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Sexual Offender Programs & Notification
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See also: Therapeutic Programs |
An intermediate California appeals court held that the state Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) gave the trial judge discretionary authority to involuntarily medicate an incompetent person placed with the state hospital pre-commitment. It affirmed an order finding that the defendant did not have the capacity to refuse medical treatment and requiring him to undergo the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. While the defendant had not been committed to the state hospital, the judge had the discretionary authority under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 6602.5 to require his involuntary medication based upon a proper finding that he was incompetent to refuse medical treatment. He was provided with adequate due process, since he was represented by an attorney, given a full evidentiary hearing on request, and the trial judge expressly found that he lacked the capacity to refuse treatment. State Dept. of State Hospitals v. J.W., # F077220, 31 Cal. App. 5th 334, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 2018 Cal. App. Lexis 1238
Two sex offenders filed a class action civil rights lawsuit on behalf of a class of sex offenders, claiming that a city refused to register them under the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) because they could not produce proof of an address. A federal appeals court commented that if that were true it might have violated the state statute, because the law provided a mechanism for registering the homeless. The plaintiffs, however, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their right to procedural due process because the city used constitutionally inadequate procedures to determine whether they had satisfied SORA’s registration requirements. Rejecting the claim, the federal appeals court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees due process only when the state deprives someone of life, liberty, or property. The plaintiffs insisted that the city deprived them of liberty based on a right to register under SORA. This was not a constitutionally protected liberty interest, so the plaintiffs had no due process claim. The court stated that the plaintiffs did not complain that the city incarcerated them; nor did they seek to enjoin the city from doing so in the future. The governmental action relevant here, the intake officers’ refusal to register them, did not deprive the plaintiffs of their interest in freedom from bodily restraint. Beley v. City of Chicago, #17-1449, 901 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2018).
Two convicted child sex offenders were required, under Illinois law, to register as sex offenders and comply with restrictions prohibiting them from living within 500 feet of a school, playground, or child-care center. Several years after their conviction, Illinois added child and group day-care homes to the 500-foot buffer zone. When they updated their sex offender registrations, they were informed that they had 30 days to move because child day-care homes had opened up within 500 feet of their residences. They sued, claiming that this change in the law imposed retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause; that applying the amended statute to them constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property; and that the statute was enforced without a hearing for an individualized risk assessment and was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, in violation of their due process rights. A federal appeals court upheld the rejection of these claims, finding that the amended statute was neither impermissibly retroactive nor punitive. The Takings Clause claim was unexhausted and the amendment was adopted before they acquired their homes, so it did not alter their property-rights expectations. The procedural due process claim failed because there was no right to a hearing to establish a fact irrelevant to the statute. The law “easily satisfies rational-basis review.” Vasquez v. Foxx, #17-1061, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018).
Sexually violent predator (SVP) detainees in a California correctional facility were subject to essentially the same conditions of confinement as their criminal counterparts and were more restrictive than conditions in a state hospital. The conditions in administrative segregation to which the detainee was subjected were substantially more restrictive than the conditions faced by the general criminal population and the detainee was viciously attacked. These conditions could be found to amount to impermissible punishment. The county and sheriff in his official capacity could be held liable in damages, but the sheriff could not be held liable in his individual capacity, so summary judgment for the county and sheriff in his official capacity was overturned. King v. County of Los Angeles, #14-55320, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 6045 (9th Cir.).
An Alabama prisoner sued, claiming that the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA) and the correctional classification manual violated his procedural due process, substantive due process, and ex post facto rights by classifying him as a sex offender. A federal appeal court ruled held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the procedural due process claim because he was convicted of a crime that constituted a sex offense under Alabama law at the time of his conviction and thus was not entitled to any additional process before being classified as a sex offender by prison officials. Furthermore, plaintiff failed to raise a viable substantive due process claim or ex post facto claim. Waldman v. Alabama Prison Commissioner, #15-15535, 871 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir.).
A Wisconsin prisoner convicted of sexually assaulting a minor and armed robbery sued correctional officials, claiming that they violated his rights to due process and freedom of association by denying him visits with his daughter in 2004 and 2013. When he inquired about visitation in 2013, he was told that he would first have to complete a sex offender program that was not then available. Instead of filing a formal request, he filed suit. The court dismissed the claims based on 2004 as time‐barred. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the defendants on the 2013 claims. The remaining defendants permissibly denied him visits in 2013 because he did not use the correct procedure to request them. His “information requests” in 2013 were not formal “denials” of visitation, so the warden and the probation officer were not liable for violating his rights. Easterling v. Thurmer, #17-1581, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 273 (7th Cir.).
A registered sex offender served a one-year sentence for driving with a revoked license, which was to be followed by mandatory supervised release. On his release date, he submitted two proposed host sites, seeking approval for one of them. The Department of Corrections had not investigated the proposed sites, so a parole supervisor ordered his parole officer to issue a parole violation rather than release him. The parole officer’s report contained false statements, including that electronic monitoring was a condition of the supervised release and that the Department had attempted to place him at a host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic monitoring requirement. As a result, he spent six more months in custody before being released because of good time credits. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment in favor of the parole officer on the basis of qualified immunity. No court had previously held that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements. Absent these arrangements, their continued detention does not violate clearly established rights. Smith v. Anderson, #16-2333, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 21569 (7th Cir.).
A registered sex offender served a one-year sentence for driving with a revoked license, which was to be followed by mandatory supervised release. On his release date, he submitted two proposed host sites, seeking approval for one of them. The Department of Corrections had not investigated the proposed sites, so a parole supervisor ordered his parole officer to issue a parole violation rather than release him. The parole officer’s report contained false statements, including that electronic monitoring was a condition of the supervised release and that the Department had attempted to place him at a host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic monitoring requirement. As a result, he spent six more months in custody before being released because of good time credits. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment in favor of the parole officer on the basis of qualified immunity. No court had previously held that the Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who lack lawful and approved living arrangements. Absent these arrangements, their continued detention does not violate clearly established rights. Smith v. Anderson, #16-2333, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 21569 (7th Cir.). A man sued the state of Nebraska and other defendants after his name and photo mistakenly appeared on the Nebraska State Patrol’s online sex offender registry. A federal appeals court ruled that even if the complaint was sufficient to state a negligence claim under the state Tort Claims Act, the claim was time barred under a two-year statute of limitations. A claim for unlawful takings failed, as he did not show that any property was taken or damaged for public use. Federal civil rights claims against state employees in their individual capacities were properly rejected because a mistake or lack of due care by state employees in these particular circumstances did not establish invidious or irrational treatment that could violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. Nebraska, #15-3680, 861 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.).
A sexually violent predator civilly committed for treatment in a Special Treatment Unit was subjected at least annually to an interview by members of a Treatment Progress Review Committee (TPRC). The committee then considered a range of materials to formulate a recommendation about whether the patient should progress to the next step in the program. A member of the committee wrote a report recommending that the patient not advance in treatment. The report recognized that this was “not consistent” with his treatment team's recommendation, but concluded that he “had not fully met the treatment goals,” provided a detailed overview of his sexual and non-sexual offenses, diagnostic history, and clinical treatment, and summarized the results of an interview, including that “it appears that he denies, minimizes or justifies much of his documented offense history,” and that “[h]e did not demonstrate remorse for his crimes or empathy for his victims.” The patient sued, alleging retaliation for his First Amendment-protected participation in legal activities on behalf of himself and other sexual predator residents. A federal appeals court concluded that he was entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that the plaintiff pleaded facts reflecting that the defendant based her recommendation on the medically-relevant collateral consequences of his protected activity, but has not sufficiently pled that the recommendation was based on the protected activity itself as required to show First Amendment retaliation. Oliver v. Roquet, #14-4824 858 F.3d 180 (3rd Cir. 2017).
