity based on his argument that his actions were objectively reasonable. Tubar v. Clift, No. 06-35836, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8346 (9th Cir.).
     A motorist moved his vehicle, boxed between other cars, forward and backwards, so that an officer acted objectively reasonably in shooting the motorist based on a belief that another officer under the motorist's car was hurt and would suffer additional serious bodily harm. No liability for shooting and killing the motorist under these circumstances. Costello v. Town of Warwick, No. 06-5138, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8378 (2nd Cir.).
     Officer who intended to use a Taser holstered near her gun against a suspect, but instead drew and fired her gun, killing the suspect was not entitled to summary judgment. At the time, the suspect was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and was handcuffed and in the back of a patrol car.  Torres v. City of Madera, No. 05-16762, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9648 (9th Cir.).
     A federal jury in Pennsylvania awarded $4 million in compensatory and $24 million in punitive damages to the father of a 12-year-old boy on a claim for excessive use of force. The unarmed youth was stopped while driving a stolen car, and was fatally shot in the back while running from the two defendant state troopers. The award consisted of $4 million for pain and suffering, $4,058 for burial expenses and $12 million in punitive damages against each of the two state troopers. Hickenbottom v. Nassan, #2:03-cv-00223 (W.D. Pa., March 12, 2008).
     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a man at the conclusion of a high speed pursuit when he pointed a silver cell phone at them, in a manner as though he were aiming a gun. At the time of the shooting, he was also running towards the officers. The officers could reasonably believe that the suspect was armed and resisting arrest. The fact that he was actually not armed with a gun was not relevant, particularly since the entire incident at the conclusion of the pursuit only took seven seconds. The incident was captured on videotape. Hudspeth v. City of Shreveport, No. 07-30260, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 5829 (5th Cir.).
     Regardless of whether a suspect was running away from a deputy or not at the time he was shot and killed, the deputy could reasonably believe that the use of deadly force was justified against him, since he was in possession of a semiautomatic handgun. Under the circumstances, there was an objectively reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm being suffered by the deputy. Garcia v. Santa Clara County, No. 06-15745, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4905 (9th Cir.).
     Police officers had probable cause to believe that a man posed a threat of serious physical harm to them when he twice pointed a shotgun at them after they chased him following his shooting of two people. They were therefore entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing him. The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim that additional discovery should be permitted to determine if any of the police vehicles present at the scene of the incident had video cameras, since prior discovery had already indicated that this was not the case. Ingle v. Yelton, No. 07-1315, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 3184 (4th Cir.).
     Police officers who allegedly fired on an unarmed man in the backyard of his own home, resulting in him being wounded in the chest, were not entitled to      Neither mother nor father of decedent who was shot and killed by police had standing to pursue federal civil rights or state law wrongful death claims arising out of the death when no one had been appointed as the representative of the decedent's estate. The lawsuit was therefore dismissed. Farrow v. Sammis, No. 3:07CV00097, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90429 (E.D. Ark.).summary judgment. The shooting was allegedly carried out without cause and without warning. The court rejects one officer's claim that the fact that he missed the plaintiff when he fired entitled him to qualified immunity, and an argument by a second officer that he acted on the reasonable, but mistaken belief that the man had shot the other defendant officer. Floyd v. City of Detroit, No. 06-2441, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4804 (6th Cir.).
     Police officer acted reasonably in shooting a man driving a stolen car who refused to obey orders to pull over, but instead drove away at high speed, and who subsequently drove recklessly, collided with another motorist's car, causing an accident that resulted in the hospitalization of the other driver. The fact that the fleeing motorist was not "armed" did not mean it was not objectively reasonable for the officer to use deadly force, as his driving posed a risk of death or serious bodily harm to others. Hill v. Nigro, No. 07-3871, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4407 (3rd Cir.).
     Mere threat to shoot suspect, even if it was "unprofessional," did not constitute a violation of the suspect's constitutional rights. Williams v. Milwaukee Police Department, No. 06-C-1124, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lex 55122 (E.D. Wis.). In a subsequent decision on other issues in the same case, the court held that a partner of an officer accused of misconduct in the case was properly dismissed from lawsuit, since no allegation was made that he was personally involved in the misconduct. . Federal civil rights law does not support the imposition of vicarious or collective liability for alleged misconduct. Williams v. Miscichoski, No. 06-C-1124, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 94831 (E.D. Wis.).
     An arrest and the shooting of the arrestee occurred in 1998, so that any lawsuit filed over the incident was time-barred by Michigan's three-year statute of limitations, and was properly dismissed when it was not filled until 2002. No "tolling" (extension) of the time period was justified, since the arrestee stated that he was conscious "before, during, and after" the time he was shot, and that he took the position, at the time of the incident, that he had been deliberately shot by the officer without provocation, allegedly in order to "cover up" the shooting officer's accidental shooting of a fellow officer during the arrest. Drake v. City of Detroit, No. 06-1817, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4224 (6th Cir.).
     Neither mother nor father of decedent who was shot and killed by police had standing to pursue federal civil rights or state law wrongful death claims arising out of the death when no one had been appointed as the representative of the decedent's estate. The lawsuit was therefore dismissed. Farrow v. Sammis, No. 3:07CV00097, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90429 (E.D. Ark.).
     A man shot by a police officer claimed that the incident occurred after he and others had been shot at by someone in a passing car and another man shot back at that car. The officer was traveling towards the scene of the incident and heard the gunshots. The officer then shot the plaintiff as he and another individual, who was armed, ran away. Overturning summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for the officer, a federal appeals court ruled that there were disputed factual issues of whether the officer acted to seize the plaintiff, the armed person, or both of them, and whether the bullet that struck the plaintiff had been fired by the officer. If the officer used deadly force to seize the plaintiff, who was unarmed and running away, a jury could have found this to be unreasonable. Moore v. Indehar, No. 06-4047, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 2243 (8th Cir.).
     Officer who shot and killed a man outside his home was entitled to qualified immunity when the decedent had threatened to commit violent acts against himself and other persons, he was armed with a knife, he refused to comply with repeated orders to drop the knife, and he allegedly raised the knife blade above his shoulder and pointed it towards officers, turning and stepping towards an officer. Larsen v. Murr, No. 06-1094, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 25 (10th Cir.).
     A homeowner who claimed that state police, acted improperly, surrounded his house while his wife and dogs were inside, and repeatedly shot into the home could not pursue federal civil rights claims against the State of Maine or the state police because of their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Palm v. State of Maine, Civil No. 07-102, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4975 (D. Maine).
     In a case where police officers shot and killed a motorist during what was characterized as a "routine" traffic stop, a federal appeals court found that the city's written policy concerning the use of deadly force complied with Fourth Amendment requirements and required officers to reasonably believe that there was an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury before shooting. There were, however, genuine issues of material fact as to whether there was an alleged "longstanding" practice or custom of use of deadly force in circumstances where it was not warranted, sufficient to support a claim for municipal liability. The court rejected, however, any claim based on inadequate training. Price v. Sery, No. 06-35159, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1196 (9th Cir.).
     A federal appeals court held that a police SWAT team sniper acted in an objectively reasonable manner in shooting and killing an armed suspect, and that neither the officer nor the city was liable for the death. The officer, according to the court, heard the suspect threaten to shoot police, saw him carrying a rifle, and had knowledge that he had previously shot at a car full of people, wounding two of them. Additionally, fellow officers had radioed that the suspect was shooting at them and yelling threats. Under these circumstances, the officer reasonably believed that the suspect posed an immediate danger, justifying the use of deadly force. The court further ruled that a decision that was made to wait for a light armored vehicle for safety reasons before entering the property where the suspect was did not constitute deliberate indifference, even accepting the argument that the delay may have contributed to the decedent's death. Long v. City and County of Honolulu, No. 05-16567, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29530 (9th Cir. 2007).
     Officer did not use excessive force in shooting a motorist who fled on foot after a vehicle pursuit, and was running in a residential area holding a screwdriver in the direction of some of the officers a few feet away. Under these circumstances, the use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. Nicarry v. Cannaday, No. 07-11679, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29707 (11th Cir.).
     Deputy did not act unreasonably in shooting and killing a man who had refused to submit to a pat down and then disarmed the deputy of his baton. At the time he was shot, the suspect was holding the baton while the deputy lay prone. A federal appeals court upheld a jury's verdict in favor of the deputy. Lewis v. County of Riverside, No. 06-55764, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29148 (9th Cir.).
     A disputed issue of fact as to whether a suspect was unarmed and surrendering to officers with his hands up or appeared to be concealing a weapon when he was shot and killed by a detective barred summary judgment in an excessive force lawsuit. White v. Gerardot, No. 07-1418, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28009 (7th Cir.).
     Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit over his shooting and killing of a motorist he had stopped because the car matched the description of a stolen vehicle. The motorist refused to comply with orders to keep his hands up, and drove off, which dragged the officer along since his hands were inside the car. Under these circumstances, the force used was objectively reasonable. Owens v. City of Austin, No. 06-50763, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28646 (5th Cir.).
     Alabama deputy sheriff acted reasonably in shooting and killing a mentally unstable man who took possession of a marked sheriff's cruiser when he was informed that he was going to be arrested, and began backing away. The deputy who shot him warned that he would be shot if he did not stop his escape. The decedent could have used to car to injure or kill someone, especially since it cloaked him with the "apparent authority' of a police officer. Long v. Slaton, No. 06-14439, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 26573 (11th Cir.).
     Three police officers who allegedly fired at a suspect while he was on the ground, already shot, were entitled to qualified immunity from liability. The facts showed that the first officer who shot the suspect before he fell to the ground was faced with a much larger man charging her with a dangerous weapon in his hand, and that the suspect refused to stop moving or show his hands, as he was ordered to do by the other officers after he fell. Under the circumstances, the officers did not act unreasonably. Berube v. Conley, No. 06-2644, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 25418 (1st Cir.).
     In a prior lawsuit concerning the fatal shooting of a suspect by police, the shooting was found to be legally justified. The decedent's mother and estate then sued another officer, seeking to hold him liable for the death on the basis that he was the highest ranking officer present. The result in the prior lawsuit barred this claim. Easley v. Reuss, No. 06-1646, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 22352 (7th Cir.).
     Deputies did not act unreasonably in shooting and killing a mentally disturbed man who posed a threat of serious physical harm. The man had placed a large sign in his front yard that said, "no police you be shot." The suspect came out of his mobile home holding something the officers believed to be a handgun and took a kneeling stance that was believed to be a shooting position, pointing it in the direction of an officer. The suspect responded to commands to drop the object by yelling, "Shoot me, Shoot me." The suspect was subsequently shot and killed as he was charging towards the officers. Summerland v. County of Livingston, No. 06-1975, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21045 (6th Cir.).
     A police officer acted reasonably within an extremely brief period of time in shooting and killing a teenage motorist whose car struck him as it drove away following a traffic stop. The officer stated that he had seen the car accelerate towards him and a "determined look" on the face of the motorist, and decided to fire upon realizing that he could not get out of the way. The officer himself testified during his deposition, that he did not know if he fired before, during, or after he was hit by the vehicle. The court found that it was reasonable to conclude that the shooting and the vehicle striking the officer happened at close to the same time. The trial court excluded offered expert witness testimony by the father of the motorist, who is a police officer, arguing that the defendant officer must have been behind the car at the time of the shooting. Hathaway v. Bazany, No. 06-50602, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 25561 (5th Cir.).
     Police officers who shot and killed an allegedly suicidal suspect who approached them with a Samurai sword were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they acted unreasonably in using force against him. It was argued that the officers escalated, rather than de-escalated the situation, having gone to check on his well-being, by entering his home, confronting him at the doorway to his bedroom, and using pepper spray against him, creating a situation in which deadly force was required. It was further argued that there was evidence from which it could be concluded that the decedent was trying to defend himself from the officers, who he viewed as aggressors against him. The court found that prior caselaw provided the officers with notice that it was unreasonable to aggressively confront an armed suicidal person in a threatening manner. Hastings v. Barnes, No. 04-5144, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24446 (10th Cir.).
     Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity in shooting a suspect during a drug raid when he feared that the suspect would take his gun as he tried to force the suspect to the ground. A federal appeals court found that an objectively reasonable officer, under the circumstances, could have believed that the suspect posed a threat, and that if he paused even for an instant he might lose his last chance to defend himself. Alford v. Cumberland County, No. 06-1569, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24138 (4th Cir.).
     When police officers reasonably believed that they were facing a potentially violent hostage situation in which an individual was in danger, they had no obligation under the Americans with Disabilities Act to provide a reasonable accommodation for an allegedly disabled mentally ill suspect.  In a previous decision, officers were held not liable for shooting and killing the suspect, who had threatened the life of an officer, and who they perceived was holding a knife and a large metal pipe with a hook at the end, and kept advancing towards them despite orders to stop and drop his weapons. Because the officers, under these exigent circumstances, had no duty to reasonably accommodate the suspect's mental illness, it was irrelevant whether or not the police department had effectively trained its officer in providing such accommodations to mentally ill hostage takers. Waller v. City of Danville, Virginia, Case No. 4:03CV00039, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 73582 (W.D. Va.).
     In a prior decision, Curley v. Klem, #01-1093, 298 F.3d 271 (3rd Cir. 2002), a federal appeals court held that a state trooper was not entitled to qualified immunity for his shooting of a Port Authority police officer in full uniform who he stated he believed to be an armed murder suspect he had been pursuing. The injured officer claimed that trooper unreasonably failed to look into vehicle where the sought suspect had just committed suicide and unreasonably shot him only because, like the suspect, he was a "black man with a gun." Subsequently, on remand, a jury found that the shooting officer's failure to look into the window of the vehicle was unreasonable but that the officer's action in shooting the injured officer was not unreasonable. On appeal, the court found that the jury's verdict, in finding that the officer acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances meant that no constitutional violation occurred. Curley v. Klem, No. 05-4701, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 20213 (3rd Cir.).
     An officer's mistaken use of his handgun, rather than the taser, which he allegedly intended to shoot an arrestee with, did not change the fact that the shooting constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Further proceedings were ordered on the issue of whether the seizure was unreasonable v. Henry v. Purnell, No. 06-1523, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 22436 (4th Cir.).
     If a vehicle had come to a stop with the engine running, and suspects in the car had their hands in the air or on the steering wheel when officers approached, then an officer who shot and killed a 16-year-old in the vehicle would not have acted reasonably. If, on the other hand, as the officer claimed, the car was backing up, and threatened the safety of the officers or others, the result could be different. Genuine issues of disputed material fact, therefore, barred qualified immunity for the officers. Green v. Taylor, No. 06-3583, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21593 (6th Cir.).
     If the facts were as alleged by the plaintiff, a jury could find that no reasonable officer would have shot and killed her son, who allegedly posed no immediate risk of death or serious injury to anyone. Further proceedings were therefore ordered on the claims against the shooting officer. Claims against a second officer, however, were properly rejected when he lacked sufficient time to prevent the shooting officer's alleged use of excessive force. Murray-Ruhl v. Passinault, No. 05-2607, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21573 (6th Cir.).
     Arrestee who claimed that deputies shot him numerous times in an attempt to murder him failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity as required for a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961, et seq., when all of the acts he claimed had occurred arose from the single incident. Curry v. Baca, No. CV 04-9992, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 56817 (C.D. Cal.).
     In a lawsuit claiming that a suspect was shot and killed during a police raid without provocation and despite the fact that he was unarmed, the trial court improperly dismissed the lawsuit on its own motion without providing notice to the family members who were plaintiffs in the case. Despite the fact that they could not identify which officer shot the decedent, that information could reasonably be provided by discovery, and their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims were not "patently meritless." Rivera v. Sanchez-Ramos, No. 06-2398, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18692 (1st Cir.).
     When an arrestee failed to comply with the officers' orders, and made furtive motions in the back of his car, the fact that bullets were exiting the car from the rear windshield made it objectively reasonable for one of the officers to perceive that the suspect was shooting at him. There was no evidence from which it could be reasonably concluded that an officer's bullet struck the suspect. Even if one of the officers did shoot the suspect, his actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Swann v. City of Richmond, No.3:06CV069, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 56907 (E.D. Va.).
     Police sergeant acted objectively reasonably in firing at a stolen car, striking the driver in the back of the neck and leaving him paralyzed. The car had been reported stolen, was being driven by a minor, and had evaded attempts to block the vehicle, going into reverse to collide with an officer's cruiser. When the sergeant pointed his gun at the driver's head, he was knocked down by the vehicle, prior to shooting several rounds. No jury, the court concluded, could reasonably find the use of deadly force unreasonable, based on the driver's decision to flee and the immediate threat of harm the driver posed to the sergeant, pedestrians, and other drivers. Williams v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, No. 05-2409, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18599 (6th Cir.).
     Police officers acted properly in shooting and killing an allegedly emotionally disturbed 19-year-old, 300-pound man, 6'7" tall, who was attacking an officer with a sword, after they came to his residence in response to his mother's concern that he might harm himself because of depression over failing to get a job as an airport security guard. The decedent allegedly continued to stab the officer despite initial shots that struck him, responding by saying "ow," but otherwise continuing his assault. Both federal civil rights and state law liability claims were rejected. Hayek v. City of St. Paul, No. 06-3802, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 15482 (8th Cir.).
     If the facts were as stated by an undercover officer, shot by a fellow officer after reporting that he had already been shot in the area by a perpetrator, the actions of the shooting officer were not objectively reasonable. A reasonable officer, arriving on the scene after there was a report of an officer shot, would have recognized that the undercover officer did not pose an immediate threat to anyone. While he had a pistol, he dropped it on the ground, and was not pointing it at the officers or reaching for it. He was also not actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade the officers by flight, but was kneeling in the street under a streetlight by himself, and waving his arms above his head trying to attract attention. Further, the shooting officer failed to attempt to give the undercover officer any commands or warnings before firing at him, and the undercover officer did not match the description of the suspect sought, who had shot him. Ngo v. Storlie, No. 06-2771, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 17798 (8th Cir.).
     A woman shot by police officers who came to her apartment after she allegedly threatened to kill herself with a shotgun failed to show that the search of her apartment violated her civil rights under Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 52.1. That statute requires, for liability, that constitutional rights be violated as a result of a threat, intimidation, or coercion, which was not shown, even if the plaintiff could show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the search did not take place until two hours after the plaintiff had been taken to the hospital for treatment of her wounds, so that the use of force was not related to the search. A federal appeals court upheld the jury's verdict for the city and police officers on claims of both excessive use of force and under the California statute. Jackson v. City of Fresno, No. 05-16857, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 11838 (9th Cir.).
     If the plaintiff's version of events were believed, officers who allegedly pursued him without identifying themselves as police, shot him, beat him, and then shot him again were not entitled to qualified immunity, because the beating and shooting of a person who was already shot and was incapacitated, under these circumstances, would violate clearly established law. The officers, on the other hand, claimed that they had identified themselves as police and only shot him after he had shot at them a number of times, as well as denying that they beat him. Further proceedings were ordered, but claims against the State of Missouri were rejected on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Johnson v. Board of Police Commissioners, No. 4:06CV605, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 40292 (E.D. Mo.).
     Officers who shot and killed a man who they believed was holding hostages inside his residence were entitled to summary judgment. A statement by a plaintiff's expert that it was "highly unlikely" that the decedent had been pointing a rifle at the officers at the time of the shooting was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to require taking the case to a jury, when all officers at the scene testified that he had done so, and the medical examiner also expressed an opinion that the evidence supported the officers' version of the incident. The appeals court also found that it was not reasonable to infer from the locations of the bullets in the residence that the officers did not actually believe that there were any hostages and were firing indiscriminately. Lewis v. Adams County, No. 06-3893, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9872 (6th Cir.).
