AELE Seminars:
Investigation, Management, and Use of Lethal and Less Lethal Force
May 6-9, 2019– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Public Safety Discipline and Internal Investigations
Sep. 30-Oct. 3, 2019– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Click here for further information about all AELE Seminars.
A civil liability law publication for officers, jails, detention
centers and prisons
ISSN 0739-0998 - Cite this issue as: 2019 JB May
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Access to Courts/Legal Info
Death Penalty
Foreign Prisoners and Immigrants
Marriage/Procreation
Medical Care (2 cases)
Prisoner Death/Injury
Retaliation
Sex Offenders
Transgender Prisoners
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AELE Seminars:
Investigation, Management, and Use of Lethal and Less Lethal Force May 6-9, 2019– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Public Safety Discipline and Internal Investigations Sep. 30-Oct. 3, 2019– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas Click here for further information about all AELE Seminars. Some of the case digests do not have a link to the full opinion.
Access to Courts/Legal Info
A Michigan prisoner serving a life sentence sued a county, state court officials, and private attorneys for allegedly conspiring to deprive him of trial transcripts, exhibits, and other records to interfere with his constitutional right of access to the courts. The trial court dismissed his complaint, concluding that several defendants were immune from suit or were not state actors and that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, #93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) barred his access-to-the-court claim because its success “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” A federal appeals court affirmed, stating that Heck was intended to channel what amount to unlawful-confinement claims to the place they belong: habeas corpus rather than civil lawsuits for damages.
Under Heck, a district court is stripped of jurisdiction in a § 1983 suit brought by an imprisoned plaintiff “if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity’” of a conviction. The reasoning applies to an access-to-the-court claim alleging state interference with a direct criminal appeal. The plaintiff could prevail on his claim only if he showed that the information he sought could make a difference in a non-frivolous challenge to his convictions. He could win only if he implied the invalidity of his underlying conviction. A favorable judgment on his access-to-the-court claim would necessarily bear on the validity of his conviction, because that is exactly what he says the defendants kept him from contesting fairly. Sampson v. Garrett, #18-1900, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 6686, 2019 Fed. App. 0036P (6th Cir.).
Death Penalty
****Editor's Case Alert****
Under prior precedent, a state’s refusal to alter its execution protocol can violate the Eighth Amendment only if an inmate identifies a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative procedure that would “significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.” The state of Missouri planned to execute the plaintiff inmate by lethal injection using a single drug, pentobarbital. He presented an as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge, alleging that, regardless of whether the protocol would cause excruciating pain for all prisoners, it would cause him severe pain because of his particular medical condition. A federal appeals court and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of that challenge. The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a prisoner a painless death. To establish that a state’s chosen method cruelly “superadds” pain to the death sentence, a prisoner must show a feasible and readily implemented alternative method that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain and that the state has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological reason. Traditionally accepted methods of execution are not necessarily unconstitutional because an arguably more humane method becomes available.
Precedent foreclosed the plaintiff’s argument that methods posing a “substantial and particular risk of grave suffering” when applied to a particular inmate due to his “unique medical condition” should be considered “categorically” cruel. Identifying an available alternative is a requirement of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims alleging cruel pain. The plaintiff failed to present a triable question on the viability of nitrogen hypoxia as an alternative to Missouri’s protocol. He merely pointed to reports from other states indicating the need for additional study. Missouri had a “legitimate” interest in choosing not to be the first to experiment with a new, “untried and untested” method of execution. Bucklew v. Precythe, #17-8151, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2477.
Foreign Prisoners and Immigrants
****Editor's Case Alert****
Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the Secretary of Homeland Security, under a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), generally has the discretion to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision or to release the alien on bond or parole. Section 1226(c), enacted out of “concern that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear,” sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or deportable for bearing links to terrorism or for committing specified crimes. Paragraph (1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such alien “when the alien is released” from jail, and paragraph (2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a removal determination. Aliens detained under 1226(c)(2), alleged that because they were not immediately detained by immigration officials after their release from criminal custody, they are not aliens “described in paragraph (1),” even though they fall into at least one of the four categories.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the statute’s text does not support the argument that because the aliens were not arrested immediately after their release, they are not “described in” 1226(c)(1). Congress’s use of the definite article in “when the alien is released” indicates that the scope of the word “alien” “has been previously specified in context,” so the class of people to whom “the alien” refers must be fixed by the predicate offenses identified in subparagraphs (A)–(D). Paragraph (c)(2) does not limit mandatory detention to those arrested “pursuant to” or “under authority created by” (c)(1), but to anyone simply “described in” (c)(1). Accordingly, the plaintiffs were properly detained under the statute even if it occurred months or even years after their release from custody from a jail or prison. Nielsen v. Preap, #16-1363, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333, 2019 U.S. Lexis 2088, 2019 WL 1245517.
