Legal Update for
Police Psychologists
|
International Association
of Chiefs of
Police, Inc.
Police Psychological Services Section
http://www.theiacp.org/div_sec_com/sections/psych.htm
Wayne W. Schmidt
AELE Law Enforcement Legal Center
Contents
I.
Tort Liability
Critical Incident Negotiations – Suicide
Critical Incident Negotiations – Shooting
Duty to Care for Ill or Injured Employees
Psychotherapy – Suicidal Patient
Prisoner Classification – Suicidal Inmate
II.
Employment Law
Psychological Exams – ADA Impairment
Psychological Exams – Retaliation
Fitness for Continued Duty
Stress-Related Claims and Defenses
Whistleblower Protection Laws
III.
Selected Articles (List)
Part One –
Tort Liability
Critical
Incident Negotiations – No Liability for Suicide
Tenth Circuit rejects a malpractice suit against Tulsa and
a police psychologist who assisted the SWAT team in negotiation with a mentally
disturbed young man who eventually fatally shot himself.
A family sued the City of Tulsa, the Chief of Police, a
police psychologist (Douglas Gentz,
Ph.D.), and his psychological services firm – following the death of a
23 year-old male. The deceased was
tasking medication and was under treatment for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
and Oppositional
Defiant Disorder.
A woman reported that her husband was armed with a loaded .38
caliber pistol and AK 47 and had
threatened to kill her and then kill himself.
The young man told arriving officers that he had “armor
piercing ammunition” for the AK 47 and that “he was going to start shooting and
that the police have just “entered into a war.” The Special Operations Team was
activated and Douglas Gentz, Ph.D., assisted in the negotiations.
Dr. Gentz generated a psychological profile of the young
man, who announced that that he wanted to kill himself and that he was “not
coming out of there alive.” He threatened to shoot anyone who tried to enter
the apartment and to kill himself if anyone attempted to enter the apartment.
Throughout the standoff, the young man was drinking and
viewing websites relating to negotiating with suicidal individuals. After eight
hours, officers instructed the phone company to re-assign a new number to
prevent third parties from calling and interrupting negotiations and to keep
the youth from using the Internet to obtain information on suicide
negotiations.
The officers concluded that the youth was no longer
negotiating in good faith and at 5:15 p.m. they launched a rubber baton to
breach a rear window. A few seconds later officers heard a single gunshot. On
entering the home, officers found a suicide note; the youth expired on the
following day.
The deceased’s psychiatrist gave a pretrial affidavit,
which stated:
[1]
By Gentz dissuading me from making contact with [Christiansen], it became more
likely that [Christiansen] would not obtain medical advice and treatment during
the standoff.
[2]
Gentz’s interferences of [sic] my contact with [Christiansen] increased the
likelihood that [Christiansen] would attempt to harm or kill himself.
[3]
In my professional opinion, cutting off [Christiansen] from his doctor and his
mother was reckless.
[4]
It is my professional opinion that Sean Christiansen could probably have been
helped by me or by Sean’s mother because his suicidal ideation was an issue
which I had handled and addressed with [him] and which his mother had handled
and addressed with him.
The District Court refused to allow the affidavit. That
holding was upheld by the Tenth Circuit:
“Dr.
Crass’ statements regarding what might have happened had he been allowed to
intervene are pure speculation. Further, as we noted earlier, during the
standoff, the TPD asked Christiansen whether he wanted to see Dr. Crass, and
Christiansen never responded to these inquiries. Finally, insofar as Dr. Crass
did not convey this information to defendants at the time of the events in
question, it has little, if any, probative value. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Crass’ affidavit.”
The panel concluded that the plaintiffs failed to allege
facts sufficient to give rise to a constitutional violation under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, # 02-5135, 332 F.3d 1270 (10th
Cir. 2003).
• Click here to read the
decision on the Internet.
• Click here to view the Tulsa Police Dept. Special
Operations Team Policy directive.
After
the shooting death of her son in a confrontation with police, a woman brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City of Palestine, Texas and the police chief. She claimed that
excessive force was used and, after shooting her son, police were deliberately
indifferent to her son's need for medical attention.
At
the time, the deceased was inside a mobile home with the door open, yelling,
cursing, brandishing an eighteen to twenty inch sword and breaking windows.