Overturning a trial court order, a federal appeals court found that Minnesota’s
sex offender civil commitment statute and the regulations and procedures used
to enforce it were rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest of
protecting the public from sexually dangerous persons or persons who have a
sexual psychopathic personality, and thus the statute was facially
constitutional; and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any of the
identified actions of the state defendants or arguable shortcomings in the
statute or its enforcement were egregious, malicious, or sadistic as is
necessary to meet the conscience-shocking standard, and thus plaintiffs'
as-applied due process violation claims failed. Karsjens
v. Johnson Piper, #15-3485, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
A man was civilly
committed under a state sexually dangerous persons statute after he was found
to be a sexually violent person who suffers from a mental disorder that creates
a substantial risk that, unless confined, he is apt to commit further sexual
violence. He sued, claiming that the state improperly restrained his liberty by
hiring detention staff members who were unable to provide him with the care and
treatment without which he will never be eligible for release. A federal
appeals court reversed dismissal of the lawsuit. The Fourteenth Amendment
requires that civil detainees receive treatment for the disorders that led to
their confinement and be released when they are no longer dangerous. It is not
clear whether the facility at which he was confined was providing the plaintiff
with treatment by licensed professionals who have authority to determine the
detainees’ right to be released. The private company which furnishes the
personnel there does not require that all of them be licensed. Hughes v. Dimas,
#16-1818, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 17081 (7th Cir.).
A man civilly committed
at a hospital as a sexually violent predator claimed that employees of the
state Department of Mental Health violated his constitutional rights when they
forcibly collected his fingerprints, a mouth swab, and a blood sample without a
warrant. The appeals court ruled that defendants reasonably could have
concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless
collection of a civilly committed person’s DNA profile, and the plaintiff had a
reduced expectation of privacy as a civilly committed sexually violent
predator. Courts generally have recognized the collection of a blood sample as
a minimally intrusive mechanism for obtaining information from individuals in
state custody; and the trial court did not err when it found that defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim. Excessive force
claims were also rejected as the minor injuries suffered in the course of the
incident did not permit an inference that the force used was unreasonable under
these circumstances. Carter v. Huterson, #15-1897, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 14490
(8th Cir.).
An Illinois man confined as a sexually violent
person sued the facility's program director, its grievance examiner, and a
security therapist aide, claiming that they infringed on his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by disregarding his grievances regarding dental care
and by insulting him. A federal appeals court overturned dismissal of the
complaint, finding that the grievances were protected speech and that a warning
that his life would be better if he stopped filing his grievance may have gone
beyond mere verbal harassment. The court also commented that the plaintiff, as
a civil detainee, was “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to
punish.” The defendants, as staff members of an institution that houses and
treats persons suffering from mental disorders should understand that they are
dealing with psychologically impaired persons, and should have known better
than to shout at a possibly vulnerable person, call him “ignorant,” “stupid,”
and a “moron,” ignore grievances that might be meritorious and serious, and
threaten him with retaliation for complaining. Hughes v. Scott, #15-3482, 2016
U.S. App. Lexis 5349 (7th Cir.).
A man served a sentence for attempted sexual
abuse and then was placed on probation. He was required to enroll in a sex
offender treatment program while on probation and was refused admission to the
program since he refused to admit his guilt before the program began and
instead invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. When
his probation was then revoked, he sued his probation officer and therapist.
The trial judge, screening the pro se in forma pauperis complaint, dismissed
the lawsuit on the basis of qualified immunity. A federal appeals court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the facts alleged in the
complaint did not foreclose the possibility that the plaintiff could have
overcome qualified immunity. Chavez v. Robinson, #14-35384, 2016 U.S. App.
Lexis 5765 (9th Cir.).
A man convicted of rape and diagnosed with
paraphilia (sexual attraction to non-consenting women) was civilly committed to
a treatment center as a Sexually Violent Person. He sued the facility's
officials and clinical staff for violation of his First Amendment
constitutional rights in restricting their access to movies and video games.
The facility barred them from watching all R-rated movies or play
M(mature)-rated video games displaying intense violence, blood and gore, sexual
content, or "strong language." Subsequently, the policy was altered
to only prohibit 353 specified movies and 232 specific games. When the facility
later discovered that at least two residents had used a video game console to
access the Internet for the purpose of viewing prohibited content, all such
consoles capable of accessing the Internet were also prohibited. A federal
appeals court ruled that the record was insufficient to show that the ban on
movies and video games was reasonably related to the state's interest in rehabilitation
and security. The court also found that a bare assertion that the ban on all
sexual material promoted treatment was insufficient to support granting summary
judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claim. The court did agree,
however, that the ban on video game consoles capable of accessing the Internet
was rationally related to the facility's interest in security. Brown v.
Phillips, #14-3325, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 16346 (7th Cir.).
An Illinois prisoner who completed his rape sentence
continued to be confined civilly as a sexually violent offender. He suffers
from a number of medical conditions—carpal-tunnel syndrome, pain in his hips
and back lingering from past injuries, flat feet, and ligament damage in one
foot—that, he says, prevent him from climbing to the top bunk in his cell.
During a previous incarceration, he had a low-bunk permit but a doctor at his
present facility refused his request to authorize a similar permit, which he
claimed forced him to sleep on the floor of his cell. He sued the doctor for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the court rejected an argument that the
trial judge should have declared a mistrial when the doctor violated a pretrial
order by mentioning to the jury that the plaintiff had been incarcerated for 26
years, noting that the jury could already infer from the plaintiff's testimony
and his medical issues going back at least 13 years that he had been in prison
a long time. Collins v. Lochard, #14-1915, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 1184 (7th
Cir.).
A sexually violent person civil detainee claimed that
security guards accompanying him to a courthouse refused to remove his hand
restraints while he attempted to use a restroom there, and laughed as he
struggled to unzip his pants and urinate. He was secured with leg shackles, a
wrist chain, handcuffs, and a black-box restraint that fit over the chain
between handcuffs and a portion of the cuffs themselves, largely immobilizing the
hands in front of the body approximately two inches apart. A jury awarded him
$1,000 in compensatory damages. A federal appeals court found that the trial
judge improperly failed to instruct the jury that the plaintiff had to prove
that the guards had a purposeful, knowing, or possibly reckless state of mind
with respect to their actions or inaction toward him. At the same time, the
court noted that a security directive allowed the guards to call their
supervisor for permission to remove the restraints, and a reasonable jury could
find that they chose not to do so for the purpose of humiliating him. He had no
means of escape from the windowless restroom other than by force through the
two younger, bigger, and healthier guards, and he would still be wearing leg
shackles if the hand restraints were removed. The guards were therefore not
entitled to qualified immunity on a due process claim as it was clearly
established that the unreasonable use of body restraints in a manner that
served to punish a civilly committed person was unlawful. Further proceedings
were ordered. Davis v. Wessel, #13-3416, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 11685 (7th Cir.).
The family of a woman raped and murdered by a
former inmate four days after his release from prison sued the State Department
of Mental Health and other defendants for failing to discharge mandatory duties
imposed by a state Sexually Violent Predators Act to evaluate whether the
prisoner should have been civilly committed. While the facts alleged, if true,
did establish that the duty to conduct a Sexually Violent Predators assessment
with two evaluators was breached (only one evaluator was used), the plaintiff
failed to show that this was the proximate cause of the woman's death. State Dept. of State
Hospitals v. Super. Ct., #S215132, 2015 Cal. Lexis 3898.
A federal appeals court found no error in summary
judgment granted to prison officials rejecting a prisoner's claim that they
violated his procedural due process rights by classifying him as a sex
offender, although he had committed no crime requiring him to register as such.
He was classified as a sex offender based on an assessment of the risk that he
would commit such crimes, given the types of crimes he had committed. That
classification did not implicate his liberty interests under the due process
clause and the individual defendants, further, were entitled to qualified
immunity from liability. Toney v. Owens, #14-50331, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 2863
(5th Cir.).
