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Corrections Law for
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Segregation: Administrative
An inmate was moved to administrative segregation after federal corrections officers found a homemade shank on him. He remained in the Special Handling Unit (SHU) pending investigation. Ten months later, he was indicted for possession of a prohibited object in prison. He filed several motions for extensions before moving to dismiss, citing his placement in isolation as the start of the speedy trial clock. The trial court denied the motion. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 months imprisonment consecutive to his underlying sentence. A federal appeals court ruled that a prisoner’s placement in isolation while under investigation for a new crime does not trigger his right to a speedy trial under either the Sixth Amendment or the Speedy Trial Act. U.S. v. Bailey-Snyder, #18-1601, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 13406 (3d Cir.).
A Kansas prisoner sued a number of state correctional officials as well as prison officials, claiming various constitutional violations arising from his lengthy placement in solitary confinement. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of the solitary confinement, there was no clearly established law that would have put them on notice that it violated his rights. Grissom v. Roberts, #17-3185, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 24544 (10th Cir.).
A federal appeals court agreed with the trial court that an inmate’s due process rights were violated when correctional officials assigned him as a pretrial detainee to administrative segregation without an individualized assessment of his risk to institutional security, but the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. It was not clearly established that a substantive due process violation would result from the plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation based solely on his prior assignment to (and failure to complete) administrative segregation. In this case, he was discharged from administrative segregation and released, arrested again on new drug-related offenses, and then re-admitted into administrative segregation. Allah v. Milling, #16-1443, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 23631 (2nd Cir.).
Placing a pretrial detainee in administrative segregation and restricting his telephone privileges while allegations of misconduct were being investigated did not violate his due process rights. The suspected misconduct involved him threatening other detainees in order to coerce them into using “Speedy Bail Bond Service” and receiving compensation from Speedy for doing so. The detainee had not met his heavy burden of showing that defendants exaggerated their response to the genuine security considerations that resulted in his move. His transfer was for institutional security reasons rather than for discipline or punishment. Steele v. Cicchi, #14-3127, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 7844 (3rd Cir.).
In a lawsuit seeking class action status by Massachusetts prisoners against correctional officials, the plaintiffs claimed that their placements in a "special management unit" (SMU) in nondisciplinary administrative segregation violated their due process rights as well as Department regulations. The highest court in Massachusetts held that the dismissal of the lawsuit as moot was erroneous even if the named inmates were no longer in administrative segregation. The court had a duty to decide the appeal on its merits notwithstanding the potential voluntary cessation of allegedly wrongful conduct by the defendants, as the alleged wrongs continued to affect those who remained confined to SMUs. Cantell v. Commissioner of Correction, #SJC-12015, 475 Mass. 745, 2016 Mass. Lexis 766, 60 N.E.3d 1149.
A
Massachusetts prisoner was awarded $28,578.69 in attorney's fees and costs as a
prevailing plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 after he sued claiming that
prison officials violated his constitutional due process rights by holding him
in essentially solitary confinement in a special management unit (SMU) for ten
months, without a hearing, while waiting to transfer or reclassify him. That
resulted in a decision in Massachusetts “for the first time that segregated
confinement on awaiting action status for longer than ninety days gives rise to
a liberty interest entitling an inmate to notice and a hearing,” and a written
post-hearing decision. The highest court in Massachusetts upheld the attorneys’
fee award although the plaintiff was discharged from the SMU detention long
before relief in his favor was granted, as he qualified as a "prevailing
party” because the declaratory judgment granted was not moot when entered, as
the deprivation of civil rights was capable of repetition against him, and the
inmate directly benefited from the judgment when it was entered. LaChance v.
Commissioner of Correction, #SJC-12016, 475 Mass. 757, 2016 Mass. Lexis 767, 60
N.E.3d 1157
A prisoner
placed in solitary confinement for twenty-two years under administrative
segregation claimed that this violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to
procedural and substantive due process. A federal appeals court ruled that the
record presented triable issues of fact regarding the inmate's Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process claim, as there were factual questions about whether his periodic state-mandated
reviews of his administrative segregation had been meaningful. The trial court
also acted erroneously by acting on its own to grant summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s substantive due process claim. Proctor
v. LeClaire, #15-3673, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 1201 (2nd
Cir.).
Each of the plaintiff inmates was
sentenced to death in Pennsylvania and housed on the death row of a state
prison in solitary confinement. Each of their death sentences was vacated, but
several years went by before they were resentenced to life without parole. They
sued seeking damages for the time spent in solitary confinement on death row
after their death sentences were vacated, claiming that this continued solitary
confinement without meaningful review violated Fourteenth Amendment due
process. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants.
While the court found that there was a constitutionally protected liberty
interest that prohibits the state from continuing to house inmates in
solitary confinement on death row after they have been granted resentencing
hearings, without meaningful review of the continuing placement, that principle
was not previously clearly established, so prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity. Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, #14-1469, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 2327 (3rd
Cir.).
A prisoner who spent
about a year in administrative segregation while waiting for a transfer claimed
that this violated his rights. A federal appeals court rejected the claim. The
state court order mandating the transfer when his conviction was vacated was
stayed for an appeal, and he remained in segregation while the appeal was
pending. He remained a prisoner and did not regain the status of a pretrial
detainee. He was not deprived of a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Ballinger v. Cedar County, #14-3576, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 567 (8th
Cir.).] A settlement has been reached in a
lawsuit challenging the practice of long-term solitary confinement in
California prisons. The settlement basically ends indeterminate long-term
solitary confinement in the Special Housing Unit in California state prisons,
in which prisoners are often confined based on gang affiliation, and spells out
detailed procedural requirements. Ashker v. Brown, #C-09-05796, U.S. Dist. Ct.
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2015).
A trial court granted summary judgment to a
Virginia death row prisoner enjoining prison officials to either improve his
conditions of confinement or provide him with an individualized classification
determination for his prison housing. A federal appeals court reversed, finding
that the mere presence of harsh and atypical confinement conditions, by themselves,
do not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding them. Further, in the
circumstances of the case, where state law mandates the conditions of
confinement to be imposed on prisoners convicted of certain crimes and
receiving certain sentences, such as housing on death row for those sentenced
to death, those conditions of confinement are, by definition, "ordinary
incidents of prison life" for those prisoners. No violation was shown of
the plaintiff's procedural due process rights. Prieto v. Clarke, #13-8021, 780
F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015).
A prisoner claimed that he had been granted
parole but that it was rescinded because he was facing pending disciplinary
charges and had been placed in a restrictive housing unit as a result. He
claimed that these actions were retaliatory for having filed a grievance
against an officer. These actions did not violate his due process rights
because the misconduct determinations, his time placed in the restrictive
housing unit, and his parole recission, did not, either alone or in
combination, create an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life. But the prisoner did adequately allege a
retaliation claim against a particular officer by claiming that when he refused
to confess to a particular charge and instead filed a grievance against this
officer, he was placed in administrative custody in retaliation. Fantone v.
Latini, #13-3611, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 2470 (3rd Cir.).