Blood was on his hands and on the broken windows. The officers, with weapons
drawn, told him to drop the sword.
The
chief told the boy to drop the sword and not to advance on the officers. He
offered to take him to see a doctor or psychologist. While the chief was
talking to the youth, he exited the mobile home, brandishing the sword. When he
turned and raised the sword toward the officers, the chief shot him in his
right arm, causing him to drop the sword.
Two
judges on the Court of Appeals found no liability; a third judge
disagreed. The majority said:
“The dissent makes much of the fact that no psychologist was called to the scene, although we do note that an ambulance had been called. We think that the fact that no psychologist was on the scene is irrelevant to this case.”
Mace
v. City of Palestine, #02-40335, 333 F.3d
621, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 12811 (5th Cir. 2003).
• Click here to read the decision on AELE’s website.
Federal appeals court holds that the widow of a prison
employee, who became sick at work, and then was fatally injured in a collision
while driving home, is not entitled to collect damages from the employer.
A three-judge appeals panel said that the question how far
an employer should go in providing medical assistance for employees who become
ill at work involves an exercise of judgment, rather than the application of
tort law.
Although prison management had sometimes accommodated the
needs of a sick employee by providing him with transportation home or to a
hospital, this did not create a contractual duty or a reasonable expectation
that a hypoglycemic employee would be restrained against his wishes from
driving home.
The deceased, a diabetic, was adamant that he wanted to go
home and intended to do so the same way that he had arrived at work, by driving
his pickup truck. Stockberger v. U.S., # 02-3651, 332 F.3d 479, 20 IER
Cases (BNA) 8, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 11601 (7th Cir. 2003).
• Click here to view the opinion on the Internet. [PDF]
Oklahoma jury awards $1.5 million to the estate of a man who killed himself after being discharged from the mental health facility.
The deceased was taken to the clinic after police found him dazed and holding a gun in public. The deceased’s daughter alleged that the defendants had failed to adequately assess him for suicidal tendencies and improperly released him. Wall v. Chisholm Trail Counseling Services, # CJ 2001-296 (Grady Co. Dist. Ct. May 17, 2002).
Research Note: A court in Alachua County, Florida, granted a summary judgment for a psychotherapist who was sued for negligence after a patient killed himself. On appeal, the panel said that the only evidence of negligence was the opinion of expert, hired by the plaintiff, stating that the suicide might have been foreseeable.
However, testimony from the decedent’s ex-wife and others who knew him at the time of treatment showed that the decedent had no indication of suicidal tendencies, there were no prior suicide attempts, and a jail screening done a few months prior revealed no risk of suicide. Summary judgment was proper. Lawlor v. Orlando, # 1D00-1887, 795 So. 2d 147 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2001).
In California, an appeals court reversed a summary judgment for a psychiatrist, who had been sued by the widow of a patient, for the negligent failure to prevent her husband’s suicide. Finding no basis for distinguishing between inpatient and outpatient cases, the panel held 2-to-1, that psychiatrists or psychologists owe a duty of care, consistent with professional community standards, to provide appropriate treatment for suicidal patients. Kockelman v. Segal, # H016390, 61 Cal.App.4th 491, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 552, 1998 Cal. App. Lexis 104 (6th App. Dist. 1998). [PDF]
Seventh Circuit rejects claims from the family of a prisoner who killed himself. Plaintiffs produced no evidence that prison psychologists acted with indifference or negligence.
The
family of an inmate who committed suicide by hanging himself in his cell sued
the prison’s intake psychologist, the prison’s treating psychologist, the
prison’s treating physician and others. They alleged that the defendants
violated the deceased’s constitutional rights by acting with deliberate
indifference to his risk of suicide. The District Court dismissed the suit.
On
appeal, a three-judge panel said that the plaintiffs failed to produce “any
evidence showing that the defendants had actual knowledge of [the prisoner’s]
risk of suicide. ...” They also noted:
“First, [the prisoner] never told any of the defendants
that he felt suicidal or depressed beyond his control during his incarceration
... despite having been asked the question numerous times during intake
interviews, psychological evaluations, crisis counseling, and physical exams.
“... second, not one of the defendants who interviewed or examined [the prisoner] – each of whom was trained in psychology, social work, medicine, or crisis response – ever determined after seeing him that he exhibited suicidal or delusional tendencies or that he needed to be placed on crisis or suicide watch.”