The California State Department of Mental Health
and its officials were not liable for the rape and murder of the plaintiff's
sister by a prisoner four days after he was released from prison. The plaintiff
argued that they should be liable because they breached mandatory duties under
the state's Sexually Violent Predators Act by failing to designate two mental
health professionals to determine if the prisoner should continue to be
confined as a sexual predator through a civil commitment. While the officials
and the department were not immune from liability under state law for the
breach of a mandatory duty, the plaintiff could not show that their failure
caused the rape and death of her sister, because there was too much distance
between the alleged breach and the criminal acts. Even had the mandatory duty
been carried out, there was no certainty that this action would have resulted
in a civil commitment. The plaintiff did have standing, however, to carry
forward a action seeking a mandate that the defendants carry out their
mandatory duties under the Act. State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior
Court, #B248603, 2013 Cal. App. Lexis 882.
A federal sex offender who had already completed
his sentence before Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 16901 argued that the statute therefore
did not apply to him, and challenged his conviction for failing to comply with
the law's registration requirements when he moved within Texas. The U.S.
Supreme Court rejected a federal appeals court's ruling overturning his conviction
on the basis that he had been unconditionally freed. Congress acted within its
authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution in
regulating the defendant's interstate movements and the registration
requirements of the law applied to him and to others who had completed their
sentences when the law became effective. U.S. v. Kebodeaux, #12-418, 2013 U.S.
Lexis 4715
New York prisoners who were civilly committed for
being sexually violent predators after their criminal sentences expired under a
new initiative claimed that their due process rights were violated and that
they were not given an opportunity for a hearing or notice before their
commitment began. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of qualified
immunity for the defendant officials. The general principle that due process
requires a pre-deprivation hearing absent an immediate danger to society was
well established. Bailey v. Pataki, #10-2563, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 3200 (2nd
Cir.).
An Indiana state statute that broadly prohibited
most registered sex offenders from using instant messaging services, social
media sites and chat programs violated their First Amendment rights. While the
state justifiably wished to protect children from inappropriate sexual
communication, and the law was content neutral, the law placed a burden on more
speech than was necessary to achieve that purpose. The court found that a sex
offender's use of social media was not dangerous as long as they did not engage
in improper communication with minors. Such communication was a tiny subset of
the "universe of social media." The state could have, without
substantial diffioculty, more precisely targeted the evil it wanted to prevent.
Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, #12-2512, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 1528 (7th
Cir.).
A federal trial court has struck down a Nebraska
state law barring registered sex offenders from using the Internet for most
purposes, including social media. The court said that by severely limiting
"even benign" uses of the Internet, the law raised First Amendment,
due process, Fourth Amendment and ex post facto issues. The law, the judge
found, did not leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
information. A portion of the statute that applied to those registered as sex
offenders but who were not on probation, parole, or court monitored supervision
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court said the law wrongly bars offenders
"from using an enormous portion of the Internet to engage inexpressive
activity." and "potentially restricts the targeted offenders from
communicating with hundreds of millions and perhaps billions of adults and
their companies despite the fact that the communication has nothing whatsoever
to do with minors." Further, the law "is not narrowly tailored to
target those offenders who pose a factually based risk to children through the
use or threatened use of the banned sites or services. The risk posited by the
statute is far too speculative when judged against the First Amendment."
Doe v. State of Nebraska, #8:09CV456, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 148770 (D. Neb).
A man convicted of attempted sexual abuse of an
unconscious 16-year-old intoxicated girl was ordered, as a special condition of
his supervised release, on probation not to reside with, or be in the company
of, any child under age 18, including his own daughters, and not to socialize
with or date anyone with such children, including his own fiancée. A federal
appeals court vacated that condition, ordering further proceedings. The
fundamental right to associate with one's family is a particularly significant
liberty interest and the condition was imposed without making any explicit
findings supported by evidence that the condition was necessary for deterrence,
protection of the public and rehabilitation, and were not broader than
necessary. As there was no evidence in the record supporting the need for such
restrictions, the special condition at issue could not be reimposed on remand.
The court below could consider whether it was necessary to impose similarly but
more narrow restrictions. U.S. v. Wolf Child, #11-30241, 699 F.3d 1082 (9th
Cir. 2012).
Two California prisoners were kept confined
beyond their scheduled dates of release for the purpose of completing an
evaluation of whether they should be classified as sexually violent predators
and therefore civilly committed. In both cases, the parole board had issued
45-day parole holds. The California Supreme Court found that the definition of
what a "good cause" was for holding a prisoner beyond their sentence,
contained in a state regulation, was invalid, but the parole board's reliance
on it was excusable since no prior court decision had invalidated it. The
board's action was excusable as a good faith mistake of law. In re Lucas,
#S181788, 53 Cal. 4th 839, 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 595, 269 P.3d 1160 (2012).
An Indiana "Sex and Violent Offender
Registry," which was accessible to the public via the Internet, was
challenged in court. The fact that there was absolutely no process provided
whereby offenders not incarcerated could challenge the accuracy of the
information or their placement on the registry violated due process. The
appeals court was also concerned that the policy allowing incarcerated
offenders to appeal their placement on the registry or the accuracy of the
information did not require officials to actually review a registrant's
complaint. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the defendants
were insufficient, as placement on a sex offender registry was stigmatizing,
and the erroneous labeling of an individual as a sexually violent predator was
"further stigmatizing" to a person's reputation. Schepers v.
Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction, #11–3834, 691 F.3d 909
(7th Cir.).
Persons civilly committed to a state sex offender
program failed to show that their rights were violated by the use of restraints
during transport, or unclothed visual body searches. The searches were
justified by institutional security concerns, and the policy of restraining sex
offenders during transport was a valid exercise of professional judgment. There
was no evidence that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
plaintiffs' health, safety, and sanitation concerns. There was also no showing
that the alleged improper opening of their legal mail interfered with their
access to the court or that monitoring their phone calls was not justified by
security concerns. Beaulieu v. Ludeman, #11–1845, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir.)
Prisoners convicted of sex crimes were kept
incarcerated long after their sentences ended, remaining in state custody as
sexually violent civil detainees. They claimed that their civil rights were
violated because they were denied the ability to have face to face social
opportunities with civil detainees in other pods of their facility and because
they were not allowed to contact other civilly committed detainees using the
facility's own internal mail system, instead being required to use the U.S.
mail for that purpose. The limits on direct socialization were justified as a
security measure. Due process did not require input from health professionals
before restrictions were put on the in-person association opportunities of the
detainees. There was no violation of First Amendment rights in requiring the
plaintiffs to use the U.S. mail rather than the facility's internal mail system
to communicate with other civil detainees. Lane v. Williams, #11-3373, 2012
U.S. App. Lexis 17922 (7th Cir.).
In three consolidated appeals by juveniles who
had pled guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of children, a federal appeals court
rejected their claims objecting to conditions of probation or supervision
requiring them to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. Chapter 109. Applying the registration requirements to
juveniles does not violate equal protection of law, procedural or substantive
due process, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, or violate the right
against self-incrimination. Congress intentionally exempted the registration of
juvenile sex offenders from the confidentiality provisions of the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. Sec 5031 et seq. U.S. v. Juvenile
Male, #09-30330, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012).
A man who completed a sentence for sexually
abusing his minor daughter was kept incarcerated for an additional 375 days
while the county sought to find an available place where he would be allowed to
live as a registered sex offender. Rejecting a claim for false imprisonment
under these circumstances, the court found that his claim was barred by the
principles stated in Heck v. Humphrey, #93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because
his incarceration was not reversed, expunged, invalidated, or otherwise
impugned by an earlier proceeding. A state appeals court decision remanding his
habeas claim to the trial court did not satisfy the Heck requirements.
Marlowe v. Fabian, #11–2748, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 7888 (8th Cir.).