A prisoner was kept in solitary confinement for
39 years, kept in his cell 23 hours a day, with one hour designated for
exercise and a shower. It began after he was suspected of the murder of a
corrections officer in 1972, a crime for which he was later convicted. During
those years, he claimed, he was also not given the ability to participate in
religious or educational opportunities or to enjoy other privileges given to
those in the general prison population. Officers were properly denied qualified
immunity. Reasonable prison officials would have been on notice that continuing
the solitary confinement in the manner alleged and for that time period, which
would have constituted an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life, would give rise to a liberty interest
requiring procedural protections.
Additionally, the appeals court found that the
fact that he had been transferred to a new facility, where he remained in
solitary confinement, was irrelevant. "Given the extraordinarily lengthy
detention and the isolating, restrictive conditions that we consider here,
there is no basis for concluding that prison officials may avoid the
established constitutional rights of prisoners by transferring them to a new
facility and wiping the slate clean, while continuing all of the conditions
that the prisoner has challenged." Wilkerson v. Stalder, #13-31289, 2014
U.S. App. Lexis 23762 (5th Cir.).
A federal prisoner filed a lawsuit claiming that
he had been placed in administrative detention for 60 days in unlawful
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment for filing a claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), as well as a claim of failure to protect in
violation of the Eighth Amendment based on an assault on him by another
prisoner. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, based on
the plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust available administrative remedies
before suing, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.
1997e(a), as well as a ruling that the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim was
barred by his decision to file a FTCA claim regarding the assault. A federal
appeals court vacated the trial court's ruling, holding that the failure to
exhaust available administrative remedies should be excused because of specific
allegations that one of the defendants intimidated him from pursuing a
grievance by a threat to transfer him to another facility where she said he
would be attacked and placing him in a special housing unit after he filed his
FTCA claim, and that the FTCA claim did not bar the Eighth Amendment claim
because the FTCA claim was dismissed by the trial court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and there was no judgment on the claim. Himmelreich v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, #13-4212, 766 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2014).
While imprisoned in a state facility, an inmate
engaged in misconduct that resulted in an administrative sanction of a ten-year
term in a segregated maximum security housing unit. He also faced a state
criminal charge of armed assault with intent to murder. When the inmate
finished his original criminal sentence, he remained incarcerated as a pretrial
detainee for the new assault charges. He was convicted on that assault, and
continued to serve out the balance of the ten-year administrative sanction on
the segregated maximum security housing unit. A federal appeals court
overturned an award of damages and equitable relief on the prisoner's claim
that two high ranking prison officials violated his due process rights by
continuing to confine him in the segregated unit both as a pretrial detainee
and as a sentenced prisoner. The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
as they had not violated his clearly established constitutional rights.
Reasonable prison officials would not have known that holding him in the segregated
unit during his pretrial detention for an offense that occurred during a prior
criminal sentence was unconstitutional. His subsequent release from the
segregated unit made his request for equitable relief moot. Ford v. Bender,
#12-1622, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 18298 (1st Cir.).
An Oregon prisoner claimed that his due process
rights were violated when he was housed in an Intensive Management Unit (IMU)
for twenty-seven months without periodic, meaningful review of his status.
While the court agreed that the alleged conditions of confinement in the IMU
implicated a protected liberty interest, claims against the state department of
corrections and officials in their official capacities for damages were barred
by Eleventh Amendment immunity, while claims against individuals in their
individual capacities were barred by qualified immunity, as the right asserted
was not clearly established at the time. Summary judgment on a claim for
declaratory judgment was also properly granted when the plaintiff had subsequently
been released from the IMU and there was nothing to indicate that he was likely
to be subjected to the same conditions again. Brown v. Oregon Dept. of Corr.,
#11-35628, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 8022 (9th Cir.).
The plaintiff was confined for many years to a
security housing unit (SHU) for the purpose of protecting other prisoners from
him and his gang underlings, as a result of his prior gang activities. He was
ordered released from the SHU in 2006 when he claimed that he was no longer an
active gang member. He was returned to the SHU subsequently on the basis of
allegations of further gang activity. The trial court later issued orders in
2009 and 2011 claiming that his return to SHU violated its 2006 order, and
again ordering him released. A federal appeals court found that the later two
orders were an abuse of discretion, ignoring developments after 2006, and
improperly impeded prison management. Griffin v. Gomez, #09-16744, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014).
A Michigan prisoner was placed in administrative
segregation for close to 13 years because he was considered an escape risk. He
was serving a sentence from attempted escape as well as two years for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, and a life sentence for murder. Most of that
time, he was in a maximum security facility. He filed a lawsuit claiming that
his statutory and First Amendment religious freedom rights had been violated
while he was in segregation and that he was denied access to Christian worship
services and kept in segregation without any meaningful review. While a federal
appeals court agreed that no violation of his religious freedom rights had been
shown, it also ruled that summary judgment for the defendants was improperly
granted on a due process claim. There were disputed factual issues, including
whether the four misconduct reports concerning his behavior over a ten year
time period was sufficient to keep him in administrative detention or whether
the "aging" escape history justified it. Selby v. Caruso, #13-1248,
734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013).
A federal trial court dismissed a prisoner's
challenge to the alleged lack of due process in the periodic reviews of his
administrative segregation in a prison special housing unit, finding that it
was barred by the decision in his earlier lawsuit raising similar issues. A
federal appeals court reinstated his claims, finding that his current complaint
was based on allegations of new facts not previously litigated. Proctor v.
LeClaire, #11-3312, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 8381 (2nd Cir.).
After a prisoner was visited by his fiancée, his
undergarments tested positive for cocaine and bottles were found in his cell
that tested positive for methamphetamine. Prison authorities placed him on
contraband watch for six days until he had three bowel movements. These bowel
movements did not reveal drugs. Rejecting the argument that placing him on
contraband watch had been cruel and unusual punishment, a federal appeals court
ruled that the law at the time (April-May 2002) did not clearly establish that
the types of measures prison officials took were unconstitutional, especially
given the important purpose of discovering contraband. The defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity. Chappell v. Mandeville, #09-16251, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 2192
(9th Cir.).
A prisoner stated a plausibly valid claim that 13
prison officials failed to adequately protect him against assault by other
prisoners by placing him in a recreation yard with others who had learned that
he was cooperating with investigators in intercepting notes which prisoners
were passing among each other. He failed, however, to show that there was
deliberate indifference in placing him in a locked recreation pen with one
specific prisoner. He state a valid claim that one prison official reacted
unreasonably to one attack on him, but not to another attack. He also stated a
valid claim for officials keeping him too long in administrative segregation.
Bistrian v. Levi, #10-3629, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 19973 (3rd Cir.).
A prisoner held in administrative segregation
claimed that officials gave only "perfunctory" review, if any at all,
as to whether prisoner behavior had improved. Such improvement was supposed to
be the basis for promotion to a less restrictive level in the six-level administrative
segregation system. The appeals court stated that it believed that "if a
prison system wishes to encourage better behavior by implementing a stratified
incentive program that involves an atypical and significant hardship, it must
provide meaningful individualized review to prisoners to help them progress
through the program." The defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
from liability, however, since, at the time of the controversy, it was not
clearly established that the review process should apply through all the
program's levels or that the perfunctory reviews given at the first three
levels or lack of any review at all on levels 4-6 would not be considered
meaningful. Toevs v. Reid, #10–1535, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 7994 (10th Cir.).