     An arrestee who was awarded $275,000 in damages ($25,000 compensatory and $250,000 in punitive) on claims that he was "framed" and maliciously prosecuted on a firearms charge, and that excessive force was used against him by an officer who shot him in the buttocks, was also entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs of $507,000. The defendant city failed to convince a federal appeals court that the trial judge had abused his discretion in refusing to lower the amount of attorneys' fees awarded. The court rejected the city's argument that the plaintiff's success should be viewed as "minimal," requiring a reduction in the attorneys' fees award because the jury award was less than the amount of damages the plaintiff sought. Additionally, the court stated that the plaintiff's success should not simply be viewed in monetary terms. ''He effectively persuaded a jury that a significant number of City of Harvey officials conspired to plant a gun at the crime scene -- a victory that serves the public interest by exposing to light disturbing police malfeasance and grave municipal institutional failures, and one that will presumably help to deter future constitutional violations by the city's officers,'' the court stated. ''These achievements are anything but minimal.'' Robinson v. City of Harvey, No. 04-3993 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 13705 (7th Cir.).
     Police officers acted reasonably in shooting and killing a man who approached them in a threatening manner while brandishing a machete and tire iron. He had been shot with a TASER® multiple times without effect.. The evidence also showed that other persons were in the area, and that the suspect had moved towards them more than once. Under the circumstances, a reasonable fact finder could not find that the officers acted in a willful or malicious manner. The officers were entitled to dismissal of both federal civil rights claims and a state law wrongful death claim arising from the incident. Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, No. 06-3504, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12506 (8th Cir.).
     In a case where the shooting police officer was the only surviving witness to the details of what happened when he shot and killed a man he initially stopped for riding a bicycle on the wrong side of the road and without lights, the court found that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer used excessive force. The decedent's estate argued that he did not, due to his physical limitations, pose a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer at the time of the shooting. The officer claimed that the suspect appeared to be drawing or pulling a weapon or object from his right rear pants pocket at the time of the shooting, and that he believed that to be a weapon, but subsequently turned out to be a pair of pliers. The Plaintiff, the decedent's mother, claimed that he had received a gun shot wound to his dominant right arm less than four months before, and therefore had almost no use of his right arm. Goodman v. Harris County, No. 05-20807, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 11318 (5th Cir.).
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a man sitting in his car with the tires shot out when they allegedly knew he had no gun, was only in possession of a pocket knife, was not suspected of any crime, and when the purpose of trying to get him out of his vehicle was to talk him out of possibly killing himself. Under these alleged circumstances, no use of deadly force would be justified, particularly when he was surrounded by a number of police vehicles and at least ten armed police officers. Lehman v. Robinson, No. 05-15636, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 8978 (9th Cir.).
     Officer did not use excessive force in shooting and killing a motorist who fled a traffic stop, entered another vehicle, and hit the officer with the car. Inadequate training claim against city also rejected. Jenkins v. Bartlett, No. 06-2495, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 9228 (7th Cir.).
     Deputies reasonably believed, at the time they shot at a car attempting to escape them by going in reverse, that a deputy behind the car was in serious danger of harm, so that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Webster v. Beary, No. 06-12194, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 8142 (11th Cir.).
     In a lawsuit over the death of a mentally impaired man holding a screwdriver, who three officers shot and killed, the trial court properly denied summary judgment to the officers, based on the existence of factual disputes about whether the decedent had posed an immediate threat to the officers when he was shot. The appeals court found, further, that the trial court had committed an error in considering the actions of all three of the officers together, and that it should, on remand, consider each of the officers' actions by themselves to determine whether any of them had used unreasonable force. Meadours v. Ermel, No. 05-20764, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 7592 (5th Cir.).
     Estate of paranoid schizophrenic shot and killed by police who came to his house in response to a 911 call from his family requesting assistance failed to show that more adequate training as to how to respond to incidents involving mentally disturbed persons would have resulted in a different result. The court found that the officers did not create the dangerous situation. Thao v. City of St. Paul, No. 06-2339, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 7553 (8th Cir.).
     Two persons shot by a deputy when their pickup truck started to drive away from a traffic stop as the deputy approached adequately alleged that the county sheriff, in training programs, did not clearly define the circumstances under which deadly force could be used, and that, if any such guidelines existed, the sheriff had violated them. A relationship between the sheriff's actions and the incident was also alleged. Official capacity claims against the sheriff, however, were dismissed, as the county, which was the proper defendant, was named in the complaint. Rodriguez v. Quintero, Civil Action No. SA-06-CA-64-FB, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25296 (W.D. Tex.).   
     Police officers acted reasonably in shooting and killing an arrestee who had refused to submit to their attempts to handcuff him, when they believed that he had his hands on or near one officer's gun, which had come loose during the struggle between them. Officers are not required to wait to take action to protect their safety until a resisting arrestee has completely freed himself and has obtained a "firm grip" on a weapon. Henning v. O'Leary, No. 06-2378, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 3380 (7th Cir.).
     California highway patrol officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit claiming that he shot and killed teenage driver at conclusion of pursuit without warning and without reason to belief that he needed to do so to defend himself or others at that time. Adams v. Speers, No. 05-15159, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 442 (9th Cir.).[N/R]
     District of Columbia could not be held liable for an officer's alleged excessive use of deadly force when there was no evidence of any official policy or custom which caused the incident, and there was no evidence of failure to properly train and supervise the officer on the part of either the District or the police chief. Claim for excessive use of force remains pending against the officer, who allegedly shot and killed a woman who failed to respond to his orders that she drop a gun when she came up a staircase with it in her hand. Reed v. D.C., No. 03-1085, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12252 (D.D.C.).[N/R]
     City not liable for misconduct, where a police trainee who was allowed the use of a marked unit to driver to the police academy stopped and shot a man for the purpose of robbing him. Trainees had no police powers, and his motivations were criminal. Georgia interlocal Risk Management Agency v. Godfrey, 273 Ga. App. 77, 614 S.E.2d 201, 2005 Ga. App. Lexis 381 (2nd Dist. 2005); cert den. 2005 Ga. Lexis 691. [N/R]
     Officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a suspect who was armed and whom he believed was pointing his gun at another officer. Livermore v. Lubelan, No. 06-1465, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 2594 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
     Officer acted properly in shooting a man who ignored orders to show his hands, and instead backed his car into a security guard's vehicle, followed by accelerating down an alley towards other police officers in his path. The officer's actions were aimed at trying to prevent him from injuring the other officers, and were reasonable under the circumstances, even if the suspect was then experiencing a bipolar episode. Because of this, there was also no violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Sanders v. City of Minneapolis, Minn., No. 06-1356, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 1396 (8th Cir.). [N/R]
     New York court declines to dismiss claims against a production company and two broadcasting companies alleging that in the course of filming a "reality-based" television program showing police on patrol they encouraged police to use excessive force, adopting a common plan to use excessive which resulted in injuries suffered when a police detective fired his gun, injuring a woman during the execution of a search warrant. Rodriguez v. City of New York, No. 2004-11173 (Index No. 20154/04), 2006 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 15242 (2nd Dept.). [N/R]
     Officer acted objectively reasonably in shooting a man at the scene of a domestic disturbance who failed to drop the knife he was holding until the officer's third order to do so, and then ran towards him, attempting to escape through a poorly lit area outside the residence. Under the circumstances, in which the man had threatened to kill his wife, and the elapsed time between him dropping the knife and running towards the officer was approximately two seconds, the officer could believe that the man was a threat to the safety of the officer and the wife. Butler v. City of Tulsa, No. 06-5078, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 27332 (10th Cir.). [N/R]
     Officer who repeatedly attempted to negotiate with a suspect and get him to drop his weapon before finally shooting and killing him was entitled to summary judgment because the facts showed no violation of the decedent's constitutional rights. DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, No. 05-2325, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 27174 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
     Despite a prior jury verdict in a federal civil rights lawsuit in favor of officers who fatally shot a man twenty-two times as he was attempting to evade arrest, the officers could still possibly face liability for negligence under California state law for the same incident on a theory that they unnecessarily put themselves in the way of harm, and therefore had to "shoot their way out." The jury verdict in the federal civil rights case only dealt with the constitutionality of the use of deadly force under the circumstances that existed at the time of the shooting, and did not decide the question of whether the officers' prior actions constituted negligence. Hernandez v. City of Pomona, No B182437, 2006 Cal. App. Lexis 1925 (2nd Dist.). [N/R]
     Simply because there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in shooting and killing a suspect that an officer reasonably could have believed was armed and was holding a person against her will did not mean that the appeals court could say that there were no set of facts from which the plaintiff could establish a claim for either violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12131-12134,  based on the suspect's mental illness or for race discrimination. The appeals court, therefore, ordered further proceedings on both claims. Waller v. City of Danville, Virginia, No. 06-1107, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 30799 (4th Cir.). [N/R]
     Because it was factually disputed whether a suspect actively posed a threat to anyone at the time when an officer shot and killed him, or whether he was, instead, shot and killed while he stood motionless with his knife at his side from a distance of ten to forty feet away when no officer had warned him to drop the knife, further proceedings were required on an excessive use of force A second officer, merely present during the incident, who was not alleged to have used any force at all, however, was entitled to qualified immunity, as his mere "inaction" during the events could not be a basis for liability for use of excessive force. Bacque v. Leger, No. 06-30019, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 27855 (5th Cir.). [N/R]
     Brother of mentally ill man shot to death by officers inside his home failed to show that the officers used excessive force or violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12131-12165 by failing to reasonably accommodate his mental illness. The officers only entered the home to check on the mentally ill man's welfare and safety, and he was only shot after he had repeatedly stabbed one of the two officers present. Under these circumstances, the officers were reasonable in believing that their actions were legal, and the lawsuit failed to show that the decedent had been denied governmental services "by reason of" a disability. Buchanan v. State of Maine, No. 06-1466, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 28352 (1st Cir.). [N/R]
     Plaintiff in excessive force lawsuit was barred from asserting facts which were inconsistent with those he had agreed to while accepting a plea in his criminal case. Thore v. Howe, No. 06-1627, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 26817 (1st Cir.). [2006 LR Dec]
     Arrestee's lawsuit against deputy for alleged excessive use of deadly force could be interpreted in a way that success in the lawsuit did not necessarily imply the invalidity of his arrest and conviction, and therefore summary judgment should not have been granted to the deputy. McCann v. Nielsen, No. 05-3699, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 26631 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Dec]
     Deputy who shot unarmed arrestee fleeing into unpopulated wooded area was not entitled to summary judgment on excessive force claim. Deputy had previously frisked the arrestee, and found no weapons on him before he fled on foot from the scene of his drug arrest. Ham v. Brice, No. 05-50657, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 26617 (5th Cir.). [2006 LR Dec]
     Officer who shot three times after a motorist drove away in a stolen vehicle, hitting and injuring a passenger on the third shot, was not entitled to qualified immunity in her federal civil rights lawsuit for alleged excessive use of force. Tubar v. Clift, No. C05-1154, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 68390 (W.D. Wash.). [N/R]
     Failure to give jury explicit instructions on the legal rules for use of deadly force required a new trial in lawsuit against officers who shot and maced a bank robber while trying to arrest him. Robber claimed that he was "peacefully surrendering" when he was shot, and an instruction concerning the general test for excessive use of force failed to alert jury as to whether the use of deadly force was allowed under such circumstances. Rahn v. Hawkins, No. 05-3329, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 24037 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Nov]
     Officer did not act unreasonably during plaintiff's arrest by shooting and killing his pit bull. Evidence showed that witnesses saw the dog growling, being aggressive, and advancing towards the officer, justifying the officer's actions. Chambers v. Doe, No. Civ. 04-415, 2006 U.S.Dist. Lexis 69965 (D. Del. 2006). [N/R]
     In a lawsuit over the fatal shooting of a suspect by an undercover police officer, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because of issues of fact as to whether, at the time of the shooting, he reasonably believed that the suspect was armed and would try to shoot him. The issue was not whether or not the suspect was actually armed, but what the officer reasonably believed. Bouggess v. Mattingly, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV-180, 426 F. Supp. 2d 601 (W.D.Ky. 2006). [N/R]
     Keeping an eleven-year-old unarmed boy in handcuffs for 15 minutes, and pointing a gun at his head, while search and arrest warrants were served on his parents' home, if true, could be found to be an excessive use of force. Federal agents were not entitled to qualified immunity. Tekle v. U.S., No. 04-55026, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 20583 (9th Cir.). [2006 LR Oct]
     Three million dollar settlement reached in lawsuit by family of unarmed man shot and killed by police officer during a raid on a warehouse where he worked repairing art and musical instruments. The raid was conducted because police suspected that DVD and CD counterfeiting was going on in the facility. The former police officer who shot the decedent was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. Sanfo v. City of New York, No. 1:04-CV-01760, U.S. Dist. Ct. (S.D.N.Y. 2006).. [N/R]
     It was no abuse of discretion to exclude an expert witness's testimony in an excessive force case involving a police shooting when the court found that the expert's opinion that a reasonable officer would have been able to tell that the plaintiff was not holding a gun, bur rather a cell phone, had "no basis." Hickey v. City of New York, No. 05-1933-CV, 173 Fed. Appx. 893 (2nd Cir. 2006). [N/R]
     Police officers, including S.W.A.T team members, were entitled to qualified immunity for surrounding the home of a man who had fired shots into the air and ground nearby, entering the home forcibly without a warrant, and using pepper gas and a flashbang in an attempt to flush him out. Assuming that the use of a second flashbang, which burned down the house, was excessive, it still did not violate any "clearly established right." Factual disputes about whether the suspect was still armed and was threatening officers at the time they shot and killed him, however, barred qualified immunity for the officers on a claim that the use of deadly force was excessive. Estate of Bing v. City of Whitehall, No. 05-3889, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 19287 (6th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Police chief was not entitled to qualified immunity on a Fourth Amendment claim that he acted unreasonably in shooting and killing a family's pet dog while it was in their enclosed backyard, mistakenly believing that it was a loose dog that he had earlier pursued through the neighborhood. Andrews v. City of W. Branch, No. 05-1188, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 18748 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Sep]
     Experts in the use of deadly force could not provide testimony based on medical evidence or opinions because this was found by the court to be outside the area of their expertise, and there was no showing that such medical reports were the kind of materials that excessive force experts relied on. Richman v. Sheahan, No. 98C7350, 415 F. Supp. 2d 929 (N.D. Ill. 2006). [N/R]
     Police officer's use of deadly force was reasonable when a suspect refused to comply with his requests and continued to move towards the officer, reaching for the officer's gun. Blossom v. Yarbrough, No. 03-5146, 429 F.3d 963 (10th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers were not liable for the shooting death of an 18-year-old involved in a family dispute who allegedly ignored their demands that he drop a knife and instead continued to move up some stairs toward the officers. Trial court rejects inadequate training and supervision claims. While the city had knowledge that the officer who shot the youth had been involved in at least eight other shootings, resulting in five other deaths, none of the shootings were ever ruled improper, and a number of years had passed since the officer last discharged his firearm in the course of his duties. Estate of Smith v. Silvas, No. 04CV00200, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1015 (D. Colo. 2006). [N/R]
     Officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a husband at the scene of a domestic disturbance when the husband refused to raise his hand, kept advancing towards the officer, and was known to possess guns, as well as telling the officer that "I've got something for you. You are going to have to kill me." Transporting wife and her daughter to the police station to take their statements after the incident was not an "unreasonable seizure," as nothing indicated that they were not free to leave. DeLuna v. City of Rockford, No. 05-1337, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 12176 (7th Cir.). [2006 LR Jul]
     Officers and city were entitled to summary judgment on civil rights, state law assault and battery, and negligence claims arising out of shooting of an arrestee in the hip while he was being handcuffed. Under New Mexico state law, the arrestee's death, six months later, from unrelated causes in a swimming accident, extinguished all claims for intentional misconduct, and there was no waiver of governmental immunity for the negligence claim under state law. Oliveros v. Mitchell, No. 05-2163, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 12146 (10th Cir.). [2006 LR Jul]
     Man shot and injured by police, supposedly as an innocent bystander to an undercover drug operation, failed to show that the District of Columbia had tolerated a pattern of excessive use of force by police officers, or that it had been deficient in its investigations of use of force incidents. The District, therefore, could not be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries. McKnight v. D.C., No. Civ.A.00-CV-2607, 412 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2006). [N/R]
     Use of deadly force to shoot and kill a suspect fleeing from the scene of an undercover drug bust was only justified if, at the time of the shooting, the suspect's vehicle posed an imminent danger to officers. Factual disputes as to whether or not that was the case made summary judgment in favor of the shooting police detective improper. Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, No. 05-3035, 437 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2006). [2006 LR Jun]
     Police officers who shot arrestee did not use excessive force, since he was armed and had shot at them while they were pursuing him and his flight from arrest ended in a car-jacking during which he put a gun to the head of a motorist and did not obey the officers' orders to halt. Gravely v. Speranza, No. 02-5594, 408 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D.N.J. 2006). [N/R]
     Deputy did not use excessive force in shooting suspect, even if he was not then armed, when the suspect confronted him again moments after attempting a potentially deadly assault on him, including throwing a U-bolt through the deputy's windshield, a hammer in the deputy's vicinity with enough force to shatter a car window, his advance on the deputy was not stopped by pepper spray, and he had punched the deputy with a pry bar. Hammond v. Smith, No. 04-73410, 408 F. Supp. 2d 425 (E.D. Mich. 2005). [N/R]
     Trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment to police officers in lawsuit over their shooting and killing of a suspect without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to discover whether video cameras in police vehicles at the scene of the incident recorded it, and what such videotapes might show. Ingle v. Yelton, No. 05-1556, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 5779 (4th Cir.). [2006 LR Apr]
     City of Chicago reaches $1.75 million settlement with man who lost an eye when officers fired on the vehicle in which he was traveling as a passenger when he was a 15-year-old. The vehicle was allegedly then traveling on the sidewalk and towards a group of police officers on the corner. The officers claimed that they fired in self-defense, believing that the vehicle was trying to run them down, and the vehicle did hit one of the officers. The plaintiff in the lawsuit claimed, however, that the shot that struck him was fired by an officer after the car had passed him by, and when none of the officers were in any further danger from the vehicle. A total of 25 shots were fired at the car. Bell v. City of Chicago, No. 01L3148, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Law Division, February 6, 2006, reported in Chicago Daily Law Bulletin, p. 1, February 7, 2006. [N/R]
     Parents of armed robbery suspect shot and killed by police officers had no standing under California law to pursue a federal civil rights lawsuit or state law claims arising out of the incident on their own behalf when they were not financially dependent on the decedent. Foster v. City of Fresno, No. CVF035306, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2005). [N/R]
     Police officers' shooting and killing of homeless mentally ill man sitting in a car was not excessive force when they acted after he raised a gun and did not know, until later, that the weapon was a BB gun. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for them to believe that their lives were at risk. Court also rules that the officers did not engage in disability discrimination when they called on a SWAT team to extract the man from his car after the shooting, causing a delay in medical treatment. The officers could reasonably do this to ensure the safety of themselves and others at the scene. Ali v. City of Louisville, No. Civ. A. 3:03CV-427, 395 F. Supp. 2d 527 (W.D. Ky. 2005). [N/R]
     In a lawsuit under Texas state law for negligence, filed by an arrestee who was shot by a sheriff's deputy after a car chase, a county was entitled to sovereign immunity. A state statute waiving immunity for certain negligent acts of governmental employees did not apply, as the shooting was an intentional action. An intermediate state appeals court reasoned that the exception to the statute's waiver of immunity for intentional acts could not be "circumvented" merely by claiming that the county was "negligent" in supervising the employee who commits an intentional act, such as a shooting. Harris County, Texas v. Cabazos, No. 01-03-00772-CV, 177 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App. 1st Dist. 2005). [N/R]
     The estate of a detainee who died after being shot by police who stopped him stated a viable claim against members of the city's Board of Police Commissioners for liability based on an alleged official policy or custom of failing to instruct and supervise the officers on the proper use of deadly force. McNeal v. Zobrist, No. CIV.A. 04-2149, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Kan. 2005). [N/R]
