Medical Examiner, Expert, and Law Enforcement Officer's Comparisons:

| Law Enforcement Officer | "Experts" in Federal Court | Forensic Pathologist, Medical Examiner, or Coroner's | | |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| (actions must be based upon | Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) | Report, Findings and Conclusions | | |
| "Objectively Reasonable") | Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) | | | |
| Facts | FRE 702, FRCP 26(a)(2)(B), Daubert | None required | | |
| Bases | FRE 702: | None required. | | |
| Justifications | • qualifications: | Often " ASSUMED ": | | |
| | √knowledge, | based on sufficient facts/data | | |
| | √skill, | methodologically reliable | | |
| | √ experience, and | objective mechanism of injury | | |
| | √training, or education. | greater weight of knowledge | | |
| | methodologically reliable: | based on science | | |
| | √ based on sufficient facts or data, | • FRE 702, FRCP 26 compliant | | |
| | √the product of reliable principles and | • Daubert trilogy compliant | | |
| | methods, and | • in most states | | |
| | Vapplied the principles and methods reliably to | • by most courts | | |
| | the facts. | • by most decision makers | | |
| | Scientifically reliable foundations | NOT held accountable – in most states cannot be challenged | | |
| | Reasonable degree of certainty | Often inappropriately based on: | | |
| | Daubert trilogy, and progeny | failure to consider all causes | | |
| | FRCP 26(a)(2)(B) requirements | failure to specify "but for" | | |
| | | • inaccuracies | | |
| | | • possibilities | | |
| | | false equivalencies | | |
| | | • ipse dixit | | |
| Definitive degrees of certainty: | Definitive degrees of certainty: | Definitive degrees of certainty: | | |
| Reasonable suspicion (detention) | Reasonable degree of medical or scientific | • "ASSUMED" to reasonable degree of medical and scientific | | |
| Reasonable suspicion (frisk) | certainty based on reliable foundation, | certainty - even when it is not | | |
| Probable cause (arrest) | evidence, and scientific support | | | |
| Probable cause (search) | | | | |
| Insufficient degrees of certainty: | Definitive degrees of certainty: | Insufficient degrees of certainty: | | |
| Possibility | Anything less than reasonable | Sometimes none | | |
| • Hunch | | | | |

| | Canada | | | | U | SA | Totals | (7) |
|---|---|--|--|---|--|--|---|--|
| | (1) Hall (2012) ¹ | (2) Hall (2015) ² | (3) Baldwin (2016) ³ | (4) Baldwin (2018) ⁴ | (5) Ross [,] (2016) ⁵ (2018) ⁶ | (6) Bozeman (2018) ⁷ | of Studies 2,4–6 (not "1" or "3") | Older Comp. Orange Co. (FL) 2003–2004 ⁷ |
| Contacts/Interactions/Calls/Arrests | | | | | 1 | | r | |
| Police-Public Interactions (PPI) | 1,566,908 | 3,250,000 | 5,400,000 | 10,900,000 | | | 14,150,000 | |
| Calls for Service (CFS) | | | | | 876,503 | 1,041,737 | 1,918,240 | 1,503,650 |
| Total PPI and CFS (PPI/CFS) | | | | | | | 16,068,240 | |
| Criminal Arrests (CA) (part of CFS) | | | | | 110,173 | 114,064 | 224,237 | 76,877 |
| Force (Use of Force (UOF), Conducte | d Energy Wea | oons (CEWs)) | | | | | | |
| All Uses of Force (UOF) in PPI/CFS | 1,269 | 4,828 | 4,799 | 9,009 | 1,085 | 893 | 15,815 | 1,264 |
| Partial Subset of UoF - Uses of CEW (received CEW exposure) | 334 | 671 | | | 217 | 504 | 1,392 | 945 |
| Handcuffed | | 4,056:4,373 | | | 1,042 | | | |
| Number in "Prone Restraint" | 537:1,255 | 2,000:4,373 | | | 1,085 | | | |
| Excited Delirium (ExDS) per UoF | | | | 1:58 | | | | |
| Deaths (temporal, not causal) | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 1 (gun) | 6 | |
| - "1" death per x PPI/CFS | 1,566,908 | 3,250,000 | 2,700,000 | 2,725,000 | No death | 1,041,737 | 2,678,040 | |
| - Deaths per UoF encounter | 1:1,269 | 1:4,828 | 1:2,400 | 2:2.252 | 0:1,085 | 1:893 | 1:2,636 | |
| UOF, CEW, CA, per PPI/CFS/CA | | | | | | | | · |
| UoF per PPI/CFS | 1:1,235 | 1:673 | 1:1,125 | 1:1,210 | 1:807 | 1:1,167 | 1:1,016 | 1:1,189 |
| UoF per CA | | | | | 1:101 | 1:128 | 1:113 | 1:61 |
| Exposure Use of CEW per PPI/CFS | 1:4,691 | 1:4,829 | | | 1:5,000 | 1:2,067 | 1:3,251 | 1:1,591 |
| Exposure Use of CEW per CA | | | | | 1:500 | | 1:500 | 1:78 |
| Deaths Caused by CEW | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Add'l – CEW Presence Compliance | | 199 | | | | | | |
| C.A. Hall, et al. Incidence and Outc Leg. Med. 2, 83–89 (2012). C.A. Hall, et al. Restraint in police u medicine 31 (2015): 29-35. [This is S. Baldwin, et al. Distinguishing fe (2016): 21-27. S. Baldwin, et al. Excited delirium s of law and psychiatry (2018) 60, 26 D.L. Ross & M.H. Hazlett. A prosper 00040. D.L. Ross & M.H. Hazlett. Assessin Criminol Int J. 2018;6(3):187–196. | use of force even an updated st eatures of Excit yndrome (ExDS 5-34. [This is an ctive analysis of ng the symptom | ents: examining udy that include ted Delirium Syr 5): Situational fa n updated study f the outcomes | sudden in cust s Hall's 2012 : adrome in nor ctors and risks that includes of violent pror ith excited dea | tody death for study.] -fatal use of fu to officer safe Baldwin's 2010 ar restraint incu | prone and no orce encount ty in non-fate 5 study.] idents in poli ne and the us | ot-prone posit ters. Journal c al use of force cing. Forensic se of conducte | ions. Journal of f of forensic and le <i>encounters</i> . Inte Res Criminol Int ed energy weapo | orensic and legal egal medicine 41 rnational journal J 2, no. 1 (2016): |