The
sole evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor was a medical history” form indicating
that, years earlier, the prisoner attempted suicide by jumping in front of a
train. None of the defendants actually saw this form.
The
Chief Judge wrote, “As a population, prison inmates are around nine times more
likely to commit suicide than free persons, and yet not every prisoner who
shows signs of depression or exhibits strange behavior can or should be put on
suicide watch.” Matos v. O’Sullivan,
# 02-1590, 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 13427 (7th Cir. 2003).
•
Click here
to read the case on the Internet. [PDF]
Part Two – Employment Law
Psychological Exams and Standards
Impairment or Disability Under ADA or
Rehab Act
EEOC
District Office finds that a police officer was “disabled” and that ordering
him to submit to additional fitness for duty evaluations was unlawful.
Because
of several encounters with coworkers, a Phoenix area police officer was ordered
to participate in a psychological fitness for duty evaluation (FFDE). Under
IACP guidelines, the purpose of a FFDE is to identify “the presence or absence
of job-related personality traits, characteristics, disorders, propensities, or
conditions that would interfere with the performance of essential job
functions.”
At
the first two meetings with the psychologist, the officer did not finish the
battery of tests. The psychologist supposedly informed management that although
the testing process was incomplete, the officer was “not psychologically fit
for duty.” At a third meeting with the psychologist, his commander and three
officers placed him on FMLA leave, relieved him of his ID and weapon, and
escorted him home.
The officer filed a disability complaint with the local office of the EEOC, alleging the city considered him to be disabled. In response to that complaint, the city’s Human Resources Administration replied that the officer had “demonstrated behaviors such as nervousness, lack of appetite, staring, inability to focus, repeating himself, sudden mood swings and excessive anger ...”
One
sergeant reported that the officer “yelled, pounded the walls ... and
periodically ranted about [the] chief ...” A fellow officer had said the
complainant was “paranoid and negatively obsessed with [the] Chief of Police”
and was “on the verge of tears.” The city denied regarding the officer as
disabled or engaging in discriminatory treatment.
The EEOC has issued a determination that the city “failed to provide any specificity that would justify their position or otherwise establish that he was a direct threat to anyone.” Moreover, “continued efforts by an employer to require an employee to provide more documentation and/or submit to additional medical examinations could be considered retaliation.”
The
EEOC found that the officer had a disability and was discriminated against by
“requiring him to submit to a psychological examination, in violation of the
ADA” and by denying his request to return to active duty after the officer’s
physician declared him fit for duty.
The
officer, during the pendency of the EEOC complaint made an application for a
disability retirement, but withdrew the application on the advice of his
attorney. EEOC ex rel. Tucker and City of Tempe Police Dept., #
350-A1-2326 (2002).
•
Click here to view the EEOC’s Determination on
AELE’s website.
•
Click here
to read or download the IACP Psychological Section’s Fitness For Duty
Guidelines.
•
Also see the Tempe
Police policy on “Fitness for Duty” examinations.
•
Click here to read or
download EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatric
Disabilities.
Research
Note: Technically, a District Office “Determination” is a nonprecedential
and nonbinding administrative decision. Although not mentioned in the EEOC’s
Determination, once an employee returns from authorized FMLA with a letter,
from the employee’s health care provider, recommending a return to work, the
employer may NOT order a confirming examination, 29 U.S. Code §2614(a)(4) and 29
C.F.R. §825.310(c). There are two recognized exceptions:
1.
There is a history of requiring return-to-duty
such exams (and if there is a bargaining agreement, it perpetuates recognized
past practices). Conroy v. Township of Lower Merion, # 00-CV-3528, 2001
U.S. Dist. Lexis 11460, 7 WH Cases2d (BNA) 365 (Unpub. E.D. Pa.).
2.
The request is based on behavior that is
observed subsequent to the return to duty request. Routes v. Henderson,
1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9835, 5 WH Cases2d (BNA) 768 (Unpub. S.D. Ind. 1999); Underhill
v. Willamina, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9722 (Unpub. D.Ore. 1999); Albert v.
Runyon, 6 F.Supp.2d 57, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7505 (D.Mass. 1998).