     No reasonable juror, federal appeals court rules, could find that a police officer violated a schizophrenic suspect's rights by shooting and killing him seconds after he stabbed another officer with a butcher knife. Untalan v. City of Lorain, No. 04-4489, 430 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2005). [2006 LR Feb]
     Officer's shooting and killing of drug crime suspect in his home during execution of search warrant was justified when the officer was confronted by a weapon upon his entry. No evidence supported a claim that the officer shot the suspect after he was incapacitated or when he was helpless. Sterling v. Weaver, No. 04-35346, 146 Fed. Appx. 136 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     City of New York and its police officers were entitled to immunity from liability under state law for the death of a man from gunfire that occurred while he was attempting to make an illegal sale of guns to undercover officers, as there was no evidence that anything the officers did was inconsistent with acceptable police practices. The officers were exercising their discretionary professional judgment at the time of the shooting. Arias v. City of New York, 802 N.Y.S.2d 209 (A.D. 2nd Dept. 2005). [N/R]
     If deputy sheriff fired final fatal shot at arrestee fleeing in stolen police car after the vehicle passed him, he violated the arrestee's constitutional rights. The arrestee had been taken into custody for the nonviolent offense of making harassing phone calls, and no longer posed an immediate threat to the deputy after driving past him. Smith v. Cupp, No. 04-5783, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 26268 (6th Cir.). [2006 LR Jan]
     Officers were properly held liable for shooting man in the leg while he fled from the scene of an arson at a garage, when jury rejected their claim of self-defense. Federal appeals court overturns jury awards against city, mayor, and police commissioner, however, finding no evidence of inadequate training or discipline. Compensatory damages of $4 million to shot man, however, found excessive by $1 million, and awards of $500,000 to each of his parents also found excessive by $400,000 each. Punitive damage awards of $15,000 against each of two officers upheld. Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, No. 04-1217, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 26549 (1st Cir.). [2006 LR Jan]
     Police officer acted reasonably in shooting a man who had barricaded himself in his bedroom armed with a number of guns after officers came to his house in response to a domestic disturbance call, and who threatened to shoot officers if they attempted to remove him from the home. Just prior to the officer shooting him, the suspect had raised a window and announced that he now had a "clean shot." Phillips v. James, No. 03-4272, 422 F.3d 1075 (10th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Dec]
     Officers who shot at car containing suspect attempting to flee from service of felony drug arrest warrant were not liable for subsequent death of one of his passengers and serious injuries to another when his car later crashed into a wall. The cause of the death and injuries was the suspect's decision to flee, not the officers' use of deadly force. Shooting at the suspect was reasonable when an officer believed that the suspect was trying to run him over. Troupe v. Sarasota County, Fla., #04-10550, 419 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Dec]
     Motorist's plea of guilty to speeding showed that officers had probable cause for his arrest, and the officers did not use excessive force by merely drawing their weapons when the vehicle was stopped at 3:30 a.m. in a secluded and unlit area. Cunningham v. Sisk, No. 03-6640, 136 Fed. Appx. 771 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Family of man shot and killed by police officer could not pursue a federal civil rights claim for deprivation of their right to familial association in the absence of any evidence that the officers intended to interfere with their relationship with the decedent, and his estate was the only party authorized to pursue a claim under New Mexico's state wrongful death statute. Murphy v. Bitsoih, No. CIV. 02-1185, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D.N.M. 2004). [N/R]
     State of Maine was not liable for the death of a mentally ill man shot and killed by police as he was attempting to stab an officer with a knife in his residence. The state's alleged inadequate provision of mental health services, if proven, did not have a disparate impact on the decedent, in violation of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disabilities by public entities, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12132, as he was not denied any public service available to able members of the public. Buchanan v. Maine, No. CIV.04-26, 366 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Me. 2005). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court, overturning 20-year-old precedent, rules that parents of an adult son shot and killed by a police officer could not recover damages in federal civil rights lawsuit for the loss of the companionship of their son. Russ v. Watts, No. 04-3628, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Nov]
    Officer acted properly, while investigating a prowler call, in stopping the only car observed in the area, which had tinted windows obstructing his view inside, and he and another officer acted properly in attempting to conduct a pat-down search of a passenger outside the vehicle who was known to be a convicted narcotics felon. Appeals court fails to reach issues of whether officers acted lawfully, however, in shooting passenger, and in hitting him and using a dog against him after the shooting, in light of disputes as to whether he was actually armed with a gun and continued to pose a threat after he was shot. Holeman v. City of New London, No. 04-5031, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 21213 (2nd Cir.). [2005 LR Nov]
     Factual issues concerning whether or not a man was holding a toy gun or otherwise threatening an officer before the officer shot and killed him barred granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the officer in the surviving family's federal civil rights lawsuit. Finks v. City of North Las Vegas, No 04-15806, 135 Fed. Appx. 976 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officer's shooting and killing of man's pet dog was not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The officer could have, under the circumstances, reasonably believed that the dog posed an imminent threat to his safety, based on its weight of 55 to 60 lbs, its speed in traveling 15 feet in five seconds, and the fact that it would have reached him in five seconds had he not shot it. While the dog owner did yell that the dog would not hurt the officer, the officer did not have to wait until the dog was within biting range before taking action to protect himself. Dziekan v. Gaynor, No. 3:03CV1486, 376 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D. Conn. 2005). [N/R]
     Sheriff who shot and killed a man while responding to a dispatch call about an armed and possibly suicidal person acted in an objectively reasonable manner when the man had grabbed and raised his rifle and struggled with the sheriff for possession of the rifle as the sheriff sought to disarm him. Under the circumstances, the sheriff could reasonably believe that his own life was in danger. Burnette v. Gee, No. 04-5551, 137 Fed. Appx. 806 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     When officers shot at motorist's car leaving the scene after the occupants ignored orders to exit their vehicle, and hit the car, but not any of its occupants, resulting in the motorist leaving unimpeded, the occupants were not "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, so an occupant's excessive force claim had to be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's "shocks the conscience" due process legal standard rather than the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. In this case, the plaintiff did not appeal the trial court's conclusion that the officers' conduct did not "shock the conscience," but unsuccessfully argued that it was excessive and unreasonable because the Fourth Amendment applied. Ferrante v. Peters, No. 04-3459, 135 Fed. Appx. 846 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     New York intermediate appellate court upholds jury's award of $1,375,799.06 for lost earnings and pain and suffering to the estate of a man shot and killed by officers when he peered out from where he was standing, after hearing the officers' shots ring out. The court found that there was evidence that the officers were aware that a "bystander" was on the street at "this wee hour of the morning," and that the man who had flagged them down had pointed out the decedent. Cusanelli v. New York City Transit Authority, 799 N.Y.S. 2d 36 (A.D. 1st Dept. 2005). [N/R]
     Mother of 30-year-old man shot and killed by police officer following traffic stop had no constitutionally protected due process right to the companionship of her son which could be the basis for a federal civil rights claim on her own behalf. Robertson v. Hecksel, No. 04-12367, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17201 (11th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
     Officers acted objectively reasonably in shooting and killing a man they were in the process of arresting for a drug offense when he used his car as a weapon, knocking one officer backwards, and there was a threat that he would then run over the fallen officer. Gaxiola v. City of Richmond Police Department, No. 03-16871, 131 Fed. Appx. 508 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers had exigent circumstances to enter a house without waiting for the occupant, a suspected methamphetamine drug dealer, to answer, based on various evidence giving them reason to believe that he was likely to be armed. Officers also did not act unreasonably in returning the suspect's gunshots, and suspect could not assert a claim for excessive use of force when he was not struck by the officers' bullets. Cabell v. Rousseau, No. 04-1258, 130 Fed. Appx. 803 (7th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a suspect in a drug transaction investigation who was slowly moving a vehicle towards him, which threatened to crush him into another car. Robinson v. Arrugueta, No. 04-10856, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 13456 (11th Cir.). [2005 LR Sep]
     Undercover federal drug agent acted reasonably in fearing for her life and shooting a suspect participating in an attempted armed robbery during a drug transaction. U.S. government not liable under Federal Tort Claims Act for agent's actions which caused suspect to be paralyzed from the waist down. Morales v. US, No. 03-1743, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10082 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Sep]
     Erroneous admission of expert witness testimony which commented on the credibility of police officers involved in shooting required a new trial in case where jury returned a verdict against a suspect shot and paralyzed from the waist down. Nimely v. City of New York, No. 04-3240, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 12712 (2d Cir.). [2005 LR Aug]
     Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity for mistakenly shooting a witness to a shooting who was crawling towards other officers with a gun in hand. Under the circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed that the witness was the shooter and that they had probable cause to arrest him and use deadly force against him. Flynn v. Mills, No. 1:03-CV-00515, 361 F. Supp. 2d 866 (S.D. Ind. 2005). [N/R]
     Deputies who shot a sword-carrying schizophrenic man, rendering him paraplegic, after he appeared to be ignoring their orders to drop the weapon and attempted to enter a house were entitled to qualified immunity. They did not know that he could not hear their orders, or that he was attempting to enter his own home. Blanford v. Sacramento County, No. 03-17146, 406 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Jul]
     Police officer who shot unarmed burglar allegedly obeying his order to exit a cabinet in which he had been hiding was not entitled to qualified immunity if the facts were as the plaintiff claimed--that he had not attempted to reach his hand into his pocket. Sample v. Bailey, No. 04-4174, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 8328 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Jul]
     Federal appeals court lacked jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified immunity when the defendant police officer made assertions on appeal which challenged the trial court's factual findings in a lawsuit concerning his shooting of an arrestee, and whether the shooting was accidental or intentional. Henry v. Purnell, No. 04-1810, 119 Fed. Appx. 441 (4th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Factual issues concerning whether off-duty officer shot bar patron, and whether in doing so, he was acting under color of law and within the scope of his employment barred summary judgment for city in patron's federal civil rights lawsuit over the incident. Coles v. City of Chicago, No. 02C9246, 351 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ill. 2005). [N/R]
     Officers acted reasonably in using deadly force against a suspect who allegedly pointed a weapon at them through the doorway of his apartment. Estate of Sowards v. City of Trenton, No. 03-2036, 125 Fed. Appx. 31 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     Police chief and SWAT team leader were entitled to qualified immunity on claims for supervisory liability in case where SWAT officer entering residence shot and killed a man inside the home within two seconds, and the plaintiffs claimed that the decedent was unarmed. Nothing showed that they made a deliberate choice to inadequately train or supervise the officer, which caused the alleged deprivation of the decedent's rights. Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, No. 04-10036, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 5893 (5th Cir.) [2005 LR Jun]
     City could be liable for on-duty officer's mistaken shooting and killing of an off-duty officer also responding to a disturbance at a restaurant while out of uniform. Federal appeals court finds sufficient evidence to send to a jury the question of whether the city was deliberately indifferent to the risk of "friendly fire" incidents by failing to provide adequate training on identification of off-duty officers, in light of the risks of its "always armed/always on-duty" policy. Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Jun]
     Police officers and sheriff's deputy were not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly seizing "truckloads" of personal property while executing search warrant at residence for the sole purpose of supporting sentencing enhancement in a pending case by proving that the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club was a gang, or for shooting two dogs at the residence. San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, No. 02-16329, 402 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Jun]
     U.S. Border Patrol agent who shot and killed arrestee acted reasonably after the arrestee escaped by kicking the window out of her patrol car and escaped, subsequently biting her hand, pulling her hair, hitting her on the head, and attempting to take her gun away from her. Under these circumstances, and because the arrestee weighed approximately 60 pounds more than the agent, she reasonably feared that the arrestee might kill her or seriously injure her, justifying the use of deadly force. Mason v. United States, No. 03-55560, 120 Fed. Appx. 40 (9th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
     City was not liable for officer's shooting of a man in his home through a kitchen door window when he thought the man was threatening his wife with a gun. Plaintiffs failed to show a municipal policy of condoning the excessive use of force, and an expert's opinion that the city must have had such a policy simply because of the number of excessive force lawsuits filed was inadequate to create a genuine factual issue in the absence of any qualitative analysis of these past cases and their similarity to the current one. Thomas v. Chattanooga, #03-6308, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 2024 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Apr]
     Officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner in shooting a 15-year-old burglary suspect who advanced on her with a knife. Suspect's guilty plea to a criminal charge of threatening the officer with the knife precluded her from disputing that fact in her subsequent civil rights lawsuit. Jiron v. City of Lakewood, No. 02-1421, 392 F.3d 410 (10th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Mar]
     Police officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a motorist following a traffic stop because the motorist picked up a gun after it fell to the sidewalk and after the officers ordered him not to pick up the gun. Bloxson v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, No. 04-1108, 110 Fed. Appx. 279 (3rd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Burglar who was shot by police officer when he reached to grab the top of a cabinet in which he was hiding in order to pull himself out established, for purposes of a qualified immunity analysis, that the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the facts were as he alleged, since he then would have posed no threat to the officer, so that the use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable. Sample v. Bailey, No. 5:04CV344, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (N.D. Ohio 2004). [N/R]
    Police officer who shot and killed victim who was grappling with his assailant and had wrestled the gun away from the suspect was not entitled to qualified immunity. If, as was alleged, victim was not pointing the weapon at the officer, the use of deadly force, which would necessarily endanger both men, was objectively unreasonable. Craighead v. Lee, No. 04-1377, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 301(8th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Feb]
     Police officers properly shot at motorist whose vehicle lurched towards them, but their continued shots after the vehicle passed them was unreasonable because the threat to their safety had ended. The officers were still, however, entitled to qualified immunity because the issue of continued use of deadly force under such circumstances had not been clearly decided at the time of the incident. Waterman v. Batton, No. 04-1096, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10 (4th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Feb]
     Qualified immunity for off-duty officer working as a crossing guard who shot and killed motorist did not, by itself, bar a claim against a police chief for alleged inadequate training, but plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that the training provided was, in fact, inadequate. Roberts v. Shreveport, No. 03-30824, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 589 (5th Cir. 2005). [2005 LR Feb]
     Officer who shot fleeing felon motorist in the back was entitled to qualified immunity, U.S. Supreme Court holds, when prior caselaw did not clearly establish that her conduct violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Brosseau v. Haugen, No. 03-1261, 2004 U.S. Lexis 8275. [2005 LR Jan]
     Officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in shooting and killing a man encountered in the woods armed with two knives who repeatedly refused to drop them in response to the officers' orders, and whose actions indicated that he was prepared to use the knives against them. Huggins v. Weider, No. 03-2333, 105 Fed. Appx. 503 (4th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Jury verdict in favor of police officer and city upheld in case where officer shot and killed a man who approached him with a knife in hand when he responded to a report of a dispute. Where the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and was not polled by special interrogatories, the appeals court could not determine the basis on which the jury found for the defendants and had to presume that the jury "found every issue in favor of the defendants." The plaintiff therefore failed to provide a record on which reversible error could be found. Morales v. Moore, No. 24286, 855 A.2d 1041 (Conn. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Estate of man shot and killed by police was barred, by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from relitigating the issue of whether the force used by the officers was excessive. Federal court had previously found that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable fashion in shooting and killing the man, a motorist, who had rammed his vehicle into an officer's vehicle and then continued to push the officer's vehicle backward. This conclusion in the federal case barred the estate from pursuing state law claims for assault and battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as liability for such claims would be inconsistent with the resolution of the federal lawsuit. Vanvorous v. Burmeister, No. 248450, 687 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Under Louisiana state law, there is no right to a jury trial in any lawsuit for injury to person or property against the state, a state agency, officer, or employee, or a political subdivision of the state or its employees acting in the discharge of his officials duties or within the course and scope of his employment. A jury trial was therefore not available on claims by the parents of a son shot and killed by an off-duty police officer, based on a determination that the officer acted in the course and scope of his employment or in discharging his official duties. Robertson v. Hessler, No. 2003-C-1060, 881 So.2d 116 (La. App. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a husband struggling on the floor with another officer summoned to the home because of a domestic dispute. Parks v. Pomeroy, No. 03-2043 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 23262 (8th Cir.2004). [2004 LR Dec]
     Officer did not use unreasonable force in shooting and killing an unarmed motorist who had crashed his car into a police vehicle and then continued to rev his engine, pushing it backwards and attempting to force it into a ditch. Officer's action was reasonable under the circumstances, and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Vanvorous v. Burmeister, #02-1150, 96 Fed. Appx. 312 (6th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Question of whether officers used excessive force in shooting a man was for the jury to determine, and they could believe, on the basis of the evidence, that the suspect, who had pointed a gun at the officers was trying to escape and disbelieve the plaintiff's asserting that he was handcuffed and in police custody at the time. Federal appeals court upholds jury verdict for defendant officers. Palma v. Edwards, No 03-2019, 103 Fed. App. 3 (7th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner in shooting and killing an intoxicated belligerent suspect who ignored repeated orders to drop his gun when he raised both his arms simultaneously while still holding the gun. Estate of Martinez v. City of Federal Way, No. 03-35210, 105 Fed. Appx. 897 (9th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Plaintiffs failed to show that an official city policy or custom of deliberate indifference to the need for training of officers on the use of deadly force caused the death of a motorist shot and killed by an officer during a pursuit of his vehicle. Genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officer acted negligently, however, barred summary judgment for the city in a Texas state law claim. Lopez-Rodriguez v. City of Levelland, Texas, No. 03-10843, 100 Fed. Appx. 272 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers who allegedly compelled warrantless entry into a woman's home by threatening to arrest her and put her baby in foster care were not entitled to qualified immunity. Warrantless entry was not justified by the fact that a parolee, the subject of the search, had previously lived there, when he was in jail at the time, and the search was based on "stale" information. Additionally, no reasonable officer could have believed that pointing a gun at the five week-old baby during a search of his room was reasonable under the circumstances. Motley v. Parks, No. 02-56648 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 19581 (9th Cir.). [2004 LR Nov]
     Officers who shot and killed a man who demanded they kill him were not entitled to summary judgment on his estate's federal civil rights claim for excessive force when there was a factual dispute over whether he was armed with a knife at the time of the shooting, and whether he posed an immediate threat to them. Murphy v. Bitsoih, 320 F.Supp.2d 1174 (D.N.M. 2004). [2004 LR Nov]
     Police officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner by using deadly force against the occupants of a truck that was being driven towards him at a high rate of speed while he stood a few feet away. Herman v. City of Shannon, No. 04-60027, 104 Fed. Appx. 398 (5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court panel rules, by 2-1 vote, that the failure of a police department to issue officers non-lethal weaponry, such as OC and batons, did not provide a basis for liability for shooting an unarmed man running towards an officer. Strong dissent asserts that a policy of equipping officers only with guns was bound to result, sooner or later, in the use of unjustified deadly force. Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, No. 03-2290, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 17732 (3rd Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Oct]
     Police officer did not use excessive force in drawing and pointing his gun at occupants of a vehicle even though they were not resisting in any way and had only committed a traffic violation, when they had guns in the vehicle and were in a high-crime neighborhood at 1 a.m. in the morning. Ready v. City of Mesa, #02-17102, 89 Fed. Appx. 44 (9th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Police officer who shot and killed suicidal man who attempted to stand in front of moving traffic on a highway, told him that "I am Jesus Christ [...] I am going to die and so are you!" and then attacked him, was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, as he acted in reasonable self defense. Kesinger v. Conner, No. 03-13883, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 18160 (11th Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Oct]