| | d Knowledge (24 April 2020) [<mark>all yellow highlighting added</mark>] |
|--|--|
| | a, Culpability, Blameworthiness, Causation |
| actus reus ¹ | "[Law Latin "guilty act"] (1902) 1. The wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability; a forbidden act < the actus reus for theft is the taking of or unlawful control over property without the owner's consent>. 2. The voluntary act or omission, the attendant circumstances, and the social harm caused by a criminal act, all of which make up the physical components of a crime. — Also termed deed of crime; overt act. See CORPUS DELICTI; voluntary act under ACT (2). Cf. MENS REA; CULPABILITY." |
| | "One cannot formulate a test for the ingredients of an act, except the test of what is required by law for the external situation of a crime. Writers have often pointed out that there is generally no harm in a man's crooking his right forefinger, unless it is (for example) around the trigger of a loaded gun which is pointing at someone. The muscular contraction, regarded as an actus reus, cannot be separated from its circumstances. When the specification of a crime includes a number of circumstances, all of these are essential and all must be regarded as part of the actus reus. It will be shown later that any narrower view is undesirable because it creates greater uncertainty and also because it leads straight to haphazard strict responsibility in crime, enabling judges to pick and choose in different ways between elements of a crime for the purpose of the requirement of mens rea. The view that actus reus means all the external ingredients of the crime is not only the simplest and clearest but the one that gives the most satisfactory results." Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 19 (2d ed. 1961). |
| | "The phrase 'deed of crime' [= actus reus] as so used does not indicate the crime itself but merely one of the ingredients of crime; and this ingredient may be present without any crime at all, just as hydrogen is one of the ingredients of water but may be present without water. The words 'deed of crime' are so suggesting of the crime itself, however, that perhaps the Latin phrase 'actus reus' is less likely to cause confusion. The actus reus is essential to crime but is not sufficient for this purpose without the necessary mens rea, just as mens rea is essential to crime but is insufficient without the necessary actus reus." Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 831 (3d ed. 1982). |
| mens rea ² | "[Law Latin "guilty mind"] (18c) The state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime < the mens rea for theft is the intent to deprive the rightful owner of the property>. • Mens rea is the second of two essential elements of every crime at common law, the other being the actus reus. Under the Model Penal Code, the required levels of mens rea — expressed by the adverbs purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently — are termed "culpability requirements." — Also termed mental element; criminal intent; guilty mind. See CULPABILITY; PURPOSELY; RECKLESSLY. Cf. ACTUS REUS. Pl. mentes reae (men-teez ree-ee)." |
| culpability requirements ³ | "Under the Model Penal Code, the required levels of mens rea — expressed by the adverbs purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently — are termed "culpability requirements."" |

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¹ ACTUS REUS, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

² MENS REA, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

³ MENS REA, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

| culpability ⁴ | "1. Moral blameworthiness; the quality of being culpable. 2. The mental state that must be proved for a defendant to be held liable for a crime. • Except in cases of absolute liability, criminal culpability under the Model Penal Code requires proof that the defendant "acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense." Model Penal Code § 2.02. See MENS REA. Cf. ACTUS REUS." |
|--------------------------|--|
| | "At times the Court seems to differentiate between the two [meanings] by casting the punishment-phase determination as one about the defendant's moral culpability, as opposed to his purely legal culpability at the guilt phase. In this respect, a defendant's moral culpability for murder may be greater or lesser, depending on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, even though his legal culpability remains the same." Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 21, 35–36 (1997). |
| causation ⁵ | "1. The causing or producing of an effect < the plaintiff must prove causation >. 2. CAUSALITY." "general causation. (1922) The potential of an agent to produce the general occurrence of injuries in a population." "specific causation. (1930) The fact or implication that an agent produced a particular injury in a specific person." |
| liability ⁶ | The quality, state, or condition of being legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil remedy or criminal punishment <liability by="" caused="" for="" injuries="" negligence="">. — Also termed legal liability; subjection; responsibility. Cf. FAULT. 2. (often pl.)A financial or pecuniary obligation in a specified amount; DEBT <tax liability=""> <assets and="" liabilities="">.</assets></tax></liability> |

 ⁴ CULPABILITY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
 ⁵ CAUSATION, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