Marriage/Procreation
A trial judge issued an order offering a 30-day sentencing credit to White County, Tennessee inmates in exchange for submitting to sterilization. After public outcry, the judge declared that inmates could no longer enroll in the program. A third order clarified which of the inmates who initially enrolled could still receive the credit. Within months, the Tennessee Legislature passed a statute which made it illegal for courts to make sentencing determinations based on a defendant’s willingness to consent to sterilization.
Three inmates who refused to submit to a vasectomy and were consequently denied the sentencing credit challenged the orders under the Equal Protection Clause. The trial court found that the claims were moot. A federal appeals court reversed, reasoning that none of those subsequent developments in the law ended the differential treatment that the plaintiffs challenged. They claimed that awarding them the 30- day sentencing credit would affect other collateral consequences related to sentencing. Tennessee law permits non-violent offenders to petition for expungement five years after the sentence termination date so that retroactive application of the sentencing credit would allow them to pursue expungement 30 days sooner. Sullivan v. Benningfield, #18-5643, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 9942 (6th Cir.).
Medical Care
Corrections officers who allegedly disregard visible and self-reported symptoms medical professionals believe to be flu symptoms were not deliberately indifferent to an obvious need for immediate medical attention. A federal appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's federal civil rights claims against the correctional officers, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs after he suffered a stroke. In this case, while the officers were less than “sympathetic” to the plaintiff's continuing illness, they were not deliberately indifferent to an obvious need for immediate medical attention that was sufficient to establish a viable claim under the Eighth Amendment. Roberts v. Kopel, #17-3579, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 6876 (8th Cir.).
A prisoner first complained about pain in his left knee in May 2009. Prescribed drugs did not help. After some delay, he saw an orthopedic surgeon in September 2010. An MRI exam was approved, but not actually conducted until February 2011. In August 2011, he had arthroscopic surgery. While his left knee was healing, the private corporation that provided prison medical care delayed approving an MRI of his right knee. One knee had to be sound before treatment of the other. In May 2012, he had an MRI exam on the right knee. It showed serious problems. Another arthroscopic surgery occurred in October 2012. This did not bring relief. Arthroplasty (knee replacement) was delayed while specialists determined whether his pulmonary and cardiology systems would handle the strain but took place in February 2015 and was successful.
After a detainee died in a jail holding cell, a lawsuit was filed against the jail guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Alabama law, accusing them of deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious medical needs. A federal appeals court overturned dismissal of the lawsuit and held that qualified immunity did not shield the guards from the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims where a reasonable jury could conclude that the guards were not entitled to rely on a trooper's statement that the detainee was just drunk, particularly because he reported injuries from a car accident. Furthermore, a reasonable jury could conclude that the guard’s willful disregard of what they heard and observed during the night made them deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs, and that the trial court erred by requiring the plaintiff to present evidence that the guards knew the cause of the detainee’s injury and the specific nature of his medical problem. The court also held that the state agent immunity and Alabama Code 14-6-1 did not shield the guards from the plaintiff's state law claims if the guards potentially violated the detainee’s constitutional rights. Taylor v. Hughes, #17-14772, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 974 (8th Cir.).
Retaliation
An inmate appealed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants on his claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The appeals court held that he failed to administratively exhaust some claims, and he failed to show a violation of his rights under RLUIPA and the First Amendment on the claims he exhausted. The appeals court also ruled that summary judgment on the plaintiff’s retaliation claims against five defendants was properly granted because the plaintiff did not allege any facts connecting those defendants to the challenged actions.However, the court also ruled that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to his retaliation claims against seven other defendants where he presented evidence that these specific defendants placed him in administrative segregation and prevented him from providing his attorney with legal documents shortly after he filed a previous lawsuit against prison officials and they knew of the lawsuit. Bitzan v. Bartruff, #17-3391, 916 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2019).
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