History, Purpose and Philosophy of Amicus Advocacy:

The AELE Amicus Brief Program


By Wayne W. Schmidt

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Amicus Curiae [plural: Amici] means “friend of the court.” In the American and British legal systems, two (or more) opposing sides present their views as plaintiff or defendant; they challenge and attack their opponent’s positions and arguments. This is the nature of the “adversary system” of jurisprudence.

The amicus brief was known in Roman law and has played an important role in English and American legal systems. Originally it was intended to be a method where a disinterested third party could cite cases, in the interest of justice, that the court might overlook. A friend of the court need not be an attorney, but the briefs are always submitted by lawyers acting in behalf of the amicus party. For example, in 1686 a member of Parliament filed an amicus brief to explain the intent of the legislation under scrutiny. {N. 1}

In large part, the continuing success of the American and British legal systems is a long-term conformity with the political process. The law must serve the People. Without popular support, a judicial system loses credibility; authority is undermined and the system begins to collapse. One writer, a professor of political science, said that “judges have sought to gain information from political groups as well as to give them a feeling of participation in the process of decision. Access to the legal process on the part of such organizations is a logical extension of realistic awareness of law as a process of social choice and policy making.” Although some critics have called amicus briefs “political propaganda,” courts traditionally welcome third parties who present their views on a case under review.

The amicus brief in modern times

A number of organizations have used the judicial branch as a vehicle for reform. As long ago as 1941, the N.A.A.C.P. began an attack on racial segregation through amicus briefs. {N. 2} In 1954, the Supreme Court reversed itself and ordered public schools to desegregate. {N. 3} The court relied on the brief of Thurgood Marshall, the then director and counsel for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund. {N. 4} In his “Brandeis Brief,” Marshall attached a 24-page appendix entitled, “The effects of segregation and the consequences of desegregation: a social science statement.” This remarkable document was signed by 32 of the nation’s “foremost authorities in sociology, anthropology, psychology and psychiatry who have worked in the area of American work relations.”

·        The technique of emphasizing economic or social evidence, rather than legal precedents, was pioneered by Louis D. Brandeis (1856-1941) in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Like Thurgood Marshall, Brandeis also served as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court after a distinguished career as an advocate.

Marshall’s stunning success has been attributed to the non-legal social data he assembled in support of court-ordered desegregation – and not to his discussion of legal precedent.

In 1961 the Supreme court again reversed itself and held that state courts were obliged to reject evidence that had been illegally seized by police officers. {N. 5}

In reaching its decision the Court overturned their 1949 ruling, which held that such evidence could be used by the prosecution. The attorney for the defendant in the 1961 case did not urge the justices to reverse the earlier ruling. Indeed, he did not even cite that case in his brief. In oral argument he stated that his sole purpose was to argue the unconstitutionality of a state statute. {N. 6}

The American Civil Liberties Union took a broader view. In the amicus brief filed by the ACLU and their state affiliate, they requested the Court to reexamine their earlier views and overturn the 1949 holding. The Court accepted this request and dramatically changed the philosophy of criminal jurisprudence. It did so, not at the request of the accused nor on the basis of the defense brief, but on the urging of a third party. The ACLU brief forever proved the importance and influence of “friends of the court.” {N. 7}

In some cases, the Federal Courts have asked the Justice Department to appear as amicus curiae, as happened in the Little Rock High School and University of Mississippi integration cases. {N. 8} In many cases, a third-party who seeks to appear as “friend of the court” obtains the consent of both litigants. When one side declines, the party seeking to appear as amicus seeks leave of the Court to file its brief. Between 1954 (the desegregation case) and the summer of 1981 (twenty years after the exclusion of evidence holding) a total of 1,822 motions were filed with the Supreme Court, 83.9 percent of which were granted (an average of 57 cases a year). {N. 9}

Not all amici are interested in criminal justice. In fact, during 1970-1980, less than 39 percent of the cases in which amici appeared involved criminal law, an average of 11 cases a year. {N. 10}

The organizations that file amicus briefs are as varied as the kinds of cases in which they appear. One study of amicus motions during 1954-1980 concluded that business groups, trade associations, corporations and professional associations filed 58 percent of all amicus briefs docketed with the Supreme Court. The remaining 42 percent were filed by public interest organizations, consumer groups, religious societies or labor organizations. {N. 11}

Purposes of amicus briefs

While the Supreme Court welcomes well-written and useful briefs, its heavy case load suggests that it does not favor amicus briefs that merely repeat or restate the arguments advanced by the party that organization supports. {N. 12} The desegregation case of 1954 relied on social studies mentioned in the brief filed by the N.A.A.C.P. counsel. The adoption of a mandatory exclusionary rule was requested by the ACLU, as amicus.