A prisoner who was held in administrative
segregation for fourteen years showed that the supposed periodic reviews of his
status were "meaningless," in violation of due process. Prison
officials essentially took the position that he would be kept in administrative
segregation because of past misconduct, and that his seven years with no
further violations were irrelevant. This put improper weight on past conduct,
denying him release from administrative segregation even if he acted as a
"model prisoner." Williams v. Hobbs, #10-2465, 662 F.3d 994
(8th Cir. 2011).
An amendment to the California state penal code
under which a prison inmate who chose to remain an active gang member during
his incarceration was placed in administrative segregation and deemed ineligible
to earn sentence reduction conduct credits did not violate his rights against
ex post facto punishment since his choice to remain in the gang continued after
the passage of the provision. The court also found that the determination that
he remained a gang member was adequately supported by "some
evidence." In re Efstathiou, #C067807, 2011 Cal. App. Lexis 1381 (Cal.
App.).
A federal appeals court ruled that prison
officials violated a prisoner's due process rights by denying him
"meaningful" periodic reviews during a long period of confinement in
administrative segregation at a certain level of the facilities "Quality
of Life" program. The prisoner had a protected liberty interest in being
able to progress to other levels of the program with fewer restrictions and
more privileges. But the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from
liability since it was not clearly established law during the years 2005-2009
that the kind of review process provided was inadequate. Toevs v. Reid, #10-1535,
646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011).
A pretrial detainee who complained about a
sheriff and a jail superintendent confining him to segregation on "suicide
watch" for over two years did not show a violation of his due process
rights. He failed to prove that the defendants intentionally disregarded a
substantial risk of harm to him when what they did was follow a psychologist's
recommendations. Miller v. Hertz, #10-1127, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 10202 (Unpub.
7th Cir.).
A pretrial detainee facing federal drug charges
was first placed in protective custody and then in lockdown without phone or
mail privileges after it was discovered that he was continuing to make phone
calls and might be a threat to various individuals. A federal appeals court
found that any right to be free from restrictive pretrial detention under these
circumstances was not clearly established, and that it was "far from
clear" that it existed at all. Jones v. Horne, #09-5128, 2011 U.S. App.
Lexis 3169 (D.C. Cir.).
When prisoner's reassignment left him better off
rather than worse off than the conditions he previously faced, in a less
restrictive environment, he failed to show that placing him there without
further due process violated his constitutional rights. The prisoner, who shot
and wounded an adult and four children at a community center, and subsequently
murdered a postal worker after fleeing the scene, was transferred from the
general population at one prison to a Special Confinement Unit at a second
prison, designed for high-security inmates. He was later transferred to a
Special Housing Unit and assigned to administrative detention. A federal
appeals court rejected his claim that he was entitled to due process before the
last transfer. Additionally, he failed to sue until he had been in the Special
Housing Unit for over four years, so that his claim that transferring him there
without a hearing violated due process was also barred by a two-year statute of
limitations. Furrow v. Marberry, #10-3232, U.S. App. Lexis 4869 (Unpub. 7th
Cir.).
A prisoner argued that he was improperly
classified as a member of a Security Threat Group in violation of his
constitutional rights. Rejecting this argument, a federal appeals court noted
that a "prisoner has no liberty interest in his custodial
classification." His resulting confinement in administrative segregation
was not so restrictive as to implicate a liberty interest. Flores v.
Livingston, #10-10280, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 26304 (Unpub. 5th Cir.
While two major misconduct tickets were pending
against him, a prison was placed in administrative segregation, and then
transferred to a higher security facility, where he was again placed in
administrative segregation. He was subsequently found guilty of both misconduct
charges, and placed in the general population at his new facility. He sued,
claiming that the administrative segregation and transfer, neither of which had
been preceded by a hearing, violated his due process rights. Upholding the
dismissal of these claims, a federal appeals court held that the prisoner
failed to show that he had a constitutionally protected liberty interest with
regard to either the administrative segregation or the transfer. The
segregation did not impose an "atypical and significant' hardship in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life." As for the transfer, the
prisoner had no right to be confined in any particular prison. Joseph v.
Curtin, #09-1616, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 24380 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Following a prisoner's third "dirty" urine
test, he was allegedly placed in administrative segregation for nine months.
Rejecting the prisoner's due process and Eighth Amendment claims, a federal
appeals court ruled that, without more, a placement in administrative
segregation, even without cause, was not an "atypical and significant
hardship." Orr v. Larkins, #08-3857, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13790 (8th
Cir.).
New York prisoners placed in close custody
housing for periods ranging from 22 days to 15 months argued that they were
improperly confined to their cells for up to 23 hours per day, and that this
had an adverse effect on their mental health and constituted solitary or
"isolation" confinement. State regulations, the court found,
explicitly set forth maximum lock-in times for all prisoners except those in
punitive segregation or contagious disease units. The department's practice of
authorizing the providing of virtually all services to these prisoners,
including meals, religious services, and counseling, in their cells for up to
23 hours per day violated the specified lock-in maximums. The Department would
be given an opportunity to present a plan for compliance before the court would
enter an order. Jackson v. v. Horn, #401028/09, 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 297 (Sup.
N/Y. County).
A prisoner claimed that false information was
used to reclassify him and segregate him. Claims relating to the alleged
placement of false information in his file were barred, as they involved the
same defendants and same motives as were involved in a previous civil rights lawsuit,
and could have been addressed in that prior lawsuit, as the information was
known by the prisoner at that time. The prisoner's claim that he was
incorrectly reclassified based on an escape attempt was rejected. A prisoner
does not ordinarily have a due process right to a particular classification, in
the absence of the reclassification imposing an "atypical and significant
hardship," and no such extreme conditions were present in this case. Muniz
v. Moore, #09-2199, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 6695 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
A Pennsylvania prisoner sought an injunction
against his placement in a Special Management Unit (SMU). He asserted that a
Periodic Review Committee had decided to release him to the general prison
population but that a prison superintendent rejected this and requested that he
be returned to the SMU. A federal appeals court found that the plaintiff
prisoner had failed to show that SMU conditions were so different that he had a
protected liberty interest in avoiding a transfer there. He had also failed to
show that, in any future transfer to the SMU, he would not be provided with
appropriate procedural protections. The plaintiff had a history of serious
institutional misconduct, and had previously served lengthy periods in
disciplinary segregation. He had not shown that other prisoners with a history
of such serious disciplinary infractions had been treated differently or that
there was no rational reason for his treatment, so he failed to establish the
basis for an equal protection claim. Pressley v. Pa. Dept. of Corrections,
#09-3324, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 3016 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A prisoner's claim that housing him in
administrative custody for three months without notice and a hearing violated
his due process rights was rejected. Even if this arguably violated a state
Department of Corrections administrative directive, the prisoner had failed to
show that conditions to which he was subjected amounted to an "atypical
and significant" hardship. Further, his contention that 16 other inmates
were released from administrative segregation while he alone remained there did
not show a violation of equal protection, as he did not allege that the other
prisoners were placed in segregation for the same reasons and were held in the
same form of custody. Jenkins v. Murray, #08-4824, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 25556
(Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A pretrial detainee claimed that jail employees
violated his due process rights by transferring him from the general population
to a segregation unit without a hearing. Upholding summary judgment for the
defendant employees, a federal appeals court found that the detainee failed to
show that the employees acted to punish him. Their asserted rationale for the
segregation was promoting the safety of those in the jail, and the safety of
the general public. Despite the detainee's rejection of this rationale, he
failed to present anything in the record that disputed it. The detainee had
allegedly threatened an officer, and could not adequately contest the
legitimacy of segregating him for trying to solicit the officer's murder. Love
v. Kirk, #09-1943, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 830 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A prisoner who was convicted of forgery while
incarcerated, based on false Uniform Commercial Code liens that he filed
against prosecutors, was properly placed in administrative segregation after a
search of his cell revealed completed UCC-1 statements in which he targeted
correctional staff members involved in disciplinary hearings against him. While
his sentence in the forgery charges included restrictions on his mailing
privileges designed to prevent him from continuing to file false liens, he was
found guilty of "kiting," or using another prisoner's identity to get
around the mailing restrictions, and the forms found in his cell were sufficient
to support a determination that he intended to keep filing false liens and to
attempt to evade the mailing restrictions. His placement in administrative
segregation on this basis did not violate due process. Fludd v. N.Y. State
Dept. of Correctional Services, #506153, 2009 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 3703 (A.D.