The
FMLA is not enforced by the EEOC, but by the Wage and Hour Div. of the U.S.
Dept. of Labor’s Employment Standards Administration. Under the ADA, the EEOC
enforces employment-related complaints, and the Justice Dept’s Civil Rights
Div. enforces access-related complaints.
As
stated in the Postal Service case, Albert v. Runyon:
“The FMLA does not authorize
an employer to make its own determination of whether an employee is fit to
return from FMLA leave following recovery from a serious health condition.
Rather, an employer must rely on the evaluation done by the employee’s own
clinician and return the employee to work without delay upon receipt of medical
certification. This certification may be a ‘simple statement of any employee’s
ability to return to work,’ and need not contain the specific information about
the employee’s condition ...
“Moreover, requiring [the
employee] to undergo a psychological examination was not the proper way for the
Postal Service to resolve any legitimate concerns it might have had about her
abilities and possible restrictions on her activities. An employer with
questions about the scope or adequacy of a medical certification may take
advantage of the FMLA provision allowing it to contact the employee’s clinician
for clarification, but may not force an employee to submit to a further
examination before allowing her to return to work.” 6 F.Supp.2d 57 at 62-63,
1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7505 at *15-16.
•
Click here
to read the Labor Dept’s regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.310, “Under what circumstances
may an employer require that an employee submit a medical certification that
the employee is able (or unable) to return.”
Psychological
Exams and Standards – Retaliation
EEOC appellate decision finds that a postal worker was retaliated
against by management after she reported sexual harassment. Backpay awarded for
a suspension for refusing to take an “unnecessary” fitness-for-duty examination
plus $50,000 in damages for mental anguish.
A
postal worker filed several equal employment opportunity complaints, alleging
that various incidents constituted unlawful employment discrimination, and were
in reprisal for complaining about sexual harassment.
Among
other things, management transferred her to a facility where she was required
to perform work inconsistent with her medical restrictions, berated her in
public about her sexual harassment complaint and suspended her for 312 hours
for refusing to take an “unnecessary” fitness-for-duty psychological exam.
The
Commission noted that, irrespective of whether an employee is an individual
with a disability, an agency may only make a disability-related inquiry or
require a medical examination if it is job related and consistent with business
necessity.
The Postal
Service was required to issue backpay for the 312 hours of work the complainant
missed while under suspension for failing to comply with an “unnecessary”
fitness-for-duty examination, and pay her $50,000 for non-pecuniary harm
(prolonged mental anguish, depression, humiliation, insomnia, etc.) suffered as
a result of the agency's discriminatory action.
Amen
v. Potter, U.S. Postal Service, Appeal
#07A10069, 2003 EEOPUB Lexis 53 (EEOC 2003).
• Click here to read the decision on the
AELE website.
Editor’s Note: A federal court in New York has held that a state employee who alleged that after filing discrimination complaints with the union and with his superiors, he was forced to undergo retaliatory psychiatric evaluations as a condition of employment, “has sufficiently alleged material adverse employment actions to survive a motion to dismiss.” Syken v. New York, #02-Civ-4673, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5358, 91 FEP Cases (BNA) 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Another federal court dismissed a civil rights suit filed by an ex-police officer who alleged that she was subjected to I-A investigations, criminal charges, and a psychological fitness test because of her gender. She failed to adduce any evidence of bias or bad motives. Zandhri v. Dortenzio, #3:99CV1776, 228 F.Supp.2d 167, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21048 (D.Conn. 2002).
Fitness for
Continued Duty
Civil
Service Commission terminates a police officer for having “Disordered
Personality Traits.” Supreme Court denies review.
In March
of 1999, a Salt Lake City police officer was involved in an incident that
resulted in a determination that he had “acted unprofessionally and had
violated the City’s deadly force policy.”
The
officer was examined by Dr. David McCann, who, in March of 2000, submitted to
the City the following conclusions regarding Joseph:
“[He] has Disordered
Personality Traits which have contributed to him placing himself in jeopardy in
the shooting incident and in other incidents. Officer Joseph’s personality
traits have caused him to be excessively self-centered and unwilling to learn
from peers or superiors.
“His personality traits are
likely to lead him to increased isolation and alienation from appropriate
professional supervision and the needs of the citizens of Salt Lake City.
