AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Corrections Law for
Jails, Prisons and Detention Facilities
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Religion
Monthly
Law Journal Article: Religious Freedom in
Correctional Facilities (I) --Legal Standard 2007 (3) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Religious Freedom in
Correctional Facilities (II) --Appearance and Apparel 2007 (4)
AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly
Law Journal Article: Prisoner
Diet Legal Issues, 2007 (7) AELE Mo. L.J. 301. [Contains a section of
religious issues arising in the context of prisoner diet].
Monthly Law Journal Article: Religious
Freedom in Correctional Facilities (III): Protection for
"Unconventional" Religions?, 2009 (3) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Atheist,
Agnostic or “Secular Humanist” Prisoners, And the “Establishment of Religion”,
2009 (5) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Prisoner
Name Changes, 2011 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 301.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Rights
of Rastafarian Employees and Inmates, 2015 (8) AELE Mo. L. J. 201.
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Ramadan is an annual Muslim religious month in which practitioners of that religion are required to fast during the day but can eat at night. Four Muslim prisoners in Michigan claimed that prison officials disrupted their Ramadan observances by failing to provide them with adequate evening meals to accommodate their daytime fasting. A jury awarded them a total of $900 in damages, $150 for each Ramadan in which the deprivation occurred. A federal appeals court upheld this award, rejecting the prisoners’ argument that the jury failed to take into account the “spiritual harms” they suffered. The jury listened to the plaintiffs’ testimony and examined their medical records. It then considered all the evidence and concluded that each inmate suffered $150 worth of harm for each Ramadan the prison officials disrupted. The trial judge did not downplay the plaintiffs’ spiritual injuries nor require that they submit medical records to substantiate them. The judge only mentioned that objective evidence (such as medical records) might help the jury reach a higher damages calculation. Without such concrete, objective evidence, the trial court had no basis to disagree with the value that the jury assigned to the damages. Heard v. Finco, #18-2371, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 20847, 2019 WL 3072151, 2019 Fed. App. 0158P (6th Cir.). State prisons in Michigan let Wiccan prisoners engage in group worship services during eight major holidays (Sabbats). Wiccans also celebrate other holidays (Esbats) 12-13 times a year. They are not permitted to worship as a group on Esbats and re only allowed to use candles and incense in the prison chapel. One Wiccan prisoner requested that he and other Wiccans be allowed to celebrate Esbats through group services. When this request was denied, he sued the state department of corrections, seeking injunctive relief and damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). A federal appeals court upheld a grant of qualified immunity to the prison chaplain. The trial court had also ruled that the state corrections department was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from damage clams. But the appeals court vacated a denial of injunctive relief under the RLUIPA, ordering a determination of whether the Department’s policy survived scrutiny under RLUIPA, which requires a showing of a compelling governmental objective and the use of the least restive means to achieve that objective when it substantially burdens religious exercises. A policy “substantially burdens” religious exercise when it bars an inmate from worshiping with others and from using ritualistic items, the court stated. Cavin v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, #18-1346. 927 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2019). A consent decree entered into in 1977 exempted Muslim inmates in Texas from a requirement that all religious gatherings and activities attended by more than four inmates must be directly supervised by either prison staff or a prison-approved outside volunteer. A federal appeals court has now terminated the consent decree, finding that it does not remain necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Free Exercise Clause, or the Establishment Clause. It also overturned an award of attorneys’ fees as the plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties.” Brown v. Collier, #14-20249, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 19824, 2019 WL 2754965 (5th Cir.). A Texas prisoner claimed that repercussions he endured because of his religiously motivated decision not to participate in an unpaid prison work program violated his rights under the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as the Texas Constitution and a Texas statute. A federal appeals court ruled that it was no abuse of discretion to dismiss the plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims as malicious and when it dismissed his retaliation and Thirteenth Amendment claims for failure to state a claim. Inmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state a Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude claim if the prison system requires them to work. Further, he could not assert a retaliation claim based on the theory that he was illegally retaliated against for asserting his constitutional right not to work when he had no such right. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state-law claims. Shakouri v. Davis, #17-20738, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 13200 (5th Cir.). A North Carolina prisoner claimed that prison officials imposed a substantial burden on his religious exercise by refusing his request to celebrate four annual Rastafarian holy days, in violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. A federal appeals court upheld judgment for the defendants based on different reasons than those stated by the trial court. It found that the prisoner failed to show that the defendants’ policies caused a substantial burden on his exercise of religion. He requested communal gatherings and feasts, but failed to identify any other Rastafarian inmate in the North Carolina prison system who would attend his proposed gatherings and join him in celebrating the four holy days. Accordingly, he did not show that the prison’s policies in fact caused a deprivation of his rights. Wright v. Lassiter, #18-6320, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 11223, 2019 WL 1645790 (4th Cir.)A Texas death row inmate sought to prohibit his execution until the state allowed his preferred spiritual advisor, a Buddhist priest, to be physically present in the execution chamber at the time of execution. After the petition was denied, he filed a federal civil rights lawsuit over the issue. The motion for a stay of execution was denied as untimely, a result upheld by the federal appeals court. The court ruled that held that the proper time for raising such claims has long since passed. The execution date was set on November 29, 2018 for March 28, 2019; and by his lawyer’s admission, he had waited until February 28 to first request that the state allow his Buddhist priest to not just meet with him prior to entering the execution chamber and watch from the viewing room, but actually enter the execution chamber with him; and then waited until March 20 -- eight days before the scheduled execution -- to raise his First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims. These claims were not brought before the federal courts until March 26. The appeals court also took note of the multiple warnings the plaintiff's lawyer had received in the past for filing motions at the last moment. Subsequently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court, by 7-2, granted a stay of execution “pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari unless the state permits Murphy's Buddhist spiritual advisor or another Buddhist reverend of the state's choosing to accompany Murphy in the execution chamber during the execution.” Murphy v. Collier, #19-70007, 919 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2019), stay granted, Murphy v. Collier, #18A985, 139 S. Ct. 1111, 203 L. Ed. 2d 633, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2298, 2019 WL 1410989. A prisoner had joined the Nation of Islam in 1992. He had been a devout, active Muslim for 20 years, including the years he spent incarcerated in Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facilities. Eid al-Fitr is one of two annual religious feasts central to Islam. MDOC officials twice prevented him from participating in Eid observances. In 2013, a prison chaplain told him that he could only attend Eid if he changed his religion from the Nation of Islam to Al-Islam, a different Muslim sect. He testified that a second chaplain denied his request to participate in Eid in 2014 without offering any justification. The trial court denied the chaplains qualified immunity. A federal appeals court affirmed. The court noted that, since 2006, MDOC had been embroiled in litigation regarding its policy of refusing to allow Muslim inmates to participate in Eid and that in July 2013, MDOC amended its Policy Directive to recognize Eid as a protected religious holy day. The plaintiff sufficiently alleged the deprivation of his constitutional rights and a reasonable official would have known that the constitutional rights at issue were clearly established when faced with a court order specifically instructing MDOC officials to allow Muslim inmates to participate in Eid. Maye v. Klee, #18-1460, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 4466, 2019 Fed. App. 0022P (6th Cir.). A prisoner on death row in Alabama filed a civil rights complaint and emergency motion for stay of execution, claiming that excluding his Muslim Imam from the execution chamber at the time of his execution in favor of a Christian chaplain violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and that requiring the presence of a Christian chaplain in the execution chamber at the time of his execution also violated his rights under RLUIPA. He further argued that Alabama’s practice of requiring a Christian chaplain in the execution chamber, while forbidding clerics of other faiths, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and that refusing to honor his late election for nitrogen hypoxia as the method of his execution, where his lateness resulted from his religious beliefs, also violated RLUIPA. A federal appeals court held that Alabama’s prison officials favored one religious denomination to the detriment of all others, that they had made only general claims about their compelling interest, and they had offered nothing remotely establishing that their policy was narrowly tailored to further that interest. The appeals court held that the prisoner was substantially likely to succeed on the merits of his Establishment Clause claim given the little evidence in the record to support the government’s interest and the fit between those interests and the state's policy. In this case, given the paucity of evidence, the court concluded that it was not altogether surprising that the state had not clearly argued that prisoner knew or should have known sooner that his religious beliefs would not be accommodated. Therefore, the appeals court granted the petition for an emergency stay of execution. The U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, did not agree. It vacated the stay, allowing the prisoner to be executed by lethal injection without his Imam present. Ray v. Commissioner, #19-10405, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 3664 (11th Cir.), vacated, Dunn v. Ray, #18A815, 139 S. Ct. 145, 203 L. Ed. 2d 145, 2019 U.S. Lexis 817, 2019 WL 488293. |
A Muslim prisoner wished to observe Islamic dietary restrictions forbidding the consumption of certain foods, such as pork, and requiring that other foods be prepared in accordance with Islamic law (halal). As there is a degree of overlap between halal and Jewish kosher requirements, some Muslims, including the plaintiff, find kosher food acceptable. Indiana correctional officials previously provided kosher meals with kosher meat to inmates requesting them. As the cost of doing so increased, however, such kosher meat meals were no longer offered and those inmates were instead put on a vegan diet. Inmates seeking kosher food successfully sued the state Department of Corrections (DOC) under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The DOC built kosher kitchens at some facilities and moved as many kosher inmates into those facilities as possible. Inmates who could not be moved continued to receive kosher trays. Inmates (including the plaintiff) in a facility with a kosher kitchen had to eat the food prepared there, which is vegetarian. While many Jewish and Muslim inmates found that diet acceptable, the plaintiff not. His Muslim sect believes that the Qur’an commands him to regularly eat meat regularly. The DOC refused his request for kosher trays with meat. A federal appeals court held that Indiana’s refusal to provide him with meat substantially burdens his exercise of religion under RLUIPA, rejecting the DOC’s argument that he could purchase halal meat at the prison commissary. The state cannot demand that the plaintiff, “uniquely among inmates,” empty his account and forgo purchasing hygiene products to avoid a diet that violates his religious beliefs. Jones v. Carter, #17-2836, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 4566 (7th Cir.).
A federal appeals court ruled that the seizure of an inmate’s religious materials burdened a sincere religious practice and that a defendant officer failed to put forward any legitimate government interest justifying the seizure. While the prisoner did not specify that he was a Christian, the religious material confiscated included copies of the Bible and religious books by Max Lucado, Charles Swindoll, and Joel Osteen, Christian authors. He asserted that the taking of those books had placed a substantial burden on his practice of reading religious literature. His decision to seek damages rather than the return of his books “does not indicate that his religious belief is disingenuous.” In fact, given that the books were allegedly destroyed, they could not be returned. Accordingly, the prisoner could proceed with his exercise of religion claim against the officer. However, the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s free exercise claim against a disciplinary captain and a former director of the state department of criminal justice, as they were not alleged to have been personally involved in the confiscation or to have somehow caused it to take place. DeMarco v. Davis, #17-11230, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 2806, 2019 WL 336916 (5th Cir.).
An Indiana prisoner claimed that a prison and state Department of Corrections officials unlawfully prevented him from fully participating in Moorish Science Temple of America services held at the prison, in violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The trial court in screening the complaint, dismissed claims against two defendants on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds and against an officer who had not participated personally in any of the cited actions; and allowed damages claims against the remaining defendants to proceed. After discovery, the court granted the remaining defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. A federal appeals court affirmed in part, concluding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on First Amendment claims for damages. The court remanded in part, ruling that the district court misread the complaint, which clearly seeks injunctive relief as well as damages. The court should have read the inmate’s pro se free exercise claim as seeking injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. On remand, the court first must determine whether the free exercise claim and RLUIPA claims are moot, then consider whether injunctive relief is warranted. There was, however, no basis for injunctive relief on the establishment clause claim. Neely--Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, #17-2980, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 12 (7th Cir.).
After state correctional officials banned incarcerated adherents of the Nation of Gods and Earths (also known as the Five-Percent Nation) from congregating together as their religion requires, a prisoner filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). A federal appeals court vacated the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that the state failed to make any argument that its ban on Nation assembly did not substantially burden plaintiff's exercise of his sincere religious beliefs. The court also held that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the state’s ban advanced a compelling interest through the least restrictive means. Tucker v. Collier, #15-1643, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 28028 (5th Cir.).
A federal appeals court overturned summary judgment to a state Department of Correction in a lawsuit claiming that a policy of not accommodating the dietary restrictions imposed by a prisoner’s Nazarite Jewish religion violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). The Department had to make a substantial showing to justify burdening an individual plaintiff’s practice of a sincerely held religious belief. In this case, there were fact questions remaining as to whether the Department’s interest was compelling and its means were the least restrictive in light of suggested alternatives. Williams v. Annucci, #15-1018, 895 F.3d 180 (2nd Cir. 2018).
A Jewish prisoner sued the official charged with coordinating, directing, and monitoring prisoners’ religious activities for violating his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by denying his request for a kosher diet. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, arguing that his conduct was, at most, negligent and, thus, did not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation. The trial court denied the request for qualified immunity, concluding that it was clearly established that a kosher-meal accommodation was necessary if the prisoner had an honest belief that the accommodation was important to his free exercise of religion. It further ruled that the record, read in the light most favorable to the prisoner, was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find that the defendant consciously or intentionally interfered with the right to free exercise by denying the kosher-diet request. A federal appeals court decided that each aspect of the defendant’s appeal amounted to a challenge of the trial court’s determinations of evidentiary sufficiency. Therefore, the appeals court lacked jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal, and dismissed the appeal. Ralston v. Cannon, #16-1372, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 6187 (10th Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner showed a genuine factual dispute as to whether his rights were substantially burdened by the prison’s serving him foods that Nation of Islam dietary rules prohibited him from eating. A federal appeals court noted that the defendants failed to offer any institutional interest that they claimed justified the burdening of a prisoner’s rights in receiving a religious diet. The plaintiff claimed that his rights were violated under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, as well under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Summary judgment for the defendants was overturned. Carter v. Fleming, #17-6461, 879 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2018).
Jewish prisoners in Indiana were transferred from one facility to another in order to keep supplying them with a kosher diet. The prisoners claimed that the department of corrections Director of Religious and Volunteer Services violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by failing to delay that transfer until the new facility also offered opportunities for Jewish group worship and study. At the time of the transfer, the department was unable to recruit Jewish volunteers to the second facility to lead worship or train inmate leaders. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that he did not violate clearly established law. The plaintiffs cited no case holding that the Free Exercise Clause provides prisoners the right to group worship when outside volunteers were unavailable to lead or train inmates or holding that a prison official violates the Free Exercise Clause by transferring inmates to a facility that does not provide congregate worship and study, or by failing to delay a transfer until the new facility provides congregate worship and study. Kemp v. Liebel, #17-1314, 877 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2017).
A Rastafarian prisoner sued as a pauper, challenging the discontinuation of Rastafarian worship services in his prison. He appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A federal appeals court held that failure to exhaust plaintiff's administrative remedies was not a proper basis for dismissal, since a failure to exhaust was not apparent on the face of the complaint. Further, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the defendants’ refusal to allow the group Rastafarian service substantially burdened his religious practices. The dismissal of claims against the prison chaplain was upheld, however, as the plaintiff failed to allege his involvement in the manner necessary to impose liability. Wilcox v. Brown, #16-7596, 877 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2017).
A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of a prisoner’s religious freedom claims as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. His claims for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), was moot after his transfer to a different detention center. His First Amendment claim failed because, other than not being allowed to attend Jumu'ah prayer services, he has not identified any other restrictions on his ability to express or exercise his Muslim faith; Coleman v. Lincoln Parish Detention Center, #16-30109, 858 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2013).
The federal government imposed Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) on a prisoner limiting his communications with the outside world due to past terrorist activities and his connections with terrorist groups. One of the restrictions included a prohibition against participating in group prayer. The plaintiff challenged the legality of his numerous restrictions. He requested a declaratory judgment proclaiming that the government’s imposition and enforcement of the restrictions violated numerous constitutional provisions as well as the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act. He also sought an injunction ordering the government to permit his participation in group prayer. The trial court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim. While his case was on appeal, the government allowed plaintiff's SAMs to expire. But he was still prohibited from participating in group prayer due to the housing restrictions at the facility. A federal appeals court found that the government did not meet its burden to affirmatively demonstrate that continuing to deny plaintiff the right to freely exercise his religion once a week furthered a compelling governmental interest in the least restrictive manner. Ghailani v. Sessions, #15-1128, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 10952 (10th Cir.).
A state trial court ruled that the prohibition on the use of straight tobacco during prisoners’ Native American religious ceremonies violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and it ordered the California Department of Corrections to "formulate and implement policies permitting and reasonably regulating the possession and use of straight tobacco" during those ceremonies. An intermediate California appeals court found that the order was improperly granted without holding an evidentiary hearing and reversed, ordering that such a hearing be conducted. The hearing will consider the disputed factual issue of whether the prisoner’s religious exercise is substantially burdened by the policy. If the prisoner meets his burden of proof on that issue, the court will then consider the factual issue of whether the policy against the use of straight tobacco constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. In re Rhoades, #D070488, 10 Cal. App. 5th 896 (2017).
A prisoner argued that Georgia prisons
enforced a grooming policy that violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by substantially burdening his exercise of
a sincerely held religious belief that Islam requires him to grow an uncut
beard. Overturning summary judgment for the defendants, a federal appeals court
ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Holt
v. Hobbs, #13-6827, 574 U.S. ——, 135 S. Ct. 853, 190 L. Ed. 2d 747 (2015) (holding
that the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violated the
RLUIPA insofar as it prevented a prisoner from growing a ½-inch beard in
accordance with his religious beliefs), made the trial court’s analysis
inadequate because it failed to analyze the substantial burden placed on the
prisoner’s religious beliefs, whether correctional authorities had a compelling
interest, or whether the least restrictive means of furthering that interest
was utilized. The plaintiff
argued that by allowing medical but not religious exemptions from the grooming
policy, the defendants showed that they were not utilizing the least
restrictive means of furthering their interests in security and hygiene. Smith
v. Owens, #14-10981, (11th Cir.).
An Illinois
prisoner filed a complaint in the Illinois Court of Claims against the Illinois
Department of Corrections asserting that Muslims in state prisons were not
permitted to attend prayer service each Friday, that prison officials regularly
stole Arabic prayer cassette tapes and Muslim prayer rugs, and that Christians
were permitted to have more volunteers enter the facility than are Muslims. He
sought $5,000 in damages and the court, while holding a hearing, failed to
issue an opinion for two years. The prisoner meanwhile filed a federal civil
rights lawsuit against prison officials in their individual capacity, only
seeking injunctive relief. The Court of Claims subsequently rejected all of the
prisoner’s claims in a brief two page order. While the federal trial court
dismissed the federal lawsuit as barred by res judicata, a federal appeals
court reversed, finding that the Illinois Court of Claims had lacked
jurisdiction to resolve federal constitutional claims. McDonald v. Adamson,
#15-1305, 840 F.3d 343 (7th Cir. 2016).
A Christian pretrial
detainee alleged that he made a religious vow to abstain from eating meat,
animal fats, or gelatin. He also refuses to eat any part of a meal that
contains those items or to trade those items for acceptable food. He sued a
deputy sheriff in his official capacity for refusing to agree to supply him
with vegetarian meals. A federal appeals court found that the sovereign
immunity of the state of Georgia from damages under the Eleventh Amendment
extended to the deputy's denial of his dietary request. The county sheriff
derived his powers from the state under Georgia law and was largely independent
of the county, and the providing of food to county jail inmates was a state
function under a Georgia statute. The deputy's functions were derived from the
sheriff, so his performance as also a state function. Lake v. Skelton,
#15-13124, 840 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016).
A Muslim inmate at a
federal correctional facility claimed that he was terminated from his paid work
assignment because he complained that two correctional officers were subjecting
him to anti-Muslim harassment at work. He further claimed that this harassment
had caused him to refrain from praying at work. He asserted claims under the
First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, and the
Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA). Reversing dismissal of the
plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation and RFRA claims, a federal appeals
court ruled that a prisoner's oral grievance to prison officials can constitute
protected activity under the Constitution, that the RFRA prohibits individual
conduct that substantially burdens religious exercise, and that the RFRA
provides for monetary relief from an official sued in his individual capacity.
The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the First Amendment Free Exercise and
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims. Mack v. Warden, Loretto Fed. Corr.
Inst., #14-2738, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 18336 (3rd Cir.).
A Wiccan prisoner on his own behalf and on behalf
of thirty fellow Wiccan inmates sued, demanding that the prison recognize Wicca
as a bona fide religion and give its followers the same rights as inmates of
other faiths. In 1997, a comprehensive settlement agreement was entered into,
followed by a second settlement agreement approved by the court in 2011 as a
consent decree and according the inmates additional privileges. On appeal the
issue was whether the trial court properly decided to terminate the consent
decree on the basis of full compliance. The appeals court found that the trial
court committed numerous errors in terminating a consent decree that had been
carefully crafted over the course of two decades; applied the wrong legal
standard, and found substantial compliance without giving due attention to the
various exacting obligations embodied in the decree, and without considering
whether the purpose of the decree had been served. Further, the trial court
improperly refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve material factual
disputes about whether defendants had complied with the decree, The appeals
court also held that under no circumstances should the trial court consider
terminating a decree unless and until there has been a substantial period of
substantial compliance - in this case no less than a year - with every one of
its terms. The consent decree was reinstated. Rouser v. White, #13-56152, 825
F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2016).
A Wiccan prisoner was denied a request to wear a
“pentacle medallion,” a five-pointed silver star set in a circle less than an
inch in diameter. The pentacle medallion was claimed to be to the Wiccan
religion what the cross is to many Christians. The medallion, he contended, was
small enough to comply with the facility's jewelry regulation, yet it was
confiscated. The warden contended that inmates were prohibited from possessing
five or six point star symbols because they are used as gang identifiers. A
federal appeals court ruled that the trial court erred in denying a preliminary
injunction on religious freedom claims under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc–1. The court ruled
that the statute's “substantial burden” inquiry asks whether the government has
substantially burdened religious exercise, not whether the plaintiff is able to
engage in other forms of religious exercise. The court noted that the plaintiff
was willing to wear his medallion under his shirt whenever he was outside his
cell to protect himself from being identified as a gang member and that he had
tendered an affidavit from another Wiccan prisoner, who stated that he has worn
his medallion in maximum security prisons since 1998 without experiencing
threats or violence. Knowles v. Pfister, #15-1703, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12853
(7th Cir.).
Native American prisoners challenged under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc
et seq. prison policies restricting the wearing of medicine bags, the use of
pipes during Native American religious ceremonies, and certain grooming
requirements. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the
plaintiffs on their medicine bag and pipe ceremony claims, and ordered further
proceedings on their grooming policy claim as there remained material issues in
dispute as to the legitimacy of officials' cost and security concerns created
by the wearing of kouplocks by the plaintiffs, who were low security risk
prisoners. Davis v. Davis, #14-40339, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 10788 (5th Cir.).
A Native American inmate claimed to have
contracted Hepatitis C while participating in a communal pipe-smoking ceremony
at a prison. He sued the Executive Director of the state prison agency for
violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment by failing to protect him from the risk of contracting communicable
diseases, including Hepatitis C. A federal appeals court noted that there was
no policy requiring the plaintiff to participate in the communal pipe ceremony,
and he did so voluntarily based on his religious beliefs. He therefore failed
to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. Legate v. Livingston,
#15-40079, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 9106 (5th Cir.).
A Nebraska prisoner claimed that prison officials
violated his religious freedom rights by refusing to accommodate his religion
of "Pastafarianism," as a member of the Church of the Flying
Spaghetti Monster. The judge held that it was not a genuine religion, although
it played an important role as "a parody, intended to advance an argument
about science, the evolution of life, and the place of religion in public
education." Cavanaugh v. Bartelt, #4:14-cv-3183, 2016 U.S. Dist. Lexis
48746 (D. Neb.).
A Muslim prisoner claimed that his rights under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
2000cc et seq. were violated by the prison's grooming regulations denying
permission to grow a "fist-length" beard not to exceed four inches
and to wear a religious kufi. The trial court upheld thesec claims, granting
declaratory and injunctive relief. Upholding this result, a federal appeals
court agreed that the prison officials had not met their burden in failing to
demonstrate that the prohibitions in question were the least restrictive means
of furthering compelling interests in preventing contraband, providing inmate
identification, orderly program administration, and cost control. Ali v.
Stephens, #14-41165, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 7964 (5th Cir.).
A prisoner in administrative segregation claimed
that a limit of two personal books imposed by the prison violated his
sincerely-held religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"). He was later moved
out of segregation and allowed 15 personal books. The trial judge declined to
dismiss the case as moot, finding that the prisoner would likely be returned to
segregation in the future, and ruling that the two-book policy violated the
RLUIPA, enjoining future enforcement of the policy. A federal appeals court
reversed, finding that the plaintiff's transfer from segregation to the general
population did moot the case, depriving the court of jurisdiction. It rejected
an argument that a "capable of repetition, yet evading review"
exception to the mootness doctrine applied, since it declined to assume that
the prisoner would repeat the misconduct that previously resulted in his
segregation. Ind v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, #14-1168, 2015 U.S. App.
Lexis 16223 (10th Cir.).
A prisoner raised a sufficient claim that his free
exercise rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
were violated by the prohibition on him consuming wine during communion, the
requirement that he work on the Sabbath, and assigning him non-Christian
cellmates. Summary judgment dismissing the lawsuit was reversed. The total ban
on consumption of wine during communion imposed a substantial burden on a
religious exercise and the legitimate safety and health concerns involved in
the ban did not preclude the possibility of a reasonable accommodation with
minimal impact or the availability of reasonable alternatives. The prisoner's
need to not work on the Sabbath could be accommodated by performing work hours
entirely during the week, and the plaintiff sufficiently alleged religiously
motivated harassment by assigning him a cellmate who chilled his exercise of
religion, which could be accommodated by assigning a compatible cellmate.
Jehovah v. Clarke, #13-7529, 792 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2015).
Alabama correctional officials were properly granted a
judgment in their favor on Native American inmates' claims that the failure to
allow their hair unshorn as required by their religion violated their rights
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. The defendants presented ample evidence that their
policy was necessary to accomplish a number of compelling goals, which included
the prevention of concealment of contraband, facilitation of inmate
identification, maintenance of good hygiene and health, and facilitation of
prison discipline through uniformity. It was also proven that the hair-length
policy was the least restrictive means of furthering these compelling
governmental interests. Knight v. Thompson, #12-11926, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis
13668 (11th Cir.)
An inmate claimed that his free exercise of
religion rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. were violated
because he was prohibited from consuming wine during communion, he was required
to work on the Sabbath, and he was housed with non-Christian and anti-Christian
cellmates, including an active Satanist. He further asserted a claim for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs. A federal appeals court found
that the plaintiff successfully alleged facts sufficient to go forward on his
Sabbath and cell assignment claims, and the fact that he received some medical
treatment for some of his various symptoms did not defeat his deliberate
indifference claim when he alleged that some symptoms were not treated at all.
The appeals court reversed the summary dismissal of the wine communion claim,
as the plaintiff did not have the opportunity to submit a brief on whether the
wine ban substantially burdened the exercise of his religion and the record did
not show that the total ban on wine consumption during communion was the least
restrictive means of furthering the prison's asserted security interest.
Jehovah v. Clarke, #13-7529, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 11818 (4th Cir.).
A California prison's refusal to accommodate an
Aryan Christian Odinist prisoner's request that he be classified an ineligible
to be housed with a cellmate of a different race did not violate his religious
free exercise rights under either the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Denying a
religious exemption to the prison's classification scheme was the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest in complying with
constitutional restrictions on racial segregation. Walker v. Beard, #12-17460,
2015 U.S. App. Lexis 10255 (9th Cir.).
A prisoner who is a member of the Nation of Gods
and Earths (NOGE), a group whose adherents are also known as "Five
Percenters" participated in a prison riot with other members of the group
in 1995, and was placed in solitary confinement as a result, where he remained
for 20 years. He claimed that his confinement in solitary for this long
violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. He claimed that the state correctional
policy required him to renounce his affiliation with his religion before it
would release him, and that his procedural due process rights were also
violated. The plaintiff could not prevail on his religious exercise claim, even
if his religion was entitled to protection, as he failed to show that the
department's policy actually did require him to renounce his faith before being
released from the special management unit. But the 20-year period of solitary
confinement was held to amount to an "atypical and significant hardship in
relation to the general population," and implicated a liberty interest in
avoiding security detention. There was a triable dispute of fact as to whether
the process used for determining which prisoners were fit for release from
security detention met the minimum due process requirements. Incumaa v.
Stirling, #14-6411, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 11321 (4th Cir.).
Prison officials were improperly granted summary
judgment on religious accommodation claims asserted by a Native American
prisoner belonging to the Navajo tribe under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq. The plaintiff
prisoner asserted a possibly viable claim that the inability to eat game meat
at a Navajo celebration imposed a substantial burden on his religious belief,
and there was no evidence presented by the defendants that USDA inspected game
meats were either not available or what the cost would be to accommodate the
inmate's request. Prison officials were also improperly granted summary
judgment on the prisoner's claim related to the denial of his request for a
multi-colored headband. Schlemm v. Wall, #14-2604, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis
6592 (7th Cir.).
The federal government filed a lawsuit against
Florida correctional officials, alleging that a failure to provide kosher meals
to all prisoners with a sincere religious belief in keeping kosher was a
substantial burden on those prisoners' religious freedom rights under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc
et seq. After the trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, the
state issued a new policy on religious diets, spelling out the criteria for
qualifying for kosher meals. The court then issued an injunction requiring the
providing of the kosher meals program and prevented the state from enforcing
the eligibility requirements. The injunctive order, however, did not mention
the need-narrowness-intrusiveness criteria for preliminary injunctions mandated
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Subsequently, the court did not finalize
the injunctive order within 90 days, as a result of which the preliminary
injunction expired by operation of law in early March of 2014. This rendered
the state's appeal from the order moot, and an exception to mootness for orders
capable of repetition, yet evading review, did not apply because the state of
Florida had not shown a probability that future such injunctive orders on the
subject would evade review. United States v. Sec'y, Florida Dept. of
Corrections, #14-10086, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 3148 (11th Cir.).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a correctional policy
that prohibited prisoners from growing beards (with an exception for inmates
with a diagnosed skin condition allowed to grow 1/4 inch beards) violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a),
when used to deny a sincerely devout Muslim prisoner the right to grow a
1/2-inch beard as required by his religious beliefs. The rights granted by the
statute are not limited to beliefs shared by all practitioners of a religion.
The defendants failed to show that enforcing the policy in this manner served
the stated compelling interests in safety, keeping out contraband, and
preventing inmates from quickly changing their appearance. It would be
difficult to hide contraband by such a short beard, and hair on the head was allowed
to be that length. It was not shown that security concerns could not be
satisfied by searching such beards. Requiring prisoners to be photographed both
with and without beards would be a less restrictive means of preventing them
from being able to quickly change appearance, such as during an escape. The
opinion noted that many other institutions allowed facial fair.Holt v. Hobbs,
#13-6827, 2015 U.S. Lexis 626.
A federal appeals court ruled that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to prison employees on a federal
prisoner's claims for injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The prisoner, a priest of the Santeria
religion, claimed that the defendants violated his rights by refusing to allow
him to receive Santeria beads and shells for religious purposes. The appeals
court found that the prison had offered "no evidence" at all to
justify its cost and safety concerns, and ruled that the defendants'
"generalized" statement of interests, when unsupported by specific
and reliable evidence, was not sufficient to show that the restriction in
question furthered a compelling governmental interest. Summary judgment to the
defendants on First Amendment claims and dismissal of money damages claims under
the RFRA were both upheld. Davila v. Gladden, #13-10739, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis
345 (11th Cir.).