3rd Dept.).
An affidavit from another prisoner, which was the
only evidence a plaintiff inmate showed of retaliation against him for filing a
grievance, actually showed that officials were motivated to place him in
administrative segregation by his dangerousness, not his grievance filing. They
would have taken the same actions even if he had never filed the grievance,
based on his gang affiliation and his long history of violent and abusive behavior.
Denying the prisoner newspapers did not violate the First Amendment, but was an
acceptable policy decision for officials trying to achieve legitimate goals.
The court also rejected the claim that the prisoner's rights were violated by
him being forced to wear a paper gown after he was found casting a string
between cells to try to pass notes and other items. Soto v. Bertrand, #08-2540,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 9901 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A prisoner's placement in administrative
segregation did not violate his due process rights when he was given periodic
reviews as to whether he should remain there. The court rejected a First
Amendment claim, finding evidence that the placement was due to the prisoner's
misconduct. But a reasonable jury could have found that the conditions in
segregation violated the Eighth Amendment based on the actions of other inmates
who allegedly threw body fluids and feces and put feces in the air vents of the
unit. Further proceedings were therefore ordered on Eighth Amendment claims.
McKeithan v. Beard, #08-1746, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7308 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
Placing an inmate in administrative segregation
for an extended period of time did not violate his due process rights when he
was placed there because of a successful escape from another facility that
involved an elaborate plan involving four other people. Over a twenty-year
period, there were fourteen specific allegations of misbehavior attributed to
the prisoner, and he was an extreme risk to the safety and security of any
correctional facility. Proctor v. Kelly, #9:05-CV-0692, 2008 WL 5243925, 2008
U.S. Dist. Lexis 101371 (N.D.N.Y.).
In a prisoner's lawsuit claiming that he was kept
in administrative segregation for an "indeterminate" time without
required review hearings, an appeals court found that, because of the sparse
facts in the record, it was hard to determine exactly when the prisoner's
segregation became so prolonged and restrictive to put him on notice, for
purposes of the statute of limitations, that he had a possible claim to assert,
so that dismissal on statute of limitations grounds was improper. Additionally,
the prisoner's claim that he tried to kill himself satisfied any requirement of
physical injury for an Eighth Amendment claim. The prisoner failed to properly
show a violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination
in the making of contracts, or of 42 U.S.C. Sec 1985(3) and 1986, since there
was no evidence that the defendants conspired to violate his constitutional
rights. He could proceed on his Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec.
1983, as well as on claims concerning the denial of religious freedom, since
there was no information in the record concerning security concerns to justify
preventing the prisoner from attending services, nor was there information as
to whether individual religious counseling was available while he was in
administrative segregation. Arauz v. Bell, No. 08-5186, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis
1370 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Pretrial detainee's placement in administrative
detention was justified by concerns that he might harm or attempt to tamper
with material witnesses in the criminal case against him, and was not imposed
for punitive purposes. Jones v. Lieber, Civil Action No. 07-1027, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 76668 (D.D.C.).
Prisoner's placement in administrative
segregation in a penitentiary Special Management Unit (SMU) was not intended to
be punitive in nature, but instead to provide him, as a person who had been
involved in a gang related disturbance at his prior facility, with additional
program opportunities. His placement in the SMU, therefore, did not raise due
process issues. His subsequent placement in disciplinary segregation in the SMU
was justified by his involvement in "no less" than eighteen
disciplinary incidents, and the prisoner failed to show that he faced atypical
conditions while so confined. MacKey v. Strada, No. 3:CV-06-015, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 86339 (M.D. Pa.).
Prisoner's confinement in segregation did not
violate either his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights or his Eighth
Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. There is no
constitutional liberty interest in confinement in a particular prison or in a
particular security classification. Inconvenient or uncomfortable conditions in
segregation, standing alone, do not violate "contemporary standards of
decency." The plaintiff also failed to show that he suffered any
significant or serious injury as a result of the confinement in segregation, or
was at risk of such an injury in the future. Barrow v. Ray, Civil Action No.
7:08-CV-00525, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 89596 (W.D. Va.).
Colorado prisoner did not have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in staying in the general population and out of
administrative segregation, especially in the absence of any specific claims
about the length or conditions of the administrative segregation. Restricting
him for 14 months from possessing headphones, glasses, a lamp, fan, and
television while on restricted privilege status also did not violate any
constitutionally protected liberty interest. Further, the prisoner's claims
concerning his disciplinary convictions could not be pursued in a federal civil
rights lawsuit when they had not been overturned on appeal or otherwise
invalidated. Doyle v. Cella, Civil Action No. 07-cv-01126, 2008 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 83837 (D. Co.).
Prisoner failed to present a viable due process
claim concerning his initial placement in administrative segregation when he
admitted that he was provided with notice of the facts on which his placement
there was based, as well as an opportunity to be heard. The prisoner also
failed to present a viable claim as to whether the periodic reviews of his
continued placement there were adequate, or concerning the adequacy of lighting
in his cell, the adequacy of the exercise provided to him, or the adequacy of
the calories provided. A claim concerning his medical care was also rejected.
Hampton v. Ryan, No. 06-17388, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 16770 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
Prison officials and directors were not entitled
to qualified immunity on prisoner's claim that they violated his due process
rights by keeping him in administrative segregation for over a year while
investigations of his alleged gang affiliation and disciplinary infractions
were ongoing. The appeals court found that, even if the prison had received
notice of the charges pending against him, there was no indication that he was
presented with any opportunity to present his views. A gang investigation,
however, was not on notice that his conduct in failing to interview the inmate
to get his views prior to recommending that he be placed and kept in
segregation could violate due process, since state regulations did not require
such interviews, so the investigation was entitled to qualified immunity.