In the desegregation case, the Court changed its views because of the content of the appendix to legal arguments. In the exclusionary rule case, the Court adopted a remedy because it was urged to do so by an organization that represented the rights of others who would be affected by the decision.

Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. (AELE) filed its first amicus brief in 1967. In the past forty plus years, AELE has advanced at least seven different approaches or styles in addressing issues under consideration by the courts:

1. To answer points raised by the opposing party. In our first case, in 1967, involving the issue of a police officer’s right to “frisk” a person suspected of being armed and dangerous, the N.A.A.C.P. suggested in its amicus brief, that stop-and-frisk procedures were unfairly and disproportionately practiced against minorities. {N. 13} AELE President James R. Thompson responded in our brief: {N. 14}

“We are somewhat at a loss to appreciate the force of this argument in the Brief of the N.A.A.C.P. It could as well be said that the arrest power is employed by the police most frequently against the inhabitants of our inner cities, racial minorities, and the under-privileged. Are the arrest statutes to be struck down on this account? Those who deal intimately with the day-to-day process of criminal justice in this country can testify that the entire machinery of the criminal law ensnares the poor more often than the wealthy, and this will continue to be true so long as poverty, lack of education, and lack of employment opportunities persist as causative crime factors. In many cities, minority group defendants compose a disproportionate share of the cases on the dockets of our criminal courts. Are they therefore immune from prosecution, conviction and punishment? May only the affluent, suburbanite members of a racial majority group be called to account for their crimes?”

In many cases, AELE speaks for the concern of the millions of law-abiding citizens, who often perceive themselves as pawns on a chessboard controlled by prosecutors and defense counsel. Conscientious police officers are likewise unrepresented by counsel of their own choosing, and are unable to respond to unwarranted criticism of their professional behavior.

2. To cite relevant statistics. Sometimes lawyers will become overly enmeshed in the facts of their own case, and may lose sight of the broader legal issues. For example, a 1986 Supreme Court case from California questioned the right of law enforcement officers to fly over and make aerial photographs of land used for the cultivation of marijuana. The arguments focused on the grower’s expectations of privacy.

First, AELE cited the statistical importance of aerial surveillance techniques in other states. In Florida, for example, state agents confiscated in 1982 some 107,500 pounds of marijuana found in 41 of the state’s 67 counties. The street value of those plants, when harvested, was estimated at $161 to $215 million dollars. At least 95 percent of those seizures were solely the result of aerial surveillance by fixed-wing aircraft flying at 1,000 feet or higher elevation.

Second, AELE cited the number of private aircraft registered with the F.A.A., a total of 257,536 in 1981. We concluded that “No landowner, therefore, can reasonably expect that aircraft will avoid his property, or that the occupants will not look down during over-flights.” {N. 15}

In another case, AELE supported a civil suit filed by the widow of an Illinois police officer who was fatally shot by a burglar in the rear of a convenience store. The owner had disconnected a sodium vapor light to save expenses, thus allowing the patrol officer to be shot without warning. AELE contacted experts, and argued that the store owner’s purported attempt to save energy was minimal. The cost of operating the vapor light was less than $4.00 a month. {N. 16}

In a 1979 case, the question was whether a policy of searching persons at the scene of a narcotics raid was justified. AELE examined the raid reports of 60 files of the Chicago Police. Our brief disclosed the results of ten of those raids, each identified by an official records division number. This summary provided vivid proof that the challenged procedure was highly effective in obtaining evidence, contraband and moneys gained from illegal pursuits – as well as weapons carried on these persons that could have been used against members of the raiding party. {N. 17}