⁶ LIABILITY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

| Levels of Knowledg | e | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| sadistic | pertaining to or characterized by sadism; deriving pleasure or sexual gratification from extreme cruelty: a sadistic psychopath. | | | | |
| willfully 18 U.S.C. § 242 | "Wilfully" as used in this section proscribing a deprivation of civil rights, implies not merely a conscious purpose to do wrong, but a specific intent to deprive an inhabitant of a right. ⁷ | | | | |
| | "The statute uses the term 'willfully'. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that: 'In law the use of the words 'wilf ul' and 'wilfully' generally imply a conscious purpose to do wrong. Doing a thing knowingly and willfully implies not only a knowledge of the thing done, but a determination to do it with evil purpose or motive * * *.' 'Willful', as applied to this section of the Act, implies not merely a conscious purpose to do wrong, but a specific intent to deprive Fraley of a right. <i>Crews v. United States</i> , (CCA Fla.1947), 160 F.2d 746; <i>Williams v. United States</i> , supra." ⁸ | | | | |
| | Intent and willfulness are the essential elements of the offense designated in this section. ⁹ | | | | |
| malicious ¹⁰ | "1. Substantially certain to cause injury. 2. Without just cause or excuse." | | | | |
| misconduct ¹¹ | "1. A dereliction of duty; unlawful, dishonest, or improper behavior, esp. by someone in a position of authority or trust. See MISBEHAVIOR." "willful and wanton misconduct. (1866) Conduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety of others, as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known danger or to discover a danger. See gross negligence under NEGLIGENCE. — Also termed willful indifference to the safety of others." "official misconduct. (1830) 1. A public officer's corrupt violation of assigned duties by malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. — Also termed misconduct in office; misbehavior in office; malconduct in office; misdemeanor in office; corruption in office; official corruption; political corruption; abuse of office. 2. ABUSE OF PUBLIC OFFICE." | | | | |
| | "affirmative misconduct. (1897) 1. An affirmative act of misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact; intentional wrongful behavior. • Some courts hold that there must be an ongoing pattern of misrepresentation or false promises, as opposed to an isolated act of providing misinformation. 2. With respect to a claim of estoppel against the federal government, a misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact by a government employee — beyond a merely innocent or negligent misrepresentation." | | | | |
| purposely ¹² | "Deliberately; esp., such a manner that the actor engaged in prohibited conduct with the intention of causing the social harm that the law was designed to prevent. • Under the Model Penal Code, purposely denotes the mental state resulting in the highest level of criminal culpability." | | | | |

⁷ United States v. Ramey, 336 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 S.Ct. 649, 379 U.S. 972, 13 L.Ed.2d 564 (1965).

⁸ United States v. Ramey, 336 F.2d 512, 515 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 85 S.Ct. 649, 379 U.S. 972, 13 L.Ed.2d 564 (1965).

⁹ Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932, 938 (10th Cir. 1951).

¹⁰ MALICIOUS, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¹¹ MISCONDUCT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¹² PURPOSELY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

| | "A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist." Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a). |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| intentional ¹³ | "Done with the aim of carrying out the act." |
| knowingly ¹⁴ | "In such a manner that the actor engaged in prohibited conduct with the knowledge that the social harm that the law was designed to prevent was practically certain to result; deliberately. • Under the Model Penal Code, knowingly describes to the mental state resulting in the second-highest level of criminal culpability. A person who acts purposely wants to cause the social harm, while a person who acts knowingly understands that the social harm will almost certainly be a consequence of the action, but acts with other motives and does not care whether the social harm occurs." |
| | "'Knowingly' or 'knowledge' has a broad sweep when used in connection with the element of a crime, and an untrue representation has been 'knowingly' made if by one who knows it is untrue, believes it is untrue or is quite aware that he has not the slightest notion whether it is true or not." Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 379 (3d ed. 1982). "A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his |
| | conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves an element of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result." Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b). |
| recklessly ¹⁵ | "In such a manner that the actor knew that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the social harm the law was designed to prevent would occur and ignored this risk when engaging in the prohibited conduct. • Under the Model Penal Code, recklessly denotes the minimum level of culpability required for criminal liability when the statute does not specify the required mental state." "A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and |
| | unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation." Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c). |
| hazardous negligenœ ¹⁶ | "(1904) 1. Careless or reckless conduct that exposes someone to extreme danger of injury or to imminent peril. 2. See gross negligence (2)." |

 ¹³ INTENTIONAL, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
 ¹⁴ KNOWINGLY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
 ¹⁵ RECKLESSLY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¹⁶ NEGLIGENCE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

| criminal negligence ¹⁷ | "(1838) 1. Gross negligence so extreme that it is punishable as a crime. • For example, involuntary manslaughter or other negligent homicide can be based on criminal negligence, as when an extremely careless automobile driver kills someone. — Also termed culpable negligence; gross negligence." |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| | "Though the legislatures and the courts have often made it clear that criminal liability generally requires more fault than the ordinary negligence which will do for tort liability, they have not so often made it plain just what is required in addition to tort negligence — greater risk, subjective awareness of the risk, or both. Statutes are sometimes worded in terms of 'gross negligence' or 'culpable negligence' or 'criminal negligence,' without any further definition of these terms The courts thus have had to do their best with little guidance from the legislature, with varying results." Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott Jr., Criminal Law § 3.7, at 235–37 (2d ed. 1986). |
| | "2. The objectively assessed mental state of an actor who should know that there is a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the social harm that the law is designed to prevent will occur but who nevertheless engages in the prohibited action. • Under the Model Penal Code, this mental state represents the minimum level of culpability required for criminal liability except when the offense carries absolute liability." |
| | "Though the legislatures and the courts have often made it clear that criminal liability generally requires more fault than the ordinary negligence which will do for tort liability, they have not so often made it plain just what is required in addition to tort negligence — greater risk, subjective awareness of the risk, or both. Statutes are sometimes worded in terms of 'gross negligence' or 'culpable negligence' or 'criminal negligence,' without any further definition of these terms The courts thus have had to do their best with little guidance from the legislature, with varying results." Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott Jr., Criminal Law § 3.7, at 235–37 (2d ed. 1986). |
| gross negligence ¹⁸ | "1. A lack of even slight diligence or care. • The difference between gross negligence and ordinary negligence is one of degree and not of quality. Gross negligence is traditionally said to be the omission of even such diligence as habitually careless and inattentive people do actually exercise in avoiding danger to their own person or property. — Also termed willful and wanton misconduct. 2. A conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and of the consequences to another party, who may typically recover exemplary damages. — Also termed reckless negligence; wanton negligence; willful negligence; willful and wanton negligence; willful and wanton misconduct; hazardous negligence; magna neglegentia. 3. See criminal negligence." |
| | "Negligence is gross if the precautions to be taken against harm are very simple, such as persons who are but poorly endowed with physical and mental capacities can easily take." H.L.A. Hart, "Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility," in Punishme nt and Responsibility 136, 149 (1968). |
| | "Gross Negligence. As it originally appeared, this was very great negligence, or the want of even slight or scant care. It has been described as a failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use. Several courts, however, dissatisfied with a term so nebulous have construed gross negligence as requiring willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or such utter lack of all |