Guizar v. Woodford, No. 07-15743, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12614 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
Placement of a prisoner in a Special Housing Unit
on administrative detention status without a hearing for a ten-week period
during the completion of an internal investigation concerning a magazine
confiscated from his locker did not violate his constitutional rights. The
prisoner failed to show, in any way, how he had been deprived of the
"minimal civilized measures of life's necessities" by his
administrative segregation. Wilson v. Hogsten, No. 07-3992, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 5640 (3rd Cir.).
Prisoner's placement in and retention in
administrative custody for eleven years did not violate his constitutional
rights. His status was reviewed every ninety days, and the committee reviewing
that status repeatedly recommended that he remain in administrative custody
status for security and safety reasons, based on his history of serious
misconduct, which included participation in a prison riot and multiple
assaults. The prisoner failed to show that his continued administrative custody
interfered with his First Amendment rights, since he failed to identify a
non-frivolous claim that his status prevented him from presenting. He also claimed
to show that the conditions of his confinement violated his rights. Gans v.
Rozum, No. 07-3750, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 4744 (3rd Cir.).
Prisoner presented insufficient evidence to show
that he was placed in administrative custody or kept there on the basis of or
in retaliation for his religious beliefs. The record showed that the actual
reason for his administrative custody was his "potential involvement"
in an assault on another inmate, and that he was subsequently placed in
disciplinary custody for breaking institutional rules, followed by a return to
administrative custody based on claims that he was a threat to others and
ordered assaults on other inmates. The prisoner also failed to argue that the
conditions of his confinement imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of
his religion. Brown v. Dept. of Corrections, Pa., No. 07-4194, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 3455 (3rd Cir.).
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to prison cells, where prisoners
have no reasonable subjective expectation of privacy. The court also rejected
the prisoner's due process claims, finding no evidence that his placement in
administrative segregation exposed him to atypical or significant hardships.
O'Cain v. Renton Police Dept., 06-36065, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 30262 (9th Cir.).
Appeals court rejects prisoner's claim
that he was subjected to unlawful retaliation when an officer placed him in
administrative segregation, since he failed to show his placement there did not
promote a legitimate interest in maintaining security and order. The prisoner
also failed to show that he suffered a serious deprivation of his rights when
officers allegedly threatened him, subjected him to verbal abuse, and took away
his lunch on one occasion. Wilson v. Pima County Jail, No. 05-16081, 2007 U.S.
App. Lexis 27774, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 27774 (9th Cir.).
Further proceedings were required as to whether
the plaintiff prisoner's confinement in administrative segregation complied
with due process, as it was unclear from the record in the case who the actual
decision-maker was concerning the placement, and whether the prisoner had an
opportunity to present his views to the decision-making authority. Castro v.
Terhune, No. 06-15756, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12700 (9th Cir.).
Prison officials were entitled to qualified
immunity and summary judgment on prisoner's claims that his due process rights
were violated by placing him in administrative segregation for a period of over
850 days. The prisoner was not subjected to an "atypical and significant
hardship," and therefore no constitutionally protected liberty interest
was violated. Hunt v. Sapien, No. 05-3004, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 37976 (D.
Kan.).
A prisoner's relatively brief placement in
administrative segregation was not shown to have subjected him to an
"atypical and significant hardship," so it was not an error to
dismiss his lawsuit. Additionally, claims against state correctional officials
in their official capacities seeking money damages were barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Clayton v. Ward, No. 06-7079, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 12245
(10th Cir.).
Prison officials were entitled to summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for placing a prisoner in
administrative segregation for a period of over 850 days as a security risk
when they had legitimate reasons to regard him as a potential risk to the
safety of other prisoners and prison staff members on the basis of his past
history. Additionally, the conditions of confinement he faced in administrative
segregation were not "atypical" of those faced by prisoners in
protective custody. Hunter v. Sapien, No. 05-3004, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 23888
(D. Kan.).
Placement of transsexual inmate, who lived life
as a female but had male genitalia, into administrative segregation for 14
months without an adversarial hearing or right to appeal did not violate her
due process rights. While the placement isolated the prisoner, it did not
extend the period of their confinement and did not impose an "atypical and
significant hardship" sufficient to violate due process, since the
prisoner was provided with the "ordinary essentials" of prison life.
DiMarco v. Wyoming Depart. of Corrections, No. 04-8024, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis
1497 (10th Cir.). [N/R]
Prisoner's placement in administrative
segregation rather than protective custody in correctional facility was
supported by substantial evidence, including information that he was suspected
of a homicide at another prison, and had a history of extortion against other
prisoners. If the information on which his placement was based was incorrect,
New York state law provided a mechanism to seek removal of the erroneous
information from his record. Mauleon v. Goord, 816 N.Y.S.2d 218 (A.D. 3rd Dept.
2006). [N/R]
Inmate's placement in administrative segregation
for a period of nineteen days was insufficient to involve a possible violation
of a due process protected liberty interest. Gilmore v. Goord, No. 02-CV-6560,
415 F. Supp. 2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). [N/R]
Prisoner who was held in administrative
segregation for three years at three different Colorado prisons asserted
several non-frivolous claims, including for unlawful retaliation against him
for complaining about his segregation, complete denial of outdoor exercise, and
denial of access to "church fellowship," and the prison law library.
Fogle v. Colorado Dep't of Corr., No. 05-1405, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 2024 (10th
Cir.).[2006 JB Mar]
Prison officials did not violate prisoner's rights
by putting him in a highly-restricted cell tier with no contact with other
inmates without a hearing and keeping him there for forty days after he killed
another prisoner who attacked him. Skinner v. Cunningham, No. 05-1046, 2005
U.S. App. Lexis 25223 (1st Cir.). [2006 JB Jan]
Hearing officer needed to make an independent
determination of whether a prisoner's conduct showed him to be a danger to
himself or others before placing him in 23-hour-a-day cell lock-in status.
Grand jury indictment of prisoner for allegedly assaulting another prisoner,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the decision. People ex rel.
Santiago v. Warden, Rikers Island Correctional Facility, 793 N.Y.S. 2d 722
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2005). [N/R]
Prisoner was properly excluded from attendance at
religious ceremony which was attended by Catholic Cardinal and the Governor of
New York, and placed in administrative segregation during the event. Prisoner
had expressed hostility towards the Cardinal, and announced his intention of
attending the ceremony despite his exclusion and "confronting" the
Cardinal for failing to assist him in challenging his conviction. Prison
officials' actions did not violate his First Amendment rights. Gonzalez v.
Narcato, No. 01CV6102, 363 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). [2005 JB Dec]
New York City correctional institution violated
the due process rights of a pre-trial detainee in placing him in 23-hour per
day in-cell lock-in for over 6 months, and failing to hold any hearing for at
least eleven weeks on accusation that he was involved in a fatal assault on
another inmate. Further, the detainee was never fully informed of his rights at
the hearing finally conducted. People ex rel Furde v. N.Y.C. Dept. of
Correction, 796 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Bronx County 2005). [N/R]
Placement of pre-trial detainee in solitary
confinement for two days without a prior hearing did not violate due process.