A federal prisoner and the American Humanist
Association sued the federal government, seeking a judicial determination that
secular humanism, defined as “an ethical and life-affirming philosophy free of
belief in any gods and other supernatural forces," should be recognized as
a religion so that a prison would allow the creation of a humanist study group.
A federal trial judge accepted the argument, finding that denying secular
humanists equal rights with other theistic religions could violate the
Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment. “The court finds that
Secular Humanism is a religion for Establishment Clause purposes,” American
Humanist Association v. United States, #3:14-cv-00565, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis
154670 (D. Or.).
A $1.925 million settlement has been reached in a
case in which an atheist parolee was jailed after he complained about being
compelled to participate in a faith-based drug rehab program that violated his
beliefs. He served a year in prison on a narcotics conviction and was initially
released on parole, but had that parole revoked following his complaints to
parole officials about having to participate in a drug recovery program that
would require him to acknowledge the existence of a "higher power."
His lawsuit, filed after serving an additional three months in prison, sought
damages from both the California Department of Corrections and the private substance
abuse firm the state contracted with to carry out drug treatment programs for
parolees. The state will pay the plaintiff $1 million under the settlement,
while the private firm will pay $925,000. The California Department of
Corrections also issued a directive that parolees who object to faith-based
treatment programs should be referred to nonreligious programs. Hazle v.
Crofoot, #2:08-cv-02295, U.S. Dist. Court, (E.D. Calif. Oct. 14, 2014). In a
federal appeals court case prior to the settlement, Hazle v. Crofoot,
#11-15354, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013), the court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to compensatory damages because his First Amendment rights to
religious freedom were violated when his parole was revoked because he refused
to participate in the residential drug treatment program. He should have been
granted a new trial after a jury awarded him nothing, the court ruled.
A federal appeals court ruled that five death-row
prisoners raised viable claims under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a) as to whether their right
to practice their Native American religion was substantially burdened without
using the least restrictive means to serve a compelling governmental interest.
There was a triable issue of fact under the statute whether they had a right to
access a sweat lodge for religious ceremonies, or the right to buffalo meat and
other traditional foods for a once a year religious powwow. The plaintiffs
could not, however, attempt to collect money damages under the statute from
prison officials sued in their individual capacities. Haight v. Thompson,
#13-6005, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 15703, 2014 Fed. App. 188P (6th Cir.).
A prisoner who was a practicing Muslim claimed
that officials unconstitutionally burdened his religious exercise when they
ordered him to produce a urine sample within a three hour time frame when he
was fasting to observe Ramadan. The appeals court found that this gave him a
choice of either providing the urine sample by drinking water, thus breaking
his fast, or facing disciplinary sanctions, and that this substantially
burdened his First Amendment exercise of religion. His claim for damages was
allowed to proceed, but his claim for injunctive relief was moot because the
relevant directive had been changed. Holland v. Goord, #13-2694, 2014 U.S. App.
Lexis 13142 (2nd Cir.).
An Idaho state prisoner claimed that prison
officials had imposed an unwarranted burden on his exercise of religion in
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Specifically, he claimed that his opportunities for
access to chapel facilities were curtailed when the defendants found out that
he was using the chapel in furtherance of romantic relationships with
correctional officers. The federal appeals court ruled that the plaintiff could
not seek money damages against prison officials in their individual capacities
under the statute. The statute was passed by Congress under its spending power,
and the individuals were not the recipients of any federal funds. The plaintiff
also asserted a First Amendment retaliation claim, alleging that the actions
taken were in retaliation for his success in an earlier lawsuit. Insufficient
evidence of any such motive was presented, however. Wood v. Yordy, #12-35336,
2014 U.S. App. Lexis 10256 (9th Cir.).
A federal appeals court upheld a ruling that
South Dakota Native American inmates had met their burden that a prison ban on
tobacco use substantially burdened their religious freedom in violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). The fact that some Native Americans who practice the Lakota
religion would accept red willow bark as an alternative to tobacco did not
alter the ruling. Even if it were shown that the ban furthered compelling
interests in order and security, it was not the least restrictive means of
doing so. The trial court's remedial orders, limiting the amount of tobacco
used in activities, did not go further than needed to remedy the rights
violation, and therefore complied with the Prison Litigation Reform Act under
18 U.S.C.S. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Native American Council v. Weber, #13-2745, 2014
U.S. App. Lexis 7766 (8th Cir.).
An atheist prisoner left a substance abuse
program with required meetings and which invoked religious tenets by using a
"serenity prayer" and religious meditations. He claimed that he was
then denied early release on parole for failure to complete the program, and
that this violated his First Amendment rights to religious freedom. A federal
appeals court held that these allegations adequately stated a claim for an
Establishment Clause violation, and the personal involvement of two defendants
that could be a basis for their liability. He had not, however, so far alleged
facts sufficient to establish the personal involvement of a third defendant.
Jackson v. Nixon, #12-2531, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 5721 (8th Cir.).
A Native American prisoner serving a life
sentence for murdering his daughter claimed that correctional officials
violated his constitutional and statutory rights to religious freedom by
denying him access to the prison's sweatlodge. Prison officials claimed that
the cost of providing the necessary security to accompany him from the special
protective unit he was housed in to the sweatlodge was "unduly
burdensome." A federal appeals court disagreed, finding that the burden to
his exercise of religion was high, given that he was granted no access of any
ki9nd, ever, to a religious exercise, and the cost to the prison left undefined
by the record and thus presumably low." Under these circumstances, the
appeals court concluded, a reasonable fact finder could find a violation of the
prisoner's statutory right to religious freedom. Yellowbear, Jr. v. Lampert,
#12-8048, (10th Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner challenged a prison policy that
conditioned accommodation of participation of Ramadan (fasting, special meals
at night, etc.) on possession of a "physical indicia" of faith, such
as a Quran, Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained from the
prison chaplain's office. Those who did not have these items were deemed
insincere in their religious beliefs and barred from participating in Ramadan.
The plaintiff was classified as insincere. A federal appeals court overturned
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for the defendants, despite
the fact that the policy had later been abandoned. The defendants failed to
show that the policy, as it was applied to the plaintiff, did not violate the
First Amendment. Qualified immunity was not available, as the rights at issue
were clearly established. The defendants also failed to meet a burden of
showing that it was "absolutely clear" that they would not later
reinstate the same policy. Wall v. Wade, #13-6355, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir.
2014).
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay who were cleared for
release but remain detained there went on a hunger strike demanding their
release, and were force fed. A federal appeals court held that they had the
right to challenge the conditions of their confinement in a habeas corpus
proceeding, and that their claims were not barred by the Military Commissions
Act. The prisoners, however, failed to establish that they were entitled to a
preliminary injunction against the forced feeding, since it served legitimate
penological interests in preserving the lives of the detainees and maintaining
security and discipline. They failed to show a likelihood that the
force-feeding was unconstitutional. The court also ruled that the protections
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not apply to the detainees. As
nonresident aliens, they were not protected persons under the statute. Aamer v.
Obama, #13-5223, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 2513 (D.C. Cir.).
A
prisoner who had been released from custody pursued a lawsuit asserting claims
for deliberate indifference to his mental health needs, violations of his right
to exercise his religion, and interference with his right of access to the
courts. A federal appeals court held that his claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief were moot as he was no longer in custody. His claim
concerning his mental health treatment boiled down with a mere disagreement
with the treatment provided, which was inadequate for a federal civil rights
claim. His claims concerning religious freedom and access to the courts were
properly dismissed, as he failed to exhaust available administrative remedies
concerning these issues, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
Lastly, he was properly denied an appointed lawyer as he was unlikely to
succeed on the merits and was able to present the case adequately by himself.
Cano v. Taylor, #10-17030, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 703 (9th Cir.).
A Michigan prisoner was placed in administrative
segregation for close to 13 years because he was considered an escape risk. He
was serving a sentence from attempted escape as well as two years for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, and a life sentence for murder. Most of that time,
he was in a maximum security facility. He filed a lawsuit claiming that his
statutory and First Amendment religious freedom rights had been violated while
he was in segregation and that he was denied access to Christian worship
services and kept in segregation without any meaningful review. While a federal
appeals court agreed that no violation of his religious freedom rights had been
shown, it also ruled that summary judgment for the defendants was improperly
granted on a due process claim. There were disputed factual issues, including
whether the four misconduct reports concerning his behavior over a ten year
time period was sufficient to keep him in administrative detention or whether
the "aging" escape history justified it. Selby v. Caruso, #13-1248,
734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013).
A Muslim prisoner claimed that three state prison
officials substantially burdened his religious freedom in violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) by
disciplining him for harassment and making statements of a personal nature to a
staff member when he gave a Quran to one of them following an incident. A
federal appeals court rejected claims against the state officials in their
official capacity as the statute does not authorize claims for money damages
against state officials. Claims against them in their individual capacities
were also rejected as no such private right of action against individual state
officials is created. Washington v. Gonyea, #11-980, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 18759
(2nd Cir.).
An inmate decided to adopt a "spiritual
name" of Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil, with Atum-Ra being an Egyptian
deity representing a fusion of the gods Atum and Ra; uhuru being the Swahili
word for freedom, and al-Mutawakkil being an Abbasid caliph who once ruled in
Samarra. He did not explain his use of the term "Prince," and did not
claim the name was selected because of his membership in a specific religion. A
federal appeals court rejected a claim that the failure to deliver mail to him
addressed only with his new chosen name violated his right to either equal
protection of law or religious freedom. The state's policy was only to deliver
mail addressed to the prisoner under his original name or the original named
together with a second name, but not mail addressed to the new name only. The
court found that this did not "substantially burden" his religious
freedom. The prisoner had failed, the court noted, to seek a formal legal name
change in state court. Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, #12-3121, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis
17493 (7th Cir.).17188
An atheist prisoner, in an earlier case, had prevailed
on his claim that his request to form an atheist prison study group should be
treated as a request for a "religious" group rather than a nonreligious
activity group. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, #04-1914, 419 F.3d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir.
2005). When he was later transferred to a new facility, he again encountered
resistance to his request to form an atheist group. He sued over that as well
as denial of his request to wear a "knowledge thought ring" (which he
said was a religious symbol), and the prison's failure to make atheist books he
donated available in the prison library. The federal appeals court vacated a
trial court ruling that the prison supplied a legitimate secular reason for
denying the group recognition because only two prisoners were believed to have
an interest in it. It upheld the determination that prohibiting the ring did
not impose a substantial burden on religious freedom, and that there was no
evidence that the defendants had any responsibility for losing the donated
boos, or that there was anything more than negligence, insufficient for a
federal civil rights claim. Kaufman v. Pugh, #13-1009, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis
16999 (7th Cir.).
An atheist parolee was entitled to compensatory
damages when the court found that his First Amendment rights to religious
freedom were violated when his parole was revoked because he refused to
participate in a residential drug treatment program that contained a
requirement that he acknowledge the existence of a higher power. He suffered
the injury of imprisonment as a result, and should have been granted a new
trial after a jury awarded him nothing. A claim for injunctive relief was not
moot as there appeared to have been no steps taken to provide an alternative
non-religious program. Hazle v. Crofoot, #11-15354, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 17663
(9th Cir.).
Prohibiting male Native American inmates from
wearing their hair unshorn, as mandated by their religion, did not violate
their rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. Correctional officials met their burden
of showing that the hair-length policy amounted to the least restrictive means
available of furthering compelling governmental interest such as facilitating
inmate identification, preventing the introduction of contraband, encouraging
prison discipline through uniformity, promoting good health and hygiene, and
safeguarding public safety in the event of escapes during which inmates with
long hair could quickly alter their appearances to prevent recapture. Knight v.
Thompson, #12-11926, , 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 15247 (11th Cir.).
A prisoner sought $50,000 in damages because a lieutenant
at a federal prison one evening denied him the religious meal he usually got
under the Federal Bureau of Prison's Common Fare religious meal program. He was
also denied a vegetarian meal, which he said would have satisfied him. A
federal appeals court ruled that this one isolated incident did not reflect,
either on the part of the lieutenant or the prison, a policy of refusing to
provide religious or vegetarian meals and did not substantially burden his
religious beliefs. The court further found that just missing one meal was not
enough to shown an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment violation.
Watkins v. Rogers, #13-6040, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 9927 (10th Cir.).
A prisoner who is a member of the African Hebrew
Israelites of Jerusalem took a "Nazirite vow," that committed him not
to cut his hair. When he had to appear in court, the prison gave him a choice
of either having a haircut to cut his dreadlocks or segregation as a punishment
for avoiding his scheduled trip to court. He chose the haircut, but claimed
that this violated his right to religious freedom. A federal appeals court
rejected this claim, noting that the "Nazirite vow" was an optional
rather than mandatory observance of his religion and that past precedent recognizes
the validity of rules regulating prisoner's hairstyles for reasons of security.
Lewis v. Sternes, #11-3297, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 6154 (7th Cir.).
California prisons employ full-time and part-time
chaplains of five religions: Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and Native
American. Inmates who are adherents of the Wiccan religion claimed that their
rights were violated by refusing to hire a full-time paid Wiccan chaplain, and
by failing to apply neutral criteria in determining whether paid chaplains were
needed to serve the needs of inmates who practiced religions outside of the
five faiths currently favored, A federal appeals court rejected the prisoners'
First Amendment religious freedom claims as it was well established that
they were not entitled to a chaplain of their choice. Their equal protection
claim was rejected as a volunteer Wiccan chaplain currently provided services.
But the court found that the prisoners' assertion that the policy in place
improperly favored the five faiths in violation of the Establishment of
Religion clause of the First Amendment and the California state Constitution
stated a viable claim. Hartmann v. California Dept. of Corrections, #11-16008,
2013 U.S. App. Lexis 3385 (9th Cir.).
A prisoner was entitled to receive vegetarian
meals on religious grounds. When an officer brought him a non-vegetarian
breakfast, he alleged put his fingertips on the open food port in his cell
door. He claimed that the officer them sprayed him with pepper spray with no
warning. His lawsuit claimed that the use of the spray was excessive force, and
that denying him a vegetarian meal violated his equal protection rights.
Qualified immunity was denied on the excessive force claim because it was not
clear from the officer's version of the incident that force was required or
that the prisoner posed a threat. The force used seem extensive and
disproportionate to the level of the disturbance created by the prisoner
putting his fingertips on the port. The court rejected his equal protection
claim as he was not treated any different than any other prison when an officer
did not know that he was supposed to receive a vegetarian meal. Furnace v.
Sullivan, #10-15961, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 1110 (9th Cir.).
It was against a Rastafarian prisoner's religious
beliefs to comb or cut his hair, which he wore in dreadlocks. When he learned
that his mother had cancer, he asked for a transfer to another facility closer
to her, which was granted. When he was to be transported to his new facility,
an officer allegedly refused to permit him to board the transport vehicle when
he declined to comply with a state correctional policy requiring him to comb
out his dreadlocks. The officer's supervisor then presented the plaintiff with
a choice of either cutting his hair or not going through with the approved
transfer. The prisoner offered instead to let the officers pat down his hair
and use a metal detector to make sure that no contraband was hidden there. The
transfer was canceled and the prisoner placed in administrative segregation. He
was later transferred, after he cut his hair. A federal appeals court upheld
the dismissal of his lawsuit, finding no violation of his right to religious
freedom, despite his argument that he was improperly forced to choose between
violating his religious beliefs and going to a prison closer to his ill mother.
The officers were entitled to qualified immunity, as it was not clearly
established that enforcement of the policy that hair be cut or combed out
violated the prisoner's rights. Stewart v. Beach, #12-3013, 2012 U.S. App.
Lexis 25846 (10th Cir.).
The trial court should not have dismissed the
claim of a prisoner that denial of his request for a conjugal visit with his
wife violated his rights to religious freedom under the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc
et seq. by interfering with important provisions of his Islamic faith requiring
him to marry, consummate his marriage, and attempt to father children. His
claim, stemming from the denial of this request in 2008, was not time barred
despite the earlier denial, under the same regulation of a similar request
relating to his first wife in 2002. Pouncil v. Tilton, #10-16881 2012 U.S. App.
Lexis 24039 (9th Cir.).
A prisoner who belonged to the Celtic Druid
religion asserted that prison officials violated his right to religious freedom
because they denied him permission to possess a religious medallion a prison
chaplain had said he could order. The prison had a legitimate rule barring
medallions costing over a certain amount or which were non-conforming. The
expensive and mirrored medallion he ordered violated the rule. The prisoner
failed to show that the policy was enforced in a discriminatory manner. McFaul
v. Valenzuela, #11-10218, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 12283 (5th Cir.).
Because failure to grow a beard was considered a
sin equivalent in severity to eating pork for a Muslim inmate, his lawsuit over
a policy prohibiting him from growing a one-eighth inch beard stated a claim
for violation of his right to religious freedom. Prison officials failed to
adequately explain how their policy was justified by health or security
concerns, or that they used the least restrictive means of satisfying a
compelling governmental interest. Couch v. Jabe, #11-6560, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis
9602 (4th Cir.).
A prisoner whose personal religious beliefs
incorporated elements of Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism complained about the
confiscation of over 30 books from his cell during shakedowns following a
stabbing incident. He claimed many of the books were religious or spiritual. He
also claimed that a prayer cap, prayer rug, prayer oil and religious beads were
taken. His claims for injunctive relief were moot, in light of his subsequent transfer.
He could not sue prison officials or employees in their official capacities for
damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 as they were state employees entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Zajrael v. Harmon, #11–1180, 677 F.3d 353
(8th Cir. 2012).
A prisoner sued over a prison policy that he
claimed limited the ability of Muslim inmates to perform regular congregational
prayers by limiting the time and space for it. A federal appeals court held
that the prisoner adequately exhausted his available administrative remedies by
pursuing a 2005 grievance against the policy as first set in place by an
earlier warden. Given that the same policy complained of was substantially
continued by the new warden in 2007, the earlier grievance had been sufficient to
put prison authorities on notice of the issues involved JJohnson v. Killian,
#10-4651, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 9874 (2nd Cir.).
The transfer of a Jewish prisoner to a prison
located at a distance from major cities did not violate his right to religious
freedom, even though it was too far away for religious volunteers to travel to
provide him with services. The law does not protect prisoners from transfers to
facilities which they view as unfavorable. There was no evidence that the
defendants precluded visits to the facilities by rabbis or other Jewish
religious volunteers. Bader v. Wrenn, #11-1634, 675 F.3d 95 (1st Cir.
2012).
A federal appeals court rejected a Jewish
prisoner's claim that his right to practice his religion was violated by a
denial of his request to eat his meals in a "succah" or tent-like
booth that he wanted to erect during the Jewish holiday of Sukkot. Prison
officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability, as it was
"not apparent" that his rights to reasonable religious dietary
accommodations included the use of a succah. Sisney v. Reisch, #10-3003, 674
F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2012).
A prisoner who claimed that her Bible, rosary
beads and other religious materials were taken during a shakedown of her cell
while she was in punitive segregation and were not subsequently returned stated
a claim for violation of her right to religious freedom. One judge on the
three-judge panel believed that going forward on the claim as to the
deprivation of the rosary beads was improper because the prison prohibited an
inmate in segregation "to possess any item, including rosary beads, that
could be wrapped around the neck to commit suicide." Kendrick v. Pope,
#11-1564, 671 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2012).
A prisoner who belongs to the Ahlus Sunnati Wal
Jama'ah faith argued that none of the services two prisons offered for three
varieties of Islam (Nation of Islam, Moorish Science Temple, and Sunni) were
sufficient to meet his religious needs. A federal appeals court found that
individual state prison officials, since they were not personally the grant
"recipients" of federal funds, could not be held individually liable
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of
2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq. That statute was passed under the spending
power given to Congress by the Constitution. As to a claim under the First
Amendment, it was not clearly established that the providing of Sunni religious
services was inadequate for prisoners of his faith. Sharp v. Johnson, #08–2174,
2012 U.S. App. Lexis 2560 (3rd Cir.).
On a Native American prisoner's claim that state
correctional officials substantially burdened the practice of his religion, he
could not pursue money damages claims against them in their official capacity
because of the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of the state. Since the
prisoner had subsequently been freed from incarceration, his claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief were moot. Alvarez v. Hill, #10-35865, 2012
U.S. App. Lexis 1174 (9th Cir.).
After a prison chaplain allegedly advised him
that only Rastafarianism requires the growing of dreadlocks, a correctional
officer ordered that an African Hebrew Israelite inmate's dreadlocks be
sheared. Summary judgment for the defendant officer was reversed. "Since
heresy is not excluded from the protection of the free exercise clause,
optional as distinct from mandatory religious observations aren't excluded
either." If the prisoner's desire to grow dreadlocks was based on a
sincere religious belief, it was entitled to protection, even if unorthodox,
particularly if followers of another religion were allowed to wear dreadlocks.
Grayson v. Schuler, #10-3256, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 730 (7th Cir.).
A prisoner who said he was a member of the Messianic
Judaism religion was denied a request to participate in an existing prison
kosher meals program, on the basis that the program was only for those
practicing the Jewish religion. A Jewish prison chaplain found that the
prisoner was not a Jew. A California appeals court ruled that this violated his
right to religious freedom under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., since the defendants
failed to either show that his request was not based on a sincere religious
belief or that excluding him from the kosher meals program promoted a
compelling governmental interest and did so in the least restrictive means
available. "On this record, we fail to see any legitimate governmental
interest, let alone a compelling interest, in allowing traditional Jews to
receive kosher meals but denying the same accommodation to Messianic Jews who
sincerely hold similar beliefs concerning diet." In re Garcia, #C066452,
202 Cal. App. 4th 892, 2012 Cal. App. Lexis 15 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2012).
A prisoner (Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen and
member of al Qaeda) presently confined after being convicted of terrorism sued
various federal officials based on his prior military detention as an
"enemy combatant." He asked for an injunction preventing government
officials from designating him as an "enemy combatant" in the future
and detaining him on that basis and nominal damages of one dollar from each
defendant. A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit. It
found that a federal civil rights suit could not be brought against federal
officials on these issues due to separation of powers concerns, and the
authority over military affairs granted to Congress and the President. The
plaintiff also did not have standing to seek to enjoin the possible future
designation of the prisoner as an "enemy combatant," since he did not
show any immediate and real threat that this would occur. The court also
rejected the prisoner's claim that he could sue federal officials under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, for alleged
violations of his religious freedom while he was a military prisoner. Lebron v.
Rumsfeld, #11-6480, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 1246 (4th Cir. 2012).
A federal appeals court rejected a challenge to
the legality of a prison-paid chaplaincy program that limited the hiring of
chaplains to only those who were members of five major faiths--Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American religions. While a Wiccan chaplain
believed that it was unfair that he was not compensated for his services, there
was no showing of intentional discrimination against him on the basis of
religion. On his employment discrimination claim, requiring that he be a member
of the designated faiths was a bona fide occupational qualification justified
by the requirement of meeting the religious needs of the prisoners. The court
did not reach the issue of whether Wiccan inmates could succeed in a challenge
to the policy, but did say that, at this point, there is no clearly established
right of Wiccan prisoners to have a paid chaplain. McCollum v. California
Department of Corrections, #09-16404, 647 F.3d 870
(9th Cir. 2011).
A Rastafarian prisoner claimed that a corrections
officer violated his religious rights by touching his dreadlock hair without
permission. While the jury held in favor of the prisoner, they only awarded
nominal damages of $1. Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(d)(2) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the court's award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing plaintiff were limited to 150% of the damage award, or $1.50. The
appeals court noted that Congress, in granting a statutory right for prevailing
plaintiffs in federal civil rights lawsuits to be granted attorneys' fees, departed
from the normal rule in U.S. courts that litigants all pay their own attorneys'
fees. It was accordingly also free to put a cap on such fees in cases brought
by prisoners. Shepherd v. Goord, #10-4821, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 22928 (2nd
Cir.).
A prisoner who said that he was a member of the
Moorish Science Temple asked for a vegan diet. His request was denied, and the
prison's chaplain stated that the religion allows members to eat a variety of
fish and meat. Ruling that a "personal religious faith is entitled to as
much protection as one espoused by an organized group," the court found
that the defendant chaplain was not entitled to qualified immunity if his
denial was based on his interpretation of the religion's tenets. He would,
however, be entitled to qualified immunity if he made his decision based on a
determination that the prisoner's religious belief that he should eat a vegan
diet was not sincere. The prison's warden was entitled to summary judgment, as
he was not involved in making or ratifying the decision. Vinning-El v. Evans,
#10-1681, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 19053 (7th Cir).
An Orthodox Jewish prisoner failed to show
that a prison's shaving policy, which limited beards to a length of 1/4 of an
inch, violated his right to religious freedom. The policy was rationally
related to a legitimate and substantial interest in maintaining prison
security, and was the least restrictive means of accomplishing that objective.
Kuperman v. Wrenn, #10-2083, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011).
A prisoner who belongs to the African Hebrew Israelite
(AHI) religion adequately stated a claim that prison officials improperly
singled out services held by his religion for cancellation, and
disproportionately allocated the prison's limited budget for religious activities
to favor other religious groups. The court cautioned, however, that
"Prisons need not provide every religious sect or group within a prison
with identical facilities or personnel and need not employ chaplains
representing every faith among the inmate population."Maddox v. Love.
#10-1139 , 2011 U.S. App. Lexis17680 (7th Cir.).
An immigration detainee claimed that medical
personnel failed to give him pain medication that he was prescribed after hand
surgery, inhibiting his rehabilitation and causing permanent injury to his
hand. Rejecting this claim, the appeals court noted that the medication had to
be taken with food, and that the detainee failed to benefit from the medical
treatment provided because he refused to eat the food he was dissatisfied with.
His reason for doing so was that he wanted halal meals containing meat, for
religious reasons, but he was provided with vegetarian meals that did not
violate his right to religious freedom. Any denial of pain medication was based
on his refusal to eat. Adekoya v. Chertoff, #11-1990, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis
12685 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.). Editor's Note: As an immigration detainee, the
plaintiff was entitled to the same protections as a pretrial detainee, those
provided by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case,
the court found that the medical care provided did not constitute punishment
that violated due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
states, in accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign
immunity to private suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U. S. C. §2000cc-1. The
decision means that prisoners may still file lawsuits seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief to compel states to change policies or practices that they
claim unduly restrict religious freedom under the statute, but may not seek
money damages against states and their agencies. The lawsuit was brought by a
Texas inmate who claimed that he was denied the right to attend Christian
worship services because of disciplinary rules restricting him to his cell, and
sought damages from the state and its prison officials. Sossamon v. Texas,
#08–1438, 2011 U.S. Lexis 3187.
A prisoner sued Jewish organizations that contracted
with the Washington State Department of Corrections to provide Jewish religious
services to prisoners, claiming that they violated his rights to religious
freedom under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U. S. C. §2000cc-1 by
refusing to recognize him as Jewish. As a consequence, they denied his requests
for access to a Torah, a Jewish religious calendar, and a visit from a rabbi. A
federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants, holding that
they were private parties and not state actors, and did not "foster or
further" any government policy. They therefore could not be sued for
allegedly violating the prisoner's civil rights. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim,
#07-35866, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 7742 (9th Cir.).
A Muslim inmate who attends "Jumah"
services on Fridays, complained that he was not allowed to comply with the
requirement that he perform ablution, or ritual cleansing, prior to the
services because he was only allowed to shower during specified times, and
during the only designated shower time on Friday prior to the services, he was
required to work. The court ruled, however, that this did not substantially
burden his religious freedom since partial ablution, washing his hands, face,
and feet, was an acceptable religious practice prior to the service, and he was
able to perform such washing at the sink in his cell. Sayed v. Profitt,
#10-1491, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5525 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
A probationer claimed that the action of personnel at a
county courthouse holding facility in requiring her to remove her Muslim
headscarf violated her rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. A federal
appeals court ruled that her lawsuit was improperly dismissed because the
courthouse holding facility fit within the statute's definitions of a
"pretrial detention facility," and a "jail." Khatib v.
County of Orange, #08-56423, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5022 (9th Cir.).
A policy restricting a prisoner from standing in
the dayroom for extended periods of time for security reasons did not violate
his rights as a Muslim to engage in prayer at specific times of the day, as he
was able to go to his cell or other places at those times to pray and to stand
or kneel there as required. DeMoss v. Crain, #09-50078, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis
4219 (5th Cir.).
A prisoner claimed that forcing him, while in a
treatment program for prisoners who exhibited sexual deviancy, to recite a
"serenity" prayer violated his right to religious freedom under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. A jury at trial found that there
had been no coercion to say the prayer. On appeal, he challenged the jury
instructions that required a finding that he had been "damaged" in
order to find a violation. While some "injury" was required, the
appeals court stated, this was not the same as "damages." It ruled
that the instruction, by combining the "damages" requirement with the
rest of the requirements, without providing any definition or explanation, was
erroneous. But the error did not rise to the level of "plain error"
because the prisoner did not object to the instructions at trial or offer any
additional or different instructions for the court to consider. The judgment
for the defendants was therefore upheld. Munson v. Norris, #08-2387, 2010 U.S.
App. Lexis 9058 (Unpub. 8th Cir.).
A prisoner claimed that his right to religious
freedom was violated by a prison's failure to provide him with kosher meals as
soon as he demanded them. A federal appeals court, however, found that the
record reflected the fact that the prison began serving him kosher meals less
than two weeks after his initial request, and that the prison was entitled to
assess whether the prisoner's request was motivated by sincere religious
belief, justifying the slight delay. As for the prisoner's complaint that the
kosher meals provided were both often cold and "lacked variety," the
court found that these facts, if true, did not violate the prisoner's rights.
Tapp v. Proto, #10-3059, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 25385 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
An African-American Muslim prisoner was told by
one correctional officer that he could not enter a gym carrying the two books
he was holding, a Quran and a book on the basics of Islam. As he walked back
towards his housing unit to return the books, another officer allegedly knocked
the books out of his hand, slammed him to the ground, and handcuffed him. The
first officer filed misconduct charges against the prisoner, asserting that he
disobeyed orders to stop walking away, which was why the second officer
responded with force. As a punishment, the prisoner had to spend time in a
restricted housing unit. A federal appeals court rejected the prisoner's claim
that the second officer subjected him to racial and religious discrimination,
and used excessive force against him. Rejecting these claims, the court noted
that the second officer had not been in a position to see what books it was the
prisoner was carrying, and that there was no indication of racial or religious
animosity in his actions. The force used was minimal, and only caused
abrasions. Washam v. Klopotoski, #10-3291, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 25272 (Unpub.
3rd Cir.).
A federal appeals court found that a prisoner had
sufficiently alleged that disciplining him for refusing to comply with prison
body-piercing regulations imposed a substantial burden on the exercise of his
religious beliefs. The trial court had determined that these beliefs were
sincerely held. The appeals court ordered further proceedings on whether the
piercing regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest. Cortez v. Noll, #09-15690, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20583
(Unpub. 9th Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner failed to prove that his
exclusion from formal prison Ramadan activities violated his First Amendment
rights to religious freedom. Participation had been limited to
"observant" Muslims as identified by the prison's Islamic chaplain,
who selected those prisoners who attended at least three of the four Friday
Jumu'ah prayer services immediately preceding Ramadan. Under this policy, the
plaintiff prisoner did not qualify as an observant Muslim. By thus limiting the
attendance at Ramadan activities, prison officials rationally promoted two
valid penological interests: 1) security by reducing unnecessary inmate
movement; and (2) economy by minimizing unnecessary expenses associated with
providing Ramadan privileges. The prison did not bar the prisoner from
observing Ramadan by fasting and praying on his own, and when he later resumed
regularly attending Friday prayer meetings, he was again allowed to participate
in subsequent formal prison Islamic activities, "including the post-Ramadan
fast of Shawwal." The prisoner also sought money damages on a claim that
his exclusion from the Ramadan activities had violated his rights under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which requires
that prison officials have a compelling state interest to justify placing a
substantial burden on a prisoner's religious beliefs and use the least
restrictive means in doing so. The court reserved judgment on that issue,
pending the U.S. Supreme Court's resolution of the question of whether an
individual may sue a state or a state official in his official capacity for
money damages under the RLUIPA. See Sossamon v. Texas, #07-50632, 560 F.3d 316
(5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3319 (2010). Hall v. Ekpe, #09-4492,
2010 U.S. App. Lexis 21243 (Unpub. 2nd Cir.).
A Louisiana prisoner claimed that his right to
religious freedom had been violated by withholding from him a publication sent
to him by the religious organization "Yahweh Ben Yahweh" Prison
officials determined the publication to be detrimental to security and racist.