3. To limit application of a decision to narrowly-drawn circumstances. There are two kinds of cases where AELE will take this approach. One of them is where we believe there is a good chance the government will lose the appeal, and we want to limit the holding to situations which will not unduly hamper effective law enforcement. In a 1987 case which contested the validity of a false arrest release, AELE declined to adopt the view of the law enforcement agency that had been sued; their attorneys sought a blanket reversal which would have upheld the legality of all releases of the right to sue when signed by persons facing prosecution. AELE asked the Supreme Court to limit the holding to those releases signed by arrested persons who are represented by legal counsel, and who sign the release on the advice of their attorney.

In differing with the party we supported, we feared an all-or-nothing decision. We also believed our view was better policy than the view taken by the party we supported. We opted for a compromise, which would uphold false arrest releases in a large number of cases. {N. 18}

In some cases, the case on appeal does not directly involve law enforcement. Yet the decision may be broad enough to affect law enforcement practices. One such case involved a university employee who challenged her termination by filing a federal civil rights suit. She had failed to exhaust her administrative appeal remedies. AELE appeared as amicus to warn the court that an affirmance would have unintended ramifications in a totally different context. It could open the floodgates to insignificant claims by prison inmates who would prefer to sue corrections officials rather than file claims under available administrative procedures. {N. 19} Obviously the attorneys for the aggrieved employee and her employer never briefed or argued the ramifications of the litigation on persons incarcerated in prisons.

In the majority opinion, which upheld the employee, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the application of the dispute to prisoner lawsuits. The Court concluded that prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies if available to them. {N. 20} Would the court have devoted more than two pages to the discussion of prisoner suits in this employment dispute, if AELE had not raised the issue of our amicus brief?

4. To promote recognized standards or model procedures. In a 1983 case, the Supreme Court upheld certain procedures respecting the inventory of personal property taken from an arrestee at the time of booking, thus reversing the state supreme court. {N. 21}

In our amicus brief we cited model policies and rules in the Handbook of Jail Security published by the National Sheriffs’ Association (which joined our brief), and reprinted procedures adopted by the Chicago Police Dept. (which also joined our brief), along with other police policies adopted elsewhere in the nation.

5. To explain police practices or to illustrate police methodology. In a 1984 case examining the legality of warrantless chemical testing of substances reasonably believed to be narcotics, our amicus brief reproduced training material which listed reagents, color reactions, and the unlawful substances. {N. 22}

AELE’s Executive Director and its Amicus Advocate are former legal advisors to major city police departments, and both have been actively involved in police training as lecturers for more than thirty years. AELE briefs often cite police techniques and needed practices, from actual experiences.

6. To supplement shortcomings in the brief of the party we are supporting. In one case before the Supreme Court, the state attorney general filed a 14-page typed brief. Former Chief Justice Burger often criticized the quality of briefs and arguments before the Court, particularly lawyers for prosecution. {N. 23}

In a case set for re-argument before a U.S. Court of Appeals, the government declined to file a revised brief; the only new brief was the AELE amicus brief. We discussed four relevant federal appellate cases and referred to four similar cases decided by state courts. None of the eight cases were cited by the government. {N. 24}

Sometimes federal prosecutors ignore or fail to cite favorable state court decisions in their briefs. There is a similar tendency of state prosecutors to fail to cite helpful cases in other states. When this happens, AELE cites those relevant cases in our amicus briefs.

7. To explain the practical effect of an adverse decision on everyday, on-the-street police work. A U.S. Appeals Court, in a 3-to-0 decision, held that the rule of law which permits warrantless searches of vehicles did not apply to a truck trailer. Ordinarily, warrants are not required for vehicular searches if the police have probable cause, because the vehicle could be miles away by the time officers obtain a warrant. The court suggested officers could place a police guard on the trailer while a warrant was obtained. As this case arose in St. Louis, the court’s suggestion would be practical in that city.

