AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Corrections Law for
Jails, Prisons and Detention Facilities
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Probation
The highest court in Massachusetts ruled, in a criminal case, that the ordering of GPS monitoring as a condition of the defendant’s probation was an unconstitutional search under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The defendant had been convicted of the possession and distribution of child pornography. A state statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47, requires the imposition of GPS monitoring as a condition of probation for persons convicted of most sex offenses. The defendant argued that, as applied to him, the condition of mandatory GPS monitoring constituted an unconstitutional unreasonable search. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed, ruling that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 47 is over inclusive in that GPS monitoring will not necessarily constitute a reasonable search for all individuals convicted of a qualifying sex offense. It further held that to comport with article 14, prior to imposing GPS monitoring on a defendant, a judge must conduct a balancing test weighing the state’s need to impose GPS monitoring against the defendant’s privacy invasion arising by the monitoring. In the immediate case, the state’s particularized reasons for imposing GPS monitoring on the defendant did not outweigh the privacy invasion that GPS monitoring entails. Commonwealth v. Feliz, #SJC-12545, 481 Mass. 689, 2019 Mass. Lexis 174, 2019 WL 1339199.
A juvenile defendant involved in a fight appealed an order declaring him a ward of the juvenile court and placing him on probation after the trial court sustained a petition for battery with serious bodily injury. An intermediate California state appeals court upheld a probation condition prohibiting the defendant from discussing his case on social media, ruling that the condition was neither overbroad nor in violation of the defendant’s First Amendment rights. In this case, the defendant posted on social media “bragging” about being a 16-year-old felon. The appeals court held that the juvenile court had broad discretion in imposing probation conditions and that the restriction on social media postings was precise, narrow, and reasonably tailored to address the defendant’s posting conduct and rehabilitation. In re A.A., #B289821, 30 Cal. App. 5th 596, 2018 Cal. App. Lexis 1186, 2018 WL 6695839.
As the majority of states now have laws authorizing the prescribing of marijuana for medical use, such use by probationers and others is becoming a more frequent issue. A federal appeals court recently upheld a trial court’s modification of the terms of a man’s supervised release to include a standard condition explicitly prohibiting the use of medical marijuana. The appeals court held that the trial court correctly concluded that his use of marijuana, even for medical purposes, contravenes federal law. The court reasoned that, although some medical marijuana was legal in Minnesota as a matter of state law, the state's law conflicted with federal law. Therefore, the trial court had no discretion to allow him to use medical marijuana while on supervised release. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the terms of supervised release to provide clarifying language accurately stating federal law. United States v. Schostag, #17-2530, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 19169 (8th Cir.).
A man served a sentence for
attempted sexual abuse and then was placed on probation. He was required to
enroll in a sex offender treatment program while on probation and was refused
admission to the program since he refused to admit his guilt before the program
began and instead invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. When his probation was then revoked, he sued his probation
officer and therapist. The trial judge, screening the pro se in forma pauperis
complaint, dismissed the lawsuit on the basis of qualified immunity. A federal
appeals court reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the facts
alleged in the complaint did not foreclose the possibility that the plaintiff
could have overcome qualified immunity. Chavez v. Robinson, #14-35384, 2016 U.S.
App. Lexis 5765 (9th Cir.).
A man who served 20
years for sexual assault was then placed on probation. A state court ruled that
a sentencing order ordering probation after the 20-year sentence had been
illegal, because the sentencing court lacked authority to suspend all of the
additional 30-year sentence (5 years of which he would have had to serve)
authorized by state law to be imposed on him after the 20 years as a persistent
felony offender because of a prior burglary conviction. Strangely enough, in
some respects, he now sought, on that basis, to collect damages against
correctional authorities who had released him from prison years too early,
placing him on probation. The federal appeals court rejected this argument,
holding that prison officials had absolute immunity for liability for conduct
dictated by facially valid court orders. Engebretson v. Mahoney, #10-35626,
2013 U.S. App. Lexis 10887 (9th Cir.).
A man convicted of attempted sexual abuse of an
unconscious 16-year-old intoxicated girl was ordered, as a special condition of
his supervised release, on probation not to reside with, or be in the company
of, any child under age 18, including his own daughters, and not to socialize
with or date anyone with such children, including his own fiancée. A
federal appeals court vacated that condition, ordering further proceedings. The
fundamental right to associate with one's family is a particularly significant
liberty interest and the condition was imposed without making any explicit
findings supported by evidence that the condition was necessary for deterrence,
protection of the public and rehabilitation, and were not broader than
necessary. As there was no evidence in the record supporting the need for such
restrictions, the special condition at issue could not be reimposed on remand.