Holly v. Woolfolk, No. 03-2448, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 14427 (7th Cir). [2005 JB
Sep]
Alleged county jail policy of keeping all
pretrial detainees housed in administrative segregation completely naked
violated their due process and Fourth Amendment rights, and was not justified
by concerns about suicide and guard safety. Federal court was also troubled by the
use of guards of the opposite gender to remove clothing from such detainees.
Sheriff was, however, entitled to qualified immunity from liability, as the law
on the subject was not clearly established at the time the alleged policy was
implemented. Rose v. Saginaw County, #01-10337, 353 F. Supp. 2d 900 (E.D. Mich.
2005). [2005 JB May]
Prison officials did not violate any clearly
established constitutional rights of a prisoner scheduled to be released from
disciplinary segregation by scheduling a hearing to determine whether he should
be kept in administrative segregation. Only an informal, "non-adversary
review" of the information supporting a prisoner's administrative
confinement was required, to be held within a reasonable time after placing the
prisoner in such confinement. In this case, additionally, the prisoner was
notified of a review hearing, and refused to attend it. Martin v. Curry, No.
A-03-604, 690 N.W.2d 186 (Neb. App. 2004). [N/R]
Determination that prisoner should be placed in
administrative segregation, as he was a safety and security risk in the general
prison population, was adequately supported by evidence of the violent and
"heinous" nature of his previous escape attempt, his threats to
escape and kill persons involved in his prosecution, and testimony concerning
recent activities and communications indicating a renewed interest in escape.
Blake v. Selsky, 781 N.Y.S.2d 802 (A.D. 3d Dept. 2004). [N/R]
Factual issues existed as to whether prison
officials who transferred prisoner to administrative segregation after a
behavior modification unit program was discontinued were motivated by a desire
to retaliate against him for filing grievances, in violation of his First
Amendment rights. Summary judgment was therefore properly denied to the
defendants in the prisoner's lawsuit. Lodatao v. Ortiz, No. CIV.A. 02-2803, 314
F. Supp. 2d 379 (D.N.J. 2004). [N/R]
Placement and retention of prisoner in
administrative segregation did not violate his due process rights when he had
previously threatened others and then refused to submit to interviews with the
warden and prison administrative segregation committee, which were required as
part of the procedure for review of his continuing administrative segregation.
Kunze v. Rauser, No. A1-04-005, 332 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D.N.D. 2004). [N/R]
Prisoner failed to show that his placement in
administrative segregation after he finished a period of disciplinary
segregation was in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights
in complaining of prison officials' alleged racism. The stated reasons for
placing the prisoner, who had previously been convicted of drug trafficking
activities within the prison, in administrative segregation were within the
scope of established policy. Hall-Bey v. Hanks, No. 02-4050, 93 Fed. Appx. 977
(7th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Federal appeals court rules that "periodic
reviews" of a prisoner's status in administrative segregation after he
allegedly killed a corrections captain satisfied procedural due process,
rejecting prisoner's complaint that these reviews were "no more than rote
exercises." Such confinement, the court noted, could be constitutional
even if it were based only on the prisoner's "past crimes." The court
further stated, however, that "it would be helpful for judicial
review" if a brief written rationalization for the prisoner's continued
solitary confinement was made during these periodic reviews, although "not
necessarily every ninety days." Delker v. McCullough, No. 03-2145, 103
Fed. Appx. 694 (3rd Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Prison officials were entitled to qualified
immunity from inmate's claim that they violated his due process rights in
deciding to keep him in administrative segregation. The record in the case
showed that the prisoner was given an opportunity to present information to the
committee which made the decision, and the committee regularly reviewed the
prisoner's confinement every seven days during the first two months, and once a
month after that. Torres v. Irvin, No. 02-0295, 99 Fed. Appx. 292 (2nd Cir.
2004). [N/R]
Federal prison officials were improperly granted
summary judgment in pretrial detainee's lawsuit claiming that he was placed in
administrative detention in extremely harsh conditions for over 500 days purely
for the purpose of punishment and without required procedural due process.
Magluta v. F.P. Sam Samples, No. 03-11667, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 14116 (11th
Cir). [2004 JB Aug]
Placement of intersexual (hermaphrodite) prisoner
with both male and female characteristics in segregated confinement for 438
days with severely limited privileges solely because of status of ambiguous
gender was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Such placement was not
aimed at punishment, but at protecting the safety of the inmate and other
prisoners, and the plaintiff prisoner was provided with all basic necessities.
Court also rejects equal protection claim. Continuation of administrative
segregation beyond 30 days, however, without a hearing and with no attempt to
"elevate" prisoner's living conditions was "completely arbitrary
and capricious," and lacked a rational basis. Prison officials should have
known this, and were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity, but only
nominal damages of $1 were awarded, in the absence of evidence of actual harm,
such as lasting mental or physical damages resulting from the segregated
confinement. Plaintiff would also be awarded expert costs, attorneys' fees, and
court costs as a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. DiMarco v. Wyoming
Dept. of Corrections, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (D. Wyo. 2004). [N/R]
Refusal to allow prisoner to call inmate
witnesses at administrative segregation hearing did not violate his procedural
due process rights when the inmates were asked the questions the prisoner
prepared and their audiotaped responses were played at the hearing. Rosales v.
Bennett, 297 F. Supp. 2d 637 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court to review issue of whether
California prison practice of routinely segregating prisoners by race during
initial period of incarceration is permissible for purposes of preventing
racial violence, as federal appeals court ruled, or unconstitutional
discrimination in violation of the right to equal protection. Johnson v.
California, #03-636, 72 U.S. Law Week 3551 (March 1, 2004). [2004 JB Apr]
Prisoner could pursue federal civil rights
lawsuit challenging procedures used in prison disciplinary proceeding or the
resulting administrative sanction, such as placement in segregation without
first having disciplinary determination set aside, since a successful claim
would not necessarily result in any earlier release from incarceration, federal
appeals court rules. Ramirez v. Galaza, #00-15994, 334 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.
2003). [2003 JB Nov]
Michigan state prisoner had no equal protection
right to be removed from administrative segregation and returned to the general
prison population. Plaintiff's claim that he was "treated
differently" from prisoners "with similar needs" did not show
that he was a member of a constitutionally protected class and that the
defendants intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership in
that class. McGaughy v. Johnson, #02-1469, 63 Fed. Appx. 177 (6th Cir.
2003).[N/R]
Placement of prisoner in administrative
segregation while disciplinary charge was pending was not cruel and unusual
punishment since it was not an "atypical and significant hardship"
and had no impact on the duration of his confinement. Lynch-Bey v. Bolden, No.
02-1240, 44 Fed. Appx. 696 (6th Cir. 2002). [N/R]
284:125 Placing
a former correctional officer and state trooper in segregated housing while he
was awaiting trial on state and federal drug charges was not punishment but was
designed to protect him, especially since correctional officials had
information about a specific threat to him from a drug dealer he was alleged to
have "ripped off." Valentin v. Murphy, 95 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D. Conn.