¹⁷ NEGLIGENCE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
¹⁸ NEGLIGENCE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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
| | care as will be evidence thereof But it is still true that most courts consider that 'gross negligence' falls short of a reckless disregard of the consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 34, at 211–12 (5th ed. 1984). |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| culpable negligence ¹⁹ | "1. Negligent conduct that, while not intentional, involves a disregard of the consequences likely to result from one's actions. 2. See criminal negligence." "'Culpable negligence,' while variously defined, has been held incapable of exact definition; it means something more than negligence In connection with negligence, the word 'culpable' is sometimes used in the sense of 'blamable,' and it has been regarded as expressing the thought of a breach of a duty or the commission of a fault; but culpable negligence has been held to amount to more than 'blameworthy' conduct It does not involve the element of intent On the other hand, it has been said to be intentional conduct which the actor may not intend to be harmful but which an ordinary and reasonably prudent man would recognize as involving a strong probability of injury to others." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1(13) (1966). |
| negligence ²⁰ | "1. The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others' rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person would not do under the particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under the circumstances. • The elements necessary to recover damages for negligence are (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plain tiff from the injury complained of, and (2) an injury to the plaintiff from the defendant's failure. The term denotes culpable carelessness. The Roman-law equivalents are culpa and neglegentia, as contrasted with dolus (wrongful intention). — Also termed actionable negligence; ordinary negligence; simple negligence. See BREACH OF DUTY OF CARE. 2. A tort grounded in this failure, usu. expressed in terms of the following elements: duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages." |
| | "Negligence in law ranges from inadvertence that is hardly more than accidental to sinful disregard of the safety of others." Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 36 (1968). "During the first half of the nineteenth century, negligence began to gain recognition as a separate and independent basis of tort liability. Its rise coincided in a marked degree with the Industrial Revolution; and it very probably was stimulated by the rapid increase in the number of accidents caused by industrial machinery, and in particular by the invention of railways. It was greatly encouraged by the disintegration of the old forms of action, and the disappearance of the distinction between direct and indirect injuries, found in trespass and case Intentional injuries, whether direct or indirect, began to be grouped as a distinct field of liability, and negligence remained as the main basis for unintended torts. Negligence thus developed into the dominant cause of action for accidental injury in this nation today." W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 28, at 161 (5th ed. 1984). "Negligence is a matter of risk — that is to say, of recognizable danger of injury In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from his act. But it may also arise where the |

 ¹⁹ NEGLIGENCE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
 ²⁰ NEGLIGENCE, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
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| | negligent party has considered the possible consequences carefully, and has exercised his own best judgment. The almost universal use of the phrase 'due care' to describe conduct which is not negligent should not obscure the fact that the essence of negligence is not necessarily the absence of solicitude for those who may be adversely affected by one's actions but is instead behavior which should be recognized as involving unreasonable danger to others." Id. at 169. |
|----------------------------------|---|
| accident ²¹ | 1. An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated; any unwanted or harmful event occurring suddenly, as a collision, spill, fall, or the like, irrespective of cause or blame < the accident was staged as part of an insurance scam>. 2. Equity practice. An unforeseen and injurious occurrence not attributable to the wintim's mistake, pagligenes, paglest, armiscenduction unanticipated and untoward event that causes harm |
| strict liability ²² | attributable to the victim's mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct; an unanticipated and untoward event that causes harm. (1844) Liability that does not depend on proof of negligence or intent to do harm but that is based instead on a duty to compensate the harms proximately caused by the activity or behavior subject to the liability rule. Prominent examples of strict liability involve the rules governing abnormally dangerous activities and the commercial distribution of defective products. — Also termed liability without fault. See strict products liability under PRODUCTS LIABILITY. Cf. absolute liability; fault liability; OUTCOME RESPONSIBILITY. |
| absolute liability ²³ | 1. Archaic. See strict liability. 2. A type of strict liability based on causation alone, without any other limiting factors. • Absolute liability is often distinguished from strict products liability, which limits strict liability to injuries caused by a product defect. Cf. PRODU CTS LIABILITY. |

²¹ ACCIDENT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
²² ACCIDENT, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
²³ LIABILITY, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

Checklist: Critical Incident Objective Investigation Timeline Systems Process Flowchart Development