Nevada's retroactive application of heightened
sex offender registration and notification requirements were constitutionally
permissible, and were not shown to violate the due process, double jeopardy,
contract, or ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. The appeals court
rejected the argument that the change violated the terms of plea bargain
contracts entered into prior to its enactment. The state had agreed not to
retroactively enforce harsher restrictions on residency and movement, so the
lawsuit did not validly challenge them. American Civil Liberties Union of
Nevada v. Masto, #08-17471, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012).
Cutbacks imposed for budgetary reasons on a
treatment program for sexually violent predators did not violate an
institutionalized offender's substantive due process rights. He was placed in
the institution until his condition sufficiently changes and it is safe for him
to be released, and the cutbacks reduced the amount of treatment he received.
Sex offenders do not have a fundamental constitutional right to treatment.
Confining him and his fellow offenders to a restriction table for the entire
time period from early morning until late evening except for meals was not
"overly restrictive." Strutton v. Meade, #10–2029, 2012 U.S.
App. Lexis 2117 (8th Cir.).
A class of persons civilly committed to a state
hospital as sexually violent predators filed a federal civil rights lawsuit
against supervisory officials challenging the conditions of their confinement,
including alleged unreasonable searches and seizures, use of unreasonable force
and physical restraints, and unlawful retaliation. The appeals court ruled that
the claims against the supervisors individually for damages failed because the
complaint was based on "conclusory allegations and generalities"
without any allegation of the specific wrongdoing by each defendant. This
entitled them to qualified immunity. The court ruled, however, that the lawsuit
could proceed on claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Hydrick v.
Hunter, #03-56712, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 628 (9th Cir.).
A sex offender, arrested for failing to report
his new address, was attacked in the county jail's protective custody pod. He
failed to show that the prisoner who assaulted him was even aware that he was a
sex offender, undercutting his theory that the jail ignored the risk that he would
be attacked because of his sex offender status. He also failed to show that
another prisoner attacked by his assailant was a sex offender. Holden v.
Hirner, #10-3656, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 23953 (8th Cir.).
A man pled guilty to charges of false imprisonment
and was placed on probation and released from custody. His probation officer
required him to register as a sex offender and be placed in a sex offender
probation unit. This was based on the probation officer's mistaken belief that
the man's victim had been a minor. He sued, and got his name removed from the
sex offender registry and himself from the sex offender probation unit. The
plaintiff stated a valid claim against the probation officer for violation of
his civil rights. The defamatory harm of being wrongly placed on sex offender
status without procedural due process satisfied a "stigma plus"
requirement for civil liability for such actions. The probation officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity on the procedural due process claim, but substantive
due process and equal protection claims were properly rejected. Claims for
supervisory liability against the Secretary of the state Department of
Corrections were rejected on the basis of qualified immunity, since there was
no showing that he was personally involved in the action or that the probation
officer acted on the basis of any policy he was responsible for. Brown v.
Montoya, #10-2269, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 22533 (10th Cir.).
A pretrial detainee under an Illinois Sexually
Violent Person Act claimed that his constitutional privacy rights and rights
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996), were violated by the
"stigmatizing effects" of the stamp that the facility affixes to his
outgoing mail, which reads "sexually violent person treatment
center." Rejecting this claim, a federal appeals court ruled that the
prisoner's claim was essentially for defamation, and that the prisoner's
"interest in his reputation, by itself, is not protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment." As to any claim under HIPAA, the trial court correctly found
that the statute does not provide for a private right of action. Carpenter v.
Phillips, #10-3176, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 9417 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
A prisoner classified as a sex offender was
denied a number of issues of subscription music publications such as Rolling
Stone, Maxim, Blender, and Spin, based on the presence of photos of females
thought to be sexually oriented, in violation of restrictions on the types of
materials he could receive. He failed to show how such restrictions violated
his First Amendment rights, and the defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity. The prisoner was allowed numerous issues of such publications, and
only those containing materials believed to be adverse to his rehabilitation as
a sex offender were withheld. Frazier v. Ortiz, #10-1133, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis
6381 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).
A man civilly committed in Illinois as a sexually
dangerous person failed to show that facility staff members acted with reckless
disregard to the danger of an attack on him by his cellmate or that they
treated him, as a black man, differently than similarly situated white
detainees. Young v. Monahan, #09-3401, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 4692 (7th Cir.).
A prisoner serving a life sentence without
possibility of parole for first-degree murder of a woman challenged his
classification as a sex offender and a recommendation that he be enrolled in a
sex offender treatment program. He had never been charged with or convicted of
any sexual offense. A federal appeals court held that, under these
circumstances, the prisoner was entitled to due process before Pennsylvania
classifies him as a sex offender, since such classification is highly
stigmatizing, reinstating his procedural due process claim. Renchenski v.
Williams, #07-3530, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20428 (3rd Cir.).
A former civil detainee at a state hospital, detained
there under California's Sexually Violent Dangerous Predator Act, appealed from
the dismissal of his federal civil rights and state law lawsuit challenging a
decision by hospital authorities denying him visits from his minor nieces and
nephews. Upholding the dismissal, a federal appeals court noted that the denial
of visitation rights was because of a policy barring visits from minor children
within the age and gender profiles of a detainee's former victims. This policy,
the court found, serves a legitimate, non-punitive governmental interest. Force
v. Hunter, #09-56294, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20773 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
A prisoner convicted of a murder in which there
was sexual trauma to the victim claimed that forcing him to participate in a
sex offender therapy program violated his due process rights, as he had never
been convicted of a sex offense. Reversing summary judgment for the defendants
on this claim, a federal appeals court found that, because a sex offender label
was "severely stigmatizing," and participation in such therapy was
not a condition imposed by his sentence, compelled treatment constituted a loss
of liberty, so that he was entitled to minimum due process on the issue.
Further proceedings were ordered on the due process claim, while
self-incrimination and equal protection claims were rejected. Renchenski v.
Piazza, #07-3530, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 20428 (3rd Cir.).
A Colorado state prisoner claimed that prison
officials violated his federal civil rights by classifying him as a sex
offender and by failing to provide him with a safe environment in which to
participate in sex offender treatment. Rejecting these claims, a federal
appeals court found that there is no federal due process right to appeal a sex
offender classification in a prison administrative hearing. While the prisoner
did show that he was exposed to a serious risk of harm in attending sex
offender treatment, he failed to show that correctional employees actually knew
of this risk or refused to provide the treatment in a safe environment. Murphy
v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, #09-1443, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 11418 (Unpub.
10th Cir.).
A man currently residing in Illinois filed a
federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the state's life-long sex offender
registration requirement, as applied to him because of his 2003 guilty plea to
a misdemeanor offense of non-consensual sexual contact in New York. He had been
assured, as part of the New York plea negotiations, that he would not be
required to register as a sex offender. His lawsuit was properly dismissed, as
the New York court order was silent as to whether he would be required to
register as a sex offender in any other state, and therefore there was no issue
of Illinois failing to give "full faith and credit" to the New York
court's order. Even if there had been, the court stated, New York lacks the
power to dictate the means by which another state can choose to protect the
public. Rosin v. Monken, #08-4132, 599 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2010).
A prisoner served sixteen years for crimes of
forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and kidnapping for the purpose of
committing rape. He was then sent to a state hospital for possible civil
commitment. He sued state officials and psychologists for violation of his
constitutional right to privacy in connection with their disclosure of his
prison treatment records. Rejecting these claims, a federal appeals court found
that a traditional Fourth Amendment right to privacy was "fundamentally
incompatible" with the continual and close scrutiny of prisoners and their
cells required for security reasons. Prisoners have no legitimate expectation
of privacy in their prison treatment records when there is a legitimate
penological interest in access to them. Access to such records is needed to
protect other inmates and staff members from violence and communicable
diseases, and to manage rehabilitation efforts. Whatever remaining
constitutional right to privacy the prisoner may have had in his medical
records, the California state law providing for a process for the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators fell outside of it. Seaton v. Mayberg,
#05-56894, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 13335 (9th Cir.).
