Unanimous holding: Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a higher standard when a "no-knock" entry results in destruction of property; officers acted reasonably in breaking in, based on reasonable suspicion of danger.
UNITED STATES v. RAMIREZ, No. 96-1469
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued January 13, 1998 -- Decided March 4, 1998
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
SYLLABUS
91 F.3d 1297, reversed and remanded.
Based on a reliable confidential informant's statement that he had seen
a person he believed to be Alan Shelby, a dangerous escaped prisoner, at
respondent's home, and on a federal agent's subsequent observation of a
man resembling Shelby outside that home, the Government obtained a "no-knock"
warrant to enter and search the home. Having gathered in the early morning
hours to execute the warrant, officers announced over a loud speaker system
that they had a search warrant. Simultaneously, they broke a single window
in respondent's garage and pointed a gun through the opening, hoping thereby
to dissuade occupants from rushing to the weapons stash the informant had
told them was in the garage. Awakened by the noise and fearful that his
house was being burglarized, respondent grabbed a pistol and fired it into
the garage ceiling. When the officers shouted "police," respondent
surrendered and was taken into custody. After he admitted that he had fired
the weapon, that he owned both that gun and another in the house, and that
he was a convicted felon, respondent was indicted on federal charges of
being a felon in possession of firearms. The District Court granted his
motion to suppress evidence regarding weapons possession, ruling that the
officers had violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. Sect. 3109
because there were "insufficient exigent circumstances" to justify
their destruction of property in executing the warrant. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
Held: 1. The Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a
higher standard when a "no-knock" entry results in the destruction
of property. It is obvious from the holdings in Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927, 934, 936, and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. ___, that such
an entry's lawfulness does not depend on whether property is damaged in
the course of the entry. Under Richards, a no-knock entry is justified
if police have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and announcing
their presence before entering would "be dangerous or futile, or .
. . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." Id., at ___.
Whether such a reasonable suspicion exists does not depend on whether police
must destroy property in order to enter. This is not to say that the Fourth
Amendment does not speak to the manner of executing a warrant. Such execution
is governed by the general touchstone of reasonableness that applies to
all Fourth Amendment analysis. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,
108-109. Excessive or unnecessary property destruction during a search
may violate the Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the
fruits of the search not subject to suppression. Applying these principles
to the facts at hand demonstrates that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
The police certainly had a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking
and announcing their presence might be dangerous to themselves or others,
in that a reliable informant had told them that Alan Shelby might be in
respondent's home, an officer had confirmed this possibility, and Shelby
had a violent past and possible access to a large supply of weapons and
had vowed that he "would not do federal time." Moreover, the
manner in which the entry was accomplished was clearly reasonable, in that
the police broke but a single window in the garage to discourage Shelby,
or anyone else, from rushing to the weapons that the informant had told
them were there. Pp. 3-5.
2. The officers executing the warrant did not violate Sect. 3109, which
provides: "The officer may break open any . . . window . . . to execute
a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is
refused admittance . . . ." Contrary to respondent's contention, that
statute does not specify the only circumstances under which an officer
executing a warrant may damage property. By its terms Sect. 3109 prohibits
nothing, but merely authorizes officers to damage property in certain instances.
Even accepting arguendo that it implicitly forbids some of what it does
not expressly permit, it is of no help to respondent. In both Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313, and Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S.
585, 591, n. 8, this Court noted that Sect. 3109's prior notice requirement
codified a common-law tradition. The Court now makes clear that Sect. 3109
also codified the exceptions to the common-law requirement of notice before
entry. Because that is the case, and because the common law informs the
Fourth Amendment, Wilson and Richards serve as guideposts in construing
the statute. In Wilson, the Court concluded that the common-law announcement
principle is an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry,
but noted that the principle was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring
announcement under all circumstances. 514 U.S., at 934. In Richards, the
Court articulated the test used to determine whether exigent circumstances
justify a particular noknock entry. 520 U. S., at ___. Thus, Sect. 3109
includes an exigent circumstances exception and that exception's applicability
in a given instance is measured by the same standard articulated in Richards
. The police met that standard here. Pp. 6-7.
91 F.3d 1297, reversed and remanded.
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