2000).
277:11
Correctional officer violated prisoner's First Amendment rights by placing him
in administrative segregation for three days in retaliation for filing
grievances against him; appeals court rules that nominal damage award of $1 was
inadequate, and that trial court should increase this and also consider
awarding punitive damages against officer. Trobaugh v. Hall, #98-4031, 176 F.3d
1087 (8th Cir. 1999).
266:26
Prisoner's placement in administrative segregation for a period of two and
one-half years, while his involvement in prison riot and murder of correctional
officer were being investigated, did not violate his due process rights. Jones
v. Baker, #97-3406, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998).
267:44
Twenty-one day keeplock confinement while awaiting disciplinary hearing did not
violate prisoner's due process rights; trial court need not present detailed
factual findings in cases involving short periods of segregation where prisoner
has not alleged any unusual conditions. Hynes v. Squillace, #97-2091, 143 F.3d
653 (2nd Cir. 1998).
271:107
Sheriff's decision to place prisoner in segregation unit for five months
without any disciplinary allegation or hearing was not a violation of
prisoner's rights when done because of prisoner's past escape attempt and
greater security of segregation unit. Zimmerman v. Tippecanoe Sheriff's Department,
25 F.Supp.2d 915 (N.D. Ind. 1998).
[N/R]
Eighteen-day administrative segregation while inmate was temporarily housed in
a facility in order to attend court hearings did not constitute an
"atypical and significant hardship" creating a liberty interest. Arce
v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329 (2nd Cir. 1998).
256:58
Prisoner's retention in administrative segregation for an additional 117 days
after he would ordinarily have been returned to general prison population,
because of lack of a bed for him at a suitable facility, did not violate his
due process constitutional rights. Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460 (6th Cir.
1997).
259:109
Prisoner's retention in protective custody without formal review did not
constitute an "atypical and significant hardship" constituting a due
process violation. Neal v. District of Columbia, 131 F.3d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
» Editor's Note: In Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997), a decision
announced the same day by the same panel of the appeals court, a prisoner sought
damages for being placed in administrative segregation without due process. The
appeals court declined to determine whether the plaintiff prisoner had a
protective liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation
under these circumstances, instead focusing on whether, assuming that he did
have such an interest, he had received due process. It ordered further
proceedings on this issue.
261:133
Prisoner's inability, for 70 days in administrative segregation, to engage in
yard exercise did not violate his clearly established rights; prisoner was able
to engage in some exercise in cell and all prisoners were denied yard exercise
for 30 day period during lockdown. Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir.
1997).
262:156
Prisoner's confinement in "drug watch" isolation for a 7 day period
after information was received suggesting that he had been in possession of
narcotics was not a violation of either due process or the 8th Amendment;
prisoner received regular medical attention, adequate food and exercise, and
his cell was actually larger than average in the facility. Thomas v. Irvin, 981
F.Supp. 794 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
243:44 Federal
appeals court overturns injunctive order granting prisoners in administrative
segregation unit right to additional personal property in cells; some property
was properly withheld because of its possible disassembly and use as weapons,
while limiting the amount of other property in cells enhanced the ability to
quickly search cells for weapons and contraband. Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 299
(8th Cir. 1996).
244:60 Focusing
on prison officials' "motives" for placing prisoner in protective
custody and increasing his custody classification was improper when issue was
whether they objectively acted with deliberate indifference and in doing so
deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Howard v.
Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343 (6th Cir. 1996).
250:155 U.S.
Supreme Court decision holding that administrative segregation does not
ordinarily give rise to constitutional due process protections applied
retroactively, federal appeals court rules. Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411 (10th
Cir. 1996). » Editor's Note: A number of other federal appeals courts have also
determined that Sandin applies retroactively. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34
(2d Cir. 1996), Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156 (1st Cir. 1996), and Mujahid v.
Meyer, 59 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 1995).
229:11 Unit
manager of administrative segregation unit liable for $4100 to prisoner who did
not receive 30-day review hearing mandated by Missouri state statute. Weems v.
Delo, 52 F.3d 175 (8th Cir. 1995).
236:125
Administrative segregation, "absent extraordinary circumstances" is
"never a ground for a constitutional claim," federal appeals court rules,
upholding dismissal of prisoner's suit as frivolous. Pichardo v. Kinker, 73
F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1996). [Cross-reference: Frivolous Lawsuits].
235:105 Inmate's
suit challenging his placement in administrative segregation on the basis of
allegedly "false" information regarding his membership in "Aryan
Brotherhood" gang was properly dismissed as frivolous; inmate had no
constitutionally protected interest in his custody status and, even if he had,
providing him with a hearing ten days after his placement in administrative
segregation gave him adequate "due process." Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d
192 (5th Cir. 1995). [Cross- reference: Frivolous Lawsuits].
236:124 Prisoner
had no constitutional right to a specific custody status; placing him in
administrative custody to protect him against possible threats on his life was
within discretion of prison officials and his disagreement with decision, which
he claimed was based on false information, was insufficient to give him grounds
for lawsuit. Oden v. Caison, 892 F.Supp. 111 (E.D.Pa. 1995). [N/R] Michigan
prison regulations did not give inmate a constitutionally protected interest in
staying out of administrative segregation. Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789
(6th Cir. 1995).
223:108
"Brief" presence of female correctional officer during strip search
of male prisoner being transferred because of information about impending
prisoner disturbance did not violate prisoner's privacy rights; decision to
strip search him again before placing him in segregation at receiving facility
was not unreasonable; transfer and segregation were justified by belief that he
was an "instigator" of feared disturbance. Jones v. Harrison, 864
F.Supp. 166 (D. Kan. 1994).
225:141
Sentencing of prisoner to nine years of administrative segregation for forty
disciplinary violations over a two year period did not violate inmate's rights.
Brown v. Nix, 33 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 1994).
226:156 Michigan
prison rules on administrative segregation created a protected liberty interest
for inmate to be released into general population after classification
committee, in monthly review, determined that he no longer met the criteria for
segregation. Mackey v. Dyke, 29 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir. 1994).
[N/R] Prisoner's
rights were violated by being placed in administrative segregation for 67 days
without hearing when state regulation provided that a hearing should be held
after fourteen days. Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496 (2nd Cir. 1994).
[N/R] Prisoner's
placement in administrative segregation prior to hearing did not violate due
process. Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529 (2nd Cir. 1994).
Colorado inmate
had no protected liberty interest in remaining in the prison's general
population rather than in administrative segregation, and therefore no
constitutionally required due process had to be given prior to placing him
there. Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367 (10th Cir. 1994).
Holding a
Missouri inmate in administrative segregation for thirty days without an
informal hearing violated clearly established law and prison officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity against inmate's suit. Jones v. Coonce, 7 F.3d
1359 (8th Cir. 1993).
Washington state
regulations did not create a liberty interest in a prisoner remaining in the
general prison population; inmate could properly be placed in administrative
segregation while investigation proceeded as to whether he threatened to
assault an inmate and an officer. Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987 (9th Cir.
1993).