Rejecting the prisoner's claim, the court found that regulations that bar
publications that advocate racial, religious, or nation hatred, creating a
serious risk of violence, are valid. The appeals court examined the material at
issue, and agreed with prison authorities that it was racially inflammatory.
Toliver v. Travis, #2010 CA 0279, 2010 La. App. Lexis 1239 (Unpub. 1st Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner claimed that his rights were
violated and that this prevented him from practicing his religion for two
weeks. During a search of his cell for unauthorized linens, officers allegedly
confiscated a towel he used as a prayer rug and a copy of the Koran, both of
which he contended he had permission to possess for religious purposes. These
items were returned to him two weeks later, after he filed a grievance. A
federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to state
a claim. The prisoner had only sued the county, but had failed to allege that
his rights were violated by any official county policy or custom. The court
also stated that neither the confiscation of the items nor the two-week delay
in their return imposed s "substantial" burden on his religious
freedom. McCroy v. Douglas County Corrections Center; #10-2080, 2010 U.S. App.
Lexis 19419 (Unpub. 8th Cir.).
After a Muslim prisoner was granted relief in his
lawsuit seeking to have prison officials provide him with kosher meals, the
trial court awarded him $73,360.20 in attorneys' fees and 271.20 in costs. A
federal appeals court ruled that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, regarding the award of
attorneys' fees, did not preempt a Nebraska state statute requiring, for
payment of such awards, submission to a state claims procedure, followed by submission
to the state legislature for possible appropriation. The appeals court also
found that the fee award failed to deduct time spent on unsuccessful claims in
the lawsuit and that the plaintiff's attorney spent an "unreasonable"
amount of time on the claims on which he did achieve success. As the requested
attorneys' fee award was disproportionate to the relief obtained, further
proceedings were required. El-Tabech v. Clarke, #09-1554, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis
16972 (8th Cir.).
A federal appeals court held that there was a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Nevada prison officials had shown, as
required under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. ("RLUIPA") that there was a "compelling"
interest in restricting the access of a prisoner who practices the Wiccan
religion to a sweat lodge, and that doing so was the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. Under that statute, the court commented, prison
officials' generalized reference to the need for order and security is not
enough, standing alone, to overcome prisoners' right to particular religious
practices. The court overturned summary judgment for the defendants and ordered
further proceedings. Chernetsky v. Nevada, #08-16100, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis
15856 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
A California prisoner received several
disciplinary citations for wearing a beard that he asserted he had to have for
religious reasons. The regulations that prohibited the beard were amended so
that his beard was no longer prohibited, but the disciplinary citations
remained in his prison file, and he wanted them expunged, based on the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et
seq. ("RLUIPA"). A federal appeals court ruled that the trial court
improperly dismissed this claim. The state did not argue that the prisoner's
rights under the statute had not been violated when the discipline occurred,
and the fact that the citations remained in his file, and that harmful
references to them could potentially be made, meant that his claim was not moot
because the policy in question had been modified. His claims for expungement
and injunctive relief would be considered upon remand. Quillar v. Calif. Dept.
of Corrections, #08-15414, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 17462 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
The EEOC filed suit on behalf of a class of
female Muslim employees against a private company that entered into a contract
with a county to run a prison. The lawsuit claimed that it was unlawful
religious discrimination not to allow these employees an exception to an
employee dress policy that barred them from wearing "khimars" (Muslim
religious headgear) at work. Rejecting this claim, the appeals court ruled that
even if the employees had a sincere religious belief requiring them to wear the
khimars, this belief was outweighed by the need for safety in the prison,
"undoubtedly an interest of the greatest importance." The policy of
no hats was adopted to help prevent the introduction of contraband into the facility,
and to prevent misidentification of persons wearing headgear. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Geo Group, Inc. #09-3093, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 15973 (3rd
Cir.).
A California state prisoner claimed that prison
grooming regulations violated his right to religious freedom. While the trial
court initially issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
regulations, ultimately it dismissed the prisoner's claims for lack of
jurisdiction. It then nevertheless awarded the plaintiff prisoner attorneys'
fees. A federal appeals court ruled that the attorneys' fee award was erroneous
when the trial court never found an actual violation of the prisoner's rights.
Kimbrough v. State of Cal.; #08-17231, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13039 (9th Cir.).
Religion -- See also, Diet
A prisoner who is a Seventh-Day Adventist clamed
that he was denied a vegan diet required by his religion. The prisoner was
properly denied a preliminary injunction when he conceded that, although
allegedly denied the vegan diet at one facility, he was provided with the
requested diet after being transferred to another Oklahoma facility,
undercutting any claim of a system-wide denial of vegan diets. Little v. Jones,
#08-7095, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 11609 (10th Cir.).
A Muslim woman claimed that her rights under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2000cc-1 et seq. were violated when she was required to remove her
"hijab" headscarf in public while she was being held on two occasions
between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. in a court holding cell pending the disposition by
the court of her probation violation. A federal appeals court ruled that a
courthouse holding cell is not an "institution" as defined in the
RLUIPA, so that the Act did not apply, and the lawsuit was properly dismissed.
Khatib v. Cty. of Orange, #08-56423, 603 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2010).
A "secular humanist" organization sued
Florida correctional officials and two religious organizations, Prisoners of
Christ, Inc. and Lamb of God Ministries, Inc., asserting that payments by the
state to these religious groups to support their faith-based substance abuse
transitional housing programs violated a provision of the state constitution
requiring "no aid" to churches or sectarian institutions. The lawsuit
challenged the contracts the state entered into with the religious groups on
the same basis, and also sought an order barring the state from delegating
government authority and powers to religious chaplains as to the placement of
offenders in the housing programs. An intermediate Florida appeals court ruled
that the trial court had erred in finding the "no aid" provision of
the state Constitution only applying to the context of schools, but also ruled
that the plaintiff organization lacked taxpayer standing to challenge the
contracts, since their claim was not a challenge to the government's taxing and
spending powers, and upheld the rejection of the unlawful delegation claim. The
appeals court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of
"Whether the no-aid provision in Article I, Section 3 of the Florida
Constitution prohibits the state from contracting for the provision of
necessary social services by religious or sectarian entities?" Council for
Secular Humanism, Inc. v. McNeil, #1D08-4713, 2010 Fla. App. Lexis 5546 (1st
Dist.).
A prisoner claimed that a 16-day denial of kosher
food, and multiple mistakes in administering a kosher food program violated his
right to practice his religion. The court found that the instances of him being
served non-kosher food were isolated incidents and mistakes, with no evidence
that prison staff intentionally served him non-kosher food. The court ordered
that the prisoner be allowed to amend his complaint, however, to provide
further detail on claims that he had been wrongfully removed from the kosher
meals program because of the discovery of a non-kosher food item in his cell,
and that he was wrongfully refused reinstatement in the program for a time
because prison officials, for some reason, believed him to be Muslim, rather
than Jewish, despite his consistent assertion, throughout his incarceration,
that he was Jewish. Colvin v. Caruso, #08-2441 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 9753 (6th
Cir.).
An Illinois prisoner argued that forcing him to
cut his dreadlocks, which he wore for religious reasons, violated his
constitutional and statutory rights. The court found, however, that the policy
at issue was justified by undisputed evidence that matted hair created a danger
to both guards and officers from concealed weapons and other contraband. The
court also found no evidence of unlawful "retaliation" in punishing
the prisoner for disobeying direct orders to cut his hair, and commented that
the prisoner's claim that prison authorities inconsistently implemented their
hair length policy did not show a constitutional violation in the absence of
any evidence that deviations from the policy were for illegitimate reasons.
Williams v. Snyder, #08-1908, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 4777 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A New York prisoner contended that his
confinement under a tuberculosis hold policy based on his refusal to submit to
TB testing violated his right to religious freedom and that he was entitled to
a religious exemption from the policy. The court found that it had not been
clearly established that the policy was not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest in preventing the spread of disease or that it was not the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Defendant employees were
therefore entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found no violation of
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment or due process rights in placing him in TB hold
confinement. Redd v. Wright, #06-4315, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 4898 (2nd Cir.).
In a prisoner's challenge, on religious grounds,
to California's prison grooming regulations, contending that they imposed a
substantial burden on his exercise of religious freedom, a federal appeals
court rule that the state's acceptance of federal prison funding did not amount
to a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit that would allow a claim for money
damages against state officials in their official capacity to proceed in
federal court. Holley v. Cal. Dept. of Corrs., #07-15552, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis
6977 (9th Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner could assert his claim for
denial of his preferred religious diet, a halal diet that includes meats, even
though other Muslims may well find religiously sufficient a vegetarian or
non-pork diet. There was no evidence indicating that the plaintiff was not
sincere in holding his expressed beliefs. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, #08-6092,
2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6861 (10th Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner sued over a denial of the right
to attend group religious services while he was on cell restriction. An appeals
court found that his request for an injunction was moot, since state officials
had amended the policy at issue to allow inmates on cell restriction to attend
such services. The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for individual
capacity damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1(a), holding that such claims were not
allowable under the statute. Any claims for official capacity damages under the
statute, whether compensatory or punitive, were barred by sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff prisoner pointed to no clearly established case law that rendered
the restriction unreasonable, so the individual defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
Jones v. Alfred, #09-40256, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 26040 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A prisoner failed to show that his right to a
religiously required kosher food diet had been denied, when there was
"undisputed evidence" that rabbis advising facility officials had
repeatedly concluded that a kosher food preparation area there was
satisfactory. Boles v. Dansdill, #09-1145, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 724 (Unpub. 3rd
Cir.).
A formerly civilly committed patient claimed that
a facility's prohibition on encoded writing violated his right to religious
freedom as his religion required him to keep his thoughts separate from
"sinners." He objected to the confiscation, after a search of his
cell, of personal journals written in code to prevent others from reading them.
He claimed that the prohibition violated both his First Amendment rights and
his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1(a). Upholding summary judgment for the
defendants, a federal appeals court found that the plaintiff failed to show a
substantial burden on his religious practice, since it was mere speculation
that others confined to the facility might obtain and read his journals if they
were not in code. Desimone v. Bartow, #09-2541, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 26687
(Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A Native American prisoner's claims that his
right to religious freedom was violated by regulations limiting his hair length
and limiting his wearing of a medicine pouch were reinstated by a federal
appeals court. The court ruled that the trial court had failed to consider
whether wearing a small patch of long hair as a "kouplock" instead of
a full head of long hair actually posed a security risk and failed to apply the
proper "compelling governmental interest" and "least restrictive
alternative" requirements to the medicine pouch restrictions. Odneal v.
Pierce, #06-41165, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7096 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A prisoner claimed that denial of his requests to
attend Mass and to be provided with a rosary and Roman Catholic prayer book to
use in his cell at night violated his right to religious freedom. A federal
appeals court found that these claims were prematurely dismissed, since there
was no showing that granting his requests would create a security risk or be
incompatible with his confinement. Ortiz v. Downey, #06-2453, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 6910 (7th Cir.).
Further proceedings were ordered on a secular
humanist group's complaint, asserting that the use of state funds to pay two
ministries for substance abuse transitional housing programs for prisoners
violated the no aid to religion provisions of the Florida state constitution.
On remand, the plaintiffs have to establish that the nature and effect of the
programs are "primarily sectarian" in order to prevail. The court
further held, however, that the state's employment of a chaplain and use of
public funds to pay him did not violate either the Establishment of Religion
clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the no aid to
religion provisions of the Florida state constitution. Council for Secular
Humanism, Inc. v. McNeil, #1D08-4713, 2009 Fla. App. Lexis 19498 (1st Dist.).
A prison policy prohibiting all inmates from
wearing beards unless they had a medical exception, which contained no
religious exception, was properly upheld by the trial court based on security
and discipline concerns, including the need to properly identify inmates and
the possibility that contraband and weapons could be carried in beards. A
proposed alternative policy allowing a religious exception for quarter-inch
beards was not financially or administratively feasible, and the existing
policy was therefore the "least restrictive means" of satisfying the
discipline and security concerns. Gooden v. Crain, #08-40966, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 25656 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
The sixth in a series of lawsuits brought by Maricopa
County jail prisoners seeking to stop the sheriff from playing Christmas
holiday songs all day, every day during the holiday season has been dismissed
by a federal trial court. Songs played included "Rudolph the Red-Nose
Reindeer" and songs by Alvin and the Chipmunks. In a press release
announcing the dismissal, the county stated, "We keep winning these
lawsuits. Inmates should stop acting like the Grinch who stole Christmas and
give up wasting the court's time with such frivolous assertions. ... But
chances are they'll keep suing and we'll keep winning." The lawsuit
claimed that being forced to listen to Christmas songs12 hours a day violated
the plaintiff prisoner's civil rights, including his right to freedom of
religion. Lamb v. Arpaio, #CV-09-0052, Pacer Doc. 25 (D. Ariz. 2009).
A Muslim prisoner failed to show how content
restrictions and screening procedures for videotapes violated his religious
freedom, and a ban on inmate personal possession of videotapes did not violate
his First Amendment rights, since there were legitimate security concerns that
the tapes could be used as weapons. The fact that Muslim services were offered
in a generic way as opposed to being services for specific sects of Muslims was
justified by compelling governmental interests, including security problems,
staffing limitations, and space constraints. The prisoner also failed to show
that the alternative food offered to Muslim prisoners violated the requirements
of his Nation of Islam religion. Jones v. Shabazz, #08-20697, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 24308 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
Muslim inmates complained that they were only
provided with Halal meat, produced in accordance with the requirements of their
religion, twice a year, while Jewish prisoners received kosher meat four to
five times a week. Prison officials agreed to provide Halal meat with the same
frequency in exchange for the dismissal of the lawsuit, which the trial court
approved. A federal appeals court ruled that the prisoners were prevailing
parties, entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988,
since they accomplished a "material alteration" on the complained of
issue, and that the caps on attorneys' fees in the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d), applied to the case despite the fact that some of the
plaintiffs were released from prison after they filed the lawsuit, but before
it was settled. Fees of $99,658.48 were awarded. On remand, the trial court was
instructed to determine a reasonable attorneys' fee award for the time spent on
the appeal. Perez v. Westchester Cty. Dep't of Corr., #08-4245, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 25396 (2nd Cir.).
A prisoner complaining about a search of his cell
and confiscation of his legal papers and other property failed to show a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, since his status of incarceration
meant that he had no right to privacy or protection from unreasonable searches.
His due process rights were not violated, since there were adequate
post-deprivation remedies for the seizure of his property, and he failed to
show a violation of his First Amendment rights, since he alleged no actual
injury that resulted from the removal of his legal papers and did not claim
that the seizure of religious materials prevented him from observing any
religious belief or practice. He also failed to show that there was a
retaliatory motive for the search and a videotape of the search refuted any
claim that an officer used excessive force in restraining the plaintiff.
Tindell v. Beard, #09-3063, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 24642 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A federal appeals court ordered that, on remand,
after considering whether requested religious items were for a sincerely held
religious belief or practice in the Wiccan religion, the trial court determine
whether access was denied to them for legitimate penological interests and
consider possible alternative accommodations and the impact they would have on
prison resources. McAlister v. Livingston, #08-20297, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis
22018 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
Prisoners claimed that they were denied the right to
practice their religion, Tulukeesh, requiring adherents to engage in sparring
and prohibiting them from appearing nude in front of non-members. They are also
allegedly required to eat a non-soybean based vegan diet. A federal appeals
court found that restrictions on sparring and limiting the practice of
Tulukeesh to individual cells, as well as mandatory strip frisks on certain
occasions were supported by legitimate security concerns. Further proceedings
were required, however, on the alleged denial of the prisoners' requested
religious diet, as the defendant prison officials failed to show that the
religious meatless alternative menu offered was the least restrictive means of
furthering compelling administrative interests. Jova v. Smith, #08-2816,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21205 (2nd Cir.).
A Jewish prisoner sued over his temporary removal
from a prison's kosher meal program. The appeals court found that claims for
injunctive relief were moot because of the plaintiff's subsequent transfer to
another facility, that a damage claim was barred against state officials under
the Eleventh Amendment, and that the prisoner failed to show a relationship
between the incidents he mentioned and his removal from the kosher meals
program that would constitute unlawful retaliation for protected conduct in
violation of the First Amendment. Berryman v. Granholm, #07-2081, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 18068 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
South Dakota state officials were entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity on money damages claims concerning the alleged
denial of religious freedom to Jewish prisoners. Prison officials were entitled
to summary judgment on claims that it violated a prisoner's right to religious
freedom to deny his request to have a tape player in his cell to study the
Hebrew language, and his request for additional group religious and language
study time. Prisoners were denied access to tape players in their cells for
security reasons, and the prisoner did not explain why the time provided for
group religious study sessions was inadequate. Factual disputes over a
prisoner's claim regarding his request to celebrate the week-long Jewish
festival of Sukkot by eating meals outside in a succah (booth or tent) required
further proceedings as did a claim that a prisoner suffered unlawful
retaliation for filing the lawsuit. Van Wyhe v. Reisch, #08-1409 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 20235 (8th Cir.).
Security concerns justified a limitation on
medium security prisoners under which they could attend only one religious
service a week. A claim for injunctive relief that the plaintiff prisoner,
while on cell restriction, had been unable to attend any weekly religious
services was moot because of a change in prison policy. Barnes v. Pierce,
#08-40620, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 15448 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A prisoner sued a correctional sergeant, other
prison employees, and a prison superintendent, claiming that his First
Amendment rights were violated when the sergeant allegedly ordered him,
pursuant to prison policies, not to publicly display beads that the inmate wore
for religious reasons. Without determining whether the prisoner had a valid
claim against the sergeant or against the superintendent who denied the
inmate's grievances over the issue, the court held that the prisoner failed to
show that other prison employees were sufficiently individually involved in the
alleged deprivation to be subject to individual liability. Additionally, any
money damages claim against any defendants in their official capacity was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Colon v. Zydell, #07-CV-6490, 2009 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 62838 (W.D.N.Y.).
A prison grooming policy that forced an inmate to
shave his head in contradiction with his sincerely held religious beliefs
substantially burdened his right to freely exercise his religion. Correctional
defendants failed to establish that the policy was the least restrictive means
of furthering compelling governmental interests in hygiene, security, and space
utilization, as required under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. The appeals court
upheld, however, summary judgment on excessive force claims and claims
concerning the quality of prison ventilation and water. Smith v. Ozmint,
#07-6558, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 16989 (4th Cir.).
A federal court jury awarded $1 to a plaintiff
Muslim immigration detainee on claims that her rights to religious freedom were
violated, as well as $100,000 on state law negligent hiring, training,
supervision, and retention claims. A federal appeals court found that the trial
court, in awarding $642,398.57 in attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, erroneously
assumed that 33% to 50% of the state law damage award was intended as
compensation for the plaintiff's federal religious freedom claim. A
recalculation was ordered of the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be
awarded. Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., #08-2500, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 17950 (3rd Cir.).
A prisoner did not establish a violation of his
right to religious freedom. He did not show how a requirement that he work on
Sunday burdened his religious beliefs. The court also rejected retaliation
claims by the prisoner, since the prisoner did not dispute that he disobeyed
orders, which was the partial basis for the misconduct reports filed against
him. Chavis v. Goord, #07-4787, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 13681 (Unpub. 2nd Cir.).
A prisoner failed to show that prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to a purported risk to his health posed by his
diet and the failure to provide him with requested dietary supplements. The
prisoner claimed both that his vegan diet provided was nutritionally
inadequate, and that, as a follower of the African Hebrew Israelite religion,
he should have been given supplements considered to be "religious
necessities": including blackstrap molasses, sesame seeds, kelp, brewer’s
yeast, parsley, fenugreek, wheat germ, and soybeans. The prisoner failed to
refute the prison's assertion that providing the supplements would have
involved security risks. The appeals court ruled, however, that the prisoner's
claims concerning strip searches should have been allowed to go to a jury,
since there was evidence from which it could be found that the searches were
conducted with the intent to harass. Mays v. Springborn, #05-3630, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 15749 (7th Cir.).
A prison substantially burdened a prisoner's
right to religious freedom under both federal and Illinois law by difficult
procedural requirements to receive a religious diet and refusal to provide
meat-free meals during Lent and on Fridays. Further proceedings were ordered to
determine if the defendants were acting to further a compelling governmental
interest, were using the least restrictive means to do so, and whether they
violated clearly established law. Nelson v. Miller, #08-2044, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 14240 (7th Cir.).
In a lawsuit against a prison official under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claiming failure
to accommodate a religious request for a kosher diet, the statute does not
allow a claim for damages against an official in their individual capacity, so
the complaint was properly dismissed. Rendelman v. Rouse, #08-6150, 2009 U.S.
App. Lexis 13659 (4th Cir.).
A Florida civil commitment center's policy
prohibiting martial arts practice did not violate a detainee's right to
practice his religion, even if he and other Zen Buddhists believed that the
practice of karate was a form of spiritual enlightenment. The policy was a
safety measure designed to aid in preventing threats to staff members and other
residents of the facility and applied to those of every religion. Marsh v.
Florida Dept. of Corrections, #08-12222, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 10649 (Unpub.
11th Cir.).
An Orthodox Jew refused to remove her headscarf
for the taking of an identification photo during her admittance into a correctional
facility as an inmate. This requirement that she briefly remove the headscarf
for this purpose, the court ruled, did not violate her First Amendment right to
practice her religion and was rationally related to legitimate governmental
objectives in having identification photos of prisoners that would not change
over time. Otherwise, a prisoner could quickly change her appearance by simply
removing her headdress or hat, posing a threat to institutional security.
Zargary v. City of New York, #00 Civ. 897, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 33240
(S.D.N.Y.).
A prisoner could proceed with his claim that his
right to practice his Buddhist religion was violated by the prison's
prohibition on Buddhist communal worship without the presence of an outside
volunteer, based on his assertion that Muslim prisoners were allowed to hold
group worship without the presence of such a volunteer, and that no approved
outside Buddhist volunteer was available. The court suggested that it was
possible that safety and security concerns might be addressed by less
restrictive alternatives. A trial court's finding that treating Buddhists
differently than Muslim prisoners was justified because there were fewer of
them was not supported by the evidence. Newby v. Quarterman, #06-11233, 2009
U.S. App. Lexis 9290 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A correctional services company showed that it
"substantially performed" its obligations under a consent decree to
provide kosher meals during the 2006 and 2007 Jewish Passover holidays, serving
the plaintiff inmate 23 out of 25 required meals. The appeals court, therefore,
upheld a trial court decision in favor of the company. Miles v. Aramark
Correctional Service, Inc., #07-3622, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7233 (Unpub. 3rd
Cir.).
A prisoner enrolled in a Bureau of Prisons
religious diet program, providing special meals to inmates whose religious
beliefs prevented them from eating the food generally offered at the prison. He
was suspended from the program, however, on three occasions, after he was seen
buying and eating non-kosher food, or trading the kosher meal he was provided
for a non-kosher meal. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment in favor
of the Bureau of Prisons on the prisoner's claim that these suspensions
violated his right to practice his religion. The court noted that the prisoner
conceded that he broke the rules of the religious diet program by buying
non-kosher food from the commissary, and the court found that those rules did
not "substantially burden" religious freedom. Daly v. Davis, #08-2046,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 6222 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A prison policy that only allowed the receipt of
books that were sent directly from a publisher or that had a publisher's
invoice enclosed was a legitimate one, aimed at preventing the introduction of
contraband into the facility. The plaintiff prisoner was denied the receipt of
two religious books sent to him by his sister because there was no publisher's
invoice enclosed, not because of any intent to interfere with his religious
freedom rights. Even though there was an eight-month delay in him receiving the
books, prison employees did deliver the books to him as soon as it was
determined that the publisher's invoices were received. Additionally, the
prisoner had access to similar religious books through the prison's library.
Heleva v. Kramer, #08-3408, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 11021 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A correctional counselor's alleged actions of
sexual harassment in staring at a prisoner for long periods of time repeatedly,
and saying that he would like to engage in homosexual sex with him (i.e., that
he wanted the inmate to do to him what he allegedly did to his rape victim) was
not sufficiently serious to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. There was
also no evidence that the counselor's supervisor retaliated against the
prisoner for becoming a Muslim by filing a false misbehavior report against him
and suggesting that he fantasized about having a homosexual relationship with a
male prison employee. Seymore v. Joslyn, #9:06 CV 1010, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis
32545 (N.D.N.Y.).
A prisoner with a number of misconduct charges
pending was transferred to a facility that did not serve kosher meals and
placed in temporary segregation there. When the warden learned that he was
refusing to eat non-kosher meals, she had him transferred to another facility
where he could receive them. The warden was entitled to summary judgment, as
there was no evidence that she knew of the problem earlier, and it appeared
that she acted to correct it as soon as she did know. Cardinal v. Metrish,
#08-1562, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 8689 (6th Cir.).
Isolated instances of alleged anti-Semitic
conduct against an Orthodox Jewish prisoner did not show that he was not given
an equal opportunity to practice his religion with that provided to prisoners
of other religions. He failed to show that his right to exercise his religion
was substantially burdened. Gallagher v. Shelton, #03-3454, 2009 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 27778 (D. Kan.).
A prisoner who belongs to an organization that he
"adamantly" stated was not a religion, but a "culture and way of
life," was denied his request to use a correctional facility's chapel for
weekly gatherings and special celebrations. This did not deny his right to
religious freedom. Additionally, the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity, based on the inmate's own argument that his organization was not a
religion. Harrison v. Watts, #1:06cv1061, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 26009 (E.D.
Va.).
A Corrections officer issued a misbehavior report
when a prisoner refused to obey orders given to him and other mess hall workers
to stop praying. The officer was entitled to qualified immunity in the
subsequent religious freedom lawsuit by the prisoner, as it was not clearly
established that a prisoner had a right to pray at his work assignment.
Additionally, a prison directive restricted group prayer to certain designated
locations. Sweeper v. Taylor, #9:06-CV-379, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 27318
(N.D.N.Y.).
Further proceedings were ordered on a prisoner's claim
that his given name was religiously offensive to him and that the prison's
action in requiring him to use that name forced him to either violate his
religious beliefs or cease accessing his inmate fund account. Al-Amin v. Shear,
#08-7681, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7620 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).
A prisoner's right to religious freedom was not
violated by a Texas correctional policy prohibiting prisoners from
"decorating" their outgoing mail envelopes. In this case, the
prisoner was prevented from putting religious messages on the outside of his
envelopes. The court held that communicating such messages to people handling
his mail, as opposed to those to whom the mail was addressed, was a
"benefit" not generally available, and that restricting such communication
did not substantially burden the prisoner's exercise of his religion. There was
no restriction on the prisoner's ability to state religious messages inside the
envelope. Smithback v. Crain, #07-10274, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 4493 (Unpub. 5th
Cir.).
A prisoner who belonged to the Assembly of Yahweh
religion claimed that his right to practice his religion was burdened by
actions allowing an insufficient amount of time for Sabbath services,
restricting travel time for religious call-outs, and failing to provide
seasonal fruits and vegetables. The court found that he failed to show that the
amount of time allowed for services substantially burdened his ability to
practice his religion or that the restrictions on travel time for religious
call-outs was not related to legitimate security and safety concerns. The
prisoner also failed to show that he requested the desired fruit and vegetables
because of sincere religious beliefs. Strope v. Cummings, #06-3021, 2009 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 15720 (D. Kan.).
Because a Wiccan clergyman was not an inmate, but
merely a California taxpayer and an applicant seeking employment with
California prisons, he did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a "Five Faiths Policy" under which the hiring of paid chaplains
was allegedly limited to ministers of five major established religions. Inmates
of the Wiccan faith, however, would have such standing, should they sue, and
could claim that the policy violated both their right to exercise their
religion and prohibitions on the "establishment of religion."
McCollum v. California, No. C 04-03339, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11154 (N.D.
Cal.).
It did not violate the religious freedom rights
of a Wiccan inmate to enforce a policy requiring inmates to check out tarot
cards from a prison chaplain and forbidding the keeping of such cards in inmate
cells. The prisoner stated that he used the cards for religious purposes, and
claimed that the policy violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1(a), by
preventing spontaneous tarot card readings. The policy was justified by
security concerns, including preventing the use of the cards for gambling,
preventing the exchange of card readings for goods or services, preventing the
placement of gang symbols on the cards "which could be used to promote or
defame gangs, leading to violence," and to prevent "psychological
control, as some prisoners may believe that tarot card-holders have special
powers." Singson v. Norris, No. 08-1570, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 1971 (8th
Cir.).
A prisoner's lawsuit claiming violation of his
right to exercise his religion was properly dismissed. He failed to assert that
the practices prohibited, such as the use of a musical instrument or visits by
clergy, were required by his religion. Additionally, he was, in fact, allowed
to practice his Jewish religion daily, using religious articles he was allowed
to keep, as well as on religious holy days. Weinberger v. Grimes, No. 07-6461,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 2693 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Federal appeals court finds that certain claims
for injunctive relief were moot when Texas prison officials stated that they
had voluntarily stopped barring cell-restricted prisoners from attending
religious services. Claims concerning alleged restrictive policies on chapel
use for congregational worship were overly restrictive, in violation of federal
and state law, however, required further proceedings. Sossamon v. Texas, No.
07-50632, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 3701 (5th Cir.).
In a prisoner's lawsuit claiming that he was kept
in administrative segregation for an "indeterminate" time without
required review hearings, an appeals court found that, because of the sparse
facts in the record, it was hard to determine exactly when the prisoner's
segregation became so prolonged and restrictive to put him on notice, for
purposes of the statute of limitations, that he had a possible claim to assert,
so that dismissal on statute of limitations grounds was improper. Additionally,
the prisoner's claim that he tried to kill himself satisfied any requirement of
physical injury for an Eighth Amendment claim. The prisoner failed to properly
show a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination
in the making of contracts, or of 42 U.S.C. Sec 1985(3) and 1986, since there
was no evidence that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional
rights. He could proceed on his Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1983, as well as on claims concerning the denial of religious freedom, since
there was no information in the record concerning security concerns to justify
preventing the prisoner from attending services, nor was there information as
to whether individual religious counseling was available while he was in
administrative segregation. Arauz v. Bell, No. 08-5186, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis
1370 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Prisoner sufficiently stated First Amendment
claim and claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1(a), by alleging that prison officials
confiscated Nation of Islam literature that his religion required him to study
and read and that he faced retaliation for practicing that religion and
possessing its religious materials. Limiting access to such religious material
amounted to imposing a "substantial burden" on the free exercise of
religion. Yates v Painter, No. 06-3302, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 499 (3rd Cir.).