The court below could consider whether it was necessary to impose similarly but
more narrow restrictions. U.S. v. Wolf Child, #11-30241, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th
Cir. 2012).
A man pled guilty to charges of false
imprisonment and was placed on probation and released from custody. His
probation officer required him to register as a sex offender and be placed in a
sex offender probation unit. This was based on the probation officer's mistaken
belief that the man's victim had been a minor. He sued, and got his name
removed from the sex offender registry and himself from the sex offender
probation unit. The plaintiff stated a valid claim against the probation
officer for violation of his civil rights. The defamatory harm of being wrongly
placed on sex offender status without procedural due process satisfied a
"stigma plus" requirement for civil liability for such actions. The
probation officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due
process claim, but substantive due process and equal protection claims were
properly rejected. Claims for supervisory liability against the Secretary of
the state Department of Corrections were rejected on the basis of qualified
immunity, since there was no showing that he was personally involved in the
action or that the probation officer acted on the basis of any policy he was
responsible for. Brown v. Montoya, #10-2269, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis
22533 (10th Cir.).
Federal probationer who was charged with a violation of
federal law in relation to the use of explosives was entitled to a modification
of the conditions of his probation to prevent the U.S. Probation Department
from obtaining a DNA sample from him under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 14135-14135e. While the probationer had a lessened
expectation of privacy when it came to searches of his person and home, the
obtaining of a DNA sample was a "highly intrusive" search, so that
the DNA Act was unconstitutional as applied to him. U.S. v. Stewart, No.
05-10062, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 745 (D. Mass.). [N/R]
Pennsylvania probation officials and employees
could not be held liable for a probationer's murder of the 8-year-old sister of
his 12-year-old victim based on the failure to act more promptly in seeking to
revoke his probation after he violated its conditions by attempting to continue
a relationship with the 12-year-old whose morals he had previously been
convicted of "corrupting." Mere inaction or failure to act swiftly
did not constitute a "state-created danger." Bright v. Westmoreland
County, No. 05-2005, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 8074 (3d Cir.). [2006 JB May]
Parole officials were not entitled to absolute
immunity for allegedly refusing to investigate a parolee's claim that the
revocation of his probation had been overturned, and that therefore he should
not be on parole. Dawson v. Newman, No. 04-2894, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17487
(7th Cir.). [2005 JB Oct]
Removal of offender from home detention program
for failure to obtain full-time employment was a deprivation of liberty,
entitling him to due process, but county community corrections agency did not
order him jailed, since only a court had the power to do so. The plaintiff was
arrested under a warrant and spent 3 days in custody. A subsequent court
hearing determined that he was mentally disabled, and therefore excused from
the condition of obtaining full time employment. He was then reinstated in the
home detention program. If there was any erroneous deprivation of due process,
it was by the probation officer and the state court that issued the arrest
warrant at the officer's request. No civil rights claim could be pursued
against the community corrections agency for merely reporting to the probation
officer a probable violation of a condition of probation. Paige v. Hudson,
#02-4317, 341 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Threats to kill county jail staff members on more
than one occasion were sufficient to support the revocation of a prisoner's
probation. The threats were made while he was serving a 90 day sentence in the
jail as one of the conditions of probation, and there was evidence that he was
shown a videotape notifying him of the jail's rules, including the rules
against threatening staff members. State v. Payne, No. COA02-809, 577 S.E.2d
166 (N.C. App. 2003). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court upholds warrantless
searches of a probationer's home without probable cause as a condition of
probation; evidence uncovered in one such search, conducted by a sheriff's
detective with reasonable suspicion, did not need to be suppressed. United
States v. Knights, No. 00-1260, 121 S. Ct. 1955 (2001). [2002 JB Feb]
272:122 Requiring atheist probationer to attend
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings as a condition of probation violated his First
Amendment rights, but award of $1 in nominal damages was proper, since county
probation officials would not have had reason to believe, at the time, that
this was a violation of his rights. Warner v. Orange Co. Dept. of Probation,
#95-7055, 173 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 1999).
[N/R] Probation employees were entitled to
absolute immunity from liability from claim that they submitted an inaccurate
presentence report in connection with a prisoner's conviction. Hill v.
Sciarrotta, #97-2161, 140 F.3d 210 (2nd Cir. 1998).