However, there are seven states in the Eighth Circuit. We provided an example from one county in each state. Consider the following example mentioned in our brief. {N. 25}

Minnesota: Lake of the Woods County: Sheriff Emmett Chilgren polices 1311 square miles without the help of a regular deputy. The highway patrol has a single trooper assigned to the county. The county justice of the peace position was recently vacated, although Lake of the Woods County shares a county judge with two other counties. The county seat is Baudette, but the county judge may be holding court in Hallock, in Kittson County, a round-trip of 264 miles from Baudette. Snow falls up to 74 inches per year in the area, and the annual low temperature for the region is -34 degrees F; the ground has more than an inch of snow on an average of 140 days a year. Sheriff Chilgren stated to counsel that a search warrant could take as long as two days to obtain under certain circumstances.”

AELE brief-writing goals

The mere presence of a national organization as amicus curiae, underscores the importance of a case on appellate review. That fact alone may encourage justices to closely follow the arguments and re-examine their perceptions. More specifically, AELE has several long-term goals, particularly at the Supreme Court level.

1. To encourage further recognition of a “good-faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. AELE was the first organization to urge the Supreme Court to adopt the good-faith exception – long before the Justice Dept. adopted a similar view. {N. 26} The Court asked for additional argument on the issue in a case in which we urged the Justices to adopt the good-faith exception. {N. 27} Eventually, the Supreme Court recognized the exception in two cases involving defective search warrants. {N. 28} In 1987, the Supreme Court extended the good-faith exception to a warrantless search in a case where AELE filed an amicus brief, urging them to do so. {N. 29}

2. To adopt a standard of reasonableness in search and seizure cases. Recently, the Supreme Court has reduced the quantum of proof needed to sustain a lawful search. {N. 30} We have repeatedly urged the courts to adopt a common-sense definition of reasonableness.

3. To project a “bright line” rule to guide police practices. Much of the confusion over searches, arrests and confessions has been created by the Supreme Court. When they go too far in supporting the defense, they often cut back with exceptions, producing a checker-board pattern of conflicting decisions that is difficult for the police to understand and follow. We have often urged the adoption of bright-line guidance, and to the extent prior decision conflict with a more simplistic set of rules, to overrule those cases. {N. 31}

4. To limit application and prevent enlargement of the Miranda decision. AELE has consistently fought an enlargement of Miranda v. Arizona, (1964). {N. 32} Perhaps no area of criminal law is misunderstood more than the process of police questioning. To clarify some important points, AELE published a training bulletin entitled, “Common Misconceptions About Interrogations and Confessions.” It was mailed to thousands of law enforcement agencies and prosecutor offices.

5. To restrain the tendency of courts to micro-manage the police and corrections. AELE openly concedes mistakes of judgment and occasional misconduct by criminal justice personnel. Those injured by such improprieties have the right to sue for their injuries – and with our full support.

In one case AELE joined with a police association in challenging an appellate decision that put the content of police training courses under the direction of a federal trial judge, through the power to issue injunctive relief. That decision was overturned by the Supreme Court. {N. 33}

6. To remedy a shocking injustice. There have been many cases at the trial or intermediate appeals level that produced unjustified and disastrous consequences for conscientious police officers, or which imposed frivolous litigation on the victim of a crime.

·        AELE has filed two briefs in support of county sheriffs who were unfairly assessed monetary verdicts they would have had to pay with their personal and family funds. Both cases were reversed. {N. 34}

·        AELE represented a teenage robbery victim who was frivolously sued by the perpetrators; the case was dismissed after we vigorously assumed her defense. {N. 35}

·        AELE has also appeared as amicus in support of rape victims in Illinois and Florida; both were sued by the persons they identified. A federal court in Illinois dismissed the first case. In Florida, a trial court awarded damages against the victim for misidentification; the verdict was overturned on appeal. Had the trial court verdict been affirmed, it would have jeopardized the future of thousands of neighborhood crime-watch programs which have been so successful in recent years. {N. 36}

·        AELE also obtained legal counsel for (and paid the pre-trial legal fees of) a California police officer who sued an ACLU chapter and its attorney for the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury supported his claims with a verdict in his favor, and awarded him $20,000 in compensatory damages. {N. 37}

AELE briefs present a unified position and raise credible arguments

AELE is a non-profit, tax-exempt, non-partisan educational organization. Our briefs are routinely joined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the National Sheriffs’ Association.