Personality traits similar to those of Officer Joseph’s are notably resistant
to psychotherapeutic intervention, additional training, closer supervision or
disciplinary action.
“His personality traits cause
an increased risk for harm to himself, to other officers and to the citizens of
Salt Lake City. In [Dr. McCann’s] opinion, Officer J__ is not psychologically
suitable to perform the duties of a police officer.”
Management
terminated the officer, and he appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The appeal was dismissed due to a failure to
comply with discovery demands.
Without
reaching the merits of the termination, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Joseph
v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Cmsn., # 20010399, 2002 UT App. 254, 53 P.3d
11, 2002 Utah App. Lexis 72; certiorari denied, # 02-1211, 71 U.S.L.W. 3666
(U.S. Sup.Ct. 2003).
• Click here
to read the decision on the Internet.
A
California appeals court affirmed an order to reinstate a deputy sheriff, who
received a worker’s comp. stress award. County could not refuse to reinstate
the deputy because she needs a stress-free work environment. Hanna
v. Los Ang. Co. Sheriff’s Dept., # B150425, 67 Cal. Comp. Case 1320,
2002 Cal. Wrk. Comp. Lexis 1528, 102 Cal.App.4th 887, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 686 (2nd
App. Dist. 2002). [PDF]
The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a death threat to a police officer and
his family was unusual, even for a law enforcement officer, because it included
a $50,000 bounty and death threats to the officer’s children at school. These
were not part of a normal officer’s experiences and stress compensation
benefits were appropriate. City
of Pittsburgh v. Logan, # 95 WAP 2001, 810 A.2d 1185 (2002). [PDF]
An
Arizona state trooper won disability benefits for PTSD. The state claimed that
shooting suspects was not an unexpected event as required by state compensation
laws. Expert testimony supported his claim, and the compensation judge ruled
“that shooting and killing another human being in the line of duty is an
extraordinary stress related to the employment.” [David] Mogel v. Dept. of
Public Safety, Ariz. Indus. Cmsn. (Unrptd., 2002).
Hawaii’s
Supreme Court upheld a disability claim by a firefighter who suffered emotional
distress because of what he perceived to be a flawed promotional process, and a
threat of retaliation by the chief when he appealed the outcome. Davenport
v. C&C of Honolulu, # 23141, 100 Haw. 481, 60 P.3d 882, 2002 Haw. Lexis
850 (Haw. 2002).
A
Pennsylvania appeals court affirmed the right of a woman police lieutenant to
recover benefits for stress resulting from male harassment because of her
promotions. The city had failed to seriously investigate her claims in a timely
manner. Sloan v. City of Pittsburgh Police Dept., # 1024 C.D. 2002
(Unpub., Pa. Commw. 2003).
A former employee
who claimed that he suffered emotional stress because of the work environment
did not place his mental condition in controversy so as to justify a
court-ordered psychiatric examination. He did not claim an ongoing mental
injury or a psychiatric disorder and he did not sue for the intentional or
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Bowen v. Parking Auth. of Camden,
# 00-5765, 214 F.R.D. 188, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6913 (D.N.J. 2003).
An
arbitrator held that a grievant was eligible for “assault leave,” even if she
did not file the proper form. She also was being treated for “post-traumatic
stress disorder/panic attacks with agoraphobia,” and the filing of a wrong form
did not prejudice the employer. Chicago Bd. of Educ. and Chicago Teachers
Union, 118 LA (BNA) 349 (Goldstein, 2002).
The
New Jersey Supreme Court revived the workers’ comp. claims filed by two police
employees who suffered work-related, delayed onset, post traumatic stress
disorder. PTSD can be either a disease
or an accident. Brunell
v. Wildwood Crest Police Dept., # A-126/127 Sept. Term 2001, 176 N.J.
225, 822 A.2d 576 (N.J. 2003).
Federal court upholds the right of management to fire a
prison psychologist who released confidential records to public advocates and
the news media. Whistleblower laws protect only those who report misconduct to
the appropriate public officials.
A prison psychologist sued, claiming that management
violated his First Amendment rights by
firing him in retaliation for objecting to racial discrimination in parole
determinations and employment practices
Management said the psychologist was fired for violating
the Dept. of Corrections Code of Ethics.