Checklist: CRITICAL INCIDENT OBJECTIVE INVESTIGATION TIMELINE SYSTEMS PROCESS FLOWCHART DEVELOPMENT

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| | | | Objective Media Sources (from all in | volved sources) | | | | |
|------|--|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| | | (1) Pre-Incident, (2) Incident, (3) Immediate Post-Incident, (4) Post-Incident Investigation, (5) Media Analysis, (6) Forensic Analysis | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Ref | Actions | Dispatch Centers | Surveillance/Civilian/Other | | | | | |
| 1 | (1) Pre-Incident | 911 Calls | | | | | | |
| 2 | (2) Incident | | LEOs – (O'Linn's) "Motorola Memory"™a | | | | | |
| 3 | (3) Immediate Post Incident | | Supervisor – Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW) | | | | | |
| | | | discharge over radio for CEW and Dispatch sync | | | | | |
| POST | -INCIDENT INVESTIGATION: | | | | | | | |
| 4 | Identify all media sources - Accurate - Full recordings - No time lapses or pauses | All Communications All Channels All Telephones 911 Recordings | Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) CEWs: - CEW cameras - Upload to Evidence.com - Time sync (correct clock drift correction) - Trilogy logs: event and pulse logs Squad recorders Audio recorders Personal phones Other | EMS dispatch EMS run sheets AEDs Personal recorders Other | Surveillance systems Home door recorders Home recorders Civilian phones, cameras Other | | | |
| 5 | Capture Native Format Recordings | | | | | | | |
| 6 | Store originals (in native formats) Properly name files/folders Organize for ease of access/locating | | | | | | | |
| MEDI | IA ANALYSIS: | | | | | | | |
| 7 | Analyze | | | | | | | |
| 8 | Verify | | | | | | | |
| | Verify Time Accuracy Tolerances | | | | | | | |
| 10 | Answer variances | | | | | | | |
| 11 | Transcribe with time codes | | | | | | | |
| 12 | Verify transcriptions | | | | | | | |
| 13 | Forensic analysis of all media | | | | | | | |
| FORE | NSIC SYNCHORNIZATINO AND ANALYS | SIS: | | | | | | |
| 14 | Forensic syncing of all media | | | | | | | |
| 15 | Generate objective, fully annotated | | | | | | | |
| | timeline, with time sync tolerances | | | | | | | |
| 16 | Generate sub-timelines as needed | | | | | | | |

a. "O'Linn's Motorola Memory" refers to Law Enforcement Defense Attorney Mildred K. O'Linn's idea of LEOs utilizing their communications devices to objectively contemporaneously time-log and record their personal observations.

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Checklist: CRITICAL INCIDENT OBJECTIVE INVESTIGATION TIMELINE DEVELOPMENT

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| Incident Identifier: | Inc No | Inc Date: | _ Inc. Time: | _ Completed by: |
|----------------------|--------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|
|----------------------|--------|-----------|--------------|-----------------|

Objective: To create objective, complete, accurate, incident timeline as expeditiously as possible post incident.

Purpose: To assist in developing the most accurate, verified, documented, objective, useable critical incident timeline possible.

Guidelines: Specific instructions/requirements for collection and creation of annotated, verified timeline:

- Available ("Avail") has the specific information been identified and determined to be available?
- Collected ("Collect") has the specific available information been collected as evidence?
- Verified has the collected information been verified, including with precision variation of information? Recordings verified for:
 - True time recording (e.g. recording time variance, source and accuracy of time stamp, no compression, no deletion of quiet time, recording true to timeline)
 - Precision (e.g. accurate to what degree of precision, source of time stamp or input, degree of potential time variance)
- Documented ("Docum") has the collected information been documented, including with appropriate affidavit for admissibility of evidence and substantiating evidentiary foundation?
- Transcribed has any recording been accurately transcribed? (document who transcribed it, when, where)
- Proofed has any transcribed recording been accurately proofed and certified as such?
- Original Retained ("Orig Ret") has the original been retained as evidence?
 (Easy Universal Use Reformatting) All recordings should also be reformatted to easily universal formats, and appropriately identified as such modification and re-formatted.
- Conflicts Resolved ("Confl Resolv") has any conflict been identified and resolved?
- Definitions ("Def") have all definitions been included for lay persons' use of information? (as example, officer's codes identified, 10 codes defined, specific terms of art defined, etc.)

| Exp | Expeditious Post-Incident Time Logging Assist Collected | | | | |
|-----|---|---|---|--|-----------|
| No | n/a | Υ | Ν | Description | Comments: |
| 1 | | | | "Motorola Memory" done | |
| 2 | | | | Supervisor CEW 5-second discharge over radio | |
| 3 | | | | Other | |
| | | | | | |

Source of Timeline Input Table:

| | Av | ail | Col | llect | Ver | ified | Doo | cum | Trar | nscril | bed | Pr | oofe | d | Orig | Ret. | Conf | Re | solv | D | ef | | |
|----|----|-----|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-----|------|--------|-----|-----|------|---|------|------|------|----|------|---|----|------------------|----------|
| No | Y | Ν | Y | Ν | Y | Ν | Y | Ν | n/a | Υ | Ν | n/a | Υ | Ν | Y | Ν | n/a | Υ | Ν | Υ | Ν | Time Source | Comments |
| 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Dispatch | |
| 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | EMS | |
| 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ambulance | |
| 4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fire | |
| 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AED/Card Mon # 1 | |
| 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AED/Card Mon # 1 | |
| 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BWC/Squad # 1 | |
| 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BWC/Squad # 2 | |
| 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BWC/Squad # 3 | |
| 10 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CEW #1 | |
| 11 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CEW #2 | |
| 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CEW #3 | |
| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Other | |
| 14 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |


Additional Details/Comments:

Criminal Justice Probability Approximation Illustration Graphic

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| Descriptive Approximation | Levels of Certainty | Notes/Comments |
|------------------------------|--|---|
| 100% | 100% Perfection Outcome 100% Perfection Decisions (20/20 hindsight) 100% Perfection Evaluation 100% Perfection Observations/Knowledge | Some Plaintiffs, Critics, Negative Law Enforcement Activists Elevated or Conflated Standard |
| 95–99% | Beyond a Reasonable Doubt | Criminal Proof Standard |
| | Substantial Likelihood | |
| 75–85% | Clear and Convincing | Punitive Damages |
| | | |
| 50.1% | Preponderance of the Evidence - (more likely than not) | Civil Proof Standard |
| | Arrest – Probable Cause (Fair Probability) | 4 th Amendment Arrest Standard |
| | Arrest – "Arguable" Probable Cause | 4 th Amendment Civil Liability Standard |
| | Frisk – Reasonable Suspicion | 4 th Amendment Frisk Standard |
| | Brief Detention – Reasonable Suspicion | 4 th Amendment Brief Detention |
| | 4 th Amendment Objective Reasonableness | Standard Threshold |
| | Mere Hunch | |
| | Plausible it Could Happen | |
| | Potentially It Could Happen | |
| | Possible it Could Happen | |
| | | |

USE OF FORCE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TIMELINE



TEST – "DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE" TO PERSON'S "SERIOUS MEDICAL NEEDS"

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4th AMENDMENT SEIZURE CHART

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| Encounter (No basis for "seizure") | | mendment Seizure dment "Seizure" of a "Free Person") | |
|---------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| | | Adment "Seizure" of a "Free Person") /Frisk t. 1868 (1968), and progeny able Suspicion" (Pat) Frisk - for Weapons AFTER - Lawful Detention Based on either consent or reasonable suspicion (not a belief) "Reasonable Articulable Suspicion" (1) Officer reasonably believes (2) that the lawfully detained person (3) is armed and/or dangerous or that the officer or another is in danger of physical injury, (4) the officer may search (pat frisk) such person for weapons or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by | Arrest "Probable Cause" ("Fair Probability") Probable Cause - a "fair probability" that a crime has been committed and the person being seized has committed it. Probable cause is based on specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that a crime has been or is being committed. |
| | (3) Is about to be committed, AND (4) The person about to be stopped, detained, or seized is the person who did one of the above. The Procedure: (1) After identifying as an officer (2) an officer may stop a person: (a) in a public place (b) for a reasonable period of time (c) when officer objectively reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a crime. (3) Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped. (Officer must diligently pursue suspicions) | law abiding persons. If the officer finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, or which may constitute a threat to his safety, the officer may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning; at completion of the questioning the officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned | |

| Graham Factors Plus "Objective Reasonableness" | Person in Need of Medical Assistance Due to Mental Health, Drugs, or Illness | Additional Force Factors Force to Gain Volitional Compliance | | | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Prioritized most important to least | Person is NOT Intentional Immediate Threat/Flight Risk | Person is NOT an Immediate Threat/Flight Risk | | | | | | |
| 1. Immediate threat | Mentally ill/Drugs Officer should make greater effort to | Person must be given reasonable opportunity to comply with | | | | | | |
| - to who? (LEO, other, self) | control situation through less-intrusive means. | directives prior to each X26E CEW touch-stun application | | | | | | |
| - beware "possible" threat fallacy | 5 | 1. Officer must have a reasonable belief that person is capable of | | | | | | |
| 2. Actively resisting seizure/arrest | Some courts believe acting out by emotionally disturbed | volitional compliance to commands; | | | | | | |
| 3. Circumstances tense, uncertain | person diminishes the level of force necessary and such persons are in need of a doctor, not a jail cell and in the | 2. must reasonably perceive person is "actively resisting"; | | | | | | |
| rapidly evolving (pace of events) | usual case – where such a person is neither a threat to | 3. must give warning of imminent application of force; | | | | | | |
| Severity of the crime at issue | himself or others – the government's interest in | 4. must give person a reasonable: | | | | | | |
| Attempting to evade seizure | deploying force to detain him is not as substantial as its | a. time "to recover from extreme pain"; | | | | | | |
| - by flight | interest in deploying force to apprehend a dangerous | b. opportunity to "gather" their thoughts; and | | | | | | |
| flight from serious event | criminal. | c. opportunity to "consider thher refusal to comply"; and | | | | | | |
| Additional Basic Factors | | 5. officer needs to include in report that before each X26E CEW | | | | | | |
| 6. Availability of less-intrusive | Pain: If pain is used to gain compliance, | touch-stun used to attempt to gain the person's volitional | | | | | | |
| methods of capturing, controlling, | (1) consideration whether person will perceive pain, and | compliance officer followed these guidelines. | | | | | | |
| restraining, or subduing subject | (2) be able to comply with officer's commands. | Consider Alternates: less risk of injury ("Quantum of Force") | | | | | | |
| 7. What officers knew about | Distraction: Must be able to articulate that force used | | | | | | | |
| subject's health, mental condition, | for distraction is reasonable. | (Some courts require greater justification) | | | | | | |
| or other relevant frailties | | | | | | | | |
| | | d quality of the intrusion (use of force) on the individual's 4 th | | | | | | |
| | ountervailing governmental interests at stake. | | | | | | | |
| | | tality of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard | | | | | | |
| to their underlying intent or motivat | | officiency and officiency to mark and it according to the | | | | | | |
| | ertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is | cofficers are often forced to make split-second judgments in | | | | | | |
| | quires careful attention to the totality of facts and circumsta | | | | | | | |
| | ediate threat to the safety of officers or others, | nces of each particular case, including (but not inflited to). | | | | | | |
| | sting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, and, | | | | | | | |
| - the severity of the crime at issue. | | | | | | | | |
| | tive (Graham): "Reasonableness" of a particular use of force | e must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the | | | | | | |
| scene, rather than with the 20/20 v | | | | | | | | |
| Each Force Application Must Be Ju | stified: Each strike, OC use, force application, trigger pull, | and 5-second CEW cycle must be objectively reasonable. | | | | | | |
| All Force Must Be Unambiguously | Justified in Officer's Reports/Statements: Any factor use | ed to justify use of or escalation of force must be explained. | | | | | | |
| Risk/Benefit Test (Scott): In judging whether officer's actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that officer's actions posed to the subject in | | | | | | | | |
| light of the threat to the public posed by the subject that the officer was trying to eliminate. | | | | | | | | |
| Armstrong (4th Circuit): CEW "may only be deployed when officer is confronted with an exigency that creates an immediate safety risk," and may not be used "in | | | | | | | | |
| the face of stationary and non-violent resistance to being handcuffed" [Bounds v, Parsons, 700 Fed. Appx. 217 (CA4 (Md.) July 14, 2017)] | | | | | | | | |
| • If no exigency or immediate safety risk exists, slow down and consider alternative force options/solutions including negotiation, commands, or physical skills. | | | | | | | | |
| Physical resistance alone does not equal immediate danger. | | | | | | | | |
| Emotionally disturbed person (EDP) or mentally ill alone does not indicate immediate threat. | | | | | | | | |
| , | likely to cure the immediate safety risk. | | | | | | | |
| Non-deadly danger to self does not | | | | | | | | |
| | | se of power,' not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct." | | | | | | |
| - Qualified immunity ("QI") Protec | ts All but the Plainly Incompetent or who Knowingly Vie | | | | | | | |