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected claims that
Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in enacting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4248,
providing for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous federal prisoners
beyond the date that they would otherwise be released. Congress had such
authority under the "necessary and proper" clause of the
Constitution, and Congress has long been involved in the delivery of mental health
care to federal prisoners. The statute was supported by sound reasons,
particularly the need to protect the community from the danger such prisoners
may pose. The Court rejected arguments that the statute invaded the province of
state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment, particularly as, under
the statute, states may assert their authority on such prisoners domiciled or
tried within their jurisdiction if they wish to do so, which would result in
the immediate transfer of the prisoner to state custody. The Court also found
that the legislation was narrow in scope, and that its ruling did not confer on
Congress a general police power, which continues to remain with the states. The
Court stated that it was not deciding any claim that the law violates equal
protection or substantive or procedural due process, claims that the plaintiffs
"are free to pursue" on remand. U.S. v. Comstock, #08–1224, 2010 U.S.
Lexis 3879.
A Texas parolee, who has never been convicted of
a sex offense, claimed that his due process rights were violated when sex
offender conditions were imposed on his mandatory supervision, including
registration as a sex offender and participation in sex offender therapy. He
was convicted of the murder of a nine-year-old girl and sentenced to
thirty-years imprisonment. The parole board imposed sex offender conditions,
believing that the prisoner had sexually assaulted the girl he murdered, but it
was unclear from the record how they determined this. Because of the conditions
imposed on him, he was allegedly unable to obtain employment or arrange for a
residence, resulting in him remaining in custody. A federal appeals court found
that the prisoner was denied due process as a defendant's parole may only be
conditioned on sex offender registration and therapy, in the absence of
conviction for a sex offense, if he is given a due process hearing which
determines that he poses a threat to society because of his lack of sexual
control. In this case, while the prisoner received notice that the board was
considering imposing sex offender restrictions on him, and was told that he
could submit a statement in opposition, he was not allowed to review the
evidence against him being relied on, and was therefore unable to correct or
challenge any misinformation. He was also not allowed to appear before the
board, preventing him from presenting any mitigating or clarifying evidence. He
was also entitled to confront and cross-examine witnesses, absent good cause
shown why this right should not be granted, and a written statement as to the
evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision. Meza v. Livingston,
#09-50367, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 10321 (5th Cir.).
Officials at a treatment center for sex offenders
were properly denied summary judgment in a lawsuit claiming that the were
deliberately indifferent to the risk that he would be assaulted by another
offender. He adequately alleged that it was "readily apparent" that
placing him in a room with another sex offender who then assaulted him
subjected him to an objectively serious risk of harm. There were also
sufficient facts from which a jury could find that a defendant acted with
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need by failing to provide him
with prescribed psychological treatment. Nelson v. Shuffman, #09-2225, 603 F.3d
439 (8th Cir. 2009).
A sex offender claimed that prison officials
discriminated against him by denying him a job in a prison program. He
attempted to assert a "class of one" equal protection program,
arguing that other sex offenders were granted jobs in the same program he was
rejected for. Granting summary judgment for defendant officials, a federal
court found that, since the plaintiff was not a member of any protected class,
the defendants only needed to show that there was a rational basis for their
treatment of him. There clearly was a rational basis for the decision, since
the program at issue placed prisoners in a minimum security facility, and the
plaintiff had a history of disciplinary problems raising security concerns. The
fact that this reasoning was not explained to the prisoner when he was rejected
for the job did not alter the result. Unruh v. Moore, #08-40750, 2009 U.S. App.
Lexis 10315 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).
A prisoner failed to show that his classification
as a sex offender violated his due process rights. While the court stated that
in some cases misclassification as a sex offender may violate due process if
there is "stigma plus," (a "stigmatizing statement plus a
deprivation of a tangible interest"), in this case the prisoner failed to
establish even the threshold requirement of a reputation-tarnishing statement
that was false. Additionally, under existing regulations, officials are not
prohibited from considering "acquitted conduct" while assigning a needs
score to determine the need for treatment as a sexual offender. The prisoner's
convictions arose from acts he committed against a sixteen-year-old girl, with
whom he had a sexual relationship, when he was twenty-nine years old. He was
convicted of various violent acts, but acquitted of sexual assault. Burgos-Vega
v. Lantz, #08-4748, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 4261 (2nd Cir.).
Congress did not have authority, under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, or the Necessary and
Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, to pass 18 U.S.C.S. § 4248, under which
the plaintiff former federal inmates were to be subject to civil commitments as
sexually dangerous persons. The statute did not regulate interstate commerce
and if upheld, would undermine the "historic distinction" between
federal authority and state authority. The plaintiffs were therefore granted
dismissal of the cases seeking their civil commitments. U.S.A. v. Swarm, Civ.
#07-12061, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 52550 (D. Mass.).
A prisoner classified as a sex offender after he
was convicted of burglary claimed that his classification was improper and that
he was improperly denied parole because he refused to participate in a sex
offender treatment program. The court found that the prisoner had a protected
liberty interest in parole under the West Virginia state constitution, and
there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the treatment program he was
asked to complete was severe enough to exceed his sentence. He presented a
viable claim as to whether prison officials failed to correct errors they had
caused in his records. Gilmore v. Bostic, #2:08-cv -326, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis
25682 (S.D.W.Va.).
Overturning a federal trial court's decision to
the contrary, a federal appeals court has held that the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. § 16913, requiring sex
offender registration, (and punishment, under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), for failure
to register) is constitutional, and within the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. U.S. v. Powers, #08-12764, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 6592 (11th
Cir.).
A number of persons who committed or attempted
kidnapping or unlawful confinement offenses involving children, and who were
not the child victims' parents, challenged the requirement that they register
as sex offenders under New York state law, claiming that this was a misleading
label, as they had not engaged in sexual abuse. The highest court in New York
rejected these arguments, holding that the state legislature could rationally
conclude that, in the "large majority" of instances where someone
kidnapped or unlawfully imprisoned someone else's children, the victims were
sexually molested or in danger of such molestation, and therefore could direct
that such offenders be conclusively be classified as sexual offenders, without
violating any constitutional right. People v. Knox, No. 9, 2009 N.Y. Lexis 16.
Restrictions on the visitation rights of a
convicted sex offender did not violate his due process, equal protection, or
Eighth Amendment rights. His daughter and his niece were removed from his
visitor's list once on the recommendation of a prison social worker who
believed that he threatened these children's safety, but they were restored to
his visitor's list when he agreed to enter a sex offender's treatment program.
They were both again barred from visiting when the prisoner subsequently
admitted to having raped two children. The appeals court found this visitation
policy rationally related to legitimate penological interests, and also noted
that the plaintiff prisoner failed to show that other similarly situated
prisoners were allowed visits with children. Stojanovic v. Humphreys, No.
08-1827, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 2169 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
Prisoner dismissed from
participation in a sex offender treatment program without a hearing, allegedly
resulting in the denial of good time credits, failed to show that he was
deprived of due process rights. West v. Olin, No. 08-1168, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
26764 (10th Cir.).
Most of the conditions of confinement challenged
by Wisconsin inmates civilly committed as "sexually dangerous" were
justified on the basis of security, including restrictions on visitors, leaving
the facility, phone call monitoring, inspection of mail, property, and the
inmates' persons, requiring restraints during transport, and mandating the
wearing of institutional clothes. Walker v. Hayden, No. 08-2628, 2008 U.S. App.
Lexis 25014 (Unpub. 7th Cir.).
The fact that a Washington state law provides the
possibility of an early release of convicted sex offenders into community
custody did not indicate that such offenders had a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in such early release. Carver v. Lehman, No. 06-35176, 2008 U.S.
App. Lexis 25822 (9th Cir.).