Prisoner's due
process rights were violated when he was "maliciously" placed in
administrative segregation without a hearing; appeals court finds that damage
award of $500 per day for eight day period of such segregation was excessive,
however. Stevens v. McHan, 3 F.3d 1204 (8th Cir. 1993).
Missouri state
prisoner transferred to new institution did not suffer a constitutional
deprivation when he was placed in administrative segregation in the new prison
for fifteen days without a hearing. Swenson v. Trickey, 995 F.2d 132 (8th Cir.
1993).
Prisoner's
placement in protective custody, based on anonymous phone tip that his life was
in danger and corroborating evidence of his possible involvement in drug
trafficking, did not violate his right to due process. Banks v. Fauver, 801 F.Supp.
1422 (D.N.J. 1992).
Confidential
informant's tip that prisoner was making escape plans was sufficiently reliable
and corroborated so that it did not violate due process for warden to place
prisoner in administrative segregation on the basis of the information. Ryan v.
Sargent, 969 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1992).
Inmate held in
administrative segregation for 2 1/2 years awarded $100,700 in damages for
violation of due process rights. Hoffer v. Commissioner of Correction, 412
Mass. 450, 589 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1992).
Hearing
officer's failure to personally interview confidential informant who supplied
information about prisoner's purported escape conspiracy was not a civil rights
violation. Robinson v. Leonardo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 721 (A.D. 1992).
Placing South
Carolina inmate in administrative segregation pending resolution of
disciplinary charge did not violate his rights. Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42
(D.S.C. 1992).
New Jersey
inmate had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in
general prison population; further proceedings ordered to determine whether a
hearing was conducted within a reasonable time. Layton v. Beyer, 953 F.2d 839
(3rd Cir. 1992).
North Carolina
prison regulations did not give an inmate a due process liberty interest in
receiving notice or a hearing prior to being placed in administrative
segregation. Berrier v. Allen, 951 F.2d 622 (4th Cir. 1991).
Illinois state
law did not create a liberty interest in being kept in the general prison
population; inmates placed in administrative segregation did not have the due
process rights violated. Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1991).
Notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to placement of inmate in administrative
segregation, together with occasional review of their status, satisfied any due
process requirement; a more formal hearing was not required. Smith v. Shettle,
946 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1991).
Inmate accused
of leading whit supremacist group harassing black inmates was given all
required due process rights when placed in administrative segregation. Thomas
v. Zelez, 731 F.Supp. 1462 (D. Kan. 1990).
Relying on
unsworn statements of other inmates to place prisoner in administrative confinement
was impermissible. State Ex Rel. Riley v. DHSS, 445 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. App.
1989).
Prison did not
violate rights of inmates retained in punitive detention for thirteen days when
beds in administrative detention unit were unavailable. Knight v. Armontrout,
878 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989).
Inmates confined
to segregation for 90 days entitled to five hours of out-of-cell exercise per
week; no eighth amendment right to take three showers a week. Davenport v.
DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988).
Inmate's
confinement in single cell apart from general population for ten days during
temporary transfer no rights violations since he was escape risk. Gladson v.
Rice, 862 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1988).
Oregon court
upholds administrative segregation of inmate for one year when he posed a
threat to others. Hedin v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 760 P.2d 901 (Or. App.
1988).
Prison
regulations spelling out procedures on determining whether to reclassify
prisoners did not create a liberty interest. Williams v. Armontrout, 852 F.2d
377 (8th Cir. 1988).
Prisoner's
placement in deadlock without written notice did not violate his rights to due
process; conditions in deadlock and administrative segregation were not cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Manley v. Bronson,
657 F.Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1987).
Inmate handbook
which describes administrative segregation rules does not create a liberty
interest; due process clause not implicated. Stephany v. Wagner, 655 F.Supp.
155 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
"Boxcar"
doors can constitute cruel and unusual punishment when considered under total
conditions; mass transfer to segregation unit during period of unrest was
unreasonable. Tyler v. Black, 811 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1987).
Co. jail
directive and guidelines create liberty interest; hearing required for
placement in administrative segregation. Franco v. Moreland, 805 F.2d 798 (8th
Cir. 1986).
Good faith
immunity for confining prisoner following psychiatric test. Adams v. Brierton,
752 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1985).
Periodic review
of inmate, who posed security threat upheld. Mims v. Shapp, 744 F.2d 946 (3rd
Cir. 1984).
Two inmates each
awarded $4,500 for excessive confinement in administrative segregation for protesting.
Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984).
Prison
administrators could be liable for inmate's transfer to involuntary protective
custody if it was for punitive reasons and not for protection. Evans v.
Headley, 566 F.Supp. 1133 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
No due process
hearing required prior to administratively segregating inmate for security
purposes during investigation. Hewitt v. Helms, U.S. 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983).
Prisoner's fear
or retaliation could be grounds for tolling statute of limitations concerning
his suit against warden. Ross v. United States, 574 F.Supp. 536 (S.D. N.Y.
1983).
Hearing required
before inmate can be assigned to administrative segregation. Wright v. Dermitt,
660 P.2d 940 (Idaho 1983).
No liability for
inmate's administrative segregation. Love v. Duckworth, 554 F.Supp. 1067 (N.D.
Ind. 1983).
Court orders
segregated prisoner back into general population of high security facility.
Morris v. Travisono, 707 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1983).
Protective
custody transfer may have been improperly made for "punitive"
reasons. Evans v. Headley, 566 F Supp. 1133 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
Prisoner's
petition for writ of habeas corpus held moot since the prisoner had already
been released from an administrative segregation and had suffered no collateral
consequences from that segregation. Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43 (Utah 1981).
Sixth Circuit
orders Tennessee prison officials to accord prisoners due process protections
prior to transfers to administrative segregation. Bill v. Henderson, 631 F.2d
1287 (6th Cir. 1980).
Virginia
District Court rules that prisoner's political associations which pose a
distinct threat to prison security may warrant inmate's segregation. Bukhari v.
Hutto, 489 F.Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1980).
Federal court
sets limitations upon placement of prisoner in administrative detention. Brown
v. Neagle, 486 F.Supp. 364 (S.D. W. Va. 1979).
California
Supreme Court rules that inmates placed in administrative segregation pending
disciplinary discharges must be given hearing within 3-10 days. In re Davis,
158 Cal.Rptr. 384 (Cal. 1979).
Inmate in
protective custody still retains the right to some programs and services.
Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F.Supp. 1288 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
Fifth Circuit rules
confinement in strip cell for 90 days to prevent suicide and assault is
permissible. McMahon v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1978).
For earlier
discussions see: Bono v. Saxbe, 462 F.Supp. 146 (E.D. Ill. 1978); Hooker v.
Arnold, 454 F.Supp. 527 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Daigle v. Hall, 564 F.2d 884 (1st Cir.
1977); Gilliard v. Oswald, 552 F.2d 456 (2nd Cir. 1977); Tasker v. Griffith,
238 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. App. 1977); McDonald v. McCracken, 399 F.Supp. 869 (JE.D
Okla. 1974); Mason v. Brown, 362 F.Supp. 518 (E.D. Va. 1973).