     Jury verdict awarding damages on the basis of officer's alleged unreasonable use of deadly force in shooting and killing a woman armed with two knives inside her house with family members upheld. Intermediate California appeals court, however, rules that city, while vicariously liable for officer's actions, could not be held liable on theories of inadequate training or supervision or other "direct negligence" theories, in the absence of a clear statutory duty which was breached. Munoz v. City of Union City, No. A095846, 2004 Cal. App. Lexis 1187 (Cal. 1st App. Dist.). [2004 LR Sep]
     Police officers' actions in shooting and killing a deaf man armed with a rifle in a parking lot who intended to protest discriminatory treatment of disabled people did not constitute disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The shooting occurred because the decedent's actions threatened others, not because of his disability. Vincent v. Town of Scarborough, #02-239, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20910; confirmed, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22934 (D. Me. 2003). [2004 LR Sep]
     Officer acted in an objectively reasonably manner in shooting and killing a suspect who had fired a gun at an officer, refused to lower his gun when ordered to do so, and then retreated into his home, where the officer feared he would pose an even greater threat to officers on the scene once he was out of sight. Elkins v. McKenzie, No. 2002-IA-00845-SCT, 865 So. 2d 1065 (Miss. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers did not use excessive force in first using pepper spray and then shooting a motorist who pulled a knife on them after initially refusing to submit to a stop on suspicion of intoxicated driving. Gaddis v. Redford Township, #02-1483, 364 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Aug]
     Police officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on supervisory liability claims based on their allowing a sergeant to supervise a "high impact" unit which was involved in the shooting death of a suspect. This was based on the sergeant's past disciplinary record, which allegedly showed that he could not control his emotions and was not "truthful and honest." There was a factual issue as to whether the officers allegedly involved in misconduct in the suspect's death acted on the sergeant's orders and whether the failure of higher-up supervisors to take stronger measures to discipline the sergeant had an "affirmative link" to the alleged violation of the decedent's rights. Court also holds, as to the officers, that there was a genuine factual issue as to whether the decedent had been carrying a gun and whether the officers planted a rifle next to his body after he was shot. Officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force claim or judgment as a matter of law on defamation claim arising from publication in newspaper of photo showing gun next to body. Gonzalez Perez v. Gomez Aguila, 312 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Puerto Rico 2004). [N/R]
     Motorist shot by police officer after car chase, who was awarded $250,000 on his excessive force claim, was also entitled to an award of $95,836.65 for legal fees and $11,758.40 for costs, for a total of $107,595.05. Court rules that time attorney spent investigating the pursuit route and the scene of the shooting was compensable as part of attorneys' fee award, that the cost of hotel expenses for an out-of-state lawyer were not recoverable without an explanation for why it was necessary to hire an out-of-state lawyer. Reduction in requested fees was required based on plaintiff only prevailing against one of four defendants and on only two of fourteen claims originally asserted. Parker v. Town of Swansea, 310 F. Supp. 2d 376 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
     City was not liable for alleged wrongful shooting and killing of woman by off-duty police officer, despite alleged awareness of officer's "violent behavior" towards the victim on prior occasions and his alleged substance abuse. In addition to the officer not being on duty at the time of the incident, the police department was not notified of the situation occurring at the victim's residence, and was therefore not aware of any need to intervene. Burkhart v. Knepper, 310 F. Supp. 2d 734 (W.D. Pa. 2004). [N/R]
     Officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner by shooting suspect during execution of search warrant on residence. Officer had been told that resident was suspected of homicide, had a violent history, and had previously shot a police officer, and that he was known to carry guns. The officer, on entering the home, saw the suspect lift his right arm and believed that an object he was carrying was a gun. The fact that the object subsequently turned out to be a Bic cigarette lighter did not alter the result. Trusdale v. Bell, No. 02-6398, 85 Fed. Appx. 691 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers' actions in approaching a "distraught" woman armed with a handgun with their own weapons drawn and issuing commands to her did not render them liable for her subsequent death when she began pointing her weapon at one of them and she was shot and killed. Court rejects the argument that their conduct unreasonably "provoked" a confrontation which resulted in the death. Neuburger v. Thompson, 303 F. Supp. 2d 521 (W.D. Pa. 2004). [N/R]
     Police officers could reasonably have believed that their safety was in danger even if the plaintiff's version of the incident were believed--i.e., that he turned and faced an officer with his gun in his hand down by his side. Officers were therefore entitled to qualified immunity for their shooting plaintiff several times. Cunningham v. Hamilton, #03-1639, 84 Fed. Appx. 357 (4th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
     Officers acted reasonably in shooting man who allegedly failed to obey orders to put down an 8.5" knife which he had when they responded to his sister's call that he was "going crazy" and needed to "be committed somewhere." No evidence contradicted officers' testimony that the man charged at an officer with the knife, as sister's claim that her brother was trying to lay the knife on a picnic table after withdrawing it from a sheath was "pure speculation," given that she was not present at the time. Santana v. City of Hartford, 283 F. Supp. 2d 720 (D. Conn. 2003). [N/R]
     Federal appeals court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal of denial of qualified immunity to officers who shot man with a history of mental illness who they shot several times after responding to his 911 call. Trial court found that there were genuine contested issues of material fact, and appeals could not review that finding. Goffney v. Carr, #03-20072, 78 Fed. Appx. 974 (5th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Minor child of motorist mistakenly shot and killed by police officers following pursuit, based on incorrect belief that he was suspect wanted for stealing police pistol, could not intervene in a wrongful death claim brought under Virginia state law by the personal representative of the decedent's estate. Personal representative adequately represented minor's interest as a beneficiary of the estate. A mere difference of opinion concerning litigation tactics did not show that personal representative's actions were "inadequate" as would justify a right to intervene in the case for the minor beneficiary. Jones v. Prince George's County, Maryland, #02-7104, 348 F.3d 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers acted reasonably in using pepper spray in an attempt to subdue an emotionally disturbed suicidal man who was armed with an axe and had previously taken hostages, and in shooting and killing him when he responded to the pepper spray by lifting the axe and running towards them. Isom v. Town of Warren, No. 03-1765, 360 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2004). [2004 LR May]
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he shot a fleeing pedestrian in the back after the pedestrian, who was armed, purportedly dropped his handgun. If facts were as plaintiff asserted, officer could not reasonably have believed that he was authorized to use deadly force without warning under the circumstances. Pablo Hernandez v. City of Miami, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2004). [N/R]
     Estate of mentally ill man shot and killed by police officers after use of bean bag pellets and pepper spray failed to subdue him presented a genuine issue of fact as to whether officers had been inadequately trained in dealing with mentally ill persons and in the use of impact projectiles, and whether the alleged inadequate training caused his death. Herrera v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Nev. 2004). [N/R]
     Maryland jury awards $105 million in damages to family of unarmed man shot and killed by Baltimore police officer. While officer claimed the man was holding a gun and turning towards him, evidence in the case led to the officer subsequently pleading guilty to murder charges. The shooting allegedly occurred because the officer believed the man was having an affair with his wife. Estate of Little v. Price, No. 24-c-02-000997 (Baltimore City, Md., Cir. Ct.), reported in The National Law Journal, page 20 (February 9, 2004). [2004 LR Apr]
     Federal appeals court upholds jury award of $1 million to arrestee who was shot in his bed by an officer, allegedly with his hands up, while in possession of a shotgun in his lap. Mere possession of a weapon, without any indication that a suspect is going to use it, is an insufficient basis for the use of deadly force. Robinson v. Nolte, No. 02-55094, 77 Fed. Appx. 413 (9th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Apr]
     Police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in lawsuit brought by family of mentally ill man they shot and killed while he was driving his vehicle towards a toll plaza. Plaintiffs claimed that the officers shot him multiple times at close range and continued firing after all officers were out of the way of his vehicle, intending to hurt or kill him. Waterman v. Batton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 709 (D. Md. 2003). [2004 LR Apr]
     County was not liable for police officer's shooting of suspect who had taken hostages in his car, even if he had his hands up when he was shot, when the suspect and his accomplice were known to be armed and the suspect allegedly quickly opened the car door and lunged out so that the officer could not see his right hand at the time he fired. County review board reasonably decided that officer's shooting did not violate police department's use of force rules. Kanae v. Hodson, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Hawaii 2003). [N/R]
     Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on claim that he shot a mentally ill man in the stomach as he pointed a butcher knife towards himself with suicidal intentions, as deadly force is only permissible when a suspect poses an imminent threat to an officer or to others. Buchanan v. City of Milwaukee, 290 F. Supp. 2d 954 (E.D. Wis. 2003). [2004 LR Mar]
     Officers had a reasonable belief that a man posed an imminent risk to their lives and the lives of commuters when he boarded a train dressed in army fatigues with a mask over his nose while carrying a wooden staff and military sword. Officers did not use excessive force in spraying him with pepper spray and shooting him without killing him after he refused to obey their orders to put the staff down and leave the train. Stevens v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department, 293 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
     Father of adult son, in the absence of evidence that son was not emancipated, could not recover damages for violation of his parental liberty interest in son's companionship in lawsuit against city and police officers who allegedly shot and killed son. Federal appeals court, overturning prior lower court decisions in the Third Circuit, holds that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not extent to a parent's interest in the companionship of an independent adult child. McCurdy v. Dodd, No. 02-2708, 352 F.3d 820 (3rd Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Plaintiff who was shot by police officer could not withhold his medical records in a federal civil rights lawsuit against the city and officer on the basis of doctor-patient privilege or medical records privilege, nor could he assert the right of privacy based on a provision of the California state constitution to prevent the disclosure of those records. The plaintiff, who claimed that he was shot in the back because the officer was in poor physical condition and was therefore unable to pursue him on foot, was also entitled in the case to the disclosure of the officer's medical records, including those in a workers' compensation file. Hutton v. City of Martinez, 219 F.R.D. 164 (N.D. Cal. 2003). [N/R]
     Genuine factual issues as to whether mayor and police commissioner adopted proper regulations regarding the use of firearms and whether officers were properly trained on those regulations barred summary judgment on lawsuit against them by arrestee who was shot twice while running away from parking ramp while allegedly unarmed. Whitfield v. Municipality of Fajardo, 279 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. Puerto Rico 2003). [N/R]
     Officer who shot a suspect as he attempted to drive away in a vehicle did not act reasonably if there was no evidence that he posed a threat of serious harm to others or was armed with a weapon. Haugen v. Brosseau, #01-35954, 339 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Jan]
     Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a suspect who turned around and drove his vehicle towards officers at the conclusion of a high-speed pursuit. Officer could reasonably believe that the motorist was posing a significant threat of physical injury or death to himself and others. Hernandez v. Jarman, No. 02-3519, 340 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 2003). [2004 LR Jan]
     Officer could have reasonably believed that he had probable cause to arrest a juvenile female for evading detection when she drove away as he ran up behind her vehicle calling out "police, stop," after seeing people begin to flee from the area around her vehicle when he shined a spotlight on it. Officer was therefore entitled to qualified immunity for making an arrest, but there were genuine issues of fact precluding summary judgment as to whether or not he was justified in using deadly force in firing at the tire of her vehicle after she allegedly pulled to the right, nearly striking him, as he ran alongside the vehicle. Flores v. City of Palacios, 270 F. Supp. 2d 865 (S.D. Tex. 2003). [N/R]
     A genuine issue of material fact as to whether a house occupant being arrested for disorderly conduct was or was not "lunging" at a police officer when the officer shot and killed him precluded summary judgment in favor of the officer in an excessive force lawsuit brought by the decedent's estate. LA v. Hayducka, 269 F. Supp. 2d 566 (D.N.J. 2003). [N/R]
     Highway patrol officer did not violate the rights of an allegedly intoxicated motorist he shot and killed while fighting in the motorist's vehicle as the suspect attempted to drive off. Officer could reasonably have feared for his own life, as well as the life and safety of others traveling on the highway, having failed to prevent the suspect from driving and being in the motorist's vehicle struggling with him as it went down the road. Anderson v. Cash, No. 02-6356, 70 Fed. Appx. 251 (6th. Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in shooting at persons who they believed, even if mistakenly, were going to use deadly force against them. Carr v. Tatangelo, No. 01-14621, 338 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Nov]
     Firing at a car with the intent to stop a suspect, when the officer did not succeed in doing so, was not a "seizure" for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive use of force. The officer did not physically impair the suspect's ability to leave the scene, since he missed hitting him, so no constitutional violation was shown. Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, No. 02-1379, 336 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Officers did not use excessive force by using non-lethal bean-bag gun and pepper spray to subdue a suspect who had assaulted two neighbors and his wife, threatened the occupants of a next door apartment with knives, and then barricaded himself in his apartment, threatening to "kill" officers if they attempted to enter, and continued to resist them after they did so. Disputed facts about whether the arrestee was then nude or still holding his knife at the time did not change the outcome. Peoples v. Kimmey, No. 02-1109, 67 Fed. Appx. 506 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Jury's verdict for defendant police officer in case accusing him of excessive force in shooting fleeing suspect in the back was inconsistent in finding that the officer used excessive force, but was nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity. Appeals court finds that jury was allowed to decide issue of qualified immunity without being given adequate instructions on how to do so. Stephenson v. Doe, #00-93, 332 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Oct]
     Police chief did not use excessive force in personally shooting and killing a man "brandishing" an 18 to 20 inch sword who raised it towards officers at the scene of a disturbance. Mace v. City of Palestine, No. 02-40335, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Sep]
     Officer was not required to give advance warning of his use of pepper spray in his attempt to subdue a man, armed with a walking stick, who was suspected of having already used it to inflict serious injury on a woman in a laundromat who was observed bleeding profusely from her head at the scene. Further, his use of deadly force was also justified when the suspect appeared ready to attack him and refused orders to drop the stick. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 01-16567, 333 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Sep]
     Federal appeals court holds that privately owned pet dogs are personal "effects" protected under the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures, but also finds that animal control officers' actions in shooting and killing the plaintiffs' dogs were objectively reasonable under circumstances where the dogs posed an actual or potential threat to the officers or others. Altman v. City of High Point, North Carolina, No. 02-1178, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003). [2003 LR Sep]
     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a man who refused to drop his handgun after he was ordered to do so. Officers were responding to reports of shots fired in a high-crime area and could reasonably believe that the suspect presented a serious threat of personal harm to them once he disobeyed orders to drop the weapon, regardless of whether or not he was then pointing the weapon at the officers. Cunningham v. Hamilton, 259 F. Supp. 2d 457 (E.D. Va. 2003). [N/R]
     County and officer could be sued under Florida law for injuries that bystander suffered when he slipped and fell when officer startled him by pointed a gun at him and yelling a him to freeze while conducting a prostitution "sting" operation. Officer's actions created a "foreseeable zone of risk" to the bystander and county was not immune from suit because his injuries were allegedly caused by the manner in which the police implemented their operation. Brown v. Miami-Dade County, No. 3D00-3540, 837 So. 2d 414 (Fla. App. 2001), order denying rehearing en banc (2003). [N/R]
     Georgia Supreme Court holds that, under state law, a parent of an adult child murdered by his surviving spouse can pursue a wrongful death claim against the alleged murderer or against "other parties" that proximately caused the death, answering a question certified to it by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in a case where the murdered son's mother asserted state wrongful death claims against the wife, a police chief, and the city. The claims against the city and police chief were based on the fact that the alleged murderer was a police captain who had previously attempted suicide. The police chief had ordered her to remove all weapons from her home, but did not relieve her of her duties, and she used her service revolver to shoot and kill her husband. Carringer v. Rodgers, No. SO2Q1483, 578 S.E.2d 841 (Ga. 2003). [N/R]
     Sheriff and SWAT team members were not entitled to qualified immunity for death of man shot and killed in his home after he resisted being taken into custody for a psychiatric evaluation. If plaintiff's factual allegations were true, and decedent was in the process of surrendering when he was shot and killed, use of deadly force against him was clearly excessive. Warrantless entry into the home when the man had "not committed" any crimes and there was no immediate need to subdue him was "reckless" and an excessive use of force. Federman v. County of Kern, No. 01-16691, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 7180 (9th Cir.). [2003 LR Jun]
     Officers did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights in 1987 when they made a "split second" decision to shoot a suspect after she had thrown a knife at one of them in an attempt to kill him, and made an assault on a second officer by throwing a glass at him, as well as being near a source of additional potential weapons. They were therefore entitled to qualified immunity. No prior case law from either the U.S. Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that using deadly force under such circumstances was excessive. Willingham v. Loughnan, No. 99-4005, 321 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     A factual issue as to whether an officer was inside or outside of his vehicle when a motorist began driving towards him prevented summary judgment on the issue of whether the officer reasonably feared for his own safety and life at the time he shot and killed the motorist. Martin v. Dishong, #02-1173, 57 Fed. Appx. 153 (4th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
     Whether or not the decedent was the bank robber sought or not did not impact the issue of whether the officers were justified in shooting him since he did threaten them with a gun. Plaintiff in excessive force lawsuit against city and officers failed to show that the first shots fired against the suspect incapacitated him, or that he did not point his weapon at the officer after these shots, justifying the shots which killed him. Muhammed v. City of Chicago, #01-4187, 316 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2002). [2003 LR May]
     Family of youth shot and killed inside his parent's house when he brandished a rifle at an officer can pursue its claim for wrongful death against township and officer under New Jersey state law based on the possibility that the officer engaged in "willful misconduct" in allegedly violating a standing order concerning "establishing a perimeter" in hostage, barricade, or sniper situations. Clarke v. Township of Mount Laurel, 815 A.2d 502 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2003). [2003 LR May]
     Police officer acted objectively reasonable in shooting and killing a 6 foot tall 180 lb 18 year-old armed with a knife who had self-inflicted cuts on himself, refused to relinquish his knife, and began to charge at the officer with it, so that the officer feared for his life. No evidence of inadequate training was produced against municipality. Easley v. Kirmsee, 235 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D.Wis. 2002). [2003 LR May]
     Defendant police officer could not challenge, on appeal of an initial denial of qualified immunity, the trial court's determination that sufficient evidence existed from which a finder of fact could conclude that the plaintiff arrestee was fleeing and no longer posed a threat when the officer shot him. This was an attempt to challenge the "genuineness" of the factual disputes in the case, rather than their "materiality." A proper challenge on appeal would be one to their "materiality," i.e., contending that no violation of a clearly established federal right would be shown even if all of the plaintiff's factual allegations were true. Reyes v. City of Richmond, Tex., #01-20398, 287 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2002) . [N/R]
     Officers were properly granted summary judgment in lawsuit brought by suicidal man armed with knives who threatened his wife and officers and then was subdued by shooting him with "beanbag" rounds. Officers use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and appeals court expresses agreement with trial judge that plaintiff should have "thanked" rather than sued the officers. Bell v. Irwin, #02-2262, 321 F.3d 637, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 3415 (7th Cir.). [2003 LR Apr]
     No reasonable jury could find that a police officer acted objectively unreasonably in shooting an armed suspect who fired the first shot, steadily advanced on the officer, and refused to obey the officer's orders. Firing officer reasonably believed that he was in jeopardy and that a fellow officer was under attack. Plaintiff's admission, in his criminal case, that he acted recklessly was "damning" in his civil rights claim. No claim against municipality could be pursued under the circumstances. Jaques v. Town of Londonderry, #02-1872, 54 Fed. Appx. 14 (1st Cir. 2002). [2003 LR Apr]
     Disputed issues of fact as to whether or not the police officers reasonably believed that they saw a motorist point or fire a gun at them following a traffic stop precluded summary judgment of the basis of qualified immunity for the officers in a lawsuit over their shooting and killing of the motorist. Lee v. Hanna, #01-55403, 32 Fed. Appx. 937 (9th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
     Jury properly awarded damages to estate of man shot and killed as he held his mother hostage with a knife and threatened to kill her if his ex-girlfriend was not brought to him, D.C. high court rules, but jury's $2.1 million compensatory damages award is reduced to $180,000, and $3.999 million punitive damage award was improper since there was no evidence to support a finding that the officers shot the decedent with an "evil motive" or "actual malice." District of Columbia v. Jackson, No. 99-CV-756, 810 A.2d 388 (D.C. 2002). [2003 LR Mar]
     No liability for police officer who entered home in response to two dropped 911 calls made during an ongoing domestic violence incident and subsequently shot and killed a man inside armed with a gun. Appeals court finds that "substantial evidence" supported the jury's finding that the officer had implied consent to enter the home when the "terrified" young female who opened the door did not respond to his questions, but stepped back and did not object when he entered. Pavao v. Pagay, #01-15201, 307 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2002). [2003 LR Feb.]