Court declines to dismiss Muslim prisoner's First
Amendment claim and claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1(a), since he allegedly was not
allowed to participate in weekly prayer services or to fast during Ramadan (by
refusing to set aside food for him to eat after sundown and before sunrise),
and was not provided with a pork-free diet. Further proceedings were needed to
determine whether these restrictions were reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests and whether the policies at issue were the least
restrictive means of accommodating the prisoner's rights under the RLUIPA.
Foster v. Ouachita Correctional Center, Civil Action No. 07-1519, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 92914 (W.D. La.).
Prisoners who are adherents of the Wiccan
religion failed to show that a prison, in granting them three hours to
celebrate the most important of eight Wiccan holidays, Samhain, and limiting
the quantity of food available for the celebration, violated their right to
religious freedom. Gladson v. Iowa Department of Corrections; 07-3528, 2009
U.S. App. Lexis (8th Cir.).
A federal prisoner was not relieved, on the basis
of his religious freedom rights, of his obligation to comply with a valid and
generally applicable neutral law, the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000 (DNA Act), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 14135-14135e. He failed to show that the law
required or prohibited conduct in violation of his religion or impeded his
religious observance. He also failed to show that the government did not have a
legitimate interest in collecting a DNA sample from him because he was a
first-time offender and had been convicted of a non-violent crime. The court
also rejected due process/equal protection, self-incrimination, and Fourth
Amendment challenges to the statute. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, No. 07-5065, 2008
U.S. App. Lexis 26507 (D.C.Cir.).
The plaintiff prisoners' purchase of non-kosher
food items from the prison store provided prison officials with some objective
factors to use in determining whether their request for a kosher diet was based
on a sincere religious belief. A policy of removing, temporarily, such
prisoners from the kosher meal program while they possessed non-kosher food did
not violate the First Amendment. Ketzner v. Williams, No. 4:06-CV-73, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 90500 (W.D. Mich.).
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections did not
violate the rights of a Rastafarian prisoner by denying his request to hold
weekly group Rastafarian services. The Department requires that approved
religious leaders or chaplains lead such services, and provides such services
to all of the largest major religions. Rastafarians, according to the court,
are not a "major" faith group and the Department had budgetary
reasons for failing to pay for a Rastafarian religious leader come to the
facility to hold group services. It could not afford to provide chaplains for
every faith. The plaintiff prisoner was provided with alternatives to group
worship services, including keeping religious books and materials in his cell,
personal meetings with a religious advisor, and asking for a religious
exemption from the facility's hair length regulations. Smith v. Kyler, No.
08-1731, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 21341 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Wardens who delegated to the assistant warden the
job of reviewing inmate grievances could not be held liable for refusing to
provide a prisoner with a vegan diet that he claimed was religiously required.
The wardens therefore were not personally involved in the alleged violation of
the plaintiff's rights, as they did not personally review his grievances. The
prisoner, who was no longer incarcerated, was not entitled to injunctive
relief. Wofford v. Sutton, Case No. 3:03-cv-725, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 78319
(S.D. Ill.).
The record failed to show how a prison's limit of
ten books in a prisoner's cell furthered safety and security interests. The
appeals court ordered further proceedings on the prisoner's lawsuit challenging
the removal of 57 books, including the Koran and other religious books, from
his cell under the policy, claiming that this violated his rights under the
First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc et seq. Warren v. Pennsylvania, No. 07-3011,
07-3011, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17395 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
The hair length and facial hair policies of the
Arkansas Department of Corrections were justified by the need to minimize the
smuggling of contraband and reduce opportunities for prisoners disguising
themselves by removing hair, and did not violate religious freedom rights under
the First Amendment or under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc et seq. The court also rejected an
equal protection claim based on valid reasons for differing hair length
requirements for men and women. Additionally, there was evidence that longer
beards created security and safety concerns absent when a prisoner is either
clean shaven or has facial hair no longer than quarter-inch long. Appeals court
also upholds an award of $1,500 to a prisoner on a claim that he was improperly
not provided with Kosher meals. Fegans v. Norris, No. 06-3473, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 17072 (8th Cir.).
Correctional officials were entitled to qualified
immunity from liability for damages in a lawsuit concerning alleged failure to
accommodate a prisoner's religious beliefs when his "Hebrew
Israelite" religion was not yet officially recognized, and the sincerity
of his beliefs had been questioned in a prior lawsuit. The prisoner sufficiently
pursued his claim for daily kosher meals through the grievance procedure, and
further proceedings were ordered as to whether the denial of such meals was the
least restrictive means to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.
Walker v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections, No. 06-1839, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18631
(8th Cir.).
Federal magistrate finds that Congress, in
passing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, did not unequivocally waive state immunity from suits for
damages, so that an inmate's claim for damages against an official in his
official capacity was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and a claim for
money damages was not available under the Act against a prison official in his
individual capacity. On the prisoner's claim for alleged violation of his First
Amendment rights to religious freedom by denying his request to purchase an
ankh cross, however, the magistrate found that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e did not bar
punitive damages because punitive damages are not for mental or emotional
injury. Additionally, even if he were seeking damages for mental or emotional
injury, those damages would potentially be recoverable because Sec. 1997e does
not apply to First Amendment claims. Porter v. Caruso, No. 1:05-CV-562, 2008
U.S. Dist. Lexis 64347 (W.D. Mich.).
Shi'ite Muslim prisoners presented a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether their rights were violated by the failure
to provide them with separate Friday Jumah prayer services for Shi'ite inmates
led by a Shi'ite cleric, giving them only the options of either attending a
Sunni Muslim led service or praying the Zohr prayer alone in their cells, which
they claimed was inadequate. Further proceedings would examine whether the
defendant prison officials could accommodate the plaintiffs' request for a
Shi'ite led prayer service without jeopardizing legitimate penological
objectives. A claim by a former inmate for injunctive relief was dismissed, as
was a claim for money damages. Pugh v. Goord, No. 00 Civ. 7279, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 60998 (S.D.N.Y.).
The New Jersey Department of Corrections'
training academy no-facial hair policy was facially neutral and only
incidentally burdened religious conduct. It was rationally related to
compliance with federal and state health regulations concerning the use of
respirator masks and to a concern about the esprit de corps, which comes from
uniformity of appearance. It therefore did not violate the rights of a Muslim
trainee removed from the training program when he failed, on three separate
occasions, to keep his beard within parameters allowed to him as an
accommodation of his religion. The policy would be lawful, the court stated,
under any standard of review, including strict scrutiny. Valdes v. New Jersey,
No. 07-2971, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 17380 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Rastafarian prisoner presented a viable claim
that his clearly established constitutional right to religious freedom and his
federal statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-1(1)(1), (2) were violated by a
prohibition on him growing his hair in dreadlocks. The warden was found to have
acted in an objectively unreasonable manner in insisting that the prisoner be
prohibited from growing dreadlocks. Further, the court reasoned that a decision
by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to provide religious
exceptions for hair grooming in its grooming code supported the prisoner's
argument that growing his hair into dreadlocks was a legitimate part of his
exercise of his religion. The warden failed to show that the dreadlocks would
constitute a security problem. Johnson v. Collins, No. 3:07 CV 211, 2008
U.S. Dist. Lexis 52127 (N.D. Ohio).
Prison officials met their burden under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2000cc of showing that prohibiting a Native American of Cherokee descent from
establishing a sweat lodge for use in outdoor religious meetings furthered a compelling
governmental interest and was the least restrictive means to furthering safety
and security concerns. The prison argued that having such a sweat lodge, and
allowing access to objects to be used during the sweat lodge, such as rocks,
willow poles, deer antlers, split wood, and shovels, which could be used as
weapons, would create unacceptable security problems. Fowler v. Crawford, No.
07-2946, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15841 (8th Cir.).
A prisoner who wished to be provided with prayer
beads for use in performing shamanic religious activities stated a viable claim
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, alleging facts which tended to show that the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (WDOC) substantially burdened his right to exercise
his religion by refusing to allow him such beads. The religion of shamanism, he
claimed, focuses on communicating with spirits, and the beads are needed to
perform activities facilitating that communication, which could not be
accomplished without them. The court found that it was "premature" to
determine whether or not the WDOC asserted legitimate concerns justifying the
denial. Meyer v. Wis. Dept. of Corrections, No. 08-cv-278, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 51362 (W.D. Wis.).
Individual liability for money damages is not
possible under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, so that individual claims for such damages
were properly dismissed against a jail chaplain and sergeant in their
individual capacities in a Muslim prisoner's lawsuit. The lawsuit asserted that
the prisoner was prevented from attending Friday prayer services, eating kosher
meals some days during Ramadan, and wearing a Muslim kufi cap. Claims for injunctive
relief were moot because the plaintiff was no longer at the jail. The court
found that a county policy requiring prior approval for the wearing of a kufi
cap did not violate the First Amendment because it was designed to make sure
that the apparel in question did not pose a safety or security threat, and that
legitimate budgetary problems prevented the jail from providing Friday
religious services more often than every other week, while prisoners were
allowed to pray in their cells the other Friday. Finally, the court ruled that
the alleged failure to provide kosher meals on certain days during the Muslim
religious month of Ramadan was merely an "oversight" in the kitchen,
which the defendants subsequently remedied. Hathcock v. Cohen, No. 07-13596,
2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15921 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
A "safe harbor" provision of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2000cc, specifically 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-3(c) applied to a temporary practice
of not allowing Jum'ah prayer at a county detention facility on Fridays while
the center was undergoing renovation construction. After the renovations were
finished, such prayer services were provided on Fridays, and prior to that,
they were provided on Sundays. While the renovation construction activity was
ongoing, the facility did not have space available to provide a room for the
services on Friday. The court also found that the RLUIPA did not mandate
that the jail necessarily hire an imam to lead Jum'ah prayer services, as the
plaintiffs demanded. Further, there was evidence that non-Muslims were allowed
to prepare Halal meals suitable for consumption by Muslims, which refuted the
plaintiffs' claim that such meals had to be prepared by other Muslims. Summary
judgment was therefore entered for the defendants on all of the plaintiffs'
claims. Tyson v. Guisto, No. CV 06-1415, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 49528 (D. Ore.).
A Wiccan or ritual magician prisoner failed to
show that the actions of two prison officials violated his rights when they
removed religious "seals" that he had affixed to his cell doors and
walls. He failed to show that the seals had religious meaning to him, and the
employees stated that there was a policy prohibiting prisoners from affixing
anything to their cells which served prison security interests by facilitating
inspections of cells and eliminating a source of conflicts between prisoners
celled together. The policy allowed the prisoners to have non-contraband items
in their cells as long as they were not affixed. Mark v. Gustafson, No.
06-3943, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13166 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
Prisoner could pursue his claim that a county
sheriff and county violated his First Amendment rights by allegedly playing
Christmas music daily in the jail, and forcing inmates to listen to
Judeo/Christian religious doctrine. The court rejected the argument that the
First Amendment claim should be dismissed based on the failure to show that the
prisoner suffered a physical injury, ruling that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(c) of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, barring recovery of damages for mental distress
in the absence of a physical injury, did not apply to the prisoner's claim.
Fabricius v. Maricopa County, No. CV-06-1105, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37569 (D.
Ariz.).
Muslim prisoner could pursue his claim that
correctional officers violated his right to exercise his religion under the
First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc et seq. by allegedly throwing away his Ramadan food
during a search of his cell. Harnett v. Barr, No. 9:06-CV-1044, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 19236 (N.D.N.Y.).
A Muslim prisoner's claim that correctional
employees subjected him to disrespect, humiliation, and embarrassment because
of his religious beliefs did not state a claim for violation of his
constitutional rights when the alleged harassment was only verbal harassment
and derogatory comments about his religion, and was not accompanied by any
physical acts. The prisoner's claim that one of the prison staff members may
have "tugged" on his beard was insufficient to state a claim for
excessive use of force. Aponte v. Karnes, Civil No. 4:CV-08-183, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 9675 (M.D. Pa.).
While asserted limitations of space and staff and
security concerns were valid penological reasons for not permitting Odinist
prisoners to gather for services without an outside volunteer, an Odinist
prisoner did present evidence that the policy was applied disparately to
Odinists as opposed to prisoners of other religions. Barring Odinists from
possessing "runestones," however, was justified by security concerns
since they are similar to certain gambling-related objects, and no
constitutional violation was found. The court found, however, that there were no
penological interests that supported alleged limits on access to "rune
literature" in the prison library, so that the trial court, on remand, had
to examine whether that limitation violated the prisoner's constitutional
rights. The court also held that, as to a claim under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5
concerning the restriction on possession of runestones, there should be further
proceedings as to whether the overall runestones policy was "narrowly
tailored" as required by the statute. Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal
Justice, No. 06-50490, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11600 (5th Cir.).
A prisoner failed to present evidence to
dispute prison officials' argument that requiring him to place his name of
conviction on outgoing mail, rather than his current legal name, which he had
changed for religious reasons, was a policy that furthered prison order.
Barring him from instead using his legal name did not violate his First
Amendment right to practice his religion. Ghashiyah v. Litscher, No. 07-3670,
2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10729 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
Prisoner's claim that he requested a non-meat
diet for religious reasons was found to be sincere. Prison officials had
refused to provide a non-meat diet because they argued that such a diet was not
required by the religious group, and the prisoner failed to submit to the
prison chaplain a written verification of his membership in a religious group
and its beliefs. The federal appeals court found that the defendant
correctional officials failed to provide any evidence that their basis for
denying the request served any compelling governmental interest, as required by
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 2000cc et seq., or that the rules used were the least restrictive means of
advancing such an interest. Further proceedings were ordered on the prisoner's
claims. Koger v. Bryan, No. 05-1904, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8825 (7th Cir.).
A Muslim prisoner's claim that correctional
employees subjected him to disrespect, humiliation, and embarrassment because
of his religious beliefs did not state a claim for violation of his
constitutional rights when the alleged harassment was only verbal harassment
and derogatory comments about his religion, and was not accompanied by any
physical acts. The prisoner's claim that one of the prison staff members may
have "tugged" on his beard was insufficient to state a claim for
excessive use of force. Aponte v. Karnes, Civil No. 4:CV-08-183, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 9675 (M.D. Pa.).
A former detainee awarded $1 against a
corrections company and correctional officials on her claims for interference
with her right to exercise her religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb, as well as $100,000 on related state law claims,
was a prevailing plaintiff entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1983. A total of $642,398.57 in attorneys' fees and costs was
awarded. The court found that the results the plaintiff had achieved caused
both a change in the defendants' behavior, and benefits for the plaintiff. Jama
v. Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., Civ. No. 97-3093, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis
32943 (D.N.J.).
Atheist prisoner failed to show that his
religious freedom rights were violated because prison officials refused to let
him receive a silver circle, free publications, and other books he ordered, and
delayed processing and placing atheistic books in the library. The court ruled
that the "silver circle" did not have anything to do with the
practice of any religion or philosophy, and that a policy of allowing prisoners
possession of only generally accepted religious symbols was supported by a
"valid secular and penological" purpose that did not advance any
religion. The defendant officials also adequately provided legitimate reasons
for any delay in the processing of atheist books for the library, as well as
why certain other materials had been excluded. The court also rejected, as
frivolous, the prisoner's claim that he should have been furnished with
additional free bars of soap, beyond those that he did receive. Kaufman v.
Karlen, No. 07-2712, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 6181 (7th Cir.).
The refusal to provide a daily "Halal"
menu to Muslim inmates who are members of the Nation of Islam was a
"substantial burden" on their exercise of their religion. For
purposes of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1 et seq., the Massachusetts Department of Corrections
failed to show that this refusal served a compelling state interest. The
Department failed to produce support for its argument that providing such meals
would have created conflicts among prisoners, particularly in light of the
Department's long standing practice of giving Jewish, Buddhist, and Seventh Day
Adventist prisoners with religious dietary accommodations. The court also found
than an "alternative vegetarian" diet did not satisfactorily replace
a Halal diet. The court also ruled that the prisoners should be provided with
closed circuit television access to Jum'ah services. The court rejected,
however, the prisoners' claims relating to alleged deprivation of prayer rugs.
Hudson v. Dennehy, No. 01-CV-12145, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16672 (D. Mass.).
Minnesota prison's failure to provide Muslim
prisoner with a Halal religious diet, instead providing him with a special
vegetarian diet, did not impose a substantial burden on his right to practice
his religion. The vegetarian diet, further, was nutritionally adequate.
Additionally, the prisoner's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were
moot because the prisoner had been moved to a federal facility. Pratt v.
Corrections Corporation of America, No. 06-3556, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4977
(8th Cir.).
Federal appeals court rejects Muslim prisoner's
claims that his right to freedom of religion was impaired by the confiscation
of his hardbound religious book and prayer rug. The confiscation of these
materials was justified on the basis of legitimate concerns that the book could
be disassembled to create a weapon, and that the rug could be used for the
hiding of weapons or contraband. Pressley v. Beard, No. 07-4150, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 4208 (3rd Cir.).
When a prison official stated that she knew that
prayer oil was recommended for use by Muslims in practicing their religion,
this was sufficient for a Muslim prisoner to continue to pursue his claims
under the Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2000cc-1, but insufficient for his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
The prisoner was not entitled to summary judgment on his RLUIPA claim,
however, because he did not assert that the denial of access to the prayer oil
caused a "substantial burden" on his practice of his religion. Claims
against a second official were dismissed. Shidler v. Moore, No. 3:05-CV-804,
2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8872 (N.D. Ind.).
In a lawsuit by a Jewish prisoner complaining
that he was denied access to a succah (a booth in which Jews eat and carry out
other activities during the celebration of a particular religious holiday) and
a tape recorder he claimed he needed to practice his religion, a federal
district court rejects the defendants' claims that the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000cc to 2000cc-5 was
unconstitutional. The court found that the RLUIPA was a legitimate use of the
power of Congress under the Spending Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1,
and that the State of South Dakota, in accepting federal funds, waived any
claim that it was immune from lawsuits for money damages, pursuant to the
Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d-7(a)(1). Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e, however, the prisoner was only entitled to
nominal damages on the denial of the requests to use a succah and a tape
recorder, and failed to show that state officials violated the RLUIPA in
denying other requests he made to use incense, oils, herbs, and certain other
items to purportedly practice his religion. Sisney v. Reisch, No. Civ. 03-4260,
2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9832 (D.S.D.).
Prisoner presented insufficient evidence to show
that he was placed in administrative custody or kept there on the basis of or
in retaliation for his religious beliefs. The record showed that the actual
reason for his administrative custody was his "potential involvement"
in an assault on another inmate, and that he was subsequently placed in
disciplinary custody for breaking institutional rules, followed by a return to
administrative custody based on claims that he was a threat to others and
ordered assaults on other inmates. The prisoner also failed to argue that the
conditions of his confinement imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of his
religion. Brown v. Dept. of Corrections, Pa., No. 07-4194, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
3455 (3rd Cir.).
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc et seq. became "clearly
established law" when it was signed into law, so that prison officials
were required to follow the law, and were not entitled to qualified immunity
for allegedly confiscating several religious publications received by the
plaintiff prisoner prior to when the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in
2005 definitively declaring that the RLUIPA was constitutional. The
confiscations took place in May and June of 2003, and in November of 2003, a
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that the RLUIPA was unconstitutional,
a ruling later rejected by the Supreme Court. The court noted that the Sixth
Circuit decision occurred after the alleged actions, and therefore could not be
used by the prison officials to obtain qualified immunity at a time when the
statute was "presumptively constitutional." Figel v. Overton, No.
06-2199, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 3311 (6th Cir.).
Even though a rehabilitation program called the
Alternatives to Violence Program was "rooted in" Quaker philosophy,
it was a secular rather than religious program, so that the recommendation, by
a prison, that a prisoner participate in the program did not violate the
Establishment of Religion clause of the First Amendment. Bader v. Wren, Civil
No. 06-CV-137, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6952 (D.N.H.).
County sheriff and chief jailer were not entitled
to summary judgment on prisoner's claim that they violated his religious
freedom rights by refusing to let him bring his Bible to a jail's day room,
since there were disputed issues of fact as to what they had done, and no
justification was provided for the alleged refusal. Grissom v. Cole, No.
3:06-CV-00037, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7169 (E.D. Ark.).
Prisoner was not entitled to a jury instruction
on punitive damages in his lawsuit contending that correctional officials'
serving of a pork substitute showed an unlawful preference for Muslim and
Jewish prisoners since they rejected his own Hindu religious request for a
modified diet. Even if his allegations were true, they did not allege conduct
amounting to evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to his
constitutional rights, and he was therefore not entitled to punitive damages.
The jury awarded him $629 in damages against one defendant and $1 against a
second, on equal protection claims. Patel v. Wooten, No. 07-1030, 2008 U.S.
App. Lexis 3216 (10th Cir.).
After a Muslim prisoner was allowed to have a
vegetarian diet on a religious basis, he claimed that he suffered adverse
health effects from it, which interfered with his religious activities. He
therefore claimed that he should receive a meat-based protein diet and that a
kosher meat diet being provided to Jewish prisoners would satisfy his religious
needs. A federal appeals court overturned the trial court's summary judgment
for prison officials. Further proceedings were needed as to the extent of the
burden on the prisoner's religious activities from the denial of the meat
kosher diet, and the amount of burden on correctional resources that providing
it would impose, as well as whether there were less restrictive alternatives
that would still satisfy his needs. The court did find that the prisoner's
beliefs were sincere, so that the denial did involve the Free Exercise of
Religion clause of the First Amendment. Shakur v. Schriro, No. 05-16705, 2008
U.S. App. Lexis 1255 (9th Cir.).
Muslim prisoner failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish whether his right to practice his religion was violated
by federal prison officials' alleged failure to provide him with
"appropriate meals" to satisfy his religious beliefs. The record in
the case failed to indicate whether the prisoner requested, or would have been
allowed to store halal food from the prison kitchen in his cell so that he
could eat a halal meal on days that kosher meat entrees were served. The
prisoner also failed to show that the defendants acted with any discriminatory
purpose. Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-3819, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
2423 (8th Cir.).
Muslim prisoner failed to show that a lockdown
prevented him from practicing his religion, that prison officials were
motivated by discriminatory intent against Muslim inmates in ordering the
lockdown, or to raise a viable claim as to whether the lockdown had, as claimed
by officials, been legitimately ordered for security purposes. Ford v. Martel,
No. 06-16994, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 30243 (9th Cir.).
A prisoner awaiting trial on charges of terrorist
threats housed in the maximum-security area of a county jail challenged a jail
policy barring maximum-security prisoners from participating in group worship. Overturning
summary judgment for jail officials on claims under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq., a
federal appeals court found that disputed issues of material fact existed as to
whether this policy was the "least restrictive means" of satisfying
security concerns. Greene v. Solano County Jail, No. 06-16957, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 1189 (9th Cir.).
Two Rastafarian prisoners and three Muslim
prisoners claimed that an inmate grooming policy prohibiting them from wearing
beards violated their rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5. A federal
appeals court rejected these claims, based on a record and established case law
showing a need for suppressing contraband, maintaining discipline and security,
maintaining inmate and staff health and safety, and preventing prisoners from
quickly changing their appearance. The court also found that a suggested
"less restrictive means" of serving these "compelling
governmental interests," which was transferring inmates with such
religious beliefs to other prison systems without similar grooming policies,
was not "workable." McRae v. Johnson, No. 06-7548, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
246 (4th Cir.).
A federal prisoner transferred from a facility in
Atlanta, Georgia to one in Kentucky allegedly noticed that a number of items
were missing from his property, which the federal Bureau of Prisons had shipped
to his new facility. He filed a lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346, seeking recovery of damages. The property involved
included items of religious and nostalgic significance, including two copies of
the Qur'an, a prayer rug, and religious magazines, with an estimated total
value of $177. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an exception to the FTCA's
waiver of sovereign immunity for actions of federal employees, which bars
liability arising from the detention of any property "by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer," 28 U.S.C. Sec.
2680(c), applies to all law enforcement officers, including federal
correctional officers. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the dismissal of the
prisoner's lawsuit. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 06-9130, 2008 U.S. Lexis
1212.
Prison officials were not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law in a lawsuit claiming that a prisoner was denied the right to
practice his Asatru faith (a pagan religion with Norse origins) in terms of group
worship. In response to the prisoner's equal protection claim, an official's
affidavit failed to show how the prisoner's Asatru religion was different from
the Nation of Islam or the Moorish American Science Temple, or other religions
allowed group worship services. Gordon v. Caruso, No. 1:06-CV-571, 2007 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 65140 (W.D. Mich.).
Prison officials were not entitled to dismissal
of prisoner's claims that they violated his First Amendment rights to freedom
of religion and freedom of speech in refusing to mail 13 letters he tried to
send to Baptist churches and ministers to seek prayer partners and religious
pen pals. These actions were taken to enforce a rule barring correspondence
soliciting or advertising for "money, goods or services," including
seeking pen pals. Prison officials, in the trial court, failed to offer any
explanation of the reason for the rule or what governmental interest it was
advancing. While they might yet justify the rule and their actions, they had
failed, to date, to do so, as a result of which the dismissal of the case was
premature. Adamson v. McDonough, No. 06-12579, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28969 (11th
Cir.).
A religiously-oriented rehabilitation
program run by two non-profit organizations under a contract with the Iowa
Department of Corrections violated the Establishment of Religion clause of the
First Amendment by improperly using tax money to pay for what was characterized
as a 24-hour-a-day, Christ-centered, biblically based program that promotes
"personal transformation of prisoners through the power of the
Gospel." Even though the government did not act for the purpose of
advancing religion, the direct aid to the operators of the program was
unconstitutional in that it funded proselytizing activity. Injunctive relief
was appropriate, but the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
repayment from the non-profit organizations for services previously rendered.
Further funding of the program was properly barred. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., No. 06-2741, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 27928 (8th Cir.).
A prisoner who practices the religion of Odinism
failed to show that prison officials' denial of his possession of a small
quartz crystal and a "fire pit" substantially burdened the practice
of his religion. He also failed to demonstrate that allowing him to practice
his religion in a "secure location," while barring him from doing so
in the general prison area hampered his rights. The court also held that the
remedies section of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq., while it may allow for the awarding of
money damages, only provides for such awards against state officials in their
official, as opposed to individual, capacities. Smith v. Allen, 05-16010, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 23038 (11th Cir.).
California prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity for the discipline of a Sikh inmate in 2001 and 2002 for
refusing to cut his hair since it was not clearly established until 2005 in
Warsoldier v. Woodford, No. 04-55879, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005), that a
regulation requiring inmates to have short hair imposed a substantial burden on
an inmate's practice of religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1(a). Haley v. Donovan, No.
06-55856, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 23236 (9th Cir.).
Federal appeals court overturns decision granting
qualified immunity to parole officer who allegedly required parolee with
methamphetamine addiction to participated in a religion-based drug treatment
program over his objections. The appeals court found that the law on the issue
was clearly established, and that a jury could conclude that the parole officer
actually had notice that his actions were unconstitutional because of the
parolee's letter objecting to compulsory placement in the program. Inouye v.
Kemna, No. 06-15474, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 23106 (9th Cir.).
While a prisoner had a right to receive a kosher
food diet based on his religious beliefs, prison officials had not
intentionally denied him such food. He was unintentionally deprived of kosher
food when he was briefly transferred to a facility that did not serve kosher
food, but he was transferred again to one which did when officials discovered
that he qualified for kosher meals. Under these circumstances, the temporary
deprivation did not "substantially" burden the exercise of his
religion, justifying the dismissal of his lawsuit. Williams v. Howes, Case No.
1:06-CV-168, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 64766 (W.D. Mich.).
Requiring an inmate to participate in a sex
offender treatment program, which required him to attend explicit group
discussions of a sexual nature and view certain images, did not violate his
First Amendment rights, based on the "vital" public and governmental
interest in rehabilitation of convicted sex offenders. Additionally, even if an
individualized sex offender treatment program existed which would have met the
plaintiff's objections, it would have "unduly depleted" the prison's
resources to provide it. The court failed to rule on the prisoner's objection
to participation in the program under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et. seq. on the
basis of the defendants' claim that they had not had sufficient opportunity to
respond to that claim. Schnitzler v. Reisch, No. Civ. 06-4064, 2007 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 72938 (S.D.).
Prisoner failed to show that the serving of
vegetarian meals to all inmates at a jail during Lent improperly forced him to
practice a religious tenet of the Catholic religion. The jail did not engage in
the serving of the vegetarian meals for the purpose of advancing Catholicism or
inhibiting other religions, but for the secular purpose of feeding the
prisoners. The prisoner's "equal protection" claim lacked merit,
because all inmates were served such meals, regardless of their religion.
Finally, the prisoner's refusal to eat vegetarian meals was not constitutionally
protected conduct. Travillion v. Leon, No. 06-2136, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 22203
(3rd Cir.). See also related proceeding at Travillion v. Coffee, No. 06-1873,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21959 (3rd Cir.), rejecting similar claims against the
private company which provided the meals to the jail.
In a lawsuit by a Utah prisoner claiming that the
refusal of prison officials to allow him possession of tarot cards, incense and
religious books prevented him from practicing his Wiccan religion, a federal
appeals court found that there was enough factual support to conclude that the
plaintiff was a sincere devotee of the Wiccan faith. Further proceedings were
therefore ordered to determine whether the prison's restrictions were justified
by reasonable penological interests for purposes of a First Amendment claim, as
well as the prisoner's claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc et seq., requiring that
restrictions on prisoner religious freedom be justified by a "compelling"
governmental interest and use the "least restrictive means" to
further that interest. Kay v. Bemis, No. 07-4032, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 21811
(10th Cir.).
Grooming regulation that required a Rastafarian
prisoner to cut his hair to a specified maximum length, in violation of his
religious beliefs, did not violate his First Amendment rights because it was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Additionally it was not
clearly established that it would violate a prisoner's Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to subject him to discipline for violating the regulation, so
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. The
court's decision did not discuss the merits of the prisoner's claims under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc(a)(1), which remains pending. Hypolite v. California Dept. of
Corrections, No. CIV S-05-0428, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55317 (E.D. Cal.).
Prisoner's claim that he was denied the right to
possess a cross and practice his religion, and that he was forcibly given an
injection for the purpose of screening him for tuberculosis, in violation of
his religious belief against the injection of foreign substances were not
frivolous claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq. Trial court ruling dismissing those claims is
vacated. Barefoot v. Polk, No. 07-6628, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 16785 (4th Cir.).
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections'
restriction on prisoners possessing more than ten books at a time in their cell
substantially burdened a prisoner's exercise of his religion for purposes of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000c. The defendant department was unable to show that the ten-book policy was
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest in
the safety and health of prisoners and prison employees, so that a federal
appeals court overturned the dismissal of the prisoner's lawsuit. The prisoner
belongs to the Children of the Sun Church, which allegedly requires that the
members of its religion read four Pan-African books per day. Washington
v. Klem, No. 05-2351, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 18345 (3rd Cir.).
A Muslim inmate who was an Egyptian citizen
failed to show that the vegetarian meal plan offered him violated any of his
personal religious beliefs, and a nutritional analysis of the food offered
indicated that it satisfied recommended dietary allowances. Additionally, the
plan offered was created after consultation with a Muslim clergyman. The court
also found that the prisoner did not have an unqualified or absolute right to
send confidential mail from the prison to the Egyptian embassy or consulate, so
that the alleged refusal to allow him to do so could not be the basis of a
civil right claim. Sefeldeen v. Alameida, No. 05-15809, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis
13508 (9th Cir.).
Florida Orthodox Jewish prisoner could proceed
with his claim that he was improperly denied kosher meals, but failed to
exhaust available administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997e(a), on a number of other claims, including
alleged denial of permission to wear religious clothing, and denial of some
supplies for observing the Jewish holiday of Sukkot. Lawson v. McDonough, No.