- Beyond Debate (al-Kidd, Mullenix, White): The contours of the right must have been sufficiently clear that any reasonable official would have understood that his conduct violated the right; "existing precedent must have placed the ... constitutional question beyond debate." (Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)

VERSION "1": STUDY AID: UNDERSTANDING THE 4TH AMENDMENT'S OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS STANDARD AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY (© Copyright September 13, 2019 by LAAW International, LLC. All rights reserved.)

(4th Amendment Addresses Misuse of Power (*Brower*)): The 4th Amendment "addresses 'misuse of power,' not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct." - Qualified Immunity ("QI") Protects All but the Plainly Incompetent or who Knowingly Violate the Law (*Malley*)

- Beyond Debate (al-Kidd, Mullenix, White): The contours of the right must have been sufficiently clear that any reasonable official would have understood that his conduct violated the right; "existing precedent must have placed the ... constitutional question beyond debate." (Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011))
 Balancing Test (Graham): Reasonableness inquiry requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion (use of force) on the individual's 4th
- Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.

Risk/Benefit Test (Scott): In judging whether officer's actions were reasonable, we must consider the risk of bodily harm that officer's actions posed to the subject in light of the threat to the public posed by the subject that the officer was trying to eliminate.

Reasonableness at the Moment Force is Used (Graham): Reasonableness test considers that officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.

Reasonableness Test (Graham): Requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including (but not limited to):

- whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others,

- whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, and,

- the severity of the crime at issue.

- Reasonable from Officer's Perspective (Graham): "Reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.
- **Objective Test** (*Graham*): Whether officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.
- Armstrong (4th Circuit): CEW "may only be deployed when ... officer is confronted with an exigency that creates an immediate safety risk," and may not be used "in the face of stationary and non-violent resistance to being handcuffed" [Bounds v, Parsons, 700 Fed. Appx. 217 (CA4 (Md.) July 14, 2017)]
- If no exigency or immediate safety risk exists, slow down and consider alternative force options/solutions including negotiation, commands, or physical skills.
- Physical resistance alone does not equal immediate danger.
- Emotionally disturbed person (EDP) or mentally ill alone does not indicate immediate threat.
- Choose a force option reasonably likely to cure the immediate safety risk.
- Non-deadly danger to self does not justify higher force risk.

Each Force Application Must Be Justified: Each strike, OC use, force application, trigger pull, and 5-second CEW cycle must be objectively reasonable. All Force Must Be Unambiguously Justified in Officer's Reports/Statements: Any factor used to justify use of or escalation of force must be explained.