     Officers who were present but did not participate in fellow officers' shooting of robbery suspects could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for the use of excessive force in the absence of any proof that they had control over the police department's operations, or the actions of the officers who did fire. Further, nothing showed that they set into motion any action that resulted in the shooting or that they authorized, approved, or acquiesced in the shooting. Their mere presence was not enough to pursue claims against them. Figueroa v. Gates, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (C.D. 2002).[N/R]
     Dismissal of an arrestee's federal civil rights lawsuit alleging excessive force in his shooting by an officer was not appropriate for failure to prosecute, despite the inactivity of the case during two years since the plaintiff's release from prison. Plaintiff had not failed to comply with any court orders or to appear for any scheduled depositions and the plaintiff was unable to leave New York to litigate his claim in Pennsylvania due to the conditions of his parole. No prejudice would be suffered by the defendants by proceeding with the case since statements were taken on the day of the shooting and the depositions of both the plaintiff and the defendant officer were already taken. Baxter v. Lancaster County, 214 F. Supp. 2d 482 (E.D. Pa. 2002).[N/R]
     Police chief's shooting and killing of an intoxicated, disturbed man wielding a sword and verbally threatening bodily harm to officers was objectively reasonable, despite arguments that he failed to "exhaust" all other options available to "contain" the individual and violated a department policy by using deadly force with the hope of only wounding the suspect. Mace v. City of Palestine, Texas, 213 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Tex. 2002). [N/R]
      State trooper was not entitled to qualified immunity for his shooting of a Port Authority police officer in full uniform who he stated he believed to be an armed murder suspect he had been pursuing. Injured officer claimed that trooper unreasonably failed to look into vehicle where sought suspect had just committed suicide and unreasonably shot him only because, like the suspect, he was a "black man with a gun." Curley v. Klem, #01-1093, 298 F.3d 271 (3rd Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Dec]
    Officer did not use excessive force in shooting arrestee four times in the chest when he was armed with a tire iron and posed an immediate threat to another officer who was trapped under the vehicle which the officer was attempting to drive off in. Harris v. Lair, #01-1968, 37 Fed. Appx. 818 (7th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Nov]
     Deputy did not use excessive force in shooting a suspect three times while arresting him when the suspect was accused of stealing several firearms and pulled out a weapon and fired, or appeared to do so. Turpin v. Mueller, #00-4585, 37 Fed. Appx. 151 (6th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Nov]
     Police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on his use of deadly force against a mentally ill suspect when a reasonable officer under the circumstances could not believe that the suspect posed a threat of serious injury to the officer or others. Clem v. Corbeau, #01-1799, 284 F.3d 543 (4th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Oct]
     Deputy who allegedly shot through window of house at suspect who had a holstered gun after chasing him there despite the fact that he did not fit the description of the suspect sought was not entitled to qualified immunity in federal civil rights lawsuit filed over suspect's death. George v. Pinellas County, No. 01-12159, 285 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Oct]
     Officers were not entitled to summary judgment when there were disputed issues of fact including discrepancies between their stories as to what transpired after they chased a suspect into a field and then shot and killed him, allegedly believing (mistakenly) that he was armed. Wilson v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, #01-290681, 293 F.3d 447 (8th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Sep]
     Police detective did not violate motorist's rights by shooting and killing him after he attacked the detective and had gained the upper hand in a physical fight in which he was attempting to obtain possession of the detective's gun. Federal appeals court overturns trial court's denial of summary judgment for detective, and rejects argument that detective's supposed tactical errors in the confrontation made his use of force unreasonable. Billington v. Smith, #00-36062, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Sep]
     Off-duty police officer who pursued and then shot and killed unarmed man who alleged stole a lawn mower from his garage was not entitled to qualified immunity from federal civil rights claim. Estate of Thurman v. City of Milwaukee, 197 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (E.D. Wis. 2002). [2002 LR Aug]
     Police officers did not engage in racial discrimination or selective enforcement of laws in stopping African-American motorist whose car was weaving in traffic and in shooting him when an altercation occurred during which he stabbed one officer. There was no evidence that any defendant had failed to enforce the law in a similar manner against similarly situated people of other races. Gaddis v. Redford Township, 188 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Mich. 2002). [N/R]
     Factual issues existed as to whether officers reasonably believed that they saw a gun, a muzzle flash, or were otherwise threated with deadly force by a motorist that they shot and killed after stopping him for a traffic violation. Officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Lee v. Hanna, No. 01-55403, 32 Fed. Appx. 937 (9th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     Off-duty police officer did not use excessive force in shooting a man he observed attempting to enter various homes in his neighborhood. Suspect was trying to escape from a house he did enter, and his right hand was out of the officer's sight when he rotated his shoulder, giving him reason to believe that he was in immediate threat of serious bodily harm. Billingsley v. City of Omaha, #01-1487, 277 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Jul]
     Family of man shot dead after he threw a knife at officers and screamed "Suicide by cop!" receives $1.25 million settlement in lawsuit against city in which plastic gun was allegedly "planted" at the scene of the shooting to justify it. Runnels v. City of Miami, U.S. Dist. Ct. No. 00-2930 (S.D. Fla. 2002). [2002 LR Jun]
     State trooper acted intentionally in shooting a motorist during a traffic stop, believing motorist was reaching for a gun. Because North Carolina Tort Claims Act did not allow recovery against the state for intentional injuries, the state Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction over the estate's claim concerning the shooting. Fennell v. North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety, No. COA00-824, 551 S.E.2d 486 (N.C. App. 2001). [N/R]
     Shooting and killing of suicidal individual armed with a shotgun who had only pointed his weapon at himself would have been unreasonable if he stopped advancing on officers at the time he was shot, but trial court must still determine whether the law on that subject was clearly established at the time of the incident in order to rule on officer's defense of qualified immunity. Bennett v. Murphy, #00-2667, 274 F.3d 133 (3rd Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Apr]
     Genuine issue of fact as to whether intoxicated suicidal person armed with a knife was "lunging" at officers when they shot and killed him or merely "leaning forward" barred summary judgment for officers in wrongful death lawsuit. Prior v. Pruett, No. COA00-415, 550 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. App. 2001). [2002 LR Apr]
     Man who was shot by an officer, but not arrested or detained, was not owed a duty by the officer to provide him with medical care. Officers did not "shock the conscience" by firing at two men after they heard what they thought was the sound of a bullet being chambered into a gun and one of the officers believed that he saw a weapon being pointed. Carr v. Tatangelo, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (M.D. Ga. 2001). [2002 LR Mar]
     Use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing arrestee after a bank robbery was reasonable even though a bank teller had reported that the robber was unarmed. The officer heard shots being fired, and did not know that it was other officers who had fired the shots. Dudley v. Eden, #99-3738, 260 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Mar]
     Passenger in speeding car who was struck by a bullet fired by an officer seeking to stop the vehicle was "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes even though officer did not intend to strike him, but officer was entitled to qualified immunity based on arguable grounds to believe that escaping vehicle posed a threat of serious harm to himself or others. Vaughan v. Cox, No. 00-14380, 264 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Feb]
     Officers acted properly in shooting and killing a man who answered his door holding what appeared to be a rifle. Sinclair v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, No. 01-1050, 268 F.3d 594 (8th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Feb]
     Firing of "beanbag round" into the face of emotionally disturbed man who had not threatened officers and was not armed was an excessive use of force, federal appeals court rules. Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Deorle v. Rutherford, No. 99-17188, 263 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Jan]
     Police officer who shot a woman seconds after she had thrown a knife at another officer was entitled to qualified immunity for incident which occurred in 1987. Appeals court rules that similar conduct today might present a jury question as to whether the officer used excessive force. Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Jan]
     Police officer did not act unreasonably in shooting fleeing suspect in the back when he believed that the suspect was reaching for a weapon, based on his motions; no liability for shooting and killing suspect who turned out to be unarmed. Thompson v. Hubbard, No. 00-2505, 257 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2001). [2002 LR Jan]
     Genuine issues of material fact as to whether officer reasonably could have believed that mentally ill suspect he shot posed a risk of harm precluded summary judgment for officer. Facts disputed include whether the officer actually and reasonably believed that the suspect was armed. Clem v. County of Fairfax, No. CIV. A. 00-1684-A, 150 F. Supp. 2d 888 (E.D. Va. 2001). [N/R]
     The mother of an emotionally disturbed man shot eight times and killed by police officers while he "incoherently" waved a pipe at them in a field where he had wandered after a car accident was awarded $1.2 million in damages against the city by a jury that found that the officers acted negligently. Decedent was found 30% at fault for his own death. Lifton v. City of Vacaville, No. CIV S 98 1678 (U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Calif.), July 10, 2001, reported in The National Law Journal, p. B3 (Aug. 20, 2001). [N/R]
     347:167 Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a suspect who emerged from his vehicle after a chase brandishing his gun, which he had just fired once through the roof of his truck, regardless of whether he was shot in the side while directly pointing his weapon at the officers, or shot in the back as the plaintiff claimed. Leong v. City of Detroit, 151 F. Supp. 2d 858 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
     347:165 Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing suspect he claimed was biting his fingers and swinging a flashlight at him at the time he shot; appeals court rules that disputes between officer and witnesses as to the details of what happened before suspect ran into field were material when officer was the sole witness to shooting. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, #97-41463, 246 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2001).
     346:150 Deputy's use of deadly force against occupants of fleeing auto theft suspects was illegal seizure of passenger struck and paralyzed, so county was not entitled to summary judgment in civil rights lawsuit, but appeals court panel rules, by 2-1, that shooting deputy was entitled to qualified immunity and could have reasonably believed that fleeing suspects posed a threat of serious harm to other motorists. Vaughan v. Cox, No. 00-14380, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19417 (11th Cir.).
     346:151 Officers reasonably used deadly force in response to suspect who had told them he had a gun, attempted to evade arrest, and emerged from his house displaying a staple gun under a towel which they reasonably could have believed was a firearm. Medina v. Cram, #00- 1153, 252 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2001).
     345:135 Officers were justified in shooting and killing an intoxicated man asleep in his bed after he broke into his own house through a rear window; decedent had not responded to their shouts and then pointed a rifle at them from underneath the covers; officers were present to investigate a possible burglary. Cox v. County of Prince William, No. 00-2159, 249 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2001).
     345:136 UPDATE: Oregon reaches $5 million settlement in case where jury awarded $8 million, including $4.5 million in punitive damages, against state trooper who allegedly attacked female motorist after stopping her for speeding and then shot her in the shoulder after she attempted to drive away. Conroy v. Henry, No. 99-3074- AA, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Ore.), The National Law Journal, p. B3 (July 23, 2001).
     345:136 California jury awards $1.9 million for officer's shooting and killing of woman intoxicated on methaphetamines who had yelled through her screen door at him that she had a gun. Munoz v. City of Union City, No. H204672-7, (Alameda Co., Calif. Superior Court, May 17, 2001), The National Law Journal, p. B4 (July 30, 2001).
     344:124 Deputy who shot a hostage during a shootout with store armed robbers did not violate hostage's Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Lee v. Williams, 138 F. Supp. 2d 748 (E.D. Va. 2001).
     344:121 $3.5 million settlement in shooting death of man who grabbed an unloaded rifle when members of a SWAT team entered his home while executing a search warrant. Heard v. Board of County Commissioners of Miami County, No. 00-2173-JWL, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Kan.), reported in The National Law Journal, p. A6 (May 14, 2001), and in 44 ATLA Law Rptr. No. 5, p. 170 (June 2001).
     344:118 Jury award in shooting by off-duty officer reduced from $29 million to $3.095 million; city's "bad- faith" failure to make payments under structured settlement results in court order accelerating payment of entire amount. Summerville v. City of New York, 723 N.Y.S.2d 208 (A.D. 2001).
     343:102 Chicago reaches $18 million settlement with family of unarmed woman shot and killed by officer at the conclusion of a 31 block pursuit of the vehicle in which she was riding. Haggerty v. Daniels, No. 99-L-006486, Circuit Ct. of Cook County, IL., reported in Chicago Tribune, p. 1 (May 8, 2001).
     342:86 Trial judge erroneously failed to instruct jury on the constitutional rules for the use of deadly force in lawsuit brought by burglar shot by police officer; error was harmless, however, since a jury instruction on a state law claim, on which the jury also found no liability, included the proper legal standard. Monroe v. City of Phoenix, #99- 16974, 248 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2001).
     344:123 Shooting and killing by sheriff's deputy of Ohio man's pet lioness, allegedly after the escaped animal was tranquilized and returning to the barn from which it had roamed, stated a claim for unreasonable seizure of property, on which the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. Newsome v. Erwin, 137 F. Supp. 2d 934 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
     341:73 City liable for $400,000 to motorist shot by off-duty Colorado officer; department adopted a policy requiring officers to always be on duty and always be armed, but provided no training on how to handle police response when off-duty, and without police vehicle, uniform, or radio. Brown v. Gray, No. 99-1134, 227 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2000).
     341:70 Jury had to determine whether officer who broke passenger window in pursued vehicle once it stopped had reason to believe that passenger, who may have been only reacting to breaking of window, was reaching for a weapon, justifying officer's shooting and killing of passenger; no qualified immunity granted. Ribbey v. Cox, No. 99-4022, 222 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2000).
     340:57 New Jersey reaches $12.9 million settlement with four occupants of a vehicle who claimed they were stopped on the highway by state troopers because of "racial profiling," three of whom were shot by troopers when the vehicle began to back up while the troopers approached on foot. Brown v. New Jersey, U.S. Dist. Ct., Trenton, N.J., settlement reported in The New York Times, p. A12 (Feb. 3, 2001).
     [N/R] Officers were entitled to qualified immunity when they continued to shoot at suspect who responded to earlier shots by turning and pointing his weapon at one of them. Boyd v. Baeppler, #99-3234, 215 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2000.
     340:58 Federal appeals court panel, by 2-1, rules that merely pointing a gun at the head of an unarmed arrestee, if he did not pose a threat, could constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment even if unaccompanied by other force, and that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity, since this was "clearly established"; full federal appeals court grants rehearing to review issue. Robinson v. Solano County, No. 99-15225, 218 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.
     2000), rehearing en banc granted, 229 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2000).
     339:44 Passenger in car shot by officer who fired on it as he jumped onto the hood of his car to avoid being hit was entitled to $10,000 in damages as well as $10,000 in attorneys' fees and court costs; factual dispute over the behavior of the vehicle as it approached the officer, and qualified immunity defense, was for the jury to decide. Fisher v. City of Memphis, Nos. 98-6550, 98-5902, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000).
     338:22 Oregon jury awards $8 million, including $4.5 million in punitive damages, against state trooper who allegedly attacked female motorist after stopping her for speeding and then shot her in the shoulder after she attempted to drive away. Conroy v. Henry, No. 99-3074- AA, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Ore. Feb. 2, 2001), reported in The National Law Journal, p. A12 (Feb. 19, 2001)
     338:22 Denver Colorado reaches $1.2 million settlement in lawsuit brought by 12 year-old shot and rendered quadriplegic by police officer while burglarizing a house. Hollis v. City and County of Denver, No. 99N-1545, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D. Colo., Jan. 29, 2001), reported in The New York Times, National Edition, p. A12 (Jan. 31, 2001).
     338:19 Officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a man who, having stated that he would kill officers if he was not killed himself, charged at the officer with a metal object held in a threatening position. Campbell v. City of Leavenworth, No. 83,833, 13 P.3d 917 (Kan. App. 2000).
     337:6 Los Angeles reaches $975,000 settlement with relatives of 55-year-old mentally ill homeless woman who was shot and killed by an officer as she allegedly lunged towards him with a 12-inch screwdriver. Mitchell v. Los Angeles, U.S. Dist. Ct. Los Angeles, settlement, reported in Los Angeles Times, Metro Section, p. 1 (Dec. 16, 2000).
     337:4 Officer's shooting and killing of mentally disturbed man who came towards him armed with two machetes did not constitute disability discrimination; if disturbed individual was "denied access to medical services," it was because of his violent, threatening behavior, not because he was mentally disabled. Thompson v. Williamson County, Tenn., No. 99-5458, 219 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2000).
     329:70 Miami reaches $2.5 million settlement in death of 72-year-old man in his bedroom during SWAT team raid on his apartment in which 122 shots were fired; officers asserted that decedent fired two shots at them after they properly knocked and announced they were executing search warrant; plaintiffs asserted that gun and drugs were "planted" by officers to "coverup" misconduct, and that officers did not properly announce their identity as police. Brown v. City of Miami, U.S. Dist. Ct. Miami, Fla., reported in The National Law Journal, p. A10 (March 27, 2000).
     331:101 There was a factual issue as to whether three plainclothes officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the occupants of a car when they thought the occupants acted "nervous"; officers were entitled to qualified immunity, however, on excessive force claims based on their firing back after shots were fired at them. Jackson v. Sauls, #98-8980, 206 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2000).
     332:117 It was disabled mentally disturbed man's own behavior in attempting to assault others with a knife at a convenience store, rather than a police officer's reaction in shooting him which resulted in his injuries; police officer's use of deadly force under the circumstances was not disability discrimination. Hainze v. Richards, No. 99-50222, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000).
     332:119 Police officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing man, armed with a knife, who had threatened suicide and had already injured himself; officer reasonably could have believed that man, who refused several orders to drop the knife, was coming towards officers and might injure or kill one of them. Wood v. City of Lakeland, FL, #98-3171, 203 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2000).
     332:122 Federal appeals court overturns $4 million award to family of woman allegedly murdered in her home by deputy who had earlier harassed her; county could not be liable for hiring the deputy as his record did not show him to have ever wrongfully shot anyone before. Aguillard v. McGowen, #97-20039, 207 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2000).
     333:136 UPDATE: After new trial is granted on $41.02 million jury award, second New York jury awards $92 million to 17-year-old male rendered paraplegic by police bullet; off-duty officer fired at plaintiff after plaintiff had shot at another man who had hit him; officer asserted that plaintiff was pointing weapon at him when he fired. Rodriguez v. City of New York, No. 17422/96 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., New York), May 18, 2000, reported in The National Law Journal, p. A16 (June 26, 2000).