4:04-cv-00105, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37821 (N.D. Fla.).
Appeals court orders further proceedings on
prisoner's claim that prison officials violated his rights by delaying in
providing him with a vegan diet after he converted from Islam to the African
Hebrew Israelite religion. The prisoner's claim could properly be analyzed
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C.S. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5, even though the prisoner cited the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which could not be applied to the states, in his
response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The prisoner was not
required to cite the specific statute he was relying on in his complaint, and
therefore did not waive his rights under the RLUIPA by failing to cite it.
Whitfield v. Illinois Department of Corrections, No. 06-2245, 2007 U.S. App.
Lexis 12786 (7th Cir.).
Muslim prisoner was not entitled to a preliminary
injunction requiring that the prison serve fish to him as part of his diet. He
did not show why fish was an absolute requirement of his practice of his
religion, but instead merely asserted that fish was important in his religion
because it was among the foods identified by Muhammad as "good" to
eat. The vegan diet being provided to him sufficiently satisfied his needs for
a religious diet, and the legitimate interest of the prison in efficiently
preparing meals outweighed his personal preferences as to what to eat. Pasco v.
Donald, No. 5:06-CV-141, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22809 (M.D. Ga.).
Hearing impaired inmate did not show that his
right to exercise his religion had been substantially burdened by prison
regulations under which he was only allowed to possess ten audio cassettes of
tape recorded church services, and permitted him to exchange two old tapes for
two new ones when new ones were sent to him. Court also rejects his argument
that he was subjected to disability discrimination by being denied possession
of bi-aural headphones to enable him to watch his television, since he had no
constitutional right to watch television. Sanders v. Ryan, No. CV 03-0523, 2007
U.S. Dist. Lexis 29070 (D. Ariz.).
Warden was not entitled to qualified immunity in
lawsuit brought by Orthodox Jewish prisoner claiming that his religious freedom
rights were violated by denying his request to wear religious garments (his
yarmulke and tallit katan) while being taken to a hospital for eye surgery. The
plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the warden had not presented a valid
penological justification for a substantial burden on his right to freely
exercise his religion. Boles v. Neet, No. 05-1570, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12177
(10th Cir.).
Prisoner's right to religious freedom was not
violated by the denial of his request to hold an interfaith study group or by a
deputy warden's refusal to provide him with additional reading material about
atheism. The prison was not required to "subsidize" his religious studies
by purchasing religious material for him. Further proceedings were ordered,
however, on the prisoner's claim that it violated his rights under the
"Establishment of Religion" clause of the First Amendment for a
deputy warden to refuse to provide him with atheist reading material while
approving the purchase of religious reading material for Christian prisoners.
Kaufman v. Schneiter, No. 07-C-45, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 32488 (W.D. Wis.).
Rhode Island Department of Corrections failed to show
that a compelling interest in prison security was served by preventing a
prisoner from preaching religion to his fellow prisoners at any time, as well
as that the total ban on such inmate preaching was the least restrictive means
of furthering that interest. The prisoner's claim that the ban violated his
rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et seq., was therefore reinstated, overturning summary
judgment for the defendant Department. Spratt v. R.I. Dept. of Corrections, No.
06-2038, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 8021 (1st Cir.).
Acting warden was not entitled to dismissal of
prisoner's claim that he had denied him his right to attend Friday Muslim
prayer services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-2(a). Henderson v. Ayers, No. CV
06-4348, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18791 (C.D. Cal.).
Federal prison authorities did not violate the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb, by requiring Muslim
prisoners to wear kufis rather than turbans. Court rules that this was the
least restrictive means of achieving the prison's security needs, and the
plaintiff failed to indicate any less restrictive accommodation that the prison
might have adopted. Appeals court rejects challenge to Bureau of Prison's
Program Statement 5360.09. Jefferson v. Lappin, No. 06-5219, 2006 U.S. App.
Lexis 31931 (D.C. Cir.). [N/R]
Prisoner who claimed that he was improperly
suspended from attending all chapel functions, preventing him from
participating in congregational prayers through the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan presented a valid claim for violation of his rights to religious
freedom under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-1(a). While the suspension was imposed by the chaplain
based on the prisoner's alleged involvement in posting unauthorized flyers, the
suspension allegedly improperly continued even after an investigation had been
completed and cleared the prisoner of any involvement. Parks-El v. Fleming, No.
06-7151, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 534 (4th Cir.). [N/R]
Trial court acted erroneously in ruling that
prison officials did not violate inmate's rights to religious freedom by
denying him access to certain allegedly religious books. The court found that
the titles of the books indicated that they were "self-help"
spiritual books. The appeals court ruled that the distinction between religion
and spiritual "self-help" was not viable, and that the prisoner
adequately alleged that his sincerely held religious beliefs were violated.
Heleva v. Kramer, No. 06-1538, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 1999 (3rd Cir.). [N/R]
The law was not clearly established, at the time
of the prisoner's claim, that enforcement of a prison grooming policy requiring
a prisoner to cut his hair would violate his right to religious freedom,
entitling a defendant retired prison official to qualified immunity against
liability. Von Staich v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, No. C-04-2799, 2006 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 73110 (N.D. Cal.). [N/R]
Muslim prisoner presented a viable factual issue
as to whether one prison guard and the warden intentionally violated his right
to practice his religion by preventing him from attending a Ramadan observance
program. Under the prison's rules, disqualification from participation in one
religious exercise automatically barred participation in communal worship
services. The prison officials failed to show that this policy was the least
restrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest, as required
by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc-1. Lovelace v. Lee, No. 04-7797, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir.
2006) [N/R]
Catholic prisoner was not entitled to preliminary
injunctive relief concerning his request for kosher meals because this was a
request for a religious practice not usually associated with the Catholic
faith. He failed to show that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his
claim that denial of kosher meals violated his rights to religious freedom.
Guzzi v. Thompson, No. 06-10874, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5132 (D. Mass.). [N/R]
Federal appeals court rules that the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. §
2000cc-1, was a constitutional use of the spending power of Congress, and
because the state of Virginia voluntarily accepted federal funds for its
correctional facilities, it could not avoid the requirements of that statute.
Because the statute does not clearly and unambiguously provide for money
damages against a state or state agency, the Eleventh Amendment barred any
money damages claim against the state under the statute. Madison v. Virginia,
No. 06-6266, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 32053 (4th Cir.). [N/R]
Inmate in Wisconsin county jail failed to show
that sheriff was involved in the alleged refusal to provide him, as an Orthodox
Jew, with kosher meals, or that the jail had a policy of refusing such
requests. His claim for money damages against the State of Wisconsin were also
barred, first because he failed to show that the State was involved in any way
in denying him the kosher meals, and secondly because claims against the state
for money damages were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also
rejects arguments that the prisoner had a right to be involved in supervising
how his meals were prepared, or that the jail had to spend additional funds to
purchase prepackaged kosher meals for him. Andreola v. Wisconsin, No. 06-1491, 2006
U.S. App. Lexis 31210 (7th Cir.). [N/R]
In prisoner's lawsuit alleging that his rights
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §
2000cc et seq., were violated by the denial of kosher meals, his claim for
money damages against the State of Virginia were barred by Eleventh Amendment,
but the state, since it accepted federal funds for its correctional facilities,
could be sued for non-monetary relief. The statute, the court held, was a valid
use of the spending power of Congress. Madison v. Commonwealth of VA, No.
06-6266, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 32053 (4th Cir.). [N/R]
Prison doctor did not violate prisoner's right to
religious freedom by obtaining a court authorization to begin intravenous
feeding of him to stop what he claimed was a religious fast, which had resulted
in serious dehydration. The prisoner had not claimed that he was religiously
opposed to intravenous feeding, so there could be no claim based on the method
of breaking his fast. Further, since the action was taken pursuant to a state
court order, the prisoner's federal civil rights claim against the prison
officials and employees was barred. O'Malley v. Litscher, No. 05-3415, 2006
U.S. App. Lexis 25661 (7th Cir.). [N/R]
Correctional officials offered no evidence
showing a legitimate penological interest to support a policy of preventing
prisoners from receiving free, softbound religious materials from the plaintiff
religious organization. The Department's voluntary change of its policy,
allowing the receipt of the softbound materials following an inspection did not
make the lawsuit moot. Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. Calif. Dept. of
Corrections, No. CIV-S-05-0440, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 73813 (E.D. Cal.). [N/R]
Muslim prisoner stated viable claims for
violation of his rights in prison officials' actions requiring Shi'ite and
Sunni Muslims to celebrate religious holiday services together, in denying him
access to religious worship and holiday meals while in keeplock, and in forcing
him to choose between attending religious services and using the law library on
religious holidays. Prison officials failed to offer particularized
justifications for these alleged deprivations, and were therefore not entitled
to summary judgment. Salahuddin v. Goord, No. 04-3470, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis
26819 (2d Cir.). [2006 JB Dec]
Federal appeals court rules that, in pro se
lawsuit filed by prisoner over denial of access to a controversial religious
text, the trial court should have considered whether the prisoner had a claim
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, a federal law
requiring the showing of a compelling governmental interest before infringing
on free exercise of religion, even though the plaintiff did not refer to that
statute in his complaint. Summary judgment for prison officials is upheld,
however, under the less stringent First Amendment legal standard. Smith v.
Johnson, No. 03-2014, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 27178 (3rd Cir.). [2006 JB Dec]
Muslim prisoner who claimed he suffered
retaliation from prison officials for complaining about alleged religious
discrimination failed to show that the alleged "retaliation" resulted
in any harm, barring his claim. Court further finds that the prisoner's
employment by the California Prison Industry Authority did not make him an
"employee" for purposes of a Title VII claim under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e. Wade v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, No.
05-15653, 171 Fed. Appx. 601 (9th Cir. 2006). [N/R]
Firing of Muslim inmate cook from prison kitchen
job after he refused to prepare a meal using pork, if true, violated his
clearly established First Amendment rights to religious freedom. Prior cases
from other federal appeals courts provided prison officials a fair warning that
their actions were unconstitutional. Williams v. Bitner, No. 05-1930, 2006 U.S.
App. Lexis 18583 (3d Cir.). [2006 JB Sep]
Muslim prisoner's case manager was not liable for
alleged violations of his religious freedom rights based on the alleged serving
of pork to him, and the refusal to provide him with his meals after sundown
during Ramadan, when there was no showing that the case manager was personally
involved in those actions. Additionally, prisoner failed to show that he could
distinguish between pork and pork substitute, as he claimed, or that prison
official's alleged mocking of his religion was anything more than a "de
minimis" (minimal) violation of his rights, insufficient to support
liability. Omar v. Casterline, No. Civ. A. No. 02-1933, 414 F. Supp. 2d 582
(W.D. La. 2006). [N/R]
Muslim prisoner sufficiently stated federal civil
rights claims against one prison cook and one food service manager for
allegedly violating his right to free exercise of his religion by intentionally
misleading him into consuming food (turkey ham) containing pork. Lewis v.
Mitchell, No. 04CV2468, 416 F. Supp. 2d 935 (S.D. Cal. 2005). [N/R]
North Dakota state prison rules prohibiting
inmates from possessing property, such as religious magazines, received from
other prisoners, and classifying such "passed-on" property as
contraband, upheld as reasonable. Larson v. Schuetzle, No. 20050418, 712 N.W.2d
617 (N.D. 2006). [2006 JB Aug]
Jewish prisoner's claim that the complete denial
of his request for wine to drink while saying Sabbath prayers violated his
right to religious freedom survived a motion for summary judgment by Bureau of
Prisons' officials, because there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
ban was the "least restrictive means" of furthering a compelling
governmental interest in preventing intoxication of prisoners, as required by
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb-1(b) and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc.
Sample v. Lappin, No. CIV. A.05-0596, 424 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006). [N/R]
Denial of a prisoner's request for a television
set on which to watch church services did not violate his First Amendment
rights to exercise his religion. Pepper v. Carroll, No. CIV.A. 05-84, 423 F.
Supp. 2d 442 (D. Del. 2006). [N/R]
New York city corrections department did not
violate the rights of a Catholic inmate by prohibiting him from attending
Protestant Bible study classes unless he changed his religious affiliation to
Protestant, even though the jail failed to offer Catholic Bible study classes.
There was no violation of equal protection, as a Catholic chaplain was
available to meet with inmates individually for Bible study. Policy allowing
inmates to participate in only one religion, which they could choose, was the
least restrictive available means of achieving a compelling interest in
limiting the movement of prisoners for the purpose of maintaining order.
Spavone v. City of New York, No. 04 Civ. 8136, 420 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). [N/R]
In a disciplinary proceeding concerning a
prisoner's possession of purportedly religious documents found to be
subversive, the notice provided to the prisoner was adequate to give him
adequate due process notice despite failing to identify the specific documents
which had been confiscated. The number of documents seized were not so many
that the inmate would not have known that the hearing officer would examine all
of them in determining guilt or innocence of the charges. Appeals court holds,
however, that genuine issues concerning whether the failure to disclose the
documents and confidential source information to the prisoner was justified
barred summary judgment against him on his due process claim, requiring further
proceedings. Samuels v. Selsky, No. 04-0097, 166 Fed. Appx. 552 (2nd Cir.
2006). [N/R]
In a prisoner's lawsuit claiming that prison
officials violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to allow him to
organize an atheist study group, federal trial court finds that defendant
officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages since
it was not clearly established at the time of the denial, 2002, that atheism
was a "religion," and the prisoner did not tell the defendants that
he was a member of any non-theistic belief system, such as secular humanism,
which had previously been held to be protected by the First Amendment's free
exercise of religion clause. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, No. 03-C-027, 422 F. Supp.
2d 1016 (W.D. Wis. 2006). [N/R]
State prison's grooming policy did not violate a
Rastafarian prisoner's rights to religious freedom under either the First
Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc by punishing him for his religious practice of wearing his
hair and beard uncut. The policy furthered compelling governmental interests in
inmate identification, inmate health, staff safety, and institutional security,
and the proposal that a religious exception to the policy be granted was not
workable. Ragland v. Angelone, No. 7:02 CV 00786, 420 F. Supp. 2d 507 (W.D. Va.
2006). [N/R]
Prison's confiscation of Jewish prisoner's prayer
shawl did not violate his First Amendment rights to practice his religion when
he was left in possession of three other prayer shawls, and failed to show that
he needed multiple prayer shawls to practice his religion. Buckley v. Presley,
No. 04-16576, 163 Fed. Appx. 550 (9th Cir. 2006). [N/R]
Prison officials did not violate the religious
freedom rights of a Native American prisoner by prohibiting him from having
multi-colored headbands, confiscated a purported quartz crystal, denying his
access to a "sacred pipe," enforcing regulations limiting hair
length, denying him access to communal services while in administrative
segregation, or failing to recognize "Native American" as a racial
category. Further, even if a policy of designating holy days for Native
American prisoners was "oriented toward" Plains Indian culture rather
than toward Algonquin Indians, because officials could not reasonably be
expected to know the holy days for all varieties of Native American religion.
Additionally, while the prisoner was in administrative segregation, he was not
working, and therefore did not need relief from work assignments on his holy
days. Thunderhorse v. Pierce, No. Civ.A. 9:04CV222, 418 F. Supp. 2d 875 (E.D.
Tex. 2006). [N/R]
Muslim prisoner's right to religious freedom
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42.
U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-1, were not violated by prison regulations and policies
allowing him the use of only a prayer towel rather than a prayer rug, and
limiting the quantities of prayer oil he could possess. Court also upholds a
policy permitting the purchase of religious items only from prescreened
vendors. Prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on prisoner's
claim that providing him with pork-free or vegetarian meals, rather than a
"halal" meat diet was inadequate to satisfy his religious
requirements, because a reasonable official could have believed that the
prisoner did not have an established right to halal meat. Ahmad v. Department
of Correction, 845 N.E.2d 289 (Mass. 2006). [N/R]
Parolee's claim that his First Amendment rights
were violated when he was required, during a mandated sex offenders' program,
to recite a prayer with the word "God" in it should have been
analyzed under the Establishment Clause, prohibiting coercion to participate in
religious activity, rather than on the basis of whether his belief that he
should only say "God" while praying at home at night was a
"serious" religious belief. Munson v. Norris, No. 04-3938, 435 F.3d
877 (8th Cir. 2006), rehearing denied, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 5248. [2006
JB Jun]
Juvenile facility in Hawaii ordered to take steps
to remedy "pervasive" sexual, physical, and verbal abuse of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, or transgender juvenile wards, and to stop, except in
emergencies, using isolation as a means of "protecting" such wards
against abuse and harassment. Court rejects, however, the claim that staff
members violated the First Amendment rights of the juveniles by quoting from
the Bible or discussing religion with them, when there was no evidence that
these actions were based on the facility's policies. R.G. v. Koller, No.
Civ.05-00566, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Hawaii 2006). Subsequent decision at
2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21254. [2006 JB Jun]
While inmate's belief that "the Creator
Yahweh" mandated that he should not cut his hair was a sincerely held
religious belief, a prison policy which limited "Afro style" hair
length to four inches was reasonably related to legitimate prison interests in
preventing the concealment and transportation of contraband, aiding in the identification
of inmates, and improving inmate hygiene. These legitimate interests outweighed
any rights the prisoner had to wear his hair in long dreadlocks. Meggett v.
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 892 A.2d 872 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). [N/R]
If a prison chaplain intentionally left a
prisoner's name off of a list of those allowed to attend Native American
religious ceremonies, he would have violated the prisoner's rights under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
2000cc. Additionally, punitive damages could be awarded if, as the prisoner
asserted, the chaplain threatened to prevent him from attending such services
if he continued to threaten to institute litigation. An award of compensatory
damages, however, was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act's, 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1997e(e), prohibition on the award of compensatory damages for mental or
emotional injuries in the absence of a showing of physical injuries. Meyer v.
Teslik, No. 05-C-269, 411 F. Supp. 2d 983 (W.D. Wis. 2006). [N/R]
Rights of Shiite Muslim inmates were not violated
by the availability of only an allegedly Sunni Muslim service at a state
prison. The services were considered "unified" Muslim services by
prison authorities, and prisoners were also allowed to engage in individual
prayers. Additionally, there was also doubt that interested Shiite Muslim
prisoners could gather the necessary seven persons required for a valid Shiite
service. Orafan v. Goord, No. 00-CV-2022, 411 F. Supp. 2d 153 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
[N/R]
Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not
subject the federal government to lawsuits for damages. Claims for injunctive
relief by Jewish prisoners claiming religious discrimination were also moot
because of their release from confinement. Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
No. 05-5031, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 7540 (D.C. Cir.). [2006 JB May]
Prison's refusal to allow a Muslim inmate to
perform a "Khutba sermon" during a weekly "Jumu'a" prayer
meeting was not a violation of his right to exercise his religion under either
the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc. Prison officials allowed the use of a
video-recorded Khutba sermon by a qualified individual each Friday when there
was no qualified person to perform the sermon live. Prison officials had a
compelling governmental interest in avoiding the "elevation" of one
inmate to a position of religious leadership over others, and allowing a tape
recorded presentation of the sermon was the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. Shabazz v. Arkansas Department of Correction, No.
04-3852, 157 Fed. Appx. 944 (8th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
While a prisoner stated a claim under the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, for money damages and injunctive relief based
on refusal to allow him to use his Islamic religious name to send or receive
mail, trial court declined to issue a preliminary injunction requiring that he
be allowed to use that religious name on his mail because the merits of his
claims were "tenuous," and he could obtain damages if he prevailed.
Further, any harm he suffered was not "irreparable," since he could still
receive mail under his incarceration name, and could use his religious name
inside the mail. Shidler v. Moore, No. 3:05-CV-804, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D.
Ind. 2006). [N/R]
Texas state prison policy prohibiting a Muslim
prisoner from having a beard did not violate his right to religious freedom
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, because of the need for accurate pictures of inmates for
security purposes. Additionally, he was not denied equal protection by the fact
that inmates with certain skin conditions were allowed to have quarter-inch
beards, since the policy prohibiting beards for other reasons was equally
applied to all religious groups and was adopted for security purposes. Gooden
v. Crain, No. 6:04cv127, 405 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Tex. 2005). [N/R]
Wisconsin prison properly barred inmate from
possessing books he claimed were essential for the practice of his
"Odinist" religion, when they were found to advocate white
supremacist violence. Borzych v. Frank, No. 05-3907, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 5278
(7th Cir.). [2006 JB Apr]
Warden was not entitled to summary judgment on
prisoner's claim that he violated his right to religious freedom by prohibiting
him from wearing religious garments as an Orthodox Jew while being transported
outside the facility for eye surgery. Factual issues existed as to whether the
warden's action was reasonable in light of security requirements. There were
also factual issues as to whether the prisoner suffered damages because of the
resulting delay in the eye surgery. Boles v. Neet, No. CIV03CV00557, 402 F.
Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Colo. 2005). [N/R]
Prison officials were entitled to qualified
immunity on prisoner's claims concerning their alleged wrongful denial of his
request for accommodation of his religious need to possess a crystal as part of
his practice of Odinism, since his right to possess such a crystal was not
clearly established at the date of the incidents at question. Smith v. Haley,
No. 2:01cv1430, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (M.D. Ala. 2005). [N/R]
Federal appeals court overturns ruling that
defendant prison officials waived their defense of qualified immunity to
plaintiff prisoner's claim under federal statute concerning religious freedom
by failing to raise it in their answer to his complaint. The defense was
sufficiently raised in their motion for summary judgment, despite the failure
to specifically mention the statute in relationship to qualified immunity.
Ahmad v. Furlong, No. 04-1450 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 1098 (10th Cir.). [2006
JB Mar]
Prisoner who was held in administrative
segregation for three years at three different Colorado prisons asserted
several non-frivolous claims, including for unlawful retaliation against him
for complaining about his segregation, complete denial of outdoor exercise, and
denial of access to "church fellowship," and the prison law library.
Fogle v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., No. 05-1405, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 2024 (10th
Cir.).[2006 JB Mar]
Muslim inmate could proceed with his claim that
he suffered severe emotional and psychological injuries from the alleged denial
of "Halal" meals required by his religion. His claims were not barred
by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1997e(e) requiring that he show a physical injury before being able to recover
damages for mental and emotional injuries because his alleged loss of 30 pounds
of weight while eating vegetarian meals which he asserted lacked adequate
nutrition was sufficient to show a physical injury. Further, his lawsuit was
not rendered moot because of his transfer to another facility when it was run
by the same private company as operates the first facility. Pratt v.
Corrections Corporation of America, No. 04-2413, 124 Fed. Appx. 465 (8th Cir.
2005). [N/R]
Refusal to allow prisoner who was a member of the
Nation of Islam to receive books concerning his religion gave him a valid claim
for denial of his right to exercise his religion. Prison rules allowed inmates
at the prisoner's "incentive-level" to keep only religious
"texts," such as a Bible or Koran, and not books "about
religion." Prison officials were, however, entitled to qualified immunity
from damages on his claims, as the law on the subject was not clearly
established. No claim was stated for violation of equal protection, however,
because of the absence of evidence that prisoners of other faiths were treated
differently. Roddy v. Banks, No. 03-3735, 124 Fed. Appx. 469 (8th Cir. 2005).
[N/R]
Muslim prisoner's rights were not violated by
county jail's refusal to create an "all-Muslim" living unit, or by
its cancellation of Muslim group worship services during lockdowns, periods of
staff shortages, or when volunteer Muslim religious leaders were not available.
Court also upholds limiting the number of inmates who could simultaneously
attend group services, limiting group services to three times weekly, and the
strip-searching of inmates returning from such services to a maximum-security
area. McRoy v. Cook County Department of Corrections, No. 03C6756, 366 F. Supp.
2d 662 (N.D. Ill. 2005). [2005 JB Dec]
Prisoner was properly excluded from attendance at
religious ceremony which was attended by Catholic Cardinal and the Governor of
New York, and placed in administrative segregation during the event. Prisoner
had expressed hostility towards the Cardinal, and announced his intention of
attending the ceremony despite his exclusion and "confronting" the
Cardinal for failing to assist him in challenging his conviction. Prison officials'
actions did not violate his First Amendment rights. Gonzalez v. Narcato, No.
01CV6102, 363 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). [2005 JB Dec]
Federal statute applying strict test prohibiting
substantial burdens on prisoner religious freedom except through the
"least restrictive means" used to achieve a "compelling
governmental interest" upheld as a valid exercise of Congressional power
to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds. Appeals court also finds
that the statute is not an unconstitutional assault on the sovereignty of
individual states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Cutter v. Wilkinson,
02-3270, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19695 (6th Cir.). [2005 JB Nov]
While a prisoner had a legitimate interest in
recognition of the new, legally adopted name he obtained for religious reasons,
he was not entitled to have pre-existing documents which pre-dated the name
change altered. United States v. Baker, No. 05-10525, 415 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir.
2005). [2005 JB Nov]
A Pennsylvania inmate could properly pursue his
claim that his First Amendment rights were violated by a state parole procedure
requiring him to attend a drug program based on religion and a belief in a
higher power through a federal civil rights lawsuit. Should he succeed in proving
his claim, this would not have shown the invalidity of either his confinement
or its duration, but merely demonstrate that the parole board used unlawful
factors in making a parole determination, and would have required merely a
reconsideration of his parole rather than his immediate release. Accordingly,
his claims were not barred under the principles set forth in Wilkinson v.
Dotson, No. 03-287, 125 S. Ct. 1242 (2005), stating that a federal civil rights
action concerning the unconstitutionality of state parole procedures may not be
pursued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 if "success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration."
Nelson v. Horn, No. 03-2284, 138 Fed. Appx. 411 (3rd Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Inmate stated a possibly viable claim for
violation of his rights to religious freedom by alleging that he was denied the
right to have a "Celtic Cross necklace," when he asserted that
wearing such a necklace was part of the way in which he practiced and expressed
his religious beliefs, as well as by alleging that he was improperly denied the
right to receive visits from a religious leader of his own faith, and
automatically prohibited from attending worship services while in
administrative segregation, without an individualized determination of whether
he should be eligible to attend group worship. Under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, prison officials cannot
impose a substantial burden on a prisoner's religious exercise unless they can
demonstrate that the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest, and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The
prisoner challenged whether these denials were either in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest or the least restrictive means of achieving the desired
goals. Rowe v. Davis, No. 305CV114, 373 F. Supp. 2d 822 (N.D. Ind. 2005). [N/R]
Federal appeals court reinstates prisoner's
lawsuit claiming that prison officials violated his right to religious freedom
by refusing to allow him to organize an inmate study group to discuss atheism.
Atheism qualified as the prisoner's "religion" for purposes of a
First Amendment claim. Defendant officials failed to show that they had a secular
purpose for their decision, since they allow group meetings of other faiths.
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, No. 04-1914, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17608 (7th Cir.).
[2005 JB Oct]
Overturning injunction allowing Native American
prisoner to wear a "kouplock" (a square section at the base of the
skull where the hair is allowed to grow long), federal appeals court finds that
the trial judge failed to give proper deference to prison officials on the
issue of whether long hair on a prisoner presented security problems. Hoevenaar
v. Lazaroff, No. 03-4119, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 19361 (6th Cir.). [2005 JB Oct]
Prison officials did not act with improper
retaliation by continuing a restriction on visitation of a maximum security
prisoner after he was acquitted of disciplinary charges of disobeying a direct
order to stop holding hands with his wife while praying during a contact visit.
The restriction was legitimate on the basis that the prisoner disobeyed a
direct order, and the prisoner failed to show that the defendants would not
have continued the restrictions on his visitations in the absence of his filing
of grievances and acquittal of the disciplinary charges. Larson v. Cooper, No.
S-10708, 113 P.3d 1196 (Alaska 2005). [N/R]
Facility's policy barring a prisoner from taking
off his shoes when entering the chapel was supported by reasonable safety and
security objectives, and the prisoner could remove his shoes to pray in his own
cell, so that he had an alternative means of satisfying his belief that he should
take off his shoes before prayer. Williams v. Secretary for the Department of
Corrections, No. 04-14328, 131 Fed. Appx. 682 (11th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Prison regulation limiting inmates to a total of
15 books in their cells did not violate the religious freedom rights of a
Shiite Muslim, and applied equally to prisoners of all religions. Neal v.
Lewis, No. 04-3324, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 14105 (10th Cir.). [2005 JB Sep]
Native American inmate was improperly denied an
injunction against California hair grooming policy which failed to provide a
relig ious exemption to short hair requirement. Correctional officials failed
to adequately show that this was the least restrictive means of achieving
compelling interests in prison security. Warsoldier v. Woodford, No. 04-55879,
2005 U.S. App. Lexis 15599 (9th Cir.). [2005 JB Sep]
Prison's failure to appoint or hire an individual
that met an Indian chief's requirements for conducting "sacred sweat lodge
ceremonies" was not a violation of Native American inmates' civil rights.
There is no constitutional requirement that a religious advisor be provided for
every sect in a facility, or that a prisoner has a right to insist on a
religious advisor whose beliefs are completely identical with his own. Trial judge
also finds that the First Amendment prohibited the state prison from adopting
requested policies preventing non-Native Americans from attending sweat lodge
ceremonies, as non-Native Americans had a right to practice that religion
despite their ethnic background. Brown v. Schuetzle, No. A1-03-127, 368 F.
Supp. 2d 1009 (D.N.D. 2005). [N/R]
Prisoner's allegation that facility improperly
excluded the Philadelphia Church of God from an authorized religious vendor
list from which he could obtain religious publication stated a claim for
violation of the First Amendment when there was nothing to show that the
organization was not a legitimate church or religious organization. Figel v.
Overton, No. 04-1038, 121 Fed. Appx. 642 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Muslim prisoner adequately alleged that prison
officials knew of a threat to him from other Muslim inmates, but failed to take
action to protect him. Hearns v. Terhune, No. 02-56302, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis
13034 (9th Cir.). [2005 JB Aug]
Plaintiff prisoner's "conclusory, vague
allegation" that he was sometimes not provided "non-meat food
trays," and that this interfered with his right to freely practice his
religion was insufficient to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment
rights. Hines v. Graham, No. 1:03-CV-152-C, 320 F. Supp. 2d 511 (N.D. Tex.
2004). [N/R]
Despite prisoner's claim that his religion--the
Moorish Science Temple of America--required him to "honor and study"
the prophets of "all religions," prison officials did not violate his
rights by refusing to allow him to attend group worship and study sessions of
Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, and Christianity, in addition to the meetings of
his own religion. The court finds that there were "obvious"
legitimate security concerns and scheduling problems with allowing an inmate to
attend the services of "all" religions. Burks-Bey v. Stevenson, No.
3:04-CV-0096, 328 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Ind. 2004). [N/R]
Prison officials did not violate inmate's right
to religious freedom in prohibiting him from possessing "Wotanist"
books that contained the swastika and other symbols of the white supremacist
movement and which promoted "Aryan supremacy." There was a compelling
interest in banning the possession of such materials. Additionally, the court
finds that the "idiosyncratic and inconsistent" nature of the
inmate's various requests showed that his requests were not based on sincere
religious beliefs. Lindell v. Casperson, No. 02-C-473, 360 F. Supp. 2d 932
(W.D. Wis. 2005). [N/R]
Unanimous Supreme Court, in a case filed by
inmates belonging to Satanist, Wicca (witchcraft), and white supremacist
religions, rejects the argument that a federal statute barring restrictions on
religious practice without a "compelling" governmental interest is an
unconstitutional "establishment of religion." Court notes that prison
safety and security are such "compelling" interests, and expects that
courts applying the statute will give "due deference" to the
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators. Cutter v.