A federal law, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4246, 18 U.S.C.
section 4248, which states that the government may subject current and former
federal prisoners certified by the Attorney General as sexually dangerous to
civil commitment is unconstitutional, as it exceeds the powers of Congress. The
federal government may not constitutionally confine persons whose
"dangerousness" does not violate any federal law. U.S. v. Comstock,
No. 07-7671, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 185 (4th Cir.).
A policy barring committed sex offenders from
having access to sexual material relating to children did not violate their
First Amendment rights. Possession of such material would undermine the
treatment being provided to the plaintiff, who had been convicted of crimes
against children. Stewart v. Richards, Case No. C08-5275, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis
83586 (W.D. Wash.).
A provision of the state law pertaining to
parolees held or detained for proceedings to declare them sexually violent
predators is void to the extent that it would bar the payment to them of a $200
release allowance otherwise authorized to be paid to all prisoners upon their
release. Sabatasso v. Superior Court of Orange County, No. G039906, 2008 Cal.
App. Lexis 1615,167 Cal. App. 4th 791; 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. App. 4th
Dist.).
The state of Washington, in limiting the
Department of Correction's discretion to deny release plans for prisoners, and
in requiring that any rejection of such a plan be based on specified criteria,
created a constitutionally protected due process liberty interest in early
release into community custody. The denial of a sex offender's release plan,
under a DOC policy which provided for the automatic denial of release
plans of those deemed to be violent sex offenders, combined with the
"complete absence" of procedures for challenging such denials,
violated due process. That right was not, however, clearly established, so that
the Secretary of the DOC was entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Carver
v. Lehman, No. 06-35176, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 12323 (9th Cir.).
Convicted sex offender civilly committed to a
special treatment unit under a New Jersey Sexually Violent Predators Act failed
to show a violation of his Fifth Amendment constitutional right against
self-incrimination by the requirement that he disclose, during the therapy,
past criminal sexual acts he had committed, even if he suffered penalties, such
as the withholding of certain privileges and placement in "treatment
refusal status" when he refused to make such disclosures. The court
further held that, even if the plaintiff had a right to remain silent about
such past crimes, which was not certain, any such right was not clearly
established, so that the defendants would be entitled, in any event, to
qualified immunity on his Fifth and First Amendment claims. Aruanno v.
Spagnuolo, No. 07-4276, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 15123 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
When a prisoner's criminal conviction, which was the
basis of his custody, has been overturned, and he has not been retried and
reconvicted, civil commitment proceedings under the California Sexually Violent
Predator (SVP) Act are not available. In re Smith, No. 14-5959, 2008 Cal.
Lexis 3548.
Requirement that Texas prisoner register as a sex
offender did not violate his double jeopardy, ex post facto (no retroactive
enhancement of punishment), due process, or Eighth Amendment rights.
Additionally, since he was currently incarcerated for failing to register, he
could not pursue a federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the registration
requirement until the incarceration had been reversed or declared invalid, as
an award in the lawsuit would imply the invalidity of his current conviction.
Hall v. Attorney General of Texas, No. 07-40157, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 3595 (5th
Cir.).
Sex offender's objection to the application of a
mental health category to him without "due process of law" rejected,
as no violation of any constitutionally protected liberty interest was
involved, since the categorization did not concern a hospital placement.
Classification as a sexual offender was justified by his past convictions of
three counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Disability discrimination claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12131 et seq., and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794 were rejected because the
definition of "disability" in those statutes specifically excludes
"sexual behavior disorders." Rice v. Mich. Dept. of Corrections, No.
1:07-CV-578, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83792 (W.D. Mich).
Wisconsin's parole system is "completely
discretionary," so that the plaintiff prisoner had no liberty interest
concerning being eligible for parole, and could not pursue a procedural due
process claim based on an alleged informal policy of not paroling sex offenders
until they had completed a sex offender treatment program. The prisoner claimed
that he had, in fact, finished such a program, but that the certificate of that
completion was removed from his records after he angered the directors of the
program, and therefore could not be granted a parole hearing. The appeals court
also found that the conduct alleged, even if true, did not shock the
conscience, as required for a substantive due process claim. Bartley v.
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, No. 07-2059, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 28430 (7th
Cir.).
Requiring an inmate to participate in a sex
offender treatment program, which required him to attend explicit group discussions
of a sexual nature and view certain images, did not violate his First Amendment
rights, based on the "vital" public and governmental interest in
rehabilitation of convicted sex offenders. Additionally, even if an
individualized sex offender treatment program existed which would have met the
plaintiff's objections, it would have "unduly depleted" the prison's
resources to provide it. The court failed to rule on the prisoner's objection
to participation in the program under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc et. seq. on the
basis of the defendants' claim that they had not had sufficient opportunity to
respond to that claim. Schnitzler v. Reisch, No. Civ. 06-4064, 2007 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 72938 (S.D.).
Federal appeals court upholds the dismissal of a
prisoner's claim that it violated his constitutional due process rights to
classify him as a sex offender based on a prison disciplinary conviction
without a further proceeding. The prisoner received all the due process
required at his disciplinary hearing, so that his classification as a sex
offender was an acceptable automatic consequence of his disciplinary
conviction. The only additional due process he was entitled to was the receipt
of notification of his sex offender classification. Mariani v. Stommel, No.
07-1068, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 24256 (10th Cir.).
Convicted sex offender did not have a
constitutional right to rehabilitative sex offender treatment, and the
prisoner's claim that the failure to provide him with such treatment violated
the terms of his plea bargain agreement could not be a basis for a federal
civil rights lawsuit, although it might be raised in a petition for habeas
corpus. Paige v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections, No. 07-6101, 2007 U.S. App.
Lexis 21558 (10th Cir.).
California state officials and employees
allegedly responsible for the conditions of confinement of civilly committed
persons and persons awaiting commitment under the state's Sexually Violent
Predators (SVP) Act were entitled to qualified immunity from a lawsuit
asserting claims for double jeopardy, violation of procedural due process,
violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
and violation of the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution (barring
retroactive enhancement of the penalty for a crime). A federal appeals court
ruled, however, that they were not entitled to qualified immunity on other
claims raised in the lawsuit concerning the conditions of confinement of such
persons, particularly as those sued were directors and policy-makers for the
state hospital at which such persons were confined. Additionally, if the facts
alleged by the plaintiffs were true, they might be able to show that they were
subjected to punishment in unlawful retaliation for their filing of grievances
about their conditions of confinement. Hydrick v. Hunter, No. 03-56712, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 20729 (9th Cir.).
Prisoner who completed his sentence following a
determination that he was a sexually violent predator (SVP), and then was
housed at a county jail pursuant to a civil commitment, stated a claim for
violation of his constitutional rights in housing him there. Appeals court
rejects arguments that confinement in the county jail in "total
separation" was not "punitive" and was not a "disciplinary
category." The plaintiff, having been civilly committed, could not be
subjected to conditions constituting punishment. Cerniglia v. Sacramento
County, No. 04-17478, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 2422 (9th Cir.).
Prisoner's claim that officials violated his due
process rights by requiring him to agree to take anti-psychotic medications
specified by a program coordinator of a sex offender treatment program as a
condition of parole was not frivolous, and should not have been dismissed on
that basis. The prisoner stated a possible claim for infringement on his
liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic
medications. Bundy v. Stommel, No. 05-1099, 168 Fed. Appx. 870 (10th Cir. 2006).