     333:131 City could not be held liable for alleged failure to adequately train officers in the use of deadly force when there was no showing that officers did anything wrong in firing at men who had fired at them and then attempted to run away; plaintiffs could not relitigate the issue of whether they had fired at the officers after they were convicted of assault on a police officer, which resolved the same factual question. Jones v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:98 CV 2158 DDN, 92 F.Supp.2d 949 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
     334:153 Officers were not liable for excessive force or wrongful death when they shot and killed an intoxicated man who had previously assaulted his wife; decedent had threatened to "kill" people and was pointing a gun at one of the officers at the time he was shot. Lee, Estate of, v. Spokane, No. 18347-5-III, 2 P.3d 979 (Wash. App. 2000).
     334:154 Officers were not liable for shooting and killing naked mentally disabled man armed with a knife who they believed was about to attack another person; jury instruction that they should not consider the possible risk to members of the public from the officers' use of deadly force in reaching their verdict was not improper. Howerton v. Fletcher, No. 98-2795, 213 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2000).
     335:163 Plaintiffs who were awarded $250,000 in compensatory damages for an officer's shooting and killing of a motorist were also properly awarded $297,645 in attorneys' fees and $13,642.40 in costs; trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys fees to plaintiffs who retained several attorneys to work on the case. Laudano v. City of New Haven, #18498, 755 A.2d 907 (Conn. App. 2000).
     [N/R] Police officer could be held liable for negligence and battery for shooting co-worker while on duty. Mayberry v. Dukes, 742 A.d 448 (D.C. 1999).
     330:83 Deputy properly used deadly force against man advancing on him with a piece of concrete in his hand; sheriff's failure to train deputies in the use of deadly force against "crazy" people was no basis for liability when general policy on use of deadly force was correct and no showing of a prior problem in this area was shown; basis for exclusion of expert witness was erroneous, but jury did not need expert help to conclude that deputy acted reasonably. Pena v. Leombruni, No. 99-1435, 200 F.3d 1031 (7th Cir. 1999).
     330:89 Officer was not liable for shooting eleven rounds and killing a 69-year-old man who fired a single shot at deputies after he was awakened at night by three deputies executing arrest warrant on him for misdemeanor property charge; jury should not have been told that the reasons for issuing the warrant were irrelevant, but the remainder of the instructions properly informed them that they could take the totality of the circumstances into account. Deering v. Reich, No. 98-2560, 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1999).
     325:8 Officers acted reasonably in shooting to try to stop motorist who had already used his vehicle to injure one officer and had almost hit a second. Parris v. Town of Alexander City, 45 F.Supp. 2d 1295 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
     325:8 New York jury awards $41.02 million to 17-year-old male rendered paraplegic by police bullet; off-duty officer fired at plaintiff after plaintiff had shot at another man who had hit him; officer asserted that plaintiff was pointing weapon at him when he fired. Rodriguez v. City of New York, #17422/96 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co., New York), Sept. 30, 1999, reported in The National Law Journal p. A11, November 22, 1999.
     327:39 Officer was legally justified in shooting and killing a man advancing towards two officers with a knife held to his own throat who had previously stabbing his brother; the fact that he posed a threat to the officers rendered irrelevant any evidence of possible alternate strategies officers might have used prior to that point, or evidence concerning the officer's past disciplinary records or city use of force policy. Yellowback v. City of Sioux Falls, #20719, 600 N.W.2d 554 (S.D. 1999).
     328:57 Trial court improperly granted summary judgment to off-duty police officer/security guard who shot and killed fleeing shoplifting suspect; there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether suspect's car was menacing the officer at the time she fired. Abraham v. Raso, #98-5405, 183 F.3d 279 (3rd Cir. 1999).
     328:57 Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting suspect in the neck when there was a factual dispute as to whether the shot was fired accidentally or intentionally. Anthony v. Vaccaro, 43 F.Supp.2d 843 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
     329:67 Finding, in juvenile delinquency proceeding, that 15-year-old recklessly endangered the life of an officer precluded him from relitigating this fact in a federal civil rights lawsuit against the officer for shooting him. Green v. Montgomery, 43 F.Supp. 2d 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
     323:170 Police officer acted properly in shooting and killing armed man who fired at him first; the fact that the officer was mistakenly at the wrong address and therefore was confronting a store owner and his armed brother, rather than burglars, did not alter the result; second officer's single kick, aimed at subduing store keeper, was objectively reasonable. Saman v. Robbins, #96-55672, 97-56683, 97-56684, 97-5524 and 97-55789, 173 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999).
     323:164 Family of paranoid schizophrenic man shot and killed by police officer as he smashed car windows could not assert claim that police action was disability discrimination in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act. Gohier v. Enright, #98-1149, 186 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 1999).
     {N/R} Unarmed couple, shot outside their home during a confrontation with police officers, awarded $408,000 by a federal jury in California. Skallerud v. City of Pinole, 1999 (10) Calif. Bar Journal Trials Digest (N.D. Cal. 1999).
     322:155 Off-duty officer working as security in convenience store acted reasonably in shooting and killing two armed robbers who had taken him and three other store employees hostage; the fact that the robbers did not shoot first did not alter result. Chandie v. Whelan, 21 F.Supp. 2d 170 (E.D. N.Y. 1998).
     321:137 Update: $1 million settlement in lawsuit over man's shooting in the back by police officer; Supreme Court was to review whether officer was entitled to qualified immunity, but further proceedings canceled by agreement of parties. Snyder v. Trepagnier, #98-507, 119 S.Ct. 1493 (1999); settlement results reported in American Bar Association Journal, p. 44 (June 1999). Snyder v. Trepagnier, #96-30935, 142 F.3d 791, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 10693, rehearing en banc denied, 149 F.3d 1181 (5th Cir. 1998).
     {N/R} Allegation that officer shot armed robbery suspect after he was stopped and had raised his hands created a factual issue as to whether the shooting was reasonable. Hemphill v. Schott, #9f6-2793, 141 F.3d 412 (2nd Cir. 1998).
     321:138 Police officer acted objectively reasonably in shooting and killing suspect who was holding a shotgun when officer kicked in door to apartment; suspect had ignored repeated requests that he drop the weapon and officer believed that he acted to prevent suspect from shooting him or another officer. Natal v. City of New Bedford, 37 F.Supp.2d 74 (D. Mass. 1999).
     321:138 City could not be liable for alleged failure to adequately train, supervise, and discipline an officer who shot an arrestee when officer's actions in shooting arrestee, who had come towards him brandishing a screwdriver, were objectively reasonable; municipal liability must be based on policy causing a violation of plaintiff's rights. Henderson v. Munic. of Cool Valley, 17 F.Supp. 2d 1044 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
     319:106 Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting at suspect detainee who ducked behind truck door when another suspect present pulled a gun on a second officer; officer was not required to wait until a potential threat became an actual threat; fact that detainee he shot was actually unarmed did not alter result. Medeiros v. Town of Dracut, 21 F.Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass. 1998).
     319:102 Police officer who allegedly fired twice at fleeing vehicle with two minor children in it while motorist fled to evade speeding ticket was entitled to qualified immunity from claims on behalf of children; no constitutional due process right against "purely emotional" harm from excessive force was "clearly established" in 1990. Petta v. Rivera, #95-40157, 133 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 1998).
     318:94 Jury awards $255,000 in damages to owners of pet dog shot and killed by officers in the yard of owner's home; officers claimed that dog jumped at them, while plaintiffs argued that dog merely stared at officers, was arthritic, and was unable to leap in the air. Fuller v. City of Richmond, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Cal (Dec. 30, 1998), reported in the San Francisco Chronicle, p. A15 (Dec. 31, 1998).
     318:89 Officers acted reasonably in shooting and killing man who had just shot and killed a police dog sent to apprehend him. Mettler v. Whitledge, #98-1279 & 98-1280, 165 F.3d 1197 (8th Cir. 1999).
     318:88 Jury awards $12.6 million for death of man shot with submachine gun in his home by officer who was engaged in executing search warrant; residents of home allegedly did not know those who entered their home were police. Gallardo v. Reinnecius, U.S. Dist. Ct., Civ. F 97- 6111 (E.D. Cal., March 12, 1999), reported in The Natl. Law Jour., p. B13 (April 5, 1999).
     317:74 Police officers who shot and killed suicidal man were improperly granted qualified immunity when factual issues concerning whether man had threatened to get a gun or was coming at the officers holding knives were unresolved. Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant, #96-2480, 142 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 1998).
     317:73 Jury awards $1.9 million in medical expenses to man shot in the back by police officer, but nothing for pain and suffering; jury finds city liable, officer violated plaintiff's rights, but officer entitled to qualified immunity; Appeals court overturns finding of municipal liability, leaving plaintiff with nothing, and U.S. Supreme Court grants review. Snyder v. Trepagnier, #96-30935, 142 F.3d 791, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 10693, rehearing en banc denied, 149 F.3d 1181 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, #98-507, 119 S.Ct. 863 (1999).
     316:56 Officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a man armed with a knife who ignored commands to drop it and advanced towards him. Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill, #97-1652, 161 F.3d 782 (4th Cir. 1998).
     316:55 Wife and mother of man shot and killed by officers at the scene of domestic disturbance had no standing to pursue Fourth Amendment claim on his behalf when they failed to bring suit as representatives of his estate or his "successors in interest" under California law; plaintiffs were also properly barred from pursuing their direct claim for interference with their family relationships when they presented no evidence on such claim at trial. Byrd v. Guess, #96-55532, 137 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1998).
     315:42 Widow of SWAT officer shot and killed by fellow officer during raid could sue shooting officer and city for violation of federal civil rights; federal appeals court rejects argument that case was about a "safe workplace"; shooting officer not entitled to qualified immunity. Jensen v. City of Oxnard, #97-55936, 145 F.3d 1078, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 10589 (9th Cir.); cert. den. 1998 U.S. Lexis 7596.
     315:41 Deputy used objectively reasonable force in shooting mentally ill suspect with drug problem who actively resisted being taken into custody by reaching for deputy's gun, hitting and kicking deputy, knocking deputy down, and attempting to jump on deputy once he had forced him into a closet. Nelson v. County of Wright, #98-2026, 162 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 1998).
     314:27 Off-duty intoxicated deputy's action of shooting and killing man in barroom brawl was unforeseeable; county could not be held liable for failure to warn deputies against carrying firearms while intoxicated; county's policy prohibiting deputies from being "drunk and disorderly" in public was sufficient. Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, #97-55175, 97-55230, 97-55341, 147 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1998).
     313:9 Officers not liable for accidental shooting of hostage while attempting to shoot hostage-taker; shooting of hostage was not a Fourth Amendment "seizure," since it was not intended; officers' attempt to rescue hostages was beyond "acceptable"--it was admirable, and could not be called "shocking to the conscience" as required for due process claim. Medeiros v. O'Connell, #97-7355, 150 F.3d 164 (2nd Cir. 1998).
     301:3 Village was not liable for inadequate training of officers in dealing with abnormally acting individuals when there was no evidence of knowledge of a need for further training in this area; officer who shot and killed disturbed individual who asked police to kill him found to have used excessive force and jury awards $165,000 in damages. Palmquist v. Selvik, 111 F.3d 1332 (7th Cir. 1997).
     301:3 Police official could face supervisory liability for shootings by officer with a long history of past disciplinary complaints concerning use of his firearm, including incident in which he captured a police station at gunpoint and took other officers hostage; liability could be based on failure to identify officer, once he returned to duty, as in need of remedial training. Diaz v. Martinez, 112 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
     301:10 Officers' use of deadly force against fleeing suspect was objectively reasonable even if he was not presently armed and his later capture was "inevitable," given his commission of a violent burglary in which he shot victims, his attempt to escape, and the possibility that he would take hostages in the area if not immediately apprehended. Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir. 1997).
     302:21 Deputy's shooting and killing of mentally disturbed man was not disability discrimination in absence of showing that decedent was a "qualified individual with a disability" or that he was somehow "denied public services" because of such a disability. Thompson v. Williamson County, 965 F.Supp. 1026 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
     302:22 Officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting fleeing man armed with sawed-off shotgun; officer need not wait until armed individual "has drawn a bead" on someone before using deadly force. Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1997).
     303:39 Officer's use of force was objectively reasonable when he shot and killed disturbed man armed with a knife and pot of hot grease when he believed the grease was about to be thrown at him; officer's request, after incident, to attend training course on alternatives to use of firearms did not show policy of inadequate training. Huong v. City of Port Arthur, 961 F.Supp. 1003 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
     303:40 California jury awards $2,002,000 against city and two officers who shot passenger who exited from pursued van; passenger was unarmed and was not charged with any offense. Betton v. Duran, No. CV956189, U.S. Dist. Ct. (C.D.Cal.). Los Angeles, Cal., Cal Law Trials Digest #33 TD 4 (Aug. 28, 1997).
     303:43 Sergeant directing entry, with warrant, into home of narcotics suspect with violent record, could reasonably conclude that forced entry immediately after announcement of police presence was needed to avoid armed response; federal appeals court overturns $92,500 jury award to home occupants, one of whom was shot, against sergeant, who was entitled to qualified immunity. Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 1997).
     304:55 Half-million dollar settlement in shooting death of man who approached officers as they attempted to handcuff another individual after entering yard of house to question four men concerning reported carjacking attempt; suit claimed entry was unlawful and force used was excessive. Garcia v. City of Stockton, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Cal., No. CIV-S-95-756, Jan. 27, 1997, reported in 40 ATLA Law Rptr. No. 10, pg. 381 (December 1997).
     304:55 Alabama Supreme Court upholds jury award of $2 million to motorist shot in the back by state trooper who followed him into his home after stopping him for speeding; award of damages was not unreasonable despite being twice what plaintiff requested; references by plaintiff's attorney to Rodney King case did not require a new trial. Breland v. Ford, 693 So.2d 393 (Ala. 1997).
     305:71 State troopers' use of deadly force to shoot and kill man at farmhouse was objectively reasonable when he had previously responded to requests that he drop his weapons by shooting and injuring a trooper. Tauke v. Stine, 120 F.3d 1363 (8th Cir. 1997).
     305:75 Federal Marshals were not entitled to absolute witness immunity on claim that they fabricated story of what happened in initial Ruby Ridge shootout; court finds that agents acted as "complaining witnesses" and could be liable for malicious prosecution; court also disapproves of "Special Rules of Engagement" under which agents were to shoot to kill any armed male in the vicinity of a farmhouse, without warning or showing of immediate danger. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Smith v. Harris, 118 S.Ct. 1051 (1998).
     306:88 Officer did not act objectively unreasonably by failing to give a warning before shooting a man who had knocked him to the ground. Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 1997).
     307:103 Off-duty officer acted reasonably in shooting at armed robber in restaurant, based on his assessment of peril to customers if he did not act; lack of notation in personnel file indicating retraining in firearms could not be basis for inadequate training claim against department when officer testified that he had been retrained annually and sheet in file appeared to be incomplete. Brown v. Diversified Hospitality Group, Inc., 694 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1997).
     309:135 Estate of doctor shot and killed by officers awarded $16.26 million against police and $1.2 million against hospital; doctor fled undercover officers, thinking they were carjackers. Kymissi v. Rozzi, 93 Civ. 8609, U.S. Dist. Ct. S.D. N.Y., June 3, 1998, reported in The Natl. Law Jour., p. A13 (July 6, 1998).
     310:151 Jury properly found plaintiff 60% at fault for his own injuries when he was shot fleeing from police after allegedly engaging in criminal conduct; jury could properly find that he "assumed the risk" of injury; city liable for $60,000 out of $150,000 in damages found by jury. Fernandez v. City of New York, 669 N.Y.S.2d 20 (A.D. 1998).
     311:167 Officer did not use excessive force when his shotgun discharged, injuring hand of man who was actively resisting officer's execution of search warrant by trying to grab shotgun and attempting to strike officer with a steam iron; shooting under these circumstances would be justified even if intentional. Garcia v. Grisanti, 998 F.Supp. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
     {N/R} Genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment; question was whether officer acted reasonably prior to shootout with armed suspect who threatened suicide. Allen v. Muskogee, Okl., 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997).
     {N/R} Man shot by police officers entitled to jury trial on assertion that special police unit engaged in conspiracy to "execute" persons who had just engaged in robberies in city. Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F.Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1997); In a related case by the same plaintiff, the court also ruled that city attorneys and City Council members could face trial on a claim that they allegedly ratified and encouraged the officers' alleged misconduct. Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F.Supp. 1262 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
     Although the officer may have "created a situation in which the use of deadly force became necessary" because of violations of police procedure and "failing to disengage," his "actions leading up to the shooting are irrelevant to the objective reasonableness of his conduct at the moment he decided to employ deadly force." Reasonableness "depends only upon the officer's knowledge of circumstances immediately prior to and at the moment that he made the split-second decision to employ deadly force." Salim v. Proulx, #95-7899, 93 F.3d 86, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 21758 (2nd Cir. 1996). [N/R]
     289:8 Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to allow jury to decide whether or not officer's shooting of her husband was unreasonable, despite lack of testimony describing the moment of the shooting; officer admitted that husband did not have a weapon and had not hit him Gardner v. Buerger, 82 F.3d 248 (8th Cir. 1996).
     289:9 Federal appeals court reinstates jury's $259,358 against officer for shooting and killing driver of car making escape from alleged purse snatching; jury necessarily found that officer could not have reasonably believed himself in danger from slow moving vehicle, and accordingly officer was not entitled to qualified immunity Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco, 83 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996).
     290:19 Complaint which alleged that officer shot man carrying a machete on the street without further warning after telling him to "freeze" adequately stated claim against District of Columbia for inadequately training and supervising of officers on the use of deadly force; federal appeals court rules that even a single incident of such use of force was adequate to support a complaint of inadequate training and supervision. Atchinson v. D.C., 73 F.3d 418 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
     291:35 Sheriff was not liable for alleged inadequate training and supervision on use of deadly force; while there had been prior lawsuits alleging excessive use of force or wrongful use of deadly force by sheriff's personnel, there had been no single case in which courts ruled that department personnel had violated a clearly established right in this area, so sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity Singleton v. McDougall, 932 F.Supp. 1386 (M.D. Fla 1996).
     291:41 Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting man in his home after he had fired pistol in the air outside the house, fired more shots inside the house, and then fired shots into the ceiling in bedroom where his girlfriend and two small children were present; officers reasonably believed their actions were needed to prevent the imminent loss of life Isquierdo v. Frederick, 922 F.Supp. 1072 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
     291:41 Officer could reasonably conclude that his decision to fire at vehicle of fleeing suspect was reasonable when a fellow officer had been dragged 25-30 feet with his hand stuck inside the vehicle's driver's side window and had just been thrown free Pittman v. Nelms, 87 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1996).
     292:56 Federal agent who was present at the scene of a shooting by another federal agent could not be held vicariously liable for other agent's action Pellegrino v. United States, 73 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996).
     292:56 Jury awards $1266 million to man shot by officer and rendered paraplegic after he had used handgun to try to fend off mugger; officers who arrived on scene only knew that there was a man with a gun and did not realize that he was a crime victim; mugger flagged down one police vehicle after he was shot at Veriguete v. City of New York, Sup Ct, Brooklyn, N.Y., reported in The Natl. Law Jour. p. A9, December 9, 1996.
     292:57 Update: Jury returns $100,000 award in lawsuit over shooting death in which U.S. Supreme Court adopted therapist-patient privilege; jury finds that force used was not reasonable, but rejects state law wrongful death claim Jaffee v. Redmond, U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill., reported in Chicago Tribune, p. 6 (Dec 7, 1996).
     293:67 Estate of man shot by officers entering trailer without announcing themselves during execution of search warrant receives $950,000 settlement in suit that claimed that county failed to properly train officers in the use of their weapons. Bryant v. County of Dodge, U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Wis, No 95-C-0526, Apr 25, 1996, reported in 39 ATLA L.Rptr. No 7, p. 273 (Sept 1996).