Wilkinson, No. 03-9877, 2005 U.S. Lexis 4346. [2005 JB Jul]
Jury instructions by trial court properly
excluded prisoner's requested instructions that "malicious" use of
force, regardless of amount of force, is always "per se" a violation
of the Eighth Amendment. Trial judge also properly dismissed prisoner's racial
and religious discrimination claims. Baskerville v. Mulvaney, No. 03-0348, 2005
U.S. App. Lexis 10190 (2nd Cir.). [2005 JB Jul]
Shiite Muslim prisoner of Iraqi descent failed to
show that he was fired from his prison job with private manufacturer on the
basis of his sex, race, religion or national origin, when, in fact, at the time
of his discharge, he was not able to work at all because he had been placed in
segregation. Alleged discriminatory remarks by supervisor were not sufficiently
pervasive to create a hostile work environment. Al-Zubaidy v. Tek Indus., No.
03-3457, 406 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2005). [2005 JB Jul]
A county's policy of segregating inmates with contagious
diseases did not violate a pre-trial detainee's right to freely exercise his
religion by preventing him, because of his HIV status, from attending religious
services. The policy served a legitimate purpose and a minister would have
visited his cell upon his request. Carter v. Lowndes County, 89 Fed. Appx. 439
(5th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Jewish prisoner failed to allege any specific
facts to demonstrate that the alleged denial of adequate medical care to him
for his asthma, migraine headaches and sleep apnea was based on anti-Semitic
motives. Additionally, his equal protection claim was at odds with his use of
the alleged mistreatment of other prisoners to show deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. Federal trial court grants dismissal of all claims in
the lawsuit. Davis v. County of Nassau, No. 03-CV-4148, 355 F. Supp. 2d 668
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
Correctional officials acted properly in imposing
discipline on prisoner who refused to obey order to take TB test on religious
grounds. Detecting latent TB to prevent its spread was a legitimate penological
interest and the discipline imposed was reasonably related to serving that
interest. Cannon v. Mote, No. 4-04-0222, 2005 Ill. App. Lexis 212 (Ill. App.
4th Dist. 2005). [2005 JB May]
Muslim prisoner's federal civil rights lawsuit
against state correctional authorities in their official capacity, claiming
that they violated his right to religious freedom and equal protection of law
by failing to provide him with ritually slaughtered meat while providing kosher
meals to Jewish inmates was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. His lawsuit
against the defendants in their official capacity was, in essence, a lawsuit
against the State itself, and the State of Kansas had not waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The prisoner failed to sue the defendants, the Secretary of
the state Department of Corrections, and the warden, in their individual
capacities. Johnson v. Simmons, No. CIV.A.02-3020, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D.
Kan. 2004). [N/R]
A disciplinary rule which prohibits prisoners
from leading or participating in work-stoppages, sit-ins, or other actions
deemed detrimental to institutional order was not improperly vague when used to
punish prisoner who orchestrated a protest over some inmates being prevented
from going to a religious service. Garrett v. Goord, 788 N.Y.S.2d 461 (A.D. 3rd
Dept. 2005).[N/R]
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc-1, does not create a cause of action against
the federal government or its agencies, so the plaintiff prisoner had no claim
against federal prison authorities for allegedly depriving him of kosher meals
in alleged violation of his right to practice his religion. Additionally, there
is no such entity as the "U.S. Department of Corrections," but even
if the prisoner meant to sue the federal Bureau of Prisons, he had no viable
claim under the statute he cited. Yerushalayim v. U.S. Dep't of Corrections,
No. 03-0076, 374 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Correctional facility did not violate a Catholic
prisoner's freedom of religion by failing to provide him with "religious
meals" of fish and unleavened bread on Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, and all
Fridays during Lent. Evidence showed that Catholic Church only required that he
refrain from eating meat on those days, and did not necessitate the eating of
fish and unleavened bread. The facility offered the prisoner meatless meal
options for those days, which adequately met the requirements of his religion.
Cape v. Crossroads Correctional Center, No. 03-172, 99 P.3d 171 (Mont.
2004).[N/R]
Jewish prisoner's apparently sincerely held
belief that it violated his religion to work in a non-kosher prison kitchen was
not entitled to lesser consideration simply because it might not be a
"central" tenet of his religion, but legitimate penological interests
including budgetary concerns and the need for non-discriminatory prison
staffing were sufficient, on limited review, to justify requiring him to accept
the work assignment. Searles v. Dechant, No. 03-3347, 393 F. 3d 1126 (10th Cir.
2004). [2005 JB Apr]
Denial of a Native American prisoner's request to
use homemade foods to celebrate the "Harvest Moon Festival" did not
violate any clearly established right. State prison chaplain was therefore
entitled to qualified immunity on prisoner's First Amendment claim concerning
the denial. Further, the plaintiff prisoner was allowed to use food provided by
the correctional facility in connection his observation of his religious
festival, and the restrictions on "homemade foods" was applied
equally to prisoners of all religions. Pierce v. Smith, No. 02-M-1349, 347 F.
Supp. 2d 1143 (M.D. Ala. 2004). [N/R]
Requirement that a prisoner participate in
Narcotics Anonymous, a 12-step program requiring acknowledgment of a belief in
a "higher power," or else not be eligible for parole, was an
unconstitutional establishment of religion, in violation of the First
Amendment. Turner v. Hickman, No. CIVS-99-1869, 342 F. Supp. 2d 887 (E.D. Cal.
2004). [2005 JB Mar]
Prison officials did not violate the religious
freedom rights of a member of small religious group by prohibiting group
worship services on holy days except in the presence of an outside certified
religious volunteer. Infrequent occurrence of such services was based on the
unavailability of such a volunteer, and not on a rule prohibiting such
services. Adkins v. Kaspar, No. 03-40028, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004). [2005
JB Mar]
Federal appeals court reinstates Buddhist prisoner's
claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
that it violated his rights to deny him a special religious diet without meat,
dairy products, or "pungent vegetables." Exhaustion of remedies under
Religious Freedom Restoration Act was sufficient to support claim under RLUIPA,
since the legal standards under both statutes were identical. Dehart v. Horn,
#03-4250, 390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Feb]
A prison regulation banning both group prayer and
"individual demonstrative prayer" in open areas of the facility had a
rational relationship to legitimate prison security concerns, and therefore did
not violate a prisoner's right to practice his religion under the First
Amendment. Further, the regulation was equally applied to all religions, and
allowed alternative means of prayer, including praying in cells, and weekly
group prayer services in designed areas. Court rules, however, that the
defendant prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the prisoner's
claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, which requires a "compelling" governmental
interest and the use of the least restrictive alternative in order to impose a
substantial burden on prisoner religious practices, because the defendants
failed to assert a qualified immunity defense in their answer to the complaint.
Ahmad v. Ehrmann, No. CIV.A.01-F-1164, 339 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D. Colo. 2004).
[N/R]
Federal appeals court finds that statute
requiring state correctional facilities that receive federal funds to refrain
from burdening prisoners' religious exercise was a valid exercise of
Congressional authority under the Spending Clause, and not a violation of
either the Tenth Amendment or the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First
Amendment. Benning v. State of Georgia, No. 04-10979, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis
24842 (11th Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Jan]
Prisoner who is an adherent of the Hebrew
Israelite/Nazarite religious group and wears "dreadlocks" as a
result, stated a claim for violation of his right to practice his religion in
challenging prison policy which limits "Afro style" hair to four
inches in length. Trial court finds that there was a viable claim that the
prisoner was entitled to a religious exemption from this grooming policy based
on his sincerely held religious beliefs. Meggett v. Pa. Dept. of Corrections,
856 A.2d 277 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). [N/R]
Prison officials did not violate inmate's
constitutional rights by force-feeding him after he refused to eat for nine
days. Appeals court upholds jury's determination that prisoner's fast was not
for religious reasons. Introduction of evidence of prisoner's robbery
convictions to impeach his testimony was, at most, harmless error. Walker v.
Horn, No. 03-1896, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 20379 (3rd Cir. 2004). [2004
JB Nov]
There was a genuine issue of fact as to whether
it would be cost prohibitive to prepare meat portion of meals for Muslim
prisoners according to the "Halal" dietary restrictions as compared
to the cost of preparing Kosher meals for Jewish prisoners, barring summary
judgment in Muslim prisoners' lawsuit. Because of existing case law, however,
suggesting that prison officials sufficiently complied with Muslim prisoners'
religious rights by merely providing a vegetarian or pork-free diet, defendant
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for money
damages. Hudson v. Maloney, 326 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Mass. 2004). [N/R]
A policy of disciplining Muslim prisoners who
missed their work assignments so that they could attend an hour long Friday
Sabbath worship service violated their rights under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000cc, because this was
not the least restrictive means of satisfying a compelling governmental
interest in keeping prisoners occupied or of using their labor to support the
upkeep of the prison. Court also rejects prison grooming policy that imposed
penalties on Muslim prisoners who refused to shave their beards for religious
reasons, as prison officials also failed to show that this was the least
restrictive means of addressing concerns about prisoners' ability to quickly
change their appearance after escape. Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d
1086 (E.D. Cal. 2004). [N/R]
Prisoner whose requests to be allowed to
participate in Wiccan religious rituals were denied failed to show that the
Florida Department of Corrections security concerns about such rituals were not
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The rituals involved
would require the plaintiff and other inmates of the Wiccan faith to be taken
outside when the moon is visible on the dates of the full moon for private
"Esbat" celebratory rituals involving "Drawing Down of the
Moon." The court upheld the correctional officials' concern that allowing
Wiccans to conduct such private ceremonies outside of the prison housing
facilities "presents security risks that are unacceptable." The court
noted that the officials had accommodated the plaintiff's practice of her
religion in other ways, including allowing her to purchase religious study
materials, to purchase and wear religious medallions, to use tarot cards, and
to participate in daily meditation. Austin v. Crosby, No. 5D03-1834, 866 So. 2d
740 (Fla. App. 5th Dist. 2004). [N/R]
Intention of Iowa correctional officials to
charge a co-payment for kosher meals provided to Orthodox Jewish inmates had no
reasonable relationship to any legitimate penological interest in maintaining a
fixed budget for food or teaching "financial responsibility" to
prisoners. Plaintiff prisoner was entitled to summary judgment on the
co-payment issue. Thompson v. Vilsack, 328 F. Supp. 2d 974 (S.D. Iowa, 2004).
[N/R]
California prison regulation which prohibiting
inmates from wearing long hair was reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests such as security, hygiene, prison workplace safety, and prevention of
escapes. Accordingly, the regulation did not violate either the First Amendment
of a Native American prisoner or a federal statute concerning Native American
religious freedom. Henderson v. Terhune, #02-17224, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 16613
(9th Cir. 2004). [2004 JB Oct]
Further proceedings were required to determine
whether prison officials' refusal to allow a Jewish prisoner to have a Sukkah
booth in the prison yard, an enclosure within which to celebrate the religious
holiday of Sukkot and within which to eat meals during the holiday, was based on
genuine security concerns or were a pretext for interfering with his right to
exercise his religion. Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from
prisoner's claims. Wares v. Vanbebber, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Kan. 2004).
[N/R]
Prison policy prohibiting inmates from wearing a
visible string of Muslim prayer beads outside of his cell, when the necklace
was larger than 1/8th of an inch in diameter did not violate his right to
religious freedom. The rule was the least restrictive means that prison
officials had of pursuing a legitimate penological interest in suppressing gang
activity, and allowed the Muslim prisoner to wear prayer beads outside his cell
if they were small enough so that they would be "unobtrusive" under
his shirt. Charles v. Frank, No. 04-1674, 101 Fed. Appx. 634 (7th Cir. 2004).
[N/R]
Prison did not violate prisoners' First Amendment
right to exercise their religion by disallowing a request for group worship by
a religious group which advocates racial separatism. Rejection of request was
reasonably related to legitimate security concerns. Further proceedings are
ordered, however, on whether the denial of group worship was the "least
restrictive means" available to prevent racial violence, as required by
federal statute. Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corr., No. 02-3874, 2004 U.S. App.
Lexis 12239 (8th Cir). [2004 JB Aug]
Prison did not violate "Charismatic
Christian" inmate's right to religious freedom by failing to use his new
"religiously inspired" name and by failing to honor his religious
vegetarian dietary requests. Use of his commitment name in prison computers
used when preparing money orders and official documents was justified by
legitimate penological interest in holding down costs, since computers were
programmed with commitment names. Prisoner was offered a vegetable option in
lieu of the meat main course on meals, and a legitimate concern about
controlling costs justified denying his requests for raw vegetables, fresh
fruit, nuts, honey, whole wheat bread, cheese and grains. Ephraim v. Angelone,
313 F. Supp. 2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2003). [N/R]
Maximum security prison did not violate
prisoner's rights under either U.S. Constitution or Alaska State Constitution
by ordering him not to hold his wife's hand during prayers when granted a
contact visit. His right to religious freedom did not require prison to allow
hand-holding, kissing, or embracing during such a visit, and the rule was
reasonably related to legitimate interests in keeping the prison free of
contraband. Temporary suspension of contact visits after prisoner allegedly
violated the rule did not violate his right to due process. Larson v. Cooper,
#S-10327, 90 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2004). [N/R]
Texas prisoners, members of the Church of Christ,
did not show that Texas correctional officials violated their rights to
religious freedom by providing a chaplain who they had doctrinal differences
with. Prisoner who allegedly caused a disturbance and walkout by 50 prisoners
at services by reading a statement denouncing the chaplain did not show that he
was unlawfully transferred in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
rights. Freeman v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, #03-10443, 2004 U.S.
App. 8998 (5th Cir). [2004 JB Jun]
Native American inmate was entitled to injunctive
relief against grooming regulation requiring him to cut his hair short, to the
extent of allowing him to grow a "kouplock," a two-inch square of
hair at the base of the skull. Allowing a prisoner with sincere religious beliefs
to grow such a limited area of hair "is not likely to result in the
delayed capture of an inmate in the event of an escape," as it
"cannot be manipulated to alter the appearance of an inmate's face or his
profile." Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 276 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
[N/R]
Prison did not violate the religious freedom
rights of inmate members of the "Church of the New Song" who were in
lock-up during the religion's "celebration of life" feast by denying
them trays of food from the banquet. Appeals court upholds ruling that there
was insufficient evidence to show that the Church required its members to hold
this feast, and the ban on receipt of the trays was reasonably related to
legitimate institutional security goals. Goff v. Graves, No. 02-1279, 2004 U.S.
App. Lexis 5832 (8th Cir. 2004). [2004 JB May]
Punishment of Muslim prisoner for failing to
respond to officer's order until he completed his prayers might violate his
rights if, as he claimed, the officer intentionally gave the order then in order
to interfere with his exercise of his religion. Prisoner was subsequently fed
food "loaf" rather than "properly blessed" (Halal) food for
a week, allegedly interfering with his celebration of the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan. McEachin v. McGuinnis, No. 02-0117, 357 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 2004).
[2004 JB Apr]
Prison policy prohibiting inmates from purchasing
Muslim prayer oils and keeping them in their cells was rationally related to a
legitimate interest in deterring drug use, since the oils could mask the scent
of drugs, but federal appeals court orders further proceedings under federal
statute requiring a showing of a compelling state interest and use of the
"least restrictive means" to justify a "substantial burden"
on prisoner religious practices. Hammons v. Saffle, No. 02-5009, 348 F.3d 1250
(10th Cir. 2003). [2004 JB Mar]
Muslim prisoner adequately stated a claim against
a correctional officer for violating his right to exercise his religion by
confiscating his prayer musk oil from his cell when he had the prison
chaplain's approval to possess the oil and he was told, in response to his
grievance against the officer, that prisoners were allowed to have such oil in
their cells. Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F. Supp. 2d 807 (N.D. Ind. 2003). [N/R]
Prison officials were improperly granted summary
judgment in Muslim prisoner's lawsuit claiming that his religious freedom
rights were denied by refusal to feed him an "Eid ul Fitr" feast in
his cell. Trial court improperly inquired into the religious significance of
the feast after finding that the prisoner sincerely believed it to be
religiously significant even though served to other prisoners on a day delayed
from its actual religious observance. Ford v. McGinnis, No. 02-0205, 352 F.3d
582, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 25224 (2nd Cir. 2003). [2004 JB Feb]
Correctional employee's "non-theistic"
spiritual belief that he should not cut his hair was not a protected religious
belief sufficient to challenge the state correctional department's grooming
policy, since it was merely based on his own "personal and
philosophical" choices. His desire to "live simply and avoid
excessive pride" did not qualify for a possible religious exemption from
the grooming policy. Luken v. Brigano, #CA2003-01-007, 797 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio.
App. 12 Dist. 2003). [N/R]
Requiring an Orthodox Jewish prisoner to fill out
a standard prison form in order to apply to receive kosher meals was not a
"substantial burden" to his right to free exercise of his religion.
Resnick v. Adams, #01-56710, 348 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003). Editor's Note: A
prior decision in this case, Resnick v. Adams, No. 01-56710, 317 F.3d 1056 (9th
Cir. 2003), reported in 2003 JB May, was withdrawn, and this opinion
substituted. [N/R]
Wiccan prisoner's lawsuit against federal Bureau
of Prisons seeking to cast spells and curses in prison should not have been
dismissed, federal appeals court rules. Further proceedings ordered to
determine whether a prohibition on casting spells would "substantially
burden" the prisoner's exercise of his religion, and whether the least
restrictive means was used to accomplish the government's alleged compelling
interest in doing so. O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, #02-4012, 349 F.3d 399,
2003 U.S. App. Lexis 22958 (7th Cir.). [2004 JB Jan]
Federal appeals court overturns trial court
decision that federal statute imposing strict rule against imposing a
substantial burden on prisoners' religious practices was an unconstitutional
"establishment of religion" in case asserting prisoner's claim to a
religious entitlement to kosher meals. Madison v. Riter, No. 03-6362/3, 355
F.3d 310, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis (4th Cir.). [2004 JB Jan]
Federal statute providing enhanced protection for
prisoners' religious practices struck down by appeals court as an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. Cutter v. Wilkinson, #02-3270, 2003
U.S. App. Lexis 22840 (6th Cir.). [2003 JB Dec]
Housing a Muslim prisoner in a cell with a
non-Muslim did not constitute a "substantial burden" to his exercise
of his religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use &
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000 cc-1 or the
Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, 51 Okl. St. Ann. Sec. 253. Prisoner could pray
several times during the day outside his cell and having to pray, once a day,
while locked down with this cellmate only had an "incidental" effect
on his practice of his religion. Policy of randomly assigning cellmates was
reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective of preventing racial
or religious discrimination in cell assignments. Steele v. Guilfeyle, No.
97,997, 76 P.3d 99 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 1 2003). [N/R]
Native American prisoner's First Amendment right
to exercise his religion was not violated by prison policies imposing
restrictions on a "smudging" ceremony or denying him the designation
of a patch of land as "Holy Ground." The prisoner failed to show that
these practices were so essential to his religion that their absence would be a
substantial burden on religious freedom. Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328
(N.D. Fla. 2003). [N/R]
New York federal court rules that "Five
Percenter" group, widely classified by correctional institutions as a
security threat group and gang, is entitled to treatment as a religion by
prison officials. Injunction issued allowing prisoner to possess a copy of the
group's basic text and numerological devices, with further proceedings ordered
as to the possible right to possess other group materials and symbols,
including its newspaper, or to engage in gatherings and fasts. Marria v.
Broaddus, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). [2003 JB Oct]
Prisoner's claim that prison officials denied
twelve separate requests he submitted to attend Jehovah Witness religious
services was sufficient to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment
right to exercise his religion, so that court declined to dismiss the claim.
Gill v. Hoadley, 261 F. Supp. 2d 113 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). [N/R]
A temporary denial of access to congregational
religious services and programs while a prisoner was in segregation on a later
expunged disciplinary conviction was not a significant deprivation of his
rights sufficient to support a federal civil rights claim. Fiorentino v.
Biershbach, No. 02-3158, 64 Fed. Appx. 550 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Federal court rules that provisions of federal
statute governing a Muslim prisoner's claim violated the Establishment of
Religion clause of the First Amendment by applying only to religious practices
and thereby providing heightened protection only to inmates seeking to exercise
religious rights as opposed to other constitutional rights. Kilaab Al Ghashiyah
v. Department of Corrections of Wisconsin, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (E.D. Wis.
2003). [2003 JB Aug]
Federal court finds that New York prisoner was
entitled to preliminary injunction against Department of Corrections policy of
putting inmates who refused an annual mandatory tuberculosis test on religious
grounds into tuberculin hold for one year. Selah v. Goord, 255 F. Supp. 2d 42
(N.D.N.Y. 2003). [2003 JB Aug]
Prisoner's claim that an officer intentionally deprived
him of one issue of a magazine to which he subscribed because the officer
disliked the magazine's views, and lied about doing so, was sufficient to state
a First Amendment free speech claim. Prisoner did not, however, state a valid
claim for violation of his right to religious freedom, since, while the Pagan
Revival magazine purported to have a religious theme, he did not claim that the
magazine had anything to do with his religious practices or that his failure to
receive it interfered with the exercise of his religion. Lindell v. Doe,
#01-2527, 58 Fed. Appx. 638 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Jail officials had an objectively reasonable
belief that they were not violating a Muslim prisoner's religious freedom
rights by denying him a vegetarian diet and were therefore entitled to
qualified immunity from liability for doing so. Kind v. Frank, No. 02-1969,
2003 U.S. App. Lexis 10754 (8th Cir.). [2003 JB Jul]
Correctional rule prohibiting the smoking of
tobacco did not violate Native American prisoner's right to practice his
religion despite his belief that the smoke carries his prayers and would purify
his body and spirit. There was an overriding compelling interest in eliminating
tobacco in prisons, related to promoting health, reducing litigation, reducing
medical costs, and maintaining internal security. Roles v. Townsend, No. 28073,
64 P.3d 338 (Idaho App. 2003). [2003 JB Jun]
Federal prison did not violate the rights of a
Jewish inmate by requiring that he fill out and submit a standard form in order
to receive a kosher diet. Prison officials were also entitled to qualified
immunity from liability, particularly as they were reasonably relying on a
federal regulation governing requests for special religious diets. Resnick v.
Adams, No. 01-56710, 317 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). [2003 JB May]
Prisoner seeking to practice religious Taoism was
not likely to prevail on his claims that he had been denied the opportunity to
do so or denied equal opportunities with those provided to prisoners of other
religions. Plaintiff prisoner had failed to cooperate with prison officials'
attempts to determine what the "essential practices" of his religion
were. Adams v. Stanley, 237 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.N.H. 2003). [2003 JB May]
Revocation of Rastafarian prisoner's supervised
release after he failed drug urinalysis tests and admitted smoking marijuana
was not violative of his right to freely exercise his religion under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000bb, since the
government had a compelling governmental interest in preventing drug abuse.
Additionally, demanding that a convicted felon on parole abstain from marijuana
use is a legitimately restrictive means for safeguarding this interest.
Accordingly, even under the most restrictive test, the prisoner had no claim
for violation of his rights. United States of America v. Israel, No. 02-1864,
317 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Prison chaplain was not entitled to qualified
immunity from liability for a civil rights violation for allegedly
intentionally interfering with an Orthodox Chassidic Jewish prisoner's request
to celebrate the religious holiday of Sukkot by being allowed to eat his meals
under a religious canopy or booth known as a Sukka. The chaplain allegedly
intentionally ignored Kansas Department of Corrections manuals and other
information describing Sukkot requirements, suggesting that the Jewish
prisoners could adequately meet the religious observance by wearing a napkin on
their head, and is alleged to have been motivated by personal animus against
Jewish prisoners. Wares v. VanBebber, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Kan. 2002).
[N/R]
Federal appeals court rejects correctional
officials' multiple constitutional attacks on federal statute establishing
restrictive test for the imposition of burdens on prisoner religious practices,
holding that Congress did not exceed its powers under the spending clause of
the Constitution, or violate the establishment of religion clause of the First
Amendment, the rights of the states under the Tenth Amendment, the immunity of
the states under the Eleventh Amendment, or the doctrine of separation of
powers. Mayweathers v. Newland, #0-16505, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002). [2003
JB Apr]
Prison officials were not shown to have any
knowledge that a non-prisoner was a Nation of Islam prisoner's spiritual
advisor, entitling them to qualified immunity over the claim that they violated
federal civil rights by preventing him and the prisoner from communicating.
Proctor v. Toney, #02-2788, 53 Fed. Appx. 793 (8th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Muslim prisoner's exclusion for two months from
group religious services did not violate his First Amendment rights when the
prisoner and chaplain had a disagreement about religious doctrines and the only
other alternative to his exclusion would have been providing more security to
ensure order at services. Plaintiff prisoner had alternative means of
exercising his religious beliefs during the period in question, including
individual prayer and study of religious literature. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F.
Supp. 2d 520 (E.D.Pa. 2002). [N/R]
Federal trial court rules that Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 is unconstitutional as an
"establishment of religion" in case where "Hebrew
Israelite" religious believer asked for kosher food diet. Madison v.
Riter, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1094 (W.D. Va.). [2003 JB Mar.]
Prison's denial, to high security Native American
prisoner, of access to a "sweat lodge" did not violate his right to
freely practice his religion, as denial was justified by legitimate security
concerns. Gonzalez v. Litscher, 230 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002). [2003 JB Mar.]
Native American prisoner's claims that his First
Amendment religious rights and his due process rights were violated when his
religious property, including fur and feathers, were destroyed by the
"unauthorized act" of a prison employee were properly dismissed as
frivolous. Due process claim regarding his property was barred because there
was an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the loss of the property under
Indiana state law. His religious freedom claim was barred because he did not
allege that the confiscation of the property restricted his exercise of his
religious beliefs or that the prison employee acted because of the religious
nature of the items or to discriminate against his Native American religion.
O'Banion v. Anderson, #01-4201, 50 Fed. Appx. 775 (7th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Prisoner could not pursue her claim that her
retention in "TB hold" segregated housing, due to her refusal to
submit to a tuberculosis test and prison's refusal to give her a requested
vegetarian diet violated her right to religious freedom under the First
Amendment. Both these claims could have been made in a prior civil rights
lawsuit involving the same facts and same parties, but she did not raise them.
Plaintiff, who had filed five "essentially similar" suits challenging
these actions was enjoined from filing further lawsuits without prior court
approval. Word v. Croce, 230 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). [N/R]
Massachusetts intermediate appeals court rules that
prison must allow Muslim prisoners to wear kufi religious caps, even if housed
in disciplinary housing units. Abdul-Alazim v. Superintendent, No. 99P-1302,
778 N.E.2d 946 (Mass. App. 2002). [2003 JB Feb.]
Rastafarian prisoner's equal protection challenge
against California prison hair length regulation should not have been dismissed
for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies when defendant prison
officials failed to establish such a failure to exhaust. Federal appeals court
rules that failure to exhaust is a defense, with the burden on the defendants
to establish it. Wyatt v. Terhune, #00-16568, 305 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2002).
[2003 JB Feb.]
Prison regulation prohibiting the possession of
reading materials encouraging violence, hatred, or vengeance against other
persons did not violate free speech rights of prisoners practicing
"Christian Identity" white supremacist religion, but appeals court
orders further proceedings on adequacy of due process surrounding censorship
system. Prisoners' rights to special foods and communion packet to celebrate
Passover holiday depended on the sincerity of their beliefs, not whether the
observation of that holiday was a "major" tenet of their religion.
Ind v. Wright, #01-1338, 44 Fed. Appx. 917 (10th Cir. 2002).
[2002 JB Dec]
Trial court's interim order requiring prison
officials to make weekly deposits of $15 in Jewish prisoner's inmate account to
allow him to buy kosher foods from the commissary at cost was not violative of
the Eleventh Amendment since it addressed the ongoing alleged violation of denial
of a religious diet, rather than representing an award of damages for past
injuries. Love v. McCown, #02-1155, 38 Fed. Appx. 355 (8th Cir. 2002) [2002
JB Nov]
Policy under which Muslim splinter group was
designated as a Security Threat Group (STG) subject to special security
measures, including the transfer of core group members to a special unit where
they must participate in a behavior modification program did not violate
prisoners' constitutional rights to free exercise of their religion, their right
to equal protection, or deprive them of a protected liberty interest. Fraise v.
Terhune, #00-5062, 283 F.3d 506 (3rd Cir. 2002). [2002 JB Oct]
Prison officials' designation of Saturday as cell
cleanup day violated a Jewish inmate's First Amendment right to practice his
religion, and no rational connection existed between the policy of designating
Saturday-only cell-cleaning and the prison's interest in efficiency, safety,
and security. Prison officials were, nevertheless, entitled to qualified immunity
from liability as there was, at the time of the violation, prior to 1999,
"virtually no guidance" in case law regarding the observance of the
Jewish Sabbath in the context of prison work. Murphy v. Carroll, 202 F. Supp.
2d 421 (D. Md. 2002). [N/R]
Prisoner's complaint that failure of prison
officials to provide him with a kosher food diet violated his right to exercise
his religion should be dismissed without prejudice because of his failure to
exhaust available administrative remedies provided under Tennessee state law.
Watler v. Campbell, #01-5646, 33 Fed. Appx. 764 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) action of
housing federal prisoners who were Rastafarians or Muslims in Virginia state
facilities with a grooming policy prohibiting long hair and beards violated the
prisoners' rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Court orders BOP
to transfer such prisoners to other facilities. Gartrell v. Ashcroft, 191 F.
Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002). [2002 JB Aug]
Claim that prisoner was punished for fasting for
religious reasons by being placed "in the hole" was sufficient to
state a claim for violation of his First Amendment right to practice his
religion. Lomholt v. Holder, #02-1427, 287 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Self-professed Wiccan witch was not entitled to
injunctive relief on his claim that prison chaplain and librarian failed to
deliver to him his religious mail concerning his continuing education in the
field of "metaphysical theology." Benham v. Priest, #01-2360, 34 Fed.
Appx. 465 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Orthodox Jewish inmates in Colorado correctional
facilities were entitled to be supplied kosher meals free of charge. Suggested
25% co-payment requirement was an impermissible burden on the exercise of
religion. Beerheide v. Suthers, #00-1086, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002). [2002
JB Jul]
Prison's refusal to accommodate an inmate's
request for a special religious diet did not violate the First Amendment when
the prisoner was provided with an adequate diet to maintain good health even if
the items which violated his religious dietary restrictions were not eaten. The
First Amendment requires that prison officials provide an inmate with food that
is adequate without violating his religious dietary restrictions. Alexander v.
Carrick, #00-1261, 31 Fed. Appx. 176 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Rastafarian prisoner's claim that prison's denial
of his request to wear dreadlocks violated his right to religious freedom and
constituted sex discrimination was improperly dismissed by trial court without
fair notice and opportunity to be heard being provided to prisoner, who was
acting as his own lawyer. Appeals court also rules that exhaustion of remedies
provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act is an affirmative defense, rather
than a pleading requirement, with the burden on the defendants to show
non-exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, #00-16568, 280 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2002).
[2002 JB Jun]
Disposing of a prisoner's medical blood samples
in a manner inconsistent with his Jehovah's Witness religious beliefs--by
failing to pour it on the ground and cover it with dust--did not violate his
right to freely exercise his religion. Schreiber v. Ault, #01-1760, 280 F.3d
891 (8th Cir. 2002). [2002 JB Jun]
State prison's denial of request of Shi'ite
Muslims for separate group religious services from Sunni Muslims was not
facially violative of their First Amendment rights. Shi'ite prisoner's rights
may have been violated by use of joint services by a chaplain hostile to their
sect to disparage their beliefs, but state correctional authorities enactment
of new protocol prohibiting such disparagement addressed the problem. Pugh v.