In addition, the National District Attorneys’ Association and 40 states (through their attorney general) have joined our briefs in specific cases. When the issues affected other groups or jurisdictions, we invited their participation — including 18 national, 41 state and 8 local organizations of police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors, civic foundations, professional groups and municipalities.

·        The former Chief of the Appellate Section, Criminal Division, of the U.S. Dept. of Justice stated that several appellate cases were won because of our briefs — and urged AELE to continue its brief-writing program. {N. 38}

However, our record speaks for itself. As of November 2010, we had filed 165 briefs; in 164 decided cases, we were on the “winning” side in 73.2 percent of these. In most cases, we successfully supported the reversal of an unfavorable lower court ruling.

AELE briefs are independent, and are not automatically supportive of a governmental position

AELE will not defend or represent officials who act in bad faith or with a reckless disregard for the civil rights of others. {N. 39} When appropriate, AELE will file a brief against a governmental entity or law enforcement official:

• In one case, AELE urged the Supreme Court to recognize the right of the parents of a murdered girl to sue State Prison officials for the wrongful release of an offender. {N. 40}

• In another case, we asked the justices to overturn a holding that allowed correctional officers to physically assault an inmate, without any civil liability consequences. {N. 41}

• In a third case, AELE asked the court to overturn a holding that a warrantless village ordinance arrest was proper, where there was no reason to suspect that a person who neglected to purchase a license would not appear in court on a citation. {N. 42}


1. Brief of Sir George Treby, M.P. in Horton & Ruesby, Comb. 33, 90 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B. 1686).

2. Brief of the N.A.A.C.P. as amicus curiae in Henderson v. United States, 314 U.S. 625 (1941).

3. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954).

4. Thurgood Marshall was appointed by a federal appeals court judge by President Kennedy; President Johnson named him to the Supreme Court in 1967.

5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1685 (1961).

6. See notes 5 and 6 of Justice Harlan’s opinion at 367 U.S. 675, 81 S.Ct. 1702.

7. Following the 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio, a 1963 article in Yale Law Journal noted the probable influence of the ACLU brief. See Krislov, “The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy,” 72 Yale Law Journal 694 [at 712] (1963).

8. Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (E.D. Ark. 1957), 163 F. Supp. 13, 16 (E.D. Ark. 1958); Faubus v. United States as amicus curiae, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958).

9. See table, 10 (1) The Justice System Journal 91 (1985).

10. O’Connor and Epstein, “Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation,” 16 (2) Law Society Review 311 [at 316, table 2] (1981).

11. Bradley and Gardner, “Underdogs, Upperdogs and the Use of the Amicus Brief: Trends and Explanations,”10 The Justice System Journal 78 [at 91, table 2] (1985).

12. Shapiro, “Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court,” 10 Litigation (ABA) 21 (1984).

13. Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968) at p. 3 and note 79 at p. 45.

14. Mr. Thompson later resigned from the AELE Board of Directors to enter public service, including four terms as Governor of Illinois.

15. AELE Amicus Brief in California v. Ciraolo, at pp. 7-9; case reported at 106 S.Ct. 1809 (1968).

16. AELE Amicus Brief in Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, 328 N.E.2d 538 (Ill. App. 1975).

17. AELE Amicus Brief in Ybarra v. Illinois, at pp. 11-14; case reported at 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338 (1979).

18. AELE Amicus Brief in Newton v. Rumery, at p. 8; case reported at 107 S.Ct. 1187 (1987).

19. AELE Amicus Brief in Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida International University, No. 80-1874.

20. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida International University, 457 U.S 496, [at 509-512], 102 S.Ct. 2557 (1982).

21. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983).

22. AELE Amicus Brief in United States v. Jacobsen, No. 82-1167, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984).

23. In addition to highly publicized remarks at bar conferences, the Chief Justice criticized counsel in his court opinions. See, for example, his comments in Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 [at 390-391] and his address to the 1975 Judicial Conference for the District of Columbia Circuit, reported in the Washington Post, June 4, 1975.

24. AELE Amicus Brief in United States v. Bozada, No. 71-1727, U.S. Court of Appeals, en banc, Eighth Circuit. See footnote 25 below.