     294:83 City's action of indemnifying police officers against punitive damages award in lawsuit brought over shooting death of fast-food restaurant robber did not constitute a policy of "encouraging and ratifying" the excessive use of force; individual city council members who voted for payment of punitive damages award were also entitled to qualified immunity for their action. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1996).
     294:90 Teenager who held birthday party in vacant house receives $150,000 settlement from city on lawsuit arising from officer shooting him in the house after neighbor reported intruders in the building Crenshaw v. City of Oakland, U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Cal, No C95 1207 WHO, May 29, 1996, reported in 39 ATLA L. Rep.No 9, p. 353 (Nov 1996).
     295:104 Officers acted reasonably in shooting and killing handcuffed arrestee sitting in front seat of police vehicle when he pointed a gun at them; federal appeals court overturns trial court's denial of qualified immunity to officers Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640 (4th Cir. 1996).
     296:119 Federal court rules that mother of man shot and killed by officers could assert federal civil rights claim for loss of companionship of adult child she was not dependent on, and that proper legal standard for liability is "deliberate indifference or reckless disregard." Smoot v. City of Placentia, 950 F.Supp. 282 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
     297:136 Officers acted reasonably in shooting at hunters who fired first at them; hunters' claim that they were firing at doves rather than officers was not relevant; officers entitled to qualified immunity since they reasonably could conclude that hunters posed a serious threat to them. Wicker v. City of Galveston, 944 F.Supp. 553 (S.D.Tex. 1996).
     298:148 City liable for $14 million to family of suicidal individual shot and killed by officer responding to his suicide threat, based on city's failure to have a training policy on suicide threat intervention; officer also liable for alleged excessive use of force when decedent stepped from his apartment holding a shotgun but may not have posed an immediate threat to officer. Wallace v. Estate of Davies, 676 N.E.2d 422 (Ind App. 1997).
     298:153 Injury to school van passenger resulting from officers shooting into it during gun battle with suspect who "commandeered" van did not violate passenger's Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; passenger was not intentionally "seized" by officers for Fourth Amendment purposes and officers were entitled to qualified immunity on due process claim. Medeiros v. O'Connell, 955 F.Supp. 21 (D.Conn 1997).
     299:168 Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting at man found inside residence entered pursuant to search warrant who pointed weapon at him. Robinett v. Carlisle, 928 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App. 1996).
     299:168 Officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing suspect armed with a knife who was on the ground, once suspect started to swing hand holding knife up towards officer. Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996).
     299:169 Sheriff's deputies acted reasonably in shooting and killing man intoxicated on PCP and armed with a knife who slowly advanced towards them and announced his intention of killing them if they did not shoot him. Martinez v. Co. of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.App.4th 334, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 772 (1996).
     {N/R} Plaintiff arrestee shot by officer was entitled to jury trial on claim that police caused a confrontation by failure to identify themselves as they entered residence. Sledd v. Lindsay, 107 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1996).
     279:38 Expert witness testimony on "hedonic damages" (the enjoyment value of human life) was barred by the trial court in lawsuit over police shooting of individual. Ayers v. Robinson, 887 F.Supp. 1049 (N.D.Ill. 1995).
     284:115 Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting armed suspect who held out a hand containing a gun in response to officer's demand that he show his hand; officer reasonably feared for his life, regardless of exactly what direction displayed weapon was pointed; officers had no clearly established duty to provide medical aid to shot suspect prior to arrival of EMTs. Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995).
     283:100 Plain clothes officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no "clearly established" requirement that they announce their identity and purpose while executing search warrant on business premises; officer reasonably believed that suspect was reaching for a weapon when he shot and paralyzed him; municipalities could not be held liable in the absence of evidence of a municipal policy, custom, or usage St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995).
     {N/R} Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for use of deadly force; court rules that:
     {1} Officers are not compelled to adopt alternative approaches to avoid creating a situation where deadly force must be used;
     {2} Officers do not have to first attempt to use nondeadly alternatives when the use of deadly force has become necessary;
     {3} Police departments and other law enforcement agencies are not required to provide officers with equipment which might be a substitute for the use of deadly force, such as dogs, tasers, capture nets, CS gas, rubber bullets, sticky foam, or beanbag projectiles;
     {4} Officers have no obligation to simply "walk away" from a situation where the use of deadly force is justified; and
     {5} Officers have no obligation to keep themselves a particular distance or to maintain a barrier between the suspect and themselves. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S.Ct. 81 (1994). [Cross-reference: Defenses: Qualified Immunity]
     277:3 U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether federal courts should recognize a therapist-patient privilege barring evidence of confidential communications during therapy; issue arises in case where jury awarded $545,000 in police shooting case where jury was told it could presume withheld therapy records would be unfavorable to officer Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1995), cert granted, 116 S.Ct. 334 (1995).
     277:7 In civil rights case over police shooting, trial judge's statement to jurors that "the races have a tendency to stick together" implied that black plaintiff and his witnesses told a consistent version of the incident out of "racial solidarity" rather than based on their promise to tell the truth; federal appeals court orders new trial Rush v. Smith, 56 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 1995).
     277:8 U.S. reaches $31 million settlement with white separatist's family over shooting deaths of 14-year-old son and wife during "Ruby Ridge" siege of mountain cabin Weaver v. US, U.S. Dist. Ct. Idaho, reported in The New York Times National Edition, p. 1 (Aug 16, 1995).
     277:9 Officer's act of drawing and pointing a gun at an unarmed felony suspect, without any indication that he intended or attempted to fire, did not violate suspect's rights Edwards v. Giles, 51 F.3d 155 (8th Cir. 1995). [Cross-references: Assault and Battery: Physical; Defenses: Qualified (Good-Faith). Immunity]
     279:42 Homeless man's status as "emotionally disturbed" person was relevant to issue of whether officers acted objectively reasonably in shooting him without warning after he displayed a knife and ran away from them Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 1995). [Cross- reference: Defenses: Qualified (Good-Faith). Immunity]
     281:73 Deputy's shooting and killing of intoxicated motorist who advanced on him with knife in attack position was a reasonable use of force, federal appeals court rules Romero v. Board of County Commissioners, 60 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 1995).
     282:120 $22 million settlement in case where police officer allegedly shot man helping store clerk who had been shot during a robbery McLeod v. City of Philadelphia, U.S. Dist. Ct., No 94-7495, Oct 6, 1995, 39 ATLA L.Rptr. p. 56 (March 1996).
     284:119 Jury awards $4,911,668 to man shot and rendered paraplegic by officer pursuing him as he fled from stopped vehicle because of outstanding warrants and illegal possession of firearm; plaintiff claimed he had abandoned weapon before officer shot him; $35 million settlement agreement reached Watson v. City of Los Angeles, No BC085132, LA Superior Central Ct, California, Dec 29, 1995, LA Daily Journal (Verd. & Stl.), Vol 109, No 77, p. 5 (April 19, 1996).
     286:147 U.S. Supreme Court adopts therapist-patient privilege protecting disclosures during therapy sessions from compelled disclosure in court; affirms ordering of new trial in which jury awarded $545,000 in police shooting case where jury was told it could presume withheld therapy records would be unfavorable to officer. Jaffee v. Allen, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996).
     285:137 City and mental health agency was not liable for officer's shooting of paranoid schizophrenic as he exited his bedroom, allegedly advancing on officer with hatchet raised; defendants adequately explained reasons for striking two black jurors, and trial judge correctly excluded evidence which was not relevant to the case at hand McKeel v. City of Pine Bluff, 73 F.3d 207 (8th Cir, 1996). [Cross-references: Procedural: Evidence; Procedural: Jury Selection]
     285:138 City liable for $102 million to restaurant patron shot in the back by off-duty police officer acting as security for canceled Halloween party scheduled there Melendez v. City of Los Angeles, No BC038583, LA Superior Central Ct, March 20, 1996, reported in LA Daily Jour. Verd. & Set., Vol 109, #82, p. 2, April 26, 1996 [Cross-reference: Off-Duty/Color of Law]
     286:152 City liable for $2.926 million for officer's shooting of man he mistakenly believed to be "with" two armed robbers escaping from successful bank robbery Summerville v. City of New York, No 39604/91 (Sup Ct Kings Co, NY), May 13, 1996, reported in The Natl. Law Jour., p. A17 (June 17, 1996).
     265:10 Police officer did not act unreasonably in shooting an unarmed handcuffed arrestee running towards him to flee from another arrestee who had obtained a weapon; officer could have reasonably believed that the person running towards him was the arrestee who a deputy sheriff's yell warned him had obtained a weapon McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir. 1994).
     265:11 Officers who entered restaurant and shot armed man holding waitresses hostage when he pointed unloaded rifle at them were entitled to qualified immunity; they did not know weapon was not loaded and no reasonable officer would think that their actions violated civil rights of hostage-taker Malignaggi v. Co. of Gloucester, 855 F.Supp. 74 (D.N.J. 1994).
     266:26 Officer was not entitled to qualified immunity in woman's federal civil rights lawsuit alleging that he wrongfully entered her house and shot her in the leg while she slept in her bed Defrancis v. Bush, 859 F.Supp. 1022 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
     267:42 Officer was justified in using deadly force against man who advanced on him waving bat and threatening to kill the officer when officer attempted to serve arrest warrant on him; officers had probable cause to obtain arrest warrant for man based on wife's statements that he hit her James v. City of Chester, 852 F.Supp. 1288 (D.S.C. 1994).
     267:42 Firing shots at fleeing helicopter in which escaped inmate held helicopter owner hostage did not constitute a "seizure" despite fact that one shot hit helicopter, when it did not result in helicopter stopping or landing; helicopter owner had no claim for Fourth Amendment violation Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. 1994).
     267:43 Deadly force may be used when necessary to prevent escape of pre-trial detainee, even when he is unarmed and is not thought to be dangerous to an officer or other person; Federal appeals court rejects argument that Tennessee v. Garner rule applies to escaping prisoners; U.S. Supreme Court declines review of case. Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, No 94-795, 115 S.Ct. 639 (1994).
     268:55 Appeals court overturns $600,000 award to carjacking hostage wounded by officer when he shot at one of her captors who was pointing a gun at the officer; officer's use of deadly force under these circumstances was reasonable Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1994).
     268:56 Officer did not "seize" man for purposes of Fourth Amendment when he merely pointed a gun at him; allegation that pet dog was shot and killed without justification, however, did state a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure of property. Fuller v. Vines, 36 F.3d 65 (9th Cir. 1994).
     268:56 Officers' use of deadly force was not unreasonable when suspect they shot and killed shot at them first Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 1994).
     270:83 City and police chief were not liable for off-duty officer's using a machine gun to shoot and kill resident of home which he entered after his friend expressed suspicion that residence was a "drug house"; no evidence showed that any inadequate training or supervision caused the shooting. Inhabitants of City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691 (1st Cir. 1994).
     270:90 Officers, faced with a report of a man inside a building who had fired shots, did not need to select the "least intrusive alternative" in responding; no liability for shooting death of suspect who stood in doorway of residence and pointed gun at officers after they knocked on door Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994).
     270:91 Deputy did not violate man's civil rights by shooting him in the back of the head when he ignored her command to stop; deputy reasonably believed that man was armed and was fleeing from the scene of a robbery where he beat a store employee, and the fact that he was actually not armed and had not robbed the store did not alter the result. Moreno v. County of Ventura, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 (Cal App. 1994).
     273:139 Burglar who hogtied three residents of home and shot one of them in the head is awarded $4 in compensatory and $104,732 in punitive damages in federal civil rights suit over officers' shooting him in the back as he fled Forrett v. Richardson, 91-6822-ABC(SHX), (April 6, 1995, USDist. Ct. CD Cal), reported in Natl. Law Jour., p. A11 (May 1, 1995).
     275:170 $1 million settlement in case where officer shot and killed armed business owner, thinking he was a burglar; business owners had previously requested police to put premises under special scrutiny following burglary, but had also informed department that owners had handgun permits and often slept there Barroso v. City of Coral Gables, No 94-0457 CIV-UNGARO, U.S. Dist. Ct., SD Fla, Nov 14, 1994, reported in 38 ATLA Law Rptr. No 6, p. 224 (August 1995).
     275:170 Update: Louisiana Supreme Court overturns $4 million jury award against city for officers' shooting of mentally disabled man holding a realistic looking toy gun. Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So.2d 318 (La 1994).
     275:171 Police department liable for $594,480 to surviving family of man shot and killed by off-duty officer angry that he was having an affair with officer's wife; suit claimed that department knew that officer had previously, while off-duty, beaten his own wife, but failed to take preventative measures to stem officer's "violent propensities" Thomas v. Los Angeles Police Department, No BC086856, LA Superior Court Glendale, May 18, 1995, reported in Los Ang. Daily Jour. (Verd. & Stl.), page 4, June 16, 1995
     County liable for $1625 million to Cuban immigrant injured in gun battle with plainclothes officers who surrounded his home; plaintiff believed man he saw pointing a rifle at his home was "pro-Castro" person carrying out prior communicated threats. Vasquez v. Metropolitan Dade Co U.S. Dist. Ct. SD Fla, 84-2865- Civ, July 7, 1994, reported in the Natl. Law Jour. p. A15 (Aug 1, 1994).
     Jury awards $3,645,000 in damages to family of motorist shot and killed by officer who stopped him for a traffic offense; plaintiffs argued that motorist's hands were in plain view, while officer argued that motorist had been reaching under his seat and that he feared motorist was reaching for a weapon Bodan v. DeMartino, No BC025408, LA Superior Central Court, LA Calif, May 23, 1994, reported in Los Ang. Daily Jour. (Verd. & Stl.), p. 6, June 10, 1994
     Deputy did not violate the Fourth Amendment in using deadly force against homeowner who turned toward him while holding a gun in his hand; deputy could reasonably believe that his life was in danger and did not know that homeowner was not the prowler that he had been summoned to apprehend. Linder v. Richmond Co., Ga, 844 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.Ga 1994).
     New York cab driver who had driven robbers from a robbery receives $15 million settlement from city in suit over officer's shooting of him as he came out of his vehicle with his hands up Camille v. City of New York, 92-4947, Fed Dist. Ct., S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1994, reported in The Natl. Law Jour., p. A13 (July 11, 1994).
     Federal appeals court rules that city of Memphis is liable for officer's shooting of fleeing felony suspect in Tennessee v. Garner case Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 8 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1993).
     Appeals court upholds $406 million award against city for officers' shooting of mentally disabled man holding a realistic looking toy gun Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 632 So.2d 375 (La. App. 1994).
     City liable for $4,370,000 to surviving family of man shot and killed by officer responding to domestic disturbance call who thought a stick in man's hand as he came out of an apartment was a rifle Camacho v. City of Cudahy, VC009187, La Superior Court, March 31, 1994, reported in Los Ang. Daily Jour. p. 5 (April 8, 1994).
     Officer who shot disturbed youth who allegedly had put down knife and was not then threatening anyone was entitled to qualified immunity from liability. McKinney v. DeKalb Co., Ga, 997 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1993).
     Estate of man shot and killed while running toward officer carrying large board awarded $333 million in damages against city Perez v. Harrison, 92-103-LH/DJFm /Fed Dist. Ct., NM, Dec 17, 1993, reported in the Natl. Law Jour., p. 9 (Jan 10, 1994).
     Officer was not liable for shooting and killing mentally disturbed individual who chased him around parking lot threatening to kill him; while suspect was actually unarmed, officer could have reasonably believed he was reaching for a weapon when he reached in back of him, in light of blood he observed on suspect's arms and other circumstances Wyche v. City of Franklinton, 837 F.Supp. 137 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
     City liable for $408 million to mentally disabled man who suffered paraplegia after being shot by police officers who thought the toy gun he was holding was a real weapon; award under appeal. Mathieu v. City of New Orleans, La, Orleans Parish Civ. Dist. Ct., #88-10254, Division H, Dec 17, 1992, reported in 36 ATLA L. Rep.374 (Dec 1993).
     Jury awards $545,000 to surviving family of man shot and killed by police officer; officer asserted decedent was about to stab a man with a knife, while decedent's four siblings testified that he did not have a knife, but that officers placed one near his body after his death Allen v. Redmond, U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Ill., reported in Chicago Tribune, p. 1 (Dec 23, 1993).
     Off-duty officer did not use excessive force in shooting at windshield of vehicle which had hit him; officer reasonably believed the driver posed a serious threat of death or serious bodily harm to him Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. 1993).
     Mother and estate of youth shot and killed by officers seeking to stop him from driving away in car suspected to be stolen awarded $2 million in damages, including $1 million in punitive damages Carmona-Rosado v. Municipality of Catano, U.S. Dist. Ct., DPR, #89-1531, Jan 30, 1992, 35 ATLA L. Rep.376 (Dec 1992).
     NY's highest court upholds $43 million award to convicted robber, who attacked elderly man in subway, for paralysis resulting from shooting by transit police officer McCummings v. NYC Trans Auth, 81 NY 2d 923, 613 N.E.2d 559, 597 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1993).
     Federal appeals court holds that officer's shooting of fleeing suspect in the back was "objectively reasonable" when he had reason to believe him to have committed a violent crime, to be armed with a knife which he appeared to be pulling, and to be inebriated; issue of whether suspect was actually unarmed at the time of the shooting was not relevant to officer's entitlement to qualified immunity Krueger v. Fuhr, 991 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1993).
     Improper admission of officer's statement that he had not previously shot anyone in 16 years on the force did not require new trial in case where jury held for defendant officer in shooting death of suspect who pulled cigarette lighter from pocket and threw it at officer; officer believed suspect might be pulling out a gun Gates v. Rivera, 993 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1993).
     Officer was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a domestic violence suspect armed with a screwdriver; officer reasonably believed that metal object in suspect's hand was a gun which he was raising against the officer Vasquez v. Hernandez, 844 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App. 1992).
     Officer not liable for shooting and killing vehicle driver during traffic stop when he thought car passenger was attempting to shoot at him; trial court's instructions to jury were wrong, but not "plain error," and did not require reversal of jury verdict for defendant officer. Turner v. White, 980 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir. 1992).
     Arrestee shot by Alaska state troopers could not sue for injuries under state law because of statute barring felons from recovering damages occurring as a result of the felony Sun v. State, 830 P.2d 772 (Alaska 1992).
     Police officers who shot and killed fleeing driver of car involved in armed robbery were not entitled to qualified immunity when a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether they should have realized that he was not armed and whether they had probable cause to believe that he posed a threat of serious bodily harm to themselves or others Washington v. Newsom, 977 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1992).
     Officer acted in reasonable self-defense in firing a shot at truck which appeared likely to run him down; neither officer or city was liable for death of truck's driver. Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992).
     Officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing armed man who they were told had previously fired shots and was pointing a gun at them; fact that gun was unloaded did not alter result, since officers had no way of knowing that. Scott v. Henrich, 978 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1992).
     Deployment of SWAT team and shooting of mentally ill woman to get her to submit to involuntary treatment was not an "unreasonable seizure" in light of the fact that she had threatened to shoot officers and swung a butcher knife at one officer Williams v. Richmond County, Ga, 804 F.Supp. 1561 (S.D.Ga 1992).
     Deputies and county were not liable for shooting unarmed 15 year-old black male in the back as he fled from them after dropping sawed-off shotgun; youth made a movement towards his waistband and deputies reasonably, if mistakenly, believed he had a second gun. Sims v. County of Los Angeles, No BC 015-704, L.A. Co. Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Calif (June 4, 1992).