The plaintiff admitted that he released confidential inmate
psychological reports to a prison
reform advocate, a local NAACP official, and
to Fox-TV News “in an effort to reveal racial discrimination in parole
determinations.”
The court said that the dissemination of confidential
prison records, involved a matter of public concern. However, this did not
outweigh the prison’s interest in keeping such records confidential.
Although the plaintiff had a right to speak out, and the
public should hear about charges of discriminatory treatment, the institution
had an overriding interest in keeping inmate psychological reports
confidential. The judge wrote:
“... common sense dictates that such records contain highly personal and sensitive information that is designated confidential for a number of valid reasons. Not the least of these reasons, we presume, is that such reports are generated as a result of psychological care that is designed to both treat inmates and evaluate their potential for rehabilitation and possible parole.
“If psychological evaluations are not kept
confidential, inmates may be less likely to frankly discuss their problems,
hampering any possibility they may have for rehabilitation. Similarly, prison
psychologists may be less likely to record their conclusions with necessary
candor out of fear that they could become public.
“Consequently, the release of confidential,
psychological records of inmates has a detrimental and possibly profoundly
negative effect on important aspects of [the institution’s] public
responsibilities.”
The court noted that under the state’s Whistleblower Law,
the plaintiff had an approved avenue for disclosing racial discrimination in
parole determinations. However, “the
Whistleblower Law does not protect the release of inmate psychological records
to the news media and public advocates.”
The judge concluded that the DoC’s interest in the
efficient operation of its organization outweighs the free speech rights of the
plaintiff to distribute confidential psychological records to non-authorized
persons. Dennison v. Penna. Dept. of Corrections, #3:01cv56, 2003 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 9579 (M.D. Penna. 2003).
• Click here to view the
opinion on the AELE website. [PDF]
• Click here
to view the American Psychological Association’s ethical standards relating to
privacy and confidentiality of personal information.
Part Three – Selected Articles
(In
chronological order)
• Article, “No Recall
of Weapon Discharge,” by Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D., 3(2) Law Enf. Executive
Forum 41 (2003).
• Article, “Perceptual and Memory Distortion
During Officer-Involved Shootings,” by Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D., 2002 (10) FBI Law
Enf. Bulletin 18 - online in PDF format at www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2002/oct02leb.pdf
• Law Outline: Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission: “Selected case law developments under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.” Download
an 82 page summary in Ms-Word and then search the text for “psych” and
“mental”.
• Law Annotation: “Liability of doctor,
psychiatrist, or psychologist for failure to take steps to prevent patient’s
suicide,” 81 A.L.R.5th 167, sec. 3 (1999).
• Law Review: “Unconscious bias and
self-critical analysis: The case for a qualified evidentiary equal employment
opportunity privilege,” 74 Wash. L. Rev. 913 (1999).
• Law Note: “Is a personality test a pre-job-offer
medical examination under the ADA?,” 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 597 (1999).
• Law Note: “Beyond Jaffee
v. Redmond: Should the federal courts recognize a right to
physician-patient confidentiality?,” 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1809 (1998).
• Law Review: “Is employee privacy an
oxymoron?,” 15 Delaware Lawyer 20 (1997).
• Law Note: “The quest for the honest worker:
a proposal for regulation of integrity testing,” 49 SMU L. Rev. 329 (1996).
• Law Note: “Integrity tests: Do they have any
integrity?,” 6 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 211 (1996).
• Law Review: “Employees with mental and
emotional problems – workplace security and
implications of state discrimination laws, the ADA (etc.),” 24 Stetson L. Rev.
201 (1994).
• Law Review: “Preplacement examinations and
job-relatedness: how to enhance privacy and diminish discrimination in the
workplace,” 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 517 (1994).
• Law Note: “To catch a thief: The private
employer’s guide to getting and keeping an honest employee,” 63 UMKC L. Rev.
251 (1994).
• Law Review: “Privacy regulation of computer-assisted testing and instruction,” 63 Wash. L. Rev. 841 (1988).
• Law Review: “Medical and psychotherapy privileges and confidentiality: On giving with one hand and removing with the other,” 75 Ky. L.J. 473 (1986).
» Law review articles and notes are accessible with Lexsee ®, a service of Lexis-Nexis. A.L.R. annotations are accessible on Westlaw ®. The EEOC outline is on the American Bar Assn. website.
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