[N/R]
Federal appeals court allows class action
challenging conditions of confinement for civilly committed "Sexually
Violent Predators" in California to proceed on most claims, including
claims involving procedural and substantive due process, privacy, excessive
force, access to courts, unlawful retaliation for grievances or lawsuits, and
forced medication in non-emergency situations. Hydrick v. Hunter, No. 03-56712,
2006 U.S. App. Lexis 13497 (9th Cir.). [2006 JB Jul]
Parolee's claim that his First Amendment rights
were violated when he was required, during a mandated sex offenders' program,
to recite a prayer with the word "God" in it should have been
analyzed under the Establishment Clause, prohibiting coercion to participate in
religious activity, rather than on the basis of whether his belief that he
should only say "God" while praying at home at night was a
"serious" religious belief. Munson v. Norris, No. 04-3938, 435 F.3d
877 (8th Cir. 2006), rehearing denied, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 5248. [2006
JB Jun]
A prisoner convicted of sodomy on his nephew, a
child less than twelve years-old, could not be granted a requested name change
he wanted to assume his deceased mother's maiden name to honor her. Despite the
fact that he would be required, following his sentence, to register as a sex
offender, people who knew him by the name used prior to his incarceration might
not get alerted to his presence and sex offender status unless his name
remained the same. In Matter of Application of Guttkaiss, 806 N.Y.S.2d 402
(Sup. Ct. Columbia County, 2005). [N/R]
Man detained by the State of Wisconsin as a
sexually violent person failed to show that he was provided with
constitutionally inadequate mental health treatment. He failed to show that
decisions about his treatment were either made by unqualified personnel or that
his treatment was "outside the bounds" of acceptable professional
judgment. Williams v. Nelson, No. 04-C-774C, 398 F. Supp. 2d 977 (W.D. Wis.
2005). [N/R]
New York corrections officials were required to
remove information from inmate's guidance file which was derived from a
pre-sentence investigation report, which described an inmate as a sexual
offender and contained references to rape and sodomy charges, when the only
basis for that information were allegations related to charges on which the
prisoner had been acquitted. Brown v. Goord, 796 N.Y.S.2d 439 (A.D. 3rd Dept.
2005). [N/R]
A one-day delay in providing pain medication to
an inmate injured in an attack by another prisoner was not sufficient to show
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The prisoner, who
received treatment by the prison doctor, and was subsequently referred to an
optometrist, ophthalmologist, neurologist, and ear, nose and throat specialist,
also could not show that his subsequent medical care for his injuries was
inadequate. The record showed that he received surgery on his nose, pain
medicine, x-rays, and a CT scan over a 3-year period of time following the
incident. His mere difference of opinion concerning the proper treatment of his
injuries did not show that the treatment provided was inadequate. The prisoner
also failed to show that prison officials violated his rights by failing to
protect him from the attack by another prisoner, which occurred during a sex
offender treatment program's group meeting, since that attack was not
foreseeable. Van Court v. Lehman, #04-35815, 137 Fed. Appx. 948 (9th Cir.
2005). [N/R]
Directive banning prisoners convicted of sex
offenses against minors from receiving visits from minors, including their own
children, was rationally related to legitimate penological interests in safety
and security. Prison officials were aware of research showing that many sexual
offenders repeated their offenses, that minor victims of sex offenses know the
perpetrators between 80 and 90 percent of the time, and that sexual offenders
who prey on children frequently "psychologically groom" them for a
time before engaging in sexual activity. Further, there was evidence of
incidents of sexual molestation of children in visiting rooms, and staffing
inadequacies in terms of adequately monitoring such visits. The directive,
therefore, did not violate prisoners' rights and was not cruel and unusual
punishment. Further, the prisoners had alternative means of maintaining family
relationships as they could communicate with family members by mail, telephone
calls, or messages brought by persons authorized to visit. Doe v. Donahue, No.
49A02-0408-CV-674, 829 N.E.2d 99 (Ind. App. 2005). [N/R]
Prisoner's claim that his due process rights were
violated when he was classified by prison officials as a sex offender because
of an accusation by a female prison guard that he deliberately masturbated in
his cell for her to see was not frivolous. Prisoner claimed that he was
improperly denied the opportunity to present witnesses at a hearing on the sex
offender classification. The appeals court does, however, reject as frivolous
his equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims. Fistell v. Neet, No. 03-1285,
125 Fed. Appx. 219 (10th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Revoking sex offender's supervised release or
probation after he allegedly refused to incriminate himself as part of his sex
offender treatment was a violation of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment. Appeals court also orders
further clarification of which sexually explicit materials the offender was
prohibited from possessing, finding a blanket prohibition on "sexually
stimulating" materials unconstitutionally vague. United States v.
Antelope, No. 03-30334, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 1327 (9th Cir.). [2005 JB Mar]
State could not constitutionally impose sex
offender registration and therapy as conditions to the release on mandatory
supervision of a prisoner never convicted of a sexual offense without first
providing due process. Coleman v. Dretke, No. 03-50743, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis
26660 (5th Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Feb]
California prisoner who had completed his
criminal sentence and was a civil detainee awaiting proceedings to commit him
as a sexually violent predator was entitled to non-punitive conditions of
confinement under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Summary
judgment for correctional officials in his lawsuit challenging his conditions
of confinement was therefore improper. Jones v. Blanas, No. 02-17148, 2004 U.S.
App. Lexis 26814 (9th Cir. 2004). [2005 JB Feb]
Colorado prisoner had a protected property
interest in being retained in a sexual offenders program when completion was
required in order to be eligible for parole under his indeterminate sentence.
He stated a possible procedural due process claim based on his alleged
expulsion from the program without advance notice or an opportunity to be
heard. Court also finds a possible substantive due process claim, ruling that
the alleged conduct of expelling him from the program without notice or hearing
could be viewed as an indifference to the prisoner's rights sufficient to
"shock the conscience." Beebe v. Heil, No. CIV.A.02-D-1993(BNB), 333
F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Colo. 2004). [N/R]
Requirement that prisoners participating in sex
offender program fully disclose their past sexual behavior, including
potentially prosecutable conduct, did not violate their Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination, even though the inmate's failure to
participate in the program resulted in her receiving a negative parole
recommendation. Participation in the program was voluntary, not compelled, and
the failure to participate did not automatically deprive the prisoner of
consideration for parole. Wolfe v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, No. Civ.
A. 02-2687, 334 F. Supp. 2d 762 (E.D. Pa. 2004). [N/R]
Juvenile court had no authority to invalidate a
California prison regulation preventing visitation between certain sexual
offenders and all minors, including minors who were not the victims of their
crimes. California appeals court overturns order invalidating regulation and
allowing an inmate convicted of sexual offenses involving children to receive
visits from his two minor sons. Robin J. v. Superior Court of San Diego County,
No. D044131, 2004 Cal. App. Lexis 1987 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004). [2005 JB
Jan]
Man held under Illinois sexually dangerous
persons statute, under which criminal proceedings are stayed for the purpose of
treatment for mental illness was a pretrial detainee properly classified as a
"prisoner" for purposes of the exhaustion of remedies requirement and
"three strikes" rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. His lawsuit
asserting a claim for alleged inadequate access to prison law library was
therefore properly dismissed for failure to exhaust available administrative
remedies. Kalinowski v. Bond, No. 02-3273, 358 F.3d 978 (7th Cir.), cert, denied,
124 S. Ct. 2843 (2004). [2004 JB Dec]
Prisoner's loss of certain incentive privileges
because he was removed from a sexual abuse treatment program did not violate
any recognized liberty or due process right. Laubach v. Roberts, No. 91, 329,
90 P.3d 961 (Kan. App. 2004). [N/R]
Prisoner's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was violated by sexual offender counseling program's
requirement that he reveal his history of sexual conduct, including actions for
which criminal charges could still be brought, or else lose good time credits.
Defendant prison officials, however, were entitled to qualified immunity, as
the law on the issue was not clearly established. Donhauser v. Goord, 314 F.
Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
Federal appeals court rejects prisoner's claim
that his constitutional rights were violated by requiring him to participate in
sexual offender treatment program requiring him to admit to his offense, under
penalty of a loss of privileges, including denial of visitation with his minor
child, if he failed to participate. Wirsching v. State of Colorado, #00-1437,
360 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2004). [2004 JB May]
Retroactive application of a rule making a
prisoner incentive program dependent on participation in a sexual offender
treatment program was not an impermissible enhancement of punishment of
prisoner convicted of rape and aggravated sodomy. Carroll v. Simmons, #03-3236,
89 Fed. Appx. 658 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Prisoner classified as a sexual offender in
prison, and compelled to participate in a treatment program in order to earn
good time credits, despite not having been convicted of a sexual offense, was
entitled to procedural due process before classification, but hearing held was
adequate when determination was made because of a detailed account of the
sexual assault based on statements from the victim. Gwinn v. Awmiller,
#00-1485, 354 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). [2004 JB Apr]
State trooper who provided community notification
of the presence of out-of-state sexual offender who transferred his parole to
Pennsylvania was entitled to qualified immunity, as a reasonable officer could
have believed that such notification did not violate the offender's
constitutional rights. Lines v. Wargo, 271 F. Supp. 2d 649 (W.D. Pa. 2003).
[N/R]
Civilly committed sexual offenders can be placed
in "therapeutic seclusion" either for purposes of therapy or to
protect the offenders or others, but not as a means of inflicting extra
punishment on them for their past sex crimes. Employees of state treatment
facility were not entitled to qualified immunity on claims that they kept
detainees in "seclusion" far longer than needed for reasons of
therapy or security. West v. Schwebke, No. 02-4298, 333 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003).
[2004 JB Jan]
Prisoner's alleged pedophilia was a "severe
mental disorder" qualifying him for commitment as a "mentally
disordered offender" under a California statute, Cal. Penal Code Sec. 2962
et seq. Intermediate California appeals court rejects prisoner's argument that
pedophiles who commit sex offenses fall exclusively under the Sexually Violent
Predators Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code. Sec. 6600 et seq., and are not
mentally disordered offenders. The same offenses may qualify a prisoner for imposition
of commitment under either of these statutes. Additionally, court finds that
the treatment provided under either statute was substantially the same. The
prisoner "contends he should be released because his pedophilia is 'under
control' and he is not a threat to children. We disagree," the court
concluded. "The psychiatric testimony established he was a threat to
children, posed a substantial danger to others, and 'might very well molest
children again.'" People v. Starr, No. B155507, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Cal.
App. 2nd Dist. 2003). [N/R]
New Hampshire Department of Corrections' sex
offenders program did not violate prisoners' Fifth Amendment rights against
self-incrimination by making them disclose their past histories of sexual
misconduct as a condition of participation in the program. The reduced
likelihood of parole for refusal to participate was not a sufficient penalty to
constitute "compelling" incriminating statements, and the result was
not altered by the state's failure to provide immunity from prosecution for
statements made in participating in the program. Ainsworth v. Stanley,
#00-1678, 317 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). [N/R]
Requiring a prisoner to answer questions about
particular past sexual offenses which he might still be prosecuted for would
violate his Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination,
and he could not be denied good time and work credits for refusal to answer
such questions in the course of a sex offenders' treatment program, but he also
could not avoid participating in and cooperating with an otherwise
non-incriminating treatment program merely because he asserted this privilege
to answering some questions. Bender v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 812
A.2d 1154 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2003). [2003 JB Apr]
The withholding of a prisoner's good time credits
on the basis of his refusal to participate in a sex offender program did not
violate his rights despite the fact that the crime he was convicted of was not
one involving sexual misconduct. An unchallenged pre-sentence report showed
that he had, in fact, performed sexual acts with two children, and the burglary
he was convicted of involved the residence of the children he was accused of
molesting. Boster v. Goord, 752 N.Y.S.2d 403 (A.D. 2002). [N/R]
Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act
did not violate a parolee's due process right. In re: Detention of William
Allen, No. 2-00-1379, 772 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. 2nd Dist. 2002). [N/R]
Persons civilly committed to state custody as
"sexual predators" stated a claim for denial of due process based on
purported "punitive" conditions of confinement and lack of mental
health treatment. Hargett v. Baker, 2002 U.S. Dist Lexis 13721, 2002 WL 1732911
(July 26, N.D. Ill.). [2002 JB Oct]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoners may be
offered incentives to participate in treatment and rehabilitation programs in
which they are required to disclose prior acts that may be crimes without
violating the compelled self-incrimination prohibitions of the Fifth Amendment.
McKune v. Lile, #00-1187, 2002 U.S. Lexis 4206. [2002 JB Jul]
Civil commitment of previously convicted sex
offender require some finding of the offender's "lack of control."
Kansas v. Crane, #00-957, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002). [2002 JB Apr]
298:157 Sexual offender's constitutional rights
were not violated when he was terminated from rehabilitative program under
which he could earn good time credits, based on further misconduct during
incarceration. Conway v. Gorczyk, No. 99-553, 765 A.2d 463 (Vt. 2000).
283:110 A requirement that a prisoner classified
as a sex offender, based on alleged conduct for which he was never convicted,
did not constitute invalid after the fact enhancement of his punishment;
prisoner was, however, entitled to a hearing to challenge the label when he had
not earlier been required to participate in a treatment program. Chamers v.
Colorado Dept. of Corrections, #97-1023, 20 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000).
286:158 Denial of privileges to prisoner serving
a sentence for sexual exploitation of a child, following his refusal to
participate in a sexual abuse treatment program, did not violate his rights;
court finds no violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, no
violation of the prisoner's First Amendment or religious freedom rights, and no
problem with the use of a "penile plethysmograph" to measure his
sexual responses to various images, when participation in the treatment program
was voluntary. Searcy v. Simmons, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Kan. 2000).
286:156 Prisoner who was classified as a sexual
offender under an Alabama state statute, despite never having been convicted of
a sex related offense was entitled to due process before such classification
because of the "stigmatizing" effect of this classification; second
prisoner who had been convicted of a sex related offense could not challenge
sex offender community notification statute while incarcerated, since it did
not affect him prior to his release. Kirry v. Siegelman, Nos. 98-6236, 98-6672,
195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
253:12 Prisoner's constitutional right against
self- incrimination was not violated by his removal from "family reunion
program" after he was denied participation in sex offenders program
because he would not admit to commission of sexual offenses of which he had
been convicted; pendency of direct appeal to conviction did not alter result.
Johnson v. Baker, 108 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 1997).
[N/R] Prisoner convicted of sex offenses received
all the due process to which he was entitled to when he was labeled a sex
offender based on his crimes, but it violated due process to apply such a label
to a prisoner not convicted of sex offenses unless he was given a chance to
challenge that label in an adversary proceeding. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818
(9th Cir. 1997).
244:61 Prisoner had no constitutional right to
participate in prison programs designed for the rehabilitation of sex
offenders. Richmond v. Cagle, 920 F.Supp. 955 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
244:61 Nurse allegedly attacked by juvenile sex
offender was not entitled to $325,000 in damages against her supervisor when
jury found that supervisor acted with gross negligence but not with deliberate
indifference. L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996).
246:92 Prisoners serving sentences for sexual
offenses had no constitutional claim regarding denial of additional psychiatric
or psychological treatment, besides group therapy sessions they were already
given, in absence of medical evidence showing that they had a serious need for
such treatment. Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1996).
Prison's interest in rehabilitation of sex
offender prisoner outbalanced his limited liberty interest in refusing
participation in sex offender treatment program; compelled participation did
not violate prisoner's constitutional rights. Sundby v. Fiedler, 827 F.Supp.
580 (W.D. Wis. 1993).
Convicted sex offender who could remain confined
in treatment center after prison sentence expired was entitled to injunction
requiring reappraisal of his personal dangerousness. Cameron v. Tomes, 990 F.2d
14 (1st Cir. 1993).
Missouri inmate serving a sentence for rape had
no liberty interest in participating in sexual offenders program, even if his
release on parole was contingent on it. Jones v. Moore, 996 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.
1993).