Goord, 184 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). [2002 JB Jun]
Appeals court orders reconsideration of whether
federal prisons violate the constitutional rights of Catholic prisoners through
a rule denying them the use of wine in taking communion. Levitan v. Ashcroft,
No. 00-5346, 281 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2002). [2002 JB May]
"Liberal Catholic Church" member stated
possible claim for violation of the right to equal protection based on
allegation that prison chaplain required him to recertify his religious request
for a vegetarian diet more frequently than African-American prisoners with
similar requests were required to. Caldwell v. Caesar, 150 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.C.
2001). [2002 JB May]
A provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
18 U.S.C. Sec. 3626(a)(2) , under which a grant of preliminary injunctive
relief automatically expires after 90 days did not bar the renewal of the
court's injunction forbidding prison administrators from imposing discipline on
Muslim inmates who missed work assignments to attend Friday Sabbath services.
The provision does not limit the number of times that a court can renew the
preliminary injunctive relief, but simply imposes a burden on the plaintiffs to
"continue to prove that preliminary relief is warranted." Mayweathers
v. Newland, No. 00-16708, 258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2001). [N/R]
Year-long delay in building a sweat lodge to
allow Native American inmates to practice their religion at a newly opened
prison violated their First Amendment free exercise rights, but did not violate
their right to equal protection. Court rules, however, that prison officials
were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for money damages for the
First Amendment claim as the law on the subject was not previously clearly
established. Youngbear v. Thalacker, 174 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
[2002 JB Mar]
299:174 Muslim prisoner could pursue claim that
his equal protection rights were violated by prison allowing inmates with
certain medical conditions to wear three-quarter-inch beards while denying his
request to wear a one-quarter-inch beard for religious purposes. Taylor v.
Johnson, #00-21155, 257 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 2001).
299:165 Federal prison rule banning possession of
electronic instruments did not violate prisoners' First Amendment rights, but
court orders further proceedings on claim that the Bureau of Prisons improperly
allowed a "religious-use" exception to the rule, discriminating in
favor of religion. Kimberlin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 150 F. Supp. 2d 36
(D.D.C. 2001).
299:163 Award of $10 in damages to prisoner for
violation of his religious right to receive a pork-free diet could be set off
against his liability to the county for costs arising out of the same lawsuit;
federal court does not reach restitution issue. Rinaldo v. Corbett, No.
99-10801, 256 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2001).
298:157 Brief isolation of prisoner who objected,
on religious grounds, to providing a blood sample for intake screening did not
violate his rights; further proceedings to determine, however, whether
conditions in isolation were more severe than required to serve legitimate
interest in insuring other prisoners' health and safety. Davis v. City of New
York, 142 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
297:139 Prisoner who was barred, by Prison
Litigation Reform Act, from receiving compensatory damages for mental distress
from failure to receive kosher diet could still be awarded punitive damages by
a jury; appeals court orders new trial on punitive damages alone. Searles v.
Van Bebber, No. 99-3076, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001).
297:136 Provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act
barring claims for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury did not
bar Muslim prisoner's lawsuit for violation of his right to practice his
religion. Shaheed- Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D. Mass. 2001).
297:131 Corrections officers subject to
discipline for "inattentiveness" during training on "gays and
lesbians" in the workplace were improperly punished for silently reading
bibles, when other officers, inattentive or reading non-religious materials,
were not similarly punished. Altman v. Minn. Dept. of Corrections, #00-1168 and
00-1489, 251 F.3d 1199 (8th Cir. 2001).
296:123 Texas Supreme Court rules that religious
instruction housing unit at county jail, popularly called the "God
Pod," was an unconstitutional establishment of religion since it
constituted a government endorsement of a particular religious view. Williams
v. Huff, No. 99-0273, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001).
295:99 Correctional facility had to either make a
good faith effort to accommodate an officer, who was also a minister, in his
request for unpaid leave to attend religious conferences, or else show that
doing so would create an undue hardship; racial harassment claim was also
asserted by officer. Jones v. New York City Dept. of Correction, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2669 (S.D.N.Y.).
294:93 Federal appeals court rules that Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) still applies to federal prisons; further
proceedings ordered on Buddhist prisoner's request to receive pastoral visits
from Methodist minister; new federal statute redefines protected "exercise
of religion" to include "any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief." Kikumura v.
Hurley, #99-1284, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001).
293:75 Officer was protected by qualified
immunity from liability for bringing disciplinary proceeding against a Moslem
inmate in retaliation for his wearing "kufi" religious headgear,
since a reasonable officer could have concluded that contraband could be
concealed under the kufi. Nicholas v. Tucker, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2323
(S.D.N.Y.).
293:75 Denial of prisoner's request for Native
American religious items on the basis that he is Caucasian rather than Native
American violated his right to equal protection of the law; prison officials
could not use race as the basis to deny a request for articles sincerely sought
for reasons of religious belief and practice. Morrison v. Garraghty, No.
00-6540, 239 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2001).
292:60 Prisoner's claim for compensation for
alleged violation of his religious rights was barred without a physical injury,
but he could still seek both nominal and punitive damages. Allah v. Al-Hafeez,
No. 98-1385, 226 F.3d 247 (3rd Cir. 2000).
291:44 New York correctional officials should not
have denied Shi'a Islam's grievance requesting separate religious services on
the basis of advice from a Sunni Islam clergyman. Cancel v. Goord, 717 N.Y.S.2d
610 (A.D. 2000).
291:37 Prisoner's claim that housing him with an
inmate of another race violated his right to exercise his religion was properly
dismissed as frivolous. Thompson v. Texas Dept. of Crim. Just.,
#01-98-01215-CV, 33 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. App. 2000).
290:26 Requirement that Muslim prisoner be clean
shaven, and not allowing him even a 1/4 inch beard, was not a violation of his
rights, despite allowance of 3/4 inch beards for inmates with medical
conditions aggravated by shaving. Green v. Polunsky, No. 00-40156, 229 F.3d 486
(5th Cir. 2000).
EDITOR'S NOTE: Other federal appeals courts
considering the issue of short beards have upheld prison grooming policies. See
Hines v. South Darolina Dept. of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 1998);
Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996); and Friedman v. Arizona, 912
F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990).
It should also be noted that the above decision,
while dated Oct. 18, 2000, almost a month after the enactment of the new
federal "Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,"
Public Law 106-274 (Sep. 22, 2000), see Jail & Prisoner Law Bulletin No.
287, p. 173 (Nov. 2000), does not apply the legal test stated in that statute,
requiring that an action that imposes a substantial burden on religious
practices or beliefs must be justified as in furtherance of a "compelling
governmental interest" and used the "least restrictive means" of
furthering that interest.
291:45 Prison's refusal to accommodate prisoner's
request for food in his cell on Saturday so that he could follow his belief
that he should not leave his cell or prepare food on Sunday, his Sabbath, was
not justified by concerns about cell cleanliness and violated his First
Amendment rights. Love v. Reed, #99-3149, 216 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2000).
294:93 Virginia prison policy mandating short
hair, which had no exception for religious objections, upheld by federal court
as "neutral" policy with only "incidental" impact on
religious practices; court rejects claim that different hair length standards
for male and female prisoners violates equal protection. DeBlasio v. Johnson,
128 F. Supp. 2d 315 (E.D. Va. 2000).
290:25 Federal trial judge rules that employees
of a private company hired to run a detention facility operated by a private
company created by a city could not be sued for alleged violations of federal
pre-trial detainee's right to religious freedom in seeking diet free from meat
and meat products. Lawson v. Liburdi, 114 F. Supp. 2d 31 (D.R.I. 2000).
289:12 Florida prison's initial refusal to put
death row prisoner's legally adopted religious name on his identification card
together with the name under which he had been imprisoned violated his right to
exercise his
religion. Hakim v. Hicks, No. 98-3062, 99-12050,
223 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2000).
287:173 New federal legislation reimposes a tough
test for justifying prison rules that impose substantial burdens on prisoner
religious freedom rights; prison officials must now demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest in the policy or regulation and also show that the
"least restrictive" means available to further that interest were
utilized. "Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act,"
Public Law 106-274 (Sep. 22, 2000).
287:174 Prison Litigation Reform Act barred
prisoners from attempting to recover damages for mental or emotional injury
alleged caused by policies they said imposed stress on Muslim prisoners, in the
absence of a showing of physical injury. Craig v. Cohn, 80 F. Supp. 2d 944
(N.D. Ind. 2000).
284:118 Native American correctional officer
should be allowed to wear his hair long (but pinned under his cap) to
accommodate his religion, Ohio Supreme Court holds. Humphrey v. Lane, #99-206,
728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000).
286:158 Denial of privileges to prisoner serving
a sentence for sexual exploitation of a child, following his refusal to
participate in a sexual abuse treatment program, did not violate his rights;
court finds no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, no
violation of the prisoner's First Amendment or religious freedom rights, and no
problem with the use of a "penile plethysmograph" to measure his
sexual responses to various images, when participation in the treatment program
was voluntary. Searcy v. Simmons, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Kan. 2000).
286:157 "Nation of Islam" members in
New York state prison were not entitled to a kosher diet, even though it was
being supplied to Jewish prisoners, when a pork-free "Religious
Alternative Menu" provided to them was adequate to meet their nutritional
and religious requirements; prison did not violate their rights by refusing to
hire one of them as an inmate clerk to handle "Nation of Islam"
affairs in the facility. Muhammad v. Warithu-Deen Umar, 98 F. Supp. 2d 337
(W.D.N.Y. 2000).
281:75 Orthodox Jewish prisoners who were sincere
in their religious beliefs were entitled to receive a
kosher diet; proposed policy under which they
would be required to make a co-payment of 25% of the cost was an unreasonable
burden on their exercise of their religion. Beerheide v. Suthers, 82 F. Supp.
2d 1190 (D. Colo. 2000).
282:83 Prisoner's conduct in pursuing frivolous
legal claims was not protected conduct for which he could pursue retaliation
claim in the absence of retaliatory conduct which "shocked the
conscience"; prisoner could, however, pursue claim that he was retaliated
against for assisting another prisoner in asserting his complaints if that
assistance was necessary to enable other prisoner to do so. Herron v. Harrison,
No. 98-5726, 203 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2000).
282:92 Refusal to allow Roman Catholic prisoner
to possess multi-colored rosary beads did not infringe on his right to practice
his religion when prison offered him a set of all-black rosary beads, and
multi-colored beads were prohibited because of the possibility that they would
be used to display gang-affiliation "colors." Kane v. Muir, #SJC-
08119, 725 N.E.2d 232 (Mass. 2000).
283:108 Native American prisoner stated a claim
for retaliatory transfer; lawsuit claimed that he was transferred to another
facility because of his practice of his Native American religion and his free
speech activities in complaining about restrictions on religious practice in
the prison. Rouse v. Benson, #98-2707, 193 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 1999).
279:42 Prison rule prohibiting religious services
in unauthorized areas did not provide Muslim prisoner with adequate notice that
his conduct of silent, individual, demonstrative prayer in recreation yard
would be a violation of the rule for which he could be disciplined; Attorneys'
fee cap of Prison Litigation Reform Act applied despite the fact that the
lawsuit was filed before the statute's enactment; $73,694.36 in fees and costs
awarded. Chatin v. Coombe, Nos. 98-2484, 98-2556, 186 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 1999).
280:57 Prisoner who declared that he was Jewish
could not be properly denied kosher food on the basis that prison Jewish
chaplain did not recognize him as Jewish; the proper legal issue was whether
his religious beliefs were sincerely held. Jackson v. Mann, No. 97-2968, 196 F.3d
316 (2nd Cir. 1999).
277:9 Prison's policy of not fully applying
modified meal delivery schedule for Muslim prisoners during Ramadan religious
holiday to prisoners in segregation imposed impermissible burden on religious
freedom when court found no legitimate security or budgetary interest supported
the difference; further proceedings ordered, however, on trial court's award of
$9,000 in damages. Makin v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, #98-1272, 183 F.3d
1205 (10th Cir. 1999).
277:10 Rastafarian prisoner's claim that prison
requirement that he cut his hair violated his religious rights was not
"frivolous" when there was, as of now, no evidence in the record
concerning any security concerns which justified the requirement. Cofer v. Schriro,
#99-1852, 176 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1999).
EDITOR'S NOTE: See also Williams v. Norris, No.
99-1743, 176 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1999). (Rastafarian prisoner's lawsuit against
prison rule prohibiting him from wearing his hair in "dreadlocks" was
improperly dismissed because prisoner complied with Prison Litigation Reform
Act's "exhaustion of administrative remedies" requirement, since his
grievance had been denied by the Warden and the Assistant Director of the state
Department of Corrections at the time the court acted).
278:25 Exhaustion of remedies requirement of
Prison Litigation Reform Act did not apply retroactively to bar lawsuit already
pending; federal appeals court reinstates prisoner's lawsuit complaining that
officials prevented him from meeting with prison chaplain. Salahuddin v. Mead,
#97-2522, 174 F.3d 271 (2nd Cir. 1999).
268:58 Sheriff was not entitled to summary
judgment on claim that establishment of a segregated jail unit to teach
fundamentalist Christian principles constituted an unconstitutional
"establishment of religion." Lara v. Williams, 986 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.
App. 1999).
269:76 Prison officials' instructions to Muslim
correctional officer, asking that he refrain from greeting Muslim inmates in
Arabic, was not religious discrimination, but rather was based on legitimate
concerns about fraternization with prisoners and the possible perception of
special treatment of Muslim prisoners. Hafford v. Seidner, #97-4240, 167 F.3d
1074 (6th Cir. 1999).
270:93 Allegation that male prisoner was
subjected to repeated strip and body cavity searches by female officer under
non-emergency conditions while male officers were available to conduct the
search, and that purpose of searches was solely to "harass" and
intimidate him stated non- frivolous claim for Fourth Amendment violation.
Moore v. Carwell, #97-40840, 168 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999).
272:122 Requiring atheist probationer to attend
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings as a condition of probation violated his First
Amendment rights, but award of $1 in nominal damages was proper, since county
probation officials would not have had reason to believe, at the time, that
this was a violation of his rights. Warner v. Orange Co. Dept. of Probation,
#95-7055, 173 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 1999).
272:123 Federal appeals court rejects
constitutional claims of Zen Buddhist prisoner; requirement of five members of
the same religion before allowing group worship was not improper, nor was
denial of vegan diet not required by the religion or of the right to possess
and store religious items prisoner did not show were necessary for the practice
of his religion. Spies v. Voinovich, #97-4175, 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999).
273:134 Prison rule banning receipt of mail which
advocated racial or religious hatred in a manner which created a serious danger
of violence did not violate the religious freedom rights of a prisoner who was
denied access to Aryan Nations materials. Chriceol v. Phillips, #98-30380, 169
F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999).
273:141 Prison's requirement that an outside
religious volunteer be present before daily group Ramadan prayer services would
be permitted was reasonable given scarce prison resources, and security
concerns about supervision of maximum security prisoners; requirement did not
violate Muslim prisoner's right to religious freedom. Muhammad v. Klotz, 36
F.Supp.2d 240 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
275:172 Prison officials denied summary judgment
in lawsuit by Muslim prisoner without canteen privileges requesting that his
regular meals be replaced, on fast days, with food that he could store and eat
before and after the times when his religion required him not to eat;
defendants amply justified refusal of canteen privileges, but plaintiff inmate
was not seeking any change regarding canteen purchases. Denson v. Marshall, 44
F.Supp.2d 400 (D. Mass. 1999). 265:6 Federal appeals court upholds statute
requiring prisoner to give DNA sample for creation of a DNA Offender Database;
rejects unreasonable search and seizure, self-incrimination, religious freedom
and impermissible retroactive application arguments. Shaffer v. Saffle,
#97-7107, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998).
265:11 Buddhist prisoner had no clearly
established right to receive strict vegetarian diet devoid of all animal and
dairy products and byproducts or to be exempt from wearing leather shoes while
being transported or in court. Dehart v. Lehman, 9 F.Supp.2d 539 (E.D. Pa.
1998).
265:11 Jewish prisoners were entitled to kosher
diet, but not necessarily to hot kosher meals, federal appeals court rules;
providing hot pork substitutes to Muslim prisoners while serving Jewish
prisoners cold kosher meals did not violate equal protection. Johnson v. Horn,
#97-3581 & 97-3582, 150 F.3d 276 (3rd Cir. 1998).
» Editor's Note: Two federal appeals courts have
previously recognized the right of a Jewish inmate to receive a kosher diet:
Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1988), and Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873
(9th Cir. 1993). As the court above noted, however, the right, as recognized in
Ward was not a "per se entitlement," with the Ward court ordering
proceedings to determine whether the prison's legitimate interests justified
denial of kosher meals.
266:19 Prisoner was not entitled to a kosher diet
when there was no evidence that he was Jewish, and was also not entitled to a
vegetarian diet; prior order by doctor that he be provided with vegetarian diet
was merely because prisoner refused to eat otherwise, and was not medically
required. Ramsey v. Coughlin, 1 F.Supp.2d 198 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
266:25 Prohibition on Muslim prisoners'
"group demonstrative prayer" in prison recreation yard was rationally
related to legitimate security interests. Sledge v. Cummings, 995 F.Supp.2d
1276 (D. Kan. 1998).
268:59 Officer liable for $2,000 in compensatory
damages and $5,000 in punitive damages for shoving Muslim prisoner to prevent
him from engaging in quiet evening prayers during "quiet time";
prison rule did not prohibit quiet prayer that did not disturb others. Arroyo
Lopez v. Nuttall, 25 F.Supp.2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
273:142 Requirement that prisoner attend a
substance abuse program utilizing religion was a violation of the Establishment
of Religion clause of the First Amendment; prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity, however, since unconstitutionality of such a program had
not previously been clearly established. Ross v. Keelings, 2 F.Supp.2d 810
(E.D. Va. 1998).
» Editor's Note: Two federal appeals courts have
similarly ruled that coerced attendance at Alcoholic Anonymous or Narcotics
Anonymous meetings that emphasized religion violated the Establishment Clause.
Warner v. Orange Co. Dep't of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068 (2nd Cir. 1996); Kerr v.
Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996).
274:156 Mandatory administration of TB test did
not violate prisoner's right to religious freedom, despite her claim that the
Bible prohibited the "injection of artificial substances" into her
body; prison's legitimate interest in controlling infectious disease justified
forcible administration of test. Hasenmeier-McCarthy v. Rose, 986 F.Supp. 464
(S.D. Ohio 1998).
263:171 Legitimate prison interest in preventing
the spread of tuberculosis justified requirement that prisoner either submit to
TB skin test, despite religious objection, or else be subjected to
administrative segregation for a one year period. Africa v. Horn, 998 F.Supp.
557 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
260:125 Federal appeals court overturns trial
court's injunctive order requiring prison officials to provide religiously
mandated vegetarian, non-dairy diet containing no grape products to prisoner
who claimed to be a "Nazarite Disciple" of Jesus Christ Messiah and
then asserted that he was a Rastafarian; trial judge improperly failed to allow
defendants to respond to prisoner's assertion of Rastafarian faith and failed
to make findings required for injunctive relief under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. Oluwa v. Gomez, 133 F.3d 1237 (8th Cir. 1998).
259:107 Correctional officer's Christian
proselytizing activities did not violate the Free Exercise or Establishment of
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment; Muslim prisoner's right to practice
his religion was not substantially burdened; federal appeals court also rules
that First Amendment claims are not impacted by provision of Prison Litigation
Reform Act barring claims for mental and emotional injury without physical
injury. Canell v. Lightner, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 9281 (9th Cir.).
254:25 Prisoner who failed to comply with
institutional rule that he register as a member of a particular religious sect
could not pursue claim that he was denied permission to wear religiously
prescribed garments to his father's funeral. Jackson- Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115
F.3d 1091 (2nd Cir. 1997).
254:26 Deputy warden and mail clerk liable for $1
in nominal damages and $500 in punitive damages each for enforcing blanket ban
on Church of Jesus Christ Christian (CJCC) publications; denial came after
prior court cases ruling a blanket ban, without review of individual
publications, impermissible. Williams v. Brimeyer, 116 F.3d 351 (8th Cir.
1997).
255:43 Prison's failure to provide
"separatist fundamentalist" religious leader to prisoner, to allow
him to take Bible to prison yard, to attend services on Sunday instead of
Friday while in protective custody, or to possess more than 25 religious books
in his cell at a time did not "substantially burden" prisoner's right
to religious freedom. Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997).
255:44 Prisoner did not show that officers
"conspired" against him because he is "Muslim, black, and a
'litigator'" when none of them made disparaging comments about his
religion or race, and he had not previously filed any lawsuits or grievances
against them. Hameed v. Pundt, 964 F.Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
256:57 Nevada prison policy prohibiting inmates
from leading religious groups did not violate prisoner's rights. Anderson v.
Angelone, 123 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1997).
256:57 Protestant prison chaplain did not act
"under color of state law" when he excommunicated for a year prisoner
who was an adherent of "Messianic Judaism"; exclusion from services
was a "purely ecclesiastical" action, for which there could be no
liability under federal civil rights law. Montano v. Hedgepeth, 120 F.3d 844
(8th Cir. 1997).
258:91 Correctional policy which restricted
practice of Native American Religion to prisoners who had a Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) number or could prove that they were "ethnically Native
American" violated the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
Combs v. Corrections Corp. of America, 977 F.Supp. 799 (W.D.La. 1997).
259:101 Prison officials did not violate Muslim
prisoner's free speech or religious freedom rights by denying him receipt of
entire issues of "Muhammad Speaks" magazine which were determined to
create a danger of violence "by advocating racial, religious, or national
hatred"; prisoner's suggestion that offending articles instead be cut out
was not reasonable alternative in light of cost to implement. Shabazz v.
Parsons, 127 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997).
259:108 Determination as to whether a prisoner
was Jewish was a matter for Jewish religious advisor at correctional facility,
not for a court; but prisoner had a right, under New York state law, to
participate in any religious observances she preferred, unless she was
disruptive, or religious doctrine barred the participation of non-members of
the faith. Thomas v. Lord, 664 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. 1997).
263:170 Muslim prisoner's claims that Christian
group received preferential treatment was not borne out by facts; court also
rules that Christian chaplain, who was not employed by the prison, was not a
"state actor" who could be sued under federal civil rights law.
McGlothlin v. Murray, 993 F.Supp. 389 (W.D. Va. 1997).
[N/R] Prison officials did not violate Muslim
prisoners right to equal protection by requiring them to sign an attendance
sheet at services or by failing to give them 10-15 minutes notice prior to
services. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1997).
[N/R] Provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act
allowing court to dismiss lawsuit by prisoner determined to be frivolous or
malicious applies to cases pending prior to statute's passage; prisoner's claim
that correctional officials "smashed" his property and legal work in
retaliation for his writing of a letter complaining about the lack of
"black culture" churches in prison state valid First Amendment claim.
Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997).
[N/R] Prohibition on prisoner receiving materials
which advocated racial supremacy did not violate his right to religious
freedom; regulation was reasonably related to legitimate security concerns.
Winburn v. Bologna, 979 F.Supp. 531 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
241:11 Federal appeals court upholds prison's
denial of Moorish prisoner's request to hold banquet in honor of the founder of
his religion, remands for further proceedings Muslim prisoner's claim that
conditions under which Muslims were allowed to celebrate Ramadan violated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir.
1996).
241:12 New York court denies prison officials
summary judgment on prisoner's claim that they violated his rights by refusing
to recognize the Church of Satan as a bona fide religion or to permit him to
possess a three inch metal bell with which to perform Satanic rituals. Ramirez
v. Coughlin, 919 F.Supp. 617 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
242:25 While Religious Freedom Restoration Act
applied retroactively to pending claims, this did not change the fact that it
was not clear, in 1985, that denying a Jewish prisoner a kosher diet would
violate his right to exercise his religion, so that prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity for that past denial. Friedman v. South, 92 F.3d
989 (9th Cir. 1996).
242:26 N.Y. high court rules that Alcoholics
Anonymous (A.A.) credo is religious, and that atheist or agnostic inmate could
not be punished by losing eligibility for conjugal visit program based on his
refusal to participate in substance abuse program at facility which used A.A.
12 steps; such action held to violate First Amendment prohibition on
"Establishment of Religion." Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 673
N.E.2d 98, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903, 1996 N.Y. Lexis 1522.
243:35 U.S. Supreme Court to review issue of
whether Congress had constitutional authority to pass Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. Flores v. City of Boerne, Tex., 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, sub. nom., Boerne, City of, v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 293 (1996).
244:57 Requiring prisoner to attend
"Narcotics Anonymous" substance abuse program or suffer possible
classification to higher security risk violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment since program was religiously-based, with references to God or
a "higher power," federal appeals court rules. Kerr v. Farrey, 95
F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). » Editor's Note: Also see Warner v. Orange Co. Dept.
of Probation, 95 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 1996) (establishment clause was violated
when the only option available to a convicted motorist for required
rehabilitation was the program run by AA). In O'Connor v. California, 855
F.Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994), however, the court ruled that there was no
violation in making an AA program one of a variety of options available to
satisfy the conditions of probation.
244:58 Prison officials could deny "Neo-Nazi
skinhead" white prisoner's request that he be housed only with prisoners
of his own race even if such denial did substantially burden a sincerely held
religious belief; denial was justified on the basis of prison security and the
public policy against racial segregation. Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293 (8th
Cir. 1996).
244:59 Officer's brief squeezing of inmate's
testicles during pat search following end of prison kitchen work shift was not
an unreasonable search, cruel and unusual punishment, or a violation of the
inmate's religious rights as a Muslim. Hill v. Blum, 916 F.Supp. 470 (E.D. Pa.
1996). 245:76 Prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from claim
that having female guards present during strip search of male Muslim prisoner,
and other incidents in which female guards observed male prisoner naked,
violated First Amendment right to religious freedom. Canedy v. Boardman, 91
F.3d 30 (7th Cir. 1996).
246:90 Florida rule allowing prison officials to
delete objectionable portions of religious literature that would pose a threat
to prison security, while allowing in the remainder of the text, did not
violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or the First Amendment. Lawson v.
Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1996).
246:91 Jewish prisoner could not challenge his
transfer to another facility based on his dissatisfaction with the quality of
the kosher food diet at the receiving facility. Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504
(2nd Cir. 1996).
247:107 Satanist prisoner could legitimately be
denied receipt and possession of The Satanic Bible based on review of the book
and determination that it was inflammatory and could create safety and security
problems. Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F.Supp. 522 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
248:124 Trial court erred in ruling that
Religious Freedom Restoration Act did not apply when prisoners did not cite it
in their complaint; federal appeals court orders further proceedings on Sunni
Muslim prisoners' claim that prison violated their right to religious freedom
by holding only one Muslim worship service for five Muslim sects whose
doctrines allegedly differed. Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762 (3rd Cir. 1996).
248:125 Jehovah's Witnesses prisoners had to be
allowed to meet on the same terms as Muslim prisoners, including meetings of
fewer than fifteen people and meetings without an outside religious leader when
none was available; federal court notes that each religion must be treated
alike when similarly situated; plaintiff prisoner awarded right to not work for
ten days and be credited for good time as though he had, as compensation for
problems with religious meetings. Hyde v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 948
F.Supp. 625 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
249:140 Prison officials did not violate
prisoner's right to religious freedom or free speech in withholding
"Christian Identity" book that advocated violence against Jews and
government; prisoner's religion did not require him to read book, so
withholding it did not substantially burden his religious freedom, and decision
to withhold it was reasonably related to prison security concerns. Stefanow v.
McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1996).
249:141 Orthodox Jewish prisoner had a right to a
kosher diet; prisoner's right to free exercise of religion outweighed prison's
concerns about expense and inconvenience. Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674
(9th Cir. 1997).
250:147 U.S. Supreme Court rules that Congress exceeded
its constitutional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in passing the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act; rules and laws of general applicability,
including jail and prison rules and regulations, no longer need to be justified
by a compelling state interest or use the least restrictive means when they
allegedly impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion. Boerne, City
of, v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 1997 U.S. Lexis 4035 (June 25, 1997).
250:154 Federal appeals court reinstates $500
punitive damage award against officer who allegedly hit restrained prisoner in
the face and taunted him with racial slurs while he and other officers forced
him to comply with prison's haircut rule; haircut rule did not violate
religious freedom rights of Rastafarian prisoner. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d
499 (11th Cir. 1996).
251:170 Inmate group's Christmas party in prison
visitation room, which included singing of Christmas carols, did not violate
First Amendment rights of prisoner receiving visitor who objected to it; party
did not constitute an "establishment of religion" when primary
purpose was secular and prison officials did not control its content.
Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F.Supp. 1405 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
251:171 Prison had adequate reasons for refusing
to supply prisoner with a vegetarian diet requested for religious reasons; diet
could have led to health problems and storage of more fresh fruit and
vegetables would present a security concern that prisoners could use them to
produce alcohol/mash; restricting hours of group religious worship was
reasonable following inmate disturbances, also for security purposes. Jenkins
v. Angelone, 948 F.Supp. 543 (E.D. Va. 1996).
[N/R] Federal trial court orders union to refund
dues paid by correctional officer who objected, on religious grounds, to union
position on abortion and death penalty; awards plaintiff officer $45,160 in
attorneys' fees and costs. E.E.O.C. v. AFSCME C-82, 937 F.Supp. 166 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) and subsequent decision (awarding attorneys' fees), 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis
17535 (Nov. 12, 1996).
[N/R] Prison rules requiring Native American
inmate to cut his hair and which denied him the use of a "sweat
lodge" did not violate his right to exercise his religious freedom.
Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996).
233:69 Prison officials showed compelling
interest in withholding delivery of issues of newspaper inciting racial
violence; fact that newspaper was published by a church did not alter result or
violate prisoner's rights under Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Reimann v.
Murphy, 897 F.Supp. 398 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
229:7 Federal trial court rejects N.Y.
correctional department's arguments that requiring Rastafarian correctional
officers to cut their modified dreadlocks furthered a compelling governmental
interest in security, discipline and esprit de corps. Brown v. Keane, 888
F.Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
234:84 Update: Roman Catholic inmates who
received no money damages and had summary judgment entered against them on
claim they were entitled to unfettered/unsupervised use of religious
sacramental articles were nevertheless entitled to $128,811.47 in attorneys'
fees and costs, plus interest on that amount, because their suit caused prison
officials to agree to expanded access to religious services and religious
articles. Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 65 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1995). 230:24 Policy
requiring Hasidic Jewish prisoner in segregation unit to get short haircut did
not violate his right to religious freedom; policy was justified by compelling
safety concerns related to quickly identifying prisoners and protection against
hidden contraband. Phipps v. Parker, 879 F.Supp. 734 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
230:25 Seizure and loss or destruction of
prisoner's Koran, Islamic prayer shawl, and other religious items did not
violate his right to exercise his religion; prison had valid regulation
allowing only prisoners who designated themselves a member of a religious group
to possess such items, and prisoner did not do so.Caffey v. Johnson, 883
F.Supp. 128 (E.D. Tex. 1995). [Cross references: Defenses: Eleventh Amendment.]
230:26 Hindu prisoner's religious freedom was not
violated by prison dietician serving Thanksgiving stuffing containing turkey
meat. Karmasu v. Hughes, 654 N.E.2d 179 (Ohio App. 1995). [Cross-reference:
Diet].
231:43 Two federal courts uphold actions of
prison officials in withholding access to literature of "Church of Jesus
Christ, Christian," religious arm of the Aryan Nation, a white supremacist
group. Van Dyke v. Washington, 896 F.Supp. 183 (C.D. Ill. 1995); George v.
Sullivan, 896 F.Supp. 895 (W.D. Wis. 1995). [Cross-references: Defenses:
Qualified Immunity; First Amendment].