| Basic Factors or Test of "Objective Reasonableness" Graham risk prioritized by Chew (prioritized most important to least) | Not an <i>Intentional</i> Immediate Threat/Flight Risk Person in Need of Medical Assistance Due to Mental Health, Drugs, or Illness | Additional (minimum passive) Force Factors (Mattos/Brooks procedure) Force to Gain Volitional Compliance (Person is not an immediate threat or flight risk) (likely inapplicable under Armstrong (4 th Circuit)) |
|--|--|--|
| Immediate threat to who? (LEO, other, self) beware "possible" threat fallacy Actively resisting seizure/arrest Circumstances tense, uncertain rapidly evolving (pace of events) Severity of the crime at issue Attempting to evade seizure by flight flight from serious event Additional Basic Factors Availability of less-intrusive methods of capturing, controlling, restraining, or subduing subject What officers knew about subject's health, mental condition, or other relevant frailties | Mentally ill/Drugs (Bryan v. MacPherson): Officer should make greater effort to control situation through less intrusive means. Some courts believe acting out by emotionally disturbed person diminishes the level of force necessary and such persons are in need of a doctor, not a jail cell and in the usual case – where such a person is neither a threat to himself or anyone else – the government's interest in deploying force to detain him is not as substantial as its interest in deploying force to gain compliance, Pain: If pain is used to gain compliance, (1) consideration whether person will perceive pain, and (2) be able to comply with officer's commands. Distraction: Must be able to articulate that force used for distraction to assist custody is reasonable. | Person must be given reasonable opportunity to comply with directives prior to each X26E CEW touch-stun application 1. Officer must have a reasonable belief that person is capable of volitional compliance to commands; 2. must reasonably perceive person is "actively resisting"; 3. must give warning of imminent application of force; 4. must give person a reasonable: a. time "to recover from extreme pain" experienced; b. opportunity to "gather herself;"; and c. opportunity to "consider her refusal to comply"; 5. the duration of time between each X26E CEW touch-stun application (according to <i>Mattos</i>) must be > 36 seconds; and 6. officer needs to include in report that before each X26E CEW touch-stun used to attempt to gain the person's volitional compliance officer followed these guidelines. Consider Alternates: less risk of injury ("Quantum of Force") (Some courts require greater justification) |

TASER CONDUCTED ENERGY WEAPON (CEW) USE GUIDELINES



This is a study guide only and is a supplement to, but not a substitute for, TASER warnings and training. Be trained and read full warnings (available online at www.axon.com/legal).
 CEWs have risks and CEW use and physical incapacitation, alone or in combination with physical exertion, stress, unforeseen circumstances, or individual susceptibilities, may ↑ risk or cause serious injury or death.



WARNING
 Warning
 Warning
 Weapon
 Conducted Energy Weapon
 Can temporarily incapacitate target.
 Can cause death or serious injury.
 Obey warnings, instructions and all laws.
 Obey warnings, instructions and all laws.
 Comply with current training materials and requirements.
 See ware and norm

TASER CEW USE GUIDELINES

(THESE GUIDELINES MAY BE MORE RESTRICTIVE THAN CONSITUTIONAL STANDARDS AND DO NOT CREATE OR ELEVATE A STANDARD OF CARE)

- If no exigency or immediate safety risk exists, slow down and consider alternative force options/solutions including negotiation, commands, or physical skills.
- Physical resistance alone does not equal an immediate safety risk.
- Emotionally disturbed person (EDP) or mentally ill, by itself, does not indicate an immediate threat.
- Choose a force option reasonably likely to cure the immediate safety risk.
- CEWs do not replace deadly-force options.

Incident Basics: Subjects with Increased Risks (requiring \uparrow justification): • Complete training first; recertify annually • Higher risk populations (children, pregnant, elderly, thin) Review latest TASER CEW warnings Known medical conditions (pregnancy, heart disease, pacemaker, seizure history) Secondary Risks (requiring \uparrow justification): • Follow all laws, regulations, policies • Uncontrolled falls, subjects in elevated positions or running on hard surfaces • If CEW is not achieving intended goal, transition to different force option - Consider if tackling or intentional grounding is objectively reasonable Monitor subject post-CEW: if unresponsive. • Operating machinery or transportation (car, motorcycle, bicycle, skateboard) Presence of explosive, flammable substance, or vapor initiate EMS/CPR protocols **Probe Targeting:** Minimize Number and Duration of CEW Exposures: • Each CEW trigger pull or 5 seconds of discharge must be objectively reasonable Avoid intentionally targeting sensitive areas (eves, head, throat, Control and restrain subject immediately, if safe and practicable chest/heart, genitals, known pre-existing injury areas) • Use 5-second "window of opportunity" to restrain and "cuff under power" • Do not use multiple CEWs or multiple circuits without justification Use preferred target areas (green areas on target figures) • Avoid chest (1 cardiac risks, particularly in thin subjects) Avoid repeated, extended, or continuous exposures beyond 15 seconds absent Close-range deployment - split belt line, maximize probe spread reasonably perceived immediate threat and ↑ justification Probe Spread: Wider probe spread ↑ effectiveness. 12" (30.5 cm) probe spread is recommended for ↑ effectiveness. - If too close to achieve good probe spread, attempt to ↑ distance. If unable to ↑ distance, targeting leg may allow tactical advantage. CEW Use: If person is NOT immediate threat or flight risk, Avoid CEW Use: Use objectively reasonable force under totality of circumstances Without first attempting verbal de-escalation, commands, or physical skills Use the minimum force necessary to accomplish lawful objectives. On person known or perceived to be emotionally disturbed or mentally ill • Give a verbal warning before using force, if practicable • On elevated risk populations Give subject reasonable opportunity to comply before force is used or repeated • For pain compliance if pain foreseeably ineffective due to ↑ tolerance from drugs, Cease force once subject is under control alcohol, or psychosis **Documentation** (always document force/CEW justification): Drive (Touch/Contact)-Stun Use: • Avoid using CEW drive (touch/contact)-stun except: Document immediate safety risks, danger, resistance, force used from officer POV - 3 or 4-point contact to complete circuit or ↑ probe spread Body worn cameras and CEWs provide best objective documentation of events - "break-contact" or distraction tactic when assaulted or tied up with subject • Fully document (identify, collect, maintain evidence) - brief application to attempt pain-compliance; must give reasonable time and - Subject's threats, behaviors, and actions opportunity to comply - Each application of force, and each injury or alleged injury Avoid repeated drive-stuns if compliance is not achieved, particularly with EDPs - Each CEW trigger pull or 5-second discharge

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