25. AELE Amicus Brief p. 10, in United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir., 1973). The en banc court reversed the panel decision, 5-to-2. The two dissenting judges commended the AELE brief but defended their purest views of the Fourth Amendment.

26. AELE first urged the Supreme Court to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 102 S.Ct. 2664 (1982).

27. In another search case, Illinois v. Gates, the State of Illinois asked the Court to include a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment in the list of questions presented for review. The Court denied that request, 455 U.S. 986, 102 S.Ct. 1607 (March 1, 1982). Undaunted, AELE urged the Court to adopt the good-faith exception in our amicus brief (in fact, that was our sole argument).

In an extraordinary action, the Court asked the parties to file additional briefs on the good-faith exception, and restored the case to the calendar for re-argument, 459 U.S. 1028, S.Ct. 436 (Nov. 29, 1982). AELE then joined, as co-amici, with members of the [U.S.] Attorney General’s Task Force on Violent Crime and other organizations, to strongly urge recognition of the good-faith exception. The Court avoided deciding the issue and affirmed the conviction on the merits, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983).

28. Finally, the Court accepted three cases that squarely raised the good-faith exception. Once, again, we asked the Court for a ruling consistent with our long-standing arguments. The defendant in one case died before the decision. In the other two cases, the Supreme Court — for the first time — recognized the good-faith exception. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984) and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984).

29. AELE Amicus Brief in Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (March 9, 1987).

30. Among the leading cases in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983) where the Court overruled the 1969 case of Spinelli v. United States. The Court rejected its two-pronged test for determining probable cause and adopted a more reasonable “totality of the circumstances” test (at 462 U.S. 225-239). Similarly, the recent case of Maryland v. Garrison, No. 85-759, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987) revived the common-sense reasonableness test of Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).

31. AELE urged a bright-line test in our brief in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). That was the sole argument in our brief. The Court agreed with our views and adopted a bright-line test in that case; see Justice Powell’s concurring opinion at 456 U.S. 826, 102 S.Ct. 2173.

32. Davis v. U.S. (1994); Stansbury v. California (1994); Illinois v. Perkins (1990); New York v. Harris (1990); Arizona v. Roberson (1988); Colorado v. Spring (1986); Colorado v. Connelly (1986); Oregon v. Elstad (1985); Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979); Brewer v. Williams (1977); Michigan v. Mosley (1975); U.S. v. Hale (1975); Michigan v. Tucker (1974).

33. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 455 U.S. 937, 102 S.Ct. 1426 (1982). AELE and the L.A. Police Protective League filed two amici briefs in this case; one urged the court to hear the appeal, and the other brief supported the merits of the city’s defense to injunctive remedies.

34. Jenkins v. Kreiger, 67 Ohio St.2d 314, 423 N.E.2d 856 (1981); Daniels v. Gilbreath, 668 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1982).

35. Mathews v. Janega, No. 74-C-70, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. 1974). AELE counsel represented V.D., a minor. See Mabley’s Report, “We Need To Protect Victims’ Rights, Too,” Chicago Today, Aug. 15, 1974, p. 4, which discussed the litigation.

36. Manis v. Miller, 317 So.2d 117 (Fla. App. 1976) and Sims v. Eisen, No. 76-C-981, U.S. Dist. Ct. (N.D. Ill. 1976).

37. Long v. American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, No. 35-98-28, Orange Co. Super Ct., Cal. (July 22, 1987).

38. Statement of T. George Gilinsky at the annual meeting of the Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association: New York (August 9, 1986).

39. For example, we have declined to enter cases concerning a defendant’s legal standing to object to evidence that is intentionally and knowingly obtained by an illegal entry and search. The Preamble to the By-Laws states that “AELE will adhere to the fundamental principles of justice and equal protection...” [and] emphatically rejects the support of, and will not support any individual, group or activity that advocates unconstitutional concepts.”

40. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 553 (1980).

41. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992).

42. Ricci v. Arlington Heights, 118 S.Ct. 679, 1693 (1998). AELE raised the same arguments against standardless custodial arrests for minor offenses in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536 (2001).

Last updated 6 November, 2010



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