231:44 Prison did not violate prisoner's rights
by providing general "Muslim" religious services rather than separate
Moorish services. Crosley-El v. Berge, 896 F.Supp. 885 (E.D. Wis. 1995).
232:60 Requiring Muslim prisoners to
"register" before being allowed to attend congregational prayer
services on Friday afternoons did not violate Religious Freedom Restoration
Act. Woods v. Evatt, 876 F.Supp. 756 (D. S.C. 1995).
232:61 Update: Federal appeals court rules that
Muslim inmate who legally changed his name was entitled to use both his
religious and committed names on correspondence; prior ruling by court reached
same result without reference to Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Malik v.
Brown, 65 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1995).
233:75 Federal trial court rules that prisoner
asserting claim under Religious Freedom Restoration Act must only show that
desire for particular practice is motivated by sincere religious belief and
substantially burdened by government action, and need not show that practice is
compelled or "mandated" by his religion. Muslim v. Frame, 897 F.Supp.
215 (E.D. Pa. 1995). » Editor's Note: A number of other courts have concluded
that, under the RFRA, the burden on religion is not substantial unless the
religious practice or belief at issue is mandated by the plaintiff's religion.
See Werner v. McCotten, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995); Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d
948 (9th Cir. 1994); Daytona Rescue Mission v. City of Daytona Beach, 885
F.Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Rust v. Clarke, 883 F.Supp. 1293 (D. Neb. 1995);
Alameen v. Coughlin, 892 F.Supp. 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Weir v. Nix, 890 F.Supp.
769 (S.D. Iowa 1995). The above court is in a distinct minority, apparently, in
ruling otherwise.
234:92 Rastafarian inmate who refused to submit
to mandatory TB testing based on religious objection ordered released from
medical keeplock; plaintiff showed likelihood of proving both that such
continued confinement violated his rights under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and violated his 8th Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment. Jolly v. Coughlin, 894 F.Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
[Cross-reference: Medical Care].
234:93 Federal appeals court rules that prison's
refusal to release Muslim prisoner from work assignment to attend Friday
religious services did not violate First Amendment or Religious Freedom
Restoration Act; attendance at such services was not an "essential
tenet" of his religion and policy did not "substantially burden"
his religious freedom. Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 65
F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 1995). [Cross-reference: Work/Education Programs].
235:104 Muslim prisoner had a clearly established
right not to handle pork in prison kitchen; kitchen supervisors were not
entitled to qualified immunity for ordering prisoner to do so and disciplining
him when he refused. Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir. 1995).
[Cross-references: Defenses: Qualified (Good-Faith) Immunity].
236:122 Court finds that refusal to allow
religious prisoner a Kosher diet, to allow him to grow a one-inch beard, or to
wear a headcovering substantially burdened his rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act when his religious beliefs were sincere; court finds no
violation of his right to maintain a vow of poverty. Luckette v. Lewis, 883
F.Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995).
236:123 Prisoner's right to use his legally
adopted religious name on outgoing mail together with his committed name was
clearly established in 1990, federal appeals court rules, and prison officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly punishing him for doing
so; notary, however, was entitled to qualified immunity for refusing to
notarize document when signature presented did not match prison identification
shown. Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 1995). [Cross-references:
Defenses: Qualified (Good-Faith) Immunity; Mail].
237:139 Absolute prohibition on Muslim inmate
wearing a beard violated Religious Freedom Restoration Act when inmate
sincerely believed his religion required him to do so, even if there was
evidence that the Koran did not require this; complete ban on beards was not
"least restrictive means" of satisfying security interests, when
warden testified that a 1/4" beard would not be a security problem and
were already allowed for medical reasons; defendants entitled to qualified
immunity from liability, however. Lewis v. Scott, 910 F.Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex.
1995). [Cross-reference: Defenses: Qualified (Good-Faith) Immunity].
237:139 Update: federal appeals court upholds
preliminary injunction against continued medical keeplock of Rastafarian inmate
who had religious objections to submitting to mandatory TB testing. Jolly v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2nd Cir. 1996). [Cross- reference: Medical Care].
238:158 Fundamentalist Christian inmate had right
to be involved in and witness baptism through immersion, and to receive
publications which did not incite violence towards Roman Catholics, even if
those publications would be "deeply offensive" to Catholics. Weir v.
Nix, 890 F.Supp. 769 (S.D.Iowa 1995).
239:170 Muslim prisoners' assertion that prison
policy preventing them from selecting a religious leader from within their
congregation violated a tenet of their religion and also violated their right
to equal protection since non-religious inmate groups were able to choose their
own leader stated valid claims. Abdul Jabbar-Al Samad v. Horn, 913 F.Supp. 373
(E.D. Pa. 1995).
239:171 Denying Muslim inmates the use of chapel
restroom to perform ablutions with water prior to Ramadan services did not
violate their religious freedom rights, but rather served legitimate security
purpose of permitting observation of inmates; inmates failed to show why
performing ablutions in cells prior to services was inadequate. Theus v.
Angelone, 895 F.Supp. 265 (D. Nev. 1995).
239:172 Federal appeals court, in criminal
appeal, rules that Religious Freedom Restoration Act may give Rastafarians the
right to possess and use marijuana; possible implications for correctional
officer or prisoner disciplinary cases. U.S. v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1996 U.S.
App. Lexis 11460 (9th Cir. 1996).
217:12 Florida prisoner who sought to change his
name because of his conversion to Islam religious faith should not have been
denied name change without an evidentiary hearing. Hoyos v. Singletary, 639
So.2d 631 (Fla. App. 1994).
217:13 Texas state statute restricting name
changes by convicted felons did not violate prisoner's right to free exercise
of his Muslim religion, since it was connected to legitimate governmental
interests. Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1994).
218:28 Appeals court reinstates suit by Native
American prisoner seeking daily access to prison sweat lodge for purposes of
prayer; defendant prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity
because they failed to articulate a legitimate penological interest served by
denial of such daily access. Thomas v. Gunter, 32 F.3d 1258 (8th Cir. 1994).
219:44 Denial of inmate's request for place of
worship to perform Satanic religious rituals and possession of candles, incense
and other items necessary for rituals constituted violation of his First
Amendment religious freedom. Howard v. U.S., 864 F.Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994).
220:57 Prison directive requiring Santeria
prisoners to receive approval to possess beads which were artifacts of their
religion, and prohibiting them from wearing the beads, violated their religious
freedom under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; imposing such requirements
on Santeria beads, while not on rosary beads, violated prisoners' right to
equal protection. Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
221:74 Trial court's order that warden supply
Hindu prisoner with a specific book not requested by him in satisfaction of
requirement that each prisoner be supplied with the "bible" of his
faith was erroneous and not supported by any evidence; Ohio appeals court
orders further proceedings to determine which of the sixty-six texts requested
by the prisoner is the Hindu "bible." Karmasu v. Tate, 95 Ohio App.3d
399, 642 N.E.2d 664 (1994).
222:93 Prohibition on prisoners performing prayer
ritual involving physical movement outside of their cells did not violate
Muslim prisoners' religious freedom rights under New York state law. Jackson v.
Coughlin, 612 N.Y.S.2d 89 (A.D. 1994).
223:108 Muslim prisoner's religious freedom
rights were not violated when he was taken off of list of fasting inmates
allowed night time meal schedule during Muslim holy month of Ramadan; prisoner
himself broke daylight fast by eating meal in infirmary cell and did not
support claim that his religion had an "injury exception" to fasting
requirement. Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1994).
224:124 Native American prisoner's religious
freedom rights were not violated by requirement that he cut his hair short and
keep his medicine pouch and headband stored in his cell. Diaz v. Collins, 872
F.Supp. 353 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
225:140 Prison policy requiring inmate with new
religious name to also use his "committed" name on all correspondence
incoming and outgoing did not violate prisoner's rights. Fawaad v. Herring, 874
F.Supp. 350 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
225:141 Failure to provide full religious
Pentecostal services at prison did not "substantially burden"
prisoner's right to practice his Pentecostal religion. Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d
948 (9th Cir. 1995).
227:172 Michigan appeals court rejects Muslim
prisoners' challenge to policy directive prohibiting release from work
assignments to attend religious services, other than during state observed
holidays. Abdur-Ra-Oof v. Dept. of Corrections, 528 N.W.2d 840 (Mich. App.
1995).
227:173 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
applies retroactively to Native American prisoner's claim that refusal to allow
him access to a sweat lodge violated his religious freedom; prison officials
were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages, however, since
they acted in good faith and in reliance on the law as it was established at
the time of their actions prior to enactment of the RFRA. Werner v. McCotter,
49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995). » Editor's Note: For other decisions holding
that the RFRA clearly applies to prisoners, see Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948
(9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); and Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir.
1994). Brown-El, as well as the above reported case, holds that the RFRA
applies retroactively to claims which arose before its passage.
Prison did not violate muslim prisoner's
religious rights by refusing to provide diet including ritually slaughtered
meat despite past practice of providing Jewish inmates with kosher meals;
policy of barring outside visitors from inmate religious meetings, while
allowing outsiders at self-help group meetings like Alcoholics Anonymous, also
did not violate inmates' religious freedoms. Salaam v. Collins, 830 F.Supp. 853
(D. Md. 1993).
Appeals court orders further hearings on whether
prison should have offered a kosher diet to a single Orthodox Jewish inmate;
court rejects claim that prison had an obligation to provide inmate with an
Orthodox rabbi and special clothing, to abstain from transporting him on the
Sabbath or religious holidays, or to allow him to possess candles in his cell
for religious purposes. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
Factual issues as to whether congregate religious
services could have been accommodated at uncompleted facility to which prisoner
was transferred precluded summary judgment in prisoner's suit alleging
violation of religious freedom. Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306 (2nd Cir.
1993).
Prison officials were entitled to qualified
immunity from suit for denying Muslim inmates use of prison video equipment to
produce a cable public access television program promoting their religious
views. Thompson v. Clarke, 848 F.Supp. 1452 (D. Neb. 1994).
Outright ban on "Hebrew Israelite"
religious literature violated prisoner's religious freedom under the First
Amendment and Religious Freedom Restoration Act; court rules that the Act
applies retroactively and supersedes rule set forth by U.S. Supreme Court in
Thornburgh v. Abbott, as to censorship of incoming religious publications.
Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
Muslim inmate who legally changed his name was
entitled to use both his religious and committed names on correspondence;
prison officials violated his rights if correspondence they refused to process
contained both names, federal appeals court holds. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330
(9th Cir. 1994).
Rules requiring Native American inmate to cut his
hair, as well as prohibiting his possession of various religious articles while
in administrative segregation, did not violate his rights and were based on
legitimate security concerns. Bettis v. Delo, 14 F.3d 22 (8th Cir. 1994).
Minister who was not part of county jail's
religious program was arbitrarily denied private meetings with prisoners, use
of one of the county jail's 50 Bibles, and limited to one visit per day. Phelps
v. Pinkney, 604 N.Y.S.2d 368 (A.D. 1993).
Prisoner's religious freedom was not unduly
burdened by rules prohibiting him from possessing a crucifix. Escobar v.
Landwehr, 837 F.Supp. 284 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
Instituting searches and restrictions on Muslim
inmates' access to chapel in response to fights in the chapel and discovery of
weapons there did not violate Muslim inmates' religious rights. Aziz v. Moore,
8 F.3d 13 (8th Cir. 1993).
"Religious Freedom Restoration Act"
passed into law without any exemption for correctional facilities; prison and
jail regulations imposing a burden on prisoners' free exercise of religion
rights must be justified as furthering a "compelling governmental
interest" and utilize the "least restrictive means" necessary;
standard of justification by showing reasonable relation to "legitimate
penological interest" set for religion cases in O'Lone case overturned by
this legislation. (1993)
Rule requiring that prisoners communicate only in
English could not constitutionally be applied to punish Muslim prisoner for
praying in Arabic; generally stated rule did not give prisoners adequate notice
that it would be given the "unexpected and unusual interpretation" of
applying to prayers. Conner v. Sakai, 994 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1993).
Prison policy prohibiting demonstrative prayers
in the exercise yard did not violate religious freedom rights of Muslim inmates
under New York state law. Jackson v. Coughlin, 595 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. 1993).
Rastafarian prisoner had no right, under New York state law, to wear a
religious crown or receive a vegetarian diet. Bunny v. Coughlin, 593 N.Y.S.2d
354 (A.D. 1993).
Prisoners who claimed a sincere religious belief
against cutting hair were entitled to preliminary injunction against
application of prison grooming code forbidding hair more than three inches in
length. Longstreth v. Maynard, 961 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1992).
Exclusion of prisoner from Native American
Religion ceremonies because he did not have a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
enrollment number did not violate his First Amendment rights, but refusal to
allow inmate to show that he was a Native American by other evidence violated
settlement agreement in other litigation. Bear v. Nix, 977 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir.
1992).
Prison's refusal to allow inmate to receive and
possess allegedly "anti-Catholic" comic books was a violation of his
First Amendment rights; action was based on "speculative" perceived
security risk. Lyon v. Grossheim, 803 F.Supp. 1583 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
Prison's total ban on prayer oil for Muslim
inmates was unconstitutional, and prison official was not entitled to qualified
immunity from damages; total ban on incense, however, was justified by its
possible use to mask the smell of marijuana and its offense to other prisoners.
Munir v. Scott, 792 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
Forbidding Muslim inmates to wear religious
headgear outside of their cells or religious services did not violate their
right to religious freedom. Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1992).
Refusal of prison authorities to deliver a
hardbound Bible to an inmate did not violate the inmate's First or Eighth
Amendment rights since they would have allowed him to possess a softbound
Bible; private corporation running detention facility under contract with
county acted under color of law for purposes of federal civil rights statute.
Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1992).
Occasional availability of a rabbi upon request
and opportunity to use an "All Faith" chapel for prayer was an
adequate accommodation of a Jewish inmate's religious needs in a facility that
only had three or four Jewish prisoners. Jaben v. Moore, 788 F.Supp. 500 (D.
Kan. 1992).
Federal appeals court finds that homosexual
inmate's claim that he was barred from attendance at services because of his
sexual preference required a trial when allegations that inmate was a
"security risk" were also factually disputed. Phelps v. Dunn, 965
F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1992).
Inmates who are members of the Moorish Science
Temple were not entitled to have prison hire an Islamic religious advisor
belonging to their sect; policy of providing only a single Islamic religious
advisor for all sects did not violate constitution. Blair-Bey v. Nix, 963 F.2d
162 (8th Cir. 1992).
Prison rule requiring short hair was justified by
legitimate security concerns and therefore did not violate religious freedom
rights of Rastafarian inmates. Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961
F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1992).
Prison prohibition on long hair and beards did
not violate prisoners' right to free exercise of religion; grooming regulation
was rationally related to legitimate prison security and hygiene concerns.
Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1992).
Inmate's request that prison use his new Islamic
name was not based on a sincerely held religious belief, but even if it had
been, the prison officials did not violate his First Amendment rights by
refusing to exclusively use his new name. Thacker v. Dixon, 784 F.Supp. 286
(E.D.N.C. 1991).
Prison regulation prohibiting "long
hair" did not violate the religious freedom rights of "Nazarite"
religion prisoner. Campbell v. Purkett, 957 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1992).
Punishment of inmate for violation of prison
rules, which prevented him from engaging in communal prayer during Islamic
holiday, did not violate his right to freedom of religion. Benford v. Wright,
782 F.Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
Prison officials' requirement that Muslim
prisoner remove his religious headgear in dining room and in disciplinary
proceedings did not violate his constitutional rights, even if his religious
belief was that he had to wear it at all times. Aqeel v. Seiter, 781 F.Supp.
517 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
Federal court should have appointed lawyer for
inmate to pursue his claim that prison officials' denial of his request to send
$2 from his inmate trust account to a religious organization violated his First
Amendment rights. Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991).
Prison's decision to conduct Muslim religious
services on Friday evenings rather than Friday afternoon, did not violate
Muslim inmate's constitutional right to exercise his religion. Johnson v.
Bruce, 771 F.Supp. 327 (D. Kan. 1991).
Rastafarian prisoner did not have a right, under
New York state law, to wear a religious crown or receive a vegetarian diet.
Bunny v. Coughlin, 573 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. 1991).
Federal appeals court overturns dismissal of
Native American prisoner's lawsuit over denial of exemption from haircut
regulation; genuine issues existed as to whether prisoner was sincere in his
religious beliefs and whether an exemption from grooming requirements would be
reasonable. Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
Failure to provide inmate with a Unitarian
Universalist chaplain or a vegetarian diet did not violate his right to
religious freedom. Johnson v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1991).
Volunteer chaplain's and deputy's actions in
barring a homosexual inmate from taking a leadership role in chapel services
was reasonably related to security concerns and the need to provide religious
programs for the inmate population as a whole. Phelps v. Dunn, 770 F.Supp. 346
(E.D. Ky. 1991).
Failure to pay for full-time "imam" to
serve Muslim inmates did not violate their religious rights; provision of pay
for four hours of service each week, plus provision of religious diet and
allowing volunteers to provide additional services showed reasonable religious
opportunities were provided. Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1991). Requiring prisoner to participate in alcoholism treatment program
modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous did not violate his religious freedom despite
references to "Higher Power" in its philosophy. Stafford v. Harrison,
766 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991).
If Seventh Day Adventist sincerely believes that
his religious beliefs require a vegetarian diet, he may be entitled to receive
one; failure to provide such a diet, however, did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991).
Prison policy prohibiting nation of Islam from
holding services at prison without outside religious leader did not violate
inmate's religious rights. Hobbs v. Pennell, 754 F.Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1991).
Prison could forbid Jewish prisoners to wear
yarmulkes outside of religious services and cells without violating their First
Amendment religious rights; rule against non-uniform headgear was aimed at
cutting down on gang activity. Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991).
Prison rules requiring haircuts and requiring
clean shaven appearance for identification photographs did not violate
prisoners' religious rights because of a strong interest in preventing escapes.
Harris v. Dugger, 757 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Perry v. Davies, 757
F.Supp. 1223 (D. Kan. 1991).
Rastafarian inmates could not be required to cut
their "dreadlocks," but could be prohibited from wearing religious
"crowns." Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 372 (1990).
Inmates in protective custody who were not
permitted private meetings with religious advisors were denied a reasonable
opportunity to exercise their religions. Griffin v. Coughlin, 743 F.Supp. 1006
(N.D.N.Y. 1990).
Prohibition on inmate in disciplinary segregation
possessing rosary and temporary denial of visits with Catholic priest did not
violate inmate's religious rights. McClaflin v. Pearce, 743 F.Supp. 1381 (D.
Or. 1990).
Prison rule against beards did not violate
religious rights of orthodox Jewish inmates; policy was justified by
institutional security interests. Friedman v. State of Ariz., 912 f. 2d 328
(9th Cir. 1990).
Prison's policy of refusing to add prisoner's
Muslim name to his clothing and mail delivery list was an unreasonable
restraint on religious freedom. Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir.
1990).
Prison policy prohibiting inmate beards over two
inches long did not violate religious freedom rights of Aryan Nation church
member. Dunavant v. Moore, 907 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1990).
Prison officials failed to justify treating one
religious group different from others who were exempted from prison grooming
policies against long hair and beards. Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir.
1990).
Regulation prohibiting use of inmate trust funds
for religious contributions did not violate prisoners' first amendment rights.
Blankenship v. Gunter, 898 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1990). Federal appeals court
reinstates inmate's suit challenging federal prison chaplains' exercise of
nonreligious powers. Theriault v. A Religious Office, 895 F.2d 104 (2nd Cir.
1990).
Denying Muslim prisoners right to hold
prison-wide services following lockdown and subsequent rearrangement did not
violate first amendment. Ra Chaka v. Franzen, 727 F.Supp. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
Inmate could be denied access to satanic
materials based on prison security concerns. McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993
(11th Cir. 1989).
Regulation requiring approval of prisoner
mailings was not unconstitutional as applied to prisoner's mailings on behalf
of purported church. Woods v. O'Leary, 890 F.2d 883 (7th cir. 1989).
Muslim prisoner was not denied religious freedom
due to lack of Muslim services at jail while he was confined there. Siddiqi v.
Leak, 880 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1989).
Prison policy prohibiting Jewish prisoners from
traveling within facility for religious services violated first amendment.
Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1989).
Requiring Rastafarian inmate to get haircut for
identification photograph violated religious freedom. Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708
F.Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Missing one meal prepared in accordance with
Muslim religious beliefs and unsanitary prayer surroundings, in absence of
municipal policy, did not result in liability. Muhammad v. McMickens, 708
F.Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Prison did not need to employ chaplains of each
possible faith; refusal to allow inmates to conduct moorish science services
without minister proper. Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1988).
U.S. appeals court remands case on prisoners' use
of Muslim names for determination of whether alternative of A/K/A on mail and
prison clothing is reasonable. Salaam v. Lockhart, 856 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir.
1988).
Orthodox Jewish inmate's rights violated by
requirement that beard be no longer than one inch. Fromer v. Scully, 693 F
Supp. 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Prison officials entitled to qualified immunity
for disciplining inmate for group prayer in prison yard. Shabazz v. Coughlin,
852 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir. 1988).
Native American inmate's rights violated by
prison policy of hiring medicine man from variant sect of Sioux Tribe.
Sapanajin v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1988).
Prison can prohibit unsupervised group worship in
yard, while allowing other group activities such as sports. Cooper v. Tard, 855
F.2d 125 (3rd Cir. 1988).
Prisoner awarded $50 for prison official's
unjustified denial of his entrance to prison chapel. Vanscoy v. Hicks, 691
F.Supp. 1336 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
Valid security interests outweighed any right of
inmate to grow hair long as required by American Indian religion. Pollock v.
Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988).
Inmate confined to special housing unit as
disciplinary measure could be denied right to request attendance at Muslim
services. Aliym v. Miles, 679 F.Supp. 1 (W.D. N.Y. 1988).
U.S. Supreme court rules inmate working outside
can be prevented from returning to prison for church services; appellate court
erred in placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of
alternative methods of ensuring constitutional protections. O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 107 S.Ct. 2400 (1987).
U.S. Supreme Court vacates court decision that
regulation prohibiting rosary beads in visiting area violates first amendment.
Higgins v. Burroughs, 816 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir.), vacated, 108 S.Ct. 54 (1987).
Prison restriction on Hebrew Israelite literature
violated first amendment; despite racist content, "speculative" to
assume it would lead to violence. Lawson v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 781 (11th Cir.
1987).
Prisoner who converted to islam did not have
clearly established constitutional right to refuse to respond to committed
name. Muhammad v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 1422 (11th Cir. 1987).
Prison could not restrict job as prison chaplain
to "protestant"; refusal to consider muslim violated Title VII. Rasul
v. District of Columbia, 680 F.Supp. 436 (D. D.C. 1988).
Prison need not accede to inmate's request for
food prepared in pots and with utensils that had not touched pork. Kahey v.
Jones, 836 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1988).
Court overturns award of damages for refusal to
allow inmate to lead muslim service; wrong standard was applied. Lane v.
Griffin, 834 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1987).
Jewish prisoner entitled to present evidence on
claim that he was denied right to practice religion; belief must be sincerely
held. McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987).
Requirement that prisoner sign both committed name
and legal muslim name when entering library did not violate religious freedom.
Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1987).
Prison regulation forbidding the wearing of
native American religious headbands in dining facilities was not a first
amendment violation. Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
Orthodox Jewish prisoner could bring lawsuit over
denial of kosher food, confiscation of religious articles and prohibition of
facial hair. Ross v. Coughlin, 669 F.Supp. 1235 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).
Prison can bar certain inmates from Native
American religious ritual requiring use of axe, red hot stones and pitchfork.
Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
Prison may ban religious worship by group
advocating violent racism, but may not bar literature advocating "racial
purity." McCabe v. Arave, No. 86-3640, (9th Cir. 1987), 87 Daily Journal
Daily Appellate Report 6186 (Sept. 15, 1987).
Policy allowing female guards access to areas
where they could view nude male inmates might violate inmates religious
freedom. Kent v. Johnson, 41 CrL 2204 (6th Cir. 1987).
Denial of request that all sunni moslem inmates
be allowed to shower before services did not violate rights. Abdullah v.
Coughlin, 515 N.Y.S.2d 881 (A.D. 1987).
Court prevents religious group of inmates from
wearing identifying emblems because of their street gang involvement; no right
to separate church services. Faheem-El v. Lane, 657 F.Supp. 638 (C.D. Ill.
1986).
Prohibiting "dreadlock" hairstyle of inmates
supported by security reasons; guard may be present at inmate religious
meetings. Reed v. Faulkner, 653 F. Sup. 965 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
Warden not in contempt of consent decree calling
for medicine men and spiritual leaders; peyote "buttons" properly
prohibited in native american inmate religious services. Indian Inmates of
Nebraska Penitentiary v. Grammer, 649 F.Supp. 1374 (D. Neb. 1986).
Protective custody inmates entitled to equivalent
religious and library facilities available to general population inmates;
injunction ordered against statesville correction department. Williams v. Lane,
646 F.Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
"Witchcraft" (Wiccan) religion held
valid by the 4th Circuit; "the Church of Wicca occupies a place in the
lives of its members parallel to that of more conventional religions."
Prison officials must allow inmate to use a white robe and statue in the
chapel, but could prohibit candles and sulfur. Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929,
1986 U.S. App. Lexis 29400 (4th Cir.).
Close custody inmates properly denied group
services. McCabe v. Arave, 626 F.Supp. 1199 (D. Idaho 1986).
National agreement signed allowing homosexual
church services in prison. Information was obtained from the San Francisco
Recorder, California, 8/28/86.
Inmates properly segregated for refusing I.D.
cards with "committed" and adopted names. Mujihadeen v. Compton, 627
F.Supp. 356 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).
Prisoner entitled to religious materials such as
candles, incense, and a robe, despite security concerns. Dettmer v. Landon, 617
F.Supp. 592 (D.C. Va. 1985).
Standard modified on right to attend religious
services. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3rd Cir. 1986).
Sheriff properly dismissed social worker for
giving religious counseling. Spratt v. Co. of Kent, 621 F.Supp. 594 (D.C. Mich.
1985).
Dietary and work provisions arranged for Muslims.
Al Shakir v. Carlson, 605 F.Supp. 374 (M.D. Pa. 1984).
Claim for denial of religious literature to
proceed. Wiggins v. Sargent, 753 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1985).
Rights between prison and inmates discussed when
Moslems change their names. Azeez v. Fairman, 604 F.Supp. 357 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
Violence prevents the conducting of group
homosexual religious services. Brown v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 408 (6thCir. 1984).
Court upholds four-bag rule; no violation in not
recognizing use of Muslim names. Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 591 F.Supp. 353
(N.D.N.Y. 1984).
Court had no authority to order officials no make
prayer provisions for Muslims. Sapp v. Jones, 481 N.Y.S.2d 514 (A.D. 3 Dept.
1984). Temporary suspension of religious services upheld for security reasons.
Thomas v. Norris, 596 F.Supp. 422 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
Religious inmates allowed to wear headbands.
Reinert v. Haas, 585 F.Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa, 1984).
Muslim prisoners may have right to shower before
religious services. Abdullah v. Coughlin, 474 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. 1984).
Prison officials improperly denied special diet
for religious inmate subsequently needing medical furlough to determine
condition of his health. Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F.Supp. 863 (E.D. N.C.
1983.
Court denies inmate's claim to practice religion
found to be a "sham". Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F.Supp. 730 (D. N.J.
1983).
Moslem inmates allowed to remain in their cells
to pray during recreation period. Abdullah v. Smith, 465 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App.
1983).
Moslem inmates must leave recreation yard and
return to their cells to pray. Bowe v. Smith, 465 N.Y.S.2d 391 (App. 1983).
Different treatment between Moslems and
Christians does not violate equal protection. Thompson v. Comm. of Ky., 712
F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1983).
Prison regulation prohibiting beards was valid;
no infringement on religion. McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983).
Inmate properly denied religious articles and the
practice of Satanic beliefs. Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983);
affirming 509 F.Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
Inmate sues seeking injunctive relief from
shaving for religious and medical reasons. Moore v. State of Florida, 703 F.2d
516 (11th Cir. 1983).
Court denies inmate's claim on basis of
"sham" religion ordination as ministers by mail (Universal Life
Church of California). Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F.Supp. 730 (D. N.J. 1983).
Native American inmates accuse prison officials
of religious discrimination. Native American Council of Tribes v. Solem, 691
F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1982).
Sixth circuit orders review of Ohio prison policy
requiring inmate to cut his hair; finds that religious rights may have been
violated. Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1982).
Missouri Federal Court dismisses suit brought by
Native American Indian federal prisoners alleging religious deprivation. Mathes
v. Carlson, 534 F.Supp. 226 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
Fourth Circuit allows inmate to grow hair in
accord with religious beliefs. Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir.
1982).
Request for religious services for homosexuals
denied for fear that violence would erupt. Inosencio v. Johnson, 547 F.Supp.
130 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
Inmate not allowed to grow beard since it
prevents ease of identification in the event of escape. Furqan v. Ga. State Bd.
of Offender Rehabilitation, 554 F.Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Appeals court rules that suit by inmate which he
claimed that hair grooming standards infringed his religious freedom was not
frivolous. Dreibelbis v. Marks, 675 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1982).
Federal court upholds North Carolina prison
regulations concerning the ordering of prayer rugs by muslim inmates;
requirements do not violate inmate's exercise of freedom of religion. Vaughn v.
Garrison, 534 F.Supp. 90 (E.D. N.C. 1981).
Missouri federal court dismisses suit concerning
deprivation of religious right finding his "religion" to be bogus.
Green v. White, 525 F.Supp. 81 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
Oklahoma Supreme Court rules that denying inmate
the use of marijuana for religious purposes was not unconstitutional.
L'Aquarius v. Maynard, 634 P.2d 1310 (Okla. 1981).
Pennsylvania Federal Court rejects inmate's
application for injunctive relief asking for either a special religious diet or
transfer to a county institution. Africa v. State of Pennsylvania, 520 F.Supp.
967 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Federal court grants summary judgment against
Jewish prisoners seeking relief for alleged religious infringement. Glasshofer
v. Thornburgh, 514 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Rules prohibiting inmates from wearing hats and
attending religious services while in segregation upheld on appeal. St. Claire
v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1980); 482 F.Supp. 257 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Punishment of inmate for refusal to handle pork
violates First Amendment; 9 1/2 month stay in segregation held not
disproportionately long. Chapman v. Pickett, 419 F.Supp. 967 (C.D. Ill. 1980).
Prison's policy of requiring Muslim inmates to
use non- Muslim commitment names violates First Amendment; exception made for
records-keeping. Masjid Muhammad - D.C.C. v. Keye, 479 F.Supp. 1311 (D. Del.
1979).
» For earlier case discussions see; Jones v.
Bradley, 590 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1979);McDonald v. Hall, 576 F.2d 120 (1st Cir.
1978); Theriault v. Silber, 453 F.Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Ron v. Lennane,
445 F.Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1977); Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir.
1976); Burgen v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976); Jihaad v. Carlson, 410
F.Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Hundley v. Sielaff, 407 F.Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Pinkston v. Bensinger, 359 F.Supp. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wilson v. Prasse,
463 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1972); William v. Hoyt, 556 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1977);
Maquire v. Wilkinson, 405 F.Supp. 637 (D. Conn. 1975); Collins v. Haga, 373
F.Supp. 923 (W.D. Va. 1974); Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa
1973); United States ex rel.Goings v. Aaron, 350 F.Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972);
Smith v. Sampson, 349 F.Supp. 268 (D. N.H. 1972); Howard v. Warden, 348 F.Supp.
1204 (E. D. Va. 1972); Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972);
Williams v. Batton, 342 F.Supp. 1110 (E.D. N.C. 1972); Rowland v. Jones, 452
F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).