     Plaintiff who was convicted of criminal culpable negligence in firing the first shots at undercover officers outside a house through a closed door was not barred, by his conviction, from suing officers and county for alleged use of excessive force in returning fire in the ensuing shootout. Vasquez v. Metrop. Dade Co., 968 F.2d 1101 (11th Cir. 1992).
     Mobile homeowner shot by officer in unmarked vehicle awarded $500,000 for use of excessive force; homeowner fired birdshot into air, believing officer to be a trespasser, but was unarmed when officer shot and hit him; county to pay award against officer. Sammons v. McDonald, U.S. Dist. Ct., #CV189-199, Mar 6, 1992, reported in 35 ATLA L. Rep. 289.
     Officer was not entitled to dismissal of excessive force claim before trial on qualified immunity grounds when nine-yearold boy, who was not a suspect, claimed that officer put a gun to his head and threatened to pull the trigger without any justifying reason during a search of the boy's residence. McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992).
     Officer's use of deadly force against a motorist who had previously shot at him was reasonable; although motorist did not then have his weapon in his hand, officer did not know that and reasonably still believed himself to be in danger. Daniels v. Terrell, 783 F.Supp. 1211 (E.D. Mo 1992).
     Police officers' shooting of paranoid schizophrenic man twenty-two times presented a jury question on excessive use of force; while decedent was armed with knives, he may not have posed a serious threat of harm following a first or second round of shots; plaintiffs also stated a claim against city for inadequate training on use of force on disturbed persons. Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1992).
     Erroneous submission of both Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional claims to jury required new trial on civil rights claim arising out of police shooting; Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" standard was the only permissible claim. Ward v. City of San Jose, 948 F.2d 1097 (9th Cir. 1991).
     Convicted robber who attacked elderly man in subway awarded $43 million for paralysis resulting from shooting by transit police officer
     Summary judgment was improperly granted to officer sued for shooting and killing suspect who attacked him with his own club; whether officer's actions in firing four more shots after shooting suspect six times were reasonable was a jury question. Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1992).
     Jury awards $44,000 to relatives of three robbers shot and killed by officers as they exited restaurant they had robbed Arango v. Gates, U.S. Dist. Ct., reported in The New York Times, national Edition p. A11 (April 1, 1992).
     Award of $1 million to compensate mother for loss of her mentally ill son from police shooting was not supported by evidence; mental anguish of mother was the only damage shown and mother had previously been the object of son's violent behavior. Fields v. Dailey, 68 Ohio App.3d 33, 587 N.E.2d 400 (1990).
     Summary judgment was improper in alleged burglar's lawsuit against off-duty officer who shot him as he crouched by officer's house armed only with a screwdriver Alexander v. Riccinto, 481 N.W.2d 6 (Mich App. 1991).
     Use of deadly force to stop motorist fleeing at speeds over 90 miles per hour was reasonable. Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992).
     Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a man when there was conflicting evidence as to whether he pointed a weapon at them; parents and children of deceased man could base their claims against officers on due process clause rather than Fourth Amendment. Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1991).
     The Fourth Amendment gives a bystander no constitutional protection against unintentional shooting by police officers pursuing a fleeing suspect Rucker v. Harford Co., Md., 946 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1991).
     Child, who was a fetus at the time officers shot and killed his father, could bring a civil rights suit over his father's death Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991).
     Court overturns $124 million award against deputy in shooting death of suicidal woman; trial court failed to assess possible objective reasonableness of deputy's action in firing when he believed that woman may have been pointing her weapon at him; county's liability under state law for negligent failure to train or supervise deputies on how to deal with potential suicides upheld, however Quezada v. Co. of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710 (10th Cir. 1991).
     Deputy sheriff's shooting and killing of suspect was justified when he advanced on the deputy with a machete upraised and ignored orders to drop the weapon Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117 (6th Cir. 1991).
     State trooper who was justified in firing at mentally impaired man was not liable for negligence of other officers involved in incident based on theory of "acting in concert"; $224 million judgment against trooper and state reversed State v. Will, 807 P.2d 467 (Alaska, 1991).
     Sister and niece of man shot and killed by officers could not bring civil rights suit to recover damages for the "traumatizing effects" of witnessing his death. Borrero-Rentero v. Rivera, 761 F.Supp. 5 (D.P.R. 1991).
     Bureau of Indian Affairs officer properly shot intoxicated man running at officers with rifle pointed at them; fact that rifle was later found to be unloaded was irrelevant to officer's decision to use deadly force at the time. Waybenais v. US, 769 F.Supp. 306 (D.Minn. 1991).
     Officer's actions in entering a dark hallway in a residence at night without identifying himself as an officer, shining a flashlight, or wearing his police cap, were not objectively reasonable; officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for use of deadly force in response to occupants' reaction. Yates v. City of Cleveland, 941 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1991).
     Narcotics officer participating in sting operation was entitled to qualified immunity for shooting arrestee; past incidents involving violence had taken place at location of the arrest and the arrestee ignored the officer's order to raise his hands, turning towards officer with an object in his hands. Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1991).
     Armed security guard shot by homicide detectives staking out convenience store was properly awarded$50,000 in negligence claim against detectives and sheriff even though jury found security guard 50% at fault in the incident Ansley v. Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1339 (11th Cir. 1991).
     Officer reasonably shot and killed unarmed robbery suspect in stopped vehicle who repeatedly reached down below officer's sight line in defiance of orders to raise his hands. Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991).
     Officer's shooting of suspect in the jaw was objectively reasonable despite her alleged failure to follow standard police procedures for making a night time prostitution arrest; reasonableness is measured by what the officer knew immediately prior to and at the moment she fired the shot. Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1991).
     Officers did not use excessive force in quickly restraining arrestee they mistakenly thought was armed escaped rapist/robber who had threatened to shoot any officer who tried to return him to prison Dean v. City of Worcester, 924 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1991).
     Federal appeals court upholds jury verdict for officer in shooting case; jury instructions requiring "knowing" use of excessive force were not improper; testimony of "use of force expert" was properly admitted Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1990).
     Officers were justified in firing at armed jail escapee who took police officer hostage and fired a shot as hostage tried to escape Fitzgerald v. Patrick, 921 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1990).
     Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" standard applied to shooting of escaping pretrial detainee by police officer. Wright v. Whiddon, 747 F.Supp. 694 (M.D. Ga 1990).
     Officer was entitled to official immunity for injuries to suspect resulting from shot fired at guard dog attacking officer during raid on alleged drug house. Murray v. Leyshock, 915 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990).
     Estate of arrestee handcuffed and shot in the head by paranoic schizophrenic police officer awarded $980,200 in damages and $132,22850 in attorneys' fees against officer; municipality ordered to indemnify officer, now deceased Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Cmsn. 915 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1990).
     Armed robber who brandished shotgun at officer awarded $60,000 in damages against two officers who fired eight shots at him. Soba v. McGoey, 748 F.Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
     DEA agent who shot and killed self-identified drug dealer who knocked him to the ground and chased him acted in self- defense and was not liable for violation of dealer's civil rights. Smith v. Hill, 741 F.Supp. 647 (E.D. Mich 1990).
     NJ Federal Court holds that Tennessee v. Garner does not apply retroactively; officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting of fleeing felon Rodriguez v. City of Passaic, 730 F.Supp. 1314 (D.N.J. 1990).
     Appeals court upholds jury's verdict in favor of officers in suit over shooting at suspect; whether bullet in arrestee's hand came from officer's gun was irrelevant. Scott v. James, 902 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1990).
     Arrestee could not recover for fright and "bad dreams" resulting from deputy placing revolver in his mouth and threatening to blow his head off. Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1990).
     Shooting driver's truck tires and pointing gun at driver's head did not constitute unconstitutional use of deadly force Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31 (Minn, 1990).
     Building owner mistakenly shot by officer investigating burglary report had no claim against officer's partner, who used no force at all. Spera v. Lee, 728 F.Supp. 366 (E.D. Pa 1990).
     Evidence of offenses of sex crimes arrestee shot during unsuccessful escape attempt could be admitted in his lawsuit against officers; it was relevant to the reasonableness of their actions. Geitz v. Lindsey, 893 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1990).
     Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals holds that Graham v. Connor standard for excessive force claims applies retroactively; orders new trial on officer's shooting of man while responding to domestic disturbance call Reed v. Hoy, 891 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1989).
     Officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting robbery suspect in the head; suspect had knife in his pocket and presented risk to store clerk he had previously held at knife- point Newcomb v. City of Troy, 719 F.Supp. 1408 (E.D. Mich 1989).
     Whether officer was reasonable in using deadly force against person creating a disturbance was a question of fact in light of conflicting evidence Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989).
     Federal appeals court upholds $51 million award for shooting by officers that rendered plaintiff paraplegic Gutierrez- Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989).
     Police officer was immune from suit if he acted in good faith in shooting fleeing unarmed burglar, but Michigan's fleeing felon statute held retroactively unconstitutional Washington v. Starke, 433 N.W.2d 834 (Mich. App. 1988).
     Civil rights plaintiff had burden of overcoming officer's argument that he fired in self-defense Miller v. Taylor, 877 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1989).
     Police officer entitled to summary judgment on excessive force complaint when plaintiff did not submit any evidence Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 864 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1989).
     Deputy was justified in shooting drunken man who took his night stick and was advancing on him with night stick upraised. Est. of Belew v. Ruppert, 694 F.Supp. 1214 (D.Md 1988).
     Mother of arrestee allegedly shot in head could recover for loss of son's companionship in federal suit even if state did not allow such recovery. Hutson v. Bell, 702 F.Supp. 212 (N.D.Ill. 1988).
     Officer on medical roll was not acting under color of law when he shot and killed individual, despite failure of city to confiscate weapon or ammunition Gibson v. City of Chicago, 701 F.Supp. (N.D.Ill. 1988).
     Officer's shooting of man who threatened him with knife was objectively reasonable; city's failure to reprimand or discipline officer did not demonstrate unconstitutional policy Est. of Jackson v. City of Rochester, 705 F.Supp. 779 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
     Parents could bring civil rights suit for loss of relationship with adult son allegedly killed by police Agresta v. Sambor, 687 F.Supp. 162 (E.D. Pa 1988).
     Arrestee awarded $400,000 for alleged negligent shooting; exclusion of evidence of arrestee's prior felony conviction for assault against officer was "harmless error." Clark v. Buhring, 761 P.2d 266 (Colo. App. 1988).
     Officers who killed decedent during a shoot-out started by the decedent are entitled to qualified immunity. Standridge v. City of Seaside, 545 F.Supp. 1195 (N.D.Cal 1982).
     Plaintiff sues federal officials for shooting him during drug arrest. Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1982).
     Officer ordered to pay $140,223 to armed man he chased into motel room and shot. Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1982).
     {N/R} NYPD pays $300,000 in compensatory and $125,000 in punitive damages after an off-duty officer shot his wife five times, then himself, using an approved off-duty weapon. There was evidence his superiors ignored the officer's psychological problems. Bonsignore v. City of N.Y., 521 F.Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982).
     City liable for killing unarmed suspect and then planting "throw down" gun on him Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1982).
     FBI not negligent for gunshot injuries to plaintiff who was attempting to rob a bank. Amato v. United States, 549 F.Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1982).
     Plaintiff in process of "hijacking" school bus suffered no constitutional rights violations when shot by officer. Todd v. White Lake Twp, 554 F.Supp. 272 (E.D. Mich 1983).
     Marshal shot and killed unwilling evictee in self-defense. Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1983).
     No liability for shooting of 16-year-old fleeing robbery suspect. Simmons v. City of Chicago, 455 N.W.2d 232 (Ill.App. 1983).
     Officer could be liable for shooting and killing plaintiff's son; no liability to police chief or city absent negligent training or policy allegation. White v. Talboys, 573 F.Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983).
     Possible liability for shooting fleeing misdemeanant Cross v. City of Gary, 456 N.E.2d 614 (Fla. App. 1983).
     Case reversed and city not liable for officer's shooting and killing his relatives with service revolver. Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (DC App. 1983).
     City and police chief could be liable for negligent training and supervision of officer who shot man leaving scene of traffic stop; plaintiff's erratic driving serves as probable cause to take blood and urine sample Hopper v. Payes, 573 F.Supp. 1368 (D. Ida. 1983).
     City liable for police permitting officer's shooting unarmed 15-year-old. Taylor v. Collins, 574 F.Supp. 1554 (E.D. Mich 1983).
     Case to continue for determination of whether officer's shooting of rape suspect in van was reasonable Taylor v. Mayone, 574 F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
     State not responsible for correctional guard's off-duty incidents to prevent crime. Frazier by Western v. State, 474 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. 1984).
     Police officer shot three times by man in rage over not having use of his telephone Ball v. State of Ga, 733 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1984).
     No liability since decedent drew pistol during arrest attempt. Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1984).
     Wrongful shooting death to proceed in federal court; plaintiff not forced to state jurisdiction under Parratt. Bullard v. Valentine, 592 F.Supp. 774 (E.D. Tenn 1984).
     OK to shoot at rape suspect fleeing past roadblock Taylor v. Mayone, 599, F.Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
     Drawing gun to approach motorist during "spot check" not grounds to recover for outrage; court recently ruled matching description on warrant not grounds to arrest. Guffey v. State, 690 P.2d 1163 (Wash. 1984).
     Bystander partially at fault when shot by police during arrest attempt. City of San Antonio v. Higle, 685 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.App. 1985).
     Plaintiff given opportunity to prove supervisor's failure to inform officers on deadly force regulations grounds for liability for shooting fleeing felon Moore v. City of Columbia, 326 S.E.2d 157 (SC App. 1985).
     Shooting fleeing teenagers as they fled from robbery scene not grounds for liability Crawford v. Edmonson, 764 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1985).
     Summary judgment in state court because of immunity does not preclude federal action. Ligas v. Allen, 765 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1985).
     Police chief's failure to make changes, reprimand or fire officers sufficient to infer policy for section 1983 municipal liability; dissenting judge says liability should not be based on a "lack of remorse" after an incident Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985). Deputy wins countersuit after widow sued for wrongful death Baltezore v. Concordia Parish Sheriff's Dept., 767 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1985).
     State court verdict, unlike summary judgment, bars federal action. Devan v. City of Des Moines, 767 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1985).
     No liability for shooting that occurred after officer found couple having intercourse in park. Rhiner v. City of Clive, 373 N.W.2d 466 (Iowa 1985).
     Deadly force policy in Alabama results in $100,000 liability for officer's shooting. Pruit v. City of Montgomery, Ala, 771 F.2d 1475 (11th Cir. 1985).
     11th Circuit finds Section 1983 liability for intentional shooting. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985).
     Court reverses $250,000 judgment by finding shooting was reasonable; parents have no constitutional right to sue. Ealey v. City of Detroit, 375 N.W.2d 435 (Mich.App. 1985).
     Court finds no wrongdoing in shooting fleeing felon already placed under custody. Garcia v. Wyckoff, 615 F.Supp. 217 (DC Colo 1985).
     Court finds no conspiracy in shooting of decedent, who allegedly would not sell drugs for deputies; no liability for deputies' shooting decedent's dogs Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985).
     Officer liable for shooting after improperly handling arrest Young v. City of Killeen, Tex, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985).
     Police shot resident in mistaken belief he was a burglar; prejudgment interest awarded. Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F2d 280 (1st Cir. 1983). Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1986).
     Not necessary to join arresting officers in suit against municipality Ellison v. Town of Brookside, 481 So.2d 89O (Ala 1985).
     City not liable for officer's being shot by fellow officer McKenna v. City of Memphis, 785 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1986).
     Off-duty officer riding with son alerted to robbery in which he used firearms. Hill v. Jenkins, 620 F.Supp. 272 (N.D.Ill. 1985).
     Defense counsel's statement that police would have to personally pay judgment admissible; shooting review board report also admissible Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986).
     Over $1 million awarded for police officer on routine patrol negligently shooting drug agents. Mazzilli v. Doud, 485 So.2d 477 (Fla.App. 1986).
     Decision to shoot was ministerial, not discretionary; no immunity. Watson v. Quarles, 381 N.W.2d 811 (Mich.App. 1985).
     City proves training policy adequate to avoid liability; suit to continue against police, even though decedent was armed when they fired their weapons York v. City of San Pablo, 626 F.Supp. 34 (N.D.Cal. 1985).
     Recommendations of officer's dismissal inadmissible Hargress v. City of Montgomery, 479 So.2d 1137 (Ala 1985).
     Plaintiff's closing argument that government will pay damages in a Sec. 1983 action prejudicial to police; new trial ordered. Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986).
     Garner given retroactive application by the sixth circuit. Carter v. City of Chattanooga, TN, 803 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986).
     Children have no Fourth Amendment claim in father's shooting; estate does. Smith v. City of Fontana, 807 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1987).
     Court rules officer need not see a gun before shooting fleeing bank robber; observing employees with hands held over their heads supports shooting under Garner rules. Ford v. Childers, 650 F.Supp. 110 (C.D.Ill. 1986).
     Police officer's intentional tort is within the scope of employment if it was foreseeable; city could be liable for negligent retention of officer with violent tendencies. Hill by Hill v. Mitchell, 653 F.Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
     Police firing their weapons at gunman without identifying themselves was justified. Trejo v. Wattles, 654 F.Supp. 1143 (D. Colo. 1987).
     Over $200,000 awarded for deputies' shooting and killing store owner, mistaking him for burglar Lundgren v. McDaniel, 804 F.2d 600 (11th Cir. 1987).
     Use of deadly force against non dangerous fleeing felon results in $472,000 judgment Guider v. Smith, 403 N.W.2d 505 (Mich.App. 1987).
     Tenth circuit U.S. Court of Appeals finds officer acted reasonably in shooting female juvenile who appeared to be armed while fleeing from robbery of Pizza Hut. Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412 (10th Cir. 1987).
     Civil rights suit ordered to continue against police over shooting; city dismissed from suit after police lieutenant testified that training was adequate. Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 731 P.2d 171 (Idaho 1986).
     Undercover police officer accused of firing his weapon without justification during drug transaction Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1985).
     Depression over police incident states claim for suicide Parker v. Superior Court, 223 Cal.Rptr. 292 (App. 1985).
     No liability for suicide of arrestee two years after being shot and paralyzed by officer. District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d. 1269 (DC App. 1987).
     Children of man shot by police can bring civil rights lawsuit for loss of companionship, children's action can raise fourth amendment, but not first or eighth amendment claims. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987).
     U.S. Court of Appeals for 7th Circuit upholds $16 million civil rights verdict for fatal shooting of unarmed teenager; allows damages for the "hedonic" value of life and loss of parental association. Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987).
     Officer who shot youth in head liable for $150,000; youth's mother and siblings could not bring suit on their own behalf, however Guzman Rosa v. de Alba, 671 F.Supp. 882 (D. Puerto Rico, 1987).
     Pointing loaded pistol at arrestee was not constitutionally excessive force. Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, Tex., 834 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1988).
     Store owner shot by state trooper under misconception that hostage situation was taking place within store; allowed to proceed with suit against trooper. Thompson v. Spikes, 663 F.Supp. 627 (S.D.Ga 1987).
     Town not liable for officer's shooting of arrestee while executing warrant for failure to pay traffic fine Stokes v. Bullins, 844 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1988).
     Second circuit court of appeals holds that supreme court decision on deadly force applies retroactively; reasonable use of deadly force measured by individual officer's knowledge Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605 (2nd Cir. 1988).
     Sixth circuit holds that supreme court decision on deadly force should not be applied retroactively to Tennessee fleeing felon statute Carter v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn, 850 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1988).
     Use of deadly force against hospital patient brandishing knife did not violate Fourth Amendment O'Neal v. DeKalb County, Ga., 85